Country Report Malaysia - GREASEgrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/10/WP2...than as a...

CountryReport

Malaysia

ZawawiIbrahimandImranMohdRasid

October2019

http://grease.eui.eu

ThisCountryReportoffersadetailedassessmentofreligiousdiversityandviolentreligiousradicalisationintheabove-namedcountry.Itispartofaseriescovering23countries(listedbelow)onfourcontinents.Morebasicinformationaboutreligiousaffiliationandstate-religionrelationsinthesestatesisavailableinourCountryProfilesseries.ThisreportwasproducedbyGREASE,anEU-fundedresearchprojectinvestigatingreligiousdiversity,secularismandreligiouslyinspiredradicalisation.Countriescoveredinthisseries:Albania,Australia,Belgium,BosniaandHerzegovina,Bulgaria,Egypt,France,Germany,Greece,Italy,Hungary,India,Indonesia,Lebanon,Lithuania,Malaysia,Morocco,Russia,Slovakia,Spain,Tunisia,TurkeyandtheUnitedKingdom.

TheGREASEprojecthasreceivedfundingfromtheEuropeanUnion'sHorizon2020researchandinnovationprogrammeundergrantagreementnumber770640

Malaysia CountryReport GREASE

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TheEU-FundedGREASEprojectlookstoAsiaforinsightsongoverningreligiousdiversityandpreventingradicalisation.InvolvingresearchersfromEurope,NorthAfrica,theMiddleEast,AsiaandOceania,GREASE is investigatinghowreligiousdiversity is governed inover20countries.Ourwork focusesoncomparingnorms, lawsandpracticesthatmay(ormaynot)proveusefulinpreventingreligiousradicalisation.Ourresearchalsoshedslightonhowdifferentsocietiescopewith thechallengeof integratingreligiousminoritiesandmigrants. The aim is to deepen ourunderstanding of howreligiousdiversitycanbegovernedsuccessfully,withanemphasisoncounteringradicalisationtrends.Whileexploringreligiousgovernancemodels inotherpartsoftheworld,GREASEalsoattempts tounravel theEuropean paradox of religious radicalisationdespitegrowing secularisation.Weconsider the claimthatmigrant integration inEuropehas failed because second generation youth have become marginalised andradicalised,withsometurningtojihadistterrorismnetworks.Theresearchersaimtodeliver innovativeacademicthinkingonsecularisationandradicalisationwhileofferinginsightsforgovernanceofreligiousdiversity.The project is being coordinated by Professor Anna Triandafyllidou from TheEuropean University Institute (EUI) in Italy. Other consortium members includeProfessorTariqModoodfromTheUniversityofBristol(UK);Dr.H.A.HellyerfromtheRoyalUnitedServicesInstitute(RUSI)(UK);Dr.MilaManchevafromTheCentrefor theStudyofDemocracy(Bulgaria);Dr.EgdunasRacius fromVytautasMagnusUniversity(Lithuania);Mr.TerryMartinfromtheresearchcommunicationsagencySPIA (Germany); ProfessorMehdiLahlou fromMohammedVUniversity ofRabat(Morocco); Professor Haldun Gulalp of The Turkish Economic and Social StudiesFoundation (Turkey); Professor Pradana Boy of Universitas MuhammadiyahMalang (Indonesia); Professor Zawawi Ibrahim of The Strategic Information andResearch Development Centre (Malaysia); Professor Gurpreet Mahajan ofJawaharlal Nehru University (India); and ProfessorMichele Grossman of DeakinUniversity(Melbourne,Australia).GREASEisscheduledforcompletionin2022.For more information please contact: Professor Anna Triandafyllidou,[email protected]

http://grease.eui.eu/GREASE-Radicalisation,SecularismandtheGovernanceofReligion:BringingtogetherEuropeanandAsianPerspectives


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TableofContents1. RELIGIOUSDIVERSITYINMALAYSIA:CONSTITUTIONALFRAMEWORKANDSOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICCONTEXT 51.1 CONSTITUTIONALFRAMEWORK 51.2 SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICCONTEXT 61.3 MAINTRENDSANDCHALLENGES 102. HISTORYANDCURRENTREGULATORYFRAMEWORK: 122.1 HISTORICALANDCURRENTOVERVIEWOFRELIGION-STATERELATIONS 122.1 CURRENTREGULATORYFRAMEWORK 123. VIOLENTRELIGIOUSRADICALISATIONCASESANDRESPONSES 153.1 TERRORISTATTACKS,TRENDSANDHISTORY 153.1 THESTRATEGICPLANAGAINSTVIOLENTRADICALIZATION 174. CONCLUDINGREMARKS 215. REFERENCES 22


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1. ReligiousdiversityinMalaysia:constitutionalframeworkandsocio-demographiccontext1

1.1 ConstitutionalframeworkMalaysia’s long-persistinghistoryencompassingreligiouspracticeandcolonialismhasinfluencedthemakingofthecountry’sFederalConstitution;adocumentofthehighestimportance in the Malaysian legal system. The principles and provisions that areenshrinedintheConstitutionaremostlyinspiredbytheincorporationoftwohistoricallegacies; (a) precolonial ‘traditional’ laws and customs, and (b) the colonialadministrativesystemintroducedduringBritishruleinMalaya(Bidin,1993,pp.3-4).ItisduringcolonialMalayathatsecularization,understoodprimarilyintermsofenforcedseparation between religion and the state becamemore pronounced. A succession oflegal, administrative, and educational reforms based on English law followedthroughout Malaya when other Malay states concluded similar agreements with thecolonialauthorities.Consequently,theselawshadeffectivelydisplacedIslamiclawfromitspremierpositionincolonialgovernance(AhmadSSandRoyRajasingam,2001,p.25).TheestablishmentofanIndependentFederationofMalaya(nowknownasMalaysia)in1957 inaugurated the Federal Constitution, which was set in accordance with theWestminster model and the principles of federalism and constitutional monarchy.Althoughtheword‘secular’isnotmentionedintheConstitution,itisclear,asaffirmedbythepartiesinvolvedinthedraftingprocess,thatthenewlyfoundedsovereignstateshould embrace secularism as the governing principle by assuming the separationbetween religion and the state. The late Tunku Abdul Rahman, leader of the Alliancecoalition and the first Prime Minister of independent Malaya, had once assured hisfellowmembersoftheWorkingPartythatreviewedthedraftpreparedbytheBritish-appointed Reid Commission, that thewhole exercise of framing the Constitutionwasundertakenontheunderstandingthattheresultantfederationwouldbeasecularstate(JosephFernando,2006,pp.259–60;pp.265–70).However, it isworthnoting thatArticle3(1)of theFederalConstitutiondeclares thatwhilst‘IslamisthereligionoftheFederation’,otherreligionsmaybepractisedinpeaceand harmony in any part of the Federation (Malaysian Constitution, 2010, p. 19)- aproclamationwhich arguably is not intended to alter the secular nature of the state.Historicalevidence,basedontheReidConstitutionalCommissionReport,thelegislativeWhite Paper, and all the primary Constitutional documents clearly suggests that such1 In the process of writing this report, we have greatly benefitted from the valuable insights shared by the list of individuals who had granted us personal interviews to facilitate the research. We would like to acknowledge their our thanks to them here: Dr Farouk Musa (Islamic Renaissance front), Dr Zulkfli Bakri (Federal Territory Mufti), Ustaz Zamihan Mat Zin (JAKIM Officer-cum-Spiritual Adviser for Rehabilitation program), Dr Danial Yusof (Peacebuilding and Civilizational Development Flagship Project), Marwan Bukhari (Maqasid Institute), Dr Mohammed Nawab Osman (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies), Ustaz Abu Hafiz Salleh Huddin (Exco Member of Bersatu Youth), Prematilaka KD Serisena (Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism and Taoism).


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provision is primarily intended to have symbolic and ceremonial significance (ShadSalemFaruqi,2005,p.265)andthatthevisionofthestateasinsistedbytheframersoftheConstitutionhasalwaysbeenasecularone(JosephFernando,2006,p.250,p.262;ZawawiandAhmadFauzi,2017,p.172).Barelyayearafter independence,due to theconfusionstemmingfromthisprovision,thethenPrimeMinister,TunkuAbdulRahman,during the debate in the Legislative Council, when called upon to clarify the matter,insistedthat:‘IwouldliketomakeitclearthatthiscountryisnotanIslamicStateasitisgenerallyunderstood,wemerelyprovidethat Islamshallbetheofficialreligionof thefederation’ (TunkuAbdulRahman, 1977, p. 246).This viewwas later affirmedby theservingchiefjustices’statementsandjudgmentsbyqualifyingthatthemeaningofIslamformal statusmerely pertained to rituals and ceremonies on official occasions ratherthanasatriumphovertheprimacyofthesecularlegislativeframework(SuffianHashim1962,pp.8–11;AhmadIbrahim,1985,pp.213-16).Thepassageoftime,however,hasblurred the initial intentionsof theMalaysian framersof theConstitution,with somerecentscholarlyworksandjudicialdecisionsbeginningtochallengethesecularbasisofthestate2.Thiswillbediscussedinmoredetailinlatersections.

1.2 Socio-demographiccontextAccording to the Press Release on the Current Population Estimates, Malaysia 2017-2018, released by the Department of StatisticsMalaysia, the estimated population ofMalaysia in 2018 is 32.4million people.When compared to 32.0million in 2017, theannualpopulationgrowthrateof thecountry isat1.1percent (PressRelease,2018).Censusfiguresfrom2010indicatethat61.3percentofthepopulationareMuslims;19.8percentembraceBuddhism;9.2percentareChristians;6.3percentpracticeHinduism;and the other 1.3 percent are believers of Confucianism, Taoism, or other traditionalChinese philosophies and religions. The rest of theminority religious groups includeanimists, Sikhs, and Bahai communities (Table 4.1 Population and Housing Census,2010).The number of self-described atheists in Malaysia are unknown as the topic is verysensitiveandrarelystudied.AglobalpollreleasedbyWIN-GallupInternational,aworld-wide network of leading opinion pollsters, in 2015 stated that 3%ofMalaysians fallsunderthecategoryof“Aconvincedatheist”,whileanother20%fallsunderthecategoryof“Notareligiousperson”(WIN-GallupInternational,2015).DespitehavingnolawsinMalaysiathatrestrictatheistsfromprofessingtheirbelief,manyoftheatheistgroupsorindividualshavebeenputunder immensepressureby theauthorities. For example, acasualmeetingof20MalaysiansorganizedbyaMalaysianchapterofAtheistRepublicin2017 received a hugebacklash from theMuslim communities.AsyrafWajdiDusuki, a2 Interviews conducted with a few prominent individuals in the government reveal that all of them take the view that Malaysia has always been an Islamic state, and not a secular one. Many of them felt that Article 3 of the Constitution must be read together with many policies and initiatives that favour Islam and Muslims done since Malaysia was established in 1957. They insisted such favouritism over Islam must be continued in order to sustain Malaysia continuously as an Islamic state. (Interview, Federal Territories Mufti, April 2019; Interview, JAKIM Officer-cum-Rehabilitation Spiritual Adviser, April 2019; Interview, Bersatu Youth Exco, April 2019)


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former minister from a department in charge of Islamic affairs, responded to theincident by demanding an investigation to determine whether there were Muslimsinvolved in themeeting. Inother instances,ShahidanKassim,another formerministerunder the reignofPrimeMinisterNajibRazak, suggesteda “forcededucation” for theatheistsinvolved(Higginbottom,2017).Theserepressivemeasureswerejustifiedbytheauthorities by referring to the first out of five principles of Rukun Negara (NationalPhilosophy)whichdeclaresthateverycitizenisexpectedtobelieveinGod(Interview,FederalTerritoriesMufti,April2019).Thesepracticesresumeunderthe leadershipofMujahid Yusof, the current of Minister of Religious Affairs of Pakatan Harapan’sgovernment3.

Percentagedistributionofthepopulationbyreligion,Malaysia,2010

Being a society known for its multi-religious and multiracial attributes, racial andreligious characteristics tend to be conflated in the realms of politics, culturalexpressions and everyday social norms. TheMuslimpopulation ismade up ofmostlyethnic Malays in Malaysia, which accounts for approximately 55 percent of thepopulation. The Federal Constitution, as stated in Article 160, dictates that all ethnicMalaysareMuslim(MalaysianConstitution,2010,p.151).InMalaysia,onlySunniIslamis recognized while the Shafi'i school of thought assumes the legal basis for Islamicjurisprudence. Other forms of Islam, especially the Shia’ sect, are deemed illegal andsubject to action by religious authorities. Some even regard Shiism as a religion that3 Last February, Mujahid Yusof proposed an amendment to the Penal Code (Act 574) to provide heavier penalties to those who have insulted any religions. The nature of the ‘insults’ is not clear but it has been used to prosecute atheists who have shared their experiences in leaving their religion In March, Mujahid had also set up a special unit to monitor insults against Prophet Muhammad and Islam.


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promotesviolenceandmustbepersecutedonthebasisofnationalsecurity(Interview,Federal Territories Mufti, April 2019; Interview, JAKIM Officer-cum-RehabilitationSpiritualAdviser,April2019;Interview,BersatuYouthExco,April2019;).Buddhism, after Islam, is the second largest religion inMalaysiawhose history in theMalayworld stretches farbackbefore theperiodof Islamisation in the15th centuries.Buddhist religion, specifically of the Mahayana tradition, is mainly practised by theethnicMalaysianChinese.Inpractice,mostChineseMalaysiansfollowacombinationofBuddhism, Taoism, Confucianism and the Chinese folk religion but, when pressed tospecify their religion, will identify themselves as Buddhist (Tan, 1983, pp. 217-219;DamodarJnawali,2007,p.31).Christian communities in Malaysia generally comprise of non-Malay Bumiputeras.Statistically speaking, of the 9.2 percent of the Malaysian Christian population, 64percentareBumiputras,27.3percentChinese,6.6percentIndianand1.8percentbelongtothe“Others”category(Loh,2006)whiletwo-thirdsofthecommunityreside inEastMalaysia, thestatesofSabahandSarawak (PopulationandHousingCensus2010). Inplace of an ethnic constituency, Malaysian Christianity has been closely associated,especially inacademic research,with themetropolitanEnglishspeakingurbanmiddleclassofChineseandIndianethnicorigin(DianaWongandNguIkTien,2014,pp.262-263). The major Christian denominations in Malaysia include Anglicans, Baptists,Brethren,non-denominationalchurches,independentCharismaticchurches,Lutherans,Methodists, Presbyterian and Roman Catholics. According to The Official CatholicDirectory 2012, the Catholics make up the majority of the total Christian population(Herald Malaysia, 2012) due to their longer history of missionary work among theindigenesintheregionwhencomparedtotheProtestants(Roxborogh,1990,pp.54-55).HinduismmakesupthefourthlargestreligioninMalaysiawith86percentoftheHindupopulationbeingofIndianethnicgroup(PopulationandHousingCensus2010).ManyoftheMalaysianIndiansworshipmajordeitiessuchasLordGanesha,LordMurugan,LordKrishna, LordRamaandGoddessMariamman,whereas someotherspray to guardiandeities, the likes of Muneeswarar, Muniyandy, Kaliamman and Madurai Veeran andestablish small shrines in places such as their residence compound, the border ofestates,ortheworkplace(ManimaranSubramaniam,2014,p.20).

TotalPopulationbyethnicgroupandreligion(PopulationCensus2010)


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PlacesofworshipandReligiousIdentificationsThere have been many views expressed from time to time by political leaders,bureaucratsandnon-lawyersthatitismandatoryforreligiousorganizationstoregisterwith the Registrar of Societies under the Societies Act, 1966. According to TommyThomas, thecurrentAttorneyGeneralofMalaysia, suchviewsarenot in linewith themeaningofArticle11(3)oftheFederalConstitution.Article11,especiallyclause1and3are“thepracticalconstitutionalmanifestationsofthedoctrineofseparationofreligionand state”, which reaffirms the notion that Malaysia embraces the principles ofsecularismandisnotbyanymeansatheocraticstate.Inotherwords,thereisnolegalobligationforareligiousgrouptoregisteritself.Yetinpractice,manyreligiousgroups,especially of non-Muslim background, decide to register as non-profit charitableorganizationsorcompaniestoavoidbeingharassedbythereligiousauthoritiesandtogain better access to funding and working opportunities with the government. Manyanecdotal evidences suggest that quite a number of churches and non-governmentalorganizations(NGOs),however,continuetofindregistrationdifficult,withtheRegistrarof Societies denying many applications for highly technical reasons. Some of thesuccessfully registered may often face the risk of being heavily monitored by thegovernment, a situation which has led to self-censorship when managing their


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community activities (Interview, Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism,Christianity,Hinduism,SikhismandTaoism,June2019).Asdescribedintheprevioussection,racialandreligiousidentitiesareoftenconflatedatmany levels of society. Islamhasbeen featuredprominently from time to time as thecoreofMalayidentity.Itisinfactpresentedasacondition:theprotectionofMalays,hasbeenrepeatedlyexpressedtobedependentonthepreservationofIslam.Accordingtoa2006CentreforPublicPolicyStudiessurvey,whenMalayswereaskedtochoosetheirprimaryidentityfromthecategoriesofMalay,Muslim,orMalaysian,72%choseMuslim(cited fromfromLimBengSoon,AzirahHashimandRichardButtny,2014,p.10).Thenotion that Islam and Malayness are inseparable, with the former assuming thedefinitive signifier for the latter, isnotonlycodified in theFederalConstitutionbut isalso narrated through national history syllabus across all educational levels (Ting,2009).Religiousdifferencescontinuetodiscursivelycreateboundariesbetweengroupswhileunifyingpeoplewithinthoseboundaries.Nationalidentitycards,forexample,aredesigned to specify the religious affiliation of the card holder. The cards identifyMuslimsinaprintedfashion;forthenon-Muslims,religiousaffiliationisnotprinted,butencryptedinasmartchipwithintheidentitycard.MarriedcouplesofMuslimfaitharealsoobligatedtocarryaspecialphotoidentificationofthemselvesandtheirspouseasproof ofmarriage. All of thesemeasures are used by the government to regulate theactivities of their citizens, especially theMuslims, who are subjected to the Shari’ahcourt.

1.3 MaintrendsandchallengesLast year’s 2018GeneralElections (GE14) resulted in awidelyunexpectedoutcome -thedownfallof a coalition thathadbeen inpower for61years being replacedby thenewly elected government of PakatanHarapan(PH). The immediate aftermath of theelections saw analysts and social commentator eager to celebrate and express theirhopes through ‘NewMalaysia’ - a concept that is rifewith sentiments of change for atransformedracerelationsdiscourseinthecountry’snewpoliticallandscape.Instead,thefirstfewmonthsintothe‘NewMalaysia’unfoldedaseriesofunprecedentedevents, indicating a further retreat into race and religion among the Malay Muslimpopulace. For example, a fewweeks after the government’s proposal to recognise theUEC (anexaminationsystemadministeredbyprivate independentChineseschools), amass demonstration of several thousands was rallied to defend the status of ‘MalayMuslimrights’underthethemeofHimpunanKebangkitanUmmah(UmmahAwakeningGathering) at the historic Padang Sultan Sulaiman in Kuala Lumpur. The mass rallyclearlyreflectedasiegementalityand insecurityamongMalayMuslims,who felt thattheirinterestswerefacingmultiple‘threats’fromso-calledminorities,rangingfromtheLBGT community (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) to Chinese-languageeducationgroups,Hindupressuregroups,Shia,and‘liberalMuslims’.


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Afewmonthslater,onthe8thofDecember2019,anothermassdemonstrationof60,000gatheredmomentumnearDataranMerdeka to protest against PakatanHarapan (PH)government’splanstoratifyICERD(theInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination).Theabove ‘MalayMuslimNationalism’consistsoftwo powerful political trajectories - the multifaceted drive of Islamisation and thenarrativeofKetuananMelayu(MalaySupremacy).Aprominentobserverobservesthat,

“What we are seeing today(post-election) is the amplification of Islamisationdrivethatisquitedifferentwiththeoneexperiencedinthe80sand90s.Earlier,theIslamisationwasaclearcuttop-downapproach.Butastheanti-ICERDrallyand a similar pattern shared by the anti-Ahok rally in Indonesia, have shown,there are now numerous forms of Islamisation at work: top-down, bottom-up,andsideways.Thismeans that thenewlyelectedPakatanHarapangovernmentwillhaveatoughertimetodictatetheIslamicnarrativeinMalaysia,letalonetoreformit.”(Interview,DrMohammedNawabOsman,April2019)

As noted in the above, this phenomenon represents a challenge for the existinggovernmenttocarryoutthereformsitpromisedbeforetheelection.ThisisclearlyseenwhenoneobserveshowMujahidYusofRawa,thecurrentMinisterofReligiousAffairs,strugglestotranslatehisagendaofRahmatanLilAlamin(BlessingforAllCreations)intopractice. Known by many as an outspoken figure who represents an inclusive andprogressivestrandof Islam,Mujahidseemstoreverseback intoaconservativemouldafterhisfirstyearinoffice(Interview,MaqasidInstitute,May2019).MujahidhasrecentlyexpressedhissupportforZakirNaik –arguablyoneofthemostcontroversialWahhabiideologuesintheworldtoday–bycallinghispreachingworks‘inspiring”(TheStar,13March2019),whenonlyafewmonthsearlierhewasreportedsaying that Zakir Naik’s combative style of propagating Islam was “not suitable forMalaysia” (The Star, 24 September 2019).He denounced LGBT communities and civilrightsorganisations for “themisuseof thedemocratic space todefend things that arewrong in the religion of Islam” when they participated in the Women’s Day March(MalayMail, 9 March 2019), by announcing the formation of special unit to monitorinsultsagainsttheProphetandIslam,aswellastoproposeabillinparliamenttowardsenacting the Religious andRacialHatredAct thatwill punish anyone found guilty of‘insulting’otherreligions(TheStar,24July2018).This conservative turn indicatesaworryingsign that theexistinggovernmentmaybebowing down to the rise of Malay Muslim nationalism on the ground., FurthernormalizationofsuchintolerantandexclusionaryreligiousviewswillriskdestabilisingsectionsofotherMalaysiancommunitiesespeciallyinthecurrentcontextofincreasingethnicandreligiouspolarizationinsociety(Interview,IslamicRenaissanceFront,March2019).


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2. Historyandcurrentregulatoryframework:

2.1 HistoricalandCurrentoverviewofReligion-StaterelationsThroughout the course of Malay history, the amalgamation of religions and culturalnormshasalwaysbeenfundamentaltothearrangementofMalaysocietalandpoliticalorder. Pre-modern polities were administrated through laws and systems that werearticulatedviareligiouslanguageandsymbolism.WhenIslambecamemorewidespreadintheregionintheearly14thcentury,Islamiclawalsobegantotobeincorporatedintheexistingstateandcustomary law,asseen fromthecodifieddocumentsofUndang-undang Kedah (Kedah Laws), Undang-undang Pahang (Pahang Laws), and Undang-UndangMelaka (Malacca Laws) (Fang LY, 2007, p. 87). This set of laws fused Islamicprinciplesandjurisprudenceinto ‘ādat(customs),withtheformerbeingtheregulativeprincipleforthelatter.Theadventofcolonialperiodsawagradual introductionofEnglishstylecourtswhichrepositioned Islamic law as a secondary law that was applicable only to Muslims inlimited matters relating to family and inheritance and in some aspects of Islamicoffences. AccordingtoHooker,theonlysubstantiveMuslimprinciplesdealtwithwere“offences against religion, i.e. attendance at mosque for prayers, fasting, teachingreligionwithoutauthority,andunlawfulproximity”(Hooker,1983,p.161,p.172).HereIslamiclawswererelegatedintotheareaofpersonallaw,whileEnglishlawsweretobeapplied to the “non-privatized” areas of life. By imposing legal restrictions uponjurisdictionsofheadsofStatetomattersconcerningIslamandcustomarylaws,asecularworldviewhitherto alien to theMalay ideological view gainedprominence in colonialgovernance. A more bureaucratised administration of Islamic affairs was alsointroduced during this period. For administrative purposes, the Council of IslamicReligionandMalayCustomswasformedandthisnewarrangementpersonifieda“newlyfound alliance between the Sultans, the aristocratic elite and a nascent religiousbureaucracy linked to colonial officialdom” (Ahmad Fauzi, 2009, p. 16.; MaznahMohamed,2016,pp.61-65)-anarrangementwhichhascontinuedtosurviveuntiltoday.

2.1 Currentregulatoryframework

TheConstitution, as apolitical charterof thenew independentnation-state, elevatesIslamasthe“religionofthefederation”.TraditionalMalayrulersretaintheirpositionsas heads of Islam in their respective states and aremade responsible to oversee theShari’ahcourtsandappointjudgesbasedontherecommendationoftherespectivestateIslamic religious departments and councilswhichmanage the operation of the courts(Malaysian Constitution, 2010, p. 20). The legal system in Malaya followsmostly theplurallegalsystemthattheBritishhadestablishedduringthecolonialera.Itadoptsthecourt system based on the UK legal system familiar to those from common law


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jurisdictions, as well as incorporates distinct characteristics in the form of Shari’ahcourtsandtwoseparateHighCourtsforthePeninsulaandfortheBorneostates.WithrespecttoIslamicmatters,eachofthestatesisgiventheconstitutionalrighttoidentifyaninterpretationofIslamiclawsthatisapplicabletoMuslimswithinitsterritory.EachstateisalsogiventherighttoestablishcourtstoadjudicatedisputesinvolvingMuslimswithinasetrangeofareasaslistedinschedule9,listII(StateList)oftheConstitution:

“Islamic law and personal and family law of persons professing the religion ofIslam, including the Islamic law relating to succession, testate and intestate,betrothal, marriage, divorce, dower, maintenance, adoption, legitimacy,guardianship, gifts, partitions and non-charitable trusts; Wakafs and thedefinition and regulation of charitable and religious endowments, institutions,trusts, charities, and charitable institutions operating wholly within the State;Malaycustoms;Zakat,FitrahandBaitulmalorsimilarIslamicreligiousrevenue,mosques or any Islamic public places of worship, creation and punishment ofoffences by persons professing the religion of Islam against precepts of thatreligion,exceptinregardtomattersincludedintheFederalList;theconstitution,organizationandprocedureofSyariahCourts,whichshallhavejurisdictiononlyover persons professing the religion of Islam and in respect only of any of thematters included in thisparagraph,but shallnothave jurisdiction in respectofoffencesexceptinsofarasconferredbyfederal law;thecontrolofpropagatingdoctrines and beliefs among persons professing the religion of Islam; thedetermination of matters of Islamic law and doctrine and Malay custom”(MalaysianConstitution,2010,p.198).

This provision accounts for each state to have the freedom to enact its owninterpretation of Islamic law, and is free to establish its own state Islamic courts toadjudicatedisputesarisingunderthestate’sIslamiclaws.Inrecentdecades,aseriesofconstitutionalamendmentshasgivenShari’ahcourtsanincreasingamountofautonomyto adjudicate disputes arising under Islamic law. States have begun to aggressivelyinterpret the scope of their power to regulate the affairs of Muslim citizens locatedwithin their boundaries, culminating in an increasing amount of Islamic legislationbeingpassedbyindividualstates(FaridShuaib,2014,p.92).

Of late, a new trend has emerged involving court cases that invoke the constitutionalrightstoreligiousfreedom.Theyhaveraisedpertinentquestionsastotheboundariesofreligious freedom for both Muslims and non-Muslims alike and the legal extent ofShariahcourt.TherisingtrendofMalaysian-stylesyariahisation,understoodhereastheinstitutionalisationofsyariah-basedvalues,normsandcategories inthediscourseandpractice ofMalaysia’s legal corpus.whilst being attached to the larger secular judicialframework as sanctioned by the Federal Constitution, has raised worrying concernsover the practice of secularism inMalaysia (Zawawi andAhmadFauzi, 2017, p. 184).


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BeneathallthesetensionsarethecreepingnarrativethatMalaysiahasalwaysbeenanIslamicstatesince its inceptionandthealleged ‘ambiguity’of theFederalConstitutionmustbeinterpretedinwaysthatprioritiseIslamicprinciplesaboveallelse(Interview,FederalTerritoriesMufti,April2019).Forinstance,the2001HighCourtrulinginLinaJoyvMajlisAgamaIslamWilayah&Anoradoptedthecontroversialviewthat:

“Article3(4)doesnothavetheeffectofreinforcingthestatusoftheFederationasasecularstate . . .Malaysia isnotpurelyasecularstate like IndiaorSingaporebut is a hybrid between the secular state and the theocratic state. Theconstitution of this hybrid model accord [sic] official or preferential status toIslambutdoesnotcreateatheocraticstate likeSaudiArabiaorIran . . .Article3(1)hasafarwiderandmeaningfulpurposethanamerefixationoftheofficialreligion(FaizaTambyChik2004,p.128).

FaizaTambyChik’sverdicthasopenedthefloodgatesforaflurryofrulingsthatbroadenthe interpretation of Article 3(1) such that serious doubts are thrown on Malaysia’s‘secular state’ status. Many of the proponents of this view argue that the FederalConstitution does not explicitly stateMalaysia as an Islamic state, yet the fact that itpositively authorises the setting up and management of Islamic institutions and theenactment of Islamic by-laws by state assemblies is proof that Malaysia cannot becategorised as a secular state either (Interview, Federal TerritoriesMufti, April 2019;Interview,JAKIMOfficer-cum-RehabilitationSpiritualAdviser,April2019).

ThequestionastowhetherMalaysiawas,is,orshouldbeanIslamicorSecularstateisalegalquestionasmuchas it ispolitical;andthepositionheldbymainstreamopinionsandgovernmentinstitutionsonthisquestionwillbearfar-reachinglegalandpoliticalimplicationsinsociety(Whitling,2010,p.7).Thisispartlybecausethe“legalityofstateaction is determined by reference to the Federal Constitution, so the secular — orreligious — identity of the state directly shapes judicial interpretation of theconstitutionandanswerstothequestionofwhatkindsoflawsmaylawfullybeenacted”(Whitling, 2010, p. 8). As a result, much of state-sponsored Islamization in Malaysiawouldbeconductedinanincreasinglyintolerant,authoritarianandchauvinistmanner,to theextent that itdirectlychallenges theexistingconstitutionalrightsand freedoms(i.e freedom of religion, expression and association) that are granted to Malaysiancitizens.Theseincludetheactofbanningbooks,theprosecutionofindividualsorgroupsfor their involvement in practicing “deviant teachings”, and the raiding of privatepremises to enforce sharia, for such ‘ violations’ as indecent dress, alcoholconsumption,orkhalwat (closeproximity toanonfamilymemberof theoppositesex)(Malaysia2017InternationalReligiousFreedomReport,2017).


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WithrespecttoFreedomofReligion,Article11oftheConstitutionclearlyassertsthat“Everypersonhastherighttoprofessandpracticehisreligion”(MalaysianConstitution,2010,pp.25-26).Yetinpracticethefreedomofreligionissubjecttoseveralimportantrestraints affecting bothMuslims and non-Muslims alike. For example, the law of thestatemayprohibitnotonlynon-MuslimstopropagatetheirbeliefstotheMuslims,butalsotorestrictanyviewsorteachingsbyMuslimsthataredeemedhereticalanddeviatefromSunni Islam.Restrictions to religiousexpression inpublic andnon-public spaceshave also amplified over the years, which include unnecessary regulations overpublications, dress codes, social media contents, blasphemy, and the intention toestablishinter-faithscommission(MohdSaniandDianDianaAbdulHamedShah,2010,p.9).

3. Violentreligiousradicalisationcasesandresponses

3.1 Terroristattacks,trendsandhistoryTheterrorismthreatinSoutheastAsia,especiallyinIndonesia,MalaysiaandPhilippines,hascontinued torise toanewstage in the last fewyears.While IS iscurrentlygoingthroughaphaseofre-adaptationanddecentralisationafterlosingitsterritorialcontrolin Iraq and Syria, its ideology is still intact and continues to be propagated in cyberspace. The groups, networks, personalities, and IS affiliates that operate outside the‘physical’caliphatesarestillactive,withsomeofthembeingbasedinSoutheastAsiaandcontinue toposedangerandnational insecurity to the region.The recent incidentsofthe Mako Brimob siege and Surabaya bombings in Indonesia, Marawi siege inPhilippines, and the Puchong attacks in Malaysia; all of these serve to confirm theconcerns raised by Singapore PrimeMinister LeeHsien Loong inMay 2015when heannouncedthatSoutheastAsiahasemergedasa“keyrecruitmentcenter”forISIS.“Thethreat,”heasserted,“isnolongeroverthere;itisoverhere”(KumarRamakrishna,2017,p.4).MalaysiaexperienceditsfirstterroristattackperpetratedbyanIslamistextremistoutfiton June29,2016. It tookonlytwomenusinghandgrenadetoblastanexplosiononaMovidanightclubinPuchong,whichcausedpanicnationwide.Theincidentinjured28people:15peoplewerelaterarrestedunderSOSMAandtheInspector-GeneralofPolice,Tan Sri Khalid Abu Bakar confirmed that the attack was conducted under the directorderofMuhammadWanndyMohamedJedi4,aMalaysianmemberofDaeshinSyria.In

4 Mohamad Wanndy Mohamad Jedi, or ‘Akhi Wendy’, is the most prominent Malaysian in Katibah Nusantara. He played the role as mediator between the newly recruited members in Malaysia and the central leadership in Iraq. Wandy, while residing in Raqqa since January 2015, was the one who set up a Telegram group called “Gagak Hitam” (Black Crow) to give orders to facilitate the terrorist operations at home. He successfully recruited more than 30 Malaysian youths to support Daesh. Some of them gave bai’ah (pledge of alliance) to him and Daesh. (Ahmad el Muhammady, 2016, p. 102; Interview, Dr Muhammed Nawab Osman, April 2019).


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comparisontotheneighbouringcountries,thenumberofsuccessfulterroristattacksledbyIS-affiliatesinMalaysiaissignificantlylow.However,thenumberofterroristrelatedactivities reported by the police is still worrying. By August 2015, 121 Malaysians,including civil servants, educators, and 70 military personnels, were arrested inconnectionwithterroristrelatedactivities(KumarRamakrishna,2017,p.5),andasof25 March 2016, there have been 175 arrests made in Malaysia with regards to thethreat. 17werekilled,ofwhichsixdiedassuicidebombers(Thomas,2016,p.60). In2017,300individualswerearrestedfortheirlinkstoISIS(TheDiplomat,3September2017).AsforMalaysianswhowentabroadasaforeignfighter,itwasreportedin2018that therewere sat least53Malaysianswhowerestill inSyria fighting forDeash(24males,12femalesand17children)(BeritaHarian,27Februari2018).Several surveys conducted over the last few years could provide a window indeterminingthegrowingappealtoIslamistextremisminMalaysia.WhilethenumbersmayaffirmthefactthatMalaysianMuslimsaregenerallydisinterestedinradicalnotionsofIslam,somefigurespointingintheoppositedirectionappearstaggeringlyhighwhencompared to similar figures for Indonesia. This is quite a revelation since the generalimpression (in view of the greater number of terrorist attacks in Indonesia) is thatIndonesianIslamismuchmoreradicalthanMalaysianIslam.SurveysconductedbyU.S.-based Pew Research Centre reveal that Malaysian Muslims’ worries about Islamicextremism is at 8 percent, while for Imdonesia, it is at 53 percent. However, theproportionofMalaysianMuslimsapprovingsuicidebombingasjustifiable(18percent)ismore thandouble the figureof their Indonesiancounterpart,which isat7per cent(PewResearchCenter,2010;AhmadFauzi,2016,p.2).The rising influence of intolerant views of Islam among Malaysian Muslim is alsoreflectedinvariousothersurveys. A2010MerdekaCenter’sstudyofMalaysianyouthaged15 to25 indicated thatmore than70%wanted theQurantoreplace theFederalConstitution(MerdekaCenter,2011).AnotherfollowupresearchbyMerdekaCenterin2014 revealed that 44 percent of theMalayMuslim community believed that HududcouldbefairlyimplementedinMalaysia(MerdekaCenter,2014).A2017surveyofJohorresidents by the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute indicated that 75 percent of Malayrespondents were in support of hudud law for Muslims, and 90 percent of Malayrespondents felt that increased Islamic religiosity was a positive development forMalaysia (Saat, 2017). It is important to recognize that whilst the findings are notconclusiveenoughtoconcludetowardsgeneralizingthemajorityofMuslimsinMalaysiaas supporters of radical ideas, they do suggest thatmainstream Islamic discourses inMalaysia are heavily coloured by intolerant and exclusivist signifiers, thus laying thefertile ground for the mainstreaming of militant and violent interpretations of IslamwithintheMalaysianMuslimcommunity.WhilethegrowinginfluenceofIslamicconservatismasdescribedearlierisrelativelyanewtrend,theinvolvementofMalaysiansinmilitantactivitiesisnotanewphenomenonin Malaysia. Malaysia began to encounter the rise of transnational Islamist terroristgroups in the late 1990s. The Soviet-AfghanWar (1979-1989) and Afghan Civil War


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(1989-2001)hadtriggeredtheparticipationofMalaysianstudentsinmilitancyoutsideMalaysia. From the 1980s until the 1990s, the Malaysian police had also detectedmovements of some Malaysian students into Pakistan and Afghanistan to join jihadimovementsagainsttheSovietoccupation(AhmadElMuhammady,2008,p.97).Whenthe war was over, the network of Afghan war veterans who returned to Malaysiacontinued to operate under two groups: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and KumpulanMujahideenMalaysia(KMM).AftermanyoftheKMMleadersweredetainedwithouttrialunder the ISA forallegedly trying tooverthrow thegovernment throughviolentmeans inthe name of Jihad in the early 2000s, the group became completely paralyzed. Thecontinuationofmonitoringandrehabilitationprogrammesbypolice in collaborationwiththe Department of Islamic Understanding and Development of Malaysia (JAKIM) hasrestricted and gradually lessened themovement of the key leaders and their influence inMalaysia.TheriseofIStoglobalprominencein2014hadrenewedmotivationofsomeoftheinactivegroups or individuals who were involved in the militant activities in the past. Many ofMalaysianswho joined ISISwere initiallygroupedundera specialmilitia calledKatibahNusantara, which was established in September 2014 and based in al-Shadadi, al-Hasakah province of northeast Syria. Through an extensive research and interviewsconducted by Nawab Osman with ISIS sympathisers and supporters in Malaysia,MalaysianISIScouldbecategorizedintwogroups.Hesuggeststhat,

“Firstofall,itseemstomethatwehavetorecognizethatISISgroupsinMalaysiaand the networks ofMalaysian foreign fighters in Syria as a separate categorywithdifferentorientationsandmotivations.InMalaysiatherearegenerallytwogroupsinplace.First, thesignificantcategoryofISIS inMalaysiarepresentstheleadership of the olderMalaysian jihadi generation. Theywere responsible forsetting up the networks of Jihadis in Malaysia with the aim to launch theiroperation within the country itself. The second category, also the largestrecruitment pool, represents the wider public audience whose attention wascapturedbymeansof thesocialmediaandwhodonothaveanyties to formerjihadi networks in the region” (Interview, DrMohammedNawabOsman, April2019).

Recent trend also indicates thatMalaysian ISIS operatives are no longer interested injoiningthefightinSyria,buttobringthefighttoMalaysiabyestablishingtheirownpro-activeandindependentinitiatives(Interview,DrMohammedNawabOsman,April2019;Interview,JAKIMOfficer-cum-RehabilitationSpiritualAdviser,April2019).Thishasledto the formation of various isolated terror-cells like Kumpulan Tandzim Al-QaedaMalaysia,BrigedAlJamaah,KumpulanFisabilillah,KumpulanDaulahIslamiahMalizia,AlQubroGenerationandKumpulanGagakHitam(MohamedNawabandAida,2018,p.7).

3.1 TheStrategicPlanAgainstViolentRadicalization


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ThenatureofMalaysianstrategicplanagainstviolentradicalizationcanbeunderstoodthrough three fronts; legislation, rehabilitation and education. The initiatives are runthrough a collaborative effort between various ministries including the Ministry ofEducation, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Minister of Communications and Multimedia,Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Some of thegovernment institutions likeDepartment of IslamicDevelopment ofMalaysia (JAKIM)andits forerunnerPusatIslam(IslamicCentre)—situatedunderthePrimeMinister’sDepartment, the Islamic Dakwah Foundation of Malaysia (YADIM), Southeast AsiaRegionalCentreforCounterTerrorism(SEARCCT);alloftheseinstitutionsprovetobevitalinexecutingsomeofthePCVEandCTmeasures.Anti-TerrorismLegislationsBefore the introductionof theSecurityOffences (SpecialMeasures)Act2012(SOSMA)andthePreventionofTerrorismAct2015(POTA),theInternalSecurityAct1960(ISA)wasthemainlawusedbytheadministrationtocurbterroristactivitiesinthecountry.ISA was brought into existence in the 1960 in which it sanctioned initial detentionwithouttrialswithunlimitedrenewalsbasedsolelyonthewilloftheHomeMinister.Itspredecessor,theEmergencyRegulationsOrdinance1948,wasintroducedinMalayaasapreventivemeasureagainstsupportersoftheinsurgencyledbytheMalayanCommunistParty in between 1948 and 1989 (Laura Khor, 2013, pp. 66-68). However, ISA hadrepeatedly been criticized by theMalaysianBar Council, theMalaysianHumanRightsCommission, and international human rights groups since it “violates fundamentalinternationalhumanrightsstandards,includingprohibitionsonarbitrarydetentionandguarantees of the right to due process and the right to a prompt and impartial trial”(DhanapalandSabaruddin,2018,p.50).AfterISAwasrepealedin2011,theMalaysiangovernmentenactedtheSecurityOffences(Special Measures) Act (SOSMA) 2012 (Act 747), followed by an enactment of thePrevention of TerrorismAct (POTA) 2015 and SpecialMeasures against Terrorism inForeignCountriesAct(SMATA)2015.TheselawshavebeenintroducedtoempowertheMalaysian authorities to deal with terrorist threats and to provide the necessaryproceduresforarrestforseriousoffencesunderChapterVIandVIAofthePenalCode,including offences against state and terrorism-related offences. Under SOSMA, initialpolicedetentioniscuttoamaximumof28days,afterwhichtheAttorney-Generalmustdecide whether to prosecute and on what charges. Like its predecessor, SOSMA alsoreceived criticisms fromhuman rights groups and civil society organisationswhen in2016theActwasusedtoarrest15prominentcivilrightactivistaftertheBersih5Rally5.TheyclaimedthattheuseofSOSMAtodetainorganisersofpeacefulrallywasanabuse

5 Bersih mobilised five peaceful demonstration rallies on 19 November 2016 to call for a new and cleaner electoral system in Malaysia. SOSMA was used to arrest 15 key individuals in the organizing committee of the rally. When asked whether SOSMA had ever been abused for political gains, one of the drafters for SOSMA Zamihan Mat Zin denied the claim saying that the arrest was justified (Interview, JAKIM Officer-cum-Rehabilitation Spiritual Adviser, April 2019).


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ofpowerbytheBarisanNationalgovernment.POTA,ontheotherhand,privilegesthepowertothepolicetodetainanypersonwhofallsundersuspicionofterroristactivities,without warrant, up to a maximum period of 60 days. Five-to-eight members ofPrevention of Terrorism board appointed by Yang di-Pertuan Agong can extend thedetentionextendedforuptotwoyearsatatime.POTA2015relatesmuchmoredirectlyto terrorism and extends the power of the SOSMA2012, as the latter’s concern’s is abroader scope of offences , meant to replace the now repealed Internal Security Act(ISA).RehabilitationProgramMalaysian deradicalisation programme represents a concerted effort between theMinistryofHomeaffairs,RoyalMalaysianPoliceandreligiousinstitutionssuchasJAKIMthat takes care of the spiritual aspects of the rehabilitation (Interview, JAKIMOfficer-cum-RehabilitationSpiritualAdviser,April2019).Therehabilitationprogramseparatesthe more “hard-line” group from the wavering terrorist to minimize radicalizationwithin the program and to provide more flexibilities in extracting any necessaryintelligence from the detainees. The ‘soft’ approach becomes the main drive for theRehabilitationprogram.Forinstance,aSpecialschemewasdevelopedthroughtheRoyalMalaysianPolicetogivefinancialassistancetothefamiliesofthedetaineesinordertoeasetheirburdensincemanyofthemarebreadwinnersfortheirfamily(ZahidHamidi,2016, p. 13). Engagement sessions between case officers and ex-detainees are heldcontinuously even after the detainees have been released. For the detainees to berecognizedas fully reformed theywill be assessed through fewcomponents; (a) theirbehaviourduringclass,(b)writtenexams,(c)interviewswiththeircounsellor,religiousofficersandthenecessaryofficersintherehabilitationmanagement(Interview,JAKIMOfficer-cum-RehabilitationSpiritualAdviser,April2019).Theirmovementswillstillbemonitored after their release to ensure that they do not fall back into their previousterrorist-relatedactivities.When describing the religious dimension of the program, Zahid Hamidi (Minister ofInternalAffairsunderBN)declaredthat“thesederadicalisationprogrammesarebasedon the ‘Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaah’ approach, an Islamic jurisdiction to counter theextremist interpretations of Islam” (Zahid Hamidi, 2016, p. 13). Zamihan Mat Zin, aJAKIMofficial seconded to thePrison’sDepartment to take chargeof rehabilitationofIslamistextremistsunderdetention,elaboratesthisfurtherbyassertingthat:

“JAKIM’sapproachisbasedonAhliSunnahWalJamaah’framework.Thismeansthatwe are in opposition to Salafism/Wahabism ideologies that are responsible forfuelling the terroristnarrativewithviolentproposals, aswellasLiberal Islam thatrepresentsWestern influences of Islamic interpretation. Thus, it is important thatour CVEmeasures include restricting these narratives in every state.” (Interview,JAKIMOfficer-cum-RehabilitationSpiritualAdviser,April2019)


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It is interesting to note that Zamihan saw the approach adopted by JAKIM inoppositionalterms,byreferringtoitscontrastwithSalafismandLiberalIslam.Zamihanhimself was already infamous in Islamist circles for his vituperative attacks againstfellow Islamists identified as being either Wahhabi-Salafi or ‘liberal’ in orientation.AmongthosewhowereheavilycriticisedbyZamihanasthebearerofradicalideologieswasAbuHafiz,ayoungSalafipreacherandanexcomemberoftheBersatuYouth.AbuHafizrefutedZamihan’sbyclaimingthathehadinflatedthevarietyofviewsamongtheSalafithemselvesintoonehomogenousgroup.Inpractice,anyone“whorefusetofollowthe mainstream understanding of Islam will be labelled as extremist salafi or salafijihadi” (Interview, Bersatu Youth Exco, April 2019; Interview,Maqasid Institute, May2019).These contradictorynarratives furtherhighlight thepolemical elementswithintherehabilitationprogramandhowithasalsobeenpoliticisedandshapedbytheclashbetweentwoideologicalIslamiccamps;theneo-conservativegroupandtheneo-Salafis(Interview,DrMohammedNawab,April2019).When asked as to the sort of Islamic narrative that JAKIM would bring to therehabilitationprogram,especiallywith regards to controversial issues suchasHudud,IslamicState,andfreedomofreligions,Zamihadreplied:

“OurnarrativeofIslamisaboutpeace,kindnessandloves.OursessioninvolveslonghoursofdialoguingwiththedetaineestocleartheirdistortedunderstandingofIslam.WhentheytoldusthatMalaysiaisnotanIslamicstate(hencetheneedforJihad),wetoldthemtorefertoArticle(3)oftheConstitution.Theprovisionclearly shows that Malaysia is an Islamic state.When asked about Hudud, weshall tell them that laws fall under the category of Takzir, and this is notnecessarilyanabandonmentofHududperse.Thedealthpenalty inMalaysia isakin to Hudud punishment, although it would be much truer to the spirit ofHudud if it is changed to beheading instead. Regardless, even if Malaysiangovernmentdidnot fullyembraceHududlawsthisdoesnotmeanthatonecansimply kill the political leaders. Thiswon’t solve anything. The emphasis is onDa’wah.”(Interview, JAKIM Officer-cum-Rehabilitation Spiritual Adviser, April2019)

HenceitisclearthattheHududcomponentsarenotabandonedintheIslamicnarrativeusedintheRehabilitationprogram.ThesameviewwassharedbytheFederalTerritoryMufti,DrZulkifliBakri,whenhemade reference toBruneiasamodel forMalaysia toemulatewithregardstoapplyingHududinsociety(Interview,FederalTerritoryMufti,April 2019). The above clearly demonstrates that the Islamic narrative proposed byJAKIM and the Rehabilitation program is still divisive, intolerant, exclusionary andheavily centredon restoring the creed rather than focussing on the environment thatcreatesthegroundforradicalizationperse,i.ethecontinuouspoliticizationofIslambypolitical figures and religious institutions (Interview, Convener of Peacebuilding andCivilizational Development Flagship Project, April 2019). Nevertheless, despite itsglaringweaknesses,theMalaysiangovernmenthasdeclaredthatitsIS-erarehabilitation


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programmehashadanimpressivesuccessrateof97.5%(MuhammadHaziq,2017,pp.6-10).EducationAspartofacomprehensivecounter-terrorism(CT)strategyagainstviolentextremismandterrorisminMalaysia,thegovernmentalsosetupvariousprogramsandinstitutionsto develop effective communications strategies and counter-narratives against violentextremist groups such as Al-Qaeda, Daesh and their affiliates. Various institutionsincludingMalaysianSpecialBranch,theDepartmentofIslamicDevelopmentofMalaysia(JAKIM), Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT)) andCounterMessagingCentre (under the jurisdictionofRoyalMalaysiaPolice (RMP))aremade responsible to consolidate the works among themselves to produce effectivepubliccampaignaimedat“winningheartsandmindsofthesegmentsofsocietythatarenormally targeted by extremist and radical groups for recruitment, support andfunding”(quotedinLauraKhor,2013,p.65).Some of the initiatives include the setting up of Jihad Concept Explanation ActionCommittee to address misconceptions about jihad at different social groups andinstitutions by JAKIM in 2015. The initiative designs a series of engagements withcommunities at various levels including schools, universities, mosques, suraus(communityprayerareas),andtheInternet(MuhammadHaziq,2017,p.7).Thesphereof social media has proven to be a very powerful tool for conveying messages andconvincing users to take a certain course of actionwhichmakes it very strategic forextremist recruitment. In Malaysia, according to a study by the Institute for YouthResearch (IYRES),85%of39militants cite socialmedia (Facebook,YouTube,Twitter,Telegram and WhatsApp) as their main source of information (Ringkasan EksekutifProfail Belia Dalam Kegiatan Ekstrimisme, 2017, p. 26). In response to this, theMalaysian government has initiated the Regional Digital Counter MessagingCommunication Centre aimed at synchronizing efforts to counter radical socialmediamessagesandpresentamoreinclusivenarrativeofIslamintheregion.

4. ConcludingRemarks

The three-prong strategy (legislation, rehabilitation and education) adopted by theMalaysiangovernmenttocombatviolentradicalizationhasproventobequiteeffectiveand vital in countering terrorism-related activities. In summary, the first measureincludesputtingcounter terrorismpoliciesand legislativemechanism inplace tocurbterrorism activities in the region, followed by strengthening “operations of lawenforcement,intelligenceandsecurityforces”tocarrythenecessarysecuritymeasuresmoreproductively(ZahidHamidi,2016,p.3).Thesecondmeasureinvolveddevisingamultifacetedrehabilitationprogramtohelpde-radicalizingtheformermilitantsandIS


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sympathisers who have been detained under the anti-terrorism laws. The aim of theprogramistoallowthedetaineestore-joinsocietywithamoreinclusiveunderstandingofreligionsandreligiousextremism,aswellastoassisttheauthoritieswithnecessaryintelligence and information. The third measure is educational in nature, targetedtowardsthewiderpublic.Theaimistocombatthespreadofextremistnarrativesthatcirculateandprevailinvariousplatforms.ThesethreemeasuresformacomprehensiveapproachthathasshapedtheMalaysiansuccessstoryincounteringthethreatposedbyISISanditscounterparts.

WhileMalaysianshavearguablyscoredquitewellinsuppressingradicalisation,itseemsto fall short in two other dimensions that become the focus of the project, namely inmaintainingitssecularpracticesandpushingformoreeffectivegovernanceofreligiousdiversity. Since its inception, it is clear thatMalaysiawas established to be a secularstateasguaranteedbytheFederalConstitution.However,inrecentdecades,thenatureofitsconstitutionalcomponents–whichincludestheprovisionofIslamasthereligionoftheFederation,andthescopeofjudicialpowergiventoStates–havebecomecriticalanddivisivesubjectsofpoliticalandlegalcontroversy,particularlythroughseveralwell-publicized court cases involving jurisdictional disputes between the Shari’ah and thecommonlaw.Overtime,thesecularbasisoftheFederationhasbecomeweakenedandthe forceof Islamisation thatbegan in1970shas insteadbecomemore transgressing.Both the ruling Pakatan Harapan political coalition and the opposition UMNO- PASallianceinstrumentalisethelanguageofreligiouspolitics,withsomehavingstakedtheirpoliticallegitimacyandelectoralfortunesonthepromisetodeliver‘Islamic’governance(Interview, Maqasid Institute, May 2019). This further retreat into religion and racewhichnormalizesbothintoleranceandethnocentricism(‘Malay-Muslimnationalism’?)in societywill not only disrupt the existing initiatives programmed to combat violentextremismbutalsoweaken the inclusiveandpeacefulmessages facilitatedvia publiccampaignsandthemedia.Ultimately,it will riskescalatingthepenetrationofradicalideasintothemainstreamunderstandingofreligioninMalaysia.Varioussurveyscitedin the previous sections have indicated that Malaysia is already heading into thatdirection. For the present and future of Malaysia, this phenomenon will pose as thegreatest challenge for the country tomaintain its sense of balanced governance overreligiousdiversityandtocurbtheriseofviolentextremismincivilsociety.

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SuffianHashim,M.(1962),‘TheRelationshipbetweenIslamandtheStateinMalaya’,Intisari,1:1,7–21


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Tan,C.(1983).ChineseReligioninMalaysia:AGeneralView.AsianFolkloreStudies,42(2),217-252.

Ting,Helen.2009.“MalaysianHistoryTextbooksandtheDiscourseofKetuananMelayu”inRaceandMulticulturalisminMalaysiaandSingapore,(eds)DanielGoh,PhilipHolden,MatildaGabrielpillai&KhooGaikCheng,London&NewYork:Routledge,36-52.

ThomasKorulSamuel,RADICALISATIONINSOUTHEASTASIA:ASELECTEDCASESTUDYOFDAESHININDONESIA,MALAYSIAANDTHEPHILIPPINES(2016),reportpreparedbyTheSoutheastAsiaRegionalCentreforCounter-Terrorism(SEARCCT).

TommyThomas(2004).FreedomofReligionandRegistrationofReligiousGroups,Insaf,(2004)XXXIIINo2,pp.15-38

TunkuAbdulRahmanPutra(1977),LookingBack,KualaLumpur:PustakaAntara.

Weng,H.W.,18Dec2018.Himpunan812andanewrivalryinMalaypolitics.[Online]Availableat:https://www.newmandala.org/himpunan-812-and-a-new-rivalry-in-malay-politics/[Accessed21April2019].

Whiting,AmandaJ.(2010)"Secularism,theIslamicStateandtheMalaysianLegalProfession,"AsianJournalofComparativeLaw:Vol.5:Iss.1,Article10,pp.1-34

ZahidHamidi,2016.Malaysia’sPolicyonCounterTerrorismandDeradicalisationStrategy,JournalofPublicSecurityandSafetyVol.6No.2/2016,pp.1-19

RingkasanEksekutifProfailBeliaDalamKegiatanEkstrimisme,2017.KualaLumpur:InstituteforYouthResearch,2017

ZawawiIbrahim,withAhmadFauziAbdulHamid(2017),Chapter8,‘GovernanceofReligiousDiversityinMalaysia::IslaminaSecularStateorSecularisminanIslamicState”in,MoreorLessSecularism?EuropeanProblems,AsianLessons(Eds.)AnnaTriandafyllidou,TariqModood(2017)UniversityofEdinburghPress.

Interviews

InterviewwithDrFaroukMusa,ChairmanofIslamicRenaissanceFront,28thMarch2019

InterviewwithDrZulkifliMohamadAl-Bakri,FederalTerritoryMufti,24thApril2019

InterviewwithDrMohammedNawabOsman,AssistantProfessoratS.RajaratnamSchoolofInternationalStudies(RSIS),3rdApril2019

InterviewwithZamihanMatZin,JAKIMOfficer-cum-SpiritualAdviserforRehabilitationprogram,12thApril2019


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InterviewwithDrDanialYusof,chiefconvenerofthePeacebuildingandCivilizationalDevelopmentFlagshipProjectatISTAC-IIUM,10thApril2019

InterviewwithAbuHafizSallehHudin,ExcoMemberofBersatuYouth,10thApril2019

InterviewwithMarwanBukhari,ExecutiveDirectoratMaqasidInstitute,25thMay2019

InterviewwithPrematilakaKDSerisena,SecretaryGeneralofMalaysianConsultativeCouncilofBuddhism,Christianity,Hinduism,SikhismandTaoism,1stJune2019

LegalandPolicyDocuments

PressRelease,CurrentPopulationEstimates,Malaysia,2017-2018.DepartmentofStatisticsMalaysia.Publishedon31July2018,andavailableat:https://www.dosm.gov.my/v1/index.php?r=column/pdfPrev&id=c1pqTnFjb29HSnNYNUpiTmNWZHArdz09[Accessed21April2019].

PopulationandHousingCensus2010(Census2010).DepartmentofStatisticsMalaysia,Table4.1:Totalpopulationbyethnicgroup,religion,sexandstate,Malaysia.Availableat:https://www.statistics.gov.my/censusatlas/images/ReligionEN.pdf[Accessed22April2019].

MalaysiaFederalConstitution(2010).Availableat:http://www.agc.gov.my/agcportal/uploads/files/Publications/FC/Federal%20Consti%20(BI%20text).pdf[Accessed2May2019].

Malaysia2017InternationalReligiousFreedomReport.Availableat:https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/281080.pdf[Accessed3May2019].

PreventionofTerrorismAct2015(POTA),Act769.LawsofMalaysia.Availableat:http://www.federalgazette.agc.gov.my/outputaktap/aktaBI_20150604_Act769%28BI%29.pdf[Accessed2May2019].

SecurityOffences(SpecialMeasures)Act2012(SOSMA),Act747.LawsofMalaysia.Availableat:http://www.agc.gov.my/agcportal/uploads/files/Publications/LOM/EN/Act%20747%20-%20Security%20Offences%20(Special%20Measures)%20Act%202012.pdf[Accessed2May2019].


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Projectname:Radicalisation,SecularismandtheGovernanceofReligion:BringingTogetherEuropeanandAsianPerspectivesProjectAcronym:GREASEProjectCoordinator:ProfessorAnnaTriandafyllidouContact:[email protected]:D2.1CountryReports

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