Country Presentation. Ukraine Presentation. Ukraine 25thMeeting of the IAEA Technical Working Group...

Country Presentation. Ukraine

25th Meeting of the IAEA Technical Working Group on Nuclear

Power Plant Instrumеntation and Control (TWG -NPPIC)

May 27-29, 2015, Vienna, Austria

Vladimir Sklyar, RPC Radiy

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TOP5 of Europe

TOP10 of the World

About 50% of national power

generation

One utility:

national company NAEC

“Energoatom”

http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/

Regulatory Authority: State Nuclear

Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine

http://www.snrc.gov.ua/nuclear

Ukrainian NPPs. Fast factsTotal Gross Capacity: 13,835 MW

4 sites

15 units

2 units under construction

South-Ukrainian NPP

3×VVER-1000

Khmelnitsky NPP2×VVER-1000

2×VVER-1000

under construction

Rivne NPP

2×VVER-1000

2×VVER-440

Kyiv

Zaporizhzhya NPP –

The biggest NPP in Europe

6×VVER-1000

May 27-29, 2015 | 25th Meeting of IAEA TWG -NPPIC,

Vienna

Ukrainian NPPs. Fleet details

Site, Unit Capacity, MW Unit type Commissioning year Decommissioning year

Zaporizhzhya NPP

1

2

3

4

5

6

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

V-320

V-320

V-320

V-320

V-320

V-320

1984 (1985)

1985 (1986)

1986 (1987)

1987 (1988)

1989 (1990)

1995 (1996)

2015

2016

2017

2018

2020

2026

South-Ukrainian NPP

1

2

3

1000

1000

1000

V-302

V-338

V-320

1982

1985

1989

2012 → 2023

2015 → 2025

2019

Rivne NPP

1

2

3

4

420

415

1000

1000

V-213

V-213

V-320

V-320

1980

1981

1986 (1987)

2004 (2005)

2010 → 2030

2011 → 2031

2017

2035

Khmelnitsky NPP

1

2

3

4

1000

1000

1000

1000

V-320

V-320

V-320

V-320

1987 (1988)

2004 (2005)

-

-

2018

2035

-

-

3May 27-29, 2015 | 25th Meeting of IAEA TWG -NPPIC,

Vienna

� Running of Consolidated program of increased safety of Ukrainian NPP units

(December 2011) with financial issues update (September 2013); Term of program is

2012-2017

� Life extension permission for Unit 1, South-Ukraine NPP (commissioned in 1982) has

been issued in December 2013; an operation has been extended for 10 additional years

(2023)

� Actions for life extension for Unit 2, South-Ukraine NPP (commissioned in 1985, shut

downed on May 10, 2015); a plan is to extend operation for 10 additional years (2025)

� Actions for life extension for Unit 1, Zaporizhzhya NPP (commissioned in 1984,

industrial operation since 2015, shut down deadline is December 2015).

� A strategy for new builds Khmelnitsky 3,4 has been changed

� Adaptation of IEC nuclear standards to Ukrainian needs

� EBRD’s Nuclear Power Plant Safety Upgrade Program is starting

Ukrainian NPPs. What has been new since 2013?


Vienna

Peculiarities of FPGA from the point of view of licensing (2)� Impulse, Severodonetsk

�Design, manufacturing and installation of new types of I&C systems (PAMS etc.)

�Westron, Kharkiv

�Design and installation of new HMI (symptom-based operator procedures etc.)

�Manometr-Kharkiv

�Enforcement activities at international markets

�Radiy, Kirovograd

�Certification of FPGA-based safety platform RadICS against functional safety requirements of IEC 61508 (SIL3)

� Initiation of the U.S. NRC application process for FPGA-based safety platform RadICS


Vienna

Ukrainian I&C vendors. What has been new since 2013?

1. I&C modernization projects in operating NPPs.

2. I&C systems being installed in NPPs under

construction.

3. Country's plan to build new NPPs.

I&C technologies in new NPP designs.

4. I&C research and development projects.

New I&C technologies.

5. Recommendation to the IAEA regarding the

content and format of future I&C activities.

Presentation Agenda


Vienna

I&C modernization projects in operating NPPs


Vienna

� Life cycle extension (from 30

to 40 or 50 years).

� NPP safety improvement.

Consolidated program of

increased safety of Ukrainian

NPP units was approved in

December 2011.

NPP I&C systems modernization reasons


Vienna

Systems modernization (in accordance with

Consolidated program of increased safety of Ukrainian NPP units) (1)

� #14201. Prevention of ESFAS and Reactor Trip System

Common Cause Failure due to absence of physical separation

of impulse lines.

� #14202. Modernization of Neutron Flux Monitoring Systems.

� #14203. Modernization of Reactor Trip Systems.

� #14204. Modernization of Reactor Power Control and Limitation

System.

� #14205. Modernization of Rod Control Systems, including

Electric Power Supply System of Rod Drives.

� #14206. Modernization of Rod Drives including electromagnet

modules and position detectors.

� #14301. Modernization of ESFAS.


Vienna

� #14101. Instrumentation assurance during accidents.

� #14102. Implementation of systems for pipe position monitoring

in the primary loop.

� #14103. Modernization Process Information Systems (PIS) and

their integration with Radiation Monitoring System and SPDS.

� #14104. Modernization of systems for hydrogen cooling

monitoring of generator.

� #14105. Modernization of Reactor Island Control System of

Normal Operation.

� #14106. Modernization of Conventional Island Control System of

Normal Operation.

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Vienna

� #14401. Modernization of Radiation Monitoring Systems.

� #14402. Modernization of In-Core Monitoring Systems with

implemented reactor simulator and extended core monitoring

and diagnostics.

� #14403. PAMS implementation.

� #14404. Modernization of Diesel Generators Control Systems.

� #14405. Modernization of Control System for Refueling Machine.

� #14406. Modernization of Chemical Monitoring System.

� #14407. Modernization of turbine control systems.

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Vienna

� Reason for modernization: to extend life

cycle of units for additional 10 years

� Outage was started in March 2013

� Regulatory decision was expected in

October 2013

� Involved I&C vendors: Radiy (Ukraine)

and Westron (Ukraine).

� Safety I&C systems was modernized by

2011, non-safety I&C systems was

modernized during 2012-2013

� Licensing permission for extra 10 years

(to 2023) was issued in December 2013

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Large I&C modernization project:

NPP South-Ukrainian-1 (VVER-1000) life extension (1)


Vienna

Modernization scope (1):

� Reactor Trip System,

� Neutron Flux Monitoring System,

� Rod Control System,

� Reactor Power Control and

Limitation System,

� Engineered Safety Features

Actuation System,

� Sensors and transmitters

replacement,

� Cables replacement.

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Vienna

Modernization scope (2):

� MCR & ECR,

� Electric Power Supply Systems

replacement,

� Reactor Island System of Normal

Operation,

� Conventional Island System of

Normal Operation,

� Diesel Generator Control System,

� Radiation Monitoring System,

� Post Accident Monitoring System.

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Vienna

Switchgears modernization

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Vienna

� Reason for modernization: to extend life

cycle of units for additional 10 years

� Safety Evaluation Report has been issued

in March 2015

� Outage has been started in May 2015

� Regulatory decision is expected in

December 2015

� Involved I&C vendors: Impuls (Ukraine),

Radiy (Ukraine) and Westron (Ukraine).

� I&C systems were modernized during

2005-2014

� Turbine Island Control System will be

modernized during the actual outage

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NPP South-Ukrainian-2 (VVER-1000) life extension


Vienna

Peculiarities of FPGA from the point of view of licensing (2)

� Increase safety of the NPP

� Increase NPP availability

�Assure long-term operation

� Improve human-machine interface for control, diagnostic and maintenance

� Improve of electrical and physical separation between safety divisions

�Assure lifetime service and maintenance

�Comply with regulatory requirements

�Assure fast implementation of modernization project

�Assure minimization of on-site premises reconfiguration


Vienna


Main targets

Country's plan to build new

NPPs.

I&C technologies in new NPP

designs

Khmelnitsky NPP, Units 3

Khmelnitsky NPP, Units 4


Vienna

� Originally there was a plan to build four VVER-1000 units at

Khmelnitsky NPP site.

� Units 3 and 4 building was stopped in 1990 in accordance with

Ukrainian Moratorium to build new NPPs.

� Construction of units was in 1990: Unit 3 – 75%, Unit 4 – 28%.

� June 2005 – Government Regulation on preparation to build

new units.

� 2006-2007 – technical analysis of Units 3,4 was performed by

KIEP (Ukrainian design company).

� January 2011 – Ukraine with Russia signed an agreement for

cooperation to build Units 3 and 4 (VVER-1000 / V-392).

Khmelnitsky NPP, Units 3,4. History


Vienna

� Reactor unit equipment PWR-100 / V-320, Skoda JS.

� The upgraded turbine K 1000 60/1500 2M, Turboatom.

� Project proposal includes all modifications and improvements of

PWR-100 / V-320 baseline design , implemented at the NPP Temelin

in order to bring the safety level to the rate of nuclear industry

international standards

� Power supply units construction without sacrificing of conceptual

layout arrangements for the main building and usage of existing

building structures with consideration of repair and renewal

operations as defined by the results of technical condition survey and

evaluation

Khmelnitsky NPP, Units 3,4. Actual Status


Vienna

I&C research and development projects.

New I&C technologies


Vienna

FPGA Technology issues (1)

� About 50 FPGA-based Applications have been

installed at Ukrainian NPPs since 2004 (Reactor

Trip Systems, Neutron Flux Monitoring System,

Rector Power Control and Limitation Systems,

Reactor Control Systems, ESFAS, Reactor and

Conventional Island Control Systems of Normal

Operation).

� 6 FPGA-based ESFASs have been commissioned

at Kozloduy-5,6 (Bulgaria) during 2008-2010 by

Ukrainian vendor.

� Two FPGA-based products for Embalse (Argentina)

has been deliver by Ukrainian vendor in

cooperation with Candu Enegy Inc. in 2013-2014.


Vienna

FPGA Technology issues (2)

� Operation experience learning.

� Experience transfer for CANDU and another types of reactors (not only

PWR).

� Improvement of regulations and procedures concerning FPGA-based

platforms and applications development, V&V, operation and licensing.

� Implementation of SIL (IEC 61508:2010) and IEC 62566:2011 based

approach to qualification of FPGA-based platforms and applications.

� Participation in development of IAEA technical document related to

application of FPGAs in NPP I&C systems.

� Learning cybersecurity issues of FPGA-based systems.


Vienna

Diversity issues (1)

� Ukrainian regulations

requires to implement

diversity for Reactor Trip

System.

� Original VVER-1000

design included two

redundant RTS trains

with three channels in

each train.

� Original VVER-440

design included one RTS

train with three channels.

� RPC Radiy is the sole

national vendor of RTS.


Vienna

Diversity issues (2)

� A regulatory decision was made to

implement the main RTS and the

diverse RTS from the same

vendor (FPGAs vs FPGAs+CPUs).

� Since 2004 RTSs have been

modernized for 15 Ukrainian NPP

units (for both VVER-1000 and

VVER-440).

� No Common Cause Failure in

modernized RTS.

� Implementation of RTS diversity

with using of SIL3 certified

platform


Vienna

Cybersecurity issues

� State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine

includes both:

�Department of safety regulation of nuclear

installations (responsibilities for I&C systems

safety regulation),

�Department of security regulation.

� New Ukrainian safety and security regulations were

approved in 2008 and 2010.

� Ukrainian cybersecurity regulations are uder

development.

� Cybersecurity regulation adoption is possible only in

cooperation between the above two departments.


Vienna

Chernobyl issues

� The Ark building is in progress

� A stage of Final Closing and

Conservation is permitted to start

in 2015 (expected target time is

2028)


Vienna


Vienna

Recommendation to the IAEA regarding the content and

format of future I&C activities

� “Peopleware” support and development:

� Knowledge management for safety culture supporting,

� Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for knowledge management assessment.

� Harmonization of standards requirements and regulations, safety classifications,

definitions.

� Information management and sharing:

� Experts communications development and improvement,

� Awareness about best practices and success stories in new I&C

technologies implementations (FPGAs, wireless etc.).

� Cybersecurity:

� Safety – Security relations,

� Cybersecurity defensive measures.

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Thank you for your attention!

Research & Production Corporation Radiy

29, Geroyiv Stalingrada Street, Kirovograd 25006, Ukraine

e-mail: [email protected]

http://www.radiy.com

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