Counterintelligence

Counterintelligence 1

Counterintelligence

MERCYHURST COLLEGEDEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES


Objectives

At the end of this lesson, the student should be able to:

Define COUNTERINTELLIGENCE;

Identify the three types of counterintelligence;

Describe how intelligence is safeguarded internally against counterintelligence;

Understand various issues related to the classification of information;

Define DECEPTION; and

Assess the motivations and damage done by various spies in U.S. history.


Counterintelligence

Efforts taken to protect one’s own intelligence

operations from penetration and disruption

by hostile nations or their intelligence services.

It is both analytical and operational.


Three Types of Counterintelligence

Collection: Gaining information about an opponent’s intelligence collection capabilities that may be aimed at you

Defensive: Thwarting efforts by hostile intelligence services to penetrate your service

Offensive: Having identified an opponent’s efforts against your system, trying to manipulate these attacks either by “turning” the opponent’s agents into double agents or by feeding them false information that they will report home


COLLECTION


Surveillance Operations

Try to determine where the officers go and with whom they communicate or are in contact

TRADECRAFT is devoted primarily to frustrating this sort of activity

Because this sort of surveillance is cumbersome and expensive, it is important to target it against actual intelligence officers


HUMINT

Defector: A person who gives up allegiance to one country in exchange for allegiance to another. This act is usually in a manner which violates the laws of the nation from which the person is seeking to depart (as opposed to changing citizenship).


HUMINT

Double Agent: A person who spies on a country while pretending to spy for it. A spy in the service of two rival countries or companies.

Mole: A spy who becomes part of and works from within the ranks of an enemy governmental staff or intelligence agency.

Dangle: An agent who pretends to volunteer to spy for the hostile intelligence service but in fact remains loyal to his/her country.


Purposes of Double Agents Identify officers of the hostile intelligence service engaged

in running agents

Learn their adversaries’ operational methods

Learn about their adversaries’ tradecraft and thus become better able counter it

Examine specialized equipment provided to double agent by adversary

Learn about the hostile service’s priorities

May allow counterintelligence to dangle successfully another double agent


External Indicators of Espionage Sudden loss of a spy network

Change in military patterns that corresponds to satellite tracks

Penetration of the other service’s apparatus that reveals the possibility of having been penetrated as well

Odd botched operation

Failed espionage meeting or a negotiation in which the other side seems to be anticipating your bottom line


DEFENSIVE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE


Internal Safeguards Against CI

Classification of Information

Personnel Security

Physical SecurityOPSEC

INFOSEC


Information Security (INFOSEC)

Harry Truman established the first government-wide system of classification in 1951

Current system is governed by an executive order promulgated by President Clinton in 1995

http://www.spyhq.com/product.php?section=Novelty+Products&dir=NoveltyProducts&typ=File+Folders&subtyp=Top+Secret+Type+2+File&pagego=/novelty


Information Security (INFOSEC)

Current classification in degrees of damage to national security Top secret: exceptionally grave

damage Secret: serious damage Confidential: damage


Personnel Security

Background investigation Polygraph Determines if an individual can be

granted a security clearance


Physical Security

Seeks to safeguard not only the material object such as the documents that contain information, but also the information itself

http://www.projectdevelopers.com/scif1large.jpg


OFFENSIVE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE


Deception

“the attempt to mislead an adversary’s intelligence analysis concerning the political, military, or

economic situation he faces, with the result that,

having formed a false picture of the situation,

he is led to act in a way that advances one’s interests rather

than his own.” Source: Shulsky, 117.


Deception

Considered a form of counterintelligence because it attempts to thwart the fundamental purpose of the adversary’s intelligence operations

Deception and intelligence failure are related things; one side’s successful deception implies the other side’s intelligence failure

Deception can be attempted in wartime or peacetime, but it is much more prevalent during wartime


Block the True and Manufacture the False

Block: If too many true signals get through, the adversary is unlikely to be deceived

Manufacture: Planned with adversary’s human and technical capabilities in mind

Feedback: Were all the real signals blocked? Did manufactured signals reach the adversary? Were desired conclusions drawn?


COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS & STRATEGY


Problems in CI Analysis

Covert

Tendency to trust your own people who have been cleared and vetted

Unwarranted suspicion can be just as debilitating as having a spy in the midst of an organization

Source of friction between the CIA and FBI

FBI has primary CI responsibility in the U.S.


CI in Law Enforcement

Identification of threats

Monitoring of suspicious activity within local communities

Community liaison

CI component of law enforcement operations


CI in Business

More about Denial and Deception than Offensive Counterintelligence

How do companies accomplish CI?

Is CI in business legal?


Prevent or neutralize the foreign acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology or equipment

Prevent the penetration of the U.S. Intelligence Community

Prevent the penetration of U.S. Government agencies or contractors

Prevent the compromise of U.S. Critical National Assets

Conduct aggressive CI operations focusing on those countries that constitute the most significant threat to U.S. Strategic interest

FBI’s FCI Program


National CI Strategy

US is becoming more aggressive in CI

2005 CI strategy called for pre-emptive action against foreign intelligence services viewed as threats to national security

Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) created 2005

2009 National Intelligence Strategy made counterintelligence a primary mission objective for the first time


National CI Strategy

2009 National Counterintelligence Strategy (approved in 2010) has 4 main goals:

1. Detect insider threats

2. Penetrate foreign services

3. Integrate CI with cyber

4. Assure the supply chain of the national security community “from foreign exploitation”


Famous Moles

Kim Philby, MI6 (Britain)

Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/coldwar/cambridge

_spies_01.shtml

Oleg Penkovsky, GRU (USSR)

Source: http://www.spymuseum.com/ pages/agent-penkovsky-oleg.html

Klaus FuchsTUBE ALLOYS/

Manhattan Project(Britain & US)

Source: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/klaus-fuchs.html


Famous Moles

John Walker, US Navy

Source: http://www.spymuseum.com/pages/agent-walker-john.html

Jonathan Pollard, US Navy

Source: http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/counterintelligence/cases/

cases-1

Ana Montes, DIA

Source: http:// www.fbi.gov/news/ stories/2008/september/montes_09

1209


Famous Moles

Aldrich Ames, CIA

Source: http://www.gwu.edu~nsarchiv/nsa/publications/ie/index.html

Robert Hanssen, FBI

Source: http://www.spymuseum.com/pages/age

nt-hanssen-robert.html


Further Reading/Viewing/Listening

Spy Museum Interviews: http://spymuseum.org/from-spy/spycast June 4, 2010 features Martha Peterson, the first female CIA

case officer in Moscow and discusses her capture by the KGB April 1, 2008 is about Col. Sergei Tretyakov, one of the most

senior Russian defectors ever Oct. 1, 2007 features John Sullivan, the CIA’s longest-serving

polygrapher Aug. 1, 2007 focuses on the Ana Montes case

Teague, Matthew. 2006. “Double Blind: The Untold Story of how British Intelligence Infiltrated and Undermined the IRA” The Atlantic Monthly 297:53-62.

http://spymuseum.org/from-spy/spycast

Counterintelligence

Education

Transcript of Counterintelligence