Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices - United …httpAssets)/4659EE6F59...UK Ministry of Defence...

UK Ministry of DefenceUK Ministry of Defence

CounterCounter--Improvised Explosive DevicesImprovised Explosive Devices

Lieutenant Colonel Peter Sonnex Royal EngineersLieutenant Colonel Peter Sonnex Royal Engineers

Commander Tim Peacock Royal NavyCommander Tim Peacock Royal Navy


““If you have ten thousand regulations you If you have ten thousand regulations you destroy all respect for the lawdestroy all respect for the law””

Winston Spencer ChurchillWinston Spencer Churchill


MenuMenu

IEDs and International Humanitarian LawIEDs and International Humanitarian Law

Humanitarian ImpactHumanitarian Impact

CC--IED Doctrine and UK CIED Doctrine and UK C--IED PolicyIED Policy

UK Approach and Lines of OperationUK Approach and Lines of Operation

Attacking the Network (AtN)Attacking the Network (AtN)


IEDs and IHLIEDs and IHL

Protection of combatants and nonProtection of combatants and non--combatants from combatants from

unnecessary suffering and to safeguard fundamental human unnecessary suffering and to safeguard fundamental human

rightsrights

Civilians shall not be the object of attackCivilians shall not be the object of attack

Restoration of peace and the resumption of friendly relations Restoration of peace and the resumption of friendly relations

between the belligerentsbetween the belligerents

Binding on States and individualsBinding on States and individuals

Requires knowledge of the law of armed conflictRequires knowledge of the law of armed conflict

IEDs are capable of being used lawfullyIEDs are capable of being used lawfully


IEDs and IHLIEDs and IHL

IEDs are capable of being used lawfully:IEDs are capable of being used lawfully:●●

By combatants in armed conflictBy combatants in armed conflict

-- Including Including ‘‘insurgentsinsurgents’’

in a nonin a non--international armed conflictinternational armed conflict

-- Against military objects in accordance with IHL principlesAgainst military objects in accordance with IHL principles

IEDs are unlawful when used indiscriminately or IEDs are unlawful when used indiscriminately or deliberately in attacks on civiliansdeliberately in attacks on civilians●●

By insurgents in ignorance, terrorists and criminalsBy insurgents in ignorance, terrorists and criminals

-- For intimidation and coercionFor intimidation and coercion

-- In publicity for a causeIn publicity for a cause


The IED ThreatThe IED Threat

A Global Threat

IED Attacks from January to November 2011

(outside IRQ and AFG):

•

6,832 IED events globally

•

621 IED average monthly events

•

12,286 casualties

•

111 Countries


Why IEDs?Why IEDs?

Simple to designSimple to design

Cheap Cheap

AdaptableAdaptable

Stand off capabilityStand off capability

A Tactical Weapon which can

have Strategic Effect


Number of Casualties caused by IEDs in Afghanistan

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800Ja

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bM

arA

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ay Jun

Jul

Aug

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Nov

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2010 2011 2012

Num

ber

of C

asua

lties

Civilian Casualties Security Forces Casualties

Security ForcesSecurity Forces CiviliansCivilians

20102010 54205420 24942494

20112011 62176217 32903290

20122012 880880 412412


Security ForcesSecurity Forces CiviliansCivilians

KilledKilled InjuredInjured KilledKilled InjuredInjured

20092009 738738 16201620 24982498 1009110091

20102010 592592 18901890 26102610 1055910559

20112011 13441344 30083008 31813181 1084810848

20122012 387387 652652 10391039 30033003

Number of Casualties caused by IEDs in Rest of World

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500Ja

nFe

bM

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ay Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep Oct

Nov

Dec Ja

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ay Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep Oct

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Dec Ja

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Jul

Aug

Sep Oct

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Dec Ja

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2009 2010 2011 2012

Num

ber o

f Cas

ualti

es

Civilian Casualties Security Forces Casualties


DiscriminationDiscrimination

The attack occurred in the Lashkari region at 1030am on 21 JanuaThe attack occurred in the Lashkari region at 1030am on 21 January 2012ry 2012

6 civilians were travelling to an unknown location when they dr6 civilians were travelling to an unknown location when they drove over a ove over a

pressurepressure--plate IEDplate IED

4 were killed instantly, 2 were injured4 were killed instantly, 2 were injured

It is believed the IED was planted to target Afghan Uniformed PIt is believed the IED was planted to target Afghan Uniformed Police or olice or

Afghan National Security ForcesAfghan National Security Forces

Neither the insurgency nor the IEDNeither the insurgency nor the IED

could ensure discriminationcould ensure discrimination

between the intended target(s)between the intended target(s)

and civiliansand civilians


Stage 3 (End 2015):Institutionalise C-IED capability,

matched in task, scale, concurrency and endurance as set by SDSR,

delivered through EP-funded, TLCM processes and mechanisms.

Stage 3 (End 2015):Institutionalise C-IED capability,

matched in task, scale, concurrency and endurance as set by SDSR,

delivered through EP-funded, TLCM processes and mechanisms.

Stage 1 (End 2010):To transform C-IED to an offensive

posture through delivering C-IED at THF BG level with sustainable capability,

focusing on robust IM/IX, improved IED Detection and empowering ANSF C-IED

capability.

Stage 1 (End 2010):To transform C-IED to an offensive

posture through delivering C-IED at THF BG level with sustainable capability,

focusing on robust IM/IX, improved IED Detection and empowering ANSF C-IED

capability.

Stage 2 (End 2011): Balance capability and capacity to fully support UK Ops, the Olympics

and contingent forces.

Stage 2 (End 2011): Balance capability and capacity to fully support UK Ops, the Olympics

and contingent forces.

The Plan - Institutionalising C-IED

Institutionalisation

ENDSTATE:A UK Defence

C-IEDcapability,

coordinatedacross

Government and with International

Partners,able to meet Defence’s Strategic

Objectives

ENDSTATE:A UK Defence

C-IEDcapability,

coordinatedacross

Government and with International

Partners,able to meet Defence’s Strategic

Objectives

Integrated government effectCOIN & CT synergies

MOUsUN

NATOISAF

Indigenous Forces

The Policy – The Defence Approach

Defence C-IED Framework Cross Government Effect International Engagement

Enabling Functions: Cross cutting activities: Preparing the Force, Equipment Capability, Operational Information Superiority, Science & Technology, Intelligence

DefensiveDeals with IEDs once they have been emplaced,

either by detecting and neutralising them or by mitigating their effects

OffensiveAims to disrupt enemy IED capability and

prevent the use of IEDs to the point when the device is emplaced

Enabling Functions: Cross cutting activities: Preparing the Force, Equipment Capability, Operational Information Superiority, Science & Technology, Intelligence

DefensiveDeals with IEDs once they have been emplaced,

either by detecting and neutralising them or by mitigating their effects

OffensiveAims to disrupt enemy IED capability and

prevent the use of IEDs to the point when the device is emplaced

C- IED STRATEGIC POLICY & PLAN


OffensiveC-IED

DefensiveC-IED

C-IED Doctrine


Lines of OperationLines of OperationAttack the Network:

Actions and activities designed to reduce the effects and interrupt the insurgent chain of IED activities through:

intel, surveillance, reconnaissance, information operations

counter-bomber targeting

device technical and forensic exploitation

influence and information operations

persistent surveillance

Defeat the Device:

Actions and activities designed to reduce the effects of IED detonations for safe operations, including:

route clearance

device detection and neutralization

military explosive ordnance disposal

vehicle and personnel protection

military working dogs

Prepare the Force:

Actions and activities designed to reduce the effects of insurgent IED employment through, but not limited to:

technology training

operations room simulators

ground sign awareness

tactics and procedures

threat awareness


CT / COIN / Crime Continuum


Detonation

Post-Blast

Surveillance

Secondary Attack on 1st

Responders

Document Attack

Attack Video

IO Operations

Local IED Cell

Cell Leader

Intel Lead Operations Officer

Financier Logistician

IED Emplacer

Primary Recruiter

Security Lead IED Trainer

Surveillance Lead

Cell Members

Training Camp

Trainees

Local Support

Mosque

Local Hospital

Village

External Influence & Support

Foreign Support

Material Manufacturer

International Support

Regional Support

Funding

Bombmaker

IED Supplier

Regional Support

BombmakerTrainer

IED NetworkIED Network

H

http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/search/LinkThrough.aspx?id=&qsrc=auimage&seqNum=1&linkURL=http://imagery.dia.smil.mil/logos/globe.gif


TrainTrain

SupplySupply

DevelopDevelop

CollectCollect

CoCo--ordinateordinate

Facility (type)Facility (type)

StoreStore

FinanceFinance

EmplaceEmplace

ManufactureManufacture

RecruitRecruit

PlanPlan

TransportTransport

ProcureProcure

Network/SystemNetwork/System

18

Success achieved by cross-government/agency collaboration: 3 networks exposed and disrupted & 20+

detentions across six nations.

Transnational Threat NetworksTransnational Threat Networks


Lessons IdentifiedLessons Identified

CC--IED requires a comprehensive approachIED requires a comprehensive approach

●●

Sustained effort across all lines of operationSustained effort across all lines of operation

Needs to be institutionalised to be effectiveNeeds to be institutionalised to be effective

●●

Throughout the Armed ForcesThroughout the Armed Forces

●●

Across Government and internationallyAcross Government and internationally

●●

Enshrining what we have learned (and reEnshrining what we have learned (and re--learned)learned)

Requires common understanding and unified actionRequires common understanding and unified action

●●

Not a solely military challengeNot a solely military challenge

●●

Indiscriminate nature and humanitarian impactIndiscriminate nature and humanitarian impact

●●

Counter terrorist/criminal networksCounter terrorist/criminal networks


Any Questions?Any Questions?

Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices - United …httpAssets)/4659EE6F59...UK Ministry of Defence...

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