Enhancing Action to Limit Illicit Small Arms and Light

Weaponry Traffic in the Black Sea Region

Cosmin Ghita’12

Candidate for B.A. in Political Science and Russian Studies at Bates CollegeFinal Paper in 2010 Summer Internship at the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Bucharest, June 25, 2010

Table of Contents

I. Introduction 3

II. Black Sea Region 3

III. Problem Identification 6

Sources and Scale of Problem 7

IV. Assessment of Cooperation with BSWR Countries to Prevent Illicit Trafficking 9

Cooperative initiatives and mechanisms 9

Regional Cooperation 10

Analysis of Cooperation 16

V. Romania’s Role as a Border Member of the Euro-Atlantic Structure 19

VI. Recommendations 21

VII. Conclusion 25

VIII.Appendixes 27

Appendix # 1 Illustrations 27

Appendix #2: Transport Corridor Europe Caucus Asia (TRACECA) 29

Appendix # 3: Romania’s Implication in Some Black Sea Regional Organizations 31

Appendix # 4: The Wassenaar Arrangement’s Statement of Understanding on Implementation of End-Use Controls for Dual-Use Items 32

Appendix #5: History of Romania’s Evolution in Export Control 33

IX. Works Cited 36

Ghita 2

I. Introduction

The Black Sea Region is a very complex and diverse geopolitical area which has become

more of a focal point after several years of exclusion from foreign policy agendas,1 due to the

adherence of several riparian states to Euro-Atlantic structures such as EU and NATO. By

opening up to this area in terms of trade an border permeability, Member States of these

structures might risk exposing themselves to increase trafficking, which is a strong phenomenon

in the region. The surplus of small armament and light weaponry (SALW) produced here during

the Cold War, is often considered subject to illicit trading and trafficking. The illegal trafficking

of SALW creates an asymmetric risk in this area which affects both littoral states and their EU

and NATO counterparts. Henceforth, it becomes detrimental for Member States and especially

those closer to this area, such Romania, to attune their legislation and make full use of the given

legislative tools, resources, influence, regional organizations and cooperations to try to curb this

risk. In this essay I will present the area’s complexities and the level of regional cooperation,

how SALW trafficking here might affect Members of Euro-Atlantic structures and make some

recommendation to how this problem might be diminished.

II. Black Sea Region

Situated at the crossroads between Europe and Asia, the Black Sea has been a site of

contention and confrontation for centuries. In the context of the Cold War, it was the front scene

of East-West strategic competition. In the post-Cold War era, it has become evermore

complicated and difficult to manage.

Throughout the Cold War, the decisive political and military presence of the superpowers

provided stability, albeit strained, in the region for forty years. The demise of the Soviet Union,

has on the one hand, liberated ancient sources of tension and grievances that the Cold War

suppressed and masked, but on the other, allowed for the first time an emergence of a truly

cooperative environment around the Black Sea. After the expansions of NATO and the EU, the

Black Sea has become the eastern frontier of Europe and as such forms an increasingly integral

part of it, as well as representing an important strategic region by its own accord. Clearly, the

Ghita 3

1 Asmus, Ronald;, Konstantin; Dimitrov, and Joerg Forbrig. A New Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region. Washington: German Marshall Fund, 2004. Print. p.9

Black Sea is no longer a region to be discovered, exploited, enclosed or dominated. Although the

region's long and complex history still generates complex problems for cooperation, it also

provides the region with both the incentive and tools for participating actively in the global

economy and the international political community.

All significant geopolitical events, whether evolutions, stagnations, taking place around the

Black Sea are foremost determined by the pushing of the Euro-Atlantic boundary towards

Central Asia, which structures the geopolitical space of the Black Sea in two major geopolitical

axes, the North-South Axis (Russia – Armenia – Iran) and the East-West Axis, which includes,

via Caucasus, and the Black Sea, essential energy resources in the Caspian Sea and destined for

Western Europe. The two axes – which intersect in Azerbaijan – draw a region of fundamental

security on the agenda of the great chancellors with interests and influence in the area.2 These

two axes have become visible especially after the process of Russia’s reassertion of power.

The Black Sea Wider Region (BSWR) joins, in a wide definition which is subject to

consensus, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania,3 Russia, Ukraine, Moldova as representatives of the

CIS – from the sphere of the ones most related to the soviet inheritance; Caucasus, including

Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – engaged on the route of democratization, but whose

renowned political earthquakes jeopardise institutional and civilian democratic construction; the

cold area whose blizzard blows thanks to “frozen conflicts” maintained by the opponents of

modernity conceptualised by the European and Euro-Atlantic stabilisation factors, Russia – the

turbid fragments from the Soviet Union: Transnistria, Abhazia, South Osetia and Karabagh;4

although lacking legitimacy, these formations which pretend to be functional and sovereign

states – succeed “to (almost) bring close, with an unremarkable dexterity, all exterior attributes

of sovereignty.”5

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2 For an extended analysis, see Edmund Herzig, The New Caucasus. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 2000.

3 NATO: the three states are members with full rights in the organisation, Turkey from 1952, Bulgaria and Romania since 2004, EU: Bulgaria and Romania are members since 2007, and Turkey is a candidate state

4 Asmus et. al., op. cit., p.19-20.

5 Charles King, Marea Neagră: o istorie, Brumar Publishing House, Timisoara, 2005, p. 352.

Ronald Asmus and Bruce Jackson foresee an even wider area equal to BSWR and, in the

virtue of building “a stable system at north of Transnistria, Odessa and Suhumi, […] across the

north-east arch” and ensuring “access to the great commercial rivers which flow into the Black

Sea: the Danube, Nistru, and Nipru”. They, hence, put forth the hypothesis according to which

“at that moment, the BSWR concept will be as wide and as varied as the North Plain of

Germany or the area of the Baltic/North Sea”.6

Using the strictly geographical analytical filter, on the other hand, Charles King grants

membership to the region to Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia and Turkey, so that a

wider definition of the region comprises 22 states, from the Alps to the Urals, because “what

takes place up stream the Danube, Nistru and Don has a major impact on sea health and the

health of the people inhabiting around it.”7

In the view of the European Commission, the Black Sea region represents a distinct area,

reuniting 10 states: 6 littoral states – Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, the Russian Federation,

Georgia and Turkey – and 4 states which history, proximity and tight connections to the Black

Sea area – Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Republic of Moldova and Greece recommend them as

relevant actors in the area. Thus, the European definition of the Black Sea region falls under the

same lines of the Wider Black Sea region, promoted, afterwards, by NATO in its relations with

the allies and partners in the area.8 If under the ratio of geographic coverage, the two concepts

are somewhat similar, at an international level, significant differences arise. NATO, outlining the

fact that BSWR is both a bridge towards the energy rich region of the Caspian Sea and a weir to

trans-national menaces, promotes a “bridge/barrier” type of concept regarding the area. For the

European Union, the Black Sea region is an integrated area of the EU9 which is mainly

influenced by the European Neighbouring Policy (ENP) which aims to institute at its borders a

“circle of friends”, as it was named by Romano Prodi, within which principles, values and

Ghita 5

6 Asmus et al., op.cit., p. 20.

7 Charles King, op. cit., p.29.

8 Adrian Pop, Dan Manoleli, Spre o strategie europeană în bazinul Mării Negre. Cooperarea Teritorială, European Institute in Romania, Bucureşti, 2007, p.9.

9 The complexities and trafficking transit routes inherent to the Black Sea Region do not represent just the Union’s periphery, but an integral part of it, after the 2007 expansion and the current prospective ascension talks with Ukraine and Moldova.

governing manners are respected and promoted to a greater or lesser extent.10 If we accept that

the last wave of expansion towards the East meant the control of the EU on certain neighbours

marked by instability and poverty, applying the ENP means the expansion of this process further

to the East, beyond the borders of wider Europe, more precisely, the second step of a process by

which “goods” which need to be “exported” are translated from the internal periphery to the

external one of the wider European Union.11

III. Problem Identification

This type of approach has not just been illustrated just in the definitions but in the ways of

acting in stabilizing and securing this Euro-Atlantic expanded territory. As aforementioned one

way in stabilising and pushing through the integration of this whole area in Euro-Atlantic

structures is to overcome the frozen conflicts which waste economic resource, prevent nation-

building, inflict instability in the whole region and through their authoritarian nature deprive

populations at large from democratic practice and from consolidating a civil society.12

Illegal trafficking is a problem throughout most of the region. It should firstly be noted that

there is a striking contrast between European prosperity and the poverty and instability in more

eastern regions. The process of globalisation has contributed to a rise in organised crime

throughout the world. At the same time, Europe is an attractive destination in the world for drug,

human and SALW trafficking. The Black Sea region is either a source or a transit route from

producing regions. The rise in cross-border crime - which coincided with the collapse of the

Soviet Union - can be attributed to several factors: weak state structures; economic hardships;

the ideal geographical situation between the source of illegal drugs - in particular opiates

Ghita 6

10 Romano Prodi, A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability, in Peace, Security and Stability – International Dialogue and the Role of the EU, Sixth ECSA-World Conference, Jean Monnet Project, Brussels, 5-6 December 2002.

11 Doina Muresan, Dimensiunea Economica a Securitatii in Epoca Parteneriatelor si a Aliantelor. Bucuresti: Pro Universitaria, 2010. Print. p. 81

12 Socor in Asmus, Conflicte Inghetate: O provocare pentru interesele Euro-Atlantice. 127.

produced in Afghanistan - and their main market, Europe; vulnerability of state institutions to

corruption.13 This rampant phenomenon fuels frozen conflicts14, furthering regional instability. 15

In comparison to other parts of the world, the demand for illicit weapons in the EU is not

high; there is a small steady market for weapons sought by criminal groups to facilitate illegal

activities such as drug trafficking, prostitution, money laundering and extortion. Police forces

across the EU are discovering larger numbers of firearms in traditional hubs for illicit goods

such as Amsterdam, and the pattern of seizures across Europe suggests this is a region-wide

development. Also, the EU is seeing flows of new weapons from the Eastern Europe to

European criminal networks.16

The rising trend for organized criminal groups to employ powerful types of firearms

coincides with a greater inclination by terrorist organizations to seek to accomplish spectacular

attacks with maximum damage. While among terrorists the quest for evermore lethal weaponry,

including weapons of mass destruction (WMD), will continue, SALW and conventional

explosives, remain, still, the weapons of choice and present a more immediate threat because of

their easy availability, low cost and potential to inflict significant human and economic costs.

Although the main terrorist threat involves mainly Islamic extremists and its affiliates, EU-based

groups—such as the Irish Republican Army could also seek to resume or intensify their

campaigns of armed violence. In the context of Euro-Atlantic expansion and increased border

permeability, it is also worth noting that separatist groups operating in neighbouring states might

operate illicit arms trading for financial support or might use arms trading to intensify their

campaigns and hence hinder

Sources and Scale of Problem

Ghita 7

13 "The South Caucasus: a Challenge for the EU", Chaillot Paper No 65, EU Institute of Security Studies, December 2003.

14 more precisely it both provides the arms necessary for continuing violence but also provides financial support for the continuation of the undemocratic, isolated regimes in these areas, e.g. Transnistria. (Socor, 123)

15 Mincă, Liliana. Controlul Exporturilor Strategice, Instrumente de Stabilitate și Securitate. Bucuresti: Editura Militara, 2009. Print. p. 52

16 Europol. Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) 2009. www.europol.europa.eu/...Organised_Crime.../OCTA2009.pdf.

A combination of wide availability of weapons, weak arms export controls, unresolved

border issues and organized criminal activities means that regions bordering the EU in the East

and South East maintain a high potential as either source or transit route for the illicit trade and

trafficking in SALW. Romania as a NATO and EU member has harmonized its arms control

and export legislation to match the standards of these institutions. Nevertheless, being a border

country might transform it into a potential target of the expansion of illicit trade networks.

In Eastern Europe, factors such as the breakdown of Warsaw Pact military production

structures, a decrease in domestic need for arms and economic hardships have created strong

incentives to export arms, sometimes to unsafe destinations. The problem is compounded by the

existence of vast stocks of weapons that are no longer required by the armed forces in the new

post-Cold War security environment. Ukraine, for example, is struggling to cope with several

million surplus SALW and 2.5 million ton of ammunition.17 Across the region, storage of

weaponry and ammunition in many cases falls below international standards, with the risk that

weapons and ammunition might enter the black market. The weakness of border and export

control systems means that SALW and ammunition might plausibly be trafficked or (illegally)

exported to sensitive destinations overseas or into the EU. For instance in Russia, weapons,

ammunition and explosives leaking out of army and Ministry of the Interior storage sites pose a

major challenge. This is the case even in the North Caucasus, where it is suspected that Russian

weapons themselves are fuelling the conflict in Chechnya.18 Even before stockpiles across

Eastern Europe have been exhausted, however, recent modernization programmes and

requirements for some countries to achieve NATO compatibility may have created additional

surpluses.

Given the scale of proliferation and potential trafficking in SALW in the above-mentioned

regions, it is not surprising that the rising trend seemed to maintain with an overall 20% increase

in the traffic of SALW sourced in Eastern Europe during 2005-2009 as detailed in the SIPRI

Yearbook 2010. In August 2009 a report was launched by the British Parliament presented a list

Ghita 8

17 Polyakov, Leonid “Aging Stocks of Ammunition and SALW in Ukraine: Risks and Challenges” (Bonn: International Center for Conversion, 2005) Deterrence and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns,” Journal of Legal Studies. p. 4

18 Anthony, Ian. "12. Illicit Arms Transfer." Russia and the Arms Trade (Sipri Publication). 1998. Reprint. Solna: A Sipri Publication, 2008. 217-232. Print. p. 224

of UK registered brokers to whom the Ukrainian State Service for Export Control had licensed

the export of collectors' items (light arms) from the Soviet stockpile of weapons and which

expressed the concern that the end users on the list included countries for which there are

Foreign and Commonwealth Office restrictions on the export of strategic goods.19

These examples illustrate the risk of SALW entering the EU from the region. However,

intelligence agencies do not have a clear picture of the nature and scope of the problem. By

definition illicit arms flows are clandestine and difficult to trace, but the lack of research and

information on this key issue is concerning.

It is obvious that to restrain such problems, the security role of border countries such as

Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria is pivotal. Due to their common security goal. the Euro-Atlantic

structures bare the responsibility to fully support these countries in their efforts to tighten border

control and mitigate instability in immediately surrounding regions. Failure to do so might lead

to instability within some Member States which are in vicinity of these tense region as “the

incidence of armed conflict is positively related to the conflict incidence of neighbouring

states.”20

IV. Assessment of Cooperation with BSWR Countries to Prevent Illicit Trafficking

On one level, countries in Euro-Atlantic proximity are improving their safeguards against

illegal weapons trafficking. They are adopting more stringent legislation and arms trade norms

and increasing international cooperation.

Cooperative initiatives and mechanisms

Fighting the Black Sea regions’ security threats in general, and terrorism and organized

crime in particular, has encompassed strengthened diplomatic, political and military relations

between neighbouring countries, improved intelligence sharing, and intensified cross-border

police and judicial cooperation. Cooperation ranges from meetings of political and military

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19Watt, Nicholas . " UK arms dealers accused of selling Soviet weapons to blacklisted countries | World news | guardian.co.uk ." The Guardian. N.p., 19 Aug. 2009. Web. 18 June 2010. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/19/british-arms-dealers-blacklisted-countries>.

20 Bulang, Halvard and Gleiditsch, Nils Petter. "The Globalization of Armed Conflict." Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization. edited by Kahler, Miles, and Barbara Walter. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 187-216. Print. p. 192

leaders in the region to common education and training with regard to combating and preventing

terrorism and organized crime, and concerted actions of regional public prosecutors, intelligence

and law enforcement officials aimed at securing their borders, arresting or expelling terrorist

and/or organized crime suspects, eliminating organizations linked with terrorism and organized

crime, freezing or confiscating the assets of people and groups suspected of terrorist financing,

and the like. Cooperation has also included BSWR and SEE countries fighting the war on

terrorism together with their allies and partners. The prospect of NATO and EU membership (a

status desired by the majority of former communist countries in Europe as a proof of their

democratic maturity and advanced security capabilities), coupled with the two organizations’

membership requirements and incentives, have accelerated regional cooperation endeavours.

After 1989, both NATO and the EU focused on expanding Europe's zone of peace and stability,

by opening their doors to new members and assisting both aspirant and non-candidate countries

to consolidate their democracies and increase their security capabilities through various

programs, partnerships and/or membership requirements aimed at post-conflict reconstruction

and development, reform of security and defense institutions, and bringing these neighbouring

countries closer to the West.21 Through these programs, the two organizations have forced the

hands of candidate countries to strengthen bilateral and trilateral relations, consolidate relations

with their neighbours and participate in a series of regional and subregional cooperative security

organizations. In other words, regional and subregional cooperation has been a prerequisite for

integration in the two organizations.

Regional Cooperation

NATO

NATO, like the EU, has for a long time developed fairly close relations with all the

countries in the Black Sea region. It has adopted an individualised approach based on

Membership Action Plans (MAPs) which establish the framework for relations between the

Alliance and its future members and Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs) for relations

with partner countries (for example with three countries of the Southern Caucasus and

Ghita 10

21 Asmus et. al. op. cit., p. 141-- Sergiu Celac

Moldova).22 The IPAP is a bilateral and individual instrument which was presented to partner

nations as a new Partnership for Peace (PfP) mechanism at the NATO Prague Summit in 2002.

However, the regional approach is innovative. Partnership programmes launched by

NATO targeted regional projects such as the Planning and Review Process (PARP) and the

Partnership Action Plans (PAP), such as the Partnership Action Plan - Defence Institutions

Building (PAP-DIB) and the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T). It is clear that

littoral states, allies and partners are working together to strengthen security and stability in the

Black Sea region, through cooperation programmes in various domains, such as democratisation

(a process established in most of the countries in question), security, energy and the yet

unresolved conflicts in the region.23

Even if the last Alliance summit, held in April 2009 in the cities of Strasbourg and Kehl,

raised all the crucial questions as to the Alliance's continuing existence and potential expansion,

it did not provide the immediate solution as had been expected.

European Union (EU)

EU action in the Black Sea region takes two different forms, based on either the

individual approach or the regional approach.

The individual approach is primarily based on the European Neighbourhood Policy

(ENP) which is the main framework for EU relations with the region and which is implemented

through Action Plans, as was the case for example with Moldova and the Ukraine in 2004, and

Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in 2005. The aim of the ENP is to establish closer ties with

countries to the east and south of the EU with a view to promoting economic development,

stability and good governance in the region, without them necessarily becoming members of the

Union.24

As part of its regional approach, the EU has launched a new long-term cooperation

initiative for the Black Sea region, presented by the European Commission on 11 April 2007

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22 Membership Action Plan. NATO. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37356.htm. May 30, 2010. Web

23 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-6845E1F1-BE58A13E/natolive/opinions_25162.htm?selectedLocale=en May 30, 2010. Web

24 European Commision. European Neighnourhood Policy. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/strengthening_en.htm. May 10, 2010. Web

(especially as the EU is now an integral part of the region since the accession of Bulgaria and

Romania). Called "Black Sea Synergy", this initiative aims to develop cooperation with the EU's

oil-rich neighbours around the Black Sea, to forge stronger ties between the EU and its

neighbours around the Black Sea and to stabilise the region. The Black Sea Synergy initiative

will build on ongoing Community sectoral programmes and initiatives in five areas of prime

importance in the region: the environment, energy, transport, internal security and democracy. 25

According to Fabrizio Tassinari of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), the new

Black Sea Synergy should endeavour to develop the following six qualities: coordination,

pragmatism, ownership, flexibility, consistency, visibility. But for the EU, and according to the

Commission, the launch of the Black Sea Synergy should provide new opportunities and

possibilities. The scope of its actions could extend beyond the region itself, as many activities

remain strongly linked to neighbouring regions, in particular the Caspian Sea, central Asia and

south-eastern Europe.26

On 16 May 2007, the Commission submitted a communication to the European

Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions

on applying the global approach to migration to the eastern and south-eastern regions

neighbouring the European Union, emphasising the importance of the dialogue on migration

with those countries that have concluded an Action Plan with the EU (Armenia, Azerbaijan and

Georgia) and the need to move forward with those countries that have already implemented the

plan (for example, Moldova and Ukraine and the border assistance mission, EUBAM). The

Commission felt that the EU should start exploratory talks with Belarus and draw on experiences

from various areas, in particular from the Söderköping and Budapest processes. The

Commission also suggested exploring "the feasibility of setting up a regional cooperation

platform (...) which will bring together relevant EU Member States, EU agencies, other countries

bordering the Black Sea and regional organisations such as SECI, the BSEC, the Baltic Sea Task

Ghita 12

25 Commision of the European Communities. COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BLACK SEA SYNERGY - A NEW REGIONAL COOPERATION INITIATIVE ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com07_160_en.pdf. June 2010.

26 "Commission on the Black Sea: Berlin." Commission on the Black Sea: The Commission on the Black Sea. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 June 2010. <http://www.blackseacom.eu/activities/news/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=10&tx_ttne>

Force on Organised Crime (TF-OC) and the Black Sea Forum."27 It also stressed that mobility

partnerships and policies to prevent brain drain should be developed and that steps should be

taken to facilitate visa procedures and remittance transfers by migrant workers; attention should

also be given to the conclusion of readmission agreements. Finally, it raised the issue of

providing the necessary support to the countries in question for border management, the fight

against organised crime and falsified documents.28 The Commission also refers to Russia which,

for its part, should implement as soon as possible the "priorities set out by the Road Map of the

Common Space", intensify the exchange of information with the EU, in particular through the

Europol-Russia Cooperation Agreement, and improve cooperation between Europol and Frontex

in the Baltic Sea region as well as between Frontex and the Russian Border Guard Service.29

Under the regional approach, specific programmes and projects are targeted, such as

TRACECA, which are carried out by different EU bodies in collaboration with other

international institutions. (see Appendix 2).

Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI)

The Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) was established in 1995 at

Romania’s proposal to strengthen Euro-Atlantic cooperation among its 13 participant states

(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova,

Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Turkey and Montenegro).30

Within the SECI, a Regional Center for Combating Trans-Border Criminality was created

in 2000 in Bucharest, Romania, to strengthen law enforcement and counter cross-border crime

cooperation (i.e. fighting drugs, arms, human trafficking and illegal immigration).

Besides the 13 member states, the SECI Center has 15 observer states (Austria, Azerbaijan,

Belgium, Canada, France Georgia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,

Slovakia, Spain, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States of America) and 2 permanent

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27"EUR-Lex - 52007DC0247 - EN." EUR-Lex Access to European Union law. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 June 2010. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52007DC0247>

28 Duta, Paul. Institutii de Securitate. Vol. I. Sibiu: 2006, TechnoMedia. p. 212

29 Представительство Европейского Сюза.http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/ru/p_335.htm. June 12, 2010. Web

30 http://www.secicenter.org/m106/About_SECI (28 May 2008). http://ue.mae.ro/index.php?lang=en&id=31&s=6181&arhiva=true (May 2010). Melanie H. RAM, 2001: Black Sea Cooperation towards European Integration, 1–20. p. 14

advisors (ICPO-Interpol and the World Customs Organization). The Center has seven working

groups, focusing on human trafficking, illegal migration, illicit drugs, stolen vehicles,

smuggling, customs crimes, financial crime and cybercrime, as well as on ensuring the safety of

sea containers. The SECI Center conducts, organizes and participates in joint education and

training activities and regular meetings to strengthen combating organized crime and terrorism

cooperation.31 Among the most recent exercises, it is worth mentioning the 2007

Black Sea Regional Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Counter-proliferation Exercise,

organized by the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency and FBI, with participants from

Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania and the SECI Center. The simulation exercise increased

cooperation among participants as concerns testing, command and control, communication,

intelligence sharing as well as operational capabilities of weapons of mass destruction counter-

proliferation.32 In addition, every six months the Center’s experts provide decision makers with

specific strategic analyses and reports on drug trafficking, cigarette smuggling, human

trafficking and illegal immigration in South Eastern Europe. Fortunately, SECI’s activity goes

far beyond meetings and exercises. The SECI is a real operational center of cooperation, which

has been very effective and successful in its anti-crime efforts during its eight years of existence,

working closely with INTERPOL, WCO and other organizations. Mitja Močnik, the ex-director

of the SECI center, exemplified in 2008 one of the many succesful operations undertaken by this

institution, when declaring that “operation Pigeon is a successful example of cooperation among

the SECI Center member states, and observer countries. This is one of the main cases solved

based on information exchange. Information exchange is increasing every year within SECI

Center. In 2006 we had 6000 information exchanges, last year 7600.”33

OSCE

Created in 1975, and reformed (including re-named) in 1995, the Organisation for Security

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the world's largest regional security organization, with 56

Ghita 14

31 http://www.irex.org/programs/symp/01/ram.pdf (May 2010). Steven WOEHREL, 2008: Islamic Terrorism and the Balkans, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress (Order Code RL33012), 1–10. p. 6

32 http://www.mai.gov.ro/engleza/Documente/Arhiva%20comunicate/2007/BI%20web%2024-30.09.en.pdf (2 June 2010).

33 SECI Press Release April 23, 2008. http://www.secicenter.org/p411/23+April+2008. May 28, 2010

participating countries from Europe, Central Asia and America. The organisation has its roots in

the 1973 UN Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).

It represents both a political cooperation forum (for issues ranging from early warning and

conflict prevention, to crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction) and an operative

mechanism (through its unique network of field missions).

Interagency cooperation on combating terrorism and organized crime has been a high

priority of the OSCE; to this end, the OSCE has organized numerous meetings, conferences and

roundtables aimed at enhancing cooperation between police, prosecutors and judges in organized

crime investigations, as well as harmonization of legislation among its member states. It has also

been a supporter and contributor to global anti-terrorism efforts.34

The Central European Initiative (CEI)

The Central European Initiative (CEI) is an intergovernmental cooperation forum

established in 1989 to assist its Central European member countries in fulfilling EU membership

requirements. Having included South Eastern and Eastern European countries in the late 1990s,

the CEI agenda changed to encompass cross-border cooperation in combating terrorism and

organized crime. Currently, the CEI comprises of 18 countries from Central and Eastern Europe

(Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic,

Hungary, Italy, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia

and Ukraine).35 The CEI’s activities have involved regular meetings aimed at exchanging and

sharing information and experience, assessing lessons learned from past experiences and

providing comparative surveys on regional security threats.36

Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)

Established in 1992, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) was the first full-

fledged regional cooperation organization in the Black Sea region, comprising all six Black Sea

riparian states (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine), as well as five

Ghita 15

34 Duta. op. cit. Vol II. p. 60-67

35 Final Document of CEI Heads of Government. 2009 http://www.ceinet.org/content/official-documents?tab=1.

36 "Interregional and Cross-Border Cooperation | CEI - Central European Initiative."Homepage | CEI - Central European Initiative. N.p., n.d. Web. 29 May 2010. <http://www.ceinet.org/content/interregional-and-cross-border-cooperation?tab=1>.

neighbouring countries (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece and Moldova). With regards to,

organized crime and terrorism, the BSEC countries signed an agreement on Cooperation in

Combating Crime (including organized crime) in 1998 and an additional protocol in 2004.37

Black Sea Naval Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR)

The Black Sea Naval Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) is a multinational naval force

comprising the six Black Sea countries (Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and

Georgia) aimed at reducing illicit activity on the Black Sea through international cooperation. It

has been activated for maritime emergencies (e.g. search and rescue operations, humanitarian

needs, counter maritime terrorism, clearing sea mines, etc).38

Border Defense Initiative (BDI)

The Border Defense Initiative (BDI), also known as the “Black Sea Border Security

Initiative”, was conceived as a cooperative endeavor of the Black Sea riparian countries

(Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine), launched in 2004. Under the auspices of

the BDI, member countries are conducting various simulation exercises to combat the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), strengthen border control and share

intelligence on illicit WMD-related activities in the region.39

Analysis of Cooperation

Admittedly, the existence of such a great number of cooperation instruments proves the

BSWR countries’ common security concerns and willingness to work together to tackle them.

However, this might also challenge effective cooperation. Not only are some cooperation

initiatives redundant, but they ultimately seem to become more symbolic than real (in that they

either lack the appropriate management and/or support to be effective, or hold meetings only for

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37 "Charter." Black Sea Economic Cooperation.Web. 21 June 2010. <http://www.bsec-organization.org/documents/LegalDo>

38"Blackseafor." BLACKSEAFOR. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 May 2010. <http://www.blackseafor.org/english/agreement.php>

39 Roslycky, Lada. "Organized transnational crime in the Black Sea Region: a geopolitical dilemma?." Trends in Organized Crime 12.1 (2009): 21-29. SpringerLink. Web. 3 June 2010. p. 27

the sake of more meetings).40 For example, there are three cooperation initiatives involving the

Black Sea countries, all of them concerned with combating terrorism and/or organized crime.

Stark critics often qualify such initiatives as “inadequate authority, confused priority

setting and less than spectacular management” because of the limited effectiveness due to

influential organized crime groups are still operating in the region.41

In addition, many regional initiatives have pursued immediate problem solving or quick-

fix solutions to various security issues, rather than long-term security goals for the region, which

made regional cooperation a “good intention” with no substantial results.42 Moreover, BSWR

has more diplomatic than operative collective tools; even if diplomatic efforts are valuable in

strengthening regional relations they may not be as effective in operative procedures.

One model of an operative collective tool which could be consulted for the issue at hand

would be the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) given that some of trafficking is conducted

by sea with major hubs placed in ports such as Odessa.43 The initiative, which comprises of 83

signatories including Russia and the US, aims to stop shipments of biological, chemical, and

nuclear weapons, as well as missiles and goods that could be used to deliver or produce such

weapons, to terrorists and countries suspected of trying to acquire WMD. Initiative participants

intend to carry out cargo interdictions at sea, in the air, or on land. For some countries this is not

a new practice but an enshrinement and expansion of current operations.44 The United States and

other countries have long records of intercepting illegal trade and smuggling activities, including

illicit weapons transactions. Still, the initiative is designed to make it more costly and risky for

proliferators to acquire the weapons or materials they seek. By doing so, members hope that

other countries will be dissuaded from pursuing weapons in the first place or experience

significant delays in their acquisition efforts. Assessing the PSI’s results has been difficult.

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40 Cordesman, Anthony, Burke, Arleigh, 2006: The Lessons of International Cooperation in Counterterrorism. http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060118_lessonsintctcoop.pdf . June 2010.

41 “Advancing Balkan Stability”. International Crisis Group.http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2001/evans-advancing-balkan-stability.aspx. June 2, 2010. Web

42 Has Regional Cooperation Led to the Establishment of Balkania: Europe’s Southeastern Dimension?, Analytica 2007. http://www.analyticamk.org/files/ReportNo7.pdf. May 2010. Web

43 Puglisi, Rosaria, “The Rise of Ukrainian Oligarchs,” Democratization 10, no. 3 (August 2003); 99-123. p. 112

44 US Department of State. Proliferation Security Initiative. http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm. June 2010. Web

Governments have been reticent to discuss specific interdictions publicly, claiming that to do so

might imperil future operations by exposing intelligence sources and methods relied on to get

useful information. Nevertheless, the two former Bush administration officials exemplified the

October 2003 confiscation of centrifuge technology bound for Libya aboard a ship, the BBC

China as a PSI success.45

While, all BSWR countries have acknowledged the need for a concerted response to

terrorism and organized crime, national interests and security concerns have prevailed over

cooperation. As a consequence, cooperation in the realm of intelligence, home affairs and justice

has been challenging: countries have been reticent to share national information with regard to

countering organized crime and terrorism, hesitant to create an integrated regional database on

organized crime (which is highly desirable in order to facilitate access to records for all law

enforcement agencies), and unable to establish robust cooperation capabilities among

investigative magistrates.46 On the other hand, the region’s countries have had different tempos

of development, institution-building, and European and Euro-Atlantic integration, thus a

different pace of reform and transformation of security and judiciary institutions. They did not

have compatible counter-terrorism and organized crime legislation, resources, capabilities,

methods and equipment, of which organized crime networks have taken advantage, which has

had a negative impact on the effectiveness of cooperation.47 The frequent meetings of regional

and subregional organizations, experience sharing, education and training, and most importantly

simulation exercises concerning combating terrorism and organized crime, will ultimately

deepen cooperation in the region.

Larger organizations such as the European Union have also had problems cooperating,

especially in the field of combating terrorism. Some EU countries do not see terrorism as a

global threat, but rather a “bygone era of political violence agitation indigenous to Europe in the

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45 Boese, Wade. Interdiction Initiative Success Assessed. Arms Control Association. June/July 2008. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_07-08/Interdiction. June 2010

46A Regional Security Strategy for the Western Balkans, Journal of Foreign Policy of Moldova, Issue 1, 2006, 2–20. p. 11

47 For further information and reference read: Antill, Peter 2002: Strengthening Stability in Central Europe: Practical Approaches to Regional and Sub-Regional Cooperative Security, 1–43.

1970s”.48 And, even if they viewed the Madrid terrorist attacks as the European version of 9/11,

Spain’s terrorist attacks did not change some EU countries’ inertia toward a common

counterterrorism strategy (including using military force to fight international terrorism) or

towards linking SALW trafficking to terrorist activities.49

In Ukraine, Germany and the UK are providing assistance to a NATO Partnership for

Peace project led by the US for the destruction of 133,000 tons of conventional munitions and

1.5 million SALW. In February 2007, the UK announced £400,000 of funding toward the

project.50

Western support and cooperation has played an important role in helping address the

problem of illicit trafficking from Eastern Europe. However, much more can and should be done.

The potential of the EU in this area is significantly underdeveloped. There is a question,

nonetheless, about the level of political priority that the EU and its members has given to

combating illicit small arms trafficking in the list of issues that applicant countries need to

address. The support that governments in the region have received from other Member States (on

a range of issues from weapons collection to intelligence sharing) has often been piecemeal,

uncoordinated and insufficient.51

V. Romania’s Role as a Border Member of the Euro-Atlantic Structure

Romania became a member of NATO in 2004 and of the EU in 2007. Domestically,

however, there are still many problems to contend with. The most serious threats to Romania’s

security are economic, and are manifested in crime, corruption, and illicit markets and

trafficking.

Accordingly, establishing the rule of law and instituting sound fiscal practices have been at

the top of the country’s political agenda since 1989. The domestic challenges facing Romania

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48 Zimmermann, Doron 2006: The European Union and Post-9/11 Counterterrorism: A Reappraisal, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol 29(2), 123–145. A Regional Security Strategy for the Western Balkans, Journal of Foreign Policy of Moldova, Issue 1, 2006, 2–20. p. 14

49 ibid, p. 17

50 “Securing a Global Arms Trade Treaty”, speech by Jack Straw, UK Foreign Secretary, 15 March 2008.

51 the reason why I am emphasizing the EU here is because Romania acts as both a EU and NATO member. NATO, however, does not conduct ample long-term neighbouring policies which are useful in this context whereas the EU does--as evidenced in the paper’s first section

are daunting, and demand significant inward-looking attention. Despite this, and the limited

resources available, Romania is determined to take on a leadership role in the Black Sea region.

The responsibility of its policies in this area have been proven historically by the country’s

systematic evolution from being a major producer of SALW during the Cold War to a

responsible NATO and EU member in 2007 (for a detailed description of the process see

Appendix #5).

Romania’s national security strategy emphasizes its desire to be a regional leader in a

broad security sense.52 It recognizes reviving the national economy as a top objective, and rightly

lays out a series of actions to address it.53 In a regional context, however, it describe two

additional and very important objectives. One of these is:

Active participation in actions of international cooperation aimed at fighting terrorism and cross-border organized crime, and second, developing regional relations and co-operation for building up stability and resolving crises.

In addition to these strategic objectives, there are three significant regional priorities that

describe specific actions Romania will take:

• Developing cooperation with the countries in the region, including participation in projects

of regional, sub-regional, cross-border and Euro-regional cooperation;

• Strengthening the OSCE’s role, as a forum of dialogue in the area of security and

developing the capability of preventing conflicts, managing crises and post-conflict

rebuilding;

• Promoting an active policy at a bilateral level or in an international framework in order to

ensure the security and stability in South-eastern Europe, as well as in the South Caucasus

and the whole area of the Danube and the Black Sea.

Moreover, the national military strategy states that Romania will be a key provider of regional

stability and a contributor to peace and security in Europe. By continuing current strategic,

multilateral and bilateral partnerships and by developing others, Romania intends to create

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52 Romanian National Security Strategy, http://www.presidency.ro/?_RID=ssnr&exp3=strat (Romanian), May 2010.

53 E.g., overcoming poverty and unemployment, streamlining the economy and the financial sector, developing the middle class; ensuring the stability of the banking system, etc.

favourable conditions to strengthen security in the region and will facilitate the modernization

of its Armed Forces.54

Because of the common concerns and view of the threats in the Black Sea region, it is in the

Member States’ interest to facilitate support for Romania to achieve its security goals as swiftly

as possible.

Romania has tremendous potential to be not just a force provider but also a regional stable

and responsible key state, moving forward in areas of mutual interest with its Euro-Atlantic

partners. This is most clearly evidenced in Romania’s active implication, initiative and

leadership in several regional security and economic organizations, as detailed in Appendix # 3,

and in its border control policy.

VI. Recommendations

A number of short and long-term priority joint-actions are required by Member States of

NATO and EU to enhance cooperation with their Black Sea neighbours to prevent and combat

SALW trafficking in and from this region. From its position as a Member State of both structures

and aspiring regional leader, Romania can and should incorporate some of these

recommendation and assume the role of a trend-setter in combating trafficking and ensuring a

greater regional security.

• Increase the emphasis on combating illicit trafficking in enlargement negotiations. It is

particularly important that Romania as a EU government and border country draws attention to

the deleterious impact of illicit SALW trafficking in Europe, since many states aspiring to

accession are producers and exporters or at least act as a source and transit route, for weapons

both throughout the region and beyond. However, this issue is often not given priority in

accession talks.

• Enhance export controls in the BSWR region. Although BSWR countries have made

significant improvements to their arms export control policies in recent years, Romania should

push EU and NATO members to increase their work with neighbouring countries, especially

EU applicant states, to ensure that they have robust export controls compatible with EU

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54 Romanian National Military Strategy, merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/RomaniaMilitaryStrategy.pdf, May 2010

standards before they are admitted to the EU. In particular, it is important to ensure that they

are not used as bases by EU companies and nationals to circumvent EU export controls.

• Strengthen and harmonize SALW legislation. There is a need to support legislative reform

to allow effective harmonization of the laws in the field of justice and home affairs, penal

codes and judicial procedure of countries in the region, especially those expected to join the

EU soon. Equally crucial to efforts to combat organized crime and illicit SALW trafficking is

the full implementation and support of all existing international commitments to regional and

international initiatives, such as the UN Firearms Protocol, the Organization for Security and

Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) SALW Document and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern

Europe’s Regional Implementation Plan for Combating the Proliferation of SALW.

• Increase cooperation between specialised agencies. Similar to the SECI model presented in

the previous section, there should be a regular flow of information between EU and NATO

specialised agencies and governments and neighbouring states’ agencies and governments with

regards to illicit SALW trafficking. This would help strengthen cooperation, identify and deter

traffic routes and employ more collective action in solving a transnational risk. Moreover this

information is a good indicator of the progress made in this field of action. The regularly

shared information should consist of 11 points as suggested by the more dated but still

important UN PoA conference from March 2001:

1. legislation which includes the illicit trade in small arms as a criminal offence;

2. types of penalities for those convicted of illegal arms trafficking;

3. number of ongoing investigations into illegal arms trafficking;

4. number of persons detained for illegal trafficking by year;

5. number of persons processed and convicted for illegal arms trafficking

6. number of small arms and light weapons confiscated by type;

7. number and description of successful governmental operations;

8. number of SALW collected and destroyed;

9. requests for legal and technical assistance and cooperation in arms trafficking cases;

10. number and type of SALW lost and/or stolen from military warehouses;

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11. sources and routes identified as used in the illegal arms trade.55

Consequently, the increased level of information can also contribute to a better harmonization

of arms’ trading and smuggling legislation between Romania, EU, NATO and BSWR

neighbouring countries.

• Increase and coordinate support for weapons collection and stockpile management.

Romania along with fellow EU and NATO governments should continue to support initiatives

to remove weapons from circulation in BSWR countries, to improve management of

government stockpiles and help destroy surplus stocks. It is vital that this support be better

coordinated, as often EU countries are supporting different programmes by different

implementation agencies both bilaterally and through the UN and NATO in the same country.

• Support research to give a clearer picture of the nature and scale of illicit SALW

trafficking. Measures should be taken to ensure that there are regular, concerted projects both

to research new developments in illicit arms trafficking, and to review and update law

enforcement strategies and practices, thus ensuring the identification and adoption of

appropriate minimum standards and best practices in preventing and combating illicit firearms

trafficking. With particular regard to arms flows from Eastern Europe, a clear picture on the

scope of the problem does not exist. To be able to realistically evaluate the situation, EU police

and customs agencies and the intelligence services should work together with their

counterparts in Eastern Europe to produce specific risk assessments for this type of crime,

which would trace origins and lines of supply of illicit SALW. This will also require the

effective use of all existing available institutions, mechanisms, networks and resources,

including Interpol, Europol, the OSCE, regional and sub-regional initiatives and so forth.

• Enhance the capacity of law enforcement agencies in the region to tackle the problem.

A number of measures need to be taken to enhance the capabilities of enforcement agencies in

this area to ensure that agencies have both the specialization and flexibility to combat the new

challenges posed by illicit SALW trafficking effectively. Central to these efforts are sufficient

financial resources, training and modern detection and analysis equipment. A variety of

training programmes are essential for improving enforcement standards. For example,

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55The Nobel Laureates Framework Convention where these points are brought and the UN PoA is referenced can be found in English, French and Spanish at http://www.armslaw.org.

customs officers should be trained to be able to thoroughly check and evaluate documents and

carriers’ compliance; recognize different classifications of firearms; use modern detection

equipment;56 and record and retrieve information stored on computerized databases, where the

information can be analysed by customs and also shared with other relevant state agencies.

• Increase cooperation with Russia on illicit trafficking. Russia, EU and NATO have issued

numerous joint statements highlighting the fact that controlling illicit trafficking in arms and

combating terrorism are in their common interest. The April 2000 EU–Russia Joint Action to

Fight Organised Crime contains provisions for combating illicit trafficking in arms that should

be developed into concrete actions.57 The EU, NATO and Russia should therefore use these

common interests to promote a joint Programme of Action on strengthening information

exchanges and combating trafficking. Nevertheless, given Russia’s new military doctrine the

possibility of such an action remains ambiguous particularly due to its undefined tone and lack

of specificity with regards to the basis of a prospective Euro-Atlantic cooperation.58

• End-user certificates, international law and export licensing. An End User Certificate

(EUC) is a clear written undertaking of a buyer / importer in a foreign country that any

controlled goods transferred from South Africa, is for its sole use. By the same token, the

buyer / importer has to certify that the controlled goods is not destined for transfer or re-export

to any other entity or State in its original form, without the prior written consent of the

relevant. It is important that EUCs are implemented in this region and that correspond to the

Wassenaar Arrangement standards as stipulated in the Statement of Understanding on

Implementation of End-Use Controls for Dual-Use Items (see Appendix # 4). Also by having

more countries in the region such as Moldova, adhere to this agreement there can be a

uniformed standard for EUCs, thus reducing red-tape and making security measures more

efficient across the region as a whole, especially due to the feedback component of the EUCs.

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56 one recent invention which could prove itself useful in this process is Roboscan developed by MBtelecom and has won the Gold Medal at the Geneva Innovation Conference because of the inventions capability to easily scan (it is handheld) incoming transportation vehicles. This type of technology should be considered in implementing a NATO Second Level Defense-type of policy. (http://www.mbtelecom.ro/en/home.html. June 2010)

57 Heisbourg, François. "Russia's security policy and EU-Russia relations." UK Space Vision 2025. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 June 2010.http://www.eusec.org/20020114.htm.

58Военная доктрина Российской Федерации, http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461, June 2010

• Support anti-corruption programmes. Law enforcement efforts to efficiently fight illicit

SALW trafficking should be accompanied and supported by measures taken in other areas.

In particular, further action is required to combat corruption in customs, border and law

enforcement agencies across Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, as well as in some of the new

EU members. Greater efforts are still required to change the culture of these professions, and

to make officers aware that bribes are not a perk of the job, but rather need to be eradicated.

Training alone, though, will not solve all these problems. Improved pay levels, better working

conditions and resources for detecting and prosecuting corruption also need to be addressed.

• Increase transparency and accountability of agencies combating illicit trafficking. In

their efforts to combat and prevent organized crime and illicit SALW trafficking, and

particularly in relation to the control of legal activities (such as data retention and protection,

telecommunications privacy etc.), all states should ensure appropriate transparency and clear

accountability mechanisms and incorporate appropriate safeguards for civil rights and

democracy. There is need to ensure adequate and appropriate systems for parliamentary

oversight, at national and international levels, such as publicly available regular reports on

policies and practices of national and international enforcement agencies.

• Supporting NGOs addressing SALW illicit arms trading. As mentioned by Keck and

Sikkink, NGOs through their transnational networks and inherent boomerang effect, have the

power to draw international attention to relevant problems.59 Member States should hence

support projects and NGOs based in this region whose aim is to educate the population or

target illicit trafficking sources in general.

VII.Conclusion

Illicit arms trafficking poses a serious threat to Romania’s, the EU’s and NATO’s security

and to their wider common international objectives. The risk of an increase in illicit SALW

trafficking into the EU and NATO is real, but there is currently a vital opportunity for early

action to prevent this from escalating. Some Member States and Allies of these Euro-Atlantic

structures are inadvertently playing a damaging role in illicitly trafficking weapons into conflict

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59 Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998. Print. pg. 32

regions, but the increased focus on this trade also provides an opportunity to put comprehensive

measures in place to address it. Similarly, the increased focus on targeting development

assistance to address problems of insecurity in the BSWR provides an opportunity for the EU

and NATO to more effectively work to help address the problem of arms trafficking in other

regions such as the Western Balkans or Africa.

If these opportunities are to be taken, however, illicit arms trafficking has to become a

higher political priority for all Member States, as the countries closer to the region i.e. Romania

and Bulgaria, cannot single-handily contend with the difficulties of this trans-border

phenomenon. There needs to be a strong cooperation so that increased law enforcement capacity

needs to be devoted to address it, more resources are needed to help address the problem at

source in BSWR, and development assistance should be targeted to combat such problems

arising in highly tense regions such as the “frozen conflicts” in Transnistria, South Ossetia,

Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabach.

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Appendixes

Appendix # 1 Illustrations

Image 1. Map of the Black Sea Region

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Image 2. TRACECA in Romania

*** Source of images: The European Security and Defence Assembly, Assembly of WEU.

Parliamentary Cooperation on Security in the Black Sea Region. http://www.assembly-weu.org/

en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2008/2002.php. 12 May 2010. Web.

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Appendix #2: Transport Corridor Europe Caucus Asia (TRACECA)

TRACECA (in the area of transport), on the one hand, was developed with a view to

establishing new relations based primarily on trade between Europe, the Caucasus and central

Asia (2nd International Conference on the Restoration of the Historic Silk Route - an Azerbaijani

and Georgian initiative with EU support - Baku Declaration, 7-8 September 1998). INOGATE

(in the area of energy), on the other hand, focuses on the energy supplies of participating

countries. Despite the fact that funding problems are already apparent and that there is some

concern as to how effective the investments are both within the EU and in the regional countries

and governments involved, it is worthwhile developing some ideas on these two initiatives

which also face other problems, such as relations between countries in the region (Azerbaijan

and Armenia) or the so-called frozen conflicts.

TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) was established in 1993 and is

financed by the EU in the framework of the TACIS programme (Technical Assistance to the

Commonwealth of Independent States) - the EU's main instrument for providing technical

assistance to the South Caucasus since 1991. It is directly linked to the revival of the Silk Road,

an ambition embedded in the aforementioned Baku Declaration where - in paragraph 5 - the

parties are formally invited, with the assistance of the EU, United Nations agencies, the BSEC,

the Economic Cooperation Organisation and other international and financial organisations, "to

pool their material and human resources to encourage mutually beneficial cooperation for

achievement of this objective" and establish the necessary institutional and legal structures.

Furthermore, and according to ideas put forward at the Colloquy on the Caucasus held by the

French Senate and the CFCE (the French centre for foreign trade) on 14 December 1999,

TRACECA is the key factor for growth for the countries in the region, while the project is part

of the EU's global strategy in the region to support the countries' political and economic

independence, to encourage regional cooperation, to provide technical assistance, to promote

investment from international financial institutions (EBRD, the World Bank, the Asian

Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the Kuwait Fund, etc), or private bodies,

and to link TRACECA with the Trans-European Networks (TEN). At the same time, questions of

institutional, judicial and administrative reforms, direct investment, technology and

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infrastructure are generally the main subjects of dialogue and discussion between the actors

involved.

***This presentation of TRACECA has been compiled and synthesised from:

• The European Security and Defence Assembly, Assembly of WEU. Parliamentary

Cooperation on Security in the Black Sea Region. http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/

documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2008/2002.php. 12 May 2010. Web.

• TRACECA Website. http://www.traceca-org.org/. June 13, 2010. Web

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Appendix # 3: Romania’s Implication in Some Black Sea Regional Organizations

NATO OSCE BSEC SECI CEI

Primary Function

Collective Security

Conflict Resolution

Economic Regional Stability

Political, Economic and Cultural Cooperation

Romania’s Role

Force provider with niche capabilities i.e., engineering, SOF, ISAF, contributor, SEEI

Pushing for strengthening OSCE’s role in conflict prevention and resolution

Pushing for revitalizing BSEC’s role in promoting regional free trade

Launched initiative and hosts SECI HQ in Bucharest

Chairs 2 of 17 working groups (Minorities, Information and Media

Implications Increase prestige and regional authority as NATO member

Allows Romania to position itself to contribute to conflict resolution in Transnistria, Caucusus

Increases Romania’s market potential

Regional prestige, some control over SECI agenda

Significant contributions to regional/ expanded forums allows Romania to gain influence and push forth problems in international agendas

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Appendix # 4: The Wassenaar Arrangement’s Statement of Understanding on Implementation of End-Use Controls for Dual-Use Items

Statement of Understanding on Implementation of End-Use Controls for Dual-Use Items

(Agreed at the 2007 Plenary) Participating States agree, while a system of end-use controls should always be applied, to maintain a flexible and effective system of end-use controls. The proper evaluation of each individual export licence application is important to minimise the risk of undesirable diversion. Based on an intelligent risk management the sensitivity of an export transaction should be analysed case by case. Participating States may, as appropriate, apply this Statement of Understanding also to exports of items other than dual-use items. 1. The underlying principle for end-use controls is that sensitive cases should be subject to a greater degree of scrutiny than less sensitive cases. Participating States therefore can combine basic and additional elements (as set out in the Reference List in the Annex, which is neither exhaustive nor binding) depending on the assessment of risk. In general, basic elements should always be applied. 2. Participating States agree that the evaluation of the degree of sensitivity remains entirely within national responsibility. The evaluation of sensitivity and the decisions made by Participating States in this context are not binding and do not constitute a prejudice for others. 3. There are three phases of an export to be considered when dealing with end-use controls: the pre-licence phase, the application procedure and the post-licence phase. There is a close inter-relationship between the phases. 4. When selecting which elements from the Annex to use, account must be taken of the different questions that will arise depending on the nature of the goods to be exported. 5. All elements of the end-use controls process need to be packaged together to form a coherent initiative. While end-use certificates are an essential element of end-use controls they are not a substitute for a full assessment of risk involving both licensing authorities and the exporter. 6. Participating States will review progress on the implementation of this Statement of Understanding on a regular basis.

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Appendix #5: History of Romania’s Evolution in Export Control

During the Cold-War Romania developed a massive firearm industry which was virtually

independent of imports. This determined the Romanian firearm industry to become the ninth

biggest firearm producer by the mid 80s.60 After the fall of the communist regime in 1989, the

country faced harsh economic troubles, peaking in 2001 with a historical minimum of exports

due to the loss of international market-share, reduction of public spending and the government’s

compliance with international firearm embargoes.61 Given these unfavourable premises, the

Romanian government has committed itself to implementing stringent norms and regulations

with regards to weapon control and border and strategic trade control.

It thus becomes clear that Romania’s strategic priority of becoming a EU and NATO

member has had a dramatic effect on the country’s foreign and security policies and have

compelled the government to maintain and implement the major international non-proliferation

treaties and standards (See Table 2).

Romania’s current policy interdicts SALW exports to conflict areas, states which support

terrorism and regions with a high risk of conflict. Since 2002 there are physical border controls

of strategic imports and exports and in 2003 a border management strategy was adopted.62

The control of strategic63 exports and imports is regimented by the Government

Emergency Ordinance 158/1999, which has been amended and completed by Law no.

595/200464 and the Government Decree no. 924/2007.65 The law Moreover, the National

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60 Hirst, C., and B. Mariani. Arms Production, Exports and Decision-making in Central and Eastern Europe. London: Saferworld, 2002. Print. p. 142

61 Mincă, op cit. p. 58

62 ‘South Eastern Europe SALW Monitor’, SEESAC, 2004, p 146

63 by strategic products I refer to military products and dual capacity technology.

64 ANCEX. Legislatie. http://www.ancex.ro/old_ancex/site_rom/legislatie/legea_595_2004.htm. June 2010. Web

65 ANCEX. Controlul Exporturilor de Arme- Raport Anual 2008. http://www.ancex.ro/?pag=89&highlight=raport. May 2010. Web.

Standard no. SR 13475 has been implemented to align SALW marking with OSCE

recommendations.66

Firearms and ammunition possession is regimented by law no. 295/2004,67 which was last

amended by law no. 99/2010 (voted and implemented in 21/05/2010).68 This law is

comprehensive and fully compatible with EU norms. On this note, it is worth mentioning that

the regulation approved in law no. 116/1997, ratifies of the European Convention on civilian

firearm control and possession.69 The fact that this convention was present in the Romanian

legislation as early as 1997 is a testimony of the country’s political responsibility given its

historical circumstances.

As in what concerns the destruction of SALW surplus, Romania has been visited by

specialists from the US and Norway who offered consultancy with regards to stock management

and identifying the feasibility of SALW surplus destruction. It is in this context that the

Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has presented a National Programme for eliminating

SALW surplus which was started with the financial support of Norway and the US.70

Table # 2: Romania’s participation in Regional SALW Regimes and Regional Security Organisations

SALW Control Agreement/Regional Security Organisation Romania’s Commitment

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council yes

EU Code of Conduct on SALW Jul 1, 1998

EU Joint Action on SALW Dec 1, 1998

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66 2008 Romanian National Report to the Programme of Action on SALW: http://disarmament.un.org/cab/bms3/1BMS3Pages/1NationalReports/Romania(E).PDF

67 DreptOnline.ro. http://www.dreptonline.ro/legislatie/regimul_armelor_munitiilor.php. 19 June 2010. Web

68 “Legea nr. 295/2004 privind regimul armelor si munitiilor a fost modificata.” InfoLegal.http://www.infolegal.ro/legea-nr-2952004-privind-regimul-armelor-si-munitiilor-a-fost-modificata/2010/06/08/. 20 June 2010. Web

69 ibid.

70 Mincă, op. cit., p. 60

SALW Control Agreement/Regional Security Organisation Romania’s Commitment

Ottawa Convention Signed yes

OSCE SALW Document Nov 1, 2000

OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition Dec 1, 2003

NATO Joined, March 2004

Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan Nov 1, 2001

UN Convention Against Signed, Transnational Organised Crime

14/12/2000; Ratified 04/12/2002

UN Firearms Protocol Feb 1, 2004

Wassenaar Arrangement Apr 1, 1996

European Union January, 2007

Ghita 35

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