Corruption risk indicators in public procurement....Corruption Risks: Investigating the impact of...
Transcript of Corruption risk indicators in public procurement....Corruption Risks: Investigating the impact of...
Corruption risk indicators in
public procurement. What we have, should have, and what to do with them
Mihály Fazekas University of Cambridge and
Government Transparency Institute
2017.04.12. 1
Using indicators to inform policy
and measure progress on anti-
corruption, DG HOME, 31/3/2017
This project has received funding
from the European Union’s
Horizon 2020 research and
innovation Programme under
grant agreement No 645852
Three main topics
1. State of public procurement data in
Europe & what needs to be done
2. Overview of corruption risk indicators &
why we trust (some of) them
3. Selected conclusions & policy advice
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Why public procurement?
1. A lot of money involved~1/3 of gov’t spend
2. Crucial role in development (e.g. capital accumulation)
3. Indicates the broader quality of institutions
4. Very corrupt (at least perceivet to be...)
5. And of course: LOTS OF DATA
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I. Public procurement data
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The DIGIWHIST data template
• Public procurement data
• Company data: registry, financials, ownership
• Political officeholder data
• Treasury accounts of public organisations
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Where is that data? Minimum threshold for publication supplies and services (EUR), 2015
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Where is that data?
Covering the full
tender cycle
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Where is that data?
Knowing the
actors
Administrative error: missing information
Average % missing information (13 mandatory fields), 2009-2015, TED data
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Where is that data?
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%
SK
IS
RO
HU
CZ
LV
PL
EE
SI
HR
LT
CY
AT
GR
BG
BE
EU AVG.
IT
DE
DK
UK
NL
ES
PT
FR
LU
CH
FI
SE
II. Proxying corruption
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Corruption definition
In public procurement, the aim of corruption is to steer the contract to the favored bidder without detection. This is done in a number of ways, including:
– Avoiding competition through, e.g., unjustified sole sourcing or direct contract awards.
– Favoring a certain bidder by tailoring specifications, sharing inside information, etc.
See: World Bank Integrity Presidency (2009) Fraud and Corruption. Awareness Handbook, World Bank, Washington DC. pp. 7.
Note the difference from legal definitions
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Conceptualizing public
procurement corruption indicators
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Contracting
body Supplier Contract
Particularistic tie
Tendering Risk Indicators
(TRI)
Supplier Risk
Indicators (SRI)
Contracting Body
Risk Indicators
(CBRI) Political
Connections
Indicators (PCI)
Source: Fazekas, M., & Kocsis, G. (2015). Uncovering High-Level Corruption: Cross-National Corruption Proxies Using Government Contracting Data. GTI-WP/2015:02, Government Transparency Institute, Budapest.
Corruption proxy building approach
1. Clear definition of corruption
2. Dictionary of corruption technologies
3. Statistical modelling of corrupt contracting
4. Indicator validation: triangulation
Corruption risks are only approximated! 2017.04.12. 13
(BAD) Alternative approaches
• Naive summation of expert-suggested red
flags
• Arbitrary cut-points
• Fixation on selected indicators
• Others which might work: PCA, SEM,
machine learning
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Selected examples
1. Single bidding on competitive markets
2. Swings in company market shares when
governments change
3. Supplier anomalies
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Modelling corrupt
contracting: single bidding
16
Distribution of contracts according to
the advertisement period
Probability of single bid submitted for contracts
compared with the market norm of 48+ days
Source: EU’s Tenders
Electronic Daily (TED),
Portugal , 2009-2014
Single bidding
Tight deadline
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Macro validity:
Corruption perceptions & single bidding
Single bidding correlates with subjective indicators of corruption
Source: Fazekas, M., & Kocsis, G. (2015). Uncovering High-Level Corruption: Cross-National Corruption Proxies Using Government Contracting Data. GTI-WP/2015:02, Government Transparency Institute, Budapest.
Micro validity:
Number of bidders & prices • Price savings by the number of bidders
• 543,705 contracts, EU27, 2009-2014
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Surprise success
goes together with
procurement red
flags (CRI)
Politically driven company success: Hungary a paradigmatic case
Companies lose/win
surprisingly when
government changes
Hungary, 2009-2012
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Few companies
lose/win surprisingly
when government
changes
UK, 2009-2012
Surprise success
sometimes goes
together with
procurement red flags
(CRI)
Politically driven company success: UK exception to the rule
Selected supplier risks
• Tax haven registration
• Young companies/company age linked to
government change
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Tax havens & procurement corruption (TRI)
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• Tax havens (Financial Secrecy Index) higher corruption risks (single bidding, Corruption Risk Index)
• EU28, 2009-2014
SRI: Expected success of companies by
age
1. Gradual
build-up of
contracts
2. Natural
fluctuation
over time
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SRI: Observed success of companies at
‚specific’ ages
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1. ‚Just’ founded
companies
2. Companies
founded
under party
last in power
Hungary, 2010
Source: Fazekas, M., Lukács, P. A., & Tóth, I. J. (2015). The Political Economy of Grand Corruption in Public Procurement in the Construction Sector of Hungary. In A. Mungiu-Pippidi (Ed.), Government Favouritism in Europe. The Anticorruption Report 3 (pp. 53–68). Berlin: Barbara Budrich Publishers.
Limitations
• Data, data, data!
• You get what you measure: no general
indicator of corruption!
• Only lower bound estimate: sophisticated
actors can avoid detection (e.g. cartels)
• Variance-driven: corruption is deviation
from a norm
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III. Some conclusions
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Objective proxies are better in tracking trends
• One example: Hungary 2009-2012 – ‚Something has changed’
– WGI CoC reports NO CHANGE (improvement not sign.)
– CRI reports INCREASING RISK
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Objective proxies can surprise you
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Panel-corrected standard errors Municipality-clustered standard errors
Static AR1 LDV Static LDV
New ruling
party
-2.197* -2.075* -2.159* -2.251* -2.191* -2.101* -2.035* -2.181** -1.991** -2.033** -2.110** -2.186* -2.084*
(1.248) (1.253) (1.233) (1.165) (1.189) (1.181) (1.171) (0.933) (0.856) (0.908) (1.010) (1.137) (1.247)
Voteshare,
governing party
0.0713** 0.0808** 0.0790** 0.168*** 0.169*** 0.0735** 0.162*** 0.00574 0.224*** 0.0813 0.147* 0.00474 0.214*
(0.0357) (0.0403) (0.0403) (0.0616) (0.0618) (0.0297) (0.0594) (0.0564) (0.0556) (0.0829) (0.0887) (0.113) (0.109)
Observations 1,870 1,870 1,870 1,870 1,870 1,870 1,870 1,544 1,544 1,901 1,901 1,576 1,576
R-squared 0.276 0.289 0.289 0.293 0.293 0.322 0.342 0.284 0.302 0.283 0.298 0.333 0.350
Number of mc 278 278 278 278 278 278 278 270 270
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Party FE NO NO NO YES YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Additional
control(s) Population
Median
income All All All All All
Sweden: new governments decrease corruption risks
Objective proxies can surprise you
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UK: entrenched parties increase prices
Objective
proxies go
beyond the
mere more or
less corruption
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Types of corruption risks in CEE &
Eu Funds’ corruption risk effects
2017.04.12. 31 Source: Fazekas, M., & King, L. (2016) Perils of development funding? The tale of EU Funds and
grand corruption in Central and Eastern Europe. Regulation and governance. Under review.
Pointers for short term action
• Get data up to the mark
– Make sure laws are implemented: data quality
– Publish structured data (csv, etc)
– Make sure variables relevant for corruption
flagging are captured (IDs, final prices, etc)
See: https://opentender.eu/blog/2017-03-towards-more-transparency/
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Key
variables
to capture
in PP
systems
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Variable group Variable Included in the announcement
call for tender contract award contract implementation
Buyer Buyer’s name ● ● ●
Buyer’s department/office ● ● ●
Buyer’s unique ID ● ● ●
Buyer’s address ● ● ●
Buyer’s type ● ● ●
Bidder / bids Bidder’s name ● ●
Bidder’s unique ID/tax ID ● ●
Bidder’s address ● ●
Number of bids submitted ●
Number of bids excluded ●
Bid price (details on total and unit prices) ● ●
Exact time of bid submission ●
Bid type (winner/loser bid) ●
Beneficial owners ● ●
Tender /
contract
Tender unique ID ● ● ●
Procedure type ● ●
Framework agreement (1st/2nd stage) ● ●
Award criteria ● ●
Threshold (below/above EU thresholds?) ● ●
Estimated price (details on total or unit prices) ● ●
Procurement type (service, supply, work) ● ● ●
CPV codes (% contract value per product) ● ● ●
NUTS code(s) of contract implementation ● ● ●
Status (cancelled, pending, etc.) ● ● ●
Dates Call for tender publication date ● ● ●
Bid submission deadline ●
Contract start and end dates ● ● ●
Publication date of contract award ●
Contract signature date ●
Publication date of contract completion ●
Subcontracting Subcontractor’s name and unique ID (tax ID) ● ●
Subcontractor’s share ● ●
Consortium Consortium members’ name and unique ID (tax ID) ● ●
Consortium members’ share ● ●
Contract
performance
Contract performance end date ●
Was performance according to the contract ●
Explanation in case of deferring from contract ●
Information on contract modification ●
Information on performance quality ●
Pointers for short term action
• Get data up to the mark – Make sure laws are implemented: data quality
– Publish structured data (csv, etc)
– Make sure variables relevant for corruption flagging are captured (IDs, final prices, etc)
– Link data (e.g. procurement to company)
• Introduce real-time monitoring and regular data use data is immediately actionable!
• Learn how to use indicators carefully
See: https://opentender.eu/blog/2017-03-towards-more-transparency/
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Differences in the average number of bids submitted between non-restricted
and restricted procedures, OECD-Europe, 2013, c.value>58k eur
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Beware of the context use of restricted procedures
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Single bidder
ratio, TED, EU,
2009-2014
Monitoring can invalidate indicators Single bidding & organised criminality
For more information check out
digiwhist.eu/resources
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Furher readings
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Charron, N., Dahlström, C., Fazekas, M., & Lapuente, V. (2017). Careers, Connections, and Corruption Risks: Investigating the impact of bureaucratic meritocracy on public procurement processes. Journal of Politics, 79(1), p. 89–103.
Fazekas, M. & Cingolani, L. (2017), Breaking the cycle? How (not) to use political finance regulations to counter public procurement corruption. Slavonic & East European Review, 95(1)
Fazekas, M. & Tóth, B. (2017), Infrastructure for whom? Corruption risks in infrastructure provision across Europe. In Hammerschmid, G, Kostka, G. & Wegrich, K. (Eds.), The Governance Report 2016 . Oxford University Press, ch 11.
Fazekas, M., & Tóth, I. J. (2017). Corruption in EU Funds? Europe-wide evidence on the corruption effect of EU-funded public contracting. In J. Bachtler, P. Berkowitz, S. Hardy, & T. Muravska (Eds.), EU Cohesion Policy. Reassessing performance and direction. London: Routledge, ch. 13.
Rasmus Broms, Carl Dahlström and Mihaly Fazekas (2017). Entrenched parties and control of public procurement in Sweden. University of Gothenburg-Quality of Government Institute, manuscript
Fazekas, M. and Tóth, I. J. (2016). From corruption to state capture: A new analytical framework with empirical applications from Hungary. Political Research Quarterly, 69(2), p. 320-334
Fazekas, M., Cingolani, L., & Tóth, B. (2016). A comprehensive review of objective corruption proxies in public procurement: risky actors, transactions, and vehicles of rent extraction: GTI-WP/2016:03. Government Transparency Institute. Budapest.
Fazekas, M., Tóth, I. J., & King, L. P. (2016). Anatomy of grand corruption: A composite corruption risk index based on objective data. Eu. Journal of Criminal Policy and Research, 22(3), 369–397.
Fazekas, M. (2015). The Cost of One-Party Councils: Lack of Electoral Accountability and Public Procurement Corruption. London: Electoral Reform Society.
Fazekas, M., & Kocsis, G. (2015). Uncovering High-Level Corruption: Cross-National Corruption Proxies Using Government Contracting Data. GTI-WP/2015:02, Government Transparency Institute, Budapest.
Fazekas, M., Lukács, P. A., & Tóth, I. J. (2015). The Political Economy of Grand Corruption in Public Procurement in the Construction Sector of Hungary. In A. Mungiu-Pippidi (Ed.), Government Favouritism in Europe The Anticorruption Report 3 (pp. 53–68). Berlin: Barbara Budrich Publishers.
Fazekas, M. (2015). The Cost of One-Party Councils: Lack of Electoral Accountability and Public Procurement Corruption. London: Electoral Reform Society.