Corruption and the human right to water and sanitation€¦ · Corruption and the human right to...

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Corruption and the human right to water and sanitation

Human right-based approach to tackling corruption in the water sector

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Corruption and the human right to water and sanitation

Human right-based approach to tackling corruption in the water sector

Contents

1. Introduction 3

2. Linkingcorruptionandhumanrights:promisesandpitfalls 5

2.1 Buildingsynergiesbetweenanti-corruptionconventionsandhumanrights’instruments:thechallengesofpettycorruption 6

3. Corruptionandtherealizationofthehumanrighttowaterandsanitation 9

3.1 Corruptionandtheobligationtodevotethe‘maximumavailableresources’torealizingthehumanrighttowaterandsanitation 10

3.2 Whencorruptionactsleadtothe`violationoftheobligationtorespect 11

3.3 Whencorruptionleadstoaviolationoftheobligationtoprotect 11

3.4 Totakeappropriatelegislativemeasuresagainstcorruptionandtheobligationtofulfill? 12

3.5 Beyondcriminalization:dealingwithcomplexrealities 13

4. AlegalframeworktoTAP-transparency,accountabilityandparticipation 15

4.1 Transparentrecruitmentprocessesinthewaterandsanitationsector 16

4.2 Transparencyininternationalaidflows 17

4.3 Makingtransparency,participationandaccountabilityinbudgetingandplanningareality:nationalandsub-nationallevels 17

4.4 TransparencyinPublicProcurementProcessesandPublicPrivatePartnerships:challengesahead 21

4.5 Transparency,ParticipationandAccountability:thecentralroleofServiceProviders(opera-tionallevels) 23

5. Conclusionsandrecommendations 25

5.1 Significanceoftheresearch 25

5.2 MeasuringandUnderstandingcorruption 26

5.3 Furtherresearchandnextsteps 26

6. References 29

6.1 Academicarticles/bookchapters 29

6.2 SelectionofConventions 32

6.3 SelectionsofUNResolutions 32

vii

Acknowledgments

AuthorsTheauthorofthispublicationisAlineBaillatfromWaterLex.

AlineBaillatisaresearcheratWaterLexsinceJanuary2012.SheholdsaPhDinInternationalRelationsfromtheGraduateInstituteofInternationalandDevelopmentStudies,Geneva(2008).Herareaofspecializationiscomparativeandinternationalwaterlawandpolicy.AtWaterLexAlinecontributestoresearch,trainingandadvisoryactivities,withspecificexpertiseonthescopeandcontentsofthehumanrighttowateranditsconsequencesforvariousaspectsofwatergovernance.

ContributorsThispublicationistheresultofcollaborationbetweentheWaterIntegrityNetwork(WIN)andWaterLex.Thepresentreporthasbenefitedfromfeedback,conversations,reviews,critiques,andsuggestionsfrommanypeople.IwouldespeciallyliketothankAnnaMariaBuzzoniofWaterWINforconductingafieldstudyinLatinAmericaonOrganizacionesComunitariasdeServiciodeAguainSpringof2013.IwouldalsoliketothankBinayakDasofWINandHeleneBoussardofWaterLexwhocontributedsignifi-cantlyintheprocessofdevelopingandfinalizingthispublication.Iwouldliketoextendthankstocommunitywaterboards-OCSCAfromCentralAmericaandFreshWaterActionNetworkSouthAsia(FANSA)forcontributingcasestudies.

ReviewersTheauthorwouldliketoexpressitsmostsinceregratitudetoseveralhumanrightspecialistsandanti-corruptionprofessionalsworkinginthefieldofwatergovernancewhocommentedonearlierdraftsofthisreport.Thesereviewersare:VirginiaRoaf(WASHUnited),MaraTignino(InternationalWaterLawPlatform,UniversityofGeneva),MovaAlAfghani(UniversityofIbnKhaldunBo-gor-Indonesia),andIreneGai(ProjectCoordinator,KAWO).Theireffortsresultedinmanyimprovements,yettheybearnorespon-sibilityfortheopinions,findingsandconclusionsexpressedinthisreport.

CopyrightsSharingthispublication,photocopyinganddistributionthroughtheInternetfornon-commercialpurposesispermittedanden-couraged,providedallsuchcopiesincludeacompletecitation.Nouseofthispublicationmaybemadeforresaleorforanycom-mercialpurposeswhatsoever.Requestsforpermissiontoreproducethepublicationinitsentiretyorfortranslationsshouldbeaddressedto:

WaterLexInternationalSecretariat83, ruedeMontbrillant1202 GenevaSwitzerland Web:www.waterlex.org Email:[email protected]

And

WaterIntegrityNetwork c/oTransparencyInternational AltMoabit96,10559Berlin Web:www.waterintegritynetwork.org Email:[email protected]

CitationBaillatA,2013;Corruptionandthehumanrighttowaterandsanitation-Humanright-basedapproachtotacklingcorruptioninthewatersector;WaterLex,GenevaandWaterIntegrityNetwork,Berlin

© 2013 WaterLexandWaterIntegrityNetwork(WIN)

TheviewsexpressedinthispublicationdonotnecessarilyreflectthoseofWINorWaterLexandresponsibilityforthefinalpublicationrestswiththeauthoronly.

Corruption and the human right to water and sanitation | 1

Foreword

SinceIbecametheMinisterofStateforWaterintheMinistryofWaterandEnvi-ronmentofUgandainJune2011,Ihavebeengivingprioritytotacklingcorrup-tioninthissectoras itbecameclearthat improvementinaccesstowaterand

sanitationcouldnotberealizedwithoutsolvingthecorruptionproblem.

Although theGoodGovernanceWorkingGroup in theMinistryofWater andEnvi-ronmentexistedbeforeIjoinedtheMinistry,itwasunderfundedandnotvisible.MylegacyisthatImadesuretheWorkingGroupis‘almost’adequatelyfunded.Westillneedtoinjectmoremoneysothatthegroupiseffective.

Secondly,theintroductionofajointsectorreviewwithdevelopmentpartners,civilso-cietyorganizations,civilservantsandelectedleadersatthedistrictlevelisveryhelpfulinevaluatingtheMinistry’sperformance.Equally important istheworkofthe jointtechnicalreviewagainwithdevelopmentpartnersandotherstakeholdersinthewaterfraternity.ThisisanadditionalplatformtochecktheMinistry’sbudgetandtechnicalperformance.Thisisacandidandrigorousexercisethathelpstoidentifyweaknessesandstrengths.

IamhappytoreportthatmyMinistryintheentireUgandagovernmentistheMinistrythatconductsjointreviewswithotherstakeholders;andmanydevelopmentpartnerstoldmethatweareaheadofmanycountriesintheinitiativesdescribedabove.

Andfinally,nowthattheMinistryispartneringinthisareawithinternationalorganiza-tionssuchasWaterIntegrityNetwork(WIN),andnowWaterlex,Iamsure,theGoodGovernanceWorkingGroupwillbestrengthened.

IwasgladtoparticipateinthefirstWaterIntegrityForuminDelftinJune2013.Itwaslikeadreamcometrue.Atthisoccasion,variousexpertsgatheredtosharegoodprac-tices, coordinateandupscale currentefforts.WaterLexpresented its joint researchprojectoncorruptionandthehumanrighttowaterandsanitation.

ThisdirectlyappealedtomeasIbelievemoreworkisneededtobuildsynergiesbe-tweenanti-corruptionandhumanrightsapproaches.Thisispreciselytheobjectiveofthepresentwork.

Thisreportdevelopsfirstaframeworktoclassifyvariouscorruptionpractices,accord-ingtotherespect,protectandfulfillobligationsofthehumanrighttowaterandsani-tation.Thisisagoodcontributiontotheefforttostudymoresystematicallythelinkagebetweencorruptionandviolationsofhumanrights.Thereportthenanalysesthecoreobligationofthehumanrighttowaterandsanitationregardingaccesstoinformation,participationandaccountability.

Thisworkwillprobablybeusefulforhumanrightsexpertsasitlaysdownthebasisforcorruptionmonitoringthroughahumanrightsapproach.Idobelieveanti-corruption

2 | Corruption and the human right to water and sanitation

professionalsandhumanrightsadvocatesshouldworkmorecloselyandbuildsyner-gies.Ascurrentlypromotedbydevelopmentpartners,watertransparencyandwaterintegrity,ontheonehand,andtherealizationofthehumanrighttowaterandsanita-tion,ontheotherhand,arepursuedalongparalleltracks.Combatingcorruptionandrealizinghumanrightsarehowevermutuallyreinforcing.Eliminatingcorruptionises-sentialforthefullrealizationofhumanrights,whileapplyinghumanrightsprinciplestowaterandsanitationprojectscandrasticallyreducethespaceinwhichopportunityforcorruptpracticesmayoccur.

Thisreportoffersagoodstartbymakingtheconnectionbetweenthesedifferentap-proaches.Italsoprovidesaframeworkforpublicauthoritiesandcivilsocietyactorstodevelop integratedand sustainable solutionsbasedonhuman rights to improvetransparencyformeaningfulpublicparticipationandaccountabilityinthewaterandsanitationsector.

MinisterofStateforWaterBettyBigombe RepublicofUganda


1. Introduction

‘Corruption is an enormous obstacle to the realization of all human rights —civil,political,economic, socialandcultural,aswellas the right todevelopment.Corruptionviolatesthecorehumanrightsprinciplesoftransparency,accountability,non-discrimination and meaningful participation in every aspect of life of thecommunity. Conversely, these principles,when upheld and implemented, are themosteffectivemeanstofightcorruption’,[…]

‘There is an urgent need to increase synergy between efforts to implement theUnited Nations Convention against Corruption and international human rightsconventions’.

OpeningstatementbyNaviPillay,

HighCommissionerforHumanRights:Panelon‘thenegativeimpactofcorruptiononhumanrights’13March2013

Theliteratureoncorruptionisenormous,effortstoaddressithavebeensignificantbutthechallengeremains.Corruption,commonlydefinedastheabuseofpublicpow-erforprivategain,iseverywhere,atalllevelsandinallcountries.Isthefightagainstcorruptionillusory?Bothacauseandasymptomofbadgovernance,somewouldar-guethatitisinherenttohumannatureandlinkedtohumanbeings’greed.Awareofthesehugechallenges,weneverthelessargueherethat‘fighting’againstcorruptionisbothpossibleandahumanrights’obligation.Wewilldemonstratethatdefiningandanalyzingcorruptionfromtheperspectiveofhumanrightsprovidegreatadvantagesinoperationalizingthistaskinthespecificwaterandsanitationsector.

TheissueofcorruptionhasbecomeanincreasingconcernamongUNHumanRightsmechanisms,suchasthetreatybodies,specialproceduresandtheUniversalPeriodicReview.AmilestoneinthisevolutionwasthedecisionofthethenSubCommissiononthePromotionandProtectionofHumanRightstoappointa‘SpecialRapporteuroncorruptionanditsimpactonthefullenjoymentofhumanrights’in20021.TheOffice

1 SeedocumentsoftheSpecialRapporteuronCorruptionanditsimpactonhumanrights,ChristyMbonu,availableat http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/Pages/Documents.aspx


oftheHighCommissionerforHumanRights(OHCHR)alsoorganizedtwoimportantconferences in 2004 in Seoul on ‘goodgovernancepractices thatpromoteshumanrights’andin2006inWarsawon‘anti-corruptionmeasures,goodgovernanceandhu-manrights’(OHCHR2007).Morerecentlyin2012,theHumanRightCouncilinitsres-olutionA/HRC/RES/21/13,‘[d]eeplyconcernedabouttheincreasingnegativeimpactofwidespreadcorruptionontheenjoymentofhumanrights’,requestedtheOHCHRtoorganizeapaneldiscussiononthe‘negativeimpactofcorruptionontheenjoymentofhumanrights’andprepareareportonthistopic.

ThePaneltookplaceinGenevainMarch2013.Thepaneldiscussionclearlyputfor-wardthe‘needformoreconcreteexaminationofspecifichumanrightsviolationsduetocorruption’2and tomovebeyondthegeneral languageon thenegative impactsof corruptiononhuman rights. Thediscussions also stressed the important roleoftheCommitteeonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights,which‘couldcontinuetoap-plysystematicapproachestotherelationbetweencorruptionandhumanrightsand,withinitsmandate,shouldtakeamoreproactiveapproachininitiatingtechnicalassis-tanceforStatesparties’.Atthisoccasion,NavyPillay,HighCommissionerforHumanRights,stressedtheurgentneedto‘increasesynergybetweeneffortstoimplementtheUNCACandinternationalhumanrightsconventions’.

Buildinguponanemergingliteratureonthegenerallinkagesbetweencorruptionandhumanrights(UNDP2004;OHCHR2007;ICHRPandTransparencyInternational 2009),thisresearchpaperwillspecificallyfocusontheimpactsofcorruptionontherealiza-tionofthehumanrighttowaterandsanitation.Atissuehereisthecentralquestion:Isthereahumanrightobligationtocombatcorruption?

Amongthelargenumberofinitiativesundertakentofightagainstcorruption,manyofthemarerelevanttothewatersector.Theideahereisrathertoshowhowthehumanrighttowaterandsanitationcanhelptofightagainstcorruption,makerecommenda-tiononspecificprograms,andidentifyparticularactorsforthatpurpose.Theobjectiveistodesignaframeworktomonitorcorruptionfromthehumanrighttowaterper-spectiveandtoguidethedevelopmentofhumanright-basedanti-corruptionpoliciesinthewatersector.

After considering some important background elements of the debate on humanrightsandcorruption,thepaperwillanalyzetowhatextendspecificcorruptactscanbequalifiedasaviolationofthehumanrighttowaterandsanitation.Therestofthepaperwillthenfocusonthekeyprinciplesoftransparency,accountabilityandpartic-ipationas integralpartofthehumanrighttowaterandsanitationandwill identifyopportunitiesanddifficultiesintheirimplementation.Thefinalpartofthepaperpro-videssomerecommendationsforfurtherresearchandoperationalprograms.

2 seepara19,SummaryReportoftheHumanRightsCouncilpaneldiscussiononthenegativeimpactofcorruptionontheenjoymentofhumanrightsA/HRC/23/26availableathttp://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBod-ies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A.HRC.23.26_EN.pdf


2. Linking corruption and human rights: promises and pitfallsCorruptionispresentinvariousformsineverycountryoftheworldintheSouthaswellasintheNorth.ButthewaycorruptionhasbeenaddressedoverthelastdecadessignificantlyevolvedandtookaparticulardimensioninNorth/Southrelationship.Inthe1970sand1980sitwasessentiallyunderstoodasaculturalphenomenon.Someauthorsevenarguedthatithadapositiveeffectontheeconomy,demonstratingits‘grease’effectontheeconomy. Inageneralmanner,Stateswerenotwilling tode-nouncecorruptpracticesand‘accepted’topaythis‘necessary’costfordoingbusinessintheSouth.WiththeendoftheColdWar,corruptionintheSouthceasedtobeseenasatabooinNorth/Southrelationshipsandvarioustheoriesaboutcorruptionweredeveloped.

Corruptionbecame theprimaryobstacle todevelopment, a ‘cancer’ tofight in thewordsofJamesWolfensohn,thethenPresidentoftheWorldBank(1996).Corruptionhasbeenacentralpreoccupationof internationalagenciessincethemid-1990withtheemergenceofthe‘goodgovernance’agenda.TheBrettonWoodsInstitutionshavebeentheleadersindevelopingthesegoodgovernancepolicyrecommendations.Cor-ruptionwasidentifiedasthemainobstacletodevelopment,economicgrowthandfor-eigninvestments(WB,WorldDevelopmentReport1997).Thefightagainstcorruptionwasdevelopedhand inhandwithstructural reformpoliciesandneoliberal reforms(PauloMauro, 1995; Abed and Davoodi, 2000). Economist extensively studied thecorrelationofcorruptionwithlevelsofregulations,foreigninvestment,taxes,publicspendingetc.

Economicapproachesusedcorruptiontojustifyeconomicreformswhilesocialscien-tistapproachestendedtofocusonpatron-clientrelationshipinthirdworldcountriesandtoidentifythirdworldpoliticiansasmainculprits(Theobald1999).

TheUSwasthefirstcountrytoadopta lawtoprohibitUScompanies frombribingforeign officials (1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act- FCPA). Addressing increasingcriticismsaboutanti-competitivenessimpactsoftheFCPAonUSfirms,theCongressrequestedthatthePresidentnegotiateaninternationaltreatywithmembersoftheOrganizationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD)-thatisUS’smajortradingpartners-toprohibitbriberyininternationalbusinesstransactions.FormostOECDcountries, indeed,bribing foreignofficialswasnotonlynotconsidered illegalbutalsotax-deductible(Tanzi1998).Withthedevelopmentofthegoodgovernanceagenda,itappearednecessarytocoordinateanti-corruptionstrategies.Regionalandinternationaleffortsresultedintheadoptionofaseriesofinternationalconventionssuchasthe1996Inter-AmericanConventionAgainstCorruption;the1997OECDCon-vention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International BusinessTransactions;the1997EuropeanUnionConventionontheFightAgainstCorruptionInvolvingOfficialsoftheEuropeanCommunitiesorOfficialsoftheMemberStatesoftheEuropeanUnion;the1999CouncilofEuropeCriminalLawConventiononCorrup-tion; the2003AfricanUnionConventiononPreventingandCombatingCorruption;andthe2005UnitedNationsConventionAgainstCorruption.


Althoughtheemergenceofanti-corruptionmovementiscertainlynotlimitedtotheseeconomicagendas,mainstreameconomistsplayedanimportantroleinthedevelop-mentofanti-corruptionprograms.Moreover the impactof isolatedanti-corruptionmeasuresonexternaltradeispartoftheunderstandingoftheemergenceofacoordi-natedinternationaleffortagainstcorruption.

Inmorerecentyears,effortstoestablishtherelationshipbetweencorruptionandhu-man rights emerged as amain areaof research (ICHRP2009, Julio Bacio Terracino2010,Gathii,2010,Boersma2010,DeBeco,2011).Thenewperspectivestheybringtocorruptionissueshavethepotentialtobringsignificantchangesintothewaycorrup-tionhasbeenunderstoodandtackledsofar.

Somearguedhoweverthatthisdiscoursemightjustbe‘anotherstickwithwhichtobeatdevelopingcountries’(Goodwin&Rose-Sender2010)and‘linkinghumanrightslanguagetoanti-corruptionisanunwelcomedaddition’thatcontributestoobscurethefactthatneoliberalpolicies–notcorruption–areresponsiblefordevelopmentfailures.Afirst riskofqualifyingcorruptionactsashumanrightsviolations is toas-similatecorruptionproblemswithdevelopingcountriescontextonly.Indeed,astheysuggested,corruptionindevelopedcountrieswillneverbequalifiedasahumanrightviolation.Theseconddangeroflinkingcorruptionandhumanrightsinsuchawayistooversimplifythecomplexitiessurrounding‘corruption’realities.Whatif–whatisdescribedas‘corruption’–doesactuallyimproveaccesstowaterandsanitationofthepoorest?

Itishopedhere,onthecontrary,thatlinkingcorruptionwithhumanrightsissuesmightbringnewlighttounderstandcorruptionandbringahumanfacetocorruptionissues.Thetrueadvantageoflinkingcorruptionwithhumanrightsispreciselytogiveahu-manfacetowhatisdescribedascorruption.Ahumanright-basedapproachtocorrup-tioninthewaterandsanitationsector offersnewwaysofunderstanding‘corruption’.

Ifthelimitationsoflinkinghumanrightsandanti-corruptionbroughtforwardbyMor-agGoodwin&KateRose-Sender(2010)arerelevantintheseregards,theyfailedtoacknowledgethetruepositivecontributionofhumanrightsinstrumentsinthefightagainstcorruption,thatistheempowermentofpeoplewithregardtotheirrightstoaccessinformation,toparticipationandaccountabilityinwaterandsanitationissues.

2.1 Building synergies between anti-corruption conventions and human rights’ instruments: the challenges of petty corruption

Corruptioniscommonlydefinedasthe‘abuseofpublicpowerforpersonalgains’.Thisdefinitionhastheadvantagetobeshort,simpleandstartaprocessofdelimitationofsuchacomplexphenomenon.Apartoftheliteratureoncorruptiondevotedattentiontoculturalperceptionsofcorruptionandprovidedalinguisticanalysisoftheconcept.Theyshowthatwhatisperceivedascorruptionisnotnecessarilyperceivedassuchinothercontext.Thismakestheworkofdefiningcorruptionevenmorecomplex.Never-thelessaninternational,consensuallegalframeworkhasrecentlyemergedtoaddress


theproblemofcorruption.

TheUNConventionAgainstCorruption(UNCAC),adopted in2003andentered intoforcein2005,doesnotprovideadefinitionof‘corruption’ingeneralbutratherfocus-esonspecificactsofcorruption:Briberyofnationalpublicofficials,briberyofforeignpublicofficialsandofficialsofpublicinternationalorganizations,embezzlement,mis-appropriationorotherdiversionofpropertybyapublicofficial,tradingininfluence,abuseoffunctions,illicitenrichment,launderingofproceedsofcrime,concealment,andobstructionofjustice(article15to25).Dealingwith‘corruption’ingeneralisin-deedusuallynotuseful.

TheConventioncondemnsbothsidesofthecorruptact,asusuallycorruptpracticesinvolvecollaborationbetweentwoormoreagents.Itisnotfocusedon‘publicpower’only;variousarticlesdealwithprivatesectorsanctionsaswell.Inadditionto‘personalgains’,theconventionincludesvarioustypesofgainssuchasgainsforpoliticalparties,families,clans,etc.Itaddressesthereforethevariousformsofcorruption:economic,political andpublic administration corruption. In otherwords, theConventionpro-videsaninterestingstartingpointtodefinecorruptacts.

However,theUNCACisnotwellequippedtotacklesystemicpettycorruptionthatissmall-scaleandlow-levelcorruption(butincludescomplexrealities).Generallyspeak-ing,criminalizationasprovidedintheUNCACwillnothelptoresolvepettycorruptionproblems.Pettyandgrandcorruptionsrepresenttwoverydifferentrealitiesandonecouldevenchallengetheuseofthesomelanguagetodefinesodifferentrealities.Inthecaseofcriminalcorruption,corruptionactsshouldindeedbethemainfocusofanti-corruptionpolicies.However,inthecaseofpettycorruption,corruptactsareasymptomofalargerproblem,usually–poverty-andifpettycorruptionistobead-dressed,oneneedstolookforothersolutionsthancriminalization.

TheUNCACisaninternationalinstrumentthathastobetailoredtothespecificcorrup-tionchallengesofeachcountry.Toaddressthesecontextualchallenges,thedesignandimplementationof specificnational anti-corruption lawsandpolicies remains Stateresponsibility.IntheUNCAC,asinsomecontexts,criminalizationisonlyapartofthestrategy,therestoftheeffortsaredevotedtopreventivemeasuresandthestrength-eningoftransparency,accountabilityandparticipationframeworks.Itisespeciallyinthisregardthatthesynergiesbetweenanti-corruptionandhumanrightsmakesense.

TheUNCACdevotesalotofattentiontorightholdersandtheirrolesinthepreventionofandfightagainstcorruption.Article5mentionsthatpreventiveanti-corruptionpol-iciesshall‘promotetheparticipationofsocietyandreflecttheprinciplesoftheruleoflaw,propermanagementofpublicaffairsandpublicproperty,integrity,transpar-encyandaccountability’.Article9on‘publicprocurementandmanagementofpublicfinance’andArticle10on‘publicreporting’refertotheestablishmentoftransparentproceduresandaccesstoinformationforthegeneralpublic.Article13isentirelyde-votedtothe‘participationofsociety’:

‘1.EachStatePartyshalltakeappropriatemeasures,[…]topromotetheactivepar-ticipation of individuals and groups outside the public sector, such as civil society,non-governmentalorganizationsandcommunity-basedorganizations,inthepreven-tionofandthefightagainstcorruptionandtoraisepublicawarenessregardingthe


existence,causesandgravityofandthethreatposedbycorruption.Thisparticipationshouldbestrengthenedbysuchmeasuresas:

(a)Enhancing the transparencyofandpromoting thecontributionof thepublic todecision-makingprocesses;

(b)Ensuringthatthepublichaseffectiveaccesstoinformation;

(c)Undertakingpublicinformationactivitiesthatcontributetonon-toleranceofcor-ruption,aswellaspubliceducationprogrammes,includingschoolanduniversitycur-ricula;

(d)Respecting,promotingandprotectingthefreedomtoseek,receive,publishanddisseminateinformationconcerningcorruption’.

Thelinkbetweenhumanrightsandtheanti-corruptionlegalframeworkisevenmoreexplicit in theAfricanUnionConventiononPreventingandCombattingCorruption.TheAfricanUnionConventionclearlystatesthatitsobjectiveisto‘promotesocio-eco-nomicdevelopmentbyremovingobstaclestotheenjoymentofeconomic,socialandculturalrightsaswellascivilandpoliticalrights’(article2.4)and‘establishtheneces-saryconditionstofostertransparencyandaccountabilityinthemanagementofpublicaffairs’ (article2.5).TheUNCACbrieflymentioned the right todueprocessbut theAfricanUnionConventionhasafullarticleon‘minimumguaranteesforafairtrial3’(article14)andthearticle3recallsthemainprinciplesoftheConventionincluding‘Re-spectforhumanandpeoples’rightsinaccordancewiththeAfricanCharteronHumanandPeoplesRightsandotherrelevanthumanrightsinstruments.’TheAfricanUnionConventiondevelopstheaspectsofaccesstoinformation(article9)andparticipationofcivilsocietyandmedia4(article12).

3 Article14:‘Subjecttodomesticlaw,anypersonallegedtohavecommittedactsofcorruptionandrelatedoffencesshallreceiveafairtrialincriminalproceedingsinaccordancewiththeminimumguaranteescontainedintheAfricanCharteronHumanandPeoples’Rightsandanyotherrelevantin-ternationalhumanrightsinstrumentrecognizedbytheconcernedStatesParties’.4 Article12 :‘Createanenablingenvironmentthatwillenablecivilsocietyandthemediatoholdgovernmentstothehighestlevelsoftransparencyandaccountabilityinthemanagementofpublicaffairs’.


3. Corruption and the realization of the human right to water and sanitationTheHumanRighttosafedrinkingwaterandsanitationhasbeenrecognizedbytheinternationalcommunityinResolution64/292oftheGeneralAssemblyinJuly2010.AppointedmemberStatesattheHumanRightsCouncilunderlinedthisinternationalcommitmenttwomonthslaterinSeptember2010inaresolutionaffirmingthat‘thehumanrighttosafedrinkingwaterandsanitationisderivedfromtherighttoanade-quatestandardoflivingandinextricablyrelatedtotherighttothehighestattainablestandardofphysicalandmentalhealth,aswellastherighttolifeandhumandignity’(HRC15/9).ReinforcingtheinterpretationoftheCommitteeonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRights(CESCR2002),thisresolutionrecognizesthatthehumanrighttosafedrinkingwaterandsanitationis implicit inboth,theInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR)andtheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights(ICESCR).Asof2013,167StatesarepartytothefirstCovenantand160tothesecond5.

Oneshouldfirstmakeclearthatalthoughthereisnointernationalconventionspecif-icallydesignedforthehumanrighttowater,accesstosafedrinkingwaterisexplicitlymentionedinvariousinternationalhumanrightsconventions.TheConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofDiscriminationAgainstWomen(intoforcesince1981,Art14(2)(h)),theConventionontheRightsoftheChild(intoforcesince1990,Art24(2)(c)), and theConventionon theRightsofPersonswithDisabilities (into force since2008(Art28(2)(a))explicitlyrefertotheright.

Foralongtimethescopeandimplicationsofthehumanrighttosafedrinkingwaterandsanitationhasbeensubjecttodebates.Itwassettledaroundthecorefollowingcomponents:thehumanrighttosafedrinkingwaterentitleseveryonetosufficient,safe,acceptable,physicallyaccessibleandaffordablewaterforpersonalanddomesticuses.’(CESCRGeneralComment15,§2,2002).TherecognitionofsafedrinkingwaterasahumanrightmeansthatStateshavetorespectanumberofprinciplesinherentinallhumanrights,specifically:non-discrimination6,accesstoinformation,participa-tion,accountabilityandsustainabilitythatwewilldevelopfurther.

Corruptionisusuallycloselyassociatedwithdiscriminationalthoughthiscouldbedoc-umentedmoreclosely.Inhis2010report,theInternationalCouncilonHumanRightsPolicyrightymentions‘Atalltheselevels,corruptionreinforcesexclusionanddiscrim-ination and tends tomagnify and exacerbate pre-existing human rights problems’(ICHRP,2010,p8).DeBecosuggestedthat‘becausehumanrightfocusonnon-discrim-ination,bringingahumanrightsperspectivetocorruptionmonitoringwouldresultinmoreattentionbeingpaidtothewayinwhichcorruptionaffectsvulnerablegroups

5 http://treaties.un.org6 Article 2.2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 2.2. ‘The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other sta-tus.’(ICESCR, art. 2.2)


differently’(DeBeco,2010,p4).

Aswithothereconomic,socialandculturalrights,thehumanrighttosafedrinkingwaterandsanitationentailsthreetypes(orlevels)ofobligations,i.e‘respect’,‘protect’and‘fulfill’:TheobligationtorespectbasicallyrequiresStatesnottotakeanymea-suresthatwouldresultinpreventingindividualsfromenjoyingtheirrighttosafedrink-ingwaterandsanitation;theobligationtoprotectrequiresmeasuresbytheStatetoensurethatthirdpartiesdonotinterferewiththeenjoymentoftherighttosafedrink-ingwaterandsanitation;theobligationtofulfillessentiallyrequiresStatestoadoptthenecessarymeasuresdirectedtowardsthefullrealizationofthehumanrighttosafedrinkingwaterandsanitation(CESCR,GeneralComment15).

3.1 Corruption and the obligation to devote the ‘maximum available resources’ to realizing the human right to water and sanitation

Thehumanrighttowaterandsanitationaswellasothereconomic,socialandculturalrightsrequiresstatepartiestocomplywitharticle2oftheInternationalCovenantonEconomicSocialandCulturalRightswhichmentionsthat:

‘1.EachStatePartytothepresentCovenantundertakestotakesteps, individuallyandthroughinternationalassistanceandcooperation,especiallyeconomicandtech-nical,tothemaximumofitsavailableresources,withaviewtoachievingprogressivelythefullrealizationoftherightsrecognizedinthepresentCovenantbyallappropriatemeans, includingparticularly theadoptionof legislativemeasures.’ (ICESCRart2.1.emphasisadded).

InanexpertpaperpreparedfortheOHCHRforthe2006Conference,NihalJayawick-ramamentions:

§10. ‘Whensubstantialnationalresourcesaredivertedfrompublicuse intoprivatebenefit,ordevelopmentaidismismanaged,misusedormisappropriated,thedevel-opment process is aborted. The government is no longer in a position to fulfill itsminimumhumanrightsobligation,namely, ‘to takesteps’, individuallyandthroughinternationalassistanceandcooperation,‘tothemaximumofitsavailableresources’,toachieveprogressivelythefullrealizationofthesocial,economic,andculturalrightsof its citizens’ (Jayawickrama.Nihal2006)(referring toarticle2of the InternationalCovenantonEconomicSocialandCulturalRights).

Onhisside,theCommitteeonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRightsinGeneralCom-ment15onthehumanrighttowaterexplicitlymentionsasexamplesofviolationsoftheobligationstofulfill:

44.(ii) ‘Insufficientexpenditureormisallocationofpublicresourceswhichresults inthenon-enjoymentoftherighttowaterbyindividualsorgroups,particularlythevul-nerableormarginalized’.

Actsdefinedunderarticle17oftheUNCAC:‘Embezzlement,misappropriationoroth-


erdiversionofpropertybyapublicofficial’canthereforeinsomecircumstancesbequalifiedasviolationsoftheobligationtofulfillthehumanrighttowater(actsofcom-mission).Totherisksofoversimplifyingtheissueshere,onecouldschematizethistypeofcorruptionasthekindofcorruptionthatusuallyhappensinpublic/publicinterac-tions(accordingtothetypologybyPlummerandCross2006).

3.2 When corruption acts lead to the`violation of the obligation to respect

TheCommitteeonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRightsinGeneralComment15onthehumanrighttowaterexplicitlymentionsthatviolationsoftheobligationtorespectincludes‘(i)arbitraryorunjustifieddisconnectionorexclusionfromwaterservicesorfacilities;(ii)discriminatoryorunaffordableincreasesinthepriceofwater’.

Abuseoffunctionsbywaterandsanitationserviceofficialsusuallyinvolvesviolationoftheobligationtorespectthehumanrighttowater.Article19oftheUNCACexplainsthat‘abuseoffunctionsreferstoapublicemployeeorpublicofficeholderthatisdoingsomethingwhichisillegalorsomethingthattheofficialhasnolegalauthoritytodo,inordertoobtainapersonaleconomicbenefitorcauseanillegaldamagetoothers’.

Thisobligationisusuallyviolatedinthecaseofpettycorruptionwherelowleveloffi-cialsabusetheirfunctionstoextractsmallbribesandfavorsfromwaterusers.Thesesituationsareparticularlyfrequentwhenpublicofficialsmeetthepublicdirectly. InIndia,KaushikBasu,thenChiefEconomicAdviseroftheFinanceMinistrydefined‘ha-rassmentbribes’asabribethatpeopleoftenhavetogivetogetwhattheyarelegallyentitledto.

Pettycorruptionisprobablythemostdifficulttypesofcorruptiontoaddress.Althoughitinvolvessmallamountofmoneyincomparisontograndcorruption,thissumsof-tenrepresentanunaffordablepriceforindividuals.Ithasbeendocumentedinmanyplacesthatthisformofcorruptiondisproportionatelyhurtsthepoorestmembersofsociety.

FollowingthetypologyproposedbyPlummerandCross(2006),thistypeofcorruptionusuallyconcernspublicofficials/consumersinteractions.

3.3 When corruption leads to a violation of the obligation to protect

GeneralComment15mentions‘ViolationsoftheobligationtoprotectfollowfromthefailureofaStatetotakeallnecessarymeasurestosafeguardpersonswithintheirju-risdiction frominfringementsoftherighttowaterbythirdparties.Thisincludes,interalia:(i)failuretoenactorenforcelawstopreventthecontaminationandinequitableextractionofwater;(ii)failuretoeffectivelyregulateandcontrolwaterservicesprovid-


ers;(iv)failuretoprotectwaterdistributionsystems(e.g.,pipednetworksandwells)frominterference,damageanddestruction’(44.b,emphasisadded).

Inthisregard,thecaseontheMilanaqueduct,CostaRica,whichwaspresentedatthefirstglobalWater IntegrityForum in June2013,highlightshowscarcecoordinationandaccountabilityofstateauthoritiescanhamperandneutralizethisobligation,andultimatelypreventtheenjoymentofthehumanrighttowater.Followingmanyyearsofdisputesaroundwatercontaminationcausedbyintensivepineappleindustry,thehighestCourtofCostaRicafinallyruled in2009thatspecificauthoritiesandminis-trieshadtheobligationtocleantheareaandrestoresafedrinkingwaterinthearea.Despitethis,communitiesarestilldeprivedoftheirrightasrelevantauthoritieshavefailedtosolvethesituation.

Corruptionactssuchastrading in influence(article18)oftenresults inthenon-en-forcementof lawsdesignedtoprotect theright towater.A2012reportbyHumanRightsWatchontheminingindustryintheIndianStatesofKarnatakaandGoaillus-tratedhowvariousformsofcorruptionincludingtradingininfluenceisregularlyusedtogetaroundregulations.Illegalminingresultsinunsustainablewaterextractionandcontaminationofgroundwaterandsurfacewatersusedbylocalcommunitiesassourc-esofdrinkingwater.Corruptionispresentallalongthedecisionmakingprocessfromtheauthorizationtodigbelowwatertablestotheconductofenvironmentalimpactassessmentsandpublichearing.ThereportforexamplepointsouthowcompaniescaninfluencetheresultsofEnvironmentalImpactAssessmentastheyarefinancingthem(p37).Thereportalsoshowshowpublichearingresultsareusuallyleftasidebycorruptpublicauthorities.

Finally,oneshouldunderlinethatState’sobligationtoprotecthasanextraterritorialdimensionmeaning that States should ‘take steps topreventhuman rights contra-ventionsabroadbycorporationswhichhavetheirmainseatundertheirjurisdiction’(CESCR2011). InGeneralComment15,theCommitteementionsthat ‘stepsshouldbetakenbyStatesPartiestopreventtheirowncitizensandcompaniesfromviolatingtherighttowaterofindividualsandcommunitiesinothercountries’(§33).Synergieswiththeinternationalanti-corruptionlegalframeworkarepossible inthisregardaswell.TheUNConventionagainstCorruptionhasindeedaspecificarticleonthecrimi-nalizationofbriberyofforeignofficials(art16).OECDMembersalsoadoptedin1997aspecificconventiononCombatingBriberyofForeignPublicOfficialsinInternationalBusinessTransactions.

Corruptionactsthatleadtoaviolationoftheobligationtoprotectcanusuallybeclas-sifiedundertheinteractionpublic/privatesuggestedbyPlummerandCross.

3.4 To take appropriate legislative measures against corruption and the obligation to fulfill?

Indevelopingcountries,corruption,ingeneral,isestimatedto,accordingtoTranspar-


encyInternational2008report,‘raisethepriceforconnectingahouseholdtoawaternetworkbyasmuchas30percent’.Giventhisgeneralnegativeimpactofcorruptionon the right towaterandsanitation,Statehavea legalobligationunderarticle2.1oftheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialsandCulturalRightstoadoptandimplementstrategiestotacklecorruptioninthewatersector.Theobligationtoadoptmeasurestopreventandcombatcorruptionclearlyfallsundertheobligationtoful-fill-understoodastheobligationtotakeappropriatelegislativeandothermeasuresfortherealizationofthehumanrighttowater.Generalcomment15mentions:‘TheobligationtofulfillrequiresStatespartiestoadoptthenecessarymeasuresdirectedtowardsthefullrealizationoftherighttowater’(§26).

3.5 Beyond criminalization: dealing with complex realities

3.5.1 UnderstandingBribes:bringingahumanfacetocorruption.

Wementionedearlierthat insomecontextbribesrequiredbypublicofficials inex-changeofwaterandsanitationservicescouldleadtoaviolationoftheobligationtorespectthehumanrighttowaterandsanitationofindividuals.Inothercontexts,how-ever,pettycorruptionmayhaveashort-termbenefitforthepoor:whenbribesareof-feredtotheserviceproviderofficialtolowerwaterbillsorgetanillegalconnection.Inthesecases,corruptionrevealsthefailureofthestatetoimplementthehumanrighttowaterandsanitation.Indeed,ifbasicwaterwereaffordabletoall(whichmeansfreeinsomecircumstances),userswouldbelesstemptedtogetaroundtherules.Systemiccorruptionrevealsalargerproblemforwhichcriminalizationcanonlybepartofthesolution.

InthewordsofM.Sohail&S.Cavill: ‘….thebestwayofaddressingcorruptionistounderstandit,notjustasaseriesofone-offactions,butaspartofthesystemwherecorruption is so institutionalized that it allows for (or evenencourages) individualstobecorrupt;thatis,corruptionisperceivedtobethemodusoperandi.Therefore,thewhole systemwouldbe indireneedof institutional reformrather thanmerely‘catching’andpunishingindividuals.’(SohailandCavill,2007).Humanrightsapproach-escouldhelptounderstandthesecomplexsystemsbybringingahumanfacetotheissue.

Inanycase,itisimportanttomeasureandanticipatetheimpactonthepoorestpopu-lationofanti-corruptionmeasures.Forthatmatter,PlummerandCross,intheirreportoncorruptioninthewatersectorinAfricaproposestodistinguishbetweenshort-termandlong-termimpactsofanti-corruptionmeasures(PlummerandCross,2006).

3.5.2 Politicalcorruptionandotherforms

Inmanyplaces,corruptioninwaterandsanitationdecision-makingisstronglyinter-


twinedwithpoliticalprocesses.Whenwaterserviceprovisionisusedforvotebuyingandclientelism,thisleadstoadistortionoftheprinciplesofuniversalityandnon-dis-criminationofthehumanrighttowaterandsanitation.The2008TransparencyInter-nationalreportoncorruptioninthewatersectormentionshowinMalawi,watercol-lectionpointsconstructedbetween1988and2002weremostlyplacedinareaswheresuchfacilitiesalreadyexisted,asareasonsof‘politicalpatronage’.MoussaDiopinhisdoctoralthesisonwaterandsanitationservicesinSenegalprovidedsomeexamplesofhowwaterandsanitationby-lawsandprogramsaredesignedinsuchawayastoen-hancediscretionarypoweroflocalauthorities.Hementionedforexampletheformalprioritygiventocriteriasuchas‘grosvillage’whoselargedefinitionopensthedoortoarbitraryinterpretation(Diop,2008).

Theseactionsleadtoageneralmistrustinpublicauthoritiesinchargeofwaterandsanitationservices,whichresultsincivildisobedienceandpaymentrefusal,worseningthestateofwaterandsanitationservices.

Theterm‘corruption’encompassesverydifferentrealitieswhoseimpactsonaccesstowaterandsanitationofmostvulnerablepopulationsshouldbecarefullyassessed.Forthatmatter,itisimportantto‘unpack’corruptionintospecifictypesofinteractions.WeusedthetypologyofPlummerandCross:public/public;private/public;providers/consumersandtriedtoshowsomepossiblewaystocombine itwithhumanrights’general obligations framework Respect, Protect and Fulfill7. Beyond theweakness-esduetothesimplificationofacomplextopic,suchasystemofferstheadvantageof‘unpacking’corruptionintospecificcorruptactsandrealities.Itishopedthatthisframeworkwillcontributetohumanrightsmonitoringmechanisms’workregardingcorruptionissues.

Wealso tried toshowthatcorruption in thewaterandsanitationsectorgoeswellbeyondspecificactsasdefinedintheUNCAC.Clientelismandotherformsofpoliticalcorruptionbutalsoscientificdatamanipulationarechallengesforequitable,sustain-ableandefficientwaterandsanitationservices.Toaddressthesechallengesandthegeneral lackof trust thatsometimesexist inwaterandsanitationservices, it is im-portanttostrengthentheproceduralcomponentsofthehumanrighttowaterandsanitation.Thenextsectionwill focusonpreventionstrategiesrestingon increasedtransparency, accountability andparticipationasdefined in the legal frameworkofthehumanrighttowaterandsanitation.Wewilltrytoaddressthevariousopportuni-tiesandchallengesconcerningtheimplementationoftheseprinciplesinthedifferenttypesofinteractionpresentedabove:public/public;private/public;provider/user.

7 EventhoughPlummerandCross’sframeworkcouldbecompletedsomehowbyincludinganothertypeofinteraction:aprivate/privatecategoryasawaytotakeintoaccountcasesofcorruptionbetweenaprincipalprivateproviderandsubcontractorsforexampleorevenmoreradicallywhereorganizedcrimecontrolstheterritoryanditsresources(likeinSicilyorinGuatemala).


4. A legal framework to TAP-transparency, accountability and participation Thehumanrighttowaterandsanitationencompassesproceduralrightssuchastherighttoaccessinformation(transparency),therighttoparticipateindecision-makingprocedureandtherighttoaskforremedy(accountability).Theseaspectsareclear-lyrelatedtothecommonframeworkofpreventivemeasuresandtopromotewaterintegrityinanti-corruptionlanguage:‘TAP’:‘Transparency,AccountabilityandPartici-pation’.TheseconceptsemergedasanextensionoftheKlitgaardformulasynthetizingcorruptionrisksandpreventionstrategies(Klitgaard1998).Accordingtothisformula:

C=R+D-A,

C(corruption)equalstoR(economicrent)plusD(discretionarypower)minusA(ac-countability).Accountabilityresultingfromtransparencyandparticipationispresent-edaspartofthesolutiontoreducediscretionarypowerandhencecorruption.Forhumanrights’advocates,accesstoinformation(transparency),participationandac-countabilityarehuman rights’obligationsandmay triggerhuman rightsprotectionmechanisms.Thehumanrighttowaterandsanitationthereforeleadstotheempow-ermentofright-holdersandhasthepotentialtotransformthebalanceofthepowerbetweenrights-holdersandduty-bearers-whichisfundamentalforeffectiveaccesstoinformation,participationandaccountability.

TheCommitteeonEconomic,SocialandCulturalrightsspecifiesinGeneralComment15ontherighttowater:

‘Theformulationandimplementationofnationalwaterstrategiesandplansofactionshouldrespect,interalia,theprinciplesofnon-discriminationandpeople’sparticipa-tion.Therightofindividualsandgroupstoparticipateindecision-makingprocessesthatmayaffecttheirexerciseoftherighttowatermustbeanintegralpartofanypol-icy,programmeorstrategyconcerningwater.Individualsandgroupsshouldbegivenfullandequalaccesstoinformationconcerningwater,waterservicesandtheenviron-ment,heldbypublicauthoritiesorthirdparties’(§48).

Moreover,GeneralComment15onthehumanrighttowaterlisted‘informationac-cessibility’underthevariousdimensionofthe‘accessibility’criteria includedinthehumanrighttowater.

‘Informationaccessibility:accessibilityincludestherighttoseek,receiveandimpartinformationconcerningwaterissues’.(§12(c)iv,GC15,seealso§48)

InResolution15/9,theHumanRightCouncilcallsuponStatesto

‘Toensurefulltransparencyoftheplanningandimplementationprocessintheprovi-sionofsafedrinkingwaterandsanitationandtheactive,freeandmeaningfulpartici-pationoftheconcernedlocalcommunitiesandrelevantstakeholderstherein’(§8(b),HRC15/9,2010).

Ofcourse,therightstoaccessinformation,toparticipateandtojusticearenotspe-cifictothewatersector.These‘procedural’rightsarelinkedtofundamentalciviland


politicalrightsincludedintheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights.Asdemonstratedelsewhere,therealizationofthesefundamentalcivilandpoliticalrightsarecentralelementsofageneralhumanright-basedanti-corruptionstrategy(ICHRP2010).Inthisregard,alleffortstowardthestrengtheningofthecapacitiesofparlia-mentariansanddemocraticinstitutions,politicalpartiesfinancing,independentme-dia,independentjudiciaryortheprotectionofwhistleblowersareimportanttorecall.Thepost-2015sustainabledevelopmentagendaislikelytohaveagoalon‘Goodgov-ernanceaneffective institutions’ includingtargetsonpublicparticipation,accesstoinformation,accountabilityandreductionofbriberyandcorruption(goal10).

Havingunderlinedthesegenerallinkages,ourobjectivehereisrathertoanalyzethevariouschallengeslinkedtothese‘procedural’rightsinthewaterandsanitationsec-tor.Tofulfillthistask,oneneedstodistinguishbetweenvariouspublicservicesdeliv-erymodelsandvariouslevelsofdecision-makings.

4.1 Transparent recruitment processes in the water and sanitation sector

First,onewouldliketostressanoften-overlookedformofparticipationinpubliclife:theright‘tohaveaccessongeneraltermsofequalitytopublicservicepositions’(HRCgeneralcomment25).Appointmentofpublicofficialsinwaterandsanitationserviceshasoftenbeenreportedasactsofcorruptionincludingsellingandbuyingpublicpo-sitionsandrequiring,offeringbribesforpromotion.Torecalltherighttoequaloppor-tunitytoaccesspublicservicepositionsisthereforeakeyinstrumenttopreventcor-ruption.TheHumanRightsCommitteeinterpretingarticle25oftheICCPRmentions:

‘Toensureaccessongeneraltermsofequality,thecriteriaandprocessesforappoint-ment, promotion, suspension anddismissalmust be objective and reasonable. Af-firmativemeasuresmaybetakeninappropriatecasestoensurethatthereisequalaccesstopublicserviceforallcitizens.Basingaccesstopublicserviceonequaloppor-tunityandgeneralprinciplesofmerit,andprovidingsecuredtenure,ensuresthatper-sonsholdingpublicservicepositionsarefreefrompoliticalinterferenceorpressures.Itisofparticularimportancetoensurethatpersonsdonotsufferdiscriminationintheexerciseoftheirrightsunderarticle25,subparagraph(c),onanyofthegroundssetoutinarticle2,para.1’.(§23,GC25,1996)(emphasisadded)

This authoritative interpretation by the Human Rights Committee of article 25 oftheICCPRisclearlyechoedbytheprovisionincludedinarticle7oftheUNConven-tionAgainstCorruptionconcerningpreventivemeasuresinthepublicsector.Article7 stresses the importance forStateparty toadopt systemsof recruitment thatare‘basedonprinciplesofefficiency,transparencyandobjectivecriteriasuchasmerit,equityandaptitude’.


4.2 Transparency in international aid flows

Theglobalfinancialcrisisthatstruckin2008revealedthenecessitytoreformmanyfinancial institutions at the national, regional and international levels. The call for‘transparency’receivedanincreasedattention.InDecember2012,theStatesattheUNGeneralAssemblyadoptedanimportantresolutionon‘Promotingtransparency,participationandaccountability infiscalpolicies’ endorsing theGlobal Initiative forFinancialTransparency(GIFT)HighLevelPrinciplesandencouragingMemberStatestointensifyeffortstoenhancetransparency,participationandaccountabilityinfiscalpolicies(A/RES/67/218).LeadinginternationalfinancialinstitutionssuchastheWorldBankandtheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)areattheoriginofthisnewglobalinitiativealongwithBrazil,thePhilippines,andInternationalBudgetPartnership(IBP).In2011,theWorldBankdecidedtomakeitsfundingmoretransparent.ThenewWorldBankFinancePortaldisclosesinformationaboutspecificfunds,thedisbursementandrepaymentstatusofthousandsofprojectsaroundtheworld.

Moreover,in2012,theWorldBanktookanotherimportantsteptowardmoretrans-parencybypublishingdecisionstakenbytheSanctionBoard.In1999,inordertoad-dresscasesofcorruption,collusionorfraudinrelationtoitsactivities,theBankestab-lishedtheWorldBankGroup’sSanctionsBoard,anadministrativetribunalsanctioningcompaniesformisconduct.Until2012,thesedecisionswerenotmadepublic.

In2013, the IMFdraftedanewandstrengthenedfiscal transparencycodeofgoodpractices(afirstversionwasreleasedin1998).TheOECDhadalsoreleasedareportongoodpracticesinbudgettransparencyin2002.

LaunchedattheHighLevelForumonAidEffectivenessinAccrain2008,theInterna-tionalAidTransparencyInitiative(IATI)providesinformationonprojectsthatdevelop-mentagenciesarefundingorimplementing.ManyUNagenciesareIATIsignatoriesaswellasthefollowinggovernments:Australia,Belgium,Canada,Denmark,Germany,Ireland,theNetherlands,NewZealand,Norway,Spain,SwitzerlandandUK.

Theserecent initiativesaregoodnewsandshouldbeencouraged,sothatmoreor-ganizationsandcountriesjointhem.Buttobringconcreteresultsforanti-corruptionpurposes,itisnowcriticaltoworkonthedevelopmentofspecificmonitoringtoolsforcivilsocietythatwouldhelppeopletounderstand,trackandsystematizeanalysisofaidflows.

4.3 Making transparency, participation and accountability in budgeting and planning a reality: national and sub-national levels

Inher2011reportonhumanright towaternationalplanning, theUNSpecial rap-porteuronthehumanrighttowaterandsanitationprovidesinsightsontherighttoparticipateandaccesstoinformationinthecontextofwaterandsanitationnationalplanning:

‘Systematicparticipationiscrucialineveryphaseoftheplanningcycle,fromdiagnosis


throughtargetsettingandtheformulationofresponsesandimplementationtomon-itoringandevaluation.’(§68,2011report).

Sheadds:

‘Participationmust be active, free andmeaningful. Itmust go beyondmere infor-mation-sharingandsuperficialconsultation,and involvepeople indecision-making,providingrealopportunitiestoinfluencetheplanningprocess.Theorganizationofatrulyparticipatoryprocessischallenging.Differentmechanismsandapproacheswillberequired, includingconsultationswithvariousstakeholders,publicmeetingsandhearingsaswellastheopportunitytosubmitwrittencommentsandfeedback’(§69,2011report).

Theseprinciplesalsoapplyforthebudgetaryaspectsofthenationalwaterandsani-tationplanning.

InternationalBudgetPartnership(IBP)isacivilsocietyinitiativedevoted‘topromotingpublicaccesstobudgetinformationandtheadoptionofaccountablebudgetsystems’.Theypublisheverytwoyearsareport‘OpenBudgetSurvey’offeringanalysisandmea-surementoftheleveloftransparencyofnationalbudgets(OpenBudgetIndex).

Inarecent IBPbook,theauthorsshowthatfiscaltransparencydoesnotnecessari-lyleadtoincreasedparticipationandaccountability(SanjeevKhagram,ArchonFung,PaolodeRenzio,2013).Theymention:

‘Simplyplacinginformationinthepublicdomainoropeningupspacesforpublicpar-ticipationdoesnotensurethatthesewillbeusedorusedwisely.Peoples’responsestoinformationareinseparablefromtheirinterests,desires,resources,cognitiveca-pacities,andsocialcontexts’.(SanjeevKhagram,ArchonFung,PaolodeRenzio,2013,p9)

Theyfurtherexplain:

‘Transparency,therefore,isachievedmoreeasilythanparticipation.Bothareneces-sary,butfarfromsufficientforbringingaboutmoreaccountabilityinpublicfinancesandotherhoped-foroutcomes,includingimprovedservicedelivery,reducedcorrup-tion,andsustainablehumandevelopmentmorebroadly.Accordingtotheevidencewegathered,thelinksbetweenfiscaltransparency,participation,andaccountabilityareoftenweak,interrupted,incomplete,or,inthebestofcases,difficulttounearthand explain and dependent on idiosyncratic factors and conditions.’ (Sanjeev Kha-gram,ArchonFung,PaolodeRenzio,2013,p39).

Moreover, according to the context, states disclose fiscal information for differentreasons:torespondtointernationaldonorrequirements,tofaceincreasingpoliticalcompetition,ortorestorefiscalcredibilitydomesticallyandoninternationalfinancialmarkets.Budget informationdisclosure is rarelydesigned foranti-corruptiongoals.Thisstudyunderlinestheneedforfurtherresearchtobetterunderstandthefactorsthatleadtoincreasedparticipationandaccountabilityinpublicfinance.

Manyfactorsshouldbetakenintoaccountintheanalysisofthedegreeandqualityofparticipationinpublicfinanceandplanning.Firstofall,thelevelofdecision-makingiskey.Publicparticipationstrengtheningwasakeyobjectiveofdecentralizationreforms


thathavebeen introduced inmanycountries.Moreover,publicparticipation in thepreparation,adoptionandmonitoringoflocalbudgetshasbeenincreasinglyadvocat-edasananti-corruptionpreventivemeasure.Participatorybudgetwerefirstexperi-mentedinPortoAlegreinBrazil inthelate1980s.StronglysupportedbytheWorldBankandUnitedNationsagencies,itisestimatedtodaythatthemodelispracticedinover300citiesaroundtheworld(InternationalBudgetPartnership).Variousstudiestriedtoevaluatetheseinitiativesandfactorsofsuccesswereidentifiedsuchaspolit-icalwillofpublicauthorities,availabilityoftechnicalandfinancialsupportandcom-munitiesorganizationandstructure.ArecentstudyonparticipatorybudgetinginPeruspecificallyfocusedonthewaterandsanitationsector(MiguelJaramilloandLorenaAlcázar, 2013). The authors found that therewerenodirect relationshipsbetweenparticipatorybudgetandimprovementinwatercoverageandservicesquality.Tobringequitableresults,participatorybudgetingshouldcarefullybeaccompaniedbyasetofothermeasuressuchasright-holderempowermentandawarenessraising,financialandtechnicalsupport,orauditingandmonitoringcapacitybuilding.Inaddition,thisstudyshowsthat‘waterandsanitationprojectsthatcomefromtheparticipatorybud-getingprocessareinmostcasesverysmall(afewblocks)andbasicallyofreplacementtype’(p35).Inotherwords,participatorybudgetingatthedistrictormunicipallevelshouldbeconnectedandcoordinatedwithotherbudgetsathigherlevelswhere‘big’projects’aredecided.

InanotherreportonLatinAmerica,theauthorarguesthatthesuccessesofparticipa-torybudgetingdependonthewayparticipatorymechanismswereintroduced(Gold-frank,2006).Heshowsthattheyweremuchmoresuccessfulwhentheyresultedfromalocalgovernmentinitiativethanwhentheywereimposedonlocalgovernmentbynationallaw(aswasdoneinBolivia,Nicaragua,andPeruinthe1990s).DetailingtheimplementationofthePopularParticipationLawinBolivia,thestudymentions:

‘Thepoliticalmanipulationofthenewostensiblyparticipatory institutions has hadclearlynegativeeffectson the actual practicesof citizenparticipation inmunicipalbudgeting.Scholarsgenerallyagreethatinmanymunicipalities,theOTBs[territorialbaseorganizations]andCVs[OversightCommittee]eitherdonotfunctionatallorarenoteffectiveattransmittingcommunitydemandsintobudgetsormonitoringbudgetimplementationsoastoreducecorruption(Altman2003:83-85;Bartholdson2002:29,47;Krekeler,etal.2003:25-26)’(Goldfrank,2006,p25).

Thisstudyhighlightsthedifficultiessurroundingtheintroductionofnewparticipatorymechanismsthatmightresults–sometimes–inasortofparallelmechanismtothosealready inplace.Before introducinganyof thesereforms, there isaneedtobetterunderstandhowcommunitiesareorganized,theirsocialandpoliticalinstitutions(betheyformalorinformal)andpowerandintereststructuresinplace.

This leadsus to another issue: the institutionalizationand formalizationof existing-informal – participatory and social accountability structures. One would like heretopresentsomeopportunitiesandchallengessurroundingcommunitywatersupplyboardsinruralandperi-urbanareasinLatinAmerica.ThesecommunityorganizationsOCSA(OrganizacionesComunitariasdeServiciodeAgua)arecentral institutionsforthedistributionofwaterandsanitationservicesandintegratedwaterresourcesman-agement.Thereare80000OCSAs in LatinAmericawhich serve roughly40millionpeople(WorldBank2008).Theseusuallysmallstructuresdemonstratedhighlevelof


transparency,participationandaccountabilitythroughoutthecycleofthecommuni-typroject fromplanning,budgeting, to construction,maintenanceandmonitoring.Indeed,transparencyandaccountabilityarethepillarsoftheir legitimacy8. Initiatedtofillagapinstateneglectedareas,theseself-organizedandnot-for-profitstructuresgeneratedastrongsenseofcommonownershipoftheirsharedwaterinfrastructures.Moreover,itiswidelyreportedthattransparency,participationandaccountabilityarethefundamentalelementsofusers’trustintheseorganizationsresultinginhighlevelofcompliancewithwatertariffcollectionnotably.

Ofcoursechallengesexist.Majorweaknessesofthesesystemsarethelackoffinan-cialandtechnicalcapacitybutalsodifficultiesrelatedtounclearlegalstatusoftheseorganizations, landrightsandassets. Infact,theirrelationshipwiththestatevariesgreatlyacrosscountries.InNicaragua,in2010,afteryearsofdebates,alawrecognizedthese‘ComitésdeAguaPotableySaneamiento’CAPS(Ley722).InGuatemalahowev-er,OCSAShavenospecificregulationorrecognition.Legalizationisadifficulttopicfortheseorganizations.Ontheonehand,thiscouldprovidethemwithstate’sfinancialandtechnicalsupportbutontheotherhand,theyfeartoloseownershipandinde-pendenceinthemanagementoftheirstructure.Aboveall,theseresistancesrevealalackoftrustinformalstatestructuresandinstitutionsaswellaswaterandsanitationagencies.Increasingtransparency,participationandaccountabilityintherelationshipamongthevariousinstitutionsatthevariouslevelsofdecision-makingisfundamentalforbetterwaterandsanitationservices.

Moreover, forfinancial transparency tobringoutcomes in termsof corruptionpre-vention,thereisaneedtobetterarticulatethebudgetsatthevariouslevelsofdeci-sion-making.Indeed,itisfundamentaltotracethevariousfinancialtransfersoccur-ringamongministriesoramongthevariouslevelofadministrationtothelocallevel.

Kenyaintroducedan interestingsystemtostrengthenpublicparticipationandcom-munity-leveldecisionmaking.In2004,Kenyaadoptedthe‘ConstituencyDevelopmentFundAct’thatcreatedanewtypeofFunds(ConstituencyDevelopmentFund–CDF)specificallydevotedtoenhancedecentralizationandcommunity-drivendevelopment.‘ConstituencyDevelopmentFundisanannualbudgetaryallocationofnotmorethan2.5%oftheannualbudgetthat isdirectlydisbursedtoconstituenciesfortheirowndevelopmentbasedontheirownprioritiesasderivedfrompeople’sfeltneedsstatedinproposalsdevelopedwithintheconstituencies’(UNDP/SIWI,2007,p60).However,itisunlikelythatthesefundsdealwithlargeinvestmentsasrequiredinthewaterandsanitationsector.

InIndia,theright-to-informationlegislationorsimplycalledtheRTIActhasbeenverywellutilizedbywaterconsumers,whetheratanindividual,communityororganizationlevel todemand information fromauthoritiesboth in the rural andurban context.CommunitieshavebeentrainedtousetheRTIact.Inmanycases,sharedinformationhelpedinchangingcourseofprojectsinwaterandsanitation.Forinstance,villagewa-

8 As documented in interviews with various Presidents of OCSAS from El Salvador (Mr. Car-los Alberto Beltrán), Guatemala (Ms. Maria del Rosario Perez and Mr. Francisco Alberto Urizas Fer-nandez) and Costa Rica (Ms. Xinia Briseño and Ms. Maria de los Angeles Bolaño)


terandsanitationcommittees,electedcollectivesatvillagelevelhavebeenusingtheRTIeffectivelyaskinginformationonprojectplansandmakinginformedrecommen-dationstomodifythoseplansresultinginmanyimprovementsforthepeople.InmanyinstanceslikeinthestateofAndhraPradesh,basedoninformationreceivedunderRTI,social auditshavebeenundertaken. These revealedamismatchbetweennumbersquotedinofficialrecordsoninstalledpipesandactualgroundsituation,whereinreal-ity,halfthepipesweremissing9.

4.4 Transparency in Public Procurement Processes and Public Private Partnerships: challenges ahead

The issueoftransparency,participationandaccountability inpublic/private interac-tionsbringadditionalchallenges.

CatarinadeAlbuquerqueinherreportonnon-stateserviceprovidersunderlinedtherightofindividualstoparticipateindecision-makingprocessesconcerningthechoicetodelegateornottheservicestoaprivateoperator.

63.(c)‘Regardlessofitsmodalities,thedecisionoftheStatetodelegateornotdel-egateserviceprovisionmustbetakeninademocraticandparticipatoryprocess.Allthoseconcernedmustbeenabledtoparticipatethroughouttheprocessandtomon-itor,evaluateandreportonpossiblehumanrightsabuses.Participationhastobeac-tive,freeandmeaningfulandallowforagenuineopportunitytoinfluencedecision-making;’

Sheunderlinesalso:

36.‘Whendecidingtodelegateserviceprovision,andoncethatfundamentaldecisionhasbeentaken,thesubsequentprocessoftendering,biddingandcontractnegotia-tionalsomustbetransparent.Thetermsofreferenceandthefinalcontractshouldbemadeavailableforpublicscrutinyandcommenting.Commercialconfidentialitymustnotjeopardizethetransparencyrequirementsprovidedforunderthehumanrightsframework’.(§36.2010reportonnon-stateserviceproviders).

Given‘thecomplexityofstrikingtherightbalancebetweencommercialconfidentialityandpublicinterest’duringpublicprocurementprocessesinthewaterandsanitationservicesector,MovaAlAfghaniarguedinhisthesisthataccesstoinformationlegis-lationneedstobespecifiedtothesectorincludingclearprocurementrules.Inotherwordshestressestheimportanceof‘integratingaccesstoinformationlawsintopublicprocurementprocesses’(AlAfghani2012).

Launchedby theWorldBank Institute in Johannesburg inOctober2012, theOpenContractinginitiative-linkedtotheOpenGovernmentinitiative–seekstofosterinfor-mationdisclosureandparticipationinpubliccontracting.Opencontractingprinciplescoverthewholecontractingchainfromplanningtofinalizationofcontractobligations,includingtenderingandperformance.Traditionalpublicprocurementandpublic-pri-

9 Based on interview with Fresh Water Action Network South Asia (FANSA), 2013


vatepartnershipshouldgetspecificattention.Furtherworkshouldfocusondevelop-ingspecificguidelinesforopencontractinginthewaterandsanitationsector.

Beyondtransparencyissuesinthesepublicprocurementprocesses,theparticipationofprivatesectorinwaterandsanitationservicesraisesquestionsregardingtheirobli-gationstodiscloseinformationunderthehumanrighttowaterandsanitation.

Overthelastdecades,manycountrieshaveadoptedright-to-informationlegislation.InsomecasessuchasIndonesiaandIndiafreedomofinformationlawswereadopt-edaspartofanti-corruptionmeasures. Inanycase, right to information legislationdependonthenatureofinformationtobedisclosed(i.e.how‘publicdocuments’aredefined)andalsoonthelevelofproactivityofinformationdisclosure(i.e.uponcitizendemandsorasroutineprocedure).Thestatusofprivateoperatorsdeliveringapublicservicesuchaswaterandsanitationservicesraisessignificancechallengetomostna-tionalrighttoinformationlegislation.The1998UnitedNationsEconomicCommissionforEurope(UNECE)ConventiononAccesstoInformation,PublicParticipationinDe-cision-MakingandAccesstoJusticeinEnvironmentalMatters,orAarhusconvention,offershoweverasomewhatlargedefinitionof‘environmentalinformation’and‘pub-licauthorities’.InacurrentlypendingcommunicationbeforetheAarhusConventionComplianceCommittee(ACCC/C/2010/55submittedbytheNGOFishLegal),theques-tionisraisedonthenatureofprivatewaterandsewagecompaniesandwateronlycompaniesinEnglandandWalesandonhowenvironmentalinformation–includinginformationrelatingtowater–heldbysuchcompaniesmaybetreated10.Accesstotherequestedinformationhadbeendeniedonthemotivationthataccordingtojurispru-denceinEnglandandWales(UpperTribunalcaseno.GI/2458/2010SmartSourcev.theInformationCommissioner)thesecompanieswerenot‘publicauthorities’forthepurposesoftheEnvironmentalInformationRegulations2004andthereforetheAar-husConvention.InthelightofthetextoftheAarhusConvention,itisratherunlikelythatthesecompaniesareexcludedfromscrutinyandaccesstoinformation,sincetheyprovidepublicservices.TheComplianceCommitteehascurrentlysuspendedconsid-erationofthecase,becauseofpendingdomesticremedies(attheUKandEUlevel).

Righttoaccessinformationlegislationhasthepotentialtobringpublicscrutinyintothemanagementofwaterresourcesandthereforepreventcorruption.However,aspointedoutbythiscaseandasdevelopedbyMovaAlAfghaniinhisthesis,righttoac-cessinformationlegislationsareusuallyinefficienttotacklethespecificchallengesofthewaterandsanitationsector,especiallywhentheyinvolveprivateoperators.Inthisregard,hesuggeststoreformfreedomofinformationlawssothattheycontainboth‘definitionalsystem’(whichdefineswhat‘publicbodies’are)and‘designationsystem’(whichspecificallylistdownpublicbodies)(AlAfghani2012).

Finally,anotherobstaclestoaccountabilityinthewaterandsanitationsector,istheconfusionoftheidentityofduty-bearers.Forthatreasonsaswell,thereisaneedfor

10 Specifically, in2009,FishLegalsoughttodeterminetheconditionsonwhatwaspreviouslyknownas‘deemedconsents’forthousandsofcombinedsewagesoverflowsinEnglandandWales.FishLegalarguedthatthedeemedconsentswerelittlemorethancarteblanchetopolluteatwillbecausenoproperconditionshadbeenap-pliedtotheconsentssincetheprivatizationofthewaterindustryin1989.Consequentlytheoutflowsofuntreatedsewagecausedsignificantenvironmentalharm.


moretransparency.AsstatedbyCatarinadeAlbuquerqueinherreportonnon-stateactors:

‘Toensureaccountability,rolesandresponsibilitieshavetobeclearlydesignatedandmadetransparent.Also,thecoordinationbetweendifferententitiesinvolved–publicandprivate–hastobeensured.Waterandsanitationusersmustbeabletoidentifywho is responsible inordertoholdtherelevantactortoaccount’. (2010reportonnon-stateproviders,§57)

4.5 Transparency, Participation and Accountability: the central role of Service Providers (operational levels)

Inorder topreventcorruption in the interactionbetweenusersandproviders,andmoregenerallytofosteraccountabilityintheoperationsofservices,socialaccount-abilitymechanismshavebeenintroducedinvariouscountries.FirstintroducedinIndiabyanNGObasedinBangalore,thePublicAffairsCenter,socialauditthrough‘Citizenreportcards’havebeenreplicatedinanumberofcountriessuchasthePhilippines,Tanzania,Ukraine,VietNamandKenya.MunicipalauthoritiesincludingtheBangaloreWaterSupplyandSewerageBoardweremadeaccountablethroughtheintroductionofthesepublicmeetingsandquestionnaires(citizenreportcards).InBangalore,whatwasfirstacivilsocietyinitiativebecameinasecondphaseaformalconsultationpro-cesslaunchedincollaborationwiththestategovernmentandmunicipalagencies.Re-sultingfromtheseconsultations,reformssuchasnewgrievancemechanismsandpro-cedurestoreportcorruptactswereintroduced.Reportingonthissuccessfulinitiative,theUNDPnotes: ‘By2003thesocialauditwas registeringreal improvements,withpoorhouseholdsreportingasharpreductioninbribesforconnectionsandimprove-mentsinefficiency’(UNDP2006,p101).

Civilsocietyhasbeeninfluentialismanyplacestopushfortheintroductionofcom-plaintmechanismswithintheenterpriseoragencyinchargeofdeliveringwaterandsanitationservices.Insomeplaces,waterandsanitationserviceprovidershaveintro-duced internalcorruptionreportingprocedure. InCochabamba,forexample, inthecontextthatfollowedthe‘guerradelagua’andthere-municipalisationofthewaterandsanitationservices,SEMAPA(ServicioMunicipaldeAguaPotableyAlcantarillado),themunicipal agencyestablished a ‘transparency and coordinationunit’. Themainobjectiveofthisunitis‘tocreatemechanismsforprocessing,followinguponreportsofpossibleactsofcorruptioncommittedbySEMAPApublicservantsintheexerciseoftheirfunctions,aswellasprivateindividualsandcompanieswithaservicecontract’(SEMAPAwebsite).

InCambodia,thePhnomPenhWaterSupplyAuthorityundertookextensivereformsfortoimprovetransparencyandaccountability.Everydepartmentisresponsibleforitsownaccountabilityandinspectionoftheworksanddepartmentsarecarriedoutby thewaterutilityboard.Theutilityhasapolicyof transparency. Itproducesanddistributesprogressreportsandperformanceindicatorsonaregularbasisandeverythreemonths,theadministrativecouncilreviewsresultsandpriorities.Internally,asetof indicatorsareusedtounderstandtheoverallperformanceanddepartment levelperformanceonamonthlybasisandatotalof148indicatorsareusedforevaluation.


Externally,dataissharedwithbenchmarkingorganizationslikeSoutheastAsianWaterUtilityNetwork(BinayakDasetal.(eds)2010).

IncollaborationwithUNDP,KWAHO(KenyaWaterforHealthOrganization),aKenyanNGOworkinginthewaterandsanitationsector,launchedthe‘WaterDialogueForum’,a local community level platformwherewater and sanitation issues arediscussed.Mostimportantly,it‘servesasfeedbacksandcomplaintredressmechanismsbetweenright-holders(consumers)andduty-bearers(formalandinformalwaterserviceprovid-ers)’.Thisprogramresultedinagreaterconfidenceofconsumersvis-à-visservicepro-vidersandthiswasexpressedbyanincreaseofrevenuecollectionandofthenumberofconnections.AlsoKWAHOnoticedmoreinterestfromright-holdersinlocalwaterandsanitationissuesandahighernumberofreportingof‘unlawfulbehaviors’11.

AsdocumentedbyPlummerandCross,transparency,participationandaccountabilitycanalsobeacentralstrategyofinformalserviceproviders(PlummerandCross2006).TheygivetheexampleofthedifficultpositionofsmallwaterprovidersinNairobivis-à-vistheformalwaterutilitythatprovidedbulkwatersupplyinexchangeofbigbribes.Theymentioned: ‘thesmall scaleprivateprovidersare increasinglyorganized,haveformedanassociationanddevelopedacodeofethicstoensuretheyallfollowasetofagreedrules,andtocreateaplatformwiththecapacityandweighttointeracteffec-tivelywiththeutility.Theyseethisasbeingacriticalvehicletocountertheregularpet-tycorruptionofNairobiWaterUtilityofficialsinmeterreading,billingandcollection’.

Thiskindofcomplicatedsituationsillustratestheneedfordevelopingmulti-stakehold-ersforumsinvolvingallduty-bearersandright-holdersinaspecificwaterandsanita-tionsector.Suchplatformswouldhelptoclearlyidentifyrolesandresponsibilitiesandthusimprovelevelsofaccountability.

11 email exchange with Irene Gai, Programme coordinator at KWAHO, may 2013


5. Conclusions and recommendations

5.1 Significance of the research

Themainobjectiveofthispaperwastolaydowntheconceptualandtheoreticalbasesforahumanright-basedapproachtothefightagainstcorruption.Thisworkconsistedintwomainstages.Firstwedevelopedaframeworktoqualifysomecorruptionactsasviolationofthehumanrighttowaterandsanitation.Thisframeworkrestsonthethreemaintypesofobligations:respect,protectandfulfill.Whiledoingthat,weestablishedlinkageswiththeinternationallegalframeworkagainstcorruptioncodifiedintheUNConventionAgainstCorruption.ThisframeworkthusbuildsthesynergiesbetweenthehumanrighttowaterobligationsandtheUNConventionAgainstCorruption.

Thesecondmainstageofthisresearchconsistedinidentifyingthesynergiesbetweencurrent preventive corruption measures and especially the TAP framework as ex-pressedintheUNCACandproceduralrightsincludedinthehumanrighttowaterandsanitation.Wepresentedopportunitiesaswellaschallengesregardingtransparency,accountabilityandparticipationinthewaterandsanitationsector.

Developingsynergiesbetweenanti-corruptionlegalframeworks,andthehumanrightsframeworkisfundamentalforaneffectivefightagainstcorruption.Aswesawhumanrightsgive ‘teeth’ totheconceptsof transparency,accountabilityandparticipation.Theyarefundamental‘rights’notjustcharitablegestures.Moreover,boththerealiza-tionofhumanrightsandthefightagainstcorruptionsharethesame‘goodgovernance’agenda.Withoutthebasesofagoodgovernanceenvironment,thatismainlydemoc-racy,separationofpowers, independenceofthejudiciary,anti-corruptionprogramsarelikelytoremaindeadletter.Withoutthisgoodgovernanceenvironment,humanrightsarealsounlikelytoberealized.Humanrightsarebothameanandanendtothisgoodgovernanceenvironment.Anti-corruptiongoalsandhumanrightsgoalsareinseparable.Ifhumanrightsgive‘teeth’toTAPmeasures,ahumanright’sapproachtotransparency,accountabilityandparticipationisinsufficienttocombatcorruption.An-ti-corruptionmeasuresandpoliciesdefinedintheUNConventionAgainstCorruptionareessentialsuchascriminalizationofcorruptacts,creationofspecializedindepen-dentanti-corruptionagenciesandombudsman,ortheprotectionofwhistleblowers.TheUNConventionagainstcorruptionoffersastrongandcoherentframeworkthathumanrightsadvocatesshouldendorseintheiractivities.

However,variouschallengesinthewaterandsanitationsectorunderlinedaboveillus-tratethenecessitytocomplementthisgeneralframeworkbyspecificanti-corruptionpoliciesandstrategiesfortherealizationofthehumanrighttowaterandsanitation.Moreover,thepreviousanalysisshedlightonthecomplexchallengesraisedby‘sys-temiccorruption’.Pettycorruptionshouldbeunderstoodinalargercontextofpovertyand is sometimes a symptomof deficiencies in public services delivery revealing aneedforsectorialinstitutionalreforms.Itisintheunderstandingofthesesystemsandthedesignofsectorialinstitutionalreformthatthehumanrighttowaterandsanita-tioncanbringasignificantcontribution.


5.2 Measuring and Understanding corruption

Thisresearchdidnotdirectlydealwiththeissueofcorruptionmeasurement,acontro-versialandcomplexissue.Theapproachadoptedinthispaperputemphasisinsteadonqualitativedatatoestablishatypologyofcorruptactsinhumanrightterms.Oneofthemaincontributionsofahumanright-basedapproachinthediagnosticofcorrup-tionisessentiallytounpack‘corruption’intospecificcorruptacts,identifykeyactorsandmechanisms.Theimpactofcorruptiononthehumanrighttowaterdependsonthetypeandlevelofcorruption.Itisdifficulttoprovideaclearanswerastothekindofcorruptionhavingthegreatestimpactsonthehumanrighttowaterandsanitation.Onthedaytodaysituation,pettycorruptionintheinteractionbetweenlower-levelofficialsandusershasprobablythemostdirectincidenceonright-holdershowever,aswesaw,significantdistinctionsneedtobemadeaccordingtothespecificcontext(e.g.harassmentbribesvs.‘speed’moneybribes).Moreover,corruptionatahigherlevel,suchasembezzlementbyaministermightactuallyimpactmoreprofoundlyanddu-rablytheenjoymentofthehumanrighttowaterthanpettycorruption.Itisthereforedifficulttogiveageneralanswertotheissueofprioritization.

Effortsshouldthereforefocusonaspecificformofcorruptionataparticularpointoftheservicesupplychainsuchasforexamplepublicprocurementprocessesorproj-ectsselectionbyhigh-levelofficialsandinternationaldonors(see‘corruptionhotspotsin thewater supply chain’ in Plummer and Cross, 2006). A human right-based ap-proachtosuchasituationwouldconsistinidentifyingwithaccuracyduty-bearersandrights-holderstakingintoaccounttheirspecificinstitutionalandregulatoryenviron-ment.Ahumanright-basedapproachtocorruptionessentiallymeanstoputahumanfacetosuchasproblem,meaningtryingtounderstandthecauseofaspecifictypeofcorruptiontakingintoaccountthesocial,politicalandeconomiccontext.Suchadiag-nosticwouldhelpidentifyentrypointsforanti-corruptionprogramming.

Inanycase,whendesigninganti-corruptionprograms,itisimportanttoanticipateandmeasurethepotentialimpactonright-holdersofanti-corruptionmeasures.Insomesituation,anti-corruptionpoliciessuchasautomaticcriminalizationofillegalbehaviorsmighthavesignificantnegativeshort-termimpactsonpoorright-holders.Indeed,insomecases,pettycorruptionemergesinordertoaddressutilities,localgovernment’sorstate’sfailurestorealizethehumanrighttowaterandsanitation.

5.3 Further research and next steps

Theroleofwaterandsanitationregulatorybodiesincorruptionmonitoringhastobefurtherinvestigated.Towhatextentandhowthiscorruptionmonitoringiscurrentlyundertakenhasnotbeenaddressedhereanddeservesfurtherresearch.

Furtherresearchshoulddocumentsuccessfulcasesofanti-corruptionpoliciesandpro-gramsinthewaterandsanitationsectorincludingadiagnosticofcorruptionpracticesintheirsocio-economiccontext,thesequencingofthereformsintroducedaswellastheirarticulationwiththegeneralanti-corruptionandgoodgovernanceefforts,andtheroleofcivilsociety-especiallyhowitsactivitieswereintegrated/formalizedinthe


legalframeworksofparticipation,accesstoinformationandaccountability.

Recentfindings showed that transparency improvementsdidnot lead to increasedparticipationandthatthepathtowardaccountabilitywasevenmorecomplex.Furtherresearchthereforeshouldfocusonunderstandingthefactorsthatcontributetomovefromtransparency toparticipationand toaccountability (SanjeevKhagram,ArchonFung,PaolodeRenzio,2013).

Weidentifiedhoweverpromisinginitiativesresultingfromthegooduseofaccesstoinformationlawsandcivilsocietytraininginthisregard.InsomecaseslikeinIndia,Andhra Pradesh, right-holders empowerment lead them to ask for changes, bene-ficially influencingwater and sanitationplanningprocesses.Other successful initia-tivesconsisted in thecreationof socialaccountabilitymechanismsofferingaspaceforright-holdersandduty-bearerstodialogue,forwateruserstofilecomplaintsandreportcorruptionacts.Theseinitiativesalsocontributetorestoreconfidenceinser-viceprovidersandpublicauthorities.Tobesuccessfulsuchprogramsshouldestablisharangeofaccompanyingmeasures.Animportanteffortshouldthereforeconsistfirstinexplainingthegainsthatresultfromtheintroductionofsuchpublicparticipationandaccountabilityprocessestodonors,governmentsandserviceproviders.Allocatingresourcesfortheseprogramsandprioritizingtheestablishmentandstrengtheningofsuchmechanismscanbringimportantpositiveoutcomesforusersaswellasforpro-viders(asshownbytheKenyanexample).

Moreeffortsshouldfocusoncivilsocietyawarenessraisingandcapacitybuilding.Foranti-corruptionand social auditprograms towork, ‘peopleneed tohave individualincentivestoengage,theycannotfeelintimidated,andtheyhavetobelievethatsys-temscanchange’(Johnsøn,2012,p28).Forthisreason,hesuggeststhatawarenessraisingprogramsshouldinclude‘positivestoriesthatdemonstratethatsystemscanbechanged’.Theseprogramsshouldalsoseektoexplainthecontentoftherighttowa-terandsanitationandhowitcontributestoaddresscorruption.Journalistscouldbetrainedalongwithcivilsocietyorganizationstopresenttheconsequencesofcorruptactsonthehumanrighttowaterandsanitation.

Finally,oneshouldkeepaneyeoncorruptionscandalsinthemedia,tomakesurethatwetakesuchopportunitiestopushforchangesandinstitutionalreforms.Indeed,inmanyplaces, important reformsandanti-corruptionprogramswere introduced fol-lowingtocorruptionscandals.Theyareopportunitiesonecannotmiss.


6. References

6.1 Academic articles/book chaptersAbed, George T. and Hamid R. Davoodi. 2000. Corruption, Structural Reform and Economic Perfor-mance,IMFWorkingPaperWP/00/132,,availableat:http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2000/wp00132.pdf(accessed23July2013)

AlAfghani,Mova.2012.TheRoleofLegalFrameworksinEnablingTransparencyinWaterUtilities’Reg-ulation.PhDThesis,UniversityofDundee,UK.

AlAfghani,Mova.2012.Thetransparencyagendainwaterutilitiesregulationandtheroleoffreedomofinformation:EnglandandJakartacasestudies,JournalofWaterLaw 20:129-143

Altman,DavidwithRickardLalander. 2003. Bolivia’sPopularParticipationLaw:AnUndemocraticDe-mocratizationProcess?In:AxelHadenius(Ed)DecentralizationandDemocraticGovernance:Experienc-esfromIndia,BoliviaandSouthAfrica.Stockholm:ExpertGrouponDevelopmentIssues.

Asthana,A.2008.Decentralisationandcorruption:evidencefromdrinkingwatersector.PublicAdmin-istrationandDevelopment 28,181–189.

BacioTerracino,Julio.2010.Linkingcorruptionandhumanrights,AmericanSocietyofInternationalLawProceedingsoftheAnnualMeeting2010,104:243-246.

Basu,Kaushik.2011.Why,foraClassofBribes,theActofGivingaBribeshouldbeTreatedasLegal,WorkingPaper,MinistryofFinance,GovernmentofIndia,availableat:http://finmin.nic.in/workingpa-per/act_giving_bribe_legal.pdf(accessed23July2013)

Butterworth,JohnandJeandelaHarpe.2011.Améliorerlastructure?Réformeinstitutionnelleetcor-ruptiondanslesecteurdel’eau.U4Brief2011:8,availableat:

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Das,Binayak,EkSonnChan,CheaVisoth,GaneshPangare,andRobinSimpson(eds),2010.SharingtheReformsProcess,MekongWaterDialoguePublicationNo.4,Gland,Switzerland:IUCN.58pp.

Davis, Jennifer.2004.Corruption inPublicServiceDelivery:Experience fromSouthAsia’sWaterandSanitationSector.WorldDevelopment 32(1):53–71.

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Diop,Moussa.2008.Doctoratdesociologieàl’UniversitéParisIX(Dauphine):«Eauetdéveloppement:échelles,temporalitès,acteursetenjeuxautourdelagestiondurableduservicepublicdel’eauauSé-négal»

Gathii, JamesT.2010.Definingtherelationshipbetweenhumanrightsandcorruption.UniversityofPennsylvaniaJournalofInternationalLaw 31(1):125-202

Goldfrank,Benjamin.2006.“LessonsfromLatinAmericanExperienceinParticipatoryBudgeting”.PaperpresentedattheLatinAmericanStudiesAssociationMeetingSanJuan,PuertoRico,March2006,avail-ableat:http://www.internationalbudget.org/themes/PB/LatinAmerica.pdf(accessed23July2013)

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InternationalCouncilonHumanRightsPolicyandTransparencyInternational.2010.IntegratingHumanRightsintheAnti-CorruptionAgenda:Challenges,PossibilitiesandOpportunities,Geneva,Switzerland:ICHRP. available at: http://archive.transparency.org/publications/publications/other/ichrp_human_rights_agenda(accessed23July2013)

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Johnsøn,Jesper.2012.Theoriesofchangeinanti-corruptionwork:Atoolforprogrammedesignandevaluation. Bergen:Chr.Michelsen Institute (U4 Issue2012:6),availableat :http://www.u4.no/pub-lications/theories-of-change-in-anti-corruption-work-a-tool-for-programme-design-and-evaluation/(accessed23July2013)

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Mauro,Paulo.1995.CorruptionandGrowth,QuarterlyJournalofEconomics 110:681-683

Ngugi,JoelM.2010.Makingthelinkbetweencorruptionandhumanrights:promisesandperils,Amer-icanSocietyofInternationalLawProceedingsoftheAnnualMeeting2010. 104:246–250

OHCHR.2007.GoodgovernancepracticesfortheprotectionofHumanRights,availableat:http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GoodGovernance.pdf(accessed23July2013)

Oostrom,BepandCorDietvorst.2006.“DecentralisationandtheroleofNGOsincombatingcorrup-tionintheWASHsector”,conferencepaper:32ndWEDCInternationalConference,Colombo,SriLan-ka,2006availableat:http://wedc.lboro.ac.uk/resources/conference/32/vanOostrom.pdf(accessed23July2013)


Pilapitiya,Thusitha.2004.Theimpactofcorruptiononthehumanrightsbasedapproachtodevelop-ment.OsloGovernanceCenter/UNDP.

Plummer,JanelleandPiersCross.2006.TacklingCorruptionintheWaterandSanitationSectorinAfrica.StartingtheDialogue.WaterandSanitationProgramWorkingPaper,December2006,availableat:

http://www.wsp.org/sites/wsp.org/files/publications/712200782528_Tackling_Corruption_in_the_Water_and_Sanitation_Sector_in_Africa.pdf(accessed23July2013)

Sohail,M. andCavill, S. 2007.Partnering toCombatCorruption in Infrastructure Services:AToolkit,WEDC, Loughborough University, UK, available at : http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/Output/178362/De-fault.aspx(accessed23July2013)

Stålgren,P.2006.CorruptionintheWaterSector:Causes,ConsequencesandPotentialReform.SwedishWaterHousePolicyBriefNr.4.SIWI,2006.Availableat:http://www.siwi.org/documents/Resources/Policy_Briefs/PB5_Corruption_in_the_water_sector_2006.pdf(accessed23July2013)

Sunga,LyalS.andIlariaBottigliero.2007.In-DepthStudyontheLinkagesbetweenAnti-CorruptionandHumanRights,RaoulWallenbergInstituteofHumanRightsandHumanitarianLaw,forthe

UNDP,availableat:http://km.undp.sk/uploads/public1/files/Sunga-Bottigliero_Revised_Final_Report_on_HR_and_Anti-Corruption_Strategies1.pdf(accessed23July2013)

Theobald,Robin.1999.Sowhatreallyistheproblemaboutcorruption?ThirdWorldQuarterly,20(3):491-502

TransparencyInternational.2008.GlobalCorruptionReport2008:CorruptionintheWaterSectoravail-ableat:http://archive.transparency.org/publications/gcr/gcr_2008(accessed23July2013)

UNDP/SIWI.2007.ImprovingWaterGovernanceinKenyathroughtheHumanRights-basedApproach:AMappingandBaselineReport

UNDP/KWAHO(KenyaWater forHealthOrganization).2009.CorruptionPracticesand theavailablecomplaint,feedback,redresstoolsandanti-corruptiontoolsinwaterandsanitationsector-Bondodis-trict,Kenya.ReportpreparedbyStrategicPublicRelationsandResearchLimitedforKWAHOandUNDP-August2009,availableat:

http://www.watergovernance.org/documents/WGF/Kenya/Mapping_Wat_San_Corruption_Compl_Redress_MEC.pdf(accessed23July2013)

UNDP.2012.FightingCorruptioninthewatersector-Methods,toolsandgoodpractices,availableat:http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/IP/Anticorruption%20Methods%20and%20Tools%20in%20Water%20Lo%20Res.pdf(accessed23July2013)

UNGlobalCompact.2010.Fightingcorruptioninthesupplychain:aguideforcustomersandsuppliers,UnitedNationsNewYork,availableat:

http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/Anti-Corruption/Fighting_Corruption_Supply_Chain.pdf(accessed23July2013)

WaterandSanitationProgram/WorldBank.2008.OperadoreslocalesdepequeñaescalaenAméricaLatina:suparticipaciónenlaprestacióndelosserviciosdeaguaysaneamiento,,availableat:http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/07/11/000020953_20080711093058/Rendered/PDF/444040WSP0LAC01res0locales01PUBLIC1.pdf(accessed23July2013)


6.2 Selection of ConventionsInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(adopted16December1966,enteredintoforce23March1976)

InternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights(adopted16December1966,enteredintoforce3January1976)

UnitedNationsConventionAgainstCorruption(adopted31October2003,enteredintoforce14De-cember2005)

AfricanUnionConventiononPreventingandCombatingCorruption(adopted11July2003,enteredintoforce5August2006)

OECDConventiononCombatingBriberyofForeignPublicOfficials (adopted17December1997andenteredintoforceon15February1999)

6.3 Selections of UN ResolutionsCESCR,2002.GeneralCommentn.15.TheRighttoWater.Geneva;OHCHR.

CommissiononHumanRights, Sub-Commissionon thePromotionandProtectionofHumanRights,2003,E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/18.Corruptionanditsimpactonthefullenjoymentofhumanrights,inpar-ticulareconomic,socialandculturalrights,WorkingpapersubmittedbyMs.ChristyMbonuinaccor-dancewithSub-Commissiondecision2002/106.

HumanRightsCouncil.2007.A/HRC/RES/7/11.Theroleofgoodgovernanceinthepromotionandpro-tectionofhumanrights.Geneva;HRC.

HumanRightsCouncil.2007.A/HRC/RES7/71ReportontheConferenceonanti-corruption,goodgov-ernanceandhumanrights(Warsaw,8and9November2006)Geneva;HRC.

HumanRightsCouncil,2010a.RES/15/9,Humanrightsandaccesstosafedrinkingwaterandsanitation.Geneva;HRC.

HumanRightsCouncil,2010b.A/HRC/15/31.Reportoftheindependentexpertontheissueofhumanrightsobligations related to access to safedrinkingwater and sanitation,CatarinadeAlbuquerque.Humanrightsobligationsrelatedtonon-stateserviceprovisioninwaterandsanitation.Geneva;HRC.

HumanRightsCouncil,2011.A/HRC/18/33.ReportoftheSpecialRapporteuronthehumanrighttosafedrinkingwaterandsanitation,CatarinadeAlbuquerque.Nationalplansofactionfortherealizationoftherightstowaterandsanitation.Geneva;HRC.

HumanRightsCouncil,2012.A/HRC/RES/21/13.Paneldiscussiononthenegativeimpactofcorruptionontheenjoymentofhumanrights.Geneva;HRC.

UNGA,2010,RES/64/292,TheHumanRighttoWaterandSanitation.NewYork;UnitedNations.

WaterLex International Secretariat 83 rue de Montbrillant 1202 Geneva Switzerland Web: www.waterlex.org Email: [email protected]

Water Integrity Network c/o Transparency International Alt Moabit 96, 10559 Berlin Web: www.waterintegritynetwork.org Email: [email protected]

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