NOTES, SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION AND BIBLIOGRAPHY TOHoward D. Grier,

Hitler, Dönitz, and the Baltic Sea: The Third Reich’s Last Hope, 1944-1945

Corrections

Hubert Wangenheim was never an admiral during World War II, as incorrectly stated onp. xvi (dramatis personae). He was promoted to Captain on 1 December 1943, andbecame an admiral in the Federal German Navy in the mid-1950s. The author thanks Dr.Werner Rahn for pointing out this error.

The quote on the dust jacket attributed to Mark R. Peattie is actually by ProfessorGerhard L. Weinberg.

Acknowledgments

The author wishes to thank the anonymous readers of the manuscript for US NavalInstitute Press for their numerous helpful suggestions. I am also particularly indebted toDr. Werner Rahn for his comments.

Abbreviations

BA/BL Bundesarchiv Berlin-LichterfeldeBA/K Bundesarchiv KoblenzBA/MA Bundesarchiv MilitärarchivFst, avd M Försvarsstaben, Marinavdelning (Swedish Defense Staff, Naval Section)GNR German Naval Records (at Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives)GVK Geschichte des Grossen Vaterländischen Krieges der SowjetunionHGr HeeresgruppeIfZ Institut für ZeitgeschichteIMT, TMWC International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War CriminalsKrA Kungl. Krigsarkivet, StockholmKDB Krigsdagbok (War Diary)KTB KriegstagebuchMst Marinstaben (Swedish Naval Staff)NA National ArchivesNavOpArch Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives, Washington Navy YardOKH Oberkommando des HeeresOKW Oberkommando der WehrmachtSkl SeekriegsleitungTBJG Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels

USSBS US Strategic Bombing Survey

Introduction

1. Important works dealing with Finland's role in World War II include Earl Ziemke, TheGerman Northern Theater of Operations, 1940-1945 (Washington: Government PrintingOffice, 1960); Ernst Klink, "Die deutsch-finnische Zusammenarbeit 1944,"Operationsgebiet östliche Ostsee und der finnische-baltische Raum 1944(Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamt ed.) (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1961);Peter Krosby, Finland, Germany and the Soviet Union, 1940-1944: The Petsamo Dispute(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968); Waldemar Erfurth, The Last FinnishWar, 1941-1944 (Washington: University Publications of America, 1979).

2. This debate is summarized in Martin Fritz, "Swedish Iron Ore and German Steel,"Scandinavian Economic History Review, Vol. 21 (1973): 133-144.

3. Some major works on Sweden in World War II include Ziemke, The GermanNorthern Theater of Operations; Erik Boheman, På Vakt, Vol. 2, Kabinettssekreterareunder andra världskriget (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1964); Carl August Ehrensvärd, I riketstjänst: Händelser och människor från min bana (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1965); WilhelmCalgren, Swedish Foreign Policy during the Second World War (Arthur Spencer trans.)(London: Ernest Benn, 1977); Wilhelm Calgren, Svensk underrättelsetjänst 1939-1945(Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 1985); Carl-Axel Gemzell, "Tysk militärplanläggning under det andra världskriget: fall Sverige," Scandia, Vol. 41, No. 2 (1975):198-248; Sveriges militära beredskap 1939-1945 (Carl-Axel Wangel ed.) (Köping:Militärhistoriska Förlaget, 1982).

4. Karl Dönitz, Ten Years and Twenty Days (R.H. Stevens trans.) (London: Weidenfeld& Nicolson, 1959).

5. The most recent biography, Peter Padfield, Dönitz, the Last Führer: Portrait of a NaziWar Leader (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), contains much useful information, but ismarred by questionable psychoanalysis.

6. Heinz Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten (Heidelberg: Kurt Vowinckel, 1951).The sole biography of Schörner, Erich Kernmayr (Erich Kern pseud.),Generalfeldmarschall Ferdinand Schörner: Ein deutsche Soldatenschicksal (Oldendorf:Schütz, 1976), contains little of use to the scholar.

7. Jost Dülffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine: Reichspolitik und Flottenbau(Düsseldorf: Droste, 1973).

8. Michael Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 1935-1945, 3 Vols. (Munich:Bernard & Graefe, 1970-75).

9. Charles Thomas, The German Navy in the Nazi Era (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,1990); Eric Rust, Naval Officers Under Hitler: The Story of Crew 34 (New York:Praeger, 1991); Keith Bird, Weimar, The German Naval Officer Corps and the Rise ofNational Socialism (Amsterdam: B.R. Grüner, 1977); Keith Bird, Erich Raeder: Admiralof the Third Reich (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006); Holger Herwig, Politics ofFrustration: The United States in German Naval Planning, 1889-1941 (Boston: Little,Brown and Company, 1976); Gerhard Schreiber, Revisionismus und Weltmachtstreben:Marineführung und deutsch-italienische Beziehungen 1919-1944 (Stuttgart: DeutscheVerlags-Anstalt, 1978); Werner Rahn, “Kriegführung, Politik und Krisen—Die Marinedes Deutschen Reiches, 1914-1933,” Die deutsche Flotte im Spannungsfeld der Politik1848-1985 (Deutsches Marine Institut and Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt ed)(Herford: Mittler, 1985), 79-104; see also Rahn’s sections in Das Deutsche Reich und derZweite Weltkrieg (Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt ed), vol. 6: Horst Boog et al,Der globale Krieg (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1990); Herbert Kraus, “KarlDönitz und das Ende des ‘Dritten Reiches,’” Ende des Dritten Reiches—Ende desZweiten Weltkriegs: Eine Perspektivische Rundschau (Hans-Erich Volkmann ed)(Munich: Piper, 1995), 1-23; Douglas Peifer, The Three German Navies: Dissolution,Transition, and New Beginnings, 1945-1960 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida,2002).

10. Helmuth Forwick, "Der Rückzug der Heeresgruppe Nord nach Kurland,"Abwehrkämpfe am Nordflügel der Ostfront 1944-1945 (MilitärgeschichtlichesForschungsamt ed.) (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1963).

11. Werner Haupt, Kurland: Die letzte Front—Schicksal für zwei Armeen (BadNauheim: Podzun, 1959); Haupt, Heeresgruppe Nord, 1941-1945 (Bad Nauheim:Podzun, 1966); Haupt, Kurland: Die vergessene Heeresgruppe, 1944/45 (Friedberg:Podzun-Pallas, 1979); Franz Kurowski, Todeskessel Kurland: Kampf und Untergang derHeeresgruppe Nord 1944/1945 (Wölfersheim-Berstadt: Podzun-Pallas, 2000).

12. Rudolf Kabath, “Die Rolle der Seebrückenköpfe beim Kampf um Ostpreussen, 1944-1945,” Abwehrkämpfe am Nordflügel der Ostfront; Kurt Dieckert and Horst Grossmann,Der Kampf um Ostpreussen: Der umfassende Dokumentarbericht über dasKriegsgeschehen in Ostpreussen (2nd ed.) (Stuttgart: Motorbuch, 1976); Otto Lasch, Sofiel Königsberg (2nd ed.) (Stuttgart: Motorbuch, 1977); Erich Murawski, Die EroberungPommerns durch die Rote Armee (Boppard: Harald Boldt, 1969).

Chapter 1: The Retreat: From Leningrad to Narva

1. Der Führer und Oberste Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht, OKW/WFSt/Abt.L (I), Nr.33408/40 gKdos.Chefs., "Weisung Nr. 21 Fall Barbarossa," 18 Dec. 1940, in HitlersWeisungen für die Kriegführung, 1939-1945 (Walther Hubatsch ed.) (2nd Ed.)(Frankfurt: Bernard & Graefe, 1983), 86.

2. OKW/WFSt/Abt.L (I Op), "Nr. 441675/41 gKdos. Chefs.," 7 Oct. 1941, InternationalMilitary Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals (Nuremberg: International MilitaryTribunal, 1949) (hereafter cited as IMT, TMWC), 34: 425-27. See also HeeresgruppeNord/Ia, "Kriegstagebuch (hereafter cited as HGr Nord, KTB)," entries for 18 Sept. and12 Oct. 1941, National Archives Microcopy T-311, Roll 53, Frames 7065327, 7065441(hereafter T-311/53/7065327); "Besprechung des Chefs OKW mit Oberbefehlshaber derHeeresgruppe Mitte am 25. Juli 1941," Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos derWehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab) 1940-1945 (Percy Schramm ed.) (Frankfurt:Bernard & Graefe, 1961) (hereafter OKW KTB), Vol. 1, Part 2, 1036. On Hitler'sintention to raze Leningrad, see Norman Rich, Hitler's War Aims (New York: Norton,1974), 2: 327, 392; Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier (Henry Picker ed.)(3rd Ed.) (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1976), entry for 5 Apr. 1942, 192-93; Monologe imFührerhauptquartier 1941-1944 (Werner Jochmann ed.) (Hamburg: Knaus, 1980),entries for 25-26 Sept. 1941, 17-18 Oct. 1941, 29 Oct. 1941, 6 and 8 Aug. 1942, 71, 93,116, 331, 334.

3. David Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad, 1941-1944 (Lawrence: University Press ofKansas, 2002), 78-80; John Erickson, The Road to Berlin (Boulder, CO: Westview,1983), 169.

4. During the winter of 1941-1942, the Soviets brought more than 360,000 tons of goodsinto Leningrad via the ice roads, and evacuated over 500,000 people; Glantz, The Battlefor Leningrad, 144. Initially, the army group attempted to tighten the blockade byseizing the railhead at Tikhvin and pushing to the Svir River to link up with Finnishforces. The Germans hoped the Finns would push across the Svir and advance onTikhvin as well. But the Finns were reluctant to cross the pre-1940 Russo-Finnishfrontier, because this would justify Soviet claims that the location of the old border poseda threat to Leningrad, and thus vindicate Soviet aggression in the Winter War of 1939-1940. Although the Germans briefly gained control of Tikhvin, the Soviets recapturedthe city in one of their first successful counteroffensives of the war; Verb. Stab Nord/Ia,"Nr. 55/42 gKdos. Chefs.," 4 Sept. 1942, T-78/337/6292971-72; Glantz, The Battle forLeningrad, 459; Earl Ziemke and Magna Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in theEast (New York: Military Heritage Press, 1988), 147-48.

5. N. Komarov, "Operation Iskra," Soviet Military Review 1973 (No. 1), 44-46.

6. In mid-September 1943 the army group possessed only 7 serviceable tanks; EarlZiemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East (Washington: Center ofMilitary History, 1968), 197; "Besprechung beim Führer am 11.9.1943," gKdos.Chefs.,T-311/77/7100293-95; Der Ob. der HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 106/43 gKdos.Chefs.," 22 Sept.1943, ibid., Frame 7100287; HGr Nord, KTB, 4 Nov. 1943, T-311/57/7070854-60;Obkdo HGr Nord/Ia/Id, "Aufstellung der Abgaben aus dem alten Bereich der H.Gr. Nordseit dem 1.8.1943," 3 Nov. 1943, Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv (hereafter BA/MA), RH 19III/5, 110-11.

7. HGr Nord, KTB, 14 Nov. 1943, T-311/57/7071026.

8. This is one of the most extensively documented conferences of an Army Group Northcommander with Hitler; Obkdo HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 227/43 gKdos.Chefs.,"Besprechungspunkte für den 30.12.43," 29 Dec. 1943, BA/MA, RH 19 III/14, 107-09;HGr Nord, KTB, 30 Dec. 43, T-311/57/7071536; Nr. 290, "Anruf O.B. an Chef,30.12.43, 17.42 Uhr," BA/MA, RH 19 III/19, 101; HGr Nord/ Ia, "Bericht über denVortrag des Herrn Oberbefehlshabers im Führerhauptquartier am 30.12.1943," 3 Jan.1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/3, 35-38; "Besprechung des Führers mit Feldmarschall v.Küchler am 30. Dezember 1943 in der Wolfsschanze," Hitlers Lagebesprechungen: DieProtokollfragmente seiner militärischen Konferenzen 1942-1945 (Helmut Heiber ed.)(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1962), 519-524. An indication that Hitler seriouslyconsidered the retreat is revealed in a letter Keitel prepared for Mannerheim, dated 31Dec. 1943 but never dispatched, which announced that the Germans would withdraw tothe Panther Position in order to gain forces; "Der nördliche Kriegsschauplatz," Part 1, inOKW KTB, Vol. 4, Part, 2, 12.

9. H Gr Nord, KTB, 31 Dec. 1943, T-311/57/7071550-51; Nr. 296, "Anruf ChefGenStab an Chef, 31.12.43, 10.45 Uhr," BA/MA, RH 19 III/19, 104.

10. On 31 Dec. the army group warned Zeitzler that it could not hold its positions if theSoviets attacked, and requested immediate approval for a retreat to the Panther Position;H Gr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 232/43 gKdos.Chefs.," 31 Dec. 1943, BA/MA, RH19 III/14, 133. Aweek later the army group reported that in the last six months the number of divisions atthe front had been reduced by 40% (18 divisions); Anlage 1 zu Obkdo HGr Nord/Ia, Nr.6/44 gKdos.Chefs. vom 7.1.1944, "Aufstellung über die Kräfteverschiebung aus demalten Bereich der H.Gr.Nord seit Juli 1943," ibid., 146. HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 230/43gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Beurteilung des inneren Kampfwertes der Divisionen," 31 Jan.1943, T-78/337/6292937-944.

11. Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad, 328-37; Ivan Fediuninskii, "The Feat ofLeningrad," Soviet Military Review, 1974, No. 1, 6. Fediuninskii commanded the Soviet2nd Shock Army.

12. HGr Nord, KTB, 14 Jan. 1944, T-311/58/7071863.

13. Emphasis in the original; ibid., 17 Jan. 1944, Frame 7072051.

14. Partisan detachments operating behind the front wreaked havoc by disrupting roadand rail communications, which considerably impeded the transfer of German units tovital sectors. On 18 January alone over three hundred rail demolitions occurred in thearmy group's sector; ibid., 18-21 and 23 Jan. 1944, Frames 7072099-103, 7072107,7072121, 7072127, 7072135, 7072177, 7072215-17, 7072235, 7072237; HGr Nord/Ia,"Nr. 15/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 20 Jan. 1944, T-78/337/6292925-26.

15. HGr Nord, KTB, 22 and 24 Jan. 1944, T-311/58/7072299-303, 7072349. Zeitzlerlater informed Küchler that his visit came at a bad time, since Hitler was preoccupiedwith other matters (the Allies landed at Anzio on 22 January); Nr. 355, "Anruf Chef anChef Gen Stab, 23.1.44, 11.05 Uhr," BA/MA, RH19 III/19, 179.

16. HGr Nord, KTB, 24 Jan. 1944, T-311/58/7072365, 7072385; H Gr Nord/Ia, Nr.20/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Beurteilung der Lage vom 26.1.," 26 Jan. 1944, BA/MA, RH19III/14, 178-79; HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 24/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 29 Jan. 1944, T-78/337/6292911.18th Army's fighting power had nearly disintegrated. On 10 Jan. its infantry combatstrength was nearly 58,000 men, but on 29 Jan. it had dropped to only 17,000; HGrNord/Ia, "Nr. 23/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 29 Jan. 1944, T-78/337/6292916-17; HGr Nord,KTB, 29 Jan. 1944, T-311/58/7072569.

17. Nr. 377, "Anruf Chef an Chef 18, 28.1.44, 20.00 Uhr," BA/MA, RH 19 III/19, 207;HGr Nord, KTB, 28 and 29 Jan. 1944, T-311/58/7072551, 7072581, 7072591-93; Nr.379, "Anruf Chef an Chef 18, 29.1.44, 12.10 Uhr," BA/MA, RH 19 III/19, 209.Küchler's about-face is especially interesting in view of a document in the army group'sChefsachen files. The memorandum, presumably notes for his up-coming meeting withHitler, lists reasons for the success of the Soviet offensive: the army group had given up10 divisions since July 1943; its front had been lengthened by 140 kilometers, requiringthe army group to transfer units to this area; insufficient reserves; and the Russians hadattacked at several far-flung sectors simultaneously (Nevel, Novgorod andLeningrad/Oranienbaum); "Gründe für die gegenwärtige Lage der Heeresgruppe," 26Jan. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/15, 18-19.

18. HGr Nord, KTB, 31 Jan. 1944, T-311/58/7072652, 7072668. On 26 Jan. theremnants of LIV Corps and III SS Panzer Corps combined to form Group Sponheimer,commanded by LIV corps’ commander, General Otto Sponheimer. By 30 Jan. there wasa 60-kilometer gap between Group Sponheimer and the closest German forces to thesouth; ibid., 30 Jan. 1944, Frame 7072623.

19. By 3 Feb. this bridgehead was 35 kilometers wide and 15 kilometers deep;Deutschland im zweiten Weltkrieg (Wolfgang Schumann et al ed.) (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1984), 5: 71.

20. HGr Nord, KTB, 13 Feb. 1944, T-311/58/7073075; ibid., 1 Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RH19 III/272, 4. As of 1 March the army group reported a strength of 638,521 men, and ashortage of over 75,000 men; H Gr Nord/Abt.IIb, Nr. 88/44 gKdos., "Zusammenstellungüber Verluste u. Ersatz im Januar u. Februar 1944, Fehlstellen u. Iststärke v. 1.3.1944,"21 March 1944, T-311/73/7095173.

21. Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad, 375.

22. Ibid., 401-05.

23. This is the evaluation of a later commander of 18th Army (and a commander of oneof 18th Army’s corps in Jan. 1944); Herbert Loch, “The Operations of the EighteenthArmy During the First Half of 1944 to the Occupation of the Panther Line,” Retreat fromLeningrad: Army Group North 1944/1945 (Steven Newton trans. and ed.) (Atglen, PA:Schiffer, 1995), 80-82. The Soviet High Command (Stavka) disbanded the VolkhovFront on 15 February, distributing its units to the Leningrad and Second Baltic Fronts.The Soviets soon discovered, however, that the huge forces of the Leningrad Front wereunwieldy, and on 18 April created a new front (Third Baltic) out of three armies of theLeningrad Front and one army from the Second Baltic Front; Sergei Shtemenko, TheSoviet General Staff at War, 1941-1945 (rev. ed.) (Robert Daglish trans.) (Moscow:Progress, 1985), 1: 342.

24. Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 2: 455.

25. Skl Iop, 2486/40, "Besprechung des Ob.d.M. beim Führer am 14.11.40,"Lagevorträge des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine vor Hitler 1939-1945 (GerhardWagner ed.) (Munich: Lehmanns, 1972), 154-55 (hereafter Lagevorträge, date ofconference). See also Wagner's comments to Raeder's private discussion with Hitler on26 Sept. 1940 in ibid., 145-46; Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 1: 356-60;Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed), Germany and the Second World War, vol. 4:Horst Boog et al, The Attack on the Soviet Union (Ewald Osers et al trans.) (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1998), 377-80; Bird, Erich Raeder, 160-74.

26. Extract from Halder Diary, 30 June 41, in 1939-1945: Der Zweite Weltkrieg inChronik und Dokumenten (Hans-Adolf Jacobsen ed.) (5th ed.) (Darmstadt: Wehr undWissen, 1961), 251. For the same reason, Hitler stressed the importance of capturingLeningrad when he visited Army Group North's headquarters the next month; "Besuchdes Führers bei Heeres-Gruppe Nord am 21. Juli 1941," OKW KTB, 2: 1029-30.

27. Wilhelm Keitel, In the Service of the Reich (Walter Görlitz ed.) (David Irving trans.)(New York: Stein & Day, 1979), 150; Franz Halder, "Decisions affecting the Campaignin Russia (1941/ 42)," in Donald Detwiler (ed.), World War II German Military Studies:A Collection of 213 Special Reports on the Second World War Prepared by formerOfficers of the Wehrmacht for the United States Army (New York: Garland, 1979), Vol.15, MS # C-067b, 1-2; Adolf Heusinger, Befehl im Widerstreit: Schicksalsstunden derdeutschen Armee, 1923-1945 (Tübingen: Rainer Wunderlich, 1950), 133; Wilhelm Rittervon Leeb, Tagebuchaufzeichnungen und Lagebeurteilungen aus zwei Weltkriegen (GeorgMeyer ed.) (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1976), entries for 3 and 23 July 1941,286, 304-05.

28. zu ObdM op 107/42 gKdos.Chefs., "Betrifft: Lage im Ostseeraum," 10 Feb. 1942,BA/MA, RM 7/1014, 103-05; 1/ Skl IL 495/42 gKdos.Chefs., "Betrifft: Lage imOstseeraum," 2 Mar. 1942, BA/MA, RM 7/159, 120-21; Lagevorträge, 13 Feb. 1942,354; ObdL/Füst/Ia (Robinson), "Nr. 5845/42 gKdos. (Op 1)," 20 Feb. 1942, BA/MA, RM7/1014, 106; Gerhard Hümmelchen, "Unternehmen 'Eisstoss:' Der Angriff der Luftflotte

1 gegen die russische Ostseeflotte im April 1942," Marine-Rundschau 56 (No. 4): 226-32.

29. Lagevorträge, 6 and 13 Feb., 19 Nov. and 22 Dec. 1942, 8 July 1943, 350, 354, 427,430-31, 434, 520-21; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 420053/42 gKdos. Chefs.,"Weisung für die Kampfführung im Osten nach Abschluss des Winters," 12 Feb. 1942,OKW KTB, 2: 1095; MVO zum OKH (GenStdH), B.Nr. 26/42 gKdos.Chefs., "Berichtüber Besprechungen beim XXVI.A.K. bezugl. Wegnahme der Inseln im finnischenMeerbusen," T-78/337/6293034-38; Der Führer und Oberste Befehlshaber derWehrmacht, OKW/WFSt, Nr. 55616/42 gKdos.Chefs., "Weisung 41," 5 Apr. 1942,Hitlers Weisungen, 184; HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 36/42 gKdos.Chefs. (W)," 24 June 1942, T-311/77/7100070-72; Der Chef des Stabes des Marinebefehlshabers Ostland, "Chefs.B.Nr. gKdos. 116," 30 Dec. 1942, T-311/77/7100263-70; Carls to Küchler, gKdos.Chefs., 5 Jan. 1943, T-311/77/7100461-62; "Niederschrift über den Besuch des Chefs desStabes der Skl beim Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres vom 29.6.-1.7.1943," Chefs.,BA/MA, RM 7/265, 161-62; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN), "Nr. 430422/43 gKdos.Chefs.,"5 July 1943, BA/MA, RH 19 III/225, 6; HGr Nord, KTB, 5 July 1943, T-311/57/7070008-09; OKW KTB, 8 July 1943, 6: 761-62.

30. OKW KTB, 26 June 1942, 3: 451; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN), "Nr. 420510/42gKdos. Chefs.," 19 July 1942, T-311/75/7097998; Der Führer, OKW/WFSt/Op, Nr.551288/42 gKdos. Chefs., "Weisung Nr. 45," 23 July 1942, Hitlers Weisungen, 199;OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 420550/42 gKdos. Chefs.," 24 July 1942, BA/MA, RH2/749, 104; OKH/GenStdH/ OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 420550/42 gKdos.Chefs. II.Ang.," 1 Aug.1942, BA/MA, RH 2/749, 107; Ziemke and Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad, 412.

31. HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 1809/42 gKdos., "Betr.: Bekämpfung le.russ.Seestreitkräfte," 6Aug. 1942, T-311/73/ 7094441; Marinegruppenkommando Nord, B.Nr. gKdos. 1009/42Chefs. A III, "Betrifft: 'Nordlicht' und Wegnahme Raum Schepel/Oranienbaum," 13 Aug.1942, T-311/75/7098241-42; I Nord, "Lageübersicht Ostsee vom 16.-31.8.1942, gKdos.,BA/MA, RM 7/90, 188; Lagevorträge, 29 Aug. 1942, 406.

32. Hitlers Tischgespräche, 5 Apr. 1942, 192-93; Monologe im Führerhauptquartier, 8and 12 Aug. 1942, 334, 341.

33. OKW KTB, 23 and 24 Aug., 4 Sept., 5, 9 and 27 Oct. 1942, 3: 627-30, 633-34, 678;4: 793, 811, 868; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN), "Nr. 420826/42 gKdos. Chefs.," 19 Oct.1942, T-311/75/7098033-34. In the spring of 1943 Hitler informed Küchler that heplanned an attack to capture Leningrad for the latter part of the summer, but Germanreverses in southern Russia ended any such hopes; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (vorg.St.), Nr.430163/43 gKdos. Chefs., "Operationsbefehl Nr. 5," 13 Mar. 1943, OKW KTB, 6: 1421;HGr Nord/Ia, gKdos.Chefs., "Stichworte für den Führervortrag des Oberbefehlshabersder Heeresgruppe Nord," 7 May 1943, BA/MA, RH 19 III/2, 8-12.

34. 1/Skl, "Br.Nr. I Opa 2106/42 gKdos.Chefs.," 21 Oct. 1942, BA/MA, RM 7/159, 228-31. See also I Nord, gKdos., "Lageübersicht Ostsee vom 16.-31.10.1942," BA/MA, RM

7/90, 199-200; MarGrKdo Nord, B.Nr. gKdos. 1330/42 Chefs. A III, "Betrifft:Ostseekrieg 1942 und 1943," 8 Dec. 1942, BA/MA, RM 7/159, 246-58; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl Iop 2662/42 gKdos.Chefs., "Betrifft: Ostseekrieg 1942/43," 16 Dec. 1942, BA/MA, RM7/159, 263; MarGrKdo Nord, B.Nr. gKdos.Chefs. 225/43 A III, "Ostseekrieg 1942," 18Feb. 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/159, 276-77.

35. Skl, "B.Nr. 1 Abt.Ia 598/43 gKdos.Chefs.," 25 Feb. 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/160, 37-40(emphasis in the original).

36. 1/Skl B.Nr. 1396/43 Chefs., "Reise C/Skl zum Führerhauptquartier vom 30.4.-2.5.1943," BA/MA, RM 7/260, 181.

37. Kommando der Marinestation der Ostsee/Führungsstab, "B.Nr. gKdos. 25/43 Chefs.,(Schmundt to Meisel)," 28 June 1943, ibid., 84-89.

38. Lagevorträge, 8 July 1943, 520-21; Seekriegsleitung, Kriegstagebuch, Teil A(hereafter Skl KTB), 13 July 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/50, 264. The Skl war diary waspublished in 68 volumes (one month per volume for Sept. 1939-Apr. 1945) by theMilitärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt and E.S. Mittler Verlag from 1988-1997;Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939-1945 (ed. for MilitärgeschichtlichesForschungsamt in conjunction with the Federal Military Archives and the Marine-Offizier-Vereinigung by Werner Rahn and Gerhard Schreiber) (facs. Edn. Pt. A/i-lxviii)(Herford and Bonn: Mittler, 1988-1997). Archivists in Freiburg informed the author thatin the future researchers would have access only to the published set. The originalsexamined by the author carried the file designations RM 7/50 (July 1943) to RM 7/71(Apr. 1945). As listing the file numbers for each volume would only further clutter thenotes, only dates and page numbers will be provided for future Skl KTB references.

39. Skl KTB, 13 and 15 Aug. 1943, 226, 270.

40. OKM, B.Nr.1 Skl Ia, "Nr. 2397/43 gKdos.Chefs.," 15 Aug. 1943, Anlage 1 to MOKOstsee, Sonderkriegstagebuch für die Zeit vom 17.8 bis 21.12.43, BA/MA, RM 31/M522.

41. Lagevorträge, 19 Aug. 1943, 540.

42. Ibid., 28 Aug. 1943, 544-45. A month later Hitler again proclaimed his intention notto withdraw Army Group North; Der Führer, OKW/WFSt/Op Nr. 662375/43 gKdos.Chefs., "Weisung Nr. 50 für die Vorbereitung der Rückführung des Geb.A.O.K. 20 nachNordfinnland und Nordnorwegen," 28 Sept. 1943, Hitlers Weisungen, 231.

43. Junge to Wangenheim, 16 Aug. 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/265, 173-74.

44. Assmann to 1Skl Ia (Admiral Hubert Wangenheim), 29 Dec. 1943, BA/MA, RM7/260, 451; Skl, KTB, 30 Dec. 1943, 523. Dönitz made these comments to a small circleof his closest associates ("im kleinsten Kreis"). This group usually consisted only ofDönitz, Meisel (Skl Chief of Staff), Wagner, Wangenheim and Pfeiffer (Skl war diarist);

Michael Salewski, "Das Kriegstagebuch der deutschen Seekriegsleitung im ZweitenWeltkrieg," Marine-Rundschau, 64 (No. 3): 140.

45. Lagevorträge, 1-3 Jan. 1944, 565; OKW/WFSt/Op M, "Nr. 77089/44 gKdos.Chefs.,"12 Jan. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/130, 59-62.

46. Skl KTB, 22 and 28 Jan. 1944, 385, 504.

47. OKW/WFSt/Op M, Nr. 77263/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Lage Nordflügel Ostfrontam Finnenbusen," 30 Jan. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161, 28. The Skl replied that over 1100naval personnel were either already in action or in transit to assist in the land fighting. Inaddition, a half-dozen artillery barges had been ordered to the Baltic, and the transfer of aheavy cruiser, several destroyers and a motor-torpedo boat flotilla was underconsideration; Skl, "B.Nr.1/Skl I op a 3052/44 gKdos.," 31 Jan. 1944, BA/MA, RM7/161, 36; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl I op a 3053/44 gKdos., "Betrifft: Einsatz weitererSeestreitkräfte in Finnenbusen," 31 Jan. 1944, RM 7/161, 34; Gruppe Nord/Flotte, "Nr.0169/44 gKdos.," 31 Jan. 1944, ibid., 33. By the time the army group reached thePanther Position, some 1700 naval troops were in action; MOK Ostsee/Führungsstab,B.Nr. gKdos. 1023/44 AIII, "Kurzer Überblick auf Februar 1944," 8 Mar. 1944, BA/MA,RM 7/90, 299.

48. Admiral Ostland, KTB, 9 Feb. 1944, BA/MA, M 533/39078a.

49. Skl, 1/Skl Ia, "Nr. 466/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 13 Feb. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161, 76;MOK Ost, KTB, 13 Feb. 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/M523; Skl, "B.Nr. 1/Skl I Op 492/44gKdos. Chefs.," 14 Feb. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161, 83; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl I Op 204/44gKdos.Chefs., "Betr: Feindliche Grosslandungen," 25 Jan. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/130, 89-90; Skl KTB, 25 Jan. 1944, 441. Dönitz had received Hitler's approval for his intentionnot to use heavy surface vessels against an invasion in the West; Lagevorträge, 19 Jan.1944, 572.

50. Commanding Admiral, Submarines, protested that Dönitz's order to maintain 6 U-boats on 12-hour readiness hampered training, and that within 2 months 6 fewersubmarines would be available for action in the Atlantic; Skl, KTB, 11 Feb. 1944, 235.On 20 Feb. Dönitz cancelled the order for the submarines to remain on alert, but onlyafter receiving a report from MOK Ost advising this measure, stating that due to the icesituation in the Gulf of Finland, neither a landing operation nor a breakout attempt of theSoviet fleet was likely; MOK Ost/Führstab, "274/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 19 Feb. 1944,BA/MA, RM 7/161, 101-03; Skl, "B.Nr. 1/Skl Iop 552/44 gKdos. Chefs.," 20 Feb. 1944,BA/MA, RM 7/161, 110-11.

51. Skl, KTB, 15 Nov. 1943, 349-50; Der Ob der Kriegsmarine und Chef der Skl, B.Nr.1.Skl Ib 1285/43 gKdos. Chefs., "Lagebetrachtung der Seekriegsleitung vom 20.5.1943,"BA/MA, RM 7/260, 217; Skl, KTB, 21 July 1943, 420; Skl, KTB, 18 and 25 Sept. 1943,361, 505; see also Pfeiffer's comments, dated 2 Feb. 1944, regarding Dönitz's reaction to

a gloomy evaluation of Germany's overall situation from 10 Nov. 1943 in BA/MA, RM7/260, 388.

52. Skl, "B.Nr. 1/Skl I op 530/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 16 Feb. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161, 87-88; “B.Nr. 1/Skl 552/44, gKdos.Chefs.,” 19 Feb. 1944, ibid., 101-03; Skl, KTB, 10 and12 Mar. 1944, 200, 252.

53. HGr Nord, KTB, 2, 4, 14, 17, and 23 Nov. 1943, T-311/57/7070828, 7070854,7071026, 7071078, 7071135-38. Hitler came up with an idea to reinforce theOranienbaum front using 60 immobilized tanks.

54. OKH/GenStdH/Op Abt (I), "Nr. 440063/44 gKdos. Chefs.," 6 Feb. 1944, T-78/337/6292909-10; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 260.

55. HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 670/44 gKdos.," 10 Feb. 1944, T-311/60/7075823; HGr Nord/Ia,Nr. 20/44 gKdos. Chefs., "Beurteilung der Lage vom 26.1.," 26 Jan. 1944, BA/MA, RH19 III/14, 178-79; HGr Nord, KTB, 16 Jan., 30-31 Jan., 6 Feb., 12 Feb., 13 Feb., 14 Feb.and 22 Feb. 1944, T-311/58/7071987-89, 7072615, 7072619-20, 7072624-25, 7072632,7072673, 7072851, 7073048, 7073075, 7073095, 7073284-86. The army group receivedthe following reinforcements during the offensive: 12th Panzer, Feldherrnhalle, 87th and214th infantry divisions; the battle group of Hitler's Escort Battalion (over 1,000 men);and a brigade of Estonian soldiers. The Estonian brigade, Hitler's Escort troops,Feldherrnhalle and 214th Inf. Div. were sent to Narva. Hitler personally requested thatDönitz use all available sea transport to expedite the transfer of the 214th Inf. Div. fromNorway to Narva, and if need be to defer all other transport tasks; MOK Ost, KTB, 12Feb. 1944, BA/MA, M 533/38768; Skl KTB, 9 Feb. 1944, 184.

56. HGr Nord, KTB, 3, 6, 7, 10, 18 and 19 Feb. 1944, T-311/58/7072762-63, 7072847,7072873-75, 7072996-97, 7073204, 7073231-32.

57. The day before Hitler ordered the army group to reinforce the Narva sector, heinstructed the Skl to strengthen coastal artillery in this area; OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr.001388/44 gKdos., "Verteidigung Estland," 5 Feb. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161, 50;OKM/Skl Qu A IV, Nr. 789/44 gKdos., "Betr: Verteidigung Estland-Küsten und Flak," 6Feb. 1944, BA/MA, M 523/38768. For the navy’s discussions, see Skl, KTB, 22 Jan.1944, 385; Skl, KTB, 7, 8, 13 and 15 Feb. 1944, 134-38, 159, 286, 328-29; MOK Ost,KTB, 24 Jan., 7 Feb. 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/ M523; Admiral Ostland, KTB, 22 Jan.1944, 6 Feb. 1944, BA/MA, M 533/39078a. For intelligence indicating a Soviet landingbehind the front, see HGr Nord, KTB, 2 Feb. and 15 Feb. 1944, T-311/58/7072748,7073150; Skl, "B.Nr. 1/Skl I Op a 3455/44 gKdos.," 3 Feb. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161,46.

58. Model warned that the Soviets had transport space for 30,000 to 40,000 troops andcould support a landing with one battleship, three cruisers and numerous smaller vessels;HGr Nord, KTB, 18 Feb. 1944, T-311/58/7073204. In his second appeal, when theretreat to the Panther was almost concluded, Model described the attack as "urgent;"

ibid., 27 Feb., Frame 7073398. His third request referred to the bombardment as"absolutely necessary;" HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 38/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Beurteilung der Lagevom 1.3.44," 1 Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/15, 35. For Model's final plea, HGr Nord,KTB, 7 Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/ 272, 85.

59. The problems included the transfer of sufficient units, the slight chance of inflicting acrippling blow upon the fleet and expected heavy flak; HGr Nord, KTB, 9 Mar. 1944,BA/MA, RH 19 III/272, 103. One of Germany's top pilots stated that when attacking theSoviet fleet at Leningrad in Sept. 1941, he encountered the heaviest flak of the entire war;Hans Rudel, Stuka Pilot (Lynton Hudson trans.) (New York: Bantam, 1979), 34.

60. HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 1383/44 geh.," 7 Feb. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161, 58; Dönitz,Grossadmiral, 1/Skl Ia 3893/44 gKdos., "Auf HGr Nord/Ia Nr. 1383/44 geh.," 7 Feb.1944, BA/MA, M533/39078a.

61. Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad, 375; Admiral Burchardi, “Landings of theRussians on the Baltic Coast,” German Naval Records, Naval Historical Center,Operational Archives, Washington Navy Yard (hereafter NavOpArch), Box T65; Skl,KTB, 14 Feb. 1944, 301; HGr Nord, KTB, 14 Feb. 1944, T-311/58/7073097, 7073104.

62. HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 34/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 19 Feb.1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/15, 20-21;HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 38/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Beurteilung der Lage vom 1.3.44," 1 Mar. 1944,ibid., 35; HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 41/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Kampfführung im Raum Narwa,"5 Mar. 1944, ibid., 40; HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 51/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Beurteilung der Lage vom27.3.44," 27 Mar. 1944, T-78/337/6292854-57.

63. HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 49/44 gKdos.Chefs, "Planspiel am 16. März 1944," 16 Mar. 1944,BA/MA, RH 19 III/290, 4-8; HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 47/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 18 Mar. 1944,ibid., 10-13. It is possible Hitler explicitly ordered this exercise. In summoning officersto this exercise, Model wrote, "Ich werde in den Tagen vom 13.-16.3.1944 in Reval eineBesprechung über einen Sonderauftrag des Führers und ein Planspiel über dieMöglichkeiten einer russischen Landung an der estnischen Küste abhalten;" Der Ob derHGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 1216/44 gKdos.," 3 Mar. 1944, T-312/1626/987. It is unclearwhether this exercise was part of Model's special mission from Hitler, or a completelyseparate matter.

64. Grossadmiral Dönitz, "B.Nr. 1/Skl 943/44 gKdos. Chefs.," 27 Mar. 1944, BA/MA,RM 7/161, 305-07.

65. OKW/WFSt/Op (M), "Nr. 77927/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 22 Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RM7/1099, 98; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl 950/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Denkschrift über die Bedeutung derNarwa-Stellung für die Gesamtkriegführung," 27 Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/15, 90-96.

66. "Kampf um Öl an der Narwa," T-312/1626/601-03.

67. Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 2: 453; Der Ob der Kriegsmarine und Chefder Skl, "B.Nr. 1Skl 642/43 gKdos.Chefs.," 1 Mar. 1943, reproduced in ibid., 627; Skl,"B.Nr. 1 Abt.Ia 598/43 gKdos.Chefs.," 25 Feb. 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/160, 38-39. In hismemorandum on the importance of the Narva Position, Dönitz claimed that Estonianshale oil represented the sole possibility for improving Germany's oil supply, except forsynthetic production; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl 950/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Denkschrift über dieBedeutung der Narwa-Stellung für die Gesamtkriegführung," 27 Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RH19 III/15, 92. The British recognized the shale oil's importance to Germany, and inOctober 1942 parachuted an agent into Estonia to sabotage the mines. The missionfailed, however, because the agent was betrayed and captured by the Gestapo; CharlesCruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia (New York: Oxford, 1986), 69-70.

68. Skl, "B.Nr. 1Skl Ia, 2397/43 gKdos.Chefs." 15 Aug. 1943, Anlage 1 to MOK Ost,Sonderkriegstagebuch für die Zeit vom 17.8 bis 21.12.43, BA/MA, RM 31/M523; MOKOst/Führstab gKdos.Chefs. 122/43, "Betrifft: Ostwall," 10 Sept. 1943, BA/MA, RM7/994, 28; Anlage 4 zu WFSt/Op, Nr. 662002/43 gKdos.Chefs. v. 21.8.43, "Ölgewinnungim Estland," T-77/778/5504009.

69. Zeitzler claims that Germany needed the shale oil for its submarines, and that the lossof this area would have been intolerable for the navy; Kurt Zeitzler, "Das Ringen um diegrossen Entscheidungen im zweiten Weltkrieg" (c. 1951), BA/MA, Nachlass Zeitzler, N63/80, Vol. 2, 112-13, 162. See also OKW/WFSt/Op M, Nr. 77263/44 gKdos. Chefs.,"Betr.: Lage Nordflügel Ostfront am Finnenbusen," 31 Jan. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161,28.

70. OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr. 1388/44 gKdos., "Verteidigung Estland," 5 Feb. 1944,BA/MA, RM 7/161, 50; HGr Nord/Ia op, Nr. 600/44 gKdos., "Herresgruppen-Befehl fürden Küstenschutz an der Nordküste Estlands," 7 Feb. 1944, ibid., 142-44.

71. HGr Nord, KTB, 22 Jan. 1944, T-311/57/7072303; Zeitzler, "Das Ringen um diegrossen Entscheidungen im zweiten Weltkrieg," Vol. 2, BA/MA, Nachlass Zeitzler, N63/80, 112-13; OKW/WFSt/Op, Nr. 662002/43 gKdos.Chefs. "Vortragsnotiz zurLinienführung des Ostwalls," 21 Aug. 1943, BA/MA, RW 4/v. 708, 53; WalterWarlimont, Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht 39-45 (3rd ed) (Munich:Bernard & Graefe, 1978), 426-27.

72. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 109; Boheman, På Vakt, 2: 246-49; Anlagen 1 and 2 toObkdo 20.Geb.-Armeee/Der Oberbefehlshaber/Ia, Nr. 95/44 gKdos., "Aktenvermerk übermeinen Besuch im finnischen Hauptquartier," 24 Jan. 1944, reproduced in OKW KTB,Vol. 4, Part 2, addendum, 51-52. On 31 Jan. Keitel assured Mannerheim that ArmyGroup North would hold the Luga Position, explaining the army group's weaknessresulted from the need to withdraw forces to counter an expected invasion in the West;Ernst Klink, "Die deutsch-finnische Zusammenarbeit 1944," in Operationsgebiet östlicheOstsee und der finnisch-baltische Raum 1944 (Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamt ed.)(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1961) (hereafter cited as Östliche Ostsee), 20-21.

73. Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, Elke Fröhlich ed. (Munich: Saur, 1994), PartII (hereafter cited as TBJG), entry for 25 Jan. 1944, 11: 156; Klink, "Der deutsch-finnische Zusammenarbeit," 17-22; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 209.

74. Earl Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940-1945 (Washington:US Govt. Printing Office, 1959) (hereafter cited as German NTO), 273-74; Skl, KTB, 22and 24 Feb. 1944, 484, 523. In early March, OKH emphasized the importance of holdingthe present front in the Baltic States to stiffen Finnish resolve; OKH/Att. Abt/Ia, "Nr.45/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 8 Mar. 1944, T-78/337/6292958-60. Goebbels maintained that theFinns were likely to remain in the war as long as the front at Narva held; TBJG, 1 Apr.1944, 12: 34.

75. TBJG, 3, 4 and 15 Mar. 1944, 11: 389, 396-97, 481.

76. OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr. 771273/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung," 16 April1944, BA/MA, RM 7/1099, 26; Klink, "Die deutsch-finnische Zusammenarbeit 1944,"31.

77. Four Finnish officers, including the head of the Army's Operations Section, visitedthe Narva front from 7-14 April; Klink, "Die deutsch-finnische Zusammenarbeit 1944,"28-29; Keitel to Mannerheim, 2 Apr. 1944, Mannerheim to Keitel, 4 Apr. 1944, OKWKTB, Vol. 4, Part 2, addendum 77-78.

78. HGr Nord, KTB, 1 April 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/273, 7; HGr Nord/Ia,"Niederschrift über die Fahrt des Herrn Oberbefehlshabers zum Führerhauptquartier(1.4.-3.4.44)," 4 Apr. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/4, 22-25. The army group carried out thisoperation from 6-9 April, significantly reducing the Soviet bridgehead on the west bankof the Narva River during the Finnish officers' visit to the front; HGr Nord, KTB, 9 April1944, RH 19 III/272, 135. Later in April the Germans attempted to eliminate thebridgehead completely, but were unable to dislodge the Soviets.

79. OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr. 2679/44 gKdos., "Lageunterrichtung," 13 Mar. 1944,BA/MA, RM 7/161, 241; HGr Nord, KTB, 3 Mar. and 31 Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19III/272, 28, 370; HGr Nord, KTB, 1 Apr. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/273, 7-8;Armeegruppenkommando Narwa/Ia, Nr. 15/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Beurteilung desinneren Kampfwertes der Divisionen," 28 Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/15, 78-80; HGrNord/Ia, Nr. 58/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Beurteilung des inneren Kampfwertes derDivisionen," 1 April 1944, T-78/337/6292842-48. In mid-March, Assmann reported,"Führer misst Halten Narwa ganz besondere militärische und politische Bedeutung zu;"see OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr. 2679/44 gKdos., "Lageunterrichtung," 13 Mar. 1944, RM7/161, 241.

80. MOK Ostsee, B.Nr. gKdos. 2060/44 A I, "Kurzer Rückblick auf Monat April 1944,"7 May 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 306; Skl, KTB, 14 and 16 Mar. 1944, 284, 325.

81. For Hitler's continued concern about a Soviet landing, see Skl, "B.Nr. 1/Skl I Nord16775/44 gKdos.," 31 May 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161, 440; for the Navy's anxiety, Skl,KTB, 1 June 1944, 14-15; MOK Ost, KTB, 15 Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/M523; 1/SklI E 2972/43 gKdos.Chefs., "Betrifft: Minensperrmassnahmen Finnenbusen Frühjahr1944," 5 Oct. 1943, RM 31/M523; see also Skl, KTB, 4 Nov. 1943, 107.

82. Skl, 1/Skl "B.Nr. 1435/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 6 June 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161, 451-52;Skl, KTB, 6 June 1944, 125.

83. This would mean that the German Navy was responsible for Tallinn 's defense; HGrNord, KTB, 11 Apr. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/273, 161.

84. B.Nr. 1.Skl I Op 11620/44 gKdos., "Betr.: Ausbau Reval als 'fester Platz' gemässFührerbefehl Nr. 11," 22 April 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/227, 147-48.

85. Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl 950/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Denkschrift über die Bedeutung der Narwa-Stellung für die Gesamtkriegführung," 27 Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/15, 93-94.

86. B.Nr. 1/Skl I op 13656/44 gKdos., "Betrifft: Ausbau Reval als fester Platz," 4 May1944, BA/MA, RM 7/227, 149-50; Skl, KTB, 3 May 1944, 35-36; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl I op14501/44 gKdos., "Betr.: Ausbau Reval als fester Platz," 10 May 1944, BA/MA, RM7/161, 404. Admiral Kummetz (MOK Ostsee) insisted that Tallinn 's value for protectingthe Baltic in the interests of the U-boat war could not be emphasized too strongly; MOKOst, KTB, 3 May 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/M523.

87. Hitler's dissatisfaction with the performance of the navy's surface fleet led him in1942 to demand that it be scrapped. For this reason, Raeder resigned as navalCommander-in-Chief. Upon his appointment to that post, Dönitz managed to convinceHitler not to send the fleet to the scrap yard, although the ships were decommissioned andserved mainly as floating barracks for naval personnel; Salewski, Die deutscheSeekriegsleitung, 2: 209-38; Lagevorträge, 6 Jan. and 8 Feb. 1943, 453-70.

88. In a message at the height of the Soviet offensive to Group North/Fleet and NavalCommand, Baltic, the Skl emphasized that all possible means must be used to smash aSoviet landing attempt west of Narva, and that if Soviet vessels appeared east of theNashorn mine barrage, destroyers and torpedo boats must challenge them in this area,despite the risk of hitting their own mines; Skl, "B.Nr. 1/Skl Ia 436/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 11Feb. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161, 72.

89. Skl, KTB, 11 and 18 Feb. 1944, 231-32, 397.

90. Dönitz informed Hitler that the pocket battleship Admiral Scheer and the cruisersPrinz Eugen, Nürnberg and Emden were immediately ready to sail, changing in thecourse of the summer to the pocket battleship Lützow and cruisers Admiral Hipper andKöln. Except for the battleship Tirpitz, which, although afloat, had been disabled bysmall British submarines in Sept. 1943 (and was finally sunk by British aircraft in Nov.

1944), this constituted all heavy surface vessels of the German Navy, aside from the (atthe time) damaged light cruiser Leipzig and two antiquated World War I battleships,Schlesien and Schleswig-Holstein; Jak Mallmann Showell, The German Navy in WorldWar II: A Reference Guide to the Kriegsmarine, 1935-1945 (Annapolis: Naval InstitutePress, 1979), 102-17.

Chapter 2: The German Collapse in the Summer of 1944

1. Andreas Hillgruber, Der Zusammenbruch im Osten 1944/45 als Problem derdeutschen Nationalgeschichte und der europäischen Geschichte (Opladen:Westdeutscher Verlag, 1985), 14; Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 228.

2. David Glantz and Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army StoppedHitler (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 220.

3. For the army group’s strength, see HGr Nord, KTB, 20 June 1944, BA/MA, RH 19III/310, 23. On German intelligence estimates, OKH/GenStdH/FHO (I), Nr. 1428/44gKdos., "Zusammenfassende Beurteilung der Feindlage vor der deutschen Ostfront imgrossen—Stand 3.5.44," 3 May 1944, T-78/466/6446142-45. For a critical appraisal ofGerman intelligence in the East, see Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, "Die Prognosen derAbteilung Fremde Heere Ost 1942-1945," in Zwei Legenden aus dem Dritten Reich(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1974); on the Soviet 1944 summer offensive, 59-63. See also David Glantz, The Role of Intelligence in Soviet Military Strategy in WorldWar II (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1990), 138-46.

4. PzAOK 3, KTB, 23 June 1944, T-313/316/8594975; HGr Nord, KTB, 28 June 1944,BA/MA, RH 19 III/310, 128.

5. Der Ob der HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 90/44 (Lindemann to Hitler)," 29 June 1944, BA/MA,RH 19 III/15, 109-11. On 23 Feb. Group Sponheimer (originally formed from the staff ofLIV Corps) had been renamed Armeegruppe Narva, and on 30 May it was upgraded to anArmy Detachment (Armeeabteilung). General Hans Friessner commanded this forceuntil he assumed command of the army group in July; his successor was General AntonGrasser.

6. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (I), "Nr. 6452/44 gKdos.," 30 June 1944, BA/MA, RH 19II/205, 16; HGr Nord, KTB, 1 July 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/ 311, 1-2; HGr Nord/Ia,"Nr. 95/44 gKdos.Chefs. (Lindemann to Hitler)," 30 June 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/15,131; HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 96/44 gKdos.Chefs., (Lindemann to Hitler)" 2 July 1944, RH 19III/15, 133; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN), "Nr. 6532/44 gKdos.," 3 July 1944, RH 19III/15, 135.

7. HGr Nord, KTB, 4, 5 and 6 July 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/311, 77, 82, 104-05, 112,121, 127. In his memoirs Friessner maintains that he was not sufficiently informed byHitler of Army Group Center's desperate predicament; Hans Friessner, VerrateneSchlachten (Holstein: Verlag Hamburg, 1956), 13, 16. Upon learning of the Alliedlanding in Normandy Friessner, either seeking to curry favor or experiencing a completemental collapse, suggested that Zeitzler order a spontaneous general offensive on theentire Russian front; Friessner, General der Inf./Ia, "Nr. 753/44 gKdos.," 6 June 1944, T-312/1628/1074.

8. HGr Nord, KTB, 9 July 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/311, 174-77, 188; Lagevorträge, 9July 1944, 595-96.

9. Geschichte des Grossen Vaterländischen Krieges der Sowjetunion (Alfred Anderle etal trans.) (Berlin: Deutscher Militärverlag, 1965) (hereafter GVK), 4: 384; Geschichte deszweiten Weltkrieges 1939-1945 (H. Hoffmann et al ed.) (Berlin: Militärverlag der DDR,1978), 9: 83-84; Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staff at War, 1: 354-57; IvanBagramian, "Die Schaulen-Mitau-Operation der 1. Baltischen Front" (Wilhelm Arenz ed.and trans.), Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 13 (No. 10): 588-91.

10. HGr Nord, KTB, 12 and 15 July, 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/313, 16-21, 56; Friessnerto Hitler, 12 July 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/6, 3-7; Friessner, Verratene Schlachten, 18-27; Der Ob der HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 6620/44 geh., "Tagesbefehl," 14 July 1944, BA/MA,RH 19 III/6, 8; AOK 18/Ia, Nr. 2653/44 gKdos., "Besprechung mit dem HerrnOberbefehlshaber der H.Gr. Nord, General d. Inf. Friessner am 15.7.44 in Rositten," 15July 1944, T-312/957/9148703.

11. HGr Nord, KTB, 15 and 18 July 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/313, 60, 71-73, 131-35.

12. PzAOK 3, KTB, 22 July 1944, T-313/317/8595402; HGr Nord, KTB, 22 July 1944,BA/MA, RH 19 III/313, 208, 213. On Guderian and Kinzel, see HGr Nord, KTB, RH 19III/313, 21 July 1944, 195-96; Nr. 555, "Besprechung beim Chef des Generalstabes d.Heeres, 21 July 1944, 1700 Uhr," T-78/352/6312576.

13. HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 126/44 gKdos.Chefs. (Friessner to Hitler)," 23 July 1944, T-312/970/9162224-26. 95. Hitler did not place Friessner in the "Führer Reserve," in thisperiod a rapidly-growing pool of officers, but promoted him to Colonel-General andappointed him commander of Army Group South Ukraine (renamed Army Group Southon 23 Sept.), where he remained until Hitler relieved him on 22 Dec. 1944. Hitler gaveSchörner authority over all military and civil personnel in order to halt the Sovietoffensive and maintain the Baltic States; Der Führer, OKW/WFSt/ Qu.2 (Ost)/Verw. 1,Nr. 007984/44 gKdos., "Betr: Neuregelung der Befehlsverhältnisse im Bereich derHeeresgruppe Nord," 23 July 1944, Hitlers Weisungen, 264-65. Although in reality thebestowal of these powers merely placed a few thousand men at Schörner’s disposal, itdemonstrates Hitler's determination to retain the Baltic States; Ziemke, Stalingrad toBerlin, 336. Schörner later stated that Hitler appointed him commander of Army Group

North at Guderian's request; see Schörner’s comments, dated 29 Nov. 1960, to page 66 ofWerner Haupt's Kurland in BA/MA, Nachlass Schörner, N 60/73.

14. TBJG, 24 July 1944, 13: 152.

15. The Marienburg Position ran along the rail line Pskov-Jakobstadt, connecting theDvina River with Lake Peipus; Haupt, Heeresgruppe Nord, 214.

16. The army group suffered 49,498 casualties from 22 June-26 July; HGr Nord, KTB,26 and 27 July 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/314, 26, 30-35, 77; Bagramian, "Die Schaulen-Mitau-Operation der 1. Baltischen Front," 589-601.

17. OKH quickly responded to Schörner’s plea, and from 1-3 Aug. sent 10,431replacements (although this included 3800 naval and air force soldiers requiring threeweeks' training before they could be sent to the front), and on 6 Aug. another 4542 menarrived; HGr Nord, KTB, 2, 4 and 6 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/315, 22, 52-53, 95.18th Army alone lost over 32,000 men from 10 July to 7 Aug.; AOK 18. KTB, 8 Aug.1944, T-312/956/9147152.

18. HGr Nord, KTB, 6 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/315, 95-96.

19. Ibid., 12 Aug. 1944, 181-82, 197-202.

20. Ibid., 16 and 18 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/316, 64-65, 132; PzAOK 3, KTB, 9and 10 Aug. 1944, T-313/317/ 8595577-78, 8595589-90.

21. The warships of the 2nd Task Force supporting this operation included the cruiserPrinz Eugen, 2-4 destroyers and 4-5 torpedo boats; MOK Ostsee, Op B.Nr. gKdos. 4341F III, "Kurzer Rückblick auf August 1944, " 22 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 338; Skl,KTB, 22 Aug. 1944, 543.

22. HGr Nord, KTB, 24 Aug. 1944, RH 19 III/317, 79.

23. Lagevorträge, 12 June 1944, 588. In addition, on 19 June German torpedo boatsdelivered 9,000 anti-tank grenade launchers (Panzerfaust), and on 22 June 5,000bazookas (Panzerschreck) arrived by air; Ziemke, German NTO, 282-83; Klink, "Diedeutsch-finnische Zusammenarbeit 1944," 66.

24. OKH also ordered the army group to send an assault gun brigade with the division(the 122nd Infantry Division); HGr Nord, KTB, 20 June 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/310,19; Skl KTB, 20 June 1944, 538.

25. From 10 June-18 July the Finns lost 44,000 men; Waldemar Erfurth, The LastFinnish War, 1941-1944 (Washington: University Publications, 1979), 193.

26. Since Ribbentrop arrived in Helsinki on the 22nd, the Finns were also under pressurefrom Germany at this time; Ziemke, German NTO, 283; Klink, "Die deutsch-finnischeZusammenarbeit 1944," 39-41; Boheman, På Vakt, 2: 256-57.

27. HGr Nord, KTB, 2 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/315, 37; AOK 18, KTB, 3 Aug.1944, T-312/956/9146972. Hitler sent Schörner, who earlier had served as a corpscommander in Finland, because the Finns had requested information on the situation inthe Baltic States; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 387-88. Natzmer later questionedwhether Schörner was the best person for this, as Mannerheim was a commander of the“old school;” Oldwig von Natzmer, “Festung Kurland: Der Kampf im Norden derdeutschen Ostfront 1944/45,” April 1949, Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich (hereafterIfZ), ZS 111, 47.

28. The terms for the armistice, signed on 19 Sept., included restoration of the 1940border, cession of the Pechenga area and $300 million in reparations; Ziemke, GermanNTO, 290-91.

29. Skl, KTB, 15, 16, 17 and 18 June 1944, 389-90, 428, 457, 484-87; MOK Ost, KTB,18 June 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/M523; OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr. 772010/44gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 20/6," 21 June 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/99, 100; Skl,"B.Nr. 1/Skl Iop 1805/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 18 June 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161, 474; Skl,"B.Nr. 1/Skl Iu 20356/44 gKdos.," 3 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 724. MOK Ostinformed the Skl that it had sent 2 torpedo boats, 6 artillery barges and 6 transport barges,and that a motor mine sweeper flotilla was en route; MOK Ost/Führstab "gKdos. 544/44Chefs. AI," 17 June 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/M523.

30. Gustav Forstmann, "Seekrieg im Finnenbusen und der östlichen Ostsee von 1942 biszum 8. Mai 1945", BA/MA, Nachlass Wagner, N 539/v. 15, 10 (Forstmann was chief ofstaff to Admiral Eastern Baltic.); Skl, KTB, 18 June 1944, 485. In June the Skl orderedorganizational changes in the Baltic theater. On 17 June, Admiral Ostland was renamedAdmiral Eastern Baltic, and Commander of Mine Sweepers, East (FdM Ost), becameCommander, 9th Escort Division.

31. OKW/WFSt/Op (M), "Nr. 771340/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 25 April 1944, BA/MA, RM7/161, 384; Skl, KTB, 8 and 12 May 1944, 117-18, 206.

32. Skl, KTB, 17 and 21 June 1944, 453, 565; 1/Skl, B.Nr. 2326/44 gKdos.Chefs.,"Aalandsfrage," BA/MA, RM 7/162, 508-12; Hans Prager, PanzerschiffDeutschland/Schwerer Kreuzer Lützow: Ein Schiffs-Schicksal vor den Hintergründenseiner Zeit (Herford: Koehlers, 1981), 414-19.

33. Skl KTB, 6 and 7 June 1944, 96, 133-35.

34. For this interpretation, see Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 2: 460-65.

35. Ibid., 407-16; Wilfred von Oven, Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende (Buenos Aires: Dürer,1950), entry for 10 June 1944, 2: 8; "An Interview with Gen Art Walter Warlimont: FromInvasion to the Siegfried Line," 19-20 July 1945, World War II German Military Studies,Vol. 2, ETHINT 1, 9; Nicolaus von Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant 1937-45 (Mainz: Hase &Koehler, 1980), 374.

36. Skl KTB, 10 June 1944, 244. Despite Dönitz’s offer, Hitler insisted that naval troopsfor the land front not include U-boat trainees; Lagevorträge, 13 July 1944, 600.

37. Skl KTB, 13 June 1944, 329-30; Lagevorträge, 12 June 1944, 589.

38. Skl KTB, 28 June 1944, 772.

39. HGr Nord, KTB, 9 and 10 July 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/311, 177-78, 199;Lagevorträge, 9 July 1944, 595-96; Nr. 481, "Anruf Chef an Chef Op.Abt., 10.7.44,12.15 Uhr," T-78/352/6312653.

40. “Stichworte aus Besprechung bei Chef Skl am 12.7.Nm.," BA/MA, RM 7/162, 656-59; Dönitz to Meisel, Chefs., 11 July 1944, ibid., 654; Lagevorträge, 11 July 1944, 598,600. At the time, this seemingly would not have represented a disastrous reduction, sincein July 1944 the German Navy commissioned only 14 new submarines; 2/Skl, BdU Op,B.Nr. gKdos.Chefs. 356 Ing., "Stand der Uboote am 1. August 1944," 6 Aug. 1944,BA/MA, RM 87/42, 7-9. But Dönitz was then in the process of switching over to newsubmarine types and he had secured Hitler's approval for, and hoped to realize, anincrease in production to 40 U-boats per month; "Niederschrift über die Ansprache desOb.d.M. an die Hauptamts- und Amtschefs am 2.6.43," gKdos.Chefs., 2 June 1943,BA/MA, RM 7/260, 232; Skl, KTB, 15 Aug. 1943, 271.

41. "B.Nr. Chef Skl 2099/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 12 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 640-41;Skl, KTB, 12 July 1944, 267-68; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl I op 2136/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.:'Weissdorn,' 'Rotdorn,'" 16 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 626-28. After approving theseplans Dönitz sent a copy to Hitler's headquarters; Skl, KTB, 16 July 1944, 349.

42. Skl, KTB, 13, 14, 17 and 18 July 1944, 287, 306, 363-64, 386. Dönitz did notprotest, although he mentioned to Hitler that after the evacuation of the Narva position,he still intended to hold the island of Tütters; Lagevorträge, 13 July 1944, 600.

43. OKW/WFSt/Op M, Nr. 772361/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 8.7.," 8 July1944, BA/MA, RM 7/99, 25-26.

44. OKW/WFSt/Op M, Nr. 772531/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 19.7.," 19 July1944, BA/MA, RM 7/101, 100-03. In this report Assmann appears surprised at thereasons for Hitler's refusal to permit Army Group North's withdrawal. This is odd,because six months earlier he had reported that Hitler would not retreat to the PantherPosition for these very reasons; OKW/WFSt/Op M, Nr. 77263/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.:Lage Nordflügel Ostfront am Finnenbusen," 30 Jan. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161, 28.

45. Skl, KTB, 20 July 1944, 431.

46. Skl KTB, 20 July 1944, 433-35; Lagevorträge, 20 July 1944, 601-03; PeterHoffmann, The History of the German Resistance 1933-1945 (Richard Barry trans.)(Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1977), 402.

47. Elke Fröhlich, “Hitler und Goebbels im Krisenjahr 1944,” Vierteljahrshefte fürZeitgeschichte. Vol. 38, No. 2 (April 1990): 208-09.

48. Alfred Mierzejewski, “When Did Albert Speer Give Up?” Historical Journal 31(1988): 392.

49. Traudl Junge, Bis zur letzten Stunde: Hitlers Sekretärin erzählt ihr Leben (Munich:List, 2003), 149-50; Gerhard Weinberg, A World at Arms A Global History of World WarII (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 754.

50. Oven, Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende, entries for 30 July and 5 Aug. 1944, 2: 101, 103-05; Walter Lüdde-Neurath, Regierung Dönitz: Die letzten Tage des Dritten Reiches (4thed.) (Leoni: Druffel, 1980), 17-18 Eleanor Hancock, The National Socialist Leadershipand Total War 1941-5 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1991), 139-41.

51. Skl, KTB, 20, 24 and 25 July 1944, 433, 509, 532; "Kurzlage des ObdM," geh., 14Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/100, 271.

52. Skl, KTB, 27 and 28 July 1944, 580, 619-20.

53. Admiral Eastern Baltic called this breakdown incomprehensible, since no Soviettroops were threatening Libau; ibid., 28 and 29 July 1944, 618, 638; Adm.FHQu, B.Nr.142/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betrifft: Lage im baltischen Raum," 29 July 1944, BA/MA, RM7/162, 563-64.

54. He informed Kummetz and Admiral Eastern Baltic that while naval interests wouldbe carefully considered, in view of the present land situation, they might not be decisive;Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl Ia 2603/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Reise Ob Heeresgruppe Nord insFührerhauptquartier," 27 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 416-17; Skl, KTB, 27 Aug.1944, 709-10.

55. "Vortrag des Chefs der Seekriegsleitung bei der Besprechung der Oberbefehlshaberin 'Koralle' am 24./25.8. 44," BA/MA, RM 7/100, 161-70.

56. OKW/WFSt/Op (M)/Qu I, "Nr. 9007/44 gKdos.," 25 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162,602; Skl Adm. Qu VI/gKdos. 5423, "Vorgang: OKW/WFSt Op (M) Qu I Nr. 009007/44gKdos. vom 25.7.," 25 July 1944, ibid., 605-06.

57. Skl KTB, 20 and 26 July 1944, 432, 562.

58. 9.Sich.Div., KTB, 29 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 67/v.148, 234; Skl, KTB, 11 Aug.1944, 271.

59. Der Ob der Kriegsmarine, "B.Nr. Skl/Adm. VI 6648/44 geh. S Nord," 3 Aug. 1944,BA/MA, RM 7/162, 498; 9.Sich Div., KTB, 3 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RM 67/v.149.Dönitz’s declaration that the Navy first learned of its task to supply Army Group Northon 26 July is not true. Assmann had alerted him to this possibility on 8 July, and theseaborne supply of Schörner’s forces was included in the plans "Rotdorn" and"Weissdorn."

60. In the period 25 July-13 August the Navy also delivered 27,379 men, 93 horses and145 vehicles to the army group, and brought back 15,782 troops, 25,362 wounded,21,679 POWs, 55,004 evacuees, 2735 horses and 539 vehicles; Skl, KTB, 14 Aug. 1944,352. The 9th Escort Division reported that during August 594 ships had sailed, sufferingno losses or serious damage despite weak escort protection, carrying 2,390,966 tons(these figures almost certainly include supplies shipped to Finland); 9. Sich. Div., KTB,"Schlussbetrachtung zum 31. August 1944," BA/MA, RM 67/v.149; PzAOK 3, KTB, 21Aug. 1944, T-313/317/8595696-97; Skl, KTB, 24 Aug. 1944, 627. The Navy continuedto ferry supplies to Schörner’s forces. The daily average at the end of the month was3897 tons; Skl, KTB, 2 Sept. 1944, 49.

61. Rudel remained until 23 Aug.; HGr Nord, KTB, 12 Aug. 1944, RH 19 III/315, 201-02; AOK 18, KTB, 12 Aug. 1944, T-312/956/9147280; Rudel, Stuka Pilot, 182-90.

62. HGr Nord, KTB, 12 and 28 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/315, 210, RH 19 III/317,149, 151. The Air Force Chief of Staff noted his surprise in his diary: “Decision for airtransport to the Baltics!!” See Persönliches Kriegstagebuch des Generals der FliegerKreipe als Chef des Generalstabes der Luftwaffe für die Zeit vom 22.7.-2.11.44,”(hereafter cited as Kreipe KTB) IfZ, F 29, entry for 27 Aug. 1944.

63. The army group considered an attack here unlikely, since the Russians hadwithdrawn at least 9 divisions from the Narva sector; HGr Nord, KTB, 24, 25 and 27June 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/310, 73, 77, 83, 115.

64. Zeitzler claims that on at least three occasions he had heated arguments with Hitleron this subject, and asked to be relieved of his post. When Hitler refused, he finallyreported himself sick; Zeitzler, "Das Ringen um die grossen Entscheidungen im zweitenWeltkrieg," Vol. 2, BA/MA, Nachlass Zeitzler, N 63/80, 162-66.

65. HGr Nord, KTB, 29 June and 10 July 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/ 310, 145-46, RH 19III/311, 199.

66. "Der Reichsmarschall schaltet sich ein und weist darauf hin, dass Kräfte doch nur zukriegen wären, wenn man die Düna-Linie einnehme. Man müsste das mal klaraussprechen. Der Führer erwidert, das dies das einfachste wäre. Das geht nicht aber

wegen der unabsehbaren Folgen. Damit würde Finnland preis-gegeben, die Ostsee fürden Russen frei werden, die gesamte U-Bootausbildung eingestellt werden müssen. Einesolche Massnahme könnte in der Folge den Verlust des Krieges bedeuten. Das Beispielwäre hierfür der Verlust der Krim. Sie hat den Abfall der Türkei zur Folge gehabt, derTürken wäre Spanien und Portugal mit den Ausfall ihrer Chromlieferungen gefolgt.Durch die Änderung der Haltung der Türkein wäre weiter die Haltung Bulgariens starkbeinflusst worden, was nicht ohne Auswirkungen auf Rumänien und Ungarn bleibenkönnte. Für den Fall des Zusammenbrechens dieser Verbündeten bedürfe es keinesHinweises mehr auf die Auswirkungen auf den ganzen Balkan-Raum und die Folgen fürdie Gesamtkriegführung. Die Aufgabe des Ostlandes würde zur Folgen haben: 1.)Ausfall des für die Marine unbedingt notwendigen Balt-Öls. 2.) Ausfall Finnlands alseinzigem Nickellieferanten. 3.) Ausfall Schwedens mit jährlich 9 Mill. to.hochwertigstem Erz. Jeder Krieg bedürfe bestimmter industrieller Grundlagen, sonstgäbe es keine Waffen. Der Auftrag der H.Gr.Nord muss daher bleiben: Halten deraugenblicklichen Front mit allen Mitteln und allen nur erdenklichen Aushilfen. DerFührer betont hierbei, dass sein Leben auch nur immer von der Suche nach Aushilfenbestimmt gewesen wäre;" ibid., 18 July 1944, RH 19 III/313, 134-35.

67. Ibid., 15 July 1944, 60, 73; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (I), "Nr. 440412/44gKdos.Chefs.," 15 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 633.

68. Adm.FHQu, Nr. 129/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung," 23 July 1944, BA/MA,RM 7/101, 64-65; AOK 18, KTB, 6 Aug. 1944, T-312/956/ 9147069; AOK 18, Nr.2991/44 gKdos., "Ferngespräche des Herrn Oberbefehlshabers am 6. August 1944," T-312/959/9150156.

69. HGr Nord, KTB, 18 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/316, 134. Hitler had alreadypermitted the withdrawal of several units from Army Detachment Narva. Originallycomposed of 10 divisions and a brigade, by mid-July it had given up 6 divisions; ibid., 17July 1944, RH 19 III/313, 110. On 20 July Grasser reported his forces no longer sufficedto hold the front; ArmeeAbt Narwa/Ia, Nr. 962/44 gKdos., "Beurteilung der Lage," 20July 1944, T-312/1633/436-38.

70. HGr Mitte, KTB, 21 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 II/199, 209; Obkdo HGr Mitte/Ia,Nr. 11473/44 gKdos., "Beurteilung der Lage am 20.8.44, 20.00 Uhr," 21 Aug. 1944,BA/MA, RH 19 II/213, 160-61. Several other high-ranking German military figuresmaintain that concern for Finland affected Hitler's decision not to retreat from Narva;Heusinger, Befehl im Widerstreit, 296, 335; Warlimont, Im Hauptquartier der deutschenWehrmacht, 502-03; "An Interview with Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering: From theInvasion to the Ruhr, Eastern vs. Western Fronts, High Level Strategy," WWII GermanMilitary Studies, Vol. 2, ETHINT 30, 19; Friessner, Verratene Schlachten, 32-33.

71. For Finland’s concern, Der deutsche General beim Obkdo der finn. Wehrmacht/Ia,"Nr. 144/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 26 Aug. 1944, T-311/53/7065562-63; OKH/Att.Abt/Ia, "Nr.45/44 gKdos. Chefs.," 8 Mar. 1944, T-78/337/6292958-60; "Der nördlicheKriegsschauplatz," OKW KTB, Vol. 4, Part 1, 872; Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, 195;

Wipert von Blücher, Gesandter zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie (Wiesbaden: Limes,1951), 362, 401 (Blücher was German Minister to Finland from 1935-1944). For Hitler’sorder, OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 440530/44 gKdos. Chefs., "Weisung für dieweitere Kampfführung im Osten," 2 Sept. 1944, T-311/53/7065571-74.

72. HGr Nord/Ia Op, "Nr. 2918/44 gKdos.," 7 July 1944, T-312/1633/105; Der Ob derHGr Nord, Nr. 2156/44 gKdos., "Betr.: Estnisches Ölschiefergebiet," 12 Aug. 1944, T-312/1633/814. In July Schörner ordered the transfer of three of the nine heavy flakbatteries from the shale oil area to the front, but Hitler commanded their return; HGrNord, KTB, 26 and 31 July, BA/MA, RH 19 III/ 314, 45, 145.

73. Der Führer, OKW/WFSt/Op, Nr. 662375/43 gKdos. Chefs., "Weisung Nr. 50 für dieVorbereitung der Rückführung des Geb. A.O.K. 20 nach Nordfinnland undNordnorwegen," 28 Sept. 1943, Hitlers Weisungen, 231-32.

74. OKW/WFSt/Op (H), Nr. 77459/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Besetzung der Aaland-Inseln und der Insel Hochland," 19 Feb. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161, 131-35; "Dienördliche Kriegsschauplatz," addendum to OKW KTB, Vol. IV, Part 2, 13-14; Skl, KTB,29 Feb. 1944, 629; Ursula von Gersdorff, "Der Operationsplan 'Tanne,'" Östliche Ostsee,145.

75. MOK Ostsee/Führungsstab, B.Nr. gKdos. 310/44 Chefs. AI, "Betrifft: 'Tanne,'" 9Mar. 1944, T-1022/1825/PG 32518.; Carl-Axel Gemzel, Raeder, Hitler undSkandinavien: Der Kampf für einen maritimen Operationsplan (Lund: Gleerup, 1965),276-77; Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 1: 66-69; Dülffer, Weimar, Hitler unddie Marine, 520-24.

76. 1/Skl, B.Nr. 641/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betrifft: Vorbereitungen zur Besetzung der InselHochland," 1 Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161, 151-52; Skl, KTB, 14 Mar. 1944, 275-76.

77. For example, see HGr Nord, KTB, 4 and 10 April 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/273, 66-67, 138; OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr. 771049/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung," 29Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/1099, 74.

78. Skl, KTB, 21 June 1944, 565; ibid., 5 July 1944, 103-04.

79. For example, see OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr. 772010/44 gKdos.Chefs.,"Lageunterrichtung 20/6," 21 June 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/99, 100; Skl, AdmQu II, B.Nr.5132/44 gKdos.Chefs., “Besprechungen Chef Skl AdmQu II im Hauptquartier am11.8.44 mit Konteradmiral Wagner, General Warlimont und Freg.Kapt. Meyer,” T-1022/1825/PG 32520; OKW/WFSt/Op (M)/Ia, Nr. 772903/44 gKdos. Chefs., "Betr.:'Tanne,'" 16 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 460-01.

80. OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr. 772115/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 24.6," 24June 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/99, 78-79; Skl, KTB, 24 June 1944, 656. There is no recordof this in Lagevorträge. Dönitz left for Hitler's headquarters on 22 June and returned late

the following day. Wagner states that on several occasions Hitler and Dönitz metprivately, but Dönitz did not reveal the content of these discussions (and thus they werenot recorded), since he regarded these talks as confidential; "Kurzbericht des Admiralsz.b.V. beim Ob.d.M. über Teilnahme des Ob.d.M. an Führerlagen," 28 Oct. 1945,BA/MA, Nachlass Wagner, N 539/ v.1. This is a handwritten report by Wagner,prepared while he was a POW, apparently in response to a question posed by his captors.After the success of the Normandy invasion, Dönitz had appointed Wagner Admiral forSpecial Duty (Admiral zbV); Wagner served as liaison between Dönitz and the Sklwhenever Dönitz was absent from OKM and he accompanied the Grand Admiral on hisvisits to Hitler's headquarters. (Hans Meyer took over Wagner's duties as head of Skl'sOperations Section.)

81. OKW/WFSt/Op(H)/Nord, Nr. 772122/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Studie über dieFortführung des Kampfes im süd- und mittel-finnischen Raum im Fall einesZusammenbruches Finnlands," 26 June 1944, T-77/786/5514516-20. Assmann reiteratedthese points a few days later; OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr. 772122/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.:Fortführung Kampfes im süd- und mittelfinnischen Raum im Fall ZusammenbruchsFinnland," 6 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 695-96.

82. Despite the minister's negative reply, Ribbentrop returned to this theme repeatedly;Blücher, Gesandter zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie, 369-70; Ziemke, Stalingrad toBerlin, 389-90; 9.Sich.Div. gKdos. 1289 A I, "Lagebeurteilung 3.9. 0600 Uhr," 3 Sept.1944, BA/MA, RM 67/v.147, 249.

83. Skl, KTB, 9 Aug. 1944, 206; Skl, "1/Skl, I Nord 2387/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 9 Aug.1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 482.

84. Skl, KTB, 3 Sept. 1944, 58. Dönitz left for Hitler's headquarters on the evening of31 Aug., and had returned by the morning of 4 September. It is interesting that Wagnermaintains that Dönitz did not attend any conferences with Hitler between 20 July and 13Oct. 1944; see Wagner's note in Lagevorträge, 615. Yet the Skl War Diary states thatWagner was also at Hitler's headquarters during Dönitz’s visit; Skl, KTB, 3 Sept. 1944,69-70. In addition, the transcripts of Hitler's situation conferences list Dönitz andWagner as present, and include Dönitz’s remarks, at a conference on 1 September;"Mittagslage vom 1. September 1944 in der Wolfsschanze," Hitlers Lagebesprechungen,634-36.

85. Skl, KTB, 3 and 4 Sept. 1944, 69, 99. Besides the obvious lack of forces for thisoperation, the seizure of the Åland islands was scrapped primarily in consideration ofSweden. Hitler feared that it would prompt the Swedes to halt the shipment of iron oreand ball-bearings to Germany; 1 Skl, B.Nr. 2326/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Aalandsfrage," [1]Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 508-12; OKW/WFSt/Qu 2 (Nord), Nr. 77653/44gKdos.Chefs., "Besondere Anordnungen Nr. 1 zum Stichwort 'Tanne,'" 11 Mar. 1944,BA/MA, RW 4/v.646, 1-5; "Der nördliche Kriegsschauplatz," Part 2, OKW KTB, Vol. 4,Part 1, 893. Sweden's military was aware of German plans to occupy the islands, andquite concerned, fearing it could be a prelude to an attack on Sweden; Fst, avd M,

"Krigsdagbok (hereafter KDB)," 31 Mar. 1944, Kungl. Krigsarkivet, Stockholm(hereafter KrA), F III:1; Fst, Avd M, "PM rörande åtgörder viden eventuell tyskockupation av Åland," 4 Apr. 1944, KrA, F IV, Vol. 3; Mst, KDB, 31 Mar., 1 April, 19June, and 15 Sept. 1944, KrA, D II, Vol. 2.

86. Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl I Op 2842/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betrifft: 'Tanne-Ost,'" 10 Sept. 1944,BA/MA, RM 7/162, 312; Skl, "1/Skl I op 2819/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 9 Sept. 1944, ibid.,317.

87. Skl, KTB, 9 Sept. 1944, 231. No one seemed to mind that the report stated theFinnish commander had made this comment, tears in his eyes, while intoxicated; AdmOstland, "B.Nr. gKdos. Chefs. 268 C," 9 June 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/323, 73-75;1/Skl, "B.Nr. I op 33814/44 geh.," 9 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 318. In fairness toDönitz, there were other reports that the Finns planned to evacuate the island.

88. Skl, KTB, 10 and 11 Sept. 1944, 255-56, 274; Adm FHQu, "Nr. 292/44gKdos.Chefs.," 11 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162.

89. Skl, KTB, 12 and 13 Sept. 1944, 296, 334; MOK Ost/Führungsstab, "KTB überDurchführung 'Tanne Ost,'" 14 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/M523; 9.Sich.Div., Gkdos.1289 A I, "Lagebeurteilung 3.9. 0600 Uhr," 3 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 67/v. 147, 249;Anlage 1 zu Lehr-Division Nord, Nr. 11/44 gKdos., "Betr: Aufenhalt auf der InselSuursaari," 27 Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/323, 38-40; Lehr-Brigade Nord/Ia, Nr.28/44 gKdos., "Denkschrift über Unternehmen 'Tanne,'" 7 May 1944, T-311/75/7097757.

90. OKL/Füst (Robinson), "Nr. 10160/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 11 Sept. 1944, T-1022/1685/PG 32521; MOK Ost/Führstab, "gKdos. 05823," 12 Sept. 1944, ibid.;9.Sich.Div., B.Nr. gKdos. 1373 A1, "Sperrbefehl für den 'Schnellschluss 1' und'Schnellschluss 1 Süd,'" 12 Sept. 1944, Anlage 3 to 9.Sich.Div., KTB, 1-15 Sept. 1944,BA/MA, RM 7/v.149; Skl, KTB, 12 and 15 Sept. 1944, 299, 407.

91. Skl, KTB, 15 Sept. 1944, 392. Communications with the landing force were sofouled up that the Germans had to monitor Finnish radio reports for information; MOKOst, KTB über Durchführung "Tanne Ost," 15 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/M523.Goebbels remarked that the operation had been poorly planned and executed; TBJG, 17Sept. 1944, 13: 499.

92. Again, Dönitz was at Hitler's headquarters with Wagner; Skl, KTB, 15 Sept. 1944,385, 390, 394-95; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl Ia 28524/44 gKdos., "Vermerk über Ferngesprächebetr. 'Tanne Ost' am 15. September 1944," BA/MA, RM 7/162, 239; MOK Ost, KTBüber Durchführung "Tanne Ost," 15 and 16 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/M523.

93. "Neu 1/Skl Ib 29035/44 gKdos.," 20 Sept. 1944, T-1022/1709/PG 32122-A. TheGermans lost 132 dead and 1200 captured. In addition, 6 naval barges and 1 tug weresunk, and 3 motor mine sweepers, 3 mine sweepers and 1 tug were damaged; Skl, KTB,17 and 20 Sept. 1944, 457, 528-29.

94. HGr Nord, KTB, 18 July 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/313, 135. Two days laterFriessner again emphasized the importance of Hitler's diplomatic motives, although thistime he also mentioned ore imports from Finland and Sweden; "Besprechung am20.7.1944 auf Gef.Stand der Armee-abteilung Grasser," T-312/1633/439. This is a topicwhich merits investigation. Did other generals make similar claims?

95. TBJG, 18 Sept. 1944, 13: 508-09.

96. OKW/WFSt/Op (M)/Ia, Nr. 9512/44 gKdos., "Operative und taktische Fragen derSeekriegsführung in östlicher Ostsee und im Nordmeer," 14 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RW4/v.614; 2/Skl BdU Op, B.Nr. 395 II.Ang.Chefs.Ing., "Stand der U-Boote am 1.September 1944," BA/MA, RM 87/43, 6-7.

97. In the West, from 6-15 June the German navy lost (not including ships damaged) 2destroyers, 16 motor torpedo boats, 3 torpedo boats and 20 smaller vessels; Skl, KTB, 15June 1944, 398. In the month of June alone, the navy lost 171 vessels the size ofdestroyer and smaller; ibid., 14 July 1944, 303. Meisel stated that in the two monthsfollowing the Normandy landings, Germany had lost 219 escort vessels; "Vortrag desChefs der Skl bei der Besprechung der Oberbefehlshaber in 'Koralle' am 24./25.8. 44,"BA/MA, RM 7/100, 166-67.

98. 9.Sich.Div., KTB, 30 and 31 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 67/v.148, 239, 242; "MOKOst/Führstab op 05019 gKdos.," 31 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/M523; OKW/WFSt/Op(M)/Ia, Nr. 9512/44 gKdos., "Operative und taktische Fragen der Seekriegführung inöstlicher Ostsee und im Nordmeer," 14 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RW 4/v.614; Adm.FHQu,Nr. 157/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung," 1 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/101, 11-12.

99. This reduced the number of Germany's remaining fleet torpedo boats by 30%; WalterLohmann and Hans Hildebrand, Die Deutsche Kriegsmarine 1939-1945 (Bad Nauheim:Podzun, 1959-64), 1: Part 54, 9-21. The Germans lost 397 men in this operation; Führerder Zerstörer, B.Nr. 2710 gKdos., "Zusammenfassender Bericht über Unternehmung 6.Torpedobootsflotille am 17.-18.8.44," 2 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 45 Ost/6; MOK Ostsee,Op B.Nr. gKdos. 4341 F III, "Kurzer Rückblick auf August 1944," 22 Sept. 1944,BA/MA, RM 7/90, 337; Skl, KTB, 1 Sept. 1944, 20; Mike Whitley, "Das Desaster in derBucht von Narwa: Die Minenoperation der 6. T-Flotille vom 18./19. August 1944"(Friedrich Forstmeier trans.), Marine-Rundschau, 80 (No. 10): 466-70. A former Germannaval officer claims that the channel had been swept for mines the previous day, and thatRussian ships were ready to pick up survivors. He believes that the Soviets had beentipped off by the Russian-born wife of a Finnish friend of Admiral Böhmer. Böhmersupposedly issued orders by telephone from his friend’s house; Study No. 121, “SovietNaval Warfare (Partial Translation)” NavOpArch, GNR, Box T 94, 10.

100. Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl 25826/44 gKdos., "Betr.: Minenlage Finnenbusen," 23 Aug. 1944,BA/MA, RM 7/162, 431. The mine barrage was successfully laid on the night of 7-8Sept.; 9.Sich.Div., KTB, 8 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/ v.149.

Chapter 3: The Retreat to Courland

1. As of 1 Sept. Army Group North reported a strength of 571,579 troops. During themonth of Aug. it had suffered 70,566 casualties and received only 41,841 replacements;HGr Nord, KTB, 21 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/319, 123; Forwick, "Der Rückzugder Heeresgruppe Nord nach Kurland,” 103, 211.

2. HGr Nord, KTB, 5, 7, 9 and 11 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/318, 49-50, 67, 84-87,107-09.

3. HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 143/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 8 Aug. 1944, T-312/958/9148790-93.Army Detachment Narva’s former chief of staff maintained that a map exercise for thewithdrawal was conducted in Schörner’s presence in early September; Paul Reichelt,“The Battles of Armeeabteilung Narva, June-September 1944,” Retreat from Leningrad,160. HGr Nord, KTB, 6 and 12 Aug. 1944, BA/ MA, RH 19 III/315, 95-96, 202, 209,218.

4. HGr Nord, KTB, 5 and 6 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/318, 49-50, 56-58; Natzmer,“Festung Kurland,” IfZ, ZS 111, 48.

5. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 404; HGr Nord, KTB, 9 and 11 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RH19 III/315, 126, 178.

6. Schörner, Genob. und Ob. der HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 187/ 44 gKdos.Chefs., (Schörner toKeitel)," 9 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RW 4/v.708, 86; HGr Nord, KTB, 13 Sept. 1944,BA/MA, RH 19 III/318, 133.

7. The Soviets assembled 900,000 men, 17,483 guns and mortars, 3081 tanks and assaultguns and 2643 aircraft (excluding naval aircraft) for the attack. In addition, the Russianshad nearly doubled their armored strength opposite Army Group North. For thisoperation the Russians disposed of 15 armies, including 3 Guards, 1 Guards Tank and 4Shock armies; GVK, 4: 388-91; Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 411-12; Deutschland imzweiten Weltkrieg, 6: 72; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (Chef), Nr. 2963/44 gKdos., "WichtigsteFeindstellungen vom 3.9. 1944," 3 Sept. 1944, T-78/466/6445468.

8. HGr Nord, KTB, 14 and 15 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/318, 147-48, 167-69; HGrNord/Ia, Nr. 200/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Befehl für Durchführung Planspiel 'Aster' (Absetzender H.Gr.Nord mit 18. Armee und Armeeabt. Narwa auf die Wenden-Stellung)," 14 Sept.1944, T-312/1636/336-40; AOK 18, KTB, 15 Sept. 1944, T-312/957/ 9147962.Guderian appointed Wenck Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff and head of OKH'sCommand Group, which consisted of the Operations Department, Foreign Armies Eastand the newly-established Fortifications Branch; its purpose was to co-ordinate

operations on the Eastern Front; Heinz Guderian, "General Critique of MSS# P-041a - P-041ll and a Report on the June 1944-March 1945 Period," The German Army HighCommand 1938-1945, Reel 4, MS# P-041jj, p. 8.

9. HGr Nord, KTB, 16 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/319, 3. Schörner’s notes for theupcoming meeting reveal the arguments he intended to use to persuade Hitler: the armygroup had completely exhausted its reserves in only two days and had barely prevented abreakthrough; the Russians had additional reserves and soon would attack the Doblen andDorpat sectors; the order for "Aster" had to be issued immediately, before his forces weresplit up and the retreat became impossible; lack of forces to hold open the corridor toArmy Group Center; an overall shortage of troops, weapons and aircraft fuel; a warningthat the mud period would begin in about three weeks, which would greatly reducemobility; and that the retreat would release 7 divisions; "Punkte für Führervortrag am16.9.44," ibid., 15 Sept. 1944, RH 19 III/318, 189-94.

10. Ibid., 17 and 18 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/319, 23, 71. Although Hitlerapproved the order, Army Detachment Narva's rear area services had already begun theirwithdrawal on the night of the 17th.

11. Ibid., 18 Sept. 1944, 60; PzAOK 3, KTB, 13, 14 and 18 Sept. 1944, T-313/317/8595832-33, 8595840-41, 8595860-63. To provide unified command for thisattack, OKH attached 3rd Panzer Army to Army Group North as of 21 Sept.;OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 440592/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 20 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH19 III/16, 33.

12. From 17-25 Sept. German vessels evacuated over 100,000 people (46,168 troops,13,049 wounded, 26,131 evacuees and 23,474 POWs) and 30,000 tons of goods fromEstonian ports; Skl, KTB, 26 Sept. 1944, 730; ibid., 3 Oct. 1944, 72; MOK Ostsee, OpB.Nr. gKdos. 4630 F III, "Kurzer Rückblick auf September 1944," 9 Oct. 1944, BA/MA,RM 7/90, 357.

13. Schörner had already informed Guderian that there was no reason to hold theSegewold Position, or even a bridgehead around Riga. Guderian emphasized that thecommand to hold Riga was "an extremely forcefully declared Führer order," from whichhe dared not deviate; HGr Nord, KTB, 19 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/319, 82.

14. Ibid., 22 and 23 Sept. 1944, 131-32, 138, 143-44; HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 4079/44 gKdos.,"Weisung für die Kampfführung der H.Gr. Nord ab 23.9.1944," 23 Sept. 1944, T-313/323/8602774-75. Nordland's achievement, covering approximately 500 kilometersin less than 5 days, is astonishing. Schörner had earlier estimated that retreating unitswould require 12 days to reach the Estland-West Position, and an additional 9 days fromthat line to the Wenden Position.

15. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 440608/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Weisung für die weitereKampfführung," 30 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/16, 47. During the conferenceWenck intervened on Schörner’s behalf, explaining that a retreat to the Riga-East

Position would release 16 of the 22 divisions currently in the Segewold Position. Thedivisions freed by the retreat would allow Schörner to withdraw Third Panzer Army'sarmored divisions from the front, and assemble them for "Blitz." The attack could notbegin until late Oct., because the retreat to the Riga-East Position was not scheduled until12 Oct.; HGr Nord, KTB, 28 Sept. 1944, RH 19 III/319, 220-21, 233-35.

16. Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 417-18; GVK, 4: 399; Shtemenko, The Soviet GeneralStaff at War, 1: 369.

17. 3rd Panzer Army defended a sector of nearly 200 kilometers with less than 6divisions, and the average combat strength per kilometer was only 86 men and less than 2pieces of artillery; PzAOK 3/Id, "Kräfteeinsatz PzAOK 3 (Infanterie und Artillerie)(Stand 30.9. 44)," 30 Sept. 1944, T-313/323/8603093-94; HGr Nord, KTB, 15 Oct. 1944,BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 14-15.

18. HGr Nord, KTB, 29 Sept., RH 19 III/319, 241; ibid., 1, 2 and 3 Oct. 1944, BA/MA,RH 19 III/330, 9, 14, 16, 24, 36; PzAOK 3/Ia, Nr. 55/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Beurteilung derLage am 2.10.44 Abends," 3 Oct. 1944, T-311/53/7065625-29; HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 233/44gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Bewegung 'Donner,'" 4 Oct. 1944, T-312/1636/369.

19. Hitler re-attached 3rd Panzer Army to Army Group Center and ordered Schörnerimmediately to launch a flank attack against Soviet force advancing on Memel and Libau.At the same time, Army Group Center received instructions to mount an assault onMemel from the south; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 440630/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 10Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/16, 83. The army group issued 16th Army the order toretreat to the Aa Position before Hitler had given his approval; HGr Nord, KTB, 10 and11 Oct. 1944, RH 19 III/330, 188, 208, 217-219, 222. For more information on thesewithdrawals, HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 233/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Bewegung 'Donner,'" 4 Oct.1944, T-312/1636/369-71; AOK 16/Ia, Nr. 097/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Studie'Bewegung Regen,'" 7 Oct. 1944, T-312/1636/376-82; AOK 16/Ia, Nr. 100/44gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Bewegung 'Sonnenschein,'" 13 Oct. 1944, T-312/1636/383-85.

20. AOK 16/Ia, "Nr. 2868/44 gKdos.," 6 Oct. 1944, T-312/628/8254571; HGr Nord/Ia,"Nr. 9808/44 geh.," 7 Oct. 1944, T-312/1636/662. From 23 Sept.-16 Oct. the followingunits passed through the 45-kilometer-long and 6-kilometer-wide corridor between Rigaand Schlock, which included 2 river crossings with only 3 roads available: 3 army-leveland 8 corps headquarters with all their supply complement; 20 divisions and 1 brigade(across the Düna); 9 divisions and 1 brigade (west of the Düna); 120 flak batteries; and174 miscellaneous units (engineers, police, Organization Todt units, artillery, etc.). Inaddition, 111,007 vehicles passed over the 2 Düna bridges in Riga after 25 Sept.; AOK16/Ia, "Nr. 7350/44 geh.," 18 Oct. 1944, T-312/636/8264190-96.

21. HGr Nord, KTB, 10, 11, 13 and 14 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 209-12, 219,253, 260-62, 270; OKH/ GenStdH/OpAbt, "Nr. 440639/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 13 Oct. 1944,BA/MA, RH 19 III/16, 87; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt, Nr. 440645 /44 gKdos. Chefs.,"Befehl für die weitere Kampfführung im memelländisch-kurlandisch Raum," 16 Oct.

1944, RH 19 III/16, 89; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia)/MVO, Nr. 440635 /44 gKdos.Chefs.,"Einsatz von Seestreitkräften im Landbeschuss," 12 Oct. 1944, T-78/338/6294757; Skl,"1/Skl I Nord 3256/44 gKdos.Chefs." 12 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 38. OnDönitz’s interest, Skl, KTB, 14 and 15 Oct. 1944, 338, 358, 362.

22. Der Chef des GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 440629/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Beurteilung derLage an der Ostfront," 8 Oct. 1944, T-78/338/6294774; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Chef),"Gedanken über die Weiterführung des Kampfes im Osten (in Stichworten)," 18 Oct.1944, ibid., Fame 6294723-24.

23. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Chef), "Besprechung am 19.10 mit Oberbefehlshaber undChef des Generalstabes der Heeresgruppe Nord auf dem Gefechtsstand derHeeresgruppe," Chefs., T-78/338/6294698-702. Although this was clearly a veryimportant conference, Army Group North's war diary contains no mention of the meetingwith Bonin. The war diary merely states that Schörner flew to Libau in the afternoon;HGr Nord, KTB, 19 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 57.

24. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 440652/44 gKdos. Chefs.," 20 Oct. 1944, BA/MA,RH 19 III/16, 91; HGr Nord, KTB, 25 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 134, 143.Although there was no mention of a later attack to East Prussia, Schörner’s remarksduring his discussion with Bonin on 19 Oct. would indicate that this was his end goal. Inaddition, see Schörner’s comments on his desire to break through to the Reich in"Besprechung mit Felix M. Steiner am 10. April 1955," BA/MA, Nachlass Schörner, N60/73.

25. OKH/GenStdH/ OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 440662/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 26 Oct. 1944, T-78/338/6294665-66; Forwick, "Rückzug nach Kurland," 172.

26. Skl, KTB, 15 and 16 Sept. 1944, 385, 416; Adm FHQu, Nr. 297/44 gKdos.Chefs.,"Lageunterrichtung 12/9," 12 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/100, 264; Adm FHQu, Nr.311/44 gKdos. Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 15.9.," 15 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/100,279. Again, there is no mention of Dönitz’s meeting with Hitler in Lagevorträge. Dönitzreturned from Hitler's headquarters on the morning of the 19th; Skl, KTB, 19 Sept. 1944,495.

27. Lagevorträge, 16 Sept. 1944, 419; Skl, B.Nr 1/Skl Ia, 2972/44 gKdos.Chefs.,"Betrifft: Heeresgruppe Nord," 16 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 224; Skl, KTB, 16Sept. 1944, 419; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl I L 29573/44 gKdos., "Betr.: Schutz des Raumes deröstl. Ostsee gegen Feindluftangriffe und Sicherung gegen Feindstreitkräfte, insbes. U-Boote," 28 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 110-13.

28. Other tasks included the conveyance and protection of supply transports to the BalticStates, protection of merchant shipping and training areas in the Baltic, supporting theArmy by transport tasks and coastal bombardment, coastal defense in the Baltic Statesand the protection of Moon Sound; Anlage zu B.Nr. 1/Skl I op 3106/44 gKdos.Chefs.,

"Weisung für die Seekriegsführung in der östlichen Ostsee," 29 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM7/162, 106-09.

29. Skl, 1/Skl 30074/44 gKdos., "Lageunterrichtung 2. 10. Abends," 2 Oct. 1944, T-1022/1709/PG 32122-A.

30. MVO beim GenStdH, "B.Nr. 2776/44 gKdos.," 9 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 47.

31. Adm FHQu, Nr. 142/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betrifft: Lage im baltischen Raum," 29 July1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 563-64. Skl, 1/Skl I Op 2235/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr:Versorgung Heeresgr. Nord über See," 26 July 1944, BA/MA, Anlage 24 to MOK Ost,KTB (16-31 July 1944), RM 31/M 522. The Skl reminded Conrady and Voss of theimportance of northern Courland for the army group's supply at the beginning of Sept.;"B.Nr. 1/Skl I op 2705/44 gKdos. Chefs.," 2 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 380.

32. HGr Mitte/Ia, "Nr. 10308/44 gKdos.," 4 Aug. 1944, T-311/229/699; HGr Nord/IaOp, "Nr. 3392/44 gKdos.," 6 Aug. 1944, T-312/627/8253823; PzAOK 3, KTB, 14 Sept.1944, T-313/317/8595842; HGr Nord, KTB, 25 Sept., 7, 9 and 10 Oct. 1944, BA/MA,RH 19 III/319, 179, RH 19 III/330, 142, 174, 212. 16th Army, responsible for Windau,ordered the city's commander that if necessary, he was to allow his men to be cut offinside Windau and fight to the end; Anlage zu AOK 16/Ia/Id, Nr. 3024/44 gKdos.,"Besondere Kampfanweisung für den Festungs-Kdt. Windau," 18 Oct. 1944, T-312/634/8262306.

33. OKH/GenStdH/MVO, "B.Nr. 329/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 6 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM7/162, 326; Skl, KTB, 6 Sept. 1944, 158. Conrady reported that as of 1 July Army GroupNorth had 520,000 men, 147,000 horses and 1,932 artillery pieces; MVO beim GenStdH,"B.Nr. 329/44 gKdos. Chefs. II. Ang.," 7 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 325;Seetransportchef f.d. Wehrmacht, OKM/Skl, "Adm QuVI 5294/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 8Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 327-28. From this information, Salewski asserts thatArmy Group North's evacuation was not possible as early as Sept. 1944, and would havebeen equally impossible a month later; Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 2: 491.This author disagrees with Salewski’s interpretation.

34. B.Nr. 1/Skl I Nord, 31363/44 gKdos., "Betr.: Einsatz Flottenstreitkräfte alsTransporter," 21 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 347.

35. HGr Nord, KTB, 29 Sept. 1944, RH 19 III/319, 238, 242; ibid., 1, 4 and 14 Oct.1944, RH 19 III/330, 1, 6, 53, 271; ibid., 15 Oct. 1944, RH 19 III/331, 8, 13; 9. Sich.Div., KTB, "Schlussbetrachtung zum 30. September 1944," BA/MA, RM 67/v.149. Thevessels Dönitz ordered to remain operational were Prinz Eugen, Hipper, Scheer, Lützow,Köln and Emden; Leipzig and Hansa were exempt. The World War I battleshipsSchlesien and Schleswig Holstein were deemed unsuitable for coastal bombardment; Skl,KTB, 5 and 15 Oct. 1944, 118, 363.

36. B.Nr. 1/Skl I op 3066/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Einsatz der Flottenstreitkräfte zurAbwehr von Landungen im Skagerrak-Raum," 25 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 327-29; Skl, KTB, 8 Oct. 1944, 198.

37. HGr Nord, KTB, 6, 16 and 18 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/318, 62, RH 19III/319, 12, 71; HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 214/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 18 Sept. 1944, T-312/1634/373.

38. The Skl noted that loss of Estonian oil would reduce the navy's Heizöl allotment by8-10%; Skl, KTB, 16 Sept., 416. One study of the navy's fuel supply during the war citesthis as evidence that the oil installations played no decisive role in the fall of 1944;Wilhelm Meier-Dörnberg, Die Ölversorgung der Kriegsmarine 1935 bis 1945 (Freiburg:Rombach, 1973), 34. Kummetz claimed that Admiral Eastern Baltic's entire forces weresupplied by Estonian shale oil; MOK Ostsee, Op.B.Nr. 3813 AI op, "Kurzer Rückblickauf Juli 1944," 19 Aug. 1944, RM 31/M 522.

39. The Germans captured Tütters by sending an assault force in trucks 42 kilometersacross the frozen Gulf of Finland; Theodor Burchardi, "Operationen in der östlichenOstsee," in BA/MA, Nachlass Wagner, N 539/v. 15, 3. Burchardi was Admiral EasternBaltic.

40. HGr Nord, KTB, 30 Aug., 13 and 21 Sept. 1943, T-311/57/7070318, 7070378,7070409; HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 2937/43 gKdos., "Betr.: Insel Tytärsaari," 13 Sept. 1943, T-311/73/7094619-20; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt IN, Nr. 9408/43 gKdos., "Bezug: HGrNord/Ia, Nr. 2937 /43 gKdos.," 20 Sept. 1943, T-311/73/7094621.

41. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt/Chef, "IN-Nr. 430635/43 gKdos.Chefs. (Heusinger toKinzel)," 22 Sept. 1943, BA/MA, RH 19 III/13, 9; HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 3141/44 gKdos.,"Betrifft: Insel Tytärsaari," 27 Sept. 1943, Anlage 8a to MOK Ost,"Sonderkriegstagebuch für die Zeit vom 17.8. bis 21.12.43,", BA/MA, RM 31/M 522.

42. MOK Ostsee, "Sonderkriegstagebuch für die Zeit vom 17.8. bis 21.12.43," 4 and 11Sept., 29 Nov. 1943, BA/MA, RM 31/M 522; Verbindungsoffizier des GenStdH beimOKM, "B.Nr. 1 Skl If 2865/43 gKdos.Chefs.," 21 Sept. 1943, BA/MA, RH 19 III/13, 10-11.

43. Admiral Ostland, KTB, 3 Feb. 1944, BA/MA, M 533/ 39078a; MOKOstsee/Führstab, B.Nr. gKdos. 1023/44 A III, "Kurzer Überblick auf Februar 1944," 8Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 299; Skl, KTB, 5 Feb. 1944, 87.

44. Skl, KTB, 5 July 1944, 101. This occurred the same day that army units earmarkedfor "Tanne" were released for front action and the navy received responsibility for theoperation against Hogland.

45. "B.Nr. 1/Skl, Ia 2113/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 14 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 634;MOK Ost, KTB, 14 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/M 522; Skl, KTB, 25 July 1944, 531;

Skl KTB, 17 Sept. 1944, 442-43; MOK Ostsee/ Führungsstab, B.Nr. gKdos. 600/45 F I,"Rückblick auf die wesentlichsten Ereignisse und Aufgaben im Bereich MOK Ost imKriegsjahr 1944," 17 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 422.

46. Adm FHQu, Nr. 129/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung," 23 July 1944, BA/MA,RM 7/101, 64-65.

47. Adm FHQu, Nr. 384/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 8.10.44," 8 Oct. 1944,BA/MA, RM 7/100, 358.

48. Wagner relayed Dönitz’s order for the Skl immediately to prepare a report on thesetransport tasks, and pointed out that it was especially important to restrict informationabout of these operational intentions to the smallest number of personnel; Adm zbV,"397/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 13 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 30.

49. The Skl received this message at 1740 hours on 19 Oct., and OKH issued the ordersto Army Group North on the afternoon of the following day; Skl, KTB, 20 Oct. 1944,484-85, 488-89.

50. Lagevorträge, 13 Oct. 1944, 603-05.

51. Adm FHQu, Nr. 421/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 21/10," 21 Oct. 1944,BA/MA, RM 7/100, 393; Adm FHQu, Nr. 429/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung24.10.," 24 Oct. 1944, ibid., 395.

52. Guderian also stated that he needed 100,000 replacements, sufficient weapons andfuel, and that the Luftwaffe must gain air superiority over the Soviets at least at criticalsectors of the front; Der Chef des GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 440629/44 gKdos.Chefs.,"Beurteilung der Lage an der Ostfront," 8 Oct. 1944, T-78/338/6294766-75.

53. HGr Nord, KTB, 14 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 264-65. Guderian slightlyamended his position the next day. He ordered Schörner to break through to Memel andestablish a line Garsden-Plunge-Zidikiai; next, Schörner was to thrust towards Heydekrugand link up with forces from Army Group Center attacking to the north from Tilsit;OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 440645/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Befehl für die weitereKampfführung im memelländisch-kurlandisch Raum," 16 Oct. 1944, RH 19 III/16, 89.

54. Voss claimed that the situation in East Prussia required the withdrawal of units fromCourland; Adm FHQu, Nr. 421/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 21/10," 21 Oct.1944, BA/MA, RM 7/100, 393. A few days earlier the Skl had briefed various navalstations on the situation, and declared that the further retention of Courland dependedupon future Soviet attacks as well as on the situation in East Prussia, whither ArmyGroup North possibly would have to give up forces; 1/Skl 31572/44 gKdos.,"Lageunterrichtung 18.10," 18 Oct. 1944, T-1022/1709/PG 32122-A.

55. HGr Nord, KTB, 5 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/ 318, 50. Schörner acknowledgedHitler's hope that the situation in Finland would swing in Germany's favor, but insistedthat, militarily, the retreat was essential; ibid., 15 Sept. 1944, 168. Voss had earlierreported that Hitler believed a definite assessment of Finland's attitude could be gainedonly after 15 Sept.; Adm.FHQu, Nr. 286/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 5/9," 5Sept. 1944, T-1022/1709/PG 32122-A. Presumably, the Finns' fierce resistance to theHogland operation provided Hitler with his "definite assessment."

56. Hitler informed Jodl that he was also hesitant because peace feelers had beenextended, and he needed the Baltic States to bargain with; Tagebuch Generaloberst Jodl,16 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RW 4/v.33, 57.

57. HGr Nord, KTB, 11 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 218.

58. In reply to Natzmer's query whether the army group could expect to retreat fromEstonia, Wenck answered that the occupation of Hogland posed no problem, since it wasintended only as a temporary measure; ibid., 12 Sept. 1944, RH 19 III/318, 114.

59. For example, ibid., 7, 11, and 26 Sept., 8 Oct. 1944, RH 19 III/318, 67, 104, RH 19III/319, 190, RH 19 III/330, 160-61.

60. Grasser's order refers to a withdrawal to the Riga area in order to break through tothe southwest via the Tuckum-Schlock corridor, as had been the case in "Map ExerciseKönigsberg;" Armeeabt. Narwa/Ia, Nr. 1250/44 gKdos., "Armee-Befehl für dieDurchführung der Bewegung 'Tannenbaum,'" 16 Sept. 1944, T-312/963/9154900."Tannenbaum" was Army Detachment Narva's code-name for "Aster."

61. HGr Nord, KTB, 16 and 17 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/319, 3, 24.

62. “Interview, Harold Deutsch with Puttkamer,” 27 June 1970, IfZ, ZS 285/III, 14-15;see also Weinberg, A World at Arms, 668-69.

63. For example, see "Stellungnahme zu dem Aufsatz von Walter Baum 'DerZusammenbruch der obersten deutschen militärischen Führung 1945,'" BA/MA, NachlassDönitz, N 236/10, in which Dönitz stated, "I did not have the slightest influence on armyoperations in the East, and merely received a general picture by my occasionalparticipation in the army situation conference with Hitler." But as Siegfried Westphal,the former Chief of Staff to the army's Commander-in-Chief, West, pointed out to Dönitzafter the war, if as late as mid-March 1945 Guderian assumed that Hitler had orderedCourland held for reasons relating to naval strategy, then Guderian probably had a goodreason for this belief. Dönitz had complained about Westphal's remarks in his book thatDönitz convinced Hitler to hold Courland and the Crimea. Westphal also replied that hehad repeatedly requested an additional army group headquarters staff and suggested thatof Army Group Courland. OKW had refused every request with the claim that Dönitzhad insisted upon Courland's defense in the interests of U-boat training; Dönitz toWestphal, 13 Mar. 1965, Nachlass Dönitz, N 236/7, 111-13; Westphal to Dönitz, 9 Apr.

1965, N 236/7, 117-18. Dönitz lodged a similar complaint with Ruge; Dönitz to Ruge,11 July 1961, N 236/7, 61-62.

Chapter 4: The Struggle for the Baltic Isles

1. The approximate size of the three main islands is as follows: Moon, 77 sq.mi.; Dagö,372 sq.mi.; and Ösel, 1042 sq.mi.; Walther Melzer, Kampf um die Baltischen Inseln,1917-1941-1944 (Neckargemünd: Vowinckel, 1960), 9.

2. HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 096/43 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Führerbefehl Nr. 10," 13 Sept. 1943,T-311/74/7097064; HGr Nord, KTB, 10, 14 and 19 Feb. 1944, T-311/58/7072966,7072996-97, 7073104, 7073233.

3. Wehrmacht-Kommandant Baltische Inseln/Ia, "Nr. 1901/44 geh.," 25 Sept. 1944, T-312/964/9155584; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 440530/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Weisungfür die weitere Kampfführung im Osten," 2 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/16, 16; HGrNord, KTB, 22 and 27 Sept. 1944, RH 19 III/319, 138, 203; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia),"Nr. 440592/44 gKdos. Chefs.," 20 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/16, 33.

4. Jürg Meister, "Die sowjetrussischen amphibischen Operationen, 1939-1945," Marine-Rundschau, 52 (No. 5): 132. The Soviets landed approximately 78,000 troops on theislands in the course of this operation; Geschichte des zweiten Weltkrieges, 9: 181. OneSoviet account states that although this was the largest amphibious assault by the BalticFleet; the largest Russian amphibious operation of the war occurred at Kertsch-Eltigen inNov. 1943; Vasiliy Achkasov and Nikolai Pavlovich, Soviet Naval Operations in theGreat Patriotic War 1941-1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981), 119-20, 140.

5. GVK, 4: 410-11; HGr Nord, KTB, 29 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/319, 249-50.

6. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 440608/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Weisung für die weitereKampfführung," 30 Sept. 1944, BA/ MA, RH 19 III/16, 47; HGr Nord, KTB, 1 Oct.1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 2.

7. HGr Nord, KTB, 5 and 6 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 68-70, 89-90, 95-96,103.

8. Ibid., 8 and 10 Oct. 1944, 146, 163, 194.

9. Approximately 500 Soviet troops landed behind the front on Sworbe's east coast on 12Oct. The Russians dumped their men into the water 300-400 meters from the beach,certainly an unpleasant experience in Baltic waters in Oct. German naval vesselsprevented a second wave from landing, and almost the entire force was killed or captured.A company-strength landing on the west coast on 11 Oct. also failed; ibid., 12 Oct. 1944,

232, 236; 9.Sich.Div., KTB, 12 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 67/v.150, 51-52; AOK 16, KTB,20-24 Oct. 1944, T-312/634/8261802-17.

10. Adm.FHQu, Nr. 423/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 22.10.," 22 Oct. 1944,BA/MA, RM 7/100, 395; HGr Nord, KTB, 22 and 24 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 91, 117-19.

11. Adm.F.H.Qu, "Nr. 443/44 gKdos. Chefs.," 28 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 319.

12. OKH/GenStdH/MVO/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 440666/44 gKdos. Chefs.," 29 Oct. 1944, T-78/338/6294677; AOK 16/Ia, "Nr. 3100/44 gKdos.," 28 Oct. 1944, T-312/635/8262911.

13. HGr Nord, KTB, 19 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/333, 31, 41, 48-49.

14. AOK 16, KTB, 21 Nov, 1944, T-312/634/8261916; HGr Nord, KTB, 23 Nov. 1944,BA/MA, RH 19 III/333, 125, 138. On the night of 23-24 Nov. 4491 troops and 678wounded were evacuated; Skl, KTB, 3 Dec. 1944, 66. 16th Army reported 5296casualties on Sworbe from 18-24 Nov., nearly 50% of its entire strength on the peninsula;HGr Nord, KTB, 8 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/ 332, 112; AOK 16/Ia, Nr. 8733/44geh. II. Ang., "Betr.: Gefechtsbericht über die Kampfhandlung auf Sworbe," 8 Dec. 1944,T-312/636/8264225-26.

15. HGr Nord, KTB, 26 Sept. and 11 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/319, 193-94, RH 19III/330, 225, 229. After the war Natzmer referred to Sworbe’s defense as “totallysenseless;” Oldwig von Natzmer, “Festung Kurland: Der Kampf im Norden derdeutschen Ostfront 1944/45,” April 1949, IfZ, ZS 111, 53-54.

16. HGr Nord, KTB, 12 and 14 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 243-44, 264, 266.

17. Skl, 1/Skl I Nord 2396/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Anfrage Adm.F.H.Qu nachBeurteilung Bedeutung baltischer Inseln für Ostsee-Kriegführung," 10 Aug. 1944,BA/MA, RM 7/162, 481; Skl, KTB, 10 Aug. 1944, 230.

18. HGr Nord, KTB, 15 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 6-7, 12-13; Adm.östl.Ostsee gKdos. 5032, "Lagebetrachtung Sworbe," 15 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 31;HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 4499/44 gKdos.," 16 Oct. 1944, T-312/634/8262497-98.

19. Skl, 1/Skl I Nord 31177/44 gKdos., "Betr.: Bedeutung Halbinsel Sworbe fürSeekriegführung," 15 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 20.

20. "MOK Ost Füst op 06457 gKdos.," 16 Oct. 1944, BA/ MA, RM 7/162, 18; Skl,KTB, 17 and 18 Oct. 1944, 410-11, 437-38.

21. HGr Nord, KTB, 20 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 74-75; Skl, KTB, 23 Oct.1944, 561.

22. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Chef), "Besprechung am 19.10. mit Oberbefehlshaber undChef des Generalstabes der Heeresgruppe Nord auf dem Gefechtsstand derHeeresgruppe," Chefs., 19 Oct. 1944, T-78/338/6294698-701; Adm FHQu, Nr. 411/44gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 17.10.44," 17 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/100, 376;OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 440562/44 gKdos. Chefs.," 20 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH19 III/16, 91.

23. AOK 16/Ia, "Nr. 7389/44 geh.," 12 Oct. 1944, T-312/628/8254650; AOK 16, KTB,12 Oct. 1944, T-312/627/ 8253752; HGr Nord, KTB, 12 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19III/330, 233; AOK 16/Ia, "Nr. 2994/44 gKdos.," 15 Oct. 1944, T-312/628/8254690; AOK16/Ia, "Nr. 7566/44 geh.," 19 Oct. 1944, T-312/635/8262861; AOK 16, KTB, 19 Oct.1944, T-312/634/8261798. On the 20th the Armed Forces Commander for the BalticIsles issued an order to his troops that Hitler had commanded Sworbe's defense due to itsimportance for the war at sea. Burchardi notified the Skl that as a result of this order,army troops on Sworbe believed they were there only for naval interests;Wehrmachtkommandant der Baltischen Inseln/Ia, Nr. 2024/44 geh., "Befehl für dieweitere Verteidigung der Festung Sworbe," 20 Oct. 1944, T-312/636/8264455; Skl, KTB,21 Oct. 1944, 513.

24. HGr Nord, KTB, 23 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 109. The army group'sdiarist noted "It [Sworbe's evacuation] has again been refused at the navy’s request;"ibid., 111. This view was reiterated a few days later by 16th Army's quartermaster:"Giving up Sworbe is not possible, since the navy absolutely requires the peninsula for itspurposes;" AOK 16/OQu/Qu1, "O.Qu.Besprechung am 25.10.44, 9.30 Uhr," T-312/640/8268877.

25. "Gedanken über einen Ost-West Konflikt im nordöstlichen Seeraum Europas,"(winter 1948-1949), BA/MA, Nachlass Meisel, N 537/v. 13, 13. In a report from March1945, Kummetz wrote, “It is obvious what significance these islands had for the navy,that is, for control of the eastern Baltic;” MOK Ostsee/Führungsstab, B.Nr. gKdos.600/45 F I, “Rückblick auf die wesentlichsten Ereignisse und Aufgaben im Bereich MOKOst im Kriegsjahr 1944," 17 Mar. 1945, RM 7/90, 423.

26. Lagevorträge, 9 July 1944, 595-96; Skl, KTB, 14 July 1944, 306; Skl KTB, 22 Sept.1944, 602, 610.

27. Skl, KTB, 30 Sept. 1944, 809-10; ibid, 2 Oct. 1944, 30-31.

28. The Skl ordered Lützow, Prinz Eugen, a destroyer flotilla, and two torpedo boatflotillas readied for action; ibid., 3 and 7 Oct. 1944, 59-61, 163; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl I op3151/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Einsatz 2. Kampfgruppe zur Unterstützung H.Gr.Nord," 3Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 82-83.

29. Skl, KTB, 7 and 8 Oct. 1944, 169, 188-89.

30. Lagevorträge, 14 Oct., 28 and 30 Nov. 1944, 605, 618-19; Skl, KTB, 19, 20 and 23Nov. 1944, 407, 431, 512-13.

31. Skl, KTB, 21and 24 Nov. 1944, 454, 537.

32. Ibid., 20 Oct. 1944, 484; "1/Skl IE 31587/44 gKdos.," 20 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM7/163, 350.

33. Skl, KTB, 28 Oct. 1944, 669-70; AOK 16/Ia, Nr. 3144/44 gKdos., "Betr.:Bevorratung Sworbe," 2 Nov. 1944, T-312/636/8264197; AOK 16/OQu/ Qu1, KTB, 5Nov. 1944, T-312/640/8268614.

34. Soviet aircraft and artillery had destroyed nearly every building on the peninsula, andSworbe's groundwater level was only half a meter below ground; HGr Nord, KTB, 2Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/332, 18; AOK 16, KTB, 1 Nov. 1944, T-312/634/8261841; MOK Ostsee, Op B.Nr. gKdos. 5351/44 F III, "Kurzer Rückblick aufOktober 1944," 20 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 367; HGr Nord, KTB, 22 Oct. 1944,BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 100.

35. Obkdo HGr Nord/Der Oberquartiermeister/Qu 1, Nr. 22468/44 geh., "Vortragsnotizüber den Besuch bei der 23. I.D. auf Halbinsel Sworbe am 25.10.44," 29 Oct. 1944, T-312/641/8270468-69; HGr Nord, KTB, 28 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 192.

36. This was the opinion of both MOK Ost and the 9th Escort Division; "MOKOst/Führstab op 06745 gKdos. F I op," 30 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 262;9.Sich.Div., Anlage 6 zu KTB für den Zeit 1-15 Nov. 1944, "Versorgung Sworbe,"BA/MA, RM 67/v. 150, 183-84. Admiral Böhmer had been killed by partisans nearWindau on 1 Oct., and Blanc took over as commander of the 9th Escort Division on 10Oct.

37. HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 4499/44 gKdos.," 16 Oct. 1944, T-312/634/2862497-98; AOK 16,KTB, 1 Nov. 1944, ibid., Frame 8261841; Adm.Östl.Ostsee, "5272/44 F I," 1 Nov. 1944,ibid., Frame 8262564; B.Nr. 1/Skl I Ost 32523/44 gKdos., "Betrifft: WinterbevorratungSworbe," 3 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 263-63.

38. At this time only 38.3% of the necessary tonnage had been delivered. Sworbe waswell stocked with diesel fuel (77%) and medical (80%) and veterinary (91%) supplies,but stores of ammunition (44%), food (38%), fodder (25%) and clothing (34%) revealedserious shortages; AOK 16/OQu/Qu1, "Bevorratung Sworbe Stand 17.11.44," T-312/640/8268841. During Oct. and Nov. the Navy shipped 5554 men, 231 animals, 293vehicles and 8145 tons of supplies from Windau to Sworbe; MOK Ostsee/Führungsstab,B.Nr. gKdos. 600/45 F I, "Rückblick auf die wesentlichsten Ereignisse und Aufgaben imBereich MOK Ost im Kriegsjahr 1944," 17 Mar. 1945, RM7/ 90, 440.

39. For example, on 21-22 Oct. the following forces were sent into action off Sworbe: 2torpedo boats, 3 artillery barges, 33 cutters, 10 motor torpedo boats, 5 motor mine

sweepers, and 13 barges; Skl, KTB, 22 Oct. 1944, 546. On 20 Nov. Blanc held 7 mine-sweepers and patrol boats, 17 artillery barges, 45 cutters, 5 motor torpedo boats and 6motor mine sweepers ready for action off Sworbe; HGr Nord, KTB, 20 Nov. 1944,BA/MA, RH 19 III/333, 58.

40. On 4 Oct. the Navy offered Prinz Eugen for coastal shelling, but the army groupturned down this proposal, claiming that it would tie up fighter aircraft needed to supportthe land fighting; HGr Nord, KTB, 30 Sept., 4 and 7 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/319,259-60, RH 19 III/330, 51, 134; Skl, KTB, 6 Oct. 1944, 140; MOK Ost/Führstab Op06236 gKdos., "Weisung für Einsatz 2. Kampfgruppe zur Unterstützung HeeresgruppeNord," 5 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 65-66; "1/Skl I Nord 31886/44 gKdos.," 22 Oct.1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 345.

41. Kurt Assmann, Deutsche Seestrategie in zwei Weltkriegen (Heidelberg: KurtVowinckel, 1957), 203-04. The 2nd Task Force supported German troops on Sworbe on24 Oct. and again from 20-24 Nov. The warships Admiral Scheer, Lützow and PrinzEugen, as well as numerous destroyers and torpedo boats took part in this action; JürgenRohwer and Gerhard Hümmelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-1945 (DerekMasters trans.) (London: Ian Allen, 1974), 2: 455, 470. The battleship Tirpitz, inNorway, had been sunk by British aircraft on 12 Nov., and the heavy cruiser AdmiralHipper was not fully operational.

42. HGr Nord, KTB, 30 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/319, 262. An entry from 12 Oct.states that there had been 1092 casualties among the 3200 naval troops on Ösel, and twoweeks later there were only 667 naval soldiers on Sworbe; ibid., 12 and 26 Oct. 1944, RH19 III/330, 236-37, RH 19 III/331, 154. Of a total of 4000 combat troops on Sworbe,2000 belonged to the Navy; ibid., 21 Oct. 1944, RH 19 III/331, 80; MOKOstsee/Führungsstab, B.Nr. gKdos. 600/45 F I, "Rückblick auf die wesentlichstenEreignisse und Aufgaben im Bereich MOK Ost im Kriegsjahr 1944," 17 Mar. 1945, RM7/90, 425.

43. Jürgen Rohwer, "Der Minenkrieg im Finnischen Meerbusen, Juni-August 1941,"Marine-Rundschau, 64 (No. 1): 16-19; Lagevorträge, 17 Sept. 1941, 287; Salewski, Diedeutsche Seekriegsleitung, 1: 418-23; Jürgen Rohwer, "Der Minenkrieg im FinnischenMeerbusen, September-November 1941," Marine-Rundschau, 64 (No. 2): 96-97.

44. Skl, I Nord, "Lageübersicht Ostsee vom 16. bis 30. April 1942," gKdos., BA/MA,RM 7/90, 161-62; Gr Nord, "Nr. 03546/42 gKdos.," 18 April 1942, BA/MA, RM 7/159,163-65.

45. The net barrier consisted of two rows of steel net 50 meters apart; Forstmann,"Seekrieg im Finnenbusen und der östlichen Ostsee von 1942 bis zum 8. Mai 1945,"BA/MA, Nachlass Wagner, N 539/v.15, 6.

46. Skl, KTB, 7 and 12 Sept. 1943, 138-39, 249.

47. For example, from 20-21 July, of 5 mine sweepers and 2 picket boats protecting themine barrages, Soviet aircraft sank 2 mine sweepers and both picket boats; the remaining3 vessels were damaged; 9.Sich.Div., KTB, 22 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 67/v.148; MOKOst/Führstab, "gKdos. 421/44 Chefs.," 25 Apr. 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/M 523; Skl, KTB,23 July 1944, 488; MOK Ostsee, Op.B.Nr. 3813 AI op, "Kurzer Rückblick auf Juli1944," 19 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 327; 9. Sich.Div., KTB, "Schlussbetrachtungzum 31 Juli 1944," 31 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 67/v.148, 248.

48. Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl I op 2092/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betrifft: Fortführung Kampfes in Süd-und Mittelfinnland," 11 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 663-64; Skl, KTB, 14 July 1944,306.

49. Skl, KTB, 31 July 1944, 698; OKW/WFSt/Op (M)/Ia, Nr. 009512/44 gKdos.,"Operative und taktische Fragen der Seekriegführung in östlicher Ostsee und imNordmeer," 14 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RM 4/v.614; Skl, KTB, 1 and 2 Aug. 1944, 2, 28-29;Skl, "B.Nr. 1/Skl I op 23871/44 gKdos.," 1 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 522.

50. For example, Soviet aircraft sank 5 German ships guarding the mine barrages on 1Aug.; MOK Ostsee, Op B.Nr. gKdos. 4341 F III, "Kurzer Rückblick auf August 1944,"22 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 337. At the beginning of Aug. only 12 vessels wereoperational, compared to 37 a month earlier. By mid-August, another 2 vessels had beensunk and 15 damaged (including one submarine); 9.Sich.Div., KTB, 1 Aug. 1944,BA/MA, RM 67/v.149; 9.Sich.Div., KTB, "Schlussbetrachtung zum 15. August 1944,"BA/MA, RM 67/v.149.

51. The submarines shifted from protecting the Seeigel to the area west of the Nashornbarrage; 7 U-boats remained at sea in this area; Skl, KTB, 22 and 23 Sept. 1944, 618,650; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl IE 3116/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betrifft: Sperrplannung Rigabusen," 29Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 103.

52. Despite this lack of preparation, Soviet submarines sank only 2 German ships in Oct.Kummetz estimated that the Soviets had at least 25 submarines ready for action in theBaltic; 9 Sich. Div., KTB, "Schlussbetrachtung zum 31. Oktober 1944," BA/MA, RM67/v.150, 123; Skl, KTB, 7 and 8 Oct. 1944, 164, 170-71, 201.

53. Skl, KTB, 7 Oct. 1944, 169.

55. Ibid., 8 and 10 Oct. 1944, 200, 241-42.

55. Dönitz commanded that Hipper and Scheer be readied for action and he ordered theFleet to examine whether the (never fully-converted) auxiliary cruiser Hansa and thelight cruiser Nürnberg could provide support to the army; ibid., 13 and 14 Oct., 307, 333-34, 338-39. A few days later Hitler asked if the old battleships (both commissioned in1908) Schlesien and Schleswig Holstein were capable of coastal bombardment. The Skl,however, concluded that these vessels were too old and had insufficient armament; ibid.,

15 Oct. 1944, pp. 363-64; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl I op, 31366/44 gKdos., "Betr.: KB-Zustandder Schiffe des Ausbildungsverbandes," 17 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 6.

56. Burchardi requested the transfer of German shipyard workers to Courland; Skl, KTB,7, 9 and 12 Oct. 1944, 164, 224, 287.

57. For example, on 22 Nov. Kummetz reported that Burchardi had to withdraw 9 of his23 escorts for action off Sworbe; MOK Ost/Füstab, Op 07188 F I M, gKdos., "Betr.:Sicherung Nachschub Heeresgruppe Nord," 22 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 199; Skl,KTB, 20-23 Nov. 1944, 443, 453, 466, 486, 505-06, 524; Adm. östl. Ostsee gKdos. F I,"Lageübersicht 1. bis 30. Nov. 1944," 3 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 156.

58. In October the 9th Escort Division had 4 vessels sunk and 27 damaged; 9.Sich.Div.,KTB, "Schlussbetrachtung zum 31. Oktober 1944," BA/MA, RM 67/v.150, 122. In Nov.almost all torpedo boats, mine sweepers, patrol boats and artillery barges were damagedin action off Sworbe; MOK Ostsee, Op B.Nr. gKdos. 5751/44 F III, "Lagebetrachtung fürden Monat November 1944," 13 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 390-91; Adm. östl.Ostsee gKdos. F I, "Lageübersicht 1. bis 30. Nov. 1944," 3 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RM7/163, 157.

59. Skl, KTB, 23 Nov. 1944, 514; Skl, "B.Nr.1/Skl Ia 3602/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 26 Nov.1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 182-83.

60. Kummetz noted that this mine barrage represented no serious obstacle to the Soviets,and at most somewhat restricted their freedom of movement; MOK Ostsee/Führungsstab,B.Nr. gKdos. 600/45 F I, "Rückblick auf die wesentlichsten Ereignisse und Aufgaben imBereich MOK Ost im Kriegsjahr 1944," 17 Mar. 1945, RM 7/90, 428.

61. Skl, KTB, 12 Dec. 1944, 291-92. After this second catastrophe, the Skl finally tooksteps to prevent another disaster, and ordered that new minefields be laid at least 3nautical miles from previous mine barrages; ibid., 21 Dec. 1944, 536-38; B.Nr. 1/Skl I E36668/44 gKdos., "Besprechungsniederschrift betreffend Verlust Z 35 und Z 36 vom21.12.1944," BA/MA, RM 7/163, 72-80. A detailed account of this action is MikeWhitley, "Kriegsschauplatz Finnenbusen 1944: Der Verlust der Zerstörer 'Z35' und'Z36,'" Marine-Rundschau, 78 (No. 5): 263-67.

62. Mike Whitley, Destroyer! German Destroyers in World War II (London: Arms andArmor, 1983), 268-79.

63. GVK, 4: 412; Achkasov and Pavlovich, Soviet Naval Operations in the GreatPatriotic War, 141-42.

64. HGr Nord, KTB, 10 Oct. 1944, RH 19 III/330, 212, 215.

65. After the war Natzmer claimed that Schörner had refused to evacuate the peninsulaand gave credit for saving the troops on Sworbe to Army Group North’s staff; Natzmer,

“Festung Kurland,” 54. Although possible, Schörner certainly played a role in thedecision to evacuate, and had repeatedly asked Hitler for permission to withdraw fromSworbe.

66. Dönitz kept approximately 10% of his submarines in the Gulf of Finland for the restof the year: on 1 Oct. 14 of Germany's 141 operational submarines; on 1 Nov. 15 of 135operational U-boats; and on 1 Dec. 16 of 140 operational submarines; 2/Skl BdU Op,B.Nr. gKdos. 459 Chefs. Ing., "Stand der U-Boote am 1. Oktober 1944," 6 Oct.. 1944,BA/MA, RM 87/44, 9-10; 2/Skl, BdU Op, B.Nr. gKdos. 507 Chefs. Ing., "Stand der U-Boote am 1. November 1944," 7 Nov. 1944, RM 87/45, 6-7; 2/Skl BdU Op, B.Nr. gKdos.Chefs. 560 Ing., "Stand der U-Boote am 1. Dezember 1944," 11 Dec. 1944, RM 87/46, 7-8.

67. Burchardi, "Operationen in der östlichen Ostsee," 1954, BA/MA, Nachlass Wagner,N 539/v. 15, 19.

68. AOK 16/Ia, Nr. 3144/44 gKdos., "Betr.: Bevorratung Sworbe," 2 Nov. 1944, T-312/641/8270436-38. For the Navy's nonchalant attitude regarding this, Admiral östlicheOstsee, B.Nr. gKdos. 5399 F I, "Betr.: Bevorratung Sworbe," 9 Nov. 1944, ibid., Frame8270403.

69. HGr Nord, KTB, 30 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/319, 256-57, 267.

Chapter 5: Army Group Courland, October 1944-May 1945

1. Alexander Werth, Russia at War, 1941-1945 (London: Barrie & Rockliff, 1964), 760;John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Viking, 1990), 510; Erickson, TheRoad to Berlin, 422.

2. There is some difference of opinion in establishing the dates of the Courland Battles.Haupt, the author of several studies on Courland, with some logic counts the Sovietoffensive from 16-26 Oct. as the 1st Courland Battle, and groups together as the 2ndCourland Battle what this author designates the 2nd and 3rd Courland Battles. In general,this study will follow dates in AOK 18, "Hauptdaten Ostfeldzug 22.6.41-30.4.45,"BA/MA, RH 20-18/928.

3. HGr Nord, KTB, 27 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/335, 132-35; Der Ob der HGrNord/Ia, "Nr. 150/45 geh.," 4 Jan. 1945, T-311/134/7179641.

4. Skl, KTB, 11 Mar. 1945, 154.

5. HGr Nord, KTB, 23 and 26 Nov., 22 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/333, 136, 140,177, RH 19 III/335, 22. The Russians retained powerful artillery units opposite

Courland. On the first day of the 5th Courland Battle they unleashed a barrage of about130,000 shells against 18th Army; AOK 18, KTB, 20 and 21 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 20-18/926, 104, 116.

6. Germans casualties are as follows: in the 1st Courland Battle 21,292; in the 2ndCourland Battle 13,677; for the 3rd Courland Battle 27,144; in the 4th Courland Battle13,315; in the 5th Courland Battle (from 15 Feb-14 Mar.) 25,406; and in the 6th CourlandBattle 17,037, for a total of 117,871; HGr Nord, KTB, 31 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/335, 185; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt/IN, "Tagesmeldung H.Gr. Kurland vom 4.2.45," 5 Feb.1945, T-78/308/6259758; HGr Kurland/ Ia, "Nr. 35/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 17 Mar. 1945, T-78/339/6295136; HGr Kurland/Ia, "Nr. 4058/45 geh.," 6 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/335,185.

7. As best as can be determined, the army group suffered approximately 154,108casualties up to 20 April 1945. From 10 Oct.-31 Dec. 1944, 18th Army reported 45,945casualties (6,888 dead, 33,556 wounded and 5,501 missing), and 16th Army (from 16Oct.-31 Dec.) a total of 35,825 casualties (5,627 killed, 24,825 wounded and 5,373missing). It is uncertain whether Army Detachment Grasser/Kleffel's losses (10,226 menfrom 10 Oct.-3 Nov.) are included in these figures. From 1 Jan-20 April 1945, 16th and18th Armies combined suffered 72,788 casualties; AOK 18/Ia, "TäglicheVerlustmeldungen v. 6.10.1944-31. 12.1944, BA/MA, RH 20-18/1173; AOK 16/IIa-AzVerl, "Tägliche Verlustmeldung Stand vom 16 Oktober 1944," 18 Oct. 1944, T-312/639/8267182; AOK 16/IIa-Az Verl, "Tägliche Verlustmeldung Stand vom 31.12.44,"2 Jan. 1945, T-312/639/8267096; Armeeabt. Grasser/IIb, "Verlustmeldung vom 10.Okt.1944," 12 Oct. 1944, T-312/1637/924; Armeeabt. Kleffel/IIb, "Verlustmeldung vom 3.Nov. 1944," 5 Nov. 1944, T-312/1637/972; Der Heeresarzt im OKH/GenStdH/GenQu,Nr. I/063/45 gKdos., "Personelle blutige Verluste des Feldheeres vom 22. Juni 1941 bis31. Dezember 1944," 4 Jan. 1945, reproduced in Hermann Jung, Die Ardennen-Offensive1944/45 (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1971), 286; Der Heeresarzt im OKH, Nr. 20/45gKdos., "Personelle blutige Verluste des Feldheeres vom 22. Juni 1941 bis 20. April1945," Jung, Die Ardennen-Offensive, 289.

8. For example, the army group reported destroying 509 Soviet tanks and inflicting44,794 casualties in the 4th Courland Battle; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt/IN, "TagesmeldungH.Gr. Kurland vom 4.2.45," 5 Feb. 1945, T-78/308/6259758. Haupt estimates thatRussian forces in Courland suffered 394,000 casualties, and lost 2,651 tanks and 722aircraft (although he provides no source for these figures); Haupt, Heeresgruppe Nord,343. Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, provide detailed statistics on Sovietcasualties during almost every operation during the war (Table B, 293-300), but do notinclude figures for the period after Nov. 1944. Wenck reported that Army Group Northhad destroyed 522 Soviet tanks in the 1st Courland Battle; "Mittagslage vom 6.November 1944," Hitlers Lagebesprechungen, 679.

9. Army Group North had one artillery battery per 0.6 kilometer of land front. Incontrast, Army Group Center possessed 1 battery per 1.1 kilometers of front, ArmyGroup A 1 battery per 1.5 kilometers, and Army Group South 1 battery per 2.3 kilometers

of front; General der Artillerie im OKH (Id), "Stärkevergleich der Artillerie an der West-u. Ostfront, Stand 10.1.1945," BA/MA, RH 2/331b, 69-70. In mid-February, the armygroup possessed 2,850 artillery pieces; HGr Kurland/Ia/Id, Nr. 723/45 gKdos., "Bezug:OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt., Nr. 2170/45 gKdos. v. 18.2.45," 19 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH2/332, 200.

10. According to a study prepared by Army Group A (defending Poland andCzechoslovakia) Army Group North had 27.5 units on a 240-kilometer front, yielding anaverage divisional sector of 8.7 kilometers. Army Group A had 31 units (not counting 3Hungarian divisions) on a 760-kilometer front (average divisional frontage of 24.5 km)and Army Group Center possessed 35 units on a 580-kilometer front (divisional sector of16.6 km). Army Group North held 3 divisions in reserve, compared to Army Group A's6.5 and Center's 8.5 divisions. Army Group North possessed 4.5 mechanized divisions toArmy Group A's 5.5 and Army Group Center's 8; HGr A/Ia, Nr. 91/45 gKdos.,"Gegenüberstellungen der eigenen Kräfte bei H.Gruppe A, Mitte und Nord, Stand29.12.1944," 3 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH 19 VI/33, 20.

11. HGr Nord, KTB, 21 Dec. 44, BA/MA, RH 19 III/335, 13; HGr Kurland /Ia/Id, Nr.723/45 gKdos., "Bezug: OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt, Nr. 2170/45 gKdos. v. 18.2.45," 19 Feb.1945, BA/ MA, RH 2/332, 200. In comparison, at beginning of Feb. the Germans hadonly 446 tanks and assault guns on the entire Western Front; Jung, Die Ardennen-Offensive, 196. Vietinghoff claimed that at the start of the 4th Courland Battle the armygroup had 191 tanks and 604 assault guns, but by the end of first phase of 5th CourlandBattle (27 Feb.) it had 121 tanks and 392 assault guns; HGr Kurland /Ia, "Nr. 869/45gKdos. (Vietinghoff to Guderian)," 2 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/333, 350-52.

12. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 3305/45 gKdos., "Bezug: H.Gr.Kurland, Ia Nr.1095/45 gKdos. v. 18.3.45," 19 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/333, 178;OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 3554/45 gKdos., "Bezug: H.Gr. Kurland Ia Nr. 38/45gKdos. Chefs. v. 23.3.45," 24 Mar. 1945, ibid., 59. At this time German forces in Italyhad only about 400 armored fighting vehicles; "Teil einer Mittagslage, vermutlich vom 2.März 1945," Hitlers Lagebesprechungen, 905.

13. Vietinghoff to Guderian, 8 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, Nachlass Loch, N 186/16; Haupt,Heeresgruppe Nord, 300.

14. This unit, composed of 18 captured tanks, formed the armored detachment of PanzerBrigade Courland; Hauptmann Aster, Stab Gen.Insp.d.Pz.Tr., Abt. Org., A Nr. 4326/45geh., "Betr.: Reisebericht zur Heeresgruppe Kurland vom 25.2. bis 6.3.1945," BA/MA,RH 10/124, 138. The army group’s armored divisions usually were split up into severalgroups in order to react quickly to possible Soviet breakthroughs; Dietrich von Saucken,4. Panzer-Division, Part II (Privately published, 1968), 234-36, 249-53.

15. For example, HGr Nord, KTB, 16 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/333, 4; AOK 18,KTB, 2 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH 20-18/925, 4.

16. HGr Nord, KTB, 13 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/332, 168; AOK 18/Ic/AO, Nr.3950/44 geh., "Ic/AO-Tagesmeldung vom 5.11.1944," T-78/487/6472590. During the3rd Courland Battle, one report mentioned an attack in which the first wave of troopswore German uniforms and was armed with German weapons. The third wave wasunarmed and supposed to get weapons from its dead comrades; HGr Nord, KTB, 26 Dec.1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/335, 111.

17. 32.Inf.Div./Ia, Nr. 2660/44 geh., "Erfahrungen aus der 2. Abwehrschlacht inKurland," 6 Dec. 1944, T-312/634/ 8262443-53; HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 12574/44 geh.," 13Dec. 1944, T-312/635/8262747; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (I), Nr. 195/45 gKdos., "WichtigeFrontaufklärungsmeldung und Gef.-Aussagen," 11 Jan. 1945, T-78/307/6258985; HGrKurland/Ia, "Nr. 42/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 28 Mar. 1945, T-78/339/6295071; Rendulic,Genob. und Ob. der HGr Kurland/Ia, "Nr. 38/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 23 Mar. 1945, T-78/339/6295094.

18. Stalin to Churchill, Stalin to Roosevelt, 29 Sept. 1944, Stalin to Churchill, 9 Nov.1944, Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSRand the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the GreatPatriotic War of 1941-1945 (Moscow: Progress, 1975) (2nd Ed.) (hereafter Stalin'sCorrespondence), 1: 261, 271-72; 2: 153; Joseph Stalin, The Great Patriotic War of theSoviet Union (New York: International, 1945), 130. Shortly after the army group'sisolation, POW interrogations revealed that Stalin had ordered the Courland pocketeliminated by 7 Nov., the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution; HGr Nord/Ic/AO, Nr.7352/44 geh., "Tagesmeldung vom 30.10.1944," 31 Oct. 1944, T-78/487/6471800. Afterthis date had passed, interrogations disclosed that new deadlines had been set for 17 Nov.1944, and later for 1 Jan. 1945.

19. W. Averell Harriman and Ellie Able, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946 (New York: Random House, 1975), 435; GVK, 4: 409, 413; Geschichte des zweitenWeltkrieges, 10: 144, 151-52.

20. German intelligence had reached these conclusions by mid-Jan. 1945;OKH/GenStdH/FHO (I), "Feindliche Kampfführung gegen die H.Gr. Nord," 17 Jan.1945, T-78/487/6471681-84.

21. HGr Nord, KTB, 4 Nov. 1944, RH 19 III/332, 63. Latvian partisans consistedmainly of deserters who obtained provisions by force, or of young men evadingconscription; ibid., 26 Oct. 1944, RH 19 III/331, 146; HGr Nord/Ia/op/Ic/AO, Nr.7113/44 geh., "Betr.: Bandenbekämpfung," 22 Oct. 1944, T-312/634/8262088; Natzmer,“Festung Kurland,” 54.

22. HGr Nord, KTB, 13 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/334, 106; OKH/GenStdH/FHO(I/Bd), Nr. 12290/44 geh., "Übersicht über die Bandenlage in der Zeit vom 1.11.-30.11.1944," 5 Dec. 1944, T-78/562/410-12. In contrast, German intelligence estimatedthat there were 90,000 partisans operating against Army Group A and 13,000 againstArmy Group Center; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (B/P), geh., "Feindlage Banden," 30 Nov.

1944, T-78/497/6485179-80. At the beginning of 1945, 16th Army estimated that therewere 11 bands with a total of 920-1055 partisans; Anlage 5 zu AOK 16/Ic/AO, Nr. 58/45geh., "Bandenlage im Bereich 16. Armee, Stand 10.1.1945," T-312/639/ 8267091. Mostpartisan activity was of a minor nature, robbing civilians for supplies and carrying outisolated attacks on individual soldiers and vehicles; AOK 18/Ic/AO, Nr. 4611 /44 geh.,"Ic/AO Tagesmeldung vom 15.12.1944," 15 Dec. 1944, T-312/1609/169, and the dailyreports of AOK 18/Ic/AO for the period 12 Oct. 1944-6 Jan. 1945 on T-78/487/6472503-613.

23. HGr Nord, KTB, 8, 11 and 13 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/334, 64, 86, 106;Stöber, Die lettischen Divisionen, 121 and 358, Note 11; AOK 18/Ia, Nr. 4647/44gKdos., "Fahrt des Herrn Ob. zum Kdt. rückw. Armeegebiet 583 am 5. Dezember 1944,"T-312/971/9163102; H.W. Posinjakoff, “German Counterintelligence in the OccupiedSoviet Union,” World War II German Military Studies, Vol. 19, MS# P-122, 107-08.

24. OKH/GenStdH/FHO (Ib), Nr. 2302/45 geh., "Übersicht über die Bandenlage in derZeit vom 1.2.-28.2. 1945," 6 Mar. 1945, T-78/562/402-04. For a report of an anti-partisan operation, during which two Jews were discovered hiding in a bunker, DerEinsatzbeauftragte für die SS-Jägerverbände Ostland, Leiter IC geh., 15 Feb. 1945,United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, RG-18.002M, Latvian Central State Archive(Riga) Records, 1941-1945, Reel 9, Fond R-82, Opis I, Folder 47.

25. Perry Biddiscombe, “’Freies Deutschland’ Guerrilla Warfare in East Prussia, 1944-1945: A Contribution to the History of the German Resistance,” German Studies Review27 (Feb. 2004): 60, note 24.

26. Weinberg, A World at Arms, 1094, note 85. In his memoirs Rendulic is quiteconfused about the situation in Courland. He states that Hitler informed him the 6thCourland Battle was expected to begin at any time (the 4th Courland Battle began on 24Jan.), and that Riga had been lost and the army group cut off from Germany in the 5thCourland Battle (these events occurred before the 1st Courland Battle); Lothar Rendulic,Gekämpft, gesiegt, geschlagen (Heidelberg: Welsermühl, 1952), 331-32, 335-36.

27. Werner Haupt, Kurland: Die vergessene Heeresgruppe (Friedberg: Podzun, 1979),75; Hans Lederer, "Kurland," 5-6; Vietinghoff to Guderian, 8 Feb. 1945, BA/MA,Nachlass Loch, N 186/16; "Studie 'Laura,'" BA/MA, RH 19 III/338. Vietinghoff signedthe agreement to surrender on 29 April (to take effect on 2 May) while Hitler was stillalive. Obviously he acted on his own initiative; OKW KTB, Vol. 4, Part 2, 1165, 1437,1662-64.

28. TBJG, 8 Feb. and 9 Mar. 1945, 15: 337, 456; AOK 4/Ia, "Nr. 1371/45 geh.," 2 Feb.1945, T-312/260/7818559; AOK 4/Ia, "Nr. 1350/45 gKdos.," 2 Feb. 1945, T-312/260/7818576; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 432-33.

29. Rendulic's statement is somewhat surprising because, in contrast to East Prussia, theSoviets did not achieve any spectacular gains against his forces in Courland. Again,

Rendulic is extremely confused regarding chronology and troops strengths in Courland;Lothar Rendulic, "The Russian Command in World War II: Possible Development sinceWorld War II," World War II German Military Studies, Vol. 19, MS# P-079, 20-22.

30. Oldwig von Natzmer, “Zusätze zum Material über Kurland,” IfZ, ZS 111, 70;Lederer, "Kurland," 6; Haupt, Kurland: Die vergessene Heeresgruppe, 121; JürgenThorwald, Die grosse Flucht: Es begann an der Weichsel: Das Ende an der Elbe(Stuttgart: Steingrüben, 1962), 579; Curt-Ulrich von Gersdorff, "Generaloberst CarlHilpert: Zur 70. Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages am 12. September 1958," DeutscherSoldatenkalender, No. 6 (1958): 47.

31. Biographical information on Schörner is taken from “Mein militärischerWerdegang,” 1 Oct. 1956, BA/MA, Nachlass Schörner, N 60/2; Friedrich vonMellenthin, German Generals of World War II: As I Saw Them (Norman, OK: Universityof Oklahoma Press, 1977), 175-86; Rudolf Aschenauer, Der Fall Schörner: EineDokumentation (Munich: Privately published, 1973) (with caution!); "Tätigkeitsberichtdes Chefs des Heerespersonalamts," BA/MA, RH 7/v.565.

32. An evaluation of Schörner as a tactics instructor by a former pupil is in Ulrich deMaizière, In der Pflicht: Lebensbericht eines deutschen Soldaten im 20. Jahrhundert (2nded.) (Bonn: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1989), 28-30.

33. TBJG, 2 Jan. 1945, 15: 38.

34. This is what Schörner told the person who arranged his surrender to Americantroops; “Unterredung mit General a.D. Foertsch, München, am 18.9.1951,” IfZ, ZS 37,67. A German POW who saw Schörner in a Soviet prison camp in June 1945 states thatSchörner claimed he and his army group fought their way to American lines; SiegfriedKnappe and Ted Brusaw, Soldat: Reflections of a German Soldier, 1936-1949 (NewYork: Orion, 1992), 293-94.

35. TBJG, 4 and 23 Jan., 12, 22 and 31 Mar., 4 Apr. 1945, 15: 61, 195, 479, 572, 649,678-79.

36. "Tätigkeitsbericht des Chefs des Heerespersonalamts," entries for 10 and 30 Aug., 3and 9 Sept. 1944, BA/ MA, RH 7/v. 565, 196, 232, 239, 247; HGr Nord, KTB, 13 Aug.1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/316, 10. Schörner relieved Grasser for not being harsh enough,and he once ordered 18th Army's commander to be ruthless to the point of brutality; HGrNord, KTB, 28 Oct. 1944, RH 19 III/331, 191; AOK 18, KTB, 11 Aug. 1944, T-312/956/9147241.

37. "Der laute Kamerad," Der Spiegel, Vol. 9 (1955), No. 7, 12; Maizière, In der Pflicht,89. Schörner often appeared at rear area units and headquarters unannounced. When hedeparted there were usually several soldiers whose rank was lower than when he hadarrived; Mellenthin, German Generals of World War II, 184-85.

38. PzAOK 3, "Ferngespräche O.B. am 5.10.44," T-313/323/8603384; Schörner, Genob.und Ob. der HGr Nord, 18 Oct. 1944, T-312/1636/908; AOK 18, KTB, 11 Aug. 1944, T-312/956/9147234.

39. Der Ob der HGr Nord, "Tagesbefehl," 12 Aug. 1944, T-312/634/8261703; DerOberbefehlshaber, "Tagesbefehl," 28 Sept. 1944, ibid., Frame 8261708; Der Ob der HGrNord, "Tagesbefehl," 12 Dec. 1944, ibid., Frame 8262135; AOK 18, KTB, 26 Sept. 1944,T-312/957/9148246; HGr Nord, KTB, 29 July 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/314, 108;Dermot Bradley, Walther Wenck: General der Panzertruppe (2nd ed) (Osnabrück:Biblio, 1982), 288. General Foertsch confirmed this, and provided an example from theGreek campaign; “Unterredung mit General a.D. Foertsch, München, am 18.9.1951,” IfZ,ZS 37, 67.

40. AOK 16/Abt.III, "Tätigkeitsbericht des Armeerichters 16 für die Zeit vom 16.Oktober bis 31. Dezember 1944," 24 Jan. 1945, T-312/640/8268734-37; Ziemke, GermanNTO, 222.

41. For example, when he encountered troops in Windau (probably en route to or comingfrom Sworbe) who had not received warm food since the previous day, and no food at allthat day, he flew into a rage and ordered an immediate court-martial investigation; HGrNord, "Br B Nr. 251/44 geh.," 25 Oct. 1944, T-312/634/8262529-30. See the numerousletters to Schörner from former members of Army Group Courland in BA/MA, NachlassSchörner, N 60/73.

42. During enemy offensives, Schörner spent most of his time at corps, division andregimental headquarters in threatened sectors. He visited Tuckum on 21 Aug., when thesituation in the area was extremely fluid, and during his return from a trip to Sworbe on25 Oct., Soviet aircraft attacked and seriously damaged the motor torpedo boat on whichhe traveled; HGr Nord, KTB, 17 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 46; PzAOK 3, KTB,21 Aug. 1944, T-313/317/8595698-99; 9.Sich.Div., KTB, 25 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM67/v.150, 103.

43. Hitler once claimed that the Golden Party Badge should rank higher than any honorconferred by the state; Monologe im Führerhauptquartier, 132-33. Schörner receivedthis award (which conferred Party membership) on 30 Jan. 1943, the 10th anniversary ofthe seizure of power; K Va Schn/Gs, “Aufnahme in die NSDAP,” 24 July 1943,Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde (hereafter BA/BL), BDC PK Schörner.

44. “3rd Situation Report, April 27, 1945,” Hitler and His Generals: MilitaryConferences 1942-1945 (Helmut Heiber and David Glantz eds.) (Roland Winter et altrans.) (New York: Enigma Books, 2003), 735. Nearly a month before Schörner’spromotion Goebbels noted that Hitler considered him one of his best commanders, andthat he was the next person Hitler planned to promote to field marshal; TBJG, 12 Mar.1945, 15: 479.

45. HGr Nord, KTB, 12 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/315, 202-03; AOK 18, KTB, 12Aug. 1944, T-312/956/9147280.

46. The army group received over 400 officers (a scarce commodity considering theneed to make good Army Group Center's losses in this period), of which 215 were rushedvia air transport, and 230 followed by sea; "Tätigkeitsbericht des Chefs desHeerespersonalamts," 5 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RH 7/v.565, 194.

47. On 30 Sept. Schörner had requested the 30,000 troops as a prerequisite for the attack"Blitz." Two weeks later the army group noted that, of the 30,000 men Hitler hadpromised Schörner, it had received notification of 20,000, and about 9,000 were on theway; HGr Nord, KTB, 30 Sept. and 13 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/319, 269, RH 19III/330, 259.

48. Ibid., 20 Aug. 1944, RH 19 III/316, 192; “Meeting of the Führer with GeneralReinecke, January 7, 1944, at the Wolfsschanze,” Hitler and His Generals, 399; TBJG,24 July 1944, 13: 152.

49. See a copy of Schörner’s order to XIX Mountain Corps from Feb. 1943 in NSDAP,Partei-Kanzlei, Der Leiter der Partei-Kanzlei, “Rundschreiben Nr. 102/43,” 7 July 1943,BA/BL, O. 367; TBJG, 9 Mar. 1945, 15: 459.

50. Whether or not Schörner actually believed this, it certainly would have strengthenedHitler's conviction that the Soviets were on their last legs; Schörner to Hitler, 6 Aug.1944, T-311/132/7177778.

51. There are several examples of Schörner approving retreats requested by subordinatecommanders; HGr Nord, KTB, 26 July and 12 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/314, 30,32-35, RH 19 III/315, 189; AOK 18, KTB, 24 July 1944, T-312/956/9146751; AOK 18,Nr. 3077/44 gKdos., "Ferngespräche des Herrn Oberbefehlshabers am 12.8.1944," T-312/959/9150136.

52. Albert Speer, Infiltration (Joachim Neugroschel trans.) (New York: Macmillan,1981), 100.

53. Natzmer, “Festung Kurland,” IfZ, ZS 111, 55-60.

54. Maizière, In der Pflicht, 28-30; Knappe, Soldat, 263, 286-87; Hans von Luck, PanzerCommander: The Memoirs of Colonel Hans von Luck (New York: Dell, 1989), 248-49,253-54. Glantz and House state, “breaking contact with a determined Soviet enemy andestablishing a new, longer defensive line in Courland required great skill and daring;”Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 228.

55. Geoffrey Megargee, Inside Hitler's High Command (Lawrence: University Press ofKansas, 2000), 126.

56. TBJG, 9, 28 and 31 Mar. 1945, 15: 456, 617, 649.

57. “Interview, Harold Deutsch with Puttkamer,” 27 June 1970, IfZ, ZS 285/III, 14;“Niederschrift der Unterredung des Herrn Oberst a.D. Nicolaus von Below durchgeführtim Hamburg am 7. Jan. 1952 durch Frhr. v. Siegler im Auftrag des IfZ,” IfZ, ZS 7, 9.

58. The starting point for any discussion of German morale on the Eastern Front is OmerBartov, Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1991). Hinsley claims that intercepted messages reported adeterioration of morale in Courland, and that in late Nov. 1944 officers with the rank ofmajor and above were being replaced by officers who were Nazi Party members or in theSS; F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. 3, Part 2 (NewYork: Cambridge, 1988), 286.

59. Der Ob der HGr Nord, "Sabotage der Kriegführung," 10 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19III/727, 38; Evang. Armeepfarrer beim AOK 16, "Tätigkeitsbericht der Ev.Armeepfarrers beim AOK 16 (Abt. IVd/e) für die Zeit vom 16.10.1944 bis 31.12.1944,"27 Jan. 1945, T-312/640/8267744.

60. This occurred on 27 Mar. 1945 in the 563rd Volksgrenadier Division. As a result,the Germans placed informants in this unit to prevent a reoccurrence; HGr Kurland/Ia,Nr. 46/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Beurteilung des inneren Kampfwertes der Divisionen," 1Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RH 19 III/ 17, 4-7; AOK 18, KTB, 27 and 28 Mar. 1945, BA/MA,RH 20-18/927, 149, 158. For other examples of desertion, AOK 16/Ia, "Nr. 8283 /44geh.," 18 Nov. 1944, T-312/635/8263065; AOK 18/Ia, Nr. 4703/44 gKdos.,"Ferngespräche des Herrn Oberbefehlshabers am 12. Dezember 1944," T-312/971/9162987; Der Ob der HGr Nord/IIa, "Nr. 2100/44 geh.," 20 Dec. 1944, BA/MA,RH 19 III/727, 51. Two Dutch SS soldiers deserted in Dec. 1944; Perry Pierik, FromLeningrad to Berlin: Dutch Volunteers in the Service of the German Waffen-SS, 1941-1945 (D.E. Butterman-Dorey trans.) (2nd ed) (Soesterberg: Aspekt, 2001), 245.

61. 4.Pz.Div., KTB, 30 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 27-4/204; AOK 18/Ia, Nr. 4671/44gKdos., "Fahrt des Herrn Oberbefehlshabers zur 32. I.D. und Gruppe Thomaski am 8.Dezember 1944," T-312/971/9163097; Genkdo L.A.K./Abt. NS-Führung,"Tätigkeitsbericht des NSFO," 30 Dec. 1944, T-312/639/8267360; 205.Inf.Div./Abt. NS-Führung, "Tätigkeitsbericht Dezember 1944," 23 Dec. 1944, T-312/629/8267355;GenKdo I AK/IIa, "Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 8.10.3.12.1944," 13 Dec. 1944, T-314/80/339.

62. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN), Nr. 11697/44 gKdos., "BesprechungspunkteH.Gr.Nord," 7 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 2/ 316, 172; Evang. Armeepfarrer beim AOK 16,"Tätigkeitsbericht der Ev. Armeepfarrers beim AOK 16 (Abt. IVd/e) für die Zeit vom16.10.1944 bis 31.12.1944," 27 Jan. 1945, T-312/640/8267743-45.

63. Der Ob der HGr Nord, "Tagesbefehl," 1 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/727, 34.

64. Der Ob der HGr Nord/IIa, "Nr. 1990/44 geh.," 29 Nov. 1944, ibid., 43; Der Ob derHGr Nord/ Ia, "Nr. 150/45 geh.," 4 Jan. 1945, T-311/134/7179641-43.

65. AOK 18/Ia, Nr. 4189/44 gKdos., "Fahrt des Herrn Ob. zur 132. und 263 Inf.Div. am25. Oktober 1944," T-312/971/9163152; AOK 18/Ia, Nr. 4150/44 gKdos., "Fahrt desHerrn Ob. zum X. and II. A.K. am 21. Okt. 1944," ibid., Frame 9163163; AOK 18/Ia, Nr.4434/44 gKdos., "Fahrt des Herrn Ob. zur 30. Inf.Div., 263. Inf.Div. und zum X. A.K.am 14 November 1944," ibid., Frames 9163119-20; AOK 16/Abt.NS-Führung,"Richtlinie für die Sprecher im Rahmen der Aufklärungsaktion vom 15.11. bis15.12.1944," 10 Nov. 1944, T-312/639/8267338-39.

66. Stellv. Genkdo. VII AK (Wehrkreiskdo VII)/NSF, "Betr.: Sprachregelung f.d. Studie'Polit. Tagesfragen,'" 9 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH 53-7/v. 878; AOK 16/Abt. NS-Führung,"Tätigkeitsbericht der Abteilung NS-Führung vom 16.10. bis 31.12.1944," 30 Jan. 1945,T-312/639/8267324-26.

67. HGr Nord, KTB, 18 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/333, 15; HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr.4355/44," 5 Nov. 1944, T-312/634/8262599.

68. Hans Breithaupt, Die Geschichte der 30. Infanterie-Division 1939-1945 (BadNauheim: Podzun, 1955), 289-90. Only two issues of the newspaper reached Courland;Haupt, Kurland: Die vergessene Heeresgruppe, 108. A photograph of this decoration isin Haupt, Kurland: Die vergessene Heeresgruppe, 70.

69. NSFOs addressed every soldier in 16th Army between 15 Nov.-15 Dec.; AOK16/Abt. NS-Führung, "Tätigkeitsbericht der Abteilung NS-Führung vom 16.10. bis31.12.1944," 30 Jan. 1945, T-312/639/8267324.

70. For 16th Army, this resulted in an increase of tanks destroyed in close combat from16% in Nov. 1944 to 25% in Dec.; AOK 16/Ia/Stopak, "Tätigkeitsbericht 16. Okt. 1944-31. Dez. 1944," T-312/634/8262276-77. One author claims that the only way a soldiercould obtain leave to Germany was to destroy an enemy tank; G.H. Bidermann, Krim-Kurland mit der 132. Infanterie-Division 1939-1945 (Hanover: Privately published,1964), 326. In addition, a divisional NSFO complained of troops who had not been onleave for over 18 months; 389.Inf. Div./Abt. NS-Führung, "Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeitvom 26.11.-25.12.44," 27 Dec. 1944, T-312/639/8267362. German soldiers were entitledto 14 days of leave per year.

71. These “R and R” installations (Erholungsheim) ranged from regimental to corpsinstallations at varying distances from the front where troops could rest and enjoy goodrations for a few days to up to a week; Genkdo. XXXVIII AK/Nat.soz. Führung,"Tätigkeitsbericht für den Monat Dezember 1944," 2 Jan. 1945, T-312/639/8267347;215.Inf.Div./Abt.NS-Führung, Tätigkeitsbericht für Dezember 1944," 30 Dec. 1944,ibid., Frame 8267351; 389.Inf. Div./Abt. NS-Führung, "Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeitvom 26.11.-25.12.44," 27 Dec. 1944, ibid., Frame 8267362.

72. AOK 18/Ia, Nr. 4441/44 gKdos., "Fahrtbericht des Herrn Oberbefehlshabers zum IA.K. am 15.11.1944," T-312/971/9163118; Evang. Armeepfarrer beim AOK 16,"Tätigkeitsbericht der Ev. Armeepfarrers beim AOK 16 (Abt. IVd/e) für die Zeit vom16.10.1944 bis 31.12.1944," 27 Jan. 1945, T-312/640/8267743; Rolf Grams, Die 14.Panzer-Division, 1940-1945 (Bad Nauheim: Podzun, 1957), 277; Haupt, HeeresgruppeNord, 306.

73. Wilhelm Tieke, Tragödie um die Treue: Kampf und Opfergang des III. (germ.) SS-Panzer-Korps (Osnabrück: Munin, 1968), 142; Willy Wolff, An der Seite der RotenArmee (3rd ed) (Berlin: Militärverlag der DDR, 1982), 182, 202, 213, 256-60.

74. OKH/GenStdH/OrgAbt, "Nr. IZ/31 600/45 gKdos.," 10 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RH10/118, 44-45; Bidermann, Krim-Kurland mit der 132. Infanterie-Division, 331.

75. 32.Inf.Div./Ia, Nr. 2660/44 geh., "Erfahrungen aus der 2. Abwehrschlacht inKurland," 6 Dec. 1944, T-312/634/8262453; GenKdo I.AK/IIa, "Tätigkeitsbericht derGruppe II für die Zeit vom 4.12.44 bis 24.1.45," 10 Feb. 1945, T-314/80/3;OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt/IN/K, "Tagesmeldung der H.Gr. Kurland vom 3.4.45," 4 Apr.1945, T-78/338/6294478; Bidermann, Krim-Kurland mit der 132. Infanterie-Division,315; Jan Montyn and Dirk Kooiman, A Lamb to Slaughter (Adrienne Dixon trans.) (NewYork: Carroll & Graf, 1982), 89-102; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN), Nr. 11697/44 gKdos.,"Besprechungspunkte H.Gr.Nord," 7 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 2/316, 172. As in otherGerman units, Army Group Courland had its own "Stomach Battalion" composed of menwith stomach disorders; AOK 16/Ia, "Nr. 9379/44 geh.," 28 Dec. 1944, T-312/635/8263248.

76. Haupt, Kurland—Die letzte Front, 105; Bidermann, Krim-Kurland mit der 132.Infanterie-Division, 333; Grams, Die 14. Panzer-Division, 305; Haupt, Kurland: Dievergessene Heeresgruppe, 120; Thorwald, Die grosse Flucht, 574-75.

77. Haupt, Kurland: Die vergessene Heeresgruppe, 82. While on leave for destroying anenemy tank, Bidermann was offered a chance to remain in Germany, but refused andreturned to Courland; Gottlob Bidermann, In Deadly Combat: A German Soldier’sMemoir of the Eastern Front (Derek Zumbro ed. and trans.) (Lawrence: University Pressof Kansas, 2000), 272-73.

78. Robert Herzstein, The War that Hitler Won: Goebbels and the Nazi Media Campaign(New York: Paragon, 1987), 357, 384, 396; GenKdo I.AK/Abt.NS-Führung,Tätigkeitsbericht der Abteilung NS-Führung Monat Oktober," 4 Nov. 1944, T-314/80/344. See also what is apparently a poster exhorting troops to fight with themessage "We must destroy the enemy . . . No Bolshevik whom we destroy will beavailable against East Prussia. Allow no Bolshevik to murder German women andchildren," on T-312/630/8257072.

79. Grams, Die 14. Panzer-Division, 278; Breithaupt, Die Geschichte der 30. Infanterie-Division, 294; Bidermann, In Deadly Combat, 254.

80. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Chef), "Besprechung am 19.10 mit Oberbefehlshaber undChef des Generalstabes der Heeresgruppe Nord auf dem Gefechtsstand derHeeresgruppe," 19 Oct. 1944, T-78/338/6294699-700; HGr Nord, KTB, 10, 23 and 28Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 212-13; RH 19 III/331, 107, 189-90; HGr Nord/Ia,"Nr. 4795/44 gKdos.," 3 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 2/316, 212.

81. From 24 Sept.-25 Nov. the navy shipped 245,642 people (including 69,409 troops,68,562 wounded, 7,558 Latvian recruits, 3,108 Latvian and Estonian soldiers, 5,809Organization Todt workers and 77,110 refugees) to Germany. From 15-28 Nov. 11,626horses, 6,432 vehicles and 290 artillery pieces were evacuated. Still awaiting transport,however, were 135,301 people, 34,771 horses, over 12,000 vehicles and more than75,000 tons of goods, which the army group estimated would require two and one-halfmonths; HGr Nord, KTB, 28 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/ 333, 202.

82. HGr Nord, KTB, 13 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/334, 102; AOK 18, KTB, 7, 18and 19 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH 20-18 /925, 23, 80, 82; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr.450012/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 16 Jan. 1945, T-78/339/6295412; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN),"Nr. 1352/45 gKdos.," 2 Feb. 1945, T-311/171/7223228.

83. I.AK/Qu, KTB, 7 and 31 Dec. 1944, 10 and 22 Jan. 1945, T-314/80/30, 63, 77, 89;HGr Kurland/Ia, Nr. 802/45 gKdos., "Beurteilung der Lage," 25 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH2/332, 264-67; Rendulic, Genob u. Ob HGr Kurland/Ia, "Nr. 36/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 22Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RW 4/v.716, 26-27; Rendulic, Genob. und Ob. der HGr Kurland/Ia,"Nr. 38/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 23 Mar. 1945, T-78/339/6295094; Skl, KTB, 26 Mar. 1945,376; Anlage 9 zu OKH/GenStdH/OrgAbt, Nr. IZ/31 600/45 gKdos., 10 Apr. 1945,BA/MA, RH 10/118, 44.

84. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN/K), "Nachtrag zur Morgenmeldung HGr Kurlandv.9.4.45," 9 Apr. 1945, T-78/354/6314268; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN/K),"Tagesmeldung HGr Kurland 9.4.45," 10 Apr. 1945, ibid., Frame 6314254.

85. OKW/WFSt/Op, "2020 Uhr: Fernspruch an Quartiermeister der Wehrmacht, GeneralToppe," 30 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RW 44 I/109.

86. Schörner reported that in Sept. his forces had lost 52,993 men and received 35,863replacements. For Oct. the numbers were 25,200 casualties to 25,121 replacements (alater report mentioned 17,374 unreplaced losses in Oct.). In Nov. there were 33,181losses and 22,828 replacements, and OKH promised only 10,912 replacements for Dec.;HGr Nord, KTB, 12 Nov. and 1 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/332, 163, RH 19 III/334,11; OKH/GenStdH/OrgAbt (I), Nr. I/16554/44 geh., "Betr.: Ersatzbereitstellung für HGrNord im Dezember 1944," 17 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 2/849a, 244-45.

87. HGr Nord, KTB, 28 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/333, 196.

88. Upon Schörner’s arrival to Army Group North, he ordered 100,000 rear area troopssent to the front as combat soldiers; AOK 16/OQu/Qu1, KTB, 24 July 1944, T-312/630/8257145. Although it is certain that he did not gain this number of men for thefront, at the end of Dec, 16th Army declared that 70% of its troops consisted of "combed-out" men without sufficient training or experience; AOK 16/ Ia, "Nr. 114/44gKdos.Chefs.," 29 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/16, 73. OKH/GenStdH/OrgAbt, Nr.I/10433/44 geh., "Betr.: Abgabe von 5000 Mann für Luftflotte 1 an HGr Nord," 1 Oct.1944, T-78/421/6390619; OKH/GenStdH/OrgAbt, "Nr. I/14045/44 geh.," 15 Nov. 1944,T-78/421/6390728; OKH/GenStdH/OrgAbt, Nr. I/11206/44 geh., "Betr.: Zuführung von6000 Marinesoldaten an HGr Nord," 1 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 2/849a, 6; Chef desGenStdH/OrgAbt, Nr. I/11715/44 geh., "Betr.: Verwendung von 4- und 8-WochenRekruten," 1 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 2/849a, 50.

89. HGr Nord, KTB, 4 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/332, 60. Rendulic protested thatfrom 15 Feb.-14 Mar. the army group had suffered over 25,000 casualties and receivedonly about 2,000 replacements; HGr Kurland/Ia, "Nr. 35/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 17 Mar.1945, BA/MA, RH 2/329, 6-7.

90. OKH/GenStdH/OrgAbt, "Nr. IZ/30 140/45 gKdos.," 11 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH2/331b, 103; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN), "Tagesmeldung HGr Kurland vom 28.1.45," 29Jan. 1945, T-78/308/6259438. Vietinghoff informed Guderian that the army group hadlost about 90,000 men in the first 5 Courland Battles, but received only 48,000replacements. Also, since 27 Nov. the army group had given up nearly a dozen divisions;HGr Kurland/Ia, "Nr. 869/45 gKdos. (Vietinghoff to Guderian)," 2 Mar. 1945, BA/MA,RH 2/333, 350-52. OKH noted that in Feb. 1945, besides giving up units with a total of55,464 men, the army group had suffered 22,579 casualties and received only 6,975replacements; Anlage 8 zu OKH/GenStdH/OrgAbt, Nr. IZ/31 600/45 gKdos., "Betr.:Stellungnahme zu den Zustandsbericht v.1.3.45," 10 April 1945, BA/MA, RH 10/118, 43.

91. Schörner’s divisions had 55,604 NCOs and lacked 10,614 (19.1%), the greatestshortage of any army group in the East; OKH/GenStdH/OrgAbt (I), "Betr.: Uffz.-Lagedes Feldheeres," 22 Nov. 1944, T-78/421/6390751. From 26 Dec. 1944 to 10 Mar. 1945the army group received 963 officers. In comparison, Army Group Center/Northreceived 604, Army Group A/Center 510, Army Group South 601, and Army GroupVistula 98; OKH/Heerespersonalamt, file entitled "Führerreserve 1945," T-78/39/6000086-94.

92. In Oct. Soviet aircraft scored a direct hit on the steamer Prake southwest of Libau,killing 200 and wounding 90 men in a naval replacement battalion. On 17 Feb. Russianplanes sank the freighter Eifel southwest of Libau, with a loss of over 500 replacements.A Soviet submarine torpedoed and sank the transport Göttingen, carrying over 1300 men,in the same area on 23 Feb., resulting in heavy casualties. Vietinghoff protested that thiswas intolerable due to lack of personnel and increased losses. He suggested dividingtroops, especially officers, among all vessels, including escorts, and called for additionalnaval forces to escort convoys; HGr Nord, KTB, 12 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/330,237; Der Ob der HGr Kurland/Ia, "Nr. 794/45 gKdos.," 24 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH

2/332, 232; OKH/GenStdH/Op Abt, IN, "Tagesmeldung der HGr Kurland vom 17.2.45,"18 Feb. 1945, T-78/308/6260479; Heinz Schön, Ostsee '45: Menschen, Schiffe,Schicksale (Stuttgart: Motorbuch, 1983), 337-38, 364.

93. AOK 18/IVa, "Beitrag zu den besonderen Anordnungen für die Versorgung und fürdie Versorgungstruppen," 14 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 20-18/1463, 29; Natzmer, “FestungKurland,” IfZ, ZS 111, 52; AOK 18/AWiFüOQu/IVa/Qu2/ VII, Az. 308 Nr. 708/44 geh.,"Betr.: Landesausnutzung," 13 Oct. 1944, T-312/973/9164794-95; AOK 16/ OQu/Qu1,"Besondere Anordnungen für die Versorgung für den 31.10., Nr. 678," 30 Oct. 1944, T-312/640/8268930.

94. Anlage 7 zu AOK 16/OQu/Qu1, Nr. 1190/44 gKdos. v. 8.12.44, "Wirtschaft," T-312/641/8269641; AOK 16/AWiFü, "Tätigkeitsbericht" for the period 19-25 Nov. 1944,ibid., Frame 8269930; AOK 18/IV (Verpflegung), "Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom20.11.-26.11.44," BA/MA, RH 20-18/1464, 5; HGr Nord, KTB, 30 Oct. 1944, BA/MA,RH 19 III/331, 214; Haupt, Heeresgruppe Nord, 298.

95. Skl, KTB, 29 Nov. 1944, 656; Anlage 1 zu AOK 16/OQu/Qu1, Nr. 1220/44 gKdos.v. 24.12. 44, "Verwaltungswesen," T-312/641/8269622; AOK 18/IVa (Verpflegung),"Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 18.-31.12. 44," T-312/970/9162178-79; HGr Kurland,"Besprechung ChefdGenSt/OQu am 23.2 betr. 'Laura,'" gKdos., 23 Feb. 1945, BA/MA,RH 19 III/338, 57.

96. Haupt, Kurland: Die vergessene Heeresgruppe, 78; Bidermann, Krim-Kurland mitder 132. Infanterie-Division, 307; Krosigk to Diplogerma Stockholm, 4 May 1945,BA/BL, R 62/18, 33. One corps even distributed recipes for horsemeat to its divisions;GenKdo I.AK/Qu, Anlage zu Besondere Anordnungen für die Versorgung Nr. 12,"Verwendung von Pferdefleisch," 5 Jan. 1945, T-314/80/183-84.

97. Skl, KTB, 1 Dec. 1944, 14. The army group received 71,450 tons of supplies inNov. (2,381.66 tons per day), 76,664 tons in Dec. (2,473.03 tons daily) and 56,138 tonsfrom 1-23 Jan. 1945 (2,440.78 tons per day). These figures are based upon entries,usually on a daily basis, in ibid., 2 Nov. 1944 to 23 Jan. 1945, passim. These areconservative numbers because on some days there was no mention of supplies sent toCourland, they do not include vehicles and artillery shipped to Courland and, possibly,omit tonnage from vessels not under direct naval command. Kummetz reported that theNavy delivered 97,824 soldiers, 5,470 horses, 3,734 vehicles and approximately 100,000tons of supplies per month to Courland from 16 Oct.-31 Dec. 1944; MOKOstsee/Führungsstab, B.Nr.gKdos. 600/45 F I, "Rückblick auf die wesentlichstenEreignisse und Aufgaben im Bereich MOK Ost im Kriegsjahr 1944," 17 Mar. 1945,BA/MA, RM 7/90, 439. Kummetz's numbers, however, seem quite high, especially withregard to replacements.

98. Only 19,990 tons of supplies reached Courland in Feb.; I Ost, Nr. 304/45 gKdos.,"Lage Ostsee am 4. März 1945, 0800 Uhr," BA/MA, RM 7/292, 384. Dönitz informedHitler that 13,000 tons had been delivered in the first 13 days of the month;

Lagevorträge, 15 Feb. 1945, 653. At the beginning of April the head of the Skl'sShipping Dept. estimated that despite daily requirements of 3000 tons for Army GroupsNorth and Courland, the Navy would be able to deliver only 1,000-1,500 tons per day;Skl, KTB, 5 Apr. 1945, 69.

99. MOK Ostsee, Op.B.Nr. gKdos. 5351/44 F III, "Kurzer Rückblick auf Oktober 1944,"20 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 367-68; Forstmann, "Seekrieg im Finnenbusen und deröstlichen Ostsee von 1942 bus zum 8. Mai 1945," BA/MA, Nachlass Wagner, N539/v.15, 12.; Skl, KTB, 9 Oct. 1944, 224; 9.Sich.Div., KTB, 17 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM67 /v.150, 78-79.

100. MOK Ostsee, Op.B.Nr. gKdos. 5751/44 F III, "Lagebetrachtung für den MonatNovember 1944," 13 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 391; Adm.östl.Ostsee, gKdos. F I,"Lageübersicht 1. bis 30. Nov. 44," BA/MA, RM 7/163, 156; Skl, KTB, 20-24 and 28Nov. 1944, 443, 466, 505, 524, 547, 643. Examples of delays in later periods are in Skl,KTB, 2 and 17 Dec. 1944, 25, 430; Adm östl. Ostsee, KTB, 7 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, M543/39511; MOK Ost/Führstb "1874 F I M," 12 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/850, 111.

101. Skl, KTB, 5 Feb. 1945, 39; ibid., 6 Mar. 1945, 82-83.

102. HGr Nord, KTB, 14 and 15 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/334, 113, 117, 122; Skl,KTB, 14 and 18 Dec. 1944, 339, 444; AOK 18, KTB, 17 and 24 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH20-18/926, 85, 143.

103. During 1943, 77 vessels hit mines and the Germans cleared 441 mines in the entireBaltic. In 1944 the number of ships struck by mines rose to 189 and the Navy cleared2,013 mines; MOK Ostsee/Führungsstab, B.Nr. gKdos. 600/45 F I, "Rückblick auf diewesentlichsten Ereignisse und Aufgaben im Bereich MOK Ost im Kriegsjahr 1944," 17Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 430.

104. From Oct. 1944-May 1945, Russian mines sank 6 warships and 9 merchant vesselsin the Baltic; Jürgen Rohwer, "Die sowjetische U-Bootwaffe in der Ostsee," Marine-Rundschau 65 (No. 6): 566; Skl, KTB, 19 Feb. 1945, 193; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia),"Nr. 2215/45 gKdos.," 19 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/332, 177.

105. Skl, KTB, 1 and 27 Dec. 1944, 14, 644; MOK Ostsee, Op B.Nr. gKdos. 1049 F III,"Rückblick auf Monat Januar 1945," 7 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 398; Adm.westliche Ostsee, B.Nr. Op gKdos. 591 F III, "Monatsbericht Kommandierender Admiralwestliche Ostsee für den Monat März 1945," 10 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 503.

106. Skl, KTB, 7 and 12 Oct. 1944, 170-71, 280. In Dec., however, the Skl ordered ananti-submarine flotilla from Norway to the Baltic; ibid., 6 Dec. 1944, 131.

107. MOK Ostsee/Führungsstab, B.Nr. gKdos. 600/45 F I, "Rückblick auf diewesentlichsten Ereignisse und Aufgaben im Bereich MOK Ost im Kriegsjahr 1944," 17

Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 446; “Soviet Naval Warfare (Partial Translation),”NavOpArch, German Naval Records, Box T-94, Study No. 121, 6.

108. In Nov. the 9th Escort Division convoyed a total of 704 ships, and in Dec. 575ships; 9.Sich.Div., KTB, "Zusammenfassung für November 1944," BA/MA, RM67/v.150, 242; ibid., "Zusammenfassung Dezember 1944," RM 67/v.151, 117.

109. Skl, KTB, 30 Oct. 1944, 727-28.

110. Kummetz reported that the Soviet fleet "presumably" was still in Kronstadt;Adm.östl.Ostsee, gKdos. F I, "Lageübersicht 1. bis 30. Nov. 44," BA/MA, RM 7/163,156; MOK Ostsee, Op B.Nr. gKdos. 1049 F III, "Rückblick auf Monat Januar 1945," 7Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 398.

111. Geschichte des zweiten Weltkrieges, 9: 265-67, 10: 268; GVK, 5: 115; Achkasovand Pavlovich, Soviet Naval Operations in the Great Patriotic War, 246.

112. MOK Ostsee/Führungsstab, B.Nr.gKdos. 600/45 F I, "Rückblick auf diewesentlichsten Ereignisse und Aufgaben im Bereich MOK Ost im Kriegsjahr 1944," 17Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 415.

113. PzAOK 3, KTB, 30 Sept. 1944, T-313/317/8595923; AOK 16/Ia, "Nr. 2792/44gKdos.," 30 Sept. 1944, T-312/628/8254505; HGr Nord, KTB, 8, 9 and 10 Oct. 1944,BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 148-49, 183, 212; Skl, KTB, 9 Oct. 1944, 223.

114. Skl, "B.Nr.1/Skl Ia 3602/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 26 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163,182-83; HGr Nord, KTB, 17 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/334, 139.

115. On 1 Dec. 1944, the army group had a ration strength of 505,546 men. On 1 Apr.1945 it reported a total strength of 250,743; HGr Nord, KTB, 1 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH19 III/334, 11; Anlage 7 zu HGr Kurland/IIb, Nr. 167/45 gKdos. v. 13.4.45, "Iststärkevom 1. April 1945 der Heeresgruppe Kurland," T-311/133/7178549.

116. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 440652/44 gKdos. Chefs.," 20 Oct. 1944, BA/MA,RH 19 III/16, 91; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt, "Nr. 440658/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 23 Oct. 1944,ibid., 95; HGr Nord, KTB, 25 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 133;OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 440662/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 26 Oct. 1944, T-311/53/7065685-86; HGr Nord, KTB, 28 Oct. and 4 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19III/331,190-91, RH 19 III/332, 66.

117. TBJG, 9 Feb. 1945, 15: 345; "Abgabe von Verbänden der HGr in das Reich,"Enclosure to Vietinghoff to Guderian, 8 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, Nachlass Loch, N 186/16;AOK 18, KTB, 17 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 20-18/926, 83; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia),"Nr. 2096/45 gKdos.," 17 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/332, 158; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt(Ia), "Nr. 450160/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 27 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/328, 252;

OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN/K), "Nr. 2693/45 gKdos.," 3 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/333,349.

118. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 1678/45 gKdos.," 7 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH2/332, 70; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 2254/45 gKdos.," 20 Feb. 1945, ibid., 190.In Feb. 1945 the navy evacuated 49,451 troops, 11,785 animals, 12,655 vehicles and 549guns from Libau; MOK Ostsee, Op B.Nr. gKdos. 1602 F III, "Rückblick auf MonatFebruar 1945," 10 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 492.

119. HGr Kurland/Ia, Nr. 72/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Vormittagsunterrichtung," 7 May 1945,BA/MA, RH 19 III/17, 23; Der Grossadmiral, OKW/WFSt, "Nr. 89003/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 7 May 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/854, 127; OKW/WFSt, "Nr. 89002/45gKdos.Chefs.," 7 May 1945, BA/MA, RW 44 I/34.

120. Maizière returned to Courland on 8 May with these instructions; Wilhelm Keitel,"Die letzten Tage unter Adolf Hitler (completed 10 Oct. 1946)," BA/MA, NachlassKeitel, N 54/8, 21.

121. AOK 16/Ia, "Nr. 918/45 gKdos.," 8 May 1945, BA/MA, RH 20-16/1063;OKW/WFSt/Einsatzabt. (H)/II, "Notiz über mündliche Berichterstattung desKdr.Pz.Rgt.d.14.Pz.Div. Oberst Sauvant," 13 May 1945, BA/MA, RW 44 I/54; Schön,Ostsee '45, 626; “Tagesniederschrift der Reichsregierung vom 9. 5. 1945,” Chefs.,BA/BL, R 62/15, 12; Maizière, In der Pflicht, 109-10.

122. In addition, thirty-five Ju-52 transport planes flew in from Norway to assist in theevacuation. Only three of these aircraft, however, eluded Soviet fighters and reachedGermany. The pilots of the two wings of Fighter Group 54 remaining in Courlandstripped their aircraft of superfluous equipment to allow them to take two or threemembers of their ground crews on their final flight to Germany; Rohwer andHümmelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea, 2: 519; Haupt, Kurland—Die vergesseneHeeresgruppe, 124, 128; Hannes Trautloft, Werner Held and Ekkehard Bob, DieGrünherzjäger: Bildchronik des Jagdgeschwaders 54 (Friedberg: Podzun-Pallas, 1985),35.

123. Jürg Meister, Der Seekrieg in den osteuropäischen Gewässern, 1941-1945 (Munich:Lehmanns, 1958), 131; Lederer, "Kurland," 12. An officer evacuated on 8 May declaredthat many men planned to escape to Gotland in small boats, and that the operationsofficer and quartermaster of I Army Corps had already fled Courland on 4 May;OKW/WFSt/Einsatzabt. (H)/II, "Notiz über mündliche Berichterstattung desKdr.Pz.Rgt.d.14.Pz.Div. Oberst Sauvant," 13 May 1945, BA/MA, RW 44 I/54.

124. The Soviets took 189,112 German (including 42 generals) and 14,000 Latviansoldiers prisoner; Haupt, Heeresgruppe Nord, 320. The army group consisted of 7 corpswith approximately 20 divisions; "Lage der HGr Kurland 9.5. 000 Uhr nach den bis 8.5.abends eingegangenen Meldungen," T-311/135/7180163; Anlage 2 zuOKW/WFSt/OrgAbt (H), Nr. 5817/45, "Verbände der HGr Kurland, Stand 7.5.45," 11

May 1945, T-77/864/5611084-85; OKW/WFSt/OrgAbt (Heer), "Vorläufige schematischeKriegsgleiderung," 19 May 1945, BA/MA, RW 44 I/58, 259.

125. The next day the Luftwaffe ordered a fighter staff squadron, with at least 15 FW-190s, to Courland; Skl, KTB, 17 and 18 Dec. 1944, 410, 448. The Luftwaffe had fewaircraft in Courland. On 15 Oct. the 1st Air Force possessed a total of 229 planes (92ground attack aircraft, 34 night fighters, 29 short-range reconnaissance planes and 74fighters), of which only 170 were operational; Köhler, "Einsatz der Luftwaffe," pp. 86-87. Some of these may have been withdrawn, for other sources assert that only 2-3 wingsof Fighter Group 54 and a few reconnaissance planes were in Courland; RaymondToliver and Trevor Constable, Horrido (New York: Bantam, 1982), 280-81; Haupt,Heeresgruppe Nord, 301; Trautloft, et al, Die Grünherzjäger, 34. Schörner, however,informed Guderian on 22 Oct. that 2 fighter wings and 2 ground attack wings were inCourland; HGr Nord, KTB, 22 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 103. On the fuelshortages, Rendulic, Genob u. Ob HGr Kurland/Ia, "Nr. 36/45 gKdos.Chefs. (Rendulic toHitler)," 22 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RW 4/v.716, 26-27; "General Christian für Führerlage,"gKdos.Chefs. (undated, but bears Keitel's initials from 23 Mar. 1945), T-77/778/5503865.

126. Skl KTB, 28 Feb. 1945, 325; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 3744/45 gKdos.,"Notiz nach Führervortrag Nacht 26./27.3.45," 27 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/334, 56;Lagevorträge, 28 Mar. 1945, 687.

Chapter 6: Memel, Prussia, and Pomerania

1. "Abschrift aus dem Taschen-Notiz-Kalender 1944 des Generals d.Inf. Gollnick,Kommandierender General des XXVIII AK," entries for 7 and 8 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH24-28/107, 27; "Erläuterung und Ergänzung der Aufzeichnungen aus dem Taschen-Notiz-Kalender 1944 und des Gefechtsberichtes des XXVIII.A.K. über die Kämpfe vom4. bis 10.10.1944: Angaben v. 19.5.1960," ibid., 30-31; HGr Nord, KTB, 9 Oct. 1944,BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 186; Der Ob der 3.Panzer-Armee/Ia, "Nr. 9800/44 gKdos.," 9Oct. 1944, T-312/974/9165756; "Die Kämpfe der Panzer-Grenadier-DivisionGrossdeutschland in Nordlitauen und um Memel in der Zeit vom 5.-15. Oktober 1944,"BA/MA, RH 26-1005/84.

2. HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 4376/44 gKdos.," 10 Oct. 1944, T-312/972/9164473-74; HGrNord, KTB, 10 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 190-92, 200-01. On the Volkssturm,David Yelton, Hitler’s Volkssturm: The Nazi Militia and the Fall of Germany, 1944-1945(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002).

3. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 440630/44 gKdos. Chefs.," 10 Oct. 1944, BA/MA,RM 7/162, 44-46; HGr Nord, KTB, 11 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 217-19;OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IM), "Nr. 10624/44 gKdos.," 11 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19

II/207, 112. Upon learning of this Reinhardt noted in his diary, "A gift from theGreeks?!"; Persönliche Tagebuch Hans Reinhardt (hereafter Reinhardt Diary), entry for11 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, Nachlass Reinhardt, N 245/3, 79.

4. HGr Nord, KTB, 14 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 270; "Die Kämpfe derPanzer-Grenadier-Division Grossdeutschland in Nordlitauen und um Memel in der Zeitvom 5.-15. Oktober 1944," BA/MA, RH 26-1005/84; Kabath, "Seebrückenköpfe," 244-54; Skl, KTB, 11 and 15 Oct. 1944, 270, 272, 360-61.

5. OKH/GenStdH/FHO (Chef), Nr. 3721/44 gKdos., "Wichtigste Feindfestellungen vom21.10.1944," 21 Oct. 1944, T-78/466/6445418; Genkdo XXVIII AK/Ia, Nr. 1182/44gKdos., "Bezug: FS Obkdo HGr Mitte, Ia Nr. 15022/44 gKdos. v. 23.10.44," 23 Oct.1944, T-311/217/1105-07.

6. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Fest), "Nr. 14036/44 geh.," 6 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19II/207, 69; PzAOK 3, KTB, 16 Nov. 1944, T-313/324/8604132; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt(IM), "Nr. 12098/44 gKdos.," 17 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 II/207, 51; HGr Mitte/Ia,"Nr. 16572/44 gKdos.," 17 Nov. 1944, T-311/229/1293; Skl, KTB, 23-24 Nov. 1944,524, 545-46, 555 Skl, KTB, 11 Dec. 1944, 270; Genkdo XXVIII AK/Ia, "Nr. 1245/44gKdos.," 16 Nov. 1944, T-311/217/999-1003; HGr Mitte/Ia, "Nr. 16717/44 gKdos.," 20Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 II/213, 351-52.

7. HGr Mitte/Ia, "Nr. 16802/44 geh.," 24 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 II/213, 355; HGrMitte/Ia, "Nr. 16916/44 geh.," 24 Nov. 1944, ibid., 356. The Germans devised animaginative method to prevent the Soviets from crossing the frozen Haff. Theyconstructed improvised bunkers, mounted on rafts, with sled runners. Even if the icebroke, the defenders would still have floating fortresses. The Germans built about 150 ofthese bunkers and moved them onto ice when the Haff froze; Military Improvisationsduring the Russian Campaign (Washington: Department of the Army, 1951), 25-26.

8. Otto Heidkämpfer, "Die Schlacht um Ostpreussen im Januar 1945 bis zum Beginn desAusbruchsversuchs am Abend des 26.1.1945," Oct. 1953, BA/MA, RH 19 II/336, 4-6.Heidkämpfer was Army Group Center's Chief of Staff.

9. By 4 Jan. 1945 the army group had given up 5 armored and motorized divisions, aVolksgrenadier division, a motorized brigade and 2 cavalry brigades. In return Reinhardtreceived a half dozen smashed divisions; ibid., 6-9; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt/Ia, file "KTBAnlagen, Dezember 1944," BA/MA, RH 2/317, passim; HGr Mitte/Ia, "Nr. 111/45gKdos.," 4 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/331b, 171-72; Reinhardt Diary, 13 and 14 Dec.1944, 3 and 4 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, Nachlass Reinhardt, N 245/3, 80-81.

10. Geschichte des zweiten Weltkrieges, 10: 114-17; Glantz and House, When TitansClashed, 238-41, 247, 369-70, (note 25); Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 449.

11. For example, OKH/GenStdH/FHO (I), Nr. 123/45 gKdos., "Kurze Beurteilung derFeindlage vom 7.1.45," 7 Jan. 1945, T-78/307/6258633-35.

12. Reinhardt Diary, 14 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, Nachlass Reinhardt, N 245/3, 81.

13. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Tagesmeldung HGr Mitte vom 21.1.45," 22 Jan. 1945,T-78/307/6295139; Reinhardt Diary, 21 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, Nachlass Reinhardt, N245/3, 82-83; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IM), "Nr. 450029/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 22 Jan. 1945,BA/MA, RH 2/328, 161.

14. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IM), "Nr. 450025/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 21 Jan. 1945, BA/MA,RH 2/328, 160; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IM), "Nr. 915/45 gKdos.," 23 Jan. 1945,BA/MA, RH 2/331a, 126; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IM), "Nr. 964/45 gKdos.," 23 Jan.1945, BA/MA, RH 2/331a, 111.

15. Heidkämper, "Die Schlacht um Ostpreussen," BA/MA, Nachlass Reinhardt, N245/15, 64-65, 69, 78-79; Reinhardt, "Nachschrift im April 1951," ibid., 29; Guderian,Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, 362; AOK 4/Ia, "Nr. 009/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 23 Jan. 1945,BA/MA, RH 20-4/611.

16. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (III), Nr. 1226/45 gKdos., "Tagesmeldung Ost v. 29.1.1945,"30 Jan. 1945, T-78/308/6259996; Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 468-69; Kabath,"Seebrückenköpfe," 324-25.

17. Skl, KTB, 28 Jan. 1945, 492; AOK 4/Ia, Nr. T 29/45 geh., "Ia Tagesmeldung vom29.1.1945," 29 Jan. 1945, T-312/261/7819009; OKH/GenStdH/Op Abt (IN),"Tagesmeldung der HGr Nord vom 31.1.45," 1 Feb. 1945, T-78/308/6259934;OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 450066/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Weisung für HeeresgruppeNord," 2 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/328, 236.

18. HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 1336/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Unternehmen 'Westwind,'" 17 Feb.1945, BA/MA, RH 2/328, 239.

19. Geschichte des zweiten Weltkrieges, 10: 139-41, 145; Ivan Bagramian, “TheStorming of Königsberg,” Main Front: Soviet Leaders look back on World War II (JohnErickson ed.) (London: Brassey's, 1987), 223, 226-30.

20. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450183/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 11 Mar. 1945, BA/MA,RH 2/329, 23-24; Dieckert and Grossmann, Der Kampf um Ostpreussen, 142; Geschichtedes zweiten Weltkrieges, 10: 141.

21. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 3325/45 gKdos.," 19 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH2/333, 174; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 3348/45 gKdos.," 20 Mar. 1945, ibid., 168;Adjutant des Chefs des GenStdH, Nr. 897/45 gKdos., "Notizen nach Führervortrag am19.3. nachmittags," 19 Mar. 1945, ibid., 165-66.

22. Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 543-44; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt/In/Lds Bef, "Betr.:Festung Königsberg," 6 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/335, 175-76; Lasch, So fielKönigsberg, 104-09.

23. Kabath, "Seebrückenköpfe," 389, 408. On the battle for Pillau, Strobel, "Der Kampfum Pillau," BA/MA, Nachlass Ruge, N 379/v.97. Strobel was the Sea Commandant ofPillau. All of the divisions evacuated were considered smashed, and most units had noartillery. Only one division reported a strength of over 600 men, and the remnants of 5divisions totaled 650 troops; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN/K), "Vortragsnotiz betr. Zustandder von Samland auf Nehrung zurückgeführten Divisionen," 18 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RH2/337, 23-25.

24. OKW/WFSt/Op, "Nr. 88142/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 21 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/328,177; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 450067/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Weisung fürHeeresgruppe Weichsel," 2 Feb. 1945, ibid., 186-87.

25. Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 518-20; Geschichte des zweiten Weltkrieges, 10: 172-74; Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 250-52.

26. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 445-48; Murawski, Die Eroberung Pommerns durchdie Rote Armee, 76. Hitler had ordered major troop withdrawals from the West on 22Jan., the day after he had created Army Group Vistula; OKW/WFSt/Op (H), "Nr.88149/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 22 Jan. 1945, T-78/339/6295651-54; Jodl Diary, 5 Feb. 1945,BA/MA, RW 4/v.33, 78; Erhard Raus, Panzer Operations: The Eastern Front Memoir ofGeneral Raus, 1941-1945 (Steven Newton comp. and ed.) (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo,2003), 318-19; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450134/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 21 Feb. 1945,BA/MA, RH 2/328, 202.

27. Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 472-76, 517-21; Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staffat War, 1: 387-98; Geschichte des zweiten Weltkrieges, 10: 175-76.

28. Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 523.

29. HGr Nord, KTB, 14 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 264-65;OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Chef), "Gedanken über die Weiterführung des Kampfes im Osten(in Stichworten)," 18 Oct. 1944, T-78/338/6294723.

30. Skl, "B.Nr. 1/Skl I op 27743/44 gKdos.," 9 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 315; Skl,KTB, 14 Sept. 1944, 363; PzAOK 3/Ia, "Nr. 9230/44 geh.," 25 Sept. 1944, T-313/323/8602873; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt/Fest, "Nr. 12290/44 gKdos.," 22 Nov. 1944,BA/MA, RH 2/316, 81.

31. Skl, KTB, 8, 10, 12 and 15 Oct. 1944, 209, 242-43, 252-53, 260, 302, 376. On 11and 12 Oct. Prinz Eugen fired 673 rounds of 20.3 cm shells, and Lützow fired 400 roundsof 28 cm and 245 rounds of 15 cm shells. Two destroyers each fired 100 rounds of 15 cmammunition. On 14 Oct. Prinz Eugen, a destroyer and 3 torpedo boats shelled the coast

near Memel early in the day, and in the afternoon were relieved by Lützow, a destroyerand 2 torpedo boats. Lützow and 2 destroyers returned on 23 Oct.; ibid., 11, 13, 14, 23and 24 Oct. 1944, 272, 280, 325-26, 347 571, 596; Kabath, "Seebrückenköpfe," 243-52.

32. Skl, KTB, 11, 12, 14 and 22 Oct. 1944, 272, 292-93 339, 538; HGr Nord, KTB, 15Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 13.

33. Skl, KTB, 20 Oct. 1944, 489; Lagevorträge, 10 Dec. 1944, 622.

34. Skl, KTB, 12, 16, 22 and 23 Dec. 1944, 286-87, 388-90, 554-55, 567.

35. For example, this subject came up when Meisel met with Guderian in mid-Decemberto discuss the situation at Memel and in Courland; Skl, 1 Skl I Ost 3753/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Besprechung Chef Skl mit Chef Genstb.d.H.," BA/MA, RM 7/261, 116-17; Skl,KTB, 15 Dec. 1944, 359. See also Skl, KTB, 13 Dec. 1944, 313-14; Skl, KTB, 2 Jan.1945, 19-20; MVO beim GenStdH, "B.Nr. 120/45 gKdos.," 7 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RM7/163, 18; Skl, "1/Skl I op 573/45 gKdos.," 9 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 18-19; Kurtvon Zydowitz, Die Geschichte der 58. Infanterie-Division 1939-1945 (Kiel: Podzun,1952), 134-35.

36. Skl, KTB, 14 and 18 Jan. 1945, 244, 321-22, 326; Lagevorträge, 19 Jan. 1945, 633.

37. Skl, KTB, 23 Jan. 1945, 420-23. A few days later Kummetz informed the Skl thatthe army group required 3600 tons of supplies daily, including provisions for civilians;ibid., 29 Jan. 1945, 504-05.

38. Ibid., 24 and 30 Jan. 1945, 434, 438, 512-13. Dönitz later ordered the transfer of 2motor torpedo boat flotillas from the West, and 6 motor mine-sweepers from Norway, tothe Baltic; ibid., 22 Feb. 1945, 242; ibid., 26 Mar. 1945, 375.

39. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt/AbtLdsBef, "Nr. 893/45 gKdos.," 22 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH2/331a, 140; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt/AbtLdsBef, Nr. 997/45 gKdos., "Bezug: FSOKM/Skl Adm Qu 2 mob 270/45 g.K. v. 23.1.45," 24 Jan. 1945, ibid., 105; Skl, KTB, 25Jan. 1945, 454.

40. Lagevorträge, 23 Jan. and 5 Feb. 1945, 637-38, 647; Skl, KTB, 24 Jan. 1945, 440;OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN), "Nr. 450045/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 26 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH2/328, 230; Oldwig von Natzmer, "Einsatz der 4. Armee ab Februar 1945 von O. v.Natzmer, Generalleutnant a.D.," BA/MA, RH 20-4/632. Natzmer came from Courland toEast Prussia with Rendulic to serve as his Chief of Staff.

41. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 450066/45 gKdos. Chefs., "Weisung fürHeeresgruppe Nord," 2 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/328, 236; Kabath, "Seebrückenköpfe,"298; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 450081/45 gKdos. Chefs., "Weisung fürHeeresgruppe Nord," 7 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/328, 235; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia),"Nr. 450137/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 21 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/328, 240;

OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450161/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 27 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH2/328, 246-47; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450183/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 11 Mar.1945, BA/MA, RH 2/329, 23-24; Heidkämper, "Die Schlacht um Ostpreussen," BA/MA,Nachlass Reinhardt, N 245/15, 77.

42. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450055/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 30 Jan. 1945, BA/MA,RH 2/328, 231-32; Lagevorträge, 6 and 9 Feb. 1945, 647-48.

43. Lagevorträge, 17 Feb. 1945, 654; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450137/45gKdos.Chefs.," 21 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/328, 240. Another reason for Hitler’sinsistence upon retaining Königsberg was his assertion that as long the Germans held thecity, he could claim still to have East Prussia; The Hitler Book: The Secret DossierPrepared for Stalin from the Interrogations of Hitler’s Personal Aides (Henrik Eberleand Matthias Uhl ed) (Giles MacDonogh trans.) (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 181.

44. Rendulic reported 39,000 wounded from 25 Jan.-2 Feb., not counting dead andmissing; HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. T 433/45 geh., "Tagesmeldung HGr Nord 5.2.45," 6 Feb.1945, T-312/261/7819610. Rendulic protested that the army group, including 2nd Army,had received only 25,000 replacements since 13 Jan., which covered losses only for theprevious six days; HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 1543/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 26 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH2/328, 242-45.

45. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450161/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 27 Feb. 1945, BA/MA,RH 2/328, 246-47; Adjutant des Chef des GenStdH, Nr. 639/45 gKdos., "Notizen nachFührervortrag am 27.2.1945," 27 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/332, 300.

46. Lagevorträge, 26-27 Feb., and 4 Mar. 1945, 660-62, 668.

47. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450183/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 11 Mar. 1945, BA/MA,RH 2/329, 23-24; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450213/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 21 Mar.1945, ibid., 30; Lagevorträge, 20 and 21 Mar. 1945, 681-83.

48. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450223/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 23 Mar. 1945, BA/MA,RH 2/329, 31; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450228/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 24 Mar.1945, ibid., 33; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 3682/45 gKdos.," 26 Mar. 1945,BA/MA, RH 2/334, 14; Lagevorträge, 25 Mar. 1945, 685.

49. Langmann to Dieckert, 18 June 1955, BA/MA, RH 20-4/632, 6-7. Langmann was4th Army's Chief of Staff from 22 Feb. through 8 Apr. 1945.

50. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 3713/45 gKdos.," 26 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH2/334, 28; HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 2455/45 gKdos., "Bezug: OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr.3713/45 g.K. vom 26.3 45," 28 Mar. 1945, ibid., 108; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr.4332/45 gKdos.," 7 Apr. 1945, T-78/497/6484545; Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 545.

51. OKW/WFSt/Op (H)/Nordost, “Nr. 3823/45 gKdos.,” 27 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RW 44I/109.

52. Adj Chef GenStdH, Nr. 1097/45 gKdos., "Notizen nach Führervortrag am30.3.nachm.," 30 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/334, 150; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr.3902/45 gKdos.," 30 Mar. 1945, ibid., 145; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450247/45gKdos.Chefs.," 31 Mar. 1945, T-78/496/6484134-35; Langmann to Dieckert, 18 June1955, BA/MA, RH 20-4/632, 6-7; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 4485/45 gKdos.," 10Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/336, 72; OKW/WFSt/Qu, "Nr. 3857/45 gKdos.," 28 Apr.1945, BA/MA, RM 7/851, 160.

53. Skl, KTB, 5 Feb. 1945, 39; Lagevorträge, 14 and 27 Feb., 16 and 20 Mar. 1945, 652,662, 676, 682.

54. From 1-13 Feb. Army Group Courland had received 13,000 tons; Lagevorträge, 15Feb., 20, 21 and 23 Mar. 1945, 653, 682-84.

55. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (III), Nr. 930/45 gKdos., "Tagesmeldung Ost v. 23.1.45," 23Jan. 1945, T-78/308/6259636.; Skl, KTB, 22 and 23 Feb. 1945, 252, 257; Skl, KTB, 9Mar. 1945, 119, 125.

56. HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 2667/45 gKdos.," 31 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/334, 191-92; Skl,KTB, 1 Apr. 1945, 7; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN/K), "Tagesmeldung AOK Ostpreussenvom 14.4.45," 15 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RH 20-2/995.

57. Lagevorträge, 28 Mar., 12 and 14 Apr. 1945, 687, 697, 699; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt(Ia), "Nr. 4757/45 gKdos.," 17 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/336, 250; OKW/WFSt/Op,"20.20 Uhr: Fernspruch an Quartiermeister der Wehrmacht, General Toppe," 30 April1945, BA/MA, RW 44 I/109.

58. Skl, B.Nr.1/Skl I op 30161/44 gKdos., "Betr.: Verteidigung Gotenhafen," BA/MA,RM 7/162, 67-68; MOK Ost, gKdos. 06497 QuH, "Betr.: Verteidigung G'hafen," 18 Oct.1944, ibid., 5; Skl, KTB, 6 and 31 Oct.,1944, 141, 749; Skl, KTB, 14 Nov. 1944, 294;OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt/Fest, Nr. 11807/44 gKdos., "Betr.: Festung Gotenhafen," 10 Nov.1944, BA/MA, RH 2/316, 156.

59. MOK Ost, Op B.Nr. gKdos. 5751/44 F III, "Lagebetrachtung für den MonatNovember 1944," 13 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 393; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt/AbtLdsBef, Nr. 13312/44 gKdos., "Bezug: FS Chef Skl Adm Qu2 mob 6050/44 g.K. vom19. Dez. 44," 20 Dec. 1944, T-78/338/6294859: Skl, KTB, 26 Dec. 1944, 618-19.

60. Lagevorträge, 19 and 21 Jan. 1945, 633, 635; Skl, KTB, 22 Jan. 1945, 401.

61. Lagevorträge, 23 Jan. 1945, 637-38.

62. On Hitler's expectations, see Himmler's remarks in "Aussprachen mit demReichsFührer SS Himmler und Vortrag bei Adolf Hitler im Febr./März 1945 über diePommernschlacht und über die Führung im Osten: Aufzeichnung des Oberbefehlshabersder 3.Pz.-Armee, Generaloberst a.D. Erhard Raus," BA/MA, RH 21-3/420, 8-11; Raus,Panzer Operations, 319-21.

63. Skl, KTB, 29 Jan. 1945, 499; Lagevorträge, 30 Jan., 1 and 5 Feb. 1945, 641, 644,647; OKW/WFSt/Op (M), "Nr. 1100/45 gKdos.," 30 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RW 4/v. 865,55.

64. Skl, KTB, 7 Feb. 1945, 58; Admiral zbV, B.Nr. 200/45 gKdos., "Bemerkungen desObdM auf der Reise nach Stettin und Swinemünde am 8.2.1945," 9 Feb. 1945, BA/MA,RM 7/231, 148-49.

65. Himmler to Weiss, 27 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RW 4/v.115, 44; "Unterlagen für dasFernschreibgespräch Reichs-Führer SS/Ob AOK 2 durchgegeben von Lt. Suhr, AOK 2,"17 Feb. 1945, T-311/168/7219776; Himmler to Weiss, 17 Feb. 1945, T-311/168/7219772-73; Skl, KTB, 17 Feb. 1945, 177-78. Hitler had already decided tosend 2 divisions coming from Courland to Pomerania to prevent a Soviet breakthrough.He feared that if eastern Pomerania and West Prussia lost land contact with the rest of thefront it would overtax the navy's ability to supply troops in coastal sectors. Dönitz agreedthat the present supply tasks had stretched the navy's resources to the limit; Lagevorträge,6 Feb. 1945, 648.

66. Lagevorträge, 20 Feb. 1945, 657-58. Yet already the next day problems arose.Army Group Vistula refused to consider Swinemünde a fortress because it had not beensufficiently fortified. OKH intervened and ordered Himmler's army group to build up thecity's defenses as a fortress, claiming Swinemünde was decisively important for ensuringsupply to East Prussia and Courland; Skl, KTB, 21 Feb. 1945, 234;OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt/Lds Bef, "Nr. 2513/45 gKdos.," 26 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH2/332, 285-86.

67. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 450138/45 gKdos. Chefs., "Weisung für dieFortführung der Operationen bei den Heeresgruppen Mitte und Weichsel," 21 Feb. 1945,BA/MA, RH 2/328, 92-93; Skl, KTB, 24 Feb. 1945, 279; Lagevorträge, 27 Feb. 1945,662.

68. The Skl estimated 2nd Army required 1100 tons of supplies per day; Lagevorträge, 3and 12 Mar. 1945, 665, 673; Skl, KTB, 2 Mar. 1945, 26.

69. MVO beim Chef GenStdH, "B.Nr. 1814/45 gKdos.," 3 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH2/333, 344; MVO beim Chef GenStdH, B.Nr. 1894/45 gKdos., "Betrifft: Bedeutungostpommerscher Häfen für Seekriegführung," 6 Mar. 1945, ibid., 404; Skl, KTB, 5 Mar.1945, 74-75. A few days later Kummetz included Hela, claiming its retention wasdecisive for possession of Danzig and Gdynia; MVO beim Chef GenStdH, "B.Nr.2185/45 gKdos.," 15 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/333, 229.

70. Skl, KTB, 4, 7 and 8 Mar. 1945, 54, 103-04, 109; Lagevorträge, 8, 12, 13 and 25Mar. 1945, 669, 673-74, 685.

71. TBJG, 12 Mar. 1945, 15: 480; Lagevorträge, 4 and 6 Mar. 1945, 668.

72. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450181/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 10 March 1945,BA/MA, RH 2/329, 18; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450184/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 13Mar. 1945, T-78/339/6295159-61; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN/K), geh., "Notizen zumAbendvortrag beim Führer am 18.3.45," 19 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/333, 185; Adjutantdes Chefs des GenStdH, Nr. 897/45 gKdos., "Notizen nach Führervortrag am 19.3.nachmittags," 19 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/333, 165-66.

73. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450181/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 10 Mar. 1945, BA/MA,RH 2/329, 18; OKH/GenStdH/ OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450183/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 11 Mar.1945, ibid., 23-24; Adjutant Chefs des GenStdH, Nr. 780/45 gKdos., "Notiz nachFührervortrag am 10.3.45," 10 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/333, 299; Lagevorträge, 16 and17 Mar. 1945, 677-78.

74. Skl, KTB, 16 Mar. 1945, 223; Lagevorträge, 17 Mar. 1945, 678.

75. Skl, KTB, 22 Mar. 1945, 313; Lagevorträge, 20 Mar. 1945, 681-82. The shellinghad been conducted by the obsolete battleship Schlesien, the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugenand the light cruiser Leipzig; Skl, KTB, 20 Mar. 1945, 273.

76. Skl, KTB, 22 and 23 Mar. 1945, 312, 337; Adj.d.Chefs d.GenStdH, Nr. 967/45gKdos., "Notizen nach Führervortrag am 23.3.nachm.," 23 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH2/333, 50-51. On the 26th, upon learning that Soviet aircraft had destroyed two shipsbearing ammunition in Danzig's harbor, Hitler commanded Göring to increase fighteractivity over Danzig; Adj.d.ChdGenStdH, Nr. 1021/45 gKdos., "Notiz nachFührervortrag am 26.3.45, nachm.," 26 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/334, 29-30.

77. Lagevorträge, 30 Mar. and 4 Apr. 1945, 688, 693; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr.450238/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 29 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/102, 54;OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450247/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 31 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RM7/102, 43.

78. Lagevorträge, 3 Apr. 1945, 692; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN/K), "Nr. 4342/45gKdos.," 8 Apr. 1945, T-78/497/6484547; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450276/45gKdos.Chefs.," 13 Apr. 1945, T-78/496/6484112-13.

79. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 4062/45 gKdos.," 1 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/335,16; Adj.d.C.d.GenStdH, Nr. 1150/45 gKdos., "Notizen nach Führervortrag am 2.4.45,nachm.," 2 Apr. 1945, ibid., 43-45; Skl, KTB, 1 and 6 Apr. 1945, 6, 85; ReinhardTiemann, Geschichte der 83. Infanterie-Division, 1939-1945 (Bad Nauheim: Podzun,1960), 318-21; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (III), Nr. 4211/45 gKdos., "Tagesmeldung Ost

vom 5.4.1945" 6 Apr. 1945, T-78/338/6294568; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr.450263/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 4 Apr. 1945, T-78/339/6295272; OKW/WFSt/Op(H)/Nordost, "Nr. 3823/45 gKdos.," 27 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RW 44 I/109.

80. Adjutant des Chefs des GenStdH, Nr. 1000/45 gKdos., "Notizen nach Führervortragam 25.3.45, nachm.," 25 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/334, 6-7;OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt/LdsBef, Nr. 4255/45 gKdos., "Betr.: Festung Stettin," 10 Apr.1945, BA/MA, RH 2/336, 58; Lagevorträge, 16 Apr. 1945, 699.

81. Admiral beim ObdM, KTB des ObdM, 25 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RM 6/115, 9;OKW/WFSt/Op (H)/Nordost, "Nr. 3821/45 gKdos.," 26 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RH 10/118,214.

82. Dönitz agreed to this only after Swinemünde had been cut off from the hinterland,rendering it useless as a supply port for Courland. Jodl issued the order on 30 April; Skl,"1/Skl Iop 908/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 28 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/851, 161;Adm.v.ObdM, "Nr. 1550/45 gKdos.," 28 Apr. 1945, ibid., 167; OKW/WFSt/Op, "Nr.88869/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 30 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RW 44 I/109.

83. OKW/WFSt/Op (H)/B, "Nr. 89000/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 3 May 1945, BA/MA, RW 44I/109; OKW/WFSt/OrgAbt (H), "Stärken der Ostfront: Schätzung Stand 7.5.1945," 9May 1945, BA/MA, RH 10/130, 28; "Lage d. AOK Ostpreussen Stand 9.5-000 Uhr nachden bis 8.5.-22 Uhr eingegang. Meldungen," T-311/135/7180164; OKW/WFSt/Op,"Stand der Schiffsbewegungen im Ostseeraum," 10 May 1945, BA/MA, RW 44 I/34;Tiemann, Geschichte der 83. Infanterie-Division, 335.

84. Jürgen Schröder and Joachim Schultz-Naumann, Die Geschichte der pommerschen32. Infanterie-Division 1939-1945 (Bad Nauheim: Podzun, 1956), 194, 201; WalterSchelm and Hans Mehrle, Von den Kämpfen der 215. württembergisch-badischenInfanterie-Division (Stuttgart: privately published), 303.

85. Apparently the order for the divisions’ transfer from Army Group Center came fromHitler; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450010/45 gKdos. Chefs. (Guderian to Hitler),"14 Jan. 1945, T-78/339/6295383-85; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450011/45 gKdos.Chefs. (Guderian to Hitler)," 15 Jan. 1945, T-78/339/6295389-91. In his memoirs,Guderian wrote: “On January 15th Hitler interfered for the first time in the defensivebattle, by issuing an order, despite my protests, for the transfer of the Gross-DeutschlandCorps from East Prussia to Kielce where it was to block the break-through that theRussians were threatening to make towards Posen. It is obvious that this move could nothave been made in time to stop the Russians and would have involved a weakening ofEast Prussia at the very moment when the enemy's attack there was about to becomehighly dangerous. If the corps was taken away, the same disastrous situation mustdevelop in East Prussia that already existed along the Vistula. So this powerful strikingforce—consisting of the Panzergrenadier Division Gross-Deutschland and the LuftwaffePanzer Parachute Division Hermann Goering, commanded by the Panzer Corps Gross-Deutschland, and led by the trusted General von Saucken—sat in railway sidings while

its destination was the subject of argument. My refusal to carry out this order infuriatedHitler;” Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York: Ballantine, 1957) (Constantine Fitzgibbontrans.), 320. Guderian incorrectly states that Grossdeutschland was transferred to ArmyGroup A. In fact, it was the division Brandenburg; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr.450011/45 gKdos.Chefs. (Guderian to Hitler)," 15 Jan. 1945, T-78/339/6295389-91;Kabath, "Seebrückenköpfe," 304.

86. Heidkämper, "Die Schlacht um Ostpreussen," BA/MA, Nachlass Reinhardt, N245/15, 40-43.

87. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450010/45 gKdos. Chefs. (Guderian to Hitler)," 14Jan. 1945, T-78/339/6295383-85; Skl, KTB, 14 Jan. 1945, 248; Reinhardt Diary, 15 Jan.1945, BA/MA, Nachlass Reinhardt, N 245/3, 82.

88. Prinz Eugen and a destroyer covered Twenty-Eighth Corps' withdrawal from Memelto Cranz from 29-31 January. A destroyer and two torpedo boats supported itsbreakthrough to German lines in the western part of the Samland from 2-5 February. Inthe Elbing-Tolkemit-Frauenburg sector, Admiral Scheer shelled Soviet troopconcentrations from 6-7 February, was relieved by Lützow on the 8th, and then returnedwith a destroyer and two torpedo boats on 9-10 February. Admiral Scheer also supportedthe attack to regain contact from the Samland to Königsberg on 19 and 20 February. Onthe 23rd a destroyer and a torpedo boat assisted the army in the Samland, and from 24-26and on 28 February another destroyer and one torpedo boat provided fire support; MOKOstsee, Op B Nr. gKdos. 1602 F III, "Rückblick auf Monat Februar 1945," 10 Apr. 1945,BA/MA, RM 7/90, 484; Skl, KTB, 29 Jan. 1945, 505; Skl, KTB, 1 Feb. 1945, 2.

89. For example, see Lagevorträge, 28 and 30 Jan. 1945, 640-41.

90. Ibid., 18 and 20 Jan. 1945, 631, 634; Skl, KTB, 20 and 22 Jan. 1945, 353, 401-02;OKM/Chef Mar Wehr Tr I, "Nr. 228/45 gKdos.," 22 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/102, 242.

91. Lagevorträge, 21 and 22 Jan., 635, 637; Skl, KTB, 21 and 27 Jan. 1945, 375, 485.

92. The 20,000 men Dönitz had offered the Army were originally intended to releaseArmy units from Denmark for the Eastern Front. In March Hitler decided that thesedivisions should no longer be known as Naval Divisions, but instead as Naval InfantryDivisions. Although this was a trivial matter indeed, it demonstrates Hitler's interest inthe subject; Lagevorträge, 20 and 30 Jan. 1945, 634, 641: OKW/WFSt/Org II/Op (M),"Nr. 1101/45 gKdos.," 30 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RW 4/v.865, 54; Skl, KTB, 31 Jan. 1945,533-34; Skl, KTB, 10 Mar. 1945, 144.

93. The order to set up the 2nd Naval Division also states that the Navy had given 5000men to the SS; OKW/WFSt/Org (II) (1), Nr. 388/45 gKdos., "Betrifft: Erdkampf-Einsatzder Kriegsmarine," 8 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RW 4/v.865, 40.

94. All Army soldiers in the division were simultaneously transferred to the Navy; DerChef des OKW/WFSt/Org (I), Nr. 1754/45 geh., "Betr.: Überführung der 163.Inf.Div. indie Kriegsmarine," 1 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RW 4/v.495, 66.

95. Hitler realized this and issued instructions for 8000 of these men to be sent to theEast as replacements; OKW/Chef WFSt, "Lage am 30. Januar 1945," gKdos.Chefs., 30Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RW 4/v.115.

Chapter 7: Courland, East Prussia, and West Prussia: Bastions or Bridgeheads?

1. Percy Schramm, "Einleitung," OKW KTB, 7: 14, 53-54.

2. "An Interview with Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering: From the Invasion to theRuhr, Eastern vs. Western Fronts, High Level Strategy," World War II German MilitaryStudies, Vol. 2, ETHINT 30, 18. As discussed in Chapter 5 above, Hitler withdrew overa dozen divisions from Courland, so Goering is incorrect in stating that Hitler evacuatedonly six.

3. HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 4587/44 gKdos.," 21 Oct. 1944, T-312/1636/955-56.

4. HGr Nord, KTB, 22 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 101.

5. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 3249/45 gKdos.," 17 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/333,212; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450246/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 31 Mar. 1945, T-78/339/6295048-49; Adjutant des Chefs des GenStdH, Nr. 897/45 gKdos., "Notizen nachFührervortrag am 19.3. nachmittags," 19 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/333, 165-66;OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450277/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 13 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RH19 III/17, 13; Adm FHQu, Nr. 278/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 18/4/45," 18Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/851, 26.

6. HGr Nord, KTB, 22 Oct., 13, 14 and 21 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 102, RH19 III/332, 170, 180-81, 184-87, RH 19 III/333, 95-97.

7. OKH/GenStdH/FHO (I), Nr. 4404/44 gKdos., "Zusammenfassende Auswertung derwichtigsten Gefangeneaussagen und Meldungen des Geheimen Meldedienstes und derFrontaufklärung—Stand 5.12.44," 5 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 2/317, 66; HGr Nord, KTB,25, 26 and 27 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/335, 80, 115, 134, 136.

8. HGr Nord, KTB, 27 and 31 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19/III 335, 133-34, 178;OKH/GenStdH/FHO (I), "Vortragsnotiz: Sowjetrussische Kräfte vor deutscher Ostfront,"8 Jan. 1945, T-78/466/6446495; Ic/AO/Ausw., "Feindkräfterechnung," 9 Jan. 1945,BA/MA, Nachlass Reinhardt, N 245/15, 14.

9. Chef der Führungsgruppe im GenStdH, Nr. 111/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Gedanken zurEntwicklung der Lage am 18.2.45," 18 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/338, 26; HGrKurland/Ia, "Nr. 869/45 gKdos. (Vietinghoff to Guderian)," 2 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH2/333, 351; HGr Kurland/Ia, "Nr. 1287/45 gKdos.," 2 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/335, 52;OKH/GenStdH/FHO/IIc, geh., "Feindkräfteberechnung Stand 1.5.45," T-78/497/6485216; Heeres-Generalstab des Beauftragten des Führers für dieReichsverteidigung Nord/Führungsgruppe/Ic/III, "Feindkräfte vor VerteidigungsbereichNord, Stand: 1.5.1945 (morgens)," T-78/462/6441657.

10. HGr Nord, KTB, 6, 7 and 9 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/334, 46, 57, 60-63, 74.

11. According to Soviet sources at the end of 1944 2nd Belorussian Front received the2nd Shock Army and 3rd Belorussian Front the 2nd Guards Army. On 8 Jan. 1945 the5th Guards Tank Army was incorporated into 2nd Belorussian Front, and 11 days laterthe 43rd Army became part of 3rd Belorussian Front. By the time Zhukov launched hisoffensive in mid-January 1945, the 3rd Shock and 61st Armies had joined 1st BelorussianFront, and the 21st Army had entered Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front. In addition, in Jan.1945 the 4th Shock Army briefly transferred to the front at Memel, and then returned toCourland. Along with the 22nd Army, the 4th Shock Army was transferred to the reserveon 1 Apr. 1945. The armies remaining in Courland during the battles in East Prussia andPomerania were the 1st Shock, 4th Shock, 6th Guards, 10th Guards, 22nd, 42nd, 51st,54th and 67th; Geschichte des zweiten Weltkrieges, 10: 114, 135-37, 144; Deutschland imzweiten Weltkrieg, 6: 690-91; Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staff at War, 1: 389; DavidGlantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War (London: Frank Cass, 1989),479, 505; Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 451. One source claims that the 54th Armyturned over its units to the 1st Shock and 61st armies in Oct., and its staff was deactivatedin Dec. 1944; Albert Conner and Robert Poirier, Red Army Order of Battle in the GreatPatriotic War (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985), 66.

12. HGr Nord, KTB, 10 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/332, 135; Anlage 6 zuOKH/GenStdH/FHO (I), Nr. 4640/44 gKdos., "Luftlage Ost, Stand 21.12.44," 22 Dec.1944, T-78/338/6294839; AOK 18, KTB, 8 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH 20-18/925, 32;Bagramian, "The Storming of Königsberg," 222.

13. Those remaining were the V and XIX Tank Corps, and the III Guards MechanizedCorps. Of the others, the I and XXIX Tank Corps participated in the Jan. offensive with3rd and 2nd Belorussian Front, respectively, while the X Tank Corps joined Konev's 1stUkrainian Front. III Guards Tank Corps formed part of 2nd Belorussian Front's reservein Jan., and XIX Tank Corps was transferred to Stavka reserve on 1 Apr. 1945; Erickson,The Road to Berlin, 453, 456, 467, 469; Geschichte des zweiten Weltkrieges, 10: 116-17,132, 144; Haupt, Heeresgruppe Nord, 308; OKH/GenStdH/ FHO (Chef), Nr. 371/45gKdos., "Wichtigste Feindfestellungen vom 20.1.1945," 20 Jan. 1945, T-78/466/6445324; HGr Nord, KTB, 21 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/333, 95-97.

14. These units included 3 guards tank brigades, 16 guards tank regiments and 2 guardsassault gun regiments; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (IIc) "Heeresgruppe Kurland Unterlage zurFeindkräfteberechnung Stand vom 13.4.1945," T-78/462/6441702.

15. OKH/GenStdH/FHO (Chef), Nr. 3721/44 gKdos., "Wichtigste Feindfestellungenvom 21.10.1944," 21 Oct. 1944, T-78/466/6445418; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (Chef), Nr.3955/44 gKdos., "Wichtigste Feindfestellungen vom 5.11.1944," 5 Nov. 1944, ibid.,Frame 6445401; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (I/M), "Vortragsnotiz: Feindlage vor Memelfluss-und Memelbrückenkopffront," 19 Dec. 1944, T-78/495/6483079-81.

16. HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 1543/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 26 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/328, 242-43; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450213/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 21 Mar. 1945, BA/MA,RH 2/329, 30; OKH/GenStdH/ OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450238/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 29 Mar.1945, BA/MA, RH 2/329, 35; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 4062/45 gKdos.," 1 Apr.1945, BA/MA, RH 2/335, 16; Adj.d.C.d.GenStdH, Nr. 1150/45 gKdos., "Notizen nachFührervortrag am 2.4.45 nachm.," 2 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/335, 43-45;OKH/GenStdH/ OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450254/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 3 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RM7/102, 34; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450263/ 45 gKdos.Chefs.," 4 Apr. 1945, T-78/339/6295272; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN/K), "Nr. 4342/45 gKdos.," 8 Apr. 1945, T-78/497/6484547; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450276/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 13 Apr.1945, T-78/496/6484112-13; OKW/WFSt/Op (H)/Nordost, "Nr. 3823/45 gKdos.," 27Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RW 44 I/109.

17. OKH/GenStdH/FHO (IIc), geh., "Feindkräfteberechnung (Stand: 15.1.45)," T-78/497/6485216; "Beitrag zum KTB für den 20.1.1945," T-78/339/6295941;OKH/GenStdH/FHO (IIc), geh., "Feindkräfteberechnung (Stand: 19.2.45)," T-78/496/6484289.

18. Foreign Armies East rated Soviet units opposite Army Group North at less than halfstrength—it evaluated Soviet troops in East Prussia as having a combat value of 39 rifledivisions and 35 armored units—while those opposite Army Group Vistula were rated ata strength of 71 rifle divisions, 6 cavalry divisions and 58 armored units. In comparison,Gehlen estimated that the units opposite Courland had a combat strength of 35 rifledivisions and 32 armored units; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (IIc), geh., "Feindkräfteberechnung(Stand: 1.3.45)," T-78/496/6484299.

19. OKH/GenStdH/FHO (IIc), geh., "Feindkräfteberechnung (Stand: 15.3.45)," T-78/496/6484314; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (IIc), geh., "Feindkräfteberechnung (Stand:31.3.45)," T-78/496/6484331.

20. OKH/GenStdH/FHO (IIc), geh., "Feindkräfteberechnung (Stand: 3.4.45),” T-78/496/6484334; OKH/GenStdH/ FHO (IIc), geh., "Feindkräfteberechnung (Stand:10.4.45)," T-78/496/6484342. Krebs, Guderian's successor, rated Russian strength evenhigher and informed Hitler that the defense of East and West Prussia tied down 193Soviet infantry divisions; Lagevorträge, 4 Apr. 1945, 693; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (IIc),

geh., "Feindkräfteberechnung (Stand: 15.4.45)," T-78/496/6484347. Gehlen wastransferred to the officer reserve pool on 10 Apr. 1945.

21. Gehlen estimated there were 1500 aircraft with 3rd Belorussian Front (1st AirArmy), 1200 with 2nd Belorussian Front (4th Air Army) and a total of 5000 supporting1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts (2nd, 6th and 16th Air Armies); Anlage 6 zuOKH/GenStdH/FHO (I), Nr. 4640/44 gKdos., "Luftlage Ost, Stand 21.12.44," 22 Dec.1944, T-78/338/6294839. Bagramian lists the 1st and 3rd, as well as parts of the 4th,15th and 18th Air Armies, as participating in the fighting in East Prussia in mid-Feb.;Bagramian, "The Storming of Königsberg," 222.

22. Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 542-44; Geschichte des zweiten Weltkrieges, 10: 145-46; Bagramian, "The Storming of Königsberg," 231-33. Nonetheless, the Soviets hadartillery to spare. Zhukov and Konev had a total of 16,716 artillery pieces for the assaulton Berlin; Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 538, 595.

23. Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 539, 556-57, 758. Particularly in this case, Gehlen'sestimates were far off the mark. Although the Soviets employed over 190 divisions in theBerlin operation, Gehlen predicted that the Russians had only a total of 192 rifle divisionsagainst both Army Groups Vistula and Center; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (IIc), geh.,"Feindkräfteberechnung (Stand: 15.4.45)," T-78/496/6484347.

24. Zhukov received 3rd Army from East Prussia, and 61st and 3rd Shock fromCourland. Konev had 21st Army from Courland and 28th Army from East Prussia. InRokossovskii's forces, the 2nd Shock Army and III Guards Tank Corps had come fromCourland. Elements of the 4th and 18th Air Armies had supported operations in EastPrussia; Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 556-57; Bagramian, "The Storming ofKönigsberg," 222.

25. Hitlers Tischgespräche, 8-10 Sept. 1941, 23 Apr. 1942, and 7, 22 and 24 July 1942,69-70, 237, 427, 442, 459; see also "Adolf Hitlers Geheimrede vor dem 'MilitärischenFührernachwuchs' vom 30. Mai 1942," reproduced in ibid., 493, 495; Lagevorträge, 9-11Aug. 1943, 537.

26. Gerhard Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler 1938-1943: Aufzeichnungen des MajorsEngel (Hildegard von Kotze ed.) (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1974), entry for 8Dec. 1941, 118; TBJG, entry for 20 Mar. 1943, 7: 593.

27. "Mittagslage vom 6. November 1944," Hitlers Lagebesprechungen, 679; Guderian,Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, 346, 350. In this connection, Schörner’s letter of 6 Aug.1944 would only have reinforced Hitler's conviction.

28. TBJG, 5 Dec. 1944, 14: 354-55, 3 Jan., 12 Feb., 3 and 7 Mar. 1945, Vol. 15: 42-43,366, 405, 442.

29. HGr Nord, KTB, 12 and 22 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 243, RH 19 III/331,102; AOK 16/OQu/Qu1, "OQu Besprechung am 25.10.44, 9.30 Uhr," T-312/640/8268877.

30. For example, after a conversation with Schörner, Hilpert noted: "Fortress Courlandmust be held until the end of the war, because it draws many times over our own strength(150 divisions!) and keeps them far from our homeland;" Der OB der 16.Armee/Ia, "Nr.8750/44 geh.," 1 Dec. 1944, T-312/634/8262429. Schörner criticized Haupt's assessmentof his role in the decision to defend Courland. Schörner claimed that he wanted to holdCourland no more than Guderian, but he had his orders and considered the reasons(which, unfortunately, he does not specify) for this command to be valid; BA/MA,Nachlass Schörner, N 60/73.

31. HGr Nord, KTB, 31 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/335, 182-83.

32. Anlage 1 zu OKH/GenStdH/FHO (I), Nr. 4012/44 gKdos. vom 10.11.44,"Vermutliche Operationsabsichten des Gegners im einzelnen," BA/MA, RH 2/316, 150.POW interrogations in Courland provided evidence to support this view; HGrNord/Ic/AO, Nr. 7352/44 geh., "Tagesmeldung vom 30.10.1944," 31 Oct. 1944, T-78/487/6471800.

33. OKH/GenStdH/FHO (I), Nr. 4520/44 gKdos., "Kurze Beurteilung der Feindlage vom14.12.1944," 14 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/779, p. 87; Skl, KTB, 16 Dec. 1944, 388.

34. Reports indicated that the 2nd Guards and 61st Armies had transferred to EastPrussia, and the 3rd Shock Army was in Hungary; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (I), Nr. 4724/44gKdos., "Kurze Beurteilung der Feindlage vom 28.12.1944," 28 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RM7/779, 58; Beilage zu Anlage 2 zu FHO (I), Nr. 81/45 gK. v. 5.1.45, "SowjetrussischeAngriffsabsichten im einzelnen," BA/MA, RH 2/331b, 153-54.

35. OKH/GenStdH/FHO (Chef), Nr. 2/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Beurteilung desGesamtfeindlage im Osten vom 15.1.1945," 15 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/328, 3-6. Therevised estimates claimed that in the first two Courland Battles the Soviets attacked withonly 10 armies of 71-80 rifle divisions, 6-7 armored corps and 10-17 armored units. Bythe beginning of the 3rd Courland Battle the Russians had withdrawn 4 armies with 22rifle divisions, 2 tank corps and 5 armored units; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (IN), "FeindlicheOperationsmöglichkeiten und Kräfteansatz gegen Heeresgruppe Nord," 17 Jan. 1945, T-78/487/6471688-90; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (I), "Feindliche Kampfführung gegen dieH.Gr.Nord," 17 Jan. 1945, T-78/487/6471681-84.

36. OKH/GenStdH/FHO (Chef), Nr. 7/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Beurteilung der Feindlage imgrossen vom 20.1. vorm.," 20 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/328, 8-10.

37. OKH/GenStdH/FHO (Chef), Nr. 26/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Gedanken zurFeindbeurteilung Stand 2.2.1945," 2 Feb. 1945, T-78/496/6484215; OKH/Chef der

Führungsgruppe im GenStdH, Nr. 111/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Gedanken zur Entwicklung derLage am 18.2.45," 18 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/328, 25-30.

38. OKH/GenStdH/FHO, Nr. 45/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Beurteilung der Feindlage vordeutscher Ostfront im grossen, Stand 25.2.45," 25 Feb. 1945, T-78/466/6446427.Although Gehlen was mistaken about the Soviets' concern for Pomerania, he did not missthe mark otherwise.

39. Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, 332, 336, 348, 361; Heinz Guderian, "TheInterrelationship between the Eastern and Western Fronts," World War II GermanMilitary Studies, Vol. 24, MS# T-42, 38; The Hitler Book, 179-80.

40. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450012/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 16 Jan. 1945, T-78/339/6295412; Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, 361, 374-75, 389-90; Speer,Inside the Third Reich, 534-35; Bradley, Walther Wenck, 328-29; Maizière, In derPflicht, 103-04. Although in his memoirs Guderian claims that Hitler had relieved him ofhis post, Hitler's Luftwaffe adjutant maintains that Hitler still thought well of Guderianand expected him to return after his convalescence; Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant, 406.

41. Zeitzler, "Das Ringen um die grossen Entscheidungen im zweiten Weltkrieg," Vol. 2,BA/MA, Nachlass Zeitzler, N 63/80, 31; Heusinger, Befehl im Widerstreit, 266; TBJG,18 April 1944, 12: 135. Another reason for Hitler's decision to defend Sevastopol washis concern for the effect of the complete loss of the Crimea on Bulgaria and especiallyTurkey, which had already halted delivery of chromium ore; OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr.771366/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung," 25 Apr. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/1099, 6-8.

42. "Besprechung des Führers mit Generaloberst Jodl am 31. July 1944 in derWolfsschanze," Hitlers Lagebesprechungen, 585, 590; Jodl Diary, 16 Sept. 1944,BA/MA, RW 4/v.33, 57.

43. For example, at the end of January Himmler ordered Thorn's fortress commandant tohold the city under all circumstances in order to tie down enemy forces; Der Ob der HGrWeichsel, 26 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RW 4/v.115, 41. On Schneidemühl and Poznan asbreakwaters, OKW KTB, 15, 16 and 18 Feb. 1945, 8: 1096-97, 1099, 1105.

44. Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 474, 517, 520, 523-25, 638.

45. Weinberg, A World at Arms, 696-99.

46. OKH/GenStdH/MVO, "B.Nr. 329/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 6 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM7/162, 326; Seetransportchef f.d.Wehrmacht, "Skl Adm QuVI 5294/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 8Sept. 1944, ibid., 327-28.

47. Skl, KTB, 13 Oct. 1944, 315; Skl, "Adm Qu VI 5508/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 13 Oct.1944, BA/MA, RM 7/131, 456.

48. From Jan. through Sept. 1944 Germany gained 339,537 tons of shipping. Losses inthis period amounted to 639,732 tons, resulting in an overall decline of over 300,000tons. By the end of Nov. the net loss had risen to 537,000 tons; "RKSHandelsschiffstonnage, Entwicklung vom 1.1-30.9. 44," BA/MA, RM 7/100, 436; Skl,KTB, 15 Dec. 1944, 373. From this Salewski concludes that it would have beenimpossible to evacuate the army group at any time after Sept. 1944; Salewski, Diedeutsche Seekriegsleitung, 2: 466-67, 491.

49. Skl, KTB, 17 Jan. 1945, 298-99. The two steamers were the Cometa and Langssee;ibid., 19 Jan. 1945, 345; BA/MA, Nachlass Genmaj. Hubert Lamay, N 317/23, 5. For alist of passenger ships and their transport capacity, see Rohwer and Hümmelchen,Chronology of the War at Sea, 2: 488-89.

50. MVO beim Chef GenStdH, "B.Nr. 567/45 geh.," 25 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/331a,72.

51. For example, the earlier estimates for the number of men heavy cruisers couldtransport rose from 1000 to 1200, for destroyers from 300 to 500, for Type 39 torpedoboats from 200 to 500, and for Type 35 and 37 torpedo boats from 100 to 220 men; Skl,KTB, 20 Jan. 1945, 360.

52. MVO beim Chef GenStdH, B.Nr. 448/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Betrifft: Abtransportweiterer Divisionen von H.Gr.Nord," 17 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/328, 225-26.Although these divisions left much of their equipment in Courland, Dönitz neverthelessassured Hitler he would transport an armored division in 3 days; Lagevorträge 18 Jan.1945, 631.

53. Vietinghoff to Guderian, 8 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, Nachlass Loch, N 186/16. Theoriginal study envisioned 3 divisions holding a small bridgehead around Windau and 11divisions in a larger Libau bridgehead. This would free 9 infantry and 2 armoreddivisions; Hofer, Oberstlt.i.G., gKdos., "Studie über Freimachung von Kräften unterÄndering des bisherigen Auftrages der Heeresgruppe," 30 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH 19III/338, 3-4. The "Laura" plans underwent several revisions, from the original one tohold bridgeheads around the ports to later variations which called for the entire armygroup's evacuation.

54. Skl, KTB, 15 Feb. 1945, 153-54; Adm FHQu, Nr. 101/45 gKdos.Chefs.,"Lageunterrichtung," 16 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/102, 205; Skl, KTB, 17 Feb. 1945,177-80.

55. Skl, KTB, 17 Feb. 1945, 180-81; Lagevorträge, 17 Feb. 1945, 655.

56. Skl, KTB, 15 Feb. 1945, 154. The transports continued throughout the month. InFeb. the Navy brought 64,000 men and 14,000 vehicles from Courland; OKW KTB, 6Mar. 1945, 8: 1147.

57. For example, AOK 18/Ia, Nr. 4605/44 gKdos., "Stärken der Divisionen (Stand:28.11.44)," 1 Dec. 1944, T-312/971/9162693; AOK 18/Ia, Nr. 4877/44 gKdos., "Stärkender Divisionen (Stand: 30.12.44)," 31 Dec. 1944, T-312/971/9162657.

58. "Vortragsnotiz des Ia vom 6.II.," 6 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 19 III/338, 12-16;OQu/NT, "Erläuterung und Beschleung des OQu bei tägliche Durchschnitts Zulauf,"ibid., 21-25; HGr Kurland/Ia, Nr. 23/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Vortragsnotiz für Fall 'Laura,'"15 Feb. 1945, ibid., 43-46; Lagevorträge, 17 Feb. 1945, 655; Skl, KTB, 17 Feb. 1945,178, 181.

59. Skl, KTB, 23 and 24 Feb. 1945, 264-65, 282; Lagevorträge, 17 Feb. 1945, 654.

60. Lagevorträge, 17 and 18 Mar. 1945, 678-80; Skl, KTB, 19 Mar. 1945, 266-67.Wagner failed to include the "lengthy comments" of Hitler's reasons for holding Courlandin his summary of the conference.

61. Natzmer, “Festung Kurland,” IfZ, ZS 111, 61-63; Dieckert and Grossmann, DerKampf um Ostpreussen, 74; Kabath, "Seebrückenköpfe," 252; Lasch, So fielKönigsberg," 28.

62. Weinberg, A World at Arms, 667-68.

63. Ibid., 399, 670-71.

64. Ibid., 604, 668.

65. Warlimont, Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht, 486-87; OKW KTB, 8: 346,355-56.

66. Skl, KTB, 20 Oct. 1944, 486-87; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 372-75; Jung, DieArdennen-Offensive, 28. Although it is true that Rumania's surrender and Bulgaria'sdefection opened a huge gap in the southeast, Hitler chose to withdraw from the Balkansbefore the danger to his forces there was acute.

67. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 395-96. Norway's importance to Hitler will beexamined in Chapters 9 and 10.

68. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 69; Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 2.

69. Junge, Bis zur letzten Stunde, 139; TBJG, 4 and 15 Mar. and 18 Apr. 1944, 11: 399,482, 12: 138; Weinberg, A World at Arms, 665-68.

70. Gotthard Breit, Das Staats- und Gesellschaftsbild deutscher Generale beiderWeltkriege im Spiegel ihrer Memoiren (Boppard: Harald Boldt, 1973), 206-07, 210.Speer mentions General Heinrici as one who believed this; “Kapitel 6, Kuerzungen, F.

Hitler als Feldherr und Politiker (9 Mar. 1952),” Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafterBA/K), Nachlass Speer, N 1340/385, 27 + 5-6.

71. "Besprechung des Führers mit Generaloberst Jodl am 31. Juli 1944 in derWolfsschanze," Hitlers Lagebesprechungen, 585-94; "An Interview with Genobst AlfredJodl: Planning the Ardennes Offensive," 26 July 1945, World War II German MilitaryStudies, Vol. 3, ETHINT 50, 4-5; "An Interview with Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering:From the Invasion to the Ruhr, Eastern vs. Western Fronts, High Level Strategy," ibid.,Vol. 2, ETHINT 30, 10.

72. TBJG, 2 and 20 Dec. 1944, 14: 318-19, 452; "An Interview with Genobst AlfredJodl: Planning the Ardennes Offensive," 15-16; "An Interview with ReichsmarschallHermann Goering: From the Invasion to the Ruhr, Eastern vs. Western Fronts, HighLevel Strategy," 10-12; Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant, 386; Albert Speer, Inside the ThirdReich (Richard and Clara Winston trans.) (New York: Avon, 1970), 527-28.

73. Kreipe Diary, 16 Sept. 1944, IfZ, F 29, 21.

74. Jung, Die Ardennen-Offensive, 105-09.

75. Wilfred von Oven, Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende (Buenos Aires: Dürer, 1950), entriesfor 5 Sept. and 25 Oct. 1944, 2: 130, 169; Speer, Inside the Third Reich, 527-28. On theSkl’s confidence in the offensive’s success, Werner Rahn, “Winkelriede, Opferkämpferoder Sturmwikinger? Zu besonderen Einsatzformen der deutschen Kriegsmarine1944/45,” Deutsche Marinen im Wandel. Vom Symbol nationaler Einheit zum Instrumentinternationaler Sicherheit (Werner Rahn ed.) (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005), 512 (Theauthor thanks Dr. Rahn for sending a copy of this important article. Unfortunately, it wastoo late to include in the manuscript).

76. Jung, Die Ardennen-Offensive, 104; Weinberg, A World at Arms, 765.

77. Kurt von Tippelskirch, Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieg (Bonn: Athenäum, 1951),563-64; Walter Görlitz, Der Zweite Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Steingrüben, 1952), 2: 462.

78. Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, 373; Guderian, "The InterrelationshipBetween the Eastern and Western Fronts," 51.

79. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Chef), "Besprechungspunkte für den Führervortrag am20.12.1944," 19 Dec. 1944, T-78/338/6294884; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr.450012/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 16 Jan. 1945, T-78/339/6295412; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt(IN), "Nr. 1357/45 gKdos.," 31 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/331a, 4.

80. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 81-85; Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories (AnthonyPowell trans.) (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1982), 398.

81. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IS/A), "Nr. 430586/43 gKdos. Chefs.," 4 Sept. 1943, OKWKTB, 6: 1455-56; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 164-65, 171; Wolfgang Pickert, VomKuban-Brückenkopf bis Sewastopol (Heidelberg: Kurt Vowinckel, 1955), 55.

82. Zeitzler, "Das Ringen um die grossen Entscheidungen im zweiten Weltkrieg," Vol. 2,BA/MA, Nachlass Zeitzler, N 63/80, 31; Weinberg, A World at Arms, 456-57.According to Speer, Hitler planned to use the Kuban Bridgehead as a springboard for afuture offensive into Persia and India; “Fragen Fest,” (undated response of Speer toquestions in a letter from Fest, dated 20 Aug. 1969), BA/K, Nachlass Speer, N 1340/17;Speer to Fest, 13 Sept. 1969, BA/K Nachlass Speer, N 1340/17; Speer, Inside the ThirdReich, 353-54.

83. Heusinger, Befehl im Widerstreit, 266.

84. Manstein, Lost Victories, 392; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 59, 181. Hitler alsobelieved that Soviet aircraft based in the Crimea would pose a serious threat to Rumanianoil fields and refineries; Lagevorträge, 27 Oct. 1943, 553.

85. Zydowitz, Geschichte der 58. Infanterie-Division, 130-31.

86. Speer to Fest, 13 Sept. 1969, BA/K, Nachlass Speer, N 1340/17; Albert Speer,Spandau: The Secret Diaries (Richard and Clara Winston trans.) (New York: Macmillan,1976), 15; "Ansprache des Führers vor Divisionskommandeuren am 12. Dezember 1944im Adlerhorst," Hitlers Lagebesprechungen, 720; "Ansprache des Führers vor Divisions-kommandeuren am 28.Dezember 1944 im Adlerhorst," Hitlers Lagebesprechungen, 739,742.

87. Heidkämper, "Die Schlacht um Ostpreussen," BA/MA, Nachlass Reinhardt, N245/15, 54-55.

88. TBJG, 4, 25, 26 and 30 Jan. 1945, 15: 53-56, 218, 231, 275.

89. Speer to Hitler, 5 Sept. 1944, BA/K, Nachlass Speer, N 1340/214; “Protokoll 8:Bedarf der Wehrmacht, Progeammgestalting, Lieferungen vom Ausland, einschliesslichbesetzte Gebiete (8 August 1945),” in Albert Speer: Die Kransberg-Protokolle 1945(Ulrich Schlie ed.) (Munich: Herbig, 2003), 384-87; Speer, Inside the Third Reich, 480-81. In his memoirs, Speer claims Jodl convinced Hitler to request the study, and thatHitler was no longer interested in it when completed. He fails to mention this in theAugust 1945 interrogation, and it could be that his memory in August 1945 was betterthan when he published his memoirs more than twenty years later.

Chapter 8: The Swedish Question

1. The Hitler Book, 179-80; HGr Nord, KTB, 5 and 7 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19III/318, 50, 67; Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, 336; Gerhard Boldt, Hitler—Dieletzten zehn Tage (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1973), 74-75, 77. Boldt is rather vague with hisdates. His account indicates that Hitler cited Sweden as a reason for holding Courland inlate Jan. and again in late Mar. 1945.

2. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed) Das Deutsche Reich und der ZweiteWeltkrieg, 4: Horst Boog et al, Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion (Stuttgart: DeutscheVerlags-Anstalt, 1983), p. 405; Boheman, På Vakt, 2: 97, 103-04; Lennart Behrendtz,"Tysklands hållning till svensk intervention i vinterkriget: En analys mot bakgrund avden nazistiska östpolitiken," Scandia 38 (No. 2): 225-27; Bruno von Uthmann, "GermanMilitary Policy in Scandinavia," 28 Feb. 1949, World War II German Military Studies,Vol. 5, MS # T-101, Annex 22, 11-13.

3. Curt Juhlin-Dannfelt was military attaché in Berlin from 1933 to 1945. He claims tohave met with Sköld on 3 Apr. and warned him that the Germans would land at Narvik.Sköld thereupon angrily lectured him at some length that this was impossible; CurtJuhlin-Dannfelt, "Hågkomster," Kungl. Krigsarkiv, Stockholm (hereafter cited as KrA),Curt Juhlin-Dannfelts arkiv, Vol. 2, 204.

4. On 9 April the Swedes had 1 company of troops and 1 artillery battery in southernSweden; Carl August Ehrensvärd, I rikets tjänst: Händelser och människor från min bana(Stockholm: Norstedt, 1965), 155. The Swedes sent over 100 artillery pieces, more than90 anti-aircraft guns, 70 anti-tank guns and 14 aircraft to Finland. In April 1940 theSwedes had only 544 artillery pieces, 244 anti-aircraft guns, 145 anti-tank guns and 122operational aircraft; Tor Lange, "Vapenhjälpen till Finland," Sveriges militära beredskap1939-1945 (Carl-Axel Wangel ed.) (Köping: Militärhistoriska Förlaget, 1982) (hereafterSveriges beredskap), 136. See also Boheman, På Vakt, 2: 13, 119-20; Nils Palmstiernaand Carl-Axel Wangel, "Försvaret av övre Norrland 1 september 1939-mars 1940,"Sveriges beredskap, 120-21.

5. Gemzell, Raeder, Hitler und Skandinavien, 277, 287; "Niederschrift des L IH (Obstlt.v.Lossberg) über seinen Vortrag vor dem Chef OKW und dem Chef WFA in derReichskanzlei am 15.4.40 von 10.40-11.05 Uhr," 15 Apr. 1940, OKW KTB, 2: 963.

6. Patrick Salmon, "British Plans for Economic Warfare against Germany 1937-1939:The Problem of Swedish Iron Ore," The Second World War: Essays in Military andPolitical History (Walter Laqueur ed.) (London: Sage, 1982), 31-32, 37, 43-46. OnChurchill's interest, Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 1: The GatheringStorm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), 531-36, 543-47.

7. The Swedes had learned of this scheme by tapping the phone lines of the Britishlegation and in Apr. 1940 arrested two Englishmen loading explosives into their car.Churchill was a driving force behind the plan to sabotage Oxelösund's port; CharlesCruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 33-42.

8. Klaus Wittmann, "Deutsch-schwedische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen im ZweitenWeltkrieg," Kriegswirtschaft und Rüstung 1939-1945 (Friedrich Forstmeier and Hans-Erich Volkmann eds.) (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1977), 201. Sources vary considerablyregarding the amount of iron ore Sweden sent to Germany. Wittmann claims that after1940 Swedish iron ore fulfilled about 25% of Germany's requirements. The Germansimported 5.34 million tons from Sweden in 1940, 5.02 million tons in 1941, 4.2 milliontons in 1942, 5.56 million tons in 1943 and 2.6 million tons in 1944; ibid., 203-07; AlanMilward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945 (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1977), 311; Martin Fritz, "A Question of Practical Politics: Economic Neutralityduring the Second World War," Neutrality and Defense: The Swedish Experience(Stockholm: Wallin & Dalholm, 1984), 106-08. These figures do not agree with an entryin the Skl war diary, which states that from Jan.-Aug. 1943 alone, iron ore shipmentsfrom Scandinavia to the greater German area amounted to 7.39 million tons, comparedwith over 5.4 million tons in the same period for 1941 and 1942, or with Speer, whomentioned an amount of close to ten million tons in 1943; Skl, KTB, 24 Sept. 1943, 493;“Die Bedeutung der Zufuhr an schwedischen und norwegischen Eisenerzen für diedeutsche Eisenerzeugung,” 11 Nov. 1943, BA/K, Nachlass Speer, N 1340/212.

9. Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 608.

10. Uthmann, "German Military Policy in Scandinavia," 13-15.

11. Fst, Marinoperationsavd., Nr. H 49, "VPM rörande det sjöstrategiska läget iÖstersjön vid krig mellan Sovjetunionen och Tyskland," 21 Mar. 1941, KrA,Beredskapverket 9 (Skölds papper), Vol. 2; TBJG, entry for 28 Jan. 1942, 3: 205. TheGerman military attaché in Sweden, Bruno von Uthmann, reported that Karl Schnurre, aspecial negotiator from the German Foreign Ministry, spoke with him of meetings on 24May 1941 with Swedish Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson and Foreign MinisterChristian Günther. Uthmann informed OKH that according to Schnurre, Günther haddeclared that if the Germans became involved in a war with Russia, the Swedishgovernment would be ready to do everything it could to support Germany and wouldeven conclude a military pact. Prime Minister Hansson, Uthmann related, had assuredSchnurre that provided Sweden maintained its sovereignty and freedom, the Swedishgovernment would bring its policies closer to those of Germany. Uthmann to Matzky, 27May 1941 (Alf Johansson ed.) Historisk Tidskrift, 1984, No. 4: 397-400. Johanssonmaintains that either Schnurre or Uthmann greatly exaggerated remarks by Hansson andGünther, because Swedish records of the talks present a very different picture.

12. Juhlin-Dannfelt, "Hågkomster," KrA, Curt Juhlin-Dannfelts arkiv, Vol. 2, 230; HökvFSt, "Nr. H 12:1/1941," 13 Mar. 1941, KrA, Beredskapverket 7, Vol. 1.

13. "Lagebetrachtung für einen Ostfeldzug gegen Russland (Fall 'Barbarossa')," 30 Jan.1941, in Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 3: 154-59. In 1941 the Swedesescorted some 650,000 tons of shipping through their territorial waters; Wittmann,"Deutsch-schwedische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen," 208.

14. OKW KTB, 3 Feb. 1941, 1: 299; ibid, 8 May 1941, 2: 393.

15. Ibid., 5 and 25 June 1941, 2: 401, 409. According to the transit agreement Germanycould not reinforce its troops in Norway via Sweden. Yet in Mar. 1941 the Swedesnoticed that 20,000 more troops on leave had “returned” north than earlier had gonesouth. The government protested, but did nothing; Wilhelm Calgren, Swedish ForeignPolicy during the Second World War (Arthur Spencer trans.) (London: Ernest Benn,1977), 96-98. Calgren gives no hint that the Swedes were fairly certain that Germanyplanned to attack the Soviet Union.

16. Boheman, På Vakt, 2: 182-87; Calgren, Swedish Foreign Policy during the SecondWorld War, 84; Uthmann, "German Military Policy in Scandinavia," 20; Carl-AxelWangel, "Neutralitetsrätt—regeler och tillämpning," Sveriges beredskap, 60-66.

17. Calgren, Swedish Foreign Policy during the Second World War, 85, 104. On theNazis’ displeasure with Sweden's press, Boheman, På Vakt, 2: 124-26, 159; TBJG,entries for 10 Dec. 1941, 28 Jan. 1942, 21 and 26 Apr. 1943, 30-31 Aug. 1943, 21 Sept.1943, 2: 462; 3: 205-06; 8: 143-44, 167 9: 389, 393, 546.

18. Denham states that the Swedish secret police photographed visitors at the Britishlegation and at his apartment. He relates a hilarious episode of an encounter with thepolice in late 1943. He discovered a microphone inside his chimney and once when hehad guests at his apartment, he and his visitors went up to attic and found two Swedishpolicemen with a tape recorder hiding under a sackcloth; Henry Denham, Inside the NaziRing: A Naval Attaché in Sweden 1940-1945 (London: John Murray, 1984), 27, 45, 48,53, 140-42, 150-52. Cruickshank also maintains that the Sweden's secret police washeaded by a "violently pro-German officer;" Cruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia, 206.

19. Lief Björkman, "Svensk beredskap hösten 1940 till Juni 1941," Sveriges beredskap,206; Juhlin-Dannfelt, "Hågkomster," KrA, Curt Juhlin-Dannfelts arkiv, Vol. 2, 334;Ehrensvärd, I rikets tjänst, 193, 216; Denham, Inside the Nazi Ring, 54. Thörnell retiredfrom active service at the end of Mar. 1944.

20. Ehrensvärd, I rikets tjänst, 207; Gunnar Hägglöf, Samtida Vittne 1940-1945(Stockholm: Norstedt, 1972), 206. Boheman states that the ball-bearings question wasespecially important to the Americans because the bombing of German ball-bearingplants at Schweinfurt had been so costly. He claims that in May 1944 the USgovernment sent Stanton Griffis, a film magnate, as a special delegate to negotiatedirectly with the Swedish company producing ball-bearings. Griffis ratherundiplomatically threatened that the US would bomb Swedish ball-bearing plants;Boheman, På Vakt, 2: 267-71, 295-96.

21. Lagevorträge, 29 Dec. 1941, 22 Jan. 1942, 336, 347-48; "Aufzeichnung desGeneralmajors Schmundt über die Besprechung Hitlers mit Mussolini und dem Chef desitalienischen Wehrmachtgeneralstabes, Generaloberst Graf Cavallero am 30. April 1942(Andreas Hillgruber and Jürgen Förster eds.)," Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 1972,

No. 1: 117. Speer states that around 1942 Hitler considered occupying Sweden, becauseair bases there could threaten northern Germany; “Fragen Fest,” BA/K, Nachlass Speer,N 1340/17.

22. OKW KTB, 16 Nov. 1942, 4: 968, 970. Hitler merely stated that he did not intend toinsist on transit traffic to the previous extent and he would send Schnurre to negotiate foras much traffic as possible; ibid., 6 Aug. 1943, 6: 905.

23. Chef WFSt, Nr. 662214/43 gKdos.Chefs., "Entspricht die Verteilung derGesamtkräfte auf den einzelnen Kriegsschauplätzen der strategischen Lage?," 8 Sept.1943, BA/MA, RM 7/260, 323; OKW/WFSt/Op, B.Nr. 662625/43 gKdos.Chefs.,"Betrachtung der Feindliche Angriffsmöglichkeiten gegen den Nordraum," 3 Nov. 1943,ibid., 338-39.

24. In 1942 the Swedes broke 2100 kilometers of telegram text; Olof Thörnell,"Sammanfattande historik rörande försvarets signal- och kryptotjäntst," 1 Dec. 1947,KrA, Beredskapverket 1, Vol. 3, Bihang 7, 37-38; Torgil Thorén, "Försvarsväsendetsradioanstalts (FRA) tillkomst, utveckling och arbete till sommaren 1945," 8 Mar. 1946,ibid., Vol. 43, 5-9. The site of Swedish code-breaking activity, Karlaplan 4, is only ablock from Sweden's military archives.

25. Calgren is extremely reluctant to state exactly when the Swedes knew that Hitlerplanned to invade Russia; Wilhelm Calgren, Svensk underrättelsetjänst 1939-1945(Stockholm: Liber Allmänna Förlaget/Försvarsdepartementet, 1985), 66-69. The Swedeslater learned that from Aug. 1941-Jan. 1942 an orderly who delivered reports on decodedGerman messages to the Defense Staff and Foreign Ministry photographed the reportsand sold them to the Soviets; ibid., 95.

26. Ibid., 98; Thörnell, "Sammanfattande historik rörande försvarets signal- ochkryptotjäntst," 1 Dec. 1947, KrA, Beredskapverket 1, Vol. 3, Bihang 7, 38; BurkhartMueller-Hillebrand, Germany and its Allies in World War II: A Record of AxisCollaboration Problems (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1980),175-76.

27. Carl-Axel Gemzell, Organization, Conflict, and Innovation: A Study of GermanNaval Strategic Planning, 1888-1940 (Lund: Esselte Studium, 1973), 372-74.

28. OKW KTB, 5 and 14 Jan, 10, 13 and 16 Mar. 1943, 5: 18, 39, 199-200, 207, 217.

29. Ziemke, German NTO, 258-60.

30. OKW KTB, 21 Aug. 1943, 6: 983; Gemzell, p. 221.

31. Olof Thörnell "Den operativa planläggning under beredskaptiden," KrA,Beredskapverket 1, Vol. 5, Bihang 2, 1-14.

32. "Militära synpunkter på Sverige läget i händelse av krig mellan Tyskland ochSovjetunionen," 5 Apr. 1941, KrA, Beredskapverket 7, Vol. 1; Fst, Sektion I, "PM förÖverbefälhavarens föredragning i statsrådsberedning 17/10 1942 rörande krigsfallTyskland-Sverige," KrA, Beredskapverket 7, Vol. 1.

33. Thörnell "Den operativa planläggning under beredskaptiden," KrA, Beredskapverket1, Vol. 5, Bihang 2, 41; Fst, Sektion I, "Memorial angående viss krigsfallsplanläggning,"25 Jan. 1944, KrA, Beredskapverket 7, Vol. 1.

34. As of 1 Oct. 1941 the Swedish Navy consisted of 7 coastal defense ships, 3 cruisers,17 destroyers, 18 submarines and 32 mine sweepers. By the end of the war the Swedeshad added 1 cruiser, 7 destroyers, 8 submarines, 10 mine sweepers and 20 motor torpedoboats; Carl-Axel Wangel, "Flottans utbyggnad," Sveriges beredskap, 322-25; Chefen förMarinen, "Instruktion för Krigsfall I/IMK:I/," [Mar.] 1941, KrA, Marinstaben,Expeditionen, Vol. 5, F XVI.

35. Chefen för Marinen, "Särskild instruktion för CKF vid Krigsfall I," 21 Apr. 1942,KrA, Marinstaben, Expeditionen, Vol. 5, F XVI. The reason for the Swedes' failure toaccount for invasion from Finland or the Baltic States earlier is puzzling; Chefen förMarinen, "Instruktion för Krigsfall I (IMK:I/42)," [Dec.] 1942, ibid.

36. Calgren, Svensk underrättelsetjänst, 64. Forshell was extremely pro-German and in1942, convinced of a Nazi victory, advised Admiral Fabian Tamm, Commander in Chiefof the Swedish Navy, that Sweden should join with Germany and not miss the “historicopportunity to contribute to Europe's future;” Juhlin-Dannfelt, "Hågkomster," KrA, CurtJuhlin-Dannfelts arkiv, Vol. 2, 271-72.

37. Denham, Inside the Nazi Ring, 63-65; Carl-Axel Wangel, "Neutralitetsförsvaret tillsjöss," Sveriges beredskap, 556-58.

38. B.Nr. 1/Skl I Op 502/43 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Einsatz der Überwasserstreitkräfte,"19 Feb. 1943, OKW KTB, 6: 1418.

39. MOK Ost, KTB, 16 and 22 July, 22 Aug. 1943, BA/MA, RM 31/M 522.

40. MOK Ostsee/Führungsstab, B.Nr. gKdos.Chefs. 65/43, "Betrifft: Tonnage-Krieg,"Anlage 4 zum KTB des MOK Ost v. 16.-31.8.1943, ibid.

41. "B.Nr.1/Skl 23966/43 gKdos.," 27 Aug. 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/160, 118-19;Lagevorträge, 28 Aug. 1943, 545; Beredskapverket 1, KrA, Vol. 3, p. 68. Skl, KTB, 6Sept. 1943, 109.

42. MOK Ost, KTB, 15 and 26 May 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/M 523.

43. Ibid., 1 July 1944; Adm.östl. Ostsee, gKdos.Chefs. 334 AI, "Betr.: Auftreten schwed.Einheiten Höhe Irbenstrasse," 14 July 1944, Anlage 17 zu MOK Ost KTB v. 1.-15.7.1944, ibid.

44. MOK Ost, KTB, 16, 18 and 24 July 1944, ibid. This was not the last incident of thistype. In March 1945 the Germans discovered a Swedish minelayer in their U-boattraining areas near Bornholm "for no apparent reason;" Adm. westliche Ostsee, B.Nr. OpgKdos. 591 F III, "Monatsbericht kommandierender Admiral westliche Ostsee für denMonat März 1945," 10 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 497.

45. Marinstaben, Krigsdagbok, 28 and 29 July, 5 and 6 Aug. 1943, KrA, D II, Vol. 2(hereafter cited as Mst, KDB).

46. Goebbels’ diary contains complaints about Sweden’s attitude throughout the year,often with threats of retaliation; TBJG, 19 Jan., 1 Mar., 15 Mar. and 18 Sept. 1944, 11:120, 374, 481, 13: 508.

47. On 23 May the Defense Staff ordered reconnaissance planes to fly no closer than 10nautical miles from Bornholm or the coast of the Baltic States; Mst, KDB, 14, 15, 16 and23 May 1944, KrA, D II, Vol. 2; Fst, Sektion I, "PM för Överbefälhavarens föredragningi statsrådsberedning 17/10 1942 rörande krigsfall Tyskland-Sverige," KrA,Beredskapverket 7, Vol. 1.

48. MOK Ostsee/Führungsstab, "B.Nr. gKdos. 648/44 Chefs.," T-1022/1825/PG 32519.See also a naval intelligence report of 40,000 Swedish troops poised to seize the islandsin 3/Skl, "S.B.Nr. 10029/44 geh. A," 14 Aug. 1944, ibid. Skl, KTB, 9 July 1944, 207.

49. On 31 Mar. the Swedes received a report that the Germans planned to invade Swedenvia the Åland Islands if Finland made peace with the Soviets; Fst, avd M, KDB, 31 Mar.1944, KrA, F III:1. This information would have served to confirm a report from aSwedish naval attaché, Möje Östberg, in Berlin. Östberg reported that following dinnerwith a mutual friend, he had spoken with Meisel about the situation in Finland. Meisel,intoxicated (according to Östberg not an unusual condition for Meisel), had declared thatthe Germans were well-prepared for action in the Baltic—even against Sweden. Meiselboasted that Germany's Baltic Fleet was larger than the Swedes assumed and warned thatGerman forces in northern Finland would be saved if that country made peace with theSoviets, which could place Sweden in a critical situation; Maratt Berlin, "Avg 52/Und 8,"24 Feb. 1944, KrA, F IV, Vol. 2. "Memorial 1/3 1944 angående utvecklingen i händelseav finsk-ryska freds- eller vapenstilleståndsförhandlingar," 1 Mar. 1944, KrA,Beredskapverket 7, Vol. 1.

50. The Navy ordered increased air reconnaissance from its southern coast to the Gulf ofBothnia, coastal artillery emplacements were fully-manned, squadrons shifted theirwarships, airfields were reinforced and mined against airborne assault, ports were closedfrom dusk to dawn, harbor obstacles and booms were erected and destroyers patrolled thecoast. In addition, port facilities at Luleå and Oxelösund and the rail lines from Luleå to

the Norwegian border and from the border to Kiruna were prepared for demolition; Fst,avd M, KDB, 1 Apr. 1944, KrA, F III:1; MSt, KDB, 23 Mar.-14 Apr. 1944, KrA, D II,Vol. 2.

51. MSt, KDB, 19-20 June and 15 and 16 Sept. 1944, KrA, D II, Vol. 2.

52. OKW/WFSt/Ag.Ausland, Nr. 4936/44 geh. Ausland II A2, "Betr.: Deutschland-Schweden," 19 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RW 4/v.653; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (IV), gKdos.,"Kurzgefasste Übersicht Schweden," 10 Jan. 1945, T-78/502/6490840. Fritz, "AQuestion of Practical Politics," 109; OKW/WFSt/Op M/Ia, "Betr.: Erzverschiffung Luleavom 5.6.-1.7.1944," 29 Aug. 1944, T-77/786/5514985; 1/Skl 2, "Nr. 22344/44 gKdos.,"19 July 1944, T-77/694/1904449; OKW/Feldwirtschaftsamt (Ausl.) 2.Abt., Nr. 7966/44geh., "Vortragsnotiz für Chef OKW," 19 Aug. 1944, T-77/694/1904425; 2/IIIeSchweden, "Nachtrag zur Vortragsnotiz für Chef OKW vom 19.8," 25 Aug. 1944, T-77/694/1904417; WO Schweden, Anlage zu Nr. 289/44 geh., "Erzverschiffung überLulea in den Kriegsjahre 1939-1944," T-77/694/1904386-87.

53. Anlage zu B.Nr. 1/Skl I Op 3106/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Weisung für dieSeekriegsführung in der östlichen Ostsee," 29 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 109.

54. ObdM, "Kurzlage ObdM Nr. 4," 6 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/100, 352.

55. Skl, KTB, 29 Sept. 1944, 787. "Vortrag des Chefs der Skl bei der Besprechung derOberbefehlshaber in 'Koralle' am 24./25.8.44," BA/MA, RM 7/100, 162; Skl, KTB, 25Sept. 1944, 697; 1/Skl I Op, B.Nr. 3151/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Einsatz der 2.Kampfgruppe zur Unterstützung H.Gr.Nord," 4 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/16, 69;B.Nr. 1/Skl I Op 3066/44 gKdos. Chefs., "Betr: Einsatz der Flottenstreitkräfte zurAbwehr von Landungen im Skagerrak-Raum," 25 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 329;1/Skl I Ost 3753/44 Chefs., "Besprechung Chef Skl mit Chef Genstb.d.H.," 15 Dec. 1944,BA/MA, RM 7/261, 117.

56. When the navy proposed the erection of launchers it also, via OKW, requested theForeign Ministry to clarify the proper response it should take to vaguely-defined Swedishencroachments. A few days later the Foreign Ministry responded that it could not provideguidelines without precise information on the navy's complaints and requested exactdetails on incidents. In the meantime, the Foreign Ministry suggested that the navyrefrain from provoking Sweden under all circumstances; OKW/WFSt/Qu2 (Nord), Nr.11914/44 gKdos., "Betr.: Deutsche Haltung gegenüber Schweden," 3 Oct. 1944, BA/MA,RW 4/v.653; Auswärtiges Amt, "Nr. 890 g.Rs.," 11 Oct. 1944, ibid; OKW/WFSt/Qu2(Nord), Nr. 7908/44 geh., "Betr.: Verhalten gegenüber Schweden," 15 Oct. 1944, ibid.

57. Skl, KTB, 23 Oct. 1944, 561.

58. MOK Ost/Führstab, "Op 6644 FI gKdos.," 24 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 340;Skl, KTB, 28 Oct. 1944, 668; Skl, KTB, 14 Nov. 1944, 298; Skl, KTB, 8 and 9 Feb.1945, 72, 75-76; Mst, KDB, 9 Nov. 1944, KrA, D II, Vol. 2.

59. OKW/WFSt/Qu2 (Nord), Nr. 88030/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Schweden," 5 Jan.1945, BA/MA, RW 4/v.654; Adm.FHQu, Nr. 20/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung,"10 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/101, 120.

60. OKW KTB, 15 Feb. 1945, 8: 1098; Lagevorträge, 10 Mar. 1945, 671. In 1943 thegovernment permitted the training of Norwegians and Danes who had fled to Sweden.Although officially referred to as police units, this force received military training andheavy weapons. By the end of the war the "police units" contained some 15,000Norwegians and 5,000 Danes; Beredskapverket 1, KrA, Vol. 3, 483-85, Vol. 35, 70-71.In the fall of 1944 Sweden's Foreign Minister informed his Norwegian counterpart thatSweden was prepared to agree to a direct request from the Norwegian government toallow 12,000 to 16,000 Norwegian police troops to enter Norway surreptitiously. IfNorway's king and the Allies so requested, Swedish troops would help the Norwegiansgain entry into Norway; JIC 263, Top Secret, "Swedish Participation and Cooperation toliberate Norway," 31 Mar. 1945, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 1, 1942-45,European Theater (University Publications of America Microfilm), Reel 10, Frames 307-11.

61. Carl-Axel Gemzell, "Tysk militär planläggning under det andra världskriget: fallSverige," Scandia 41 (No. 2): 201-04.

62. 1/Skl, Nr. 1568/43 gKdos.Chefs., "Kurze Betrachtung zum Kriegsfall mit Schwedenund zu den dabei auftretenden Aufgaben der Kriegsmarine" [May 1943], BA/MA, RM7/160, 172-84.

63. Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 2: 403.

64. 1/Skl 3119/43 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Schweden," 20 Oct. 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/163,384; Skl, KTB, 23 Oct. 1943, 463-64; MOK Ostsee/Führungsstab, "B.Nr. gKdos.Chefs.196/43," 10 Dec. 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 372-80. The report by Naval HighCommand, Norway, bluntly stated that war with Sweden would result in Norway'sisolation almost without a fight, because Sweden would immediately provide Anglo-American air and naval forces with bases to block all shipping through the Kattegat andSkagerrak. German troops in Norway and northern Finland would then be cut off fromtheir supplies, and left with whatever was on hand. In addition, this would put an end toexports from Norway, which in 1943 included 1.06 million tons of ores and metals,360,000 tons of fertilizer, and 200,000 tons of fish; MOK Norwegen/Führungsstab, B.Nr.gKdos. 934 AI Chefs., "Betrifft: Studie Schweden," 6 Mar. 1944, RM 7/163, 363.

65. Skl, KTB, 19 Oct. 1944, 460; B.Nr. 1/Skl Ib 3337/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: StudieSchweden," 19 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 355-59.

66. B.Nr. 1/Skl 3414/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lagebetrachtung für den Fall einesKriegseintrittes Schwedens auf der Seite unserer Gegner," 29 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM7/163, 267-93.

67. Skl, KTB, 1 Dec. 1944, 10; 1/Skl I op 110/45 Chefs., "Betr.: Vorbereitungen füreinen möglichen Kriegseintritt Schwedens," 12 Feb. 1945, T-1022/3913/PG 31757.

68. Fst, avd M, "VPM ang marinpolitiska läget," 9 Sept. 1944, KrA, F IV, Vol. 3; Mst,KDB, 28 Oct., 3 and 11 Nov. 1944, KrA, D II, Vol. 2.

69. Fst, avd M, "VPM angående det militär-politiska läget hösten-vintern 1943/44 samtde åtgärder, som böra vidtagas därest en ökning av den marina beredskapen måstagenomföras," 29 Dec. 1943, KrA, F IV, Vol. 3. In the spring of 1943 the Swedesconsidered Soviet seizure of the Baltic States as presenting a possible threat to the ÅlandIslands and Gotland; Fst, Avd M, "Sveriges strategiska läget våren 1943," ibid.

70. Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 462.

Chapter 9: The U-Boat War, the Baltic Sea, and Norway

1. Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 2: 497.

2. Germany and the Second World War, 6: 348; Günter Hessler, The U-Boat War in theAtlantic, 1939-1945 (London: HMSO, 1989), 3: Diagram 31. Hessler was Dönitz’s son-in-law and a submarine commander who later served as Staff Officer (Operations) to FlagOfficer, U-Boats. Shortly after the war Hessler prepared this study at the BritishAdmiralty's request and received access to captured German documents.

3. B.Nr. 1/Skl Iu 843/43 gKdos.Chefs., "Abschlussbetrachtung zum Geleitzug Nr. 19,"24 May 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/ 847; 2/Skl BdU Op, B.Nr. gKdos. 3104 A op,"Geleitoperation Nr. 3," 28 May 1943, ibid. According to Allied sources, the Germansactually sank 21 ships of 141,000 tons; Jürgen Rohwer, The Critical Convoy Battles ofMarch 1943: The Battle for HX 229/SC 122 (Derek Masters trans.) (Annapolis: NavalInstitute Press, 1977), 198. Other helpful works on the U-boat war include Rahn’sexcellent summary in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed), Germany and theSecond World War, Vol. 6: Horst Boog et al, The Global War: Widening of the Conflictinto a World War and the Shift of the Initiative 1941-1943 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,2001), 342-405; Michael Gannon, Operation Drumbeat (New York: Harper & Row,1990), Stephen Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939-1945, 3 vols. (London: HMSO, 1954-61)and, despite questionable interpretation, Clay Blair, Hitler’s U-Boat War, 2 vols. (NewYork: Random House, 1996, 1998).

4. Lagevorträge, 11 Apr. 1943, 475-77; Iu, "Kurze Betrachtung zum U-Bootskrieg,"Chefs., [7] June 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/847. In May 1943 the Germans lost one submarinefor every 10,000 tons of Allied shipping sunk, compared to recent ratios of one U-boatper 100,000 tons; BdU, KTB, 24 May 1943, BA/MA, RM 87/8, 258-60.

5. Lagevorträge, 14 and 31 May 1943, 505, 507-10; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl 33470/44 gKdos.,"Der Rüstungsstand der Seestreitkräfte, Anfang November 1944," 11 Nov. 1944, OKWKTB, 8: 1577.

6. Although several sources state that this was the diving depth of the Type XXI, Rugementions Dönitz’s fury upon learning that construction flaws jeopardized the U-boats'ability to reach a depth of 300 meters, and during trials a Type XXI dove to 225 meters(738 feet); Friedrich Ruge, In vier Marinen (Munich: Bernard & Graefe, 1979), 264. Seealso Ing. J. Elenz, Bericht Nr. St 116, "Festigkeitstechnische Untersuchung an einem U-Boot vom Typ XXI beim Tieftauchen am 23.3.45," 16 June 1948, BA/MA, NachlassOelfken, N 518/2a; Axel Niestlé, “German Technical and Electronic Development,” inStephen Howarth and Derek Law (eds) The Battle of the Atlantic 1939-1945 (Annapolis:Naval Institute Press, 1994), 435-36; Werner Rahn, “Die Entstehung neuer deutscher U-Boot-Typen im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Bau, Erprobung und erste operative Erfahrungen,”Militärgeschichte 3 (No. 2, 1993): 15. On convoy speed, Weinberg, A World at Arms,374.

7. 2/Skl BdU Op, B.Nr. gKdos. 4858 AI, Überlegungen zum Einsatz des Typ XXI," 10July 1944, BA/MA, Nachlass Dönitz, N 236/19, 7-18; Hessler, The U-Boat War in theAtlantic, 1: 115, 119, 3: 6; N.I.D. 24/T.9A/45, “Report: Summary of German U-BoatDesigns,” 17 Oct. 1945, NavOpArch, GNR, Box T 77, 17; Erwin Sieche, "The Type XXISubmarine," Warship, No. 17 (Jan. 1981), 3-7; Eberhard Rössler, The U-boat: TheEvolution and Technical History of German Submarines (Harold Erenberg trans.)(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981), 208-09, 340. The Type XXIs also vastlyimproved living conditions for their crews. Each sailor had his own bunk, and thesubmarines contained a washroom with showers and, most important, 3 toilets instead ofthe former "primitive lavatory" also used to store food; Peter Cremer, U-BoatCommander: A Periscope View of the Battle of the Atlantic (Lawrence Wilson trans.)(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984), 195.

8. Rössler, The U-Boat, 209-10, 341; Hessler, The U-Boat War in the Atlantic, 3: 7;N.I.D. 24/T.9A/45, “Report: Summary of German U-Boat Designs,” 17 Oct. 1945,NavOpArch, GNR, Box T 77, 20; Erwin Sieche, "The German Type XXIII Submarine,"Warship, No. 19 (July 1981): 154-58.

9. Guntram Schulze-Wegener, Die deutsche Kriegsmarine-Rüstung 1942-1945(Hamburg: Mittler, 1997), 130-31; Lagevorträge, 8 July 1943, 517-21. For an equallyoptimistic evaluation by Dönitz on the prospects for the new submarines, 2/Skl BdU Op,B.Nr. gKdos. 4858 AI, “Überlegungen zum Einsatz des Typ XXI," 10 July 1944,BA/MA, Nachlass Dönitz, N 236/19, 4-18.

10. Skl, KTB, 15 Aug. 1943, 271; Hessler, The U-Boat War in the Atlantic, 3: 83;Rössler, The U-Boat, 214; Albert Speer, Reichsminister für Rüstung undKriegsproduktion, "Nr. M 1362/45 gRs.," 27 Jan. 1945, T-77/864/5611342-43.

11. Report 92a17, USSBS Interview No. 49, Otto Merker, 20 June 1945, NationalArchives, Record Group 243 (hereafter NA, RG 243), Entry 6, Box 723; Report 92a22,USSBS Agency Investigation Ingenieurbureau Glueckauf—Procurement Division, 7 May1945, NA, RG 243, Entry 6, Box 724. According to these estimates the first Type XXIwas scheduled for delivery at the end of Apr. or beginning of May 1944, and the firstType XXIII (consisting of 4 sections) at the end of Feb. or beginning of March; Anlagezu Der Reichsminister für Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion, Vorsitzer derSchiffbaukommission, "B.Nr. 2321/43 gKdos.," 30 Nov. 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/98, 126-29.

12. Hauptamt Kriegsschiffbau, "K Stb. 2812/43 gKdos.," 13 Oct. 1943, BA/MA, RM7/98, 198. In fact, sectional construction reduced slip time from 26 weeks for a Type IX-D, a U-boat of similar size, to about 6 weeks for Type XXI submarines; Heinrich Oelfkenand Kurt Arendt, "Die Baumethoden der deutschen U-Boote 1935-1945," 28 Mar. 1948,BA/MA, Nachlass Oelfken, N 518/5. The great advantage to reduced construction timewas that it required fewer workers—it usually took 250,000-300,000 work hours to buildType XXIs according to sectional construction, and building boats of similar size by oldmethods would have required 460,000 hours; Schulze-Wegener, Die deutscheKriegsmarine-Rüstung, 141.

13. Oelfken and Arendt, "Die Baumethoden der deutschen U-Boote 1935-1945," 28 Mar.1948, BA/MA, Nachlass Oelfken, N 518/5; U.S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe,Technical Report No. 312-45, “German Submarine Design 1935-1945,” July 1945,NavOpArch, NAVTECHMISSEUR, Series IV, Box 32, 11-13; USSBS “Overall Report(European War),” 30 Sept. 1945, NA, RG 243, Box 47, 69; Schulze-Wegener, Diedeutsche Kriegsmarine-Rüstung, 132-35; Cremer, U-Boat Commander, 193-94; KarlDönitz, Die deutsche Seekriegführung," 6 Aug. 1945, BA/MA, RM 6/374, 57.

14. U.S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe, Technical Report No. 477-45,“Organization of German Submarine Construction—1943-45,” Sept. 1945, NavOpArch,NAVTECHMISSEUR, Series IV, Box 42, 25. Dönitz intended to deploy 30 TypeXXIIIs in English waters, 60 in the western Mediterranean, 15 each in the Adriatic andBlack Seas and retain 20 in the Baltic for training. He originally planned to build theType XXIIIs near their intended operational areas (Toulon in France, Genoa andMonfalcone in Italy, and Nikolaev in Russia), but in the end only Hamburg served asassembly site for these U-boats; Skl, KTB, 21 and 27 Sept. 1943, 422, 537; Sieche, "TheGerman Type XXIII Submarine," 154; Rössler, The U-Boat, 218-19.

15. Report 92a22, “USSBS Report on Ingenieurburo Glueckauf,” 27 Apr.-7 May 1945,NA, RG 243, Entry 6, Box 724; Technical Report No. 477-45, “Organization of GermanSubmarine Construction—1943-45,” Sept. 1945, NavOpArch, NAVTECHMISSEUR,Series IV, Box 42, 33-36; A.N. Glennon, "The Weapon that Came too Late,"Proceedings 87 (No. 3): 91; Rössler, The U-Boat, 231-34.

16. Lagevorträge, 26 Jan. 1940, 79; Rössler, The U-boat, 168-75; Hessler, The U-BoatWar in the Atlantic, 2: 44-45.

17. Lagevorträge, 26 Aug. and 28 Sept. 1942, 416-19, 420-24; Rössler, The U-Boat,178-82. The failure to increase production of hydrogen peroxide fuel was the mainreason for postponing construction of these U-boats; Heinrich Oelfken, "Deutsche U-Bootsprojekte 1943-45," BA/MA, Nachlass Oelfken, N 518/2a; Ruge, In vier Marinen,259.

18. Lagevorträge, 24 Dec. 1942, 435-36; Skl, KTB, 15 Aug. 1943, 271; Hessler, The U-Boat War in the Atlantic, 1: 110; see also Wagner's comments in Lagevorträge, 445.There were a number of other projected Walter submarines, but they never got off thedrawing board; Rössler, The U-Boat, 234-38, 246-47, 254-72, 277-82.

19. Skl, KTB, 8 June 1943, T-1022/1681/PG 32066; BdU, KTB, 1 Dec. 1943, BA/MA,RM 87/9, 99-100.

20. BdU, KTB, 24 May and 22 June 1943, BA/MA, RM 87/8, 259, 306; Marine-Artillerieamt, AWa C IIf 3936/43 gKdos., "Betrifft: Flakbewaffnung U-Boote," 30 June1943, BA/MA, RM 7/98, 468; Lagevorträge, 14 and 31 May 1943, 505, 507-10.Obsessed with the idea that an unknown location device was the sole cause of the U-boats' defeat, the Germans falsely concluded that their own radar search receiver (Metox)emitted waves on which the Allies homed in. In fact, after the Germans had introducedtheir search receivers the Allies switched to ten-centimeter radar on a wavelength Metoxcould not detect; BdU, KTB, 5 and 23 Aug. 1943, BA/MA, RM 87/9, 25, 40. TheGermans reached the same erroneous conclusion about the next model of radar searchreceiver (Wanze, or Hagenuk), and forbade its use; Skl, KTB, 6 Nov. 1943, 167-68.

21. Walter to Dönitz, 19 May 1943, BA/MA, RM 6/106, 7-8; Heinrich Oelfken, "DerSchnorchel: Entwicklung und Erfahrungen," 30 Apr. 1947, BA/MA, Nachlass Oelfken, N518/3; Werner Fuchs, "Stellungnahme zu den Angaben des Buches von GrossadmiralDönitz 'Zehn Jahre und Zwanzig Tage,'" 6 Feb. 1959, BA/MA, Nachlass Fuchs, N548/v.43. On the snorkel making life on U-boats less comfortable, V.E. Tarrant, The LastYear of the Kriegsmarine, May 1944-May 1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994),30-31.

22. Some of the major works on breaking German naval codes include ChangingInterpretations and New Sources in Naval History: Papers from the Third US NavalAcademy History Symposium (Robert Love ed.) (New York: Garland, 1980); PatrickBeesly, Very Special Intelligence: The Story of the Admiralty's Operational IntelligenceCentre, 1939-1945 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1977) (during the war Beesly served inthe British Admiralty as Deputy Chief, Submarine Plotting Room); Francis Hinsley,British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations,Vol. 3, Parts 1 and 2 (London: HMSO, 1984, 1988); David Kahn, Seizing the Enigma:The Race to Break the German U-Boat Codes, 1939-1943 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,1991).

23. Germany and the Second World War, 6: 396-405; Brian Schofield, "The Defeat ofthe U-Boats during World War II," Journal of Contemporary History 16 (No. 1): 127-28;Jürgen Rohwer, "Doenitz and the Battle of the Atlantic: A New Perspective," Afterwordto Karl Dönitz, Ten Years and Twenty Days (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990),494-96, 506-07; Schulze-Wegener, Die deutsche Kriegsmarine-Rüstung, 119-21.

24. This represented a tremendous percentage. Since the beginning of the war theGermans had lost an average of 6% of their operational U-boats per month;Lagevorträge, 2 Aug. 1943, 529; Skl, KTB, 13 Aug. 1943, 234; Skl, KTB, 8 Sept. 1943,164. Rahn gives the losses at 37 and 25, respectively; Germany and the Second WorldWar, 6: 348.

25. Skl, KTB, 6 Jan. 1944, 91; Lagevorträge, 1-3 Jan. 1944, 565; Anlage zum KTB desBdU v. 20.2.44, "Ubootslage," BA/MA, RM 87/10, 35-37.

26. Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl 33470/44 gKdos., "Der Rüstungsstand der Seestreitkräfte, AnfangNovember 1944," 11 Nov. 1944, OKW KTB, 8: 1577-80; Jodl Diary, 20 Dec. 1943,BA/MA, RW 4/v.33, 3; Skl, KTB, 31 Jan. 1944, 567; Lagevorträge, 26 Feb. 1944, 575.

27. Lagevorträge, 12-13 Apr., 4-6 May 1944, 583-85; B.Nr. 1/Skl Iu 1374/44gKdos.Chefs., "U-Bootslage Mittelmeer," 1 May 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/848, 63-64.

28. OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr. 771900/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 14.6," 14June 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/99, 122; Anlage zum KTB des BdU v. 10.8.44, "Ubooteinsatzim Invasions- und im invasionsgefährdeten Raum," BA/MA, RM 87/42, 38;Lagevorträge, 29 June 1944, 593; Anlage zum KTB des BdU vom 7.6.1944,gKdos.Chefs., "Ubootslage 1.6.1944," BA/MA, RM 87/40, 13, 19; Skl, KTB, 7 June1944, 140-41.

29. Skl, KTB, 23 June 1944, 641; ibid., 11 Sept. 1944, 282; ibid., 5 Nov. 1944, 111;ibid., 6 Jan. 1945, 104; BdU, KTB, 3 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RM 87/46, 14; "Kurzlage desObdM," geh., 14 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/100, 271; "Erfahrungs-FT Nr. 186," 13Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/848, 327-28; Anlage 3 zum KTB des BdU vom 1.1.1945,"Zusammengefasste Ubootslage Atlantik Monat November-Dezember, BA/MA, RM87/46, 107-11; Lagevorträge, 3 Dec. 1944, 3, 21 and 23 Jan., 15 and 17 Feb., 13 Mar.1945, 621, 630, 635, 638, 653, 655, 675.

30. In Jan. 1945 the Allies sank only 6 U-boats, and not a single one by aircraft; CharlesSternhell and Alan Thorndike, "Antisubmarine Warfare in World War II (Washington:Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1946) (Operations Evaluation Group Report No.51)," Strategic Planning in the US Navy: Its Evolution and Execution, 1891-1945(Scholarly Resources Microfilm) Reel 10, 70, 73-74; Glennon, "The Weapon that Cametoo Late," 88.

31. Report 200a37, USSBS, “Interview No. 53, Karl-Otto Saur,” 22 June 1945, NA, RG243, Entry 6, Box 1000; Rössler, The U-Boat, 241, 246; Ruge, In vier Marinen, 256.

32. Skl, KTB, 7 Aug. 1944, 160-61; ibid., 6 Sept. 1944, 160; 2/Skl BdU Op, B.Nr.gKdos. 507 Chefs. Ing., "Stand der U-Boote am 1. November 1944," 7 Nov. 1944,BA/MA, RM 87/45, 6-7.

33. Lagevorträge, 13 Oct. 1944, 604; Oven, Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende, entry for 25Oct. 1944, 2: 169; Skl, KTB, 5 Oct. 1944, 119.

34. OKM, Mar Rüst/Rü Wi IIIg 2720/44 gKdos., "XIX. Rü-Besprechung Kriegsmarineam 6.9.44; Besprechungs-ergebnisse und Entscheidungen," 11 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM7/100, 260-61; 2/Skl BdU Op, B.Nr. gKdos.Chefs. 611 Ing., "Stand der U-Boote am 1.Januar 1945," 5 Jan. 1945, RM 87/46, 94. In 1944 total new U-boat tonnage was 233,559tons, compared with 161,719 tons built in 1941, 193,000 tons in 1942 and 221,093 tonsin 1943; Albert Speer, Reichsminister für Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion, "Nr. M1362/45 gRs.," 27 Jan. 1945, T-77/864/5611342-43.

35. 2/Skl BdU Op, B.Nr. gKdos. 626 Chefs., "Wirkungsgrad der U-Boote," 13 Jan. 1945,BA/MA, RM 87/46, 175-77; TBJG, 4 Jan. 1945, 15: 58; Lagevorträge, 15 Feb. 1945,653.

36. Skl, KTB, 1 Mar. 1945, 16; Lagevorträge, 12 and 18 Mar. 1945, 673, 680; "TypXXIII Boote," BA/MA, Nachlass Ruge, N 379/v.101; Fuchs to Bodo Herzog, 16 Sept.1965, BA/MA, Nachlass Fuchs, N 548/v.17; Hessler, The U-Boat War in the Atlantic, 3:98-99; Sieche, "The Type XXIII German Submarine," 160-61.

37. Report 92a17, USSBS Interview No. 49, Otto Merker, 20 June 1945, NA, RG 243,Entry 6, Box 723; Navy Dept., Office of the Chief of Naval Ops, Op 32-FN, Top Secret,9 May 1947, “Estimate of Russian Exploitation of German Submarine Types,” NA, RG38, Entry 98c, Box 15; U.S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe, Technical Report No.312-45, “German Submarine Design 1935-1945,” July 1945, NavOpArch,NAVTECHMISSEUR, Series IV, Box 32, 13; Schulze-Wegener, Kriegsmarine-Rüstung,140; Hessler, The U-Boat War in the Atlantic, 1: 110.

38. Lagevorträge, 16 Mar. 1945, 676; Skl, KTB, 17 Mar. 1945, 244; OKW KTB, 29 Mar.1945 8: 1208; Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. 3, Part 2, 631;Hessler, The U-Boat War in the Atlantic, 3: 98; Cremer, U-Boat Commander, 201-02.

39. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. 3, Part 1, 47-50, 244-45,284-85, 519-23; Part 2, 483, 627-29. For an example of the detailed informationavailable to the Allies on the Type XXIs and XXIIIs, JIC (44), 316 (O), "New Weaponsin Relation to German Strategy: Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee," TopSecret, 28 July 1944, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 1, 1942-45, EuropeanTheater (University Publications of America Microfilm), Reel 10, Frames 817-19.

40. Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, 246, 249; Hinsley, British Intelligence in theSecond World War, Vol. 3, Part 2, 627.

41. On several occasions British estimates came to only half the actual number of newU-boats the Germans possessed; Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War,Vol. 3, Part 2, 471-74, 482, 486, 630, 633; Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, 248;Kenneth Knowles, "Ultra and the Battle of the Atlantic: The American View," ChangingInterpretations and New Sources in Naval History, 447; Erickson, The Road to Berlin,481-82.

42. Lagevorträge, 8 July 1943, 518; Oelfken, "Deutsche U-Bootsprojekte 1943-45," 23Feb. 1947, BA/MA, Nachlass Oelfken, N 518/2a; Ruge, In vier Marinen, 259-60.

43. In 138 major air raids on naval yards, U-boat bases, ports, shipbuilding and navalinstallations the Allies dropped about 100,000 tons of bombs, or about 4% of the totalbomb tonnage on all targets during the war. These air attacks destroyed only 29 XXIs;USSBS “Overall Report (European War),” 30 Sept. 1945, NA, RG 243, Box 47, 69-70.Examples of damage from air raids include Skl AdmQu, B.Nr. Skl/AdmQu 414/44gKdos., "Betr.: XIV. Rüstungs-Besprechung am 28.6," 28 June 1944, BA/MA, RM7/1099, 130; B.Nr. 1/Skl IIIa 25244/44 gKdos., "Auszug aus Bericht überRüstungsbesprechung am 9.8," 19 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/100, 134-35; OKM, MarRüst/Rü Wi IIIg 2720/44 gKdos., "XIX. Rü-Besprechung Kriegsmarine am 6.9.44;Besprechungsergebnisse und Entscheidungen," 11 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/100, 261;Skl, KTB, 26 July 1944, 569; Skl, KTB, 17 Nov. 1944, 365; Skl, KTB, 9 and 19 Dec.1944, 208, 468-69; Skl, KTB, 22 Feb. 1945, 249; BdU, KTB, 18 and 31 Dec. 1944,BA/MA, RM 87/46, 56, 92; Lagevorträge, 26 Feb. and 10 Apr. 1945, 660, 696: OKWKTB, 1 and 19 Jan., 12 and 31 Mar. 1945, 8: 976, 1023, 1167, 1213; Rössler, The U-Boat,240-41, 250-54.

44. Skl AdmQu, B.Nr. Skl/AdmQu 414/44 gKdos., "Betr.: XIV. Rüstungs-Besprechungam 28.6," 28 June 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/1099, 130; Skl, KTB, 9 and 20 Dec. 1944, 208,515; Skl, KTB, 13 Jan. 1945, 224; Oelfken and Arendt, "Die Baumethoden der deutschenU-Boote 1935-1945," 28 Mar. 1948, BA/MA, Nachlass Oelfken, N 518/5; U.S. NavalTechnical Mission in Europe, Technical Report No. 477-45, “Organization of GermanSubmarine Construction—1943-45,” Sept. 1945, NavOpArch, NAVTECHMISSEUR,Series IV, Box 42, 20; Cremer, U-Boat Commander, 196; Hinsley, British Intelligence inthe Second World War, Vol. 3, Part 2, 483.

45. Report 92a17, USSBS Interview No. 49, Otto Merker, 20 June 1945, NA, RG 243,Entry 6, Box 723; Report 200a35, USSBS, “Questionnaire submitted by a BritishCommission to Albert Speer with Answers supplied by Speer while he was at Dustbin,”NA, RG 243, Entry 6, Box 999; Tarrant, Last Year of the Kriegsmarine, 185-89.

46. U.S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe, Technical Report No. 477-45,“Organization of German Submarine Construction—1943-45,” Sept. 1945, NavOpArch,NAVTECHMISSEUR, Series IV, Box 42, 38-40. The total amount of time required torepair damage to the Type XXI program in the autumn of 1943 amounted to 300,000

hours per month, but in 1944 rose to 2.2 million hours per month; Rössler, The U-Boat,251-52.

47. Report 200a37, USSBS, Interview No. 59, Dönitz, 28 June 1945, NA, RG 243, Entry6, Box 1000. For example, in Jan. 1944 the Germans cleared 24 mines from the Baltic.The number of mines cleared rose to 88 in Feb., 157 in Mar., 235 in Apr. and 431 inMay; Skl, KTB, 3 June 1944, 44; Lagevorträge, 26 Feb., 4-6 May 1944, 575, 586.

48. For example, Skl, KTB, 12 and 21 Apr. 1944, 268, 466; ibid., 9 Sept. 1944, 239;ibid., 21 Dec. 1944, 526; ibid., 1 Jan. 1945, 2-3; ibid., 25 Mar. 1945, 364.

49. Ruge maintained there were so many problems that sectional construction did notyield significant savings in building time, and Speer came under Gestapo investigationdue to the delays; Ruge, In vier Marinen, 256. On delays in construction, “Niederschriftder Unterredung des Herrn Admiral a.D. Werner Fuchs, durchgeführt am 16. Dez. 1951mit Dr. Frhr. von Siegler im Auftrage des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte,” 31 Dec. 1951, IfZ,ZS 41, 20-21; Glennon, "The Weapon that Came too Late," 91; Speer, Infiltration, 113-14, 124. Admiral Fuchs (head of the Main Office for Warship Construction from Nov.1939-Nov. 1944) not surprisingly assigns most of the blame to Speer, who he says madeunrealistic promises to Hitler. Puttkamer, however, claims that naval constructionexperts were simply naysayers, and that Speer and Dönitz together forced through aviable program; see notes from David Irving’s interview of Puttkamer from 28 May1968, IfZ, ZS 285/II, 124-25. Although Irving has been denounced as a Holocaustdenier, a racist, and an anti-Semite by a British court and his books are unreliable, there isno reason to assume Puttkamer would lie to him. For the judgment in the Irving Case,http://www.guardian.co.uk/irving/ (accessed 1 September 2006).

50. U.S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe, Technical Report No. 312-45, “GermanSubmarine Design 1935-1945,” July 1945, NavOpArch, NAVTECHMISSEUR, SeriesIV, Box 32, 13; U.S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe, Technical Report No. 477-45,“Organization of German Submarine Construction—1943-45,” Sept. 1945, ibid., Box 42,38; Glennon, "The Weapon that Came too Late," 86, 91-92; Rössler, The U-Boat, 241-42;Heinrich Oelfken, "Schwierigkeiten beim Bau der U-Boote Typ XXI, XXIII, XXVI," 8Mar. 1949, BA/MA, Nachlass Oelfken, N 518/5.

51. Skl, KTB, 27 Dec. 1944, 635; ibid., 25 Jan. 1945, 458; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl 33470/44gKdos., "Der Rüstungsstand der Seestreitkräfte, Anfang November 1944," 11 Nov. 1944,OKW KTB, 8: 1577-80; U.S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe, Technical Report No.477-45, “Organization of German Submarine Construction—1943-45,” Sept. 1945,NavOpArch, NAVTECHMISSEUR, Series IV, Box 42, 24; Glennon, "The Weapon thatCame too Late," 92; Sieche, "The Type XXI Submarine," 5, 8; Rössler, The U-Boat, 240-45.

52. Schulze-Wegener, Kriesgmarine Rüstung, 126, 202; Hessler, The U-Boar War in theAtlantic, 1: 108; Skl AdmQu, B.Nr. Skl/AdmQu 414/44 gKdos., "Betr.: XIV. Rüstungs-Besprechung am 28.6," 28 June 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/1099, 130; Chef Mar.Rüst,

MarRüst Nr. 5448/44 gKdos., "Meldung an ObdM betr. Rü-Sitzung vom 12.7.1944," 13July 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/99, 13; U.S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe, TechnicalReport No. 477-45, “Organization of German Submarine Construction—1943-45,” Sept.1945, NavOpArch, NAVTECHMISSEUR, Series IV, Box 42, 38-40.

53. Schulze-Wegener, Kriesgmarine Rüstung, 198-99; Hessler, The U-Boat War in theAtlantic, 1: 108.

54. Hessler, The U-Boat War in the Atlantic, 1: 108; Skl, KTB, 9 Dec. 1944, 208; Skl,KTB, 25 Jan. 1945, 457; Skl, KTB, 13 and 16 Apr. 1945, 208-13, 262-63; Report 92a17,USSBS Interview No. 49, Otto Merker, 20 June 1945, NA, RG 243, Entry 6, Box 723;U.S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe, Technical Report No. 477-45, “Organization ofGerman Submarine Construction—1943-45,” Sept. 1945, NavOpArch,NAVTECHMISSEUR, Series IV, Box 42, 38; Cremer, U-Boat Commander, 201;Lagevorträge, 5 Feb. 1945, 647. For additional problems that surfaced during trials,Oelfken, "Schwierigkeiten beim Bau der U-Boote Typ XXI, XXIII, XXVI," 8 Mar. 1949,BA/MA, Nachlass Oelfken, N 518/5; Rössler, The U-Boat, 240-45; Glennon, "TheWeapon that Came too Late," 92-93; Ruge, In vier Marinen, 264; Tarrant, Last Year ofthe Kriegsmarine, 47-50, 190.

55. Type XXIII submarines needed only one week's additional work; Oelfken,"Schwierigkeiten beim Bau der U-Boote Typ XXI, XXIII, XXVI," 8 Mar. 1949, BA/MA,Nachlass Oelfken, N 518/5; Lagevorträge, 14 May 42, 393; “Auszug aus dem KTB desB.D.U. vom 21. Juni 1942,” in OKW KTB, 4: 1279.

56. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Operations Evaluation Group, Report No.60, “An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the Primary Anti-Submarine Measures inCountering Type XXI Submarines” 4 Apr. 1949, NavOpArch, OEG, Box 99; OEG StudyNo. 41, “Tactical Kinematic Capabilities of the Type XXI Submarine,” 3 Mar. 1950,NavOpArch, OEG, Box 71.

57. Schulze-Wegener, Die deutsche Kriegsmarine-Rüstung, 136. The 40,000 workersincluded 1,000 inmates of Neuengamme concentration camp; Study 126,“Wilhelmshaven Dockyard Workers in World War II,” 1949, NavOpArch, GNR, Box T94, 12; Report 92a17, USSBS Interview No. 49, Otto Merker, 20 June 1945, NationalArchives, Record Group 243, Entry 6, Box 723.

58. Schulze-Wegener, Die deutsche Kriegsmarine-Rüstung, 135; Friedrich Ruge,“German Supreme Command-OKW,” 17 Nov. 1948, NavOpArch, GNR, Box T 69;Weinberg, A World at Arms, 1033, note 92. Similarly, the V-2 program devouredresources equivalent to 24,000 combat aircraft; Williamson Murray, “Betrachtungen zurdeutschen Strategie im Zweiten Weltkrieg,” Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realität (Rolf-Dieter Müller and Hans-Erich Volkmann eds.) (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999), 321.

59. Jürgen Rohwer and Mikhail Monakov, Stalin’s Ocean-Going Fleet: Soviet NavalStrategy and Shipbuilding Programmes 1935-1953 (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 136-37;

Michael Salewski, "Die Verteidigung der Ostsee 1918-1939: Politische und strategischeKonzeptionen," Marine-Rundschau 69: (No. 7): 394; Adam Ulam, Stalin: The Man andhis Era (New York: Viking, 1973), 489, 519; Robert Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy:Fifty Years of Theory and Practice (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1968), 36-40;Jürgen Rohwer, "The Russians as Naval Opponents in Two World Wars," The SovietNavy (Malcolm Saunders ed.) (New York: Praeger, 1958), 59.

60. Germany and the Second World War 4: 656-57; V.I. Ackasov, "Der Durchbruchs-Operation der Baltischen Rotbanner-Flotte von Reval auf Kronstadt (Hans Siegel trans.),"Marine-Rundschau 64 (No. 1): 26-45; Rohwer, "Der Minenkrieg im finnischenMeerbusen, September-November 1941," 94.

61. "Skl I op 1556/41 gKdos.Chefs.," 21 Sept. 1941, T-608/1/664; Rohwer, "DerMinenkrieg im finnischen Meerbusen, September-November 1941," 97-100; Rudel,Stuka Pilot, 31-44; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl 928/41 gKdos., "Lage Kriegsmarine am 28.9.1941,0800 Uhr," T-608/2/472.

62. Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl I Op 502/43 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Einsatz derÜberwasserstreitkräfte," 19 Feb. 1943, OKW KTB, 6: 1418; "1/Skl IE 2326/43gKdos.Chefs.," 13 Aug. 1943, Anlage 13 to MOK Ost KTB, 1-15 Aug. 1943, BA/MA,RM 31/M522.

63. Skl, KTB, 19, 24, 25 and 29 Sept. 1943, 385, 486, 504, 565-66; Lagevorträge, 24Sept. 1943, 551.

64. Anlage zu 1/Skl 950/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Bestand der russischen Ostseeflotte, StandMitte März 1944," BA/MA, RH 19 III/15, 96.

65. 9.Sich.Div., KTB, "Schlussbetrachtung zum 30. Sept. 1944," BA/MA, RM 67/v.149;MOK Ostsee, Op B.Nr. gKdos. 4630 F III, "Kurzer Rückblick auf September 1944," 9Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 358; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl IL 29573/44 gKdos., "Betr.: Schutzdes Raumes der östl. Ostsee gegen Feindluftangriffe und Sicherung gegenFeindseestreitkräfte, insbes. U-Boote," 28 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 110-13;Anlage zu B.Nr. 1/Skl I Op 3106/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Weisung für die Seekriegsführung inder Östlichen Ostsee," 29 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 106-09; OKM/3.Abt.Skl,B.Nr. 3/Skl R 5653/44 gKdos., "Feindlagebericht Ost vom 1.9. bis 30.9.1944," 16 Oct.1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 13-14.

66. MOK Ostsee, KTB, 3 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/3217, 249; Admiral Östl. Ostsee,"Chefs. 450 F I," 3 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 78; Skl, 1/Skl I Ost 3753/44gKdos.Chefs., "Besprechung Chef Skl mit Chef Genstb.d.H.," 15 Dec. 1944, BA/MA,RM 7/261, 117; MOK Ostsee/Führungsstab, "B.Nr. gKdos. 1035 Chefs.," 30 Nov. 1944,BA/MA, RM 7/163, 163.

67. Skl, KTB, 20, 21 and 22 Feb. 1945, 209-15, 233-34, 242.

68. Ibid., 15 Mar. 1945, 203.

69. Ibid., 26 Mar. 1945, 385; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 3640/45 gKdos.," 25 Mar.1945, BA/MA, RH 2/333, 11.

70. Skl, KTB, 14 Mar. 1945, 195; ibid., 13 Apr. 1945, 201-02.

71. MOK Ostsee/Führungsstab, B.Nr. gKdos. 600/45 F I, "Rückblick auf diewesentlichsten Ereignisse und Aufgaben im Bereich MOK Ost im Kriegsjahr 1944," 17Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 415-16.

72. Achkasov and Pavlovich, Soviet Naval Operations in the Great Patriotic War, 251-54. In the last 8 months of the war Soviet naval aircraft sank 34 warships and 57merchant vessels totaling 163,489 tons, and Russian submarines sank only 33merchantmen with 102,521 tons; Rohwer, "The Soviets as Naval Opponents in TwoWorld Wars," 65; Kabath, "Seebrückenköpfe," 274.

73. V. I. Ackasov, "Die sowjetische Kriegsflotte im Verlauf des 'GrossenVaterländischen Krieges (Woldemar Gangnus trans.),'" Marine-Rundschau 62 (No. 5):270.

74. Basically, an “old school” strategy envisioned gaining command of the sea with abattle fleet composed of heavy surface vessels. A “young school” approach regardedlarge surface vessels as obsolete, being vulnerable to swarms of smaller, faster vessels.

75. The conditions under which the Soviet fleet envisioned combat were an enemy fleetsimultaneously exposed to mines, coastal artillery, shore-based aircraft, torpedo boats andsubmarines; Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy, xxvii, 40.

76. Kabath, "Seebrückenköpfe," 274.

77. On the invasion of Scandinavia, Carl-Axel Gemzell, Raeder, Hitler undSkandinavien: Der Kampf für einen maritimen Operationsplan (Lund: Gleerup, 1965),275-77, 289-90; Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 1: 177-80, 192-93;Lagevorträge, 23 Feb. and 9 Mar. 1940, 82, 85. For Hitler's comments on Norway'simportance to the U-boat war, Hitlers Tischgespräche, 24 Apr. 1942, 238-39.

78. Hitler feared the British would take advantage of the upcoming campaign in theSoviet Union to attack Norway; OKW/WFSt/Abt L (I op), "Nr. 44141/41 gKdos. Chefs.,"15 Feb. 1941, T-608/1/457.

79. Lagevorträge, 17 Sept. and 29 Dec. 1941, 288, 334-36. In mid-Dec. Hitler decreedthat Norway had top priority for construction of coastal defenses; OKW/WFSt/Abt.L (IOp), Nr. 3022/41 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Küstenverteidigung," 14 Dec. 1941, OKW KTB,4: 1262-63.

80. Germany and the Second World War, 6: 423-25; Lagevorträge, 341. On Hitler'sconstant fear of an invasion in Norway, Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 2: 2-36.

81. The navy pointed out that insufficient base facilities in Norway would prevent thetransfer of all submarines there; Lagevorträge, 22 Jan. 1942, 347-48; Der Führer undOberste Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht, OKW/WFSt/Op (M), "Nr. 55493/42gKdos.Chefs.," 14 Mar. 1942, T-77/786/5514473. By late April the Germans haddeployed 20 U-boats off Norway and in May the navy had 1 battleship, 3 heavy cruisers,8 destroyers and 4 torpedo boats there; OKW KTB, 22 Apr. 1942, 3: 326; Lagevorträge,19 Nov. 1942, 427; Ziemke, German NTO, 217. Lagevorträge, 7 Feb. 1942, 351-52.

82. Ziemke, German NTO, 252-57; see also Warlimont's comments to entries from 19Oct. 1942 and 23 Jan. 1943 in OKW KTB, 4: 841, 5: 66; "Abendlage vermutlich vom 20.Dezember 1943," Hitlers Lagebesprechungen, 441, 446-47; OKW KTB, 28 Dec. 1943, 6:1387-88; Lagevorträge, 1 Jan. 1944, 569; Hessler, The U-Boat War in the Atlantic, 3: 69.

83. OKW KTB, 23 Jan. (Warlimont's comments), 5 Oct., 8 Oct., 1, 3 and 12 Nov., 31Dec. 1943, 5: 66, 6: 1219, 1226, 1238, 1243-44, 1271-72, 1394, 1401; Dönitz, "DieSchlacht im Atlantic in der deutschen Strategie des Zweiten Weltkrieges," Marine-Rundschau 61 (No. 2): 71-72; Skl, KTB, 10 and 13 Feb. 1944, 232, 278.

84. OKW KTB, 31 Jan. 1945, 8: 1060; Ziemke, German NTO, 300-09.

85. Hitler had also stated this belief in Dec. 1943; OKW KTB, 28 Dec. 1943, 6: 1387-88;Adm.FHQu, Nr. 411/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 17.10.44," 17 Oct. 1944, T-1022/1709/PG 32122-A; Skl, KTB, 18 Oct. 1944, 431-32; Lagevorträge, 31 Oct. 1944,616.

86. B.Nr. 1/Skl I op 2614/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: 'Tanne,'" 27 Aug. 1944, T-1022/1825/PG 32520; Ob MOK Ost, "O6753 gKdos.," 31 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM7/163, 259-60; Skl, B.Nr. 1 Skl Ib 3714/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Die Notwendigkeit,zusätzliche Mittel für Kriegsmarine und Handelsschiffahrt einzusetzen" (undated, butprobably from Dec. 1944), BA/MA, RM 7/261, 69. See also Dönitz’s comments in"Mittagslage vom 1. September 1944 in der Wolfsschanze," Hitlers Lagebesprechungen,635-36.

87. Skl, KTB, 31 Oct. 1944, 752; ibid., 2 Nov. 1944, 34. Even in Feb. 1945 Hitlercontinued to worry about an invasion in Norway, and Dönitz still regarded Denmark as alikely target; Lagevorträge, 25 Jan. and 15 Feb. 1945, 639, 653.

88. Skl, KTB, 13 June 1944, 329-30; ibid., 13 Aug. 1944, 316.

89. “Vortrag des Chefs der Skl bei der Besprechung der Oberbefehlshaber in 'Koralle'am 24./25.8.44,” BA/MA, RM 7/100, 170; Chef der Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl I Op 26968/44gKdos., "Betr.: Seekriegsbasis Norwegen," 2 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/131, 582-83;

Anlage zum KTB des BdU v. 18.9.44, "Abschliessende Betrachtung des Ubootseinsatzesim Kanal," BA/MA, RM 87/43, 63.

90. Lagevorträge, 28 Nov. 1944, 618; Ziemke, German NTO, 309; OKW KTB, 13 Feb.1945, 8: 1092.

91. Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, 336, 374; Skl, KTB, 1 Feb. 1945, 3; OKWKTB, 8: 1309-10, 1899. Most of the troops in Norway at the beginning of May, exceptthose belonging to 20th Mountain Army (which had withdrawn from Finland), had nocombat experience; Steinert, 23 Days, 142, 304 (note 9).

92. Skl, KTB, 1 and 3 Mar. 1945, 10-13, 44-47. OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr. 88542/45gKdos.Chefs., "Stellungnahme Seekriegsleitung zur Studie 'Birkhahn,'" 5 Mar. 1945, T-78/786/5514693-95. OKW/WFSt/Qu/Op, Nr. 88546/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Studie über dieAuflockerung bzw. Aufgabe von Nordnorwegen zur Kräftegewinnung für den Einsatz inDeutschland und auf Grund der Versorgungs- und Transportlage," 8 Mar. 1945, T-77/786/5514669; Jodl to Winter, 10 Mar. 1945, T-77/786/5514663-64; Lagevorträge, 10Mar. 1945, 671.

93. Skl, KTB, 28 Mar. 1945, 401.

94. MOK Norwegen/Führstb, "gKdos. 03800," 27 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/851, 148;"1/Skl I op 9611/45 gKdos.," 27 Apr. 1945, ibid.

95. 1/Skl I op gKdos., 4 May 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/854, 25; "Abschrift von Abschrifteiner dokumentarischen Niederschrift von Admiral a.D. Godt, zur Verfügung gestellt vonDr. Walter Baum,-Oldenburg," BA/MA, Nachlass Weichold, N 316/v.29, 3; Ziemke,German NTO, 313.

96. Report 94a4, “OKM Documents at Glucksberg,” NA, RG 243, Entry 6, Box 731.

97. Skl, "Neu B.Nr. 1/Skl I op 3404/43 gKdos.Chefs., 13 Nov. 1943, T/608/1/1044; Skl,KTB, 22 Dec. 1943, 357; Skl, KTB, 20 Nov. 1944, 443; Lagevorträge, 19 Jan. 1944,572.

Chapter 10: Hitler and Dönitz

1. Portions of this chapter appeared in an abbreviated form in David Grier, “TheAppointment of Admiral Karl Dönitz as Hitler’s Successor,” The Impact of Nazism: NewPerspectives on the Third Reich and Its Legacy (Alan Steinweis and Daniel Rogers eds.)(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003): 182-198; and “Army Group Kurland,” inThomas Kelly (ed.), World War II: Variants and Visions (Collingdale, PA: Diane, 1999),145-55.

2. Dönitz claimed that the navy’s main task after Jan. 1945 was to evacuate wounded,refugees and troops from the East to prevent their capture by the Russians; Dönitz, TenTears and Twenty Days, 433.

3. Meisel to Assmann, 6 Oct. 1949, BA/MA, Nachlass Meisel, N 537/v.18. For a similarview, Kurt Assmann, "Why the U-Boat War Failed," Foreign Affairs 28 (No. 4): 668.

4. Dönitz informed Hitler that the 227 U-boats being readied for action included 84 TypeXXIs and 42 Type XXIIIs; Lagevorträge, 15 and 17 Feb. 1945, 653, 655-56.

5. Skl, KTB, 29 Jan. 1945, 506-07; ibid., 4 Feb. 1945, 29; ibid., 2 Mar. 1945, 24.

6. Ibid., 28 Feb. 1945, 339-42; Lagevorträge, 1 Mar. 1945, 664; Karl Dönitz, "Diedeutsche Seekriegführung," 6 Aug. 1945, BA/MA, RM 6/374, 56.

7. IMT, TMWC, 13: 296, 397.

8. Gerald Posner, Hitler's Children: Sons and Daughters of Third Reich Leaders Talkabout Themselves and Their Fathers (New York: Berkley Books, 1992), 160. Dönitz'sparty membership form is now at the German Federal Archives in Berlin-Lichterfelde.According to this document the request for membership was made on 7 March 1944, butDönitz's admission into the Party, with Party Number 9664999, was backdated to 1 Feb.

9. Eberhard Weichold, "Die deutsche U-Bootskrieg 1939/45," BA/MA, NachlassWeichold, N 316/v.9, 39; "Abschrift von Abschrift einer dokumentarischen Niederschriftvon Admiral a.D. Godt, zur Verfügung gestellt von Dr. Walter Baum,-Oldenburg," ibid.,N 316/v.29, 1; Ruge, In vier Marinen, 268. Admiral Fuchs claimed that Dönitz was not aNational Socialist at the start of the war, but that a transformation in his views occurredin 1942 as a result of his increased contact with Hitler; “Niederschrift der Unterredungdes Herrn Admiral a.D. Werner Fuchs, durchgeführt am 16. Dez. 1951 mit Dr. Frhr. vonSiegler im Auftrage des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte,” 31 Dec. 1951, IfZ, ZS 41, 22.

10. Erich Raeder, "Mein Verhältnis zu Adolf Hitler und zur Partei," BA/MA, NachlassRaeder, N 391/3, 50-51.

11. Speer, Inside the Third Reich, 541. Following his release from Spandau, Speer wasquite critical of Dönitz. Despite this animosity, many of Speer’s observations aboutDönitz ring true.

12. Army Group South's commander, General Otto Woehler, protested that this was aninsult to the Army; Der Ob der HGr Süd/Ia, "Nr. 404/45 gKdos.," 5 Feb. 1945, BA/MA,RH 2/332, 41-42.

13. ObdM, "Kurzlage ObdM Nr. 4," 6 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/100, 352.

14. IMT, TMWC, 13: 392; Thomas, The German Navy in the Nazi Era, 236.

15. IMT, TMWC, 13: 393.

16. Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir (Boston:Little, Brown & Co., 1992), 406.

17. Thomas, The German Navy in the Nazi Era, 243.

18. “Admiral Doenitz re Pastor Niemoeller, 24 July 1945: 1400 Hours,” IfZ, ZS 1810/II,18.

19. IMT, TMWC, 13: 392-93; Thomas, The German Navy in the Nazi Era, 232; GittaSereny, Albert Speer: His Battle with Truth (New York: Knopf, 1995), 390, 638.

20. Wolfgang Peter, "Euthanasia Programme," The Oxford Companion to World War II(I.C. Dear ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 344.

21. Friedrich Ruge, "Vorwart," Lagevorträge, 7; see also Wagner's comments in ibid.,449; IMT, TMWC, 13: 321; 35: 291-301.

22. Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 2: 551.

23. Fuchs could not recall who the official was; Fuchs to Baum, 30 Dec. 1956, IfZ, ZS41, 27.

24. Lagevorträge, 31 Jan., 2, 14 and 27 Feb., 4 Mar. and 14 Apr. 1945, 642-43, 645, 652,662, 668, 699.

25. Walter Baum, "Marine, Nationalsozialismus und Widerstand," Vierteljahrshefte fürZeitgeschichte 11 (No. 1): 25-30, 39; Speer, Spandau: The Secret Diaries, entry for 24Mar. 1959, 334-35; AdmFHQu, Nr. 287/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 6/9," 6Sept. 1944, T-1022/1709/PG 32122-A; Lagevorträge, 13 Oct. 1944, 26 Mar. 1945, 604,686. Hitler had apparently forgotten about the scuttling of the pocket battleship GrafSpee in Dec. 1939.

26. “Midday Situation Report, January 27, 1945, in Berlin,” Hitler and His Generals,631; Raus, Panzer Operations, 339.

27. Speer, Spandau: The Secret Diaries, 25 Mar. 1959, 335; Lagevorträge, 9 and 11Aug., 10 Sept. 1943, 18 and 19 Jan., 12 June 1944, 533, 535, 549, 571-72, 589. Thesummaries of Dönitz’s meetings with Hitler no longer included Dönitz’s mealtimecompanions after 2 Nov. 1944. Although one could argue Dönitz had reason to meetwith Hitler, he also dined with Himmler on at least 3 occasions; Lagevorträge, 11 Sept.1943, 12 July and 13 Oct. 1944, 549, 599, 605.

28. OKW/WFSt/Op (M), "Nr. 6327/43 gKdos.," 21 Oct. 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/98, 188;Skl, KTB, 22 Oct. 1943, 439. In this connection, see Goebbels' comments on the greatbenefit in having a "one-day advantage" with Hitler in Oven, Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende,entry for 3 Sept. 1944, 2: 127-28.

29. The only others with an SS escort were Hitler, Himmler, Bormann, Keitel,Ribbentrop, and Funk; Speer, Spandau: The Secret Diaries, entries for 26 Dec. 1950, 23-25 Mar. 1959, 163, 334-35; Heinz Linge, Bis zum Untergang: Als Chef des PersönlischenDienstes bei Hitler (Werner Maser ed.) (2nd rev.ed.) (Munich: Herbig, 1980), 119; DavidIrving’s notes of an interview with Puttkamer from 21 Nov. 1967, IfZ, ZS 285/II, 70-71,77; Puttkamer to Uhlig, 16 Apr. 1952, IfZ, ZS 285/I, 20; Below, Als Hitler Adjutant, 410-11; TBJG, 28 Feb., 14 and 21-22 Mar. 1945, 15: 383, 505, 557, 571; Keitel, In theService of the Reich, 197; "Hitlers politisches Testament," 29 Apr. 1945, OKW KTB, 8:1666-69.

30. In February 1945, 35 generals and 19 field marshals received “salary supplements”from Hitler; Peter Meroth, "Vorschuss auf den Endsieg," Stern, 12 June 1980, 88-92;Norman J.W. Goda, “Black Mark: Hitler’s Bribery of His Senior Officers during WorldWar II,” Journal of Modern History 72 (June 2000): 413-52. At Nuremberg Dönitz wasasked if he had received bribes or "a gift of any kind from Hitler." He replied, "Apartfrom the salary to which I was entitled, I did not receive a penny; I received no gifts;"IMT, TMWC, 13: 313. One author claims that Hitler presented Dönitz with 300,000marks when he became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy; Peter Padfield, "GrandAdmiral Karl Dönitz," Men of War: Great Naval Leaders of World War II (StephenHowarth ed.) (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), 196.

31. Although Raeder was the one who suggested this date for his retirement, to expresshis and the navy’s loyalty, Hitler agreed; Bird, Raeder, 203. Hitler's decree that the NaziParty was the only legal party on 14 July 1933, Bastille Day, appears to have been aconscious attempt to show this was a new revolution, and the establishment of theVolkssturm was officially proclaimed on 18 Oct. 1944, the anniversary of Battle ofLeipzig. On Hitler's sensitivity to timing, Hitlers Tischgespräche, 6 July 1942, 423-24;Speer to Fest, 13 Sept. 1969, BA/K, Nachlass Speer, N1340/17; Joachim Fest, Speer: TheFinal Verdict (Ewald Osers and Alexandra Dring trans.) (New York: Harcourt, 2001), 49.

32. Lagevorträge, 9-11 Aug. 1943, 538.

33. Oven, Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende, entry for 22 Nov. 1944, 2: 180-81.

34. “Interrogation of Grand Admiral Dönitz, 21 July 1945: 1400 Hours,” IfZ, ZS1810/II, 3.

35. “Testimony of KARL DOENITZ, taken at Nuremberg, Germany, on 22 October1945, 1030-1130 by Lt.Col. Thomas S. Hinkel, IGD, OUSCC, Comdr. John P. Bracken,USNR, and Lt. Michael Reade, RN,” NavOpArch, John Bracken Papers, Box 1, 20-21.

36. Unterredung Meckel-Doenitz, IfZ, ZS 1810/I, 18, 32.

37. Speer, Spandau: The Secret Diaries, entries for 18 Mar., 11 May and 10 Dec. 1947,20 Jan. 1953, 23-25 Mar. 1959, 42, 58, 77-78, 217, 334-35; John Brown Mason, “PWGrand Admiral Dönitz” [July 1945], IfZ, ZS 1810/II, 18; Navy Dept., Office of the Chiefof Naval Operations, Intelligence Division, "Report on Interrogation of German Prisonersof War," 23 Aug. 1945, NA, RG 38, Entry 98c, Box 8; Herbert Kraus, “Karl Dönitz unddas Ende des ‘Dritten Reiches,’” Hans-Erich Volkmann (ed) Ende des DrittenReiches—Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Munich: Piper, 1995), 4.

38. Steinert, 23 Days, 21, 145-46, 304 (note 17) ; “Politische Angelegenheiten,” BA/BL,R62/10, 2-5; Padfield, Dönitz, 415; Thomas, The German Navy in the Nazi Era, 251;Guido Knopp, Hitlers Helfer (Munich: Bertelsmann, 1996), 329; Erich Topp, “Manningand Training the U-boat Fleet,” in Stephen Howarth and Derek Law (eds), The Battle ofthe Atlantic 1939-1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 216-17; Douglas Peifer,The Three German Navies (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2002), 16, 37-38. Peifer estimates that between 2,500-6,000 German sailors were executed in WorldWar II; Peifer, The Three German Navies, 10.

39. Kraus, “Karl Dönitz und das Ende des ‘Dritten Reiches,’” 1; Rolf-Dieter Müller andGerd Ueberschär, Kriegsende 1945: Die Zerstörung des Deutschen Reiches (Frankfurt:Fischer, 1994), 103; Steinert, 23 Days, 120-28.

40. Dönitz, Ten Years and Twenty Days, 441-42; IMT, TMWC, 13: 305. For examplesof Dönitz’s private talks with Hitler, or their meetings in a very small group,Lagevorträge, 13, 14 and 31 Oct., 1 and 2 Nov., 3 Dec. 1944, 3 and 23 Jan., 12 Apr.1945, 604-05, 616-17, 621, 630, 638, 696. See also Heinz Assmann, "Some PersonalRecollections of Adolf Hitler (Roland Krause trans.)," Proceedings 79 (No. 12): 1293.

41. Speer, Spandau: The Secret Diaries, entries for 30 Sept. 1956 and 25 Mar. 1959,295, 335.

42. IMT, TMWC, 13: 402-03.

43. Meisel to [Kurt] Assmann, 6 Oct. 1949, BA/MA, Nachlass Meisel, N 537/v.18.

44. Irving’s notes from an interview with Puttkamer from 20 Nov. 1967, IfZ, ZS 285/II,55.

45. Gerhard Weinberg, "Der Überfall auf die Sowjetunion im Zusammenhang mitHitlers diplomatischen und militärischen Gesamtplanungen," Unternehmen Barbarossa:Zum historische Ort der deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen von 1933 bis Herbst 1941(Roland Foerster ed.) (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1993), 184-85.

46. Leon Goldensohn, The Nuremberg Interviews (Robert Gellately ed) (New York:Knopf, 2004), 127.

47. KTB des Führungsstab Nord, 22 and 26 Apr. 1945, OKW KTB, 8: 1454, 1458; seealso untitled, undated document (a record of activities in the area under Dönitz's control)in a folder entitled "Politische Angelegenheiten," in BA/BL, R 62/10, 7. Hitler's order forthe execution of Hermann Fegelein, his bride-to-be's brother-in-law, on 28 Aprildemonstrates that Hitler still believed the struggle must continue. On Eva Braun'sunsuccessful attempt to prevent Fegelein's execution, see Hitler's secretary TraudlJunge’s comments in Last Witnesses in the Bunker (Pierre Galante and Eugene Silianoffeds.) (Jan Dalley trans) (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1989), 11. Eva’s sister Gretlwas pregnant at this time; Sereny, Albert Speer, 534.

48. Last Witnesses in the Bunker, 11-15; Fest, Hitler, 769-77; Alan Bullock, Hitler andStalin: Parallel Lives (New York Viking, 1992), 887-91.

49. OKM/AMA/WF, B.Nr. 156/44 Chefs., "Grossadmiral Dönitz Schlussansprache aufder Tagung für Befehlshaber der Kriegsmarine in Weimar am Freitag, dem 17. Dezember1943," BA/MA, RM 7/98, 34-37.

50. 1/Skl, "Ansprache des Ob.d.M. vor den Oberbefehlshabern am 15.2.44,"gKdos.Chefs., 1939-1945: Der zweite Weltkrieg in Chronik und Dokumenten (Hans-Adolf Jacobsen ed.) (5th ed.) (Darmstadt: Wehr und Wissen Verlagsgesellschaft, 1961),456-58; Pruf-Nr. 1535 gKdos., "Vortrag des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine überden Tonnagekrieg gehalten am 19. Oktober 1944 vor führenden Persönlichkeiten derPolitik, Wissenschaft und Wirtschaft," BA/MA, RM 7/848, 300-01. Ruge's account,based upon his notes from this speech, lists Courland as the first topic in Dönitz’s speech;Ruge, In vier Marinen, 260-61.

51. Dönitz Speech to German Youth, 20 Feb. 1945, cited in Robert Conot, Justice atNuremberg (New York: Harper & Row, 1983), 416.

52. "Tagesniederschriften der Reichsregierung vom 2.-17. Mai 1945," Chefs., 9 May1945, BA/BL, R 62/15, 12.

53. Earl Beck, Under the Bombs: The German Home Front 1942-1945 (Lexington, KY:University Press of Kentucky, 1986), 182; IMT, TMWC, 35: Document 650-D, 304-08;Admiral beim ObdM, KTB des ObdM, 25 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RM 6/115, 8-9.

54. “3rd Situation Report, April 27, 1945,” Hitler and His Generals, 737-38. See alsoAdm FHQu, 21/45 gKdos., “Lagebeurteilung 26.4.1945,” 26 Apr. 1945, BA/BL, R62/10, 49. A doctor in the bunker stated that the cadets presented excellent targets,wearing white caps and blue uniforms with gold buttons; Ernst Günther Schenck, DasNotlazarett unter der Reichskanzlei: Ein Arzt erlebt Hitlers Ende in Berlin (Neuried: ArsUna, 1995), 102-04. For the recollections of the naval unit’s commander, FranzKuhlmann, “Endkampf um den ‘Führerbunker,’” Ruhr-Nachrichten, 20-26 April 1985 (Iam indebted to Dr. Werner Rahn for drawing my attention to this source). See also Rahn,“Winkelriede, Opferkämpfer oder Sturmwikinger? Zu besonderen Einsatzformen der

deutschen Kriegsmarine 1944/45,” 515-20.

55. Steinert, 23 Days, 293-94 (note 56); KTB des Führungsstab Nord, 1 May 1945, OKWKTB, 8: 1468.

56. "Hitlers politisches Testament," 29 Apr. 1945, OKW KTB, 8: 1666-69.

57. Baum, "Marine, Nationalsozialismus und Widerstand," 44-48; Thomas, The GermanNavy in the Nazi Era, 241, 262; Rust, Naval Officers Under Hitler, 11-12, 173; Topp,“Manning and Training the U-boat Fleet,” 218.

58. Godt dates Dönitz’s shift as occurring on the evening of 30 Apr. More likely itoccurred on 4 or 5 May; "Abschrift von Abschrift einer dokumentarischen Niederschriftvon Admiral a.D. Godt, zur Verfügung gestellt von Dr. Walter Baum,-Oldenburg,"BA/MA, Nachlass Weichold, N 316 /v.29, 1. For a discussion of Dönitz’s policies on 1May, Lennart Sjöstedt, "Kapitulation eller strid till sista man? Til frågan om Karl Dönitz'handlingsprogram vid regeringstillträdet 1945," Scandia 30 (No. 2): 288-356.

59. Keitel, In the Service of the Reich, 227.

60. "Tagesniederschriften der Reichsregierung vom 2.-17. Mai 1945," Chefs., 2 May1945, BA/BL, R 62/15, 2.

61. Frido von Senger und Etterlin, Neither Fear Nor Hope: The Wartime Career ofGeneral Frido von Senger und Etterlin, Defender of Cassino (George Malcolm trans.)(Novato, CA: Presidio, 1989), 306; Müller and Ueberschär, Kriegsende 1945, 100-02.

62. See the unpublished entry from Spandau Diaries for 22 Jan. 1955, BA/K, NachlassSpeer, N 1340/450.

63. Voices from the Third Reich: An Oral History (Johannes Steinhoff et al ed.)(Washington: Regnery Gateway, 1989), 182, 186; Erich Topp, The Odyssey of a U-BoatCommander (Eric Rust trans.) (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 107-08.

64. 1/Skl I op gKdos., 4 May 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/854, 25. Schellenberg maintains thatat least until 2 May Dönitz was not ready to give up Norway without a fight; WalterSchellenberg, Hitler's Secret Service: The Memoirs of Walter Schellenberg (Louis Hagentrans.) (New York: Jove, 1977), 397, 399. "Abschrift von Abschrift einerdokumentarischen Niederschrift von Admiral a.D. Godt, zur Verfügung gestellt von Dr.Walter Baum,-Oldenburg," BA/MA, Nachlass Weichold, N 316/v.29, 3.

65. OKW, "Nr. 89001/45," 3 May 1945, RW 44 I/109; de Maizière, Oberstleutnant i.G.,"Punkte für den mündliche Vortrag bei den Ob. und Chefs der HGr Kurland und desAOK Ostpreussen," 3 May 1945, ibid. Maizière states that Dönitz’s goal was thecontinuation of the fight against Bolshevism to save as many Germans as possible fromthe Soviets.

66. “Tagesniederschriften der Reichsregierung vom 2.-17. Mai 1945," Chefs., 6 May1945, BA/BL, R 62/15, 9.

67. Friedrich Ruge, “German Supreme Command-OKW,” 17 Nov. 1948, NavOpArch,GNR, Box T 69.

68. Maizière, In der Pflicht, 105-06.

69. Kapitel 6, Kuerzungen, F. Hitler als Feldherr und Politiker, 10 Feb. 1954, BA/K,Nachlass Speer, N 1340/385, 40.

70. Traudl Junge, Bis zur letzten Stunde: Hitlers Sekretärin erzählt ihr Leben (Munich:List, 2003), 123; Joachim Fest, Inside Hitler’s Bunker: The Last Days of the Third Reich(Margot Dembo trans.) (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), 74, 131; Breit,Staats- und Gesellschaftsbild, 215-16.

71. See untitled folder in BA/K Nachlass Speer, N 1340/384, 5-6; “Protokoll 1: AdolfHitler (1 August 1945),” Albert Speer: Die Kransberg-Protokolle, 88-89.

72. Sereny, Albert Speer, 82.

73. Wilhelm Meisel, “Betr: Hitler und die KM,” IfZ, ZS 1739, 6.

74. Fröhlich, “Hitler und Goebbels im Krisenjahr 1944,” 197-98, 208-09.

75. Fest, Inside Hitler’s Bunker, 74, 131. For other examples of Hitler’s uncanny abilityto inspire hope in the latter stages of the war, Fest, Speer, 240-41, 248; Ian Kershaw,Hitler, 1936-1945: Nemesis (New York: Norton, 2001), 1026, note 40.

76. Jürgen Rohwer, "Introduction," in Dönitz, Ten Years and Twenty Days (Annapolis:Naval Institute Press, 1990), xiii-xiv.

77. Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 2: 383-400. See also reports for the periodFeb.-Apr. 1944 in “Auszug aus Vortragsnotizen H.V.O. Genst.d.H. bei Ob.d.M. und ChefSkl,” T-608/1/1554-74.

78. Lagevorträge, 18 Jan., 20-21 Mar. 1944, 571, 578; "1/Skl Ib 833/44 gKdos.Chefs.,"17 Mar. 1944, T-77/778/5503976-77; OKW/WFSt/Op (M), "Nr. 77927/44gKdos.Chefs.," 22 Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/1099, 98; B.Nr.1/Skl 921/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Bemerkungen des ObdM über die Bedeutung von Odessa für die Kriegführungim Südosten," 24 Mar. 1944, T-77/778/5503979-87.

79. On Tunisia, Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 2: 245-68; on Sicily, Thomas,The German Navy in the Nazi Era, 230; on the Scheldt River, Adm.FHQu, Nr. 291/44gKdos.Chefs., "Lagebeurteilung 7/9," 7 Sept. 1944, T-1022/1709/PG 32122-A.

80. Lagevorträge, 31 Oct. 1944, 616;" Skl, "B.Nr. 1/Skl I op a 30696/44 gKdos.," 9 Oct.1944, BA/MA, RM 7/131, 464. The former Chief of Staff to the Army's Commander-in-Chief, West, maintains that repeated requests to give up Dutch coast were frustratedbecause navy opposed this for its strategic reasons until the end; Siegfried Westphal,Heer in Fesseln (Bonn: Athenäum, 1950), 100. On the Rhine, Lagevorträge, 5, 9 and 15Feb. 1945, 647-48, 653. There are undoubtedly other examples. Aside from the Baltic,all other cases of Dönitz’s intervention in army operations are only examples the authordiscovered by chance.

81. Wagner rather lamely maintained that Dönitz’s plan bore no hostile design, butintended full agreement on the part of Spain; Lagevorträge, 14 May 1943, 505-06.

82. On the loss of the Scharnhorst, Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 2: 327, 332-45; Thomas, The German Navy in the Nazi Era, 234-35.

83. For example, Skl, KTB, 12 Nov. 1943, 295; ibid., 20 Dec. 1943, 316-18;Lagevorträge, 17 Sept. 1941, 8 and 26 Feb., 10 Sept. 1943, 208, 465, 470, 548; “Redevon Grossadmiral Dönitz, gehalten am 6. Oktober 1943 auf der Tagung des NSReichsleiter, Gauleiter und Verbandsführer,” IfZ, ZS 1810/I, 3.

84. Skl, KTB, 18 Dec. 1943, 288-91; Lagevorträge, 19-20 Dec. 1943, 555-56; OKWKTB, 21 Dec. 1943, 6: 1376; Skl, KTB, 6 Feb. 1944, 109; Weinberg, A World at Arms,772-73. See also 1/Skl IL 400/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Aufklärungsflugzeuge fürBelange des BdU," 7 Feb. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/847.

85. Skl, KTB, 7 June 1944, 140; ibid., 5 Oct. 1944, 119; BdU, B.Nr. 656/45gKdos.Chefs., "Stand des U-Bootskrieges am 1.1.1945," BA/MA, RM 87/46, 104-05.

86. Lagevorträge, 31 May 1943, 510.

87. "Niederschrift über die Ansprache des Ob.d.M. an die Hauptamts- und Amtschefs am2.6.43," Chefs., 3 June 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/260, 232; OKW KTB, 17 Nov. 43, 6: 1289;OKM/AMA/WF, B.Nr. 156/44 Chefs., "Grossadmiral Dönitz Schlussansprache auf derTagung für Befehlshaber der Kriegsmarine in Weimar am Freitag, dem 17. Dezember1943," BA/MA, RM 7/98, 34-37; Skl, KTB, 6 Jan. 1944, 91; TBJG, 8 June 1944, 12:427; Voices from the Third Reich, 185; Anlage zum KTB des BdU vom 7.6.1944,gKdos.Chefs., "Ubootslage 1.6.1944," BA/MA, RM 87/40, 11, 20-22; Eberhard Godt,"Der U-Boot Krieg," Bilanz des zweiten Weltkrieges (Oldenburg: Stalling, 1953), 143.

88. Pruf-Nr. 1535 gKdos., "Vortrag des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine über denTonnagekrieg gehalten am 19. Oktober 1944 vor führenden Persönlichkeiten der Politik,Wissenschaft und Wirtschaft," BA/MA, RM 7/848, 300.

89. “Ansprache des Führers an die Feldmarschälle und Generale am 27.1.1944 in derWolfsschanze,” IfZ, F 19/3; “Ansprache des Führers vor Generalen und Offizieren am

22.6.1944 im Platterhof,” IfZ, F 19/3; “Protokoll 1: Adolf Hitler (1 August 1945),” AlbertSpeer: Die Kransberg-Protokolle, 109; TBJG, 13 Feb., 22 and 28 Mar. 1945, 15: 377,572-73, 618; Kershaw, Hitler, 1936-1945: Nemesis, 609-10, 731.

90. OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr. 772281/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 3.7," 3 July1944, BA/MA, RM 7/99, 42-43.

91. Junge, Bis zur letzten Stunde, 154.

92. For Hitler’s enthusiasm for the V-2 rockets, TBJG, 2 Dec. 1944, 23 and 25 Jan. 1945,14: 321, 15: 192-94, 217; Junge Bis zur letzten Stunde, 135-36.

93. Skl, KTB, 4 July 1944, 76.

94. On the cover sheet to this speech is penciled in: ”A good speech from our Dönitz, thespeech of a man!” Adjutant des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine, “M 555/44gKdos.,” 18 Oct. 1944, IfZ, F 20. For more on Dönitz’s commitment to the Durchhaltstrategy, Rahn, “Winkelriede, Opferkämpfer oder Sturmwikinger? Zu besonderenEinsatzformen der deutschen Kriegsmarine 1944/45,” 506-07, 511-12, 514-20.

95. TBJG, 25 Jan. 1944, 23, 26 and 30 Jan., 2 and 28 Feb., 1, 3, 4, 5 and 16, 22 Mar.1945, 11: 157, 15: 198, 229, 273-75, 368, 383, 391, 404, 410, 422-23, 517, 572-73;Herzstein, The War that Hitler Won, 91; Oven, Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende, entries for 16Aug. and 5 Sept. 1944, 30 Jan. and 25 Feb. 1945, 2: 119, 130, 227, 252.

96. Jung, Die Ardennen-Offensive, 81; Herzstein, The War that Hitler Won, 357, 396;Otto Carius, Tigers in the Mud (Robert Edwards trans.) (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole,2003), 192, 196-99; “Ansprache des Reichsführers SS und Befehlshaber des ErsatzheeresHimmler an NS-Führungsoffiziere des Feld- und Ersatzheeres am 29.7.44 im Führer-hauptquartier," BA/MA, RH 53-7/v. 878; "Unterlagen für einen Vortrag des Gen.Obersten Jodl, des Chefs WFSt, vor den Reichs- und Gauleitern über die militärischeLage (München, 7. November 1943)," OKW KTB, 8: 1559-60.

97. “Rede auf der Gauleiter-Tagung am 3. August 1944 in Posen,” BA/K, NachlassSpeer, N 1340/205; “Tagung der Leiter der Reichspropagandaämter am 28. u. 29. Aug.1944, Vortrag von Reichsminister Speer: Die deutsche Rüstung und der totaleKriegseinsatz,” ibid; “Ansprache Reichsminister Speer auf der Arbeitstagung derRüstungsobmänner in Berlin am 31.8.44,” ibid; “Reichsminister Speer auf dem ‘Tag desdeutschen Eisenbahners 1944’ in Berlin, Revalerstrasse 99,” 5 Dec. 1944, BA/K,Nachlass Speer, N 1340/206; “Reichsminister Speer vor dem 3. Lehrgang derKommandierenden Generale und Korpschefs, Kaserne Krampnitz, 13.1.1945,” BA/K,Nachlass Speer, N 1340/207; Mierzejewski, “When Did Albert Speer Give Up?,” 391-97;and on the generals, Breit, Staats- und Gesellschaftsbild, 208-14, 224.

98. Reinhardt Diary, 5 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, Nachlass Reinhardt, N 245/3, 87.Reinhardt’s comment could also be interpreted as derisive, or as an exclamation ofdespair.

99. Eberhard Weichold, "Der deutsche U-Bootskrieg 1939/45," BA/MA, NachlassWeichold, N 316/v.9, 46, 53; Weichold, "Auseinandersetzung mit Grossadmiral Dönitzin Bezug auf den Aufbau einer neuen Ubootwaffe vom Frühjahr 1943 an und hinsichtlichseiner Beratertätigkeit Hitlers als Oberbefehlshaber der Marine," 15 Apr. 1959, ibid., N316/v.29. Allied interrogations revealed that about half of the German POWs still hadconfidence in Hitler, and believed Germany possessed decisive secret weapons, untilMar. 1945; Rudolf Sulzmann, "Die Propaganda als Waffe im Kriege," Bilanz des zweitenWeltkrieges, 399.

100. Helmut Heye, “Die deutsche Kriegfuehrung der Marine,” August 1945,NavOpArch, GNR, Box T 68, 31-32; Schenck, Das Notlazarett unter der Reichskanzlei,44-45; Weinberg, A World at Arms, 783; The Hitler Book, 300-01.

101. “Protokoll 2: Politiker und Politik in national-sozialistischen Deutschland (20.August 1945),” Albert Speer: Die Kransberg-Protokolle, 167-68. See the similaraccount, in this instance from April 1945, in Knappe, Soldat, 15.

102. Hitlers Tischgespräche, 27 June 1942, 389; Lagevorträge, 11 Aug. 1943, 535, 537;Assmann, "Some Personal Recollections of Adolf Hitler," 1295; TBJG, 18 Apr. 1944, 2,4, 26 and 30 Jan., 12 Feb., 5 and 12, 22 Mar. 1945, 12: 134, 15: 37, 52, 232, 273, 368,424, 485, 572-73.

103. TBJG, 12 and 28 Feb., 15 Mar. 1945, 15: 366, 383, 512; “Ansprache des Führers andie Feldmarschälle und Generale am 27.1.1944 in der Wolfsschanze,” IfZ, F 19/3;“Ansprache des Führers vor Generalen und Offizieren am 22.6.1944 im Platterhof,” IfZ,F 19/3; “Protokoll 1: Adolf Hitler (1 August 1945),” Albert Speer: Die Kransberg-Protokolle, 108.

104. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 475.

105. OKM/M Att, gKdos., 7 May 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/854, 156. Hitler was not theonly one under illusions about the Battle of Berlin. The German commander in Italy,General von Vietinghoff (another former Army Group Courland commander), wasunwilling to negotiate a surrender in Italy because he felt that most of his troops believedHitler's declaration that the Battle of Berlin would turn the tide of the war; Jürgen Förster,"The Final Hour of the Third Reich: The Capitulation of the Wehrmacht," in 1945:Consequences and Sequels of the Second World War (Paris: Institut d'histoire de tempspresent, 1995), 78.

106. TBJG, 18 and 24 Jan. 1945, 15: 150, 210; “Protokoll 1: Adolf Hitler (1 August1945),” Albert Speer: Die Kransberg- Protokolle, 85-86; Speer, Inside the Third Reich,541.

107. TBJG, 16 Mar. 1945, 15: 520; Herzstein, The War that Hitler Won, 103.

108. For Hitler’s comparisons to the Kampfzeit, TBJG, 18 Apr. 1944, 4, 26 and 29 Jan.1945, 12: 136, 15: 62, 232-33, 263-64. For comparisons to Stalin, ibid., 25 Jan., 6 and 8Feb. 1945, 15: 218-19, 321, 337.

109. Eberhard Jäckel, Hitler's World View: A Blueprint for Power (Herbert Arnoldtrans.) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Megargee, Inside Hitler’s HighCommand, 207.

110. Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 717 and 1011, note 151; Weinberg, A World at Arms,750.

111. Schulze-Wegener, Die deutsche Kriesgmarine Rüstung, 193-94.

112. Der Chef des technischem Amtes, “Niederschrift über die Besprechung beim Führeram 22. März 1945,” BA/BL, R 3/1511, 29; Monologe im Führerhauptquartier, 9 Feb.1942, 275; Hitlers Tischgespräche, 28 July 1942, 474-75; Lagevorträge, 28 Sept. 1942,31 May and 8 July 1943, 420-24, 511, 518; TBJG, 25 Jan., 14, 22 and 28 Mar. 1945, 15:221, 505, 569-70, 618-19. On his hopes Speer, Infiltration, 143; Karl-Jesko vonPuttkamer, Die unheimliche See: Hitler und die Kriegsmarine (Munich: Kühne, 1952),59; Below, Als Hitler Adjutant, 366, 379, 402; Albert Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Albert Kesselring (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1989), 239; Junge Bis zur letztenStunde, 171-72. Goebbels, who frequently echoed Hitler's beliefs, was also extremelyoptimistic about the revival of the U-boat war; TBJG, 18 Jan., 13 Mar., 16 Apr., 8 June,25 Nov. and 7 Dec. 1944, 8, 11, 18 and 31 Jan., 1, 6, 7, 9, 13 Mar. 1945, 11: 113-14, 464,12: 114, 427, 14: 276-77, 369, 15: 88, 103, 145, 282, 389, 430, 436, 455, 494.

113. Weinberg, A World at Arms, 720, 755-57; Hancock, The National SocialistLeadership and Total War, 157; TBJG, 4 Jan. 1945, 15: 53-56.

114. Yelton, Hitler’s Volkssturm, 19-30.

Conclusions

1. Martin Blumenson, "Hitler versus his Generals in the West," Proceedings 82 (No. 12):1281-87.

2. Speer, Infiltration, 100. Dönitz was quite intelligent as well. He scored a 138 on hisIQ test, which placed him in the 99th percentile, or very superior range. He therefore tiedfor the third highest IQ of Nazis at Nuremberg; behind Schacht, who scored 143, Seyss-Inquart with 140 and Goering, who also had an IQ of 138; Eric Zillmer et al, The Quest

for Nazi Personality: A Psychological Investigation of Nazi War Criminals (Hillsdale,NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1995), 48.

3. As Eberhard Jäckel claims, "alone Hitler planned, alone he decided, alone he ruled;"Jäckel, Hitler's World View, 83. Asked if Hitler made military decisions in conferences,Jodl replied, “From the very first day on. All decisions that were of any importance weremade by him, himself;” Report 200a37, USSBS, Interview No. 62 Alfred Jodl, 29 June1945, NA, RG 243, Entry 6, Box 1000. See also Speer, Infiltration, 6.

4. Cecil, Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia, 24; Franz Halder, "Decisions affecting theCampaign in Russia (1941/42)," World War II German Military Studies, Vol. 15, MS# C-067b, 8; Kurt Zeitzler, "General Critique of MS # P-041a-P-041ll and a report on theSeptember 1942-June 1944 Period," The German High Command, Reel 4, MS# P-041ii,15.

5. Jung, Die Ardennen-Offensive, 8, 17. Speer claims that Hitler told his generals hecould not give up Nikopol and Kriwoj Rog in the Ukraine, or permit the loss of Finland,due to the need for manganese and nickel, even though Speer had recently informedHitler sufficient stocks were available; “Protokoll 1: Adolf Hitler (1 August 1945),”Albert Speer: Die Kransberg-Protokolle, 122; “Protokoll 8: Bedarf der Wehrmacht,Programmgestaltung, Lieferungen vom Ausland, einschliesslich besetzte Gebiete (8August 1945),” Albert Speer: Die Kransberg-Protokolle, 386-87.

6. TBJG, entry for 27 July 1943, 9: 179. See also ibid., entry for 9 Mar. 1943, 7: 509.

7. Megargee, Inside Hitler's High Command, 213-14.

8. "Im Uebrigen waren bei aller Schwere der Lage doch noch Gruende vorhanden, die zuder Hoffnung auf einen Umschwung in letzter Stunde durchaus berechtigten. . . So kames fuer die Fuehrung darauf an, unter Konzentration aller Kraefte auf die wichtigstenAufgaben weiter durchzuhalten und auf Zeitgewinn zu arbeiten, bis die neuenKampfmittel zum Einsatz kommen konnten. In diesem Sinn wurde auch dieKriegsmarine gefuehrt;" Dönitz, "Die deutsche Seekriegführung," 6 Aug. 1945, BA/MA,RM 6/374, 56.

9. Ibid., 62.

10. Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris (New York: Norton, 1999), 529-31. Seealso Weinberg, A World at Arms, 477.

11. Weinberg dates this shift to an earlier period, to late 1943 or early 1944; Weinberg, AWorld at Arms, 668-69.

12. On Kershaw’s failure to emphasize ideology sufficiently, especially during the war,see the review by Peter Longerich, “Working Towards the Führer,”http://www1.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%205426.pdf (accessed

2 Sept. 2006), 11-12, 14-15. The review was published in Yad Vashem Studies, 30(2002): 405-426.

13. Herwig, Politics of Frustration, 192-93, 242, 259.

14. Bird, Raeder, xvii, 50-51, 213; Peifer, Three German Navies, 188-89.

15. Michael Salewski, “Das maritime Dritte Reich—Ideologie und Wirklichkeit 1933-1945” in Die deutsche Flotte im Spannungsfeld der Politik 1848-1985 (Deutsches MarineInstitut and Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt ed) (Herford: Mittler, 1985),” 125-27.

16. Bird, Raeder, 137. On Raeder’s acceptance of Nazism, see also Werner Rahn,“Kriegführung, Politik und Krisen—Die Marine des Deutschen Reiches 1914-1933,” inDie deutsche Flotte im Spannungsfeld der Politik, 79-80.

17. Salewski, “Das maritime Dritte Reich,” 127-29; Salewski, Die deutscheSeekriegsleitung, 2; Thomas, The German Navy in the Nazi Era, 141-61, 211-12, 235.

18. Peifer, The Three German Navies, 58.

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I. ARCHIVAL SOURCES:

1. National Archives. Washington, D.C. World War II Records Division. Captured German Documents.

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B. Naval Records: RM 6: Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine RM 7: Seekriegsleitung RM 8: Kriegswissenschaftliche Abteilung der Kriegsmarine RM 31: Marinestation der Ostsee RM 45 Ost: Dienst- und Kommandostellen der Kriegsmarine mit regionaler und lokaler

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II. PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS:

Albert Speer: Die Kransberg-Protokolle 1945: Seine ersten Aussagen undAufzeichnungen (Juni-September). Edited by Ulrich Schlie. Munich: Herbig,2003.

Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and thePresidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the GreatPatriotic War of 1941-1945. 2nd ed. 2 Vols. Edited by A. Gromyko. Moscow:Progress Publishers, 1975.

Deutschlands Rüstung im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Hitlers Konferenzen mit AlbertSpeer 1942-1945. Edited by Willi Boelcke. Frankfurt: AkademischeVerlagsgesellschaft Athenaion, 1969.

Goldensohn, Leon. The Nuremberg Interviews: An American Psychiatrist’sConversations with the Defendants and Witnesses. Edited by Robert Gellately.New York: Knopf, 2004.

The Hitler Book: The Secret Dossier Prepared for Stalin from the Interrogations ofHitler’s Personal Aides. Edited by Henrik Eberle and Matthias Uhl. Translatedby Giles MacDonogh. New York: Public Affairs, 2005.

Hitlers Lagebesprechungen: Die Protokollfragmente seiner militärischen Konferenzen,1942-1945. Edited by Helmut Heiber. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt,1962 [English edition: Hitler and His Generals. New York: Enigma, 2004].

Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier. 3rd ed. Edited by Henry Picker.Stuttgart: Seewald, 1976.

Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegsführung, 1939-1945. Edited by Walther Hubatsch. 2nd

ed. Frankfurt: Bernard & Graefe, 1983.

Hitlers zweites Buch: Ein Dokument aus dem Jahr 1928. Edited by Gerhard L.Weinberg. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1961.

International Military Tribunal. Trial of the Major War Criminals before the InternationalMilitary Tribunal: Nuremberg, 14 November 1945- 1 October 1946. Vols. 1,13, 34. Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal, 1949.

Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab), 1940-1945. 8 Vols. Edited by Percy Schramm. Frankfurt: Bernard & Graefe, 1961.

Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939-1945. 68 Vols. Edited for theMilitärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt in conjunction with the Federal MilitaryArchives and the Marine-Offizier-Vereinigung by Werner Rahn and GerhardSchreiber. Facs. Ed. Pt. A. Herford and Bonn: Mittler, 1988-1997.

Lagevorträge des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine vor Hitler, 1939-1945. Edited byGerhard Wagner. Munich: Lehmanns, 1972.

Latvian-Russian Relations: Documents. Compiled by Alfred Bilmanis. Washington:Latvian Legation, 1944.

Monologe im Führerhauptquartier 1941-1944: Die Aufzeichnungen Heinrich Heims.Edited by Werner Jochmann. Hamburg: Knaus, 1980.

1939-1945: Der Zweite Weltkrieg in Chronik und Dokumenten. Edited by Hans-AdolfJacobsen. 5th ed. Darmstadt: Wehr und Wissen Verlagsgesellschaft, 1961.

III. DIARIES AND MEMOIRS:

Below, Nicolaus von. Als Hitlers Adjutant 1937-1945. Mainz: Hase & Koehler, 1980.

Bidermann, Gottlob. In Deadly Combat: A German Soldier’s Memoir of the EasternFront. Translated and edited by Derek Zumbro. Lawrence: University Press ofKansas, 2000.

Blücher, Wipert von. Gesandter zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie. Wiesbaden: Limes,1951.

Boldt, Gerhard. Hitler—die letzten zehn Tage. Berlin: Ullstein, 1973.

Boheman, Erik. På vakt. Vol. 2: Kabinettssekreterare under andra världskriget.Stockholm: Norstedts, 1964.

Carius, Otto. Tigers in the Mud. Translated by Robert Edwards. Mechanicsburg, PA:Stackpole, 2003.

Churchill, Winston. The Gathering Storm. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948.

Cremer, Peter. U-Boat Commander: A Periscope View of the Battle of the Atlantic.Translated by Lawrence Wilson. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984.

Denham, Henry. Inside the Nazi Ring: A Naval Attaché in Sweden 1940-1945. London:John Murray, 1984.

Dönitz, Karl. Ten Years and Twenty Days. Translated by R.H. Stevens. London:Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1959.

Ehrensvärd, Carl August. I rikets tjänst: Händelser och människor från min bana.

Stockholm: Norstedts, 1965.

Engel, Gerhard. Heeresadjutant bei Hitler 1938-1943: Aufzeichnungen des MajorsEngel. Edited by Hildegard von Kotze. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt,1974.

Friessner, Hans. Verratene Schlachten. Hamburg: Holsten, 1956.

Goebbels, Joseph. Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels. Edited by Elke Fröhlich. PartII. Munich: Saur, 1993-1996.

Guderian, Heinz. Erinnerungen eines Soldaten. Heidelberg: Kurt Vowinckel, 1951.

Hägglöf, Gunnar. Det kringrända Sverige. Stockholm: Norstedts, 1983.

. Samtida Vittne 1940-1945. Stockholm: Norstedts, 1972.

. Vägen ut. Stockholm: Norstedts, 1984.

. Var försiktig i Berlin! Möten med Hitlermotståndare under krigsåren.Stockholm: Norstedts, 1986.

Harriman, W. Averell, and Ellie Abel. Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946. New York: Random House, 1975.

Heusinger, Adolf. Befehl im Widerstreit: Schicksalsstunden der deutschen Armee, 1923-1945. Tübingen: Rainer Wunderlich Verlag Hermann Leins, 1950.

Junge, Traudl. Bis zur letzten Stunde: Hitlers Sekretärin erzählt ihr Leben. Munich: List, 2003.

Keitel, Wilhelm. In the Service of the Reich. Edited by Walter Görlitz. Translated byDavid Irving. New York: Stein & Day, 1979.

Kellgren, Henry. Sex krigsår i Skölds skugga. 2nd ed. Stockholm: Saxon & Lindström,1951.

Kesselring, Albert. The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Albert Kesselring. Novato, CA:Presidio, 1989.

Knappe, Siegfried and Ted Brusaw. Soldat: Reflections of a German Soldier, 1936-1949.New York: Orion, 1992.

Kuhlmann, Franz. “Endkampf um den ‘Führerbunker.’” Ruhr-Nachrichten,20-26 April 1985.

Lasch, Otto. So fiel Königsberg. 2nd ed. Stuttgart: Motorbuch, 1977.

Last Witnesses in the Bunker. Edited by Pierre Galante and Eugene Silianoff. Translatedby Jan Dalley. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1989.

Leeb, Wilhelm Ritter von. Tagebuchaufzeichnung und Lagebeurteilungen aus zweiWeltkriegen. Edited by Georg Meyer. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1976.

Linge, Heinz. Bis zum Untergang: Als Chef des Persönlichen Dienstes bei Hitler. Editedby Werner Maser. 2nd rev. ed. Munich: Herbig, 1980.

Luck, Hans von. Panzer Commander: The Memoirs of Colonel Hans von Luck. NewYork: Dell, 1989.

Lüdde-Neurath, Walter. Regierung Dönitz: Die letzten Tage des Dritten Reiches. 4th ed.Leoni: Druffel, 1980.

Maizière, Ulrich de. In der Pflicht: Lebensbericht eines deutschen Soldaten im 20.Jahrhundert. 2nd ed. Bonn: Mittler, 1989.

Manstein, Erich. Lost Victories. Edited and translated by Anthony Powell. Reprint ed.Novato, CA: Presidio, 1982.

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Rendulic, Lothar. Gekämpft, gesiegt, geschlagen. Heidelberg: Welsermühl, 1952.

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Voices from the Third Reich: An Oral History. Edited by Johannes Steinhoff, PeterPechel and Dennis Showalter. Washington: Regnery Gateway, 1989.

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IV. PUBLISHED WORKS:

Achkasov, Vasiliy and Nikolai Pavlovich, Soviet Naval Operations in the Great PatrioticWar 1941-1945. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981.

Ackasov, V. I. "Die Durchbruchs-Operation der Baltischen Rotbanner-Flotte von Revalauf Kronstadt." Translated by Hans Siegel. Edited by Jürgen Rohwer. Marine-Rundschau. Vol. 64, No. 1 (1967): 26-45.

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Arbeitskreis der 56. Infanterie-Division. Geschichte der 56. Infanterie-Division.Privately published (copy in Freiburg University Library).

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Assmann, Heinz. "Some Personal Recollections of Adolf Hitler." Translated by RolandKrause. US Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 79, No. 12 (1953): 1289-95.

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. "Der Zusammenbruch der obersten deutschen militärischen Führung 1945."Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau. Vol. 10, No. 5 (1960): 257-66.

Beck, Earl. Under the Bombs: The German Home Front 1942-1945. Lexington, KY:University Press of Kentucky, 1986.

Beesly, Patrick. Very Special Intelligence: The Story of the Admiralty's OperationalIntelligence Centre 1939-1945. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1977.

Behrendtz, Lennart. "Tysklands hållning till svensk intervention i vinterkriget: en analysmot bakgrund av den nazistiska östpolitiken." Scandia, Vol. 38, No. 2 (1972):218-33.

Berenbrok, Hans-Dieter (Cajus Bekker pseud.). Flucht übers Meer; Ostsee—deutschesSchicksal 1945. Oldenburg: Stalling, 1964.

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Bernau, Günter. "Felix Steiner, SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Waffen-SS; zuseinem 10. Todestag." Deutsches Soldaten-Jarhbuch. Vol. 24 (1976):401-08.

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Bilanz des zweiten Weltkrieges. Oldenburg: Stalling, 1953.

Bilmanis, Alfred. A History of Latvia. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951.

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Bird, Keith. Erich Raeder: Admiral of the Third Reich. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,2006.

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Blair, Clay. Hitler’s U-Boat War. 2 vols. New York: Random House, 1996, 1998.

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. Swedish Foreign Policy during the Second World War. Translated by ArthurSpencer. London: Ernest Benn, 1977.

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Dülffer, Jost. "Die Reichs- und Kriegsmarine 1918-1939." Handbuch zur deutschenMilitärgeschichte 1648-1939. Vol. 8: Deutsche Marinegeschichte der Neuzeit.Munich: Bernard & Graefe, 1977.

. Weimar, Hitler und die Marine: Reichspolitik und Flottenbau 1920-1939.Düsseldorf: Droste, 1973.

Ekholm, Curt. Balt- och tyskutlämningen 1945-1946. Part 1: Ankomsten ochinterneringen. Uppsala: University of Uppsala, 1984.

Elliot, Mark. Pawns of Yalta: Soviet Refugees and America's Role in their Repatriation.Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982.

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. Speer: The Final Verdict. Translated by Ewald Osers and Alexandra Dring.New York: Harcourt, 2001.

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