Corporations: A Contemporary Approach Chapter 17 Shareholder Litigation Slide 1 of 17 Chapter 17...

Corporations:A Contemporary Approach

Chapter 17Shareholder Litigation

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• Derivative vs. direct actions– Derivative action: 2 suits in 1- enforce

fiduciary duties to corporation– Direct action: representative suit - protect Sh

rights– Distinction between two: who recovers?

• Demand requirement– Board decides lawsuit’s merits– Aronson test: (1) director disinterest +

independence, (2) decision protected by BJR

Module VII – Fiduciary Duties

Citizen of world

Citizen of world

Law profession

Law profession

Corporate practice

Corporate practice

Bar examBar

exam


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1. Fundamentals– Introduction to firm– Corporate basics

2. Corporations and policy– Corporate federalism– Corporate social responsibility – Corporate political action

3. Corporate form– Organizational choices– Incorporation– Locating corporate authority

4. Corporate finance– Numeracy for corporate lawyers– Capital structure

5. Corporate externalities– Piercing corporate veil– Corporate environmental liability– Corporate criminal liability

6. Corporate governance – Shareholder voting– Shareholder information rights– Public shareholder activism

7. Fiduciary duties– Shareholder litigation– Board decision making – Board oversight – Director conflicts– Executive compensation – Corporate groups

8. Stock trading– Securities markets– Securities fraud class actions– Insider trading

9. Corporate deals– Sale of control– Antitakeover devices– Deal protection

10. Close corporations– Planning– Oppression

1. Fundamentals– Introduction to firm– Corporate basics

2. Corporations and policy– Corporate federalism– Corporate social responsibility – Corporate political action

3. Corporate form– Organizational choices– Incorporation– Locating corporate authority

4. Corporate finance– Numeracy for corporate lawyers– Capital structure

5. Corporate externalities– Piercing corporate veil– Corporate environmental liability– Corporate criminal liability

6. Corporate governance – Shareholder voting– Shareholder information rights– Public shareholder activism

10. Close corporations– Planning– Oppression

7. Fiduciary duties1. Shareholder litigation2. Board decision making 3. Board oversight 4. Director conflicts5. Executive compensation 6. Corporate groups




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Enforcement of fiduciary duties …



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Derivative suit(enforce duties to corporation)

CorporationShareholder(lawyer)

Fiduciaries

“on behalf of corporation”

violation of corporate duties

(recovery to corporation)

Delaware Supreme Court:

“if an action is derivative, the plaintiffs are then required to comply with the requirements of Court of Chancery Rule 23.1, that the stockholder:

(a) retain ownership of the shares throughout the litigation;

(b) make pre-suit demand on the board; and

(c) obtain court approval of any settlement. Further, the recovery, if any, flows only to the corporation.”



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Class action(enforce duties to shareholders)

Corporation

Sh rep(lawyer)

Insiders

“on behalf of class”

violation of direct duties

(recovery to shareholders)

Shareholderclass



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Demand requirement …

[in Delaware]



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Aronson v. Lewis (Del. 1984)

Meyers Parking gives its CEO (and 47% shareholder) a sweetheart employment and retirement package.

Sh Lewis (a serial plaintiff – really a plaintiff’s law firm) claims this is waste. Why is this a derivative suit?

Who controls the corporation’s litigation decisions. Why doesn’t plaintiff ask the board to sue?

Asking the board to sue all the directors is futile - no? Who dominates the board?

Where does the court start its analysis? Why the BJR?

Directors

Shareholders

Corporation

Board

Plaintiffshareholder



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Our view is that in determining demand futility the Court of Chancery in the proper exercise of its discretion must decide whether, under the particularized facts alleged, a reasonable doubt is created that:

(1) the directors are disinterested and independent and

(2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment.

Hence, the Court of Chancery must make two inquiries, one into the independence and disinterestedness of the directors and the other into the substantive nature of the challenged transaction and the board's approval thereof.


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1. Which of the following should be a derivative suit?a. Board issues new stock,

without preemptive rights b. Board has Corp buy majority

Sh’s art collectionc. Board gives lifetime

employment to CEO2. Delaware requires Shs make

demand on board …a. Alwaysb. when time is of essencec. Unless excused as futile

3. Delaware excuses demand …a. When current board majority

$$ interested b. When current board not

independentc. When BJR not apply

4. In Aronson v. Lewis …a. Directors dominated because CEO

was 47% Shb. Directors interested because all

directors were suedc. Demand was not excused

5. After Aronson v. Lewis a Sh must have particularized facts that …a. Current directors personally tied to

interested directorb. Current directors financially

interested in challenged txc. All directors interested/dominated

6. In Delaware, a Sh who makes demand on board …a. Concedes board is disinterested and

independentb. Can still sue and show board

interested and non-independentc. Can sue after waiting for 90 days for

board to act

Answers: 1-b (c – either deriv, direct) / 2-c / 3-abc / 4-c / 5-b / 6-a

Chapter 29Planning in CHC



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Universal demand and board dismissal ….

[under MBCA]



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MBCA (demand in derivative litigation)

§ 7.42 DemandNo shareholder may commence a derivative proceeding until:

(1) a written demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable action; and(2) 90 days have expired from the date the demand was made unless … the demand has been rejected

by the corporation or unless irreparable injury to the corporation would result by waiting ….

§ 7.44 Dismissal(a) A derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the court on motion by the corporation if one of the groups specified in subsection (b) … has determined in good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which its conclusions are based that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is not in the best interests of the corporation.(b) … the determination in subsection (a) shall be made by: (1) a majority vote of independent directors present at a meeting of the board of directors if the independent directors constitute a quorum; or (2) a majority vote of a committee consisting of two or more independent directors appointed by majority vote of independent directors present at a meeting of the board of directors, whether or not such independent directors constituted a quorum. (c) None of the following shall by itself cause a director to be considered not independent for purposes of this section:

(1) the nomination or election of the director by persons who are defendants in the derivative proceeding or against whom action is demanded;

(2) the naming of the director as a defendant in the derivative proceeding or as a person against whom action is demanded; or

(3) the approval by the director of the act being challenged in the derivative proceeding or demand if the act resulted in no personal benefit to the director.


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1. Which of the following should be a derivative suit?

a. Board misleads Shs about impending merger

b. Board has Corp buy CEO’s wife’s art collection

c. Board announces revised dividend policy

2. MBCA requires Shs make demand on board …

a. Always (except emergency)b. When time is of essencec. Unless excused as futile

3. MBCA requires dismissal of derivative suit …

a. When current board asksb. When majority of independent,

disinterested Ds ask c. When Sh makes demand

4. In MBCA derivative suit must be dismissed if in good faith and after reasonable inquiry …a. Ds constituting board quorum askb. Special litigation committee

(properly chosen/composed) asksc. Demand was not excused

5. In MBCA Ds are not independent …a. If they have personal ties to

interested directorb. If they have financial interest in

challenged txc. If they have been sued

6. In MBCA, a Sh who makes demand on board …a. Concedes board is disinterested and

independentb. Can still sue to show current Ds

interested and non-independentc. Can sue after waiting for 90 days for

board to act

Answers: 1-b (c – either deriv/direct) / 2-a / 3-abc / 4-b / 5-b / 6-c

Chapter 29Planning in CHC



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Corporations: A Contemporary Approach Chapter 17 Shareholder Litigation Slide 1 of 17 Chapter 17...

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