(Copyright, Peter B. Beeching, Toronto: December 16, 1998: Revised: April 6 & 19, 1999: May 1, 1999; July 29, 1999; August 9 & 23, 1999; September 17 & 22, 1999; October 9, 15, 19, 20, 25. 30, 1999, November 4, 13, 15, 18, 1999; December 14, 1999; January 03, 17; February 07; March 06, 14; May 12; June 20, 23; July 07,10,11, 12; October 26 - 31; November 1, 2000 -

December 18, 2000)

Principles, Pinochet, and the Realpolitik of Humanitarianism

Putting it together as a Subway Transit Reader

by Peter B. Beeching

93 Pages

Prepared for: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2300 Yonge Street, Ste. 402, Toronto, Ontario. M4P 1E4

(ww.ciss.ca)

December 18, 2000.

By:

Peter B. Beeching, Toronto, Ontario.

For M., another friend of M, and Mary Luisa, all of who were picked by Security Forces in Cordoba, April, 1977, and released (after much torture) at dawn in a

cemetery - dumped from moving cars. Except for Mary Luisa, who

was never seen again. Crime: being youthful, with minds of their own.

For Professor George Heiman, who forgot more justice than any Supreme Justice probably ever knew.

For Gunther Plaut, who has seen it all, and probably knows more about future peace in the quiet days of his present life than most chanting it to promote themselves.

For Mr. Stephen Kass, Chair Human Rights Watch, Americas Advisory Committee, New York) and Pierre Sané, Secretary General, Amnesty International,

International Secretariat, inter alia, who never bothered responding to queries relating this project.

About the Author:

Peter Beeching has a Master’s degree in International Affairs and European History from the University of Western Ontario, and has been accepted for doctoral work on Latin American affairs in the United States. Formerly a journalist, he has been marketing director for Spanish media and is currently looking to advance his focus upon Hispanic issues. He has an interest in the overly of current affairs evolving from historical antecedents - and interpretive variations arising from competing claims of “historical authenticity and precedent.“

Mr. Beeching hopes that the premise of his article’s premise proves to be wrong.

Principles, Pinochet, and the Realpolitik of Humanitarianism

by Peter B. Beeching

Under the authority of the European Convention on Extradition and the 1984 United

Nations Convention against torture, for some time Spain‘s Judge Baltazar Garzon had

wanted General Augusto Pinochet Uguarte in Spain to stand trial for the torture, murder,

and disappearance of Spanish citizens during his (Pinochet‘s) rule in Chile from 1973 -

1990. On April 15, 1999, Britain‘s Home secretary Jack Straw decided to permit

Garzon’s extradition request to proceed against Pinochet, despite the Second Law Lords’

circumscribed judgment against the former Chilean leader (having voted six to one

against the General, though only for offences committed after 1988, not those between

1973 - 1988 -- thereby reducing the number of viable charges from thirty two to one

[1.]). On October 08, 1999, deputy Chief Magistrate Ronald Bartle ruled that Spain could

proceed with extradition against the General.

On January 11, 2000, however, Home Secretary Straw, concluding that the General was

unfit to stand trial after the unanimous conclusion of an independent panel of four

medical specialists (but not including a geriatric psychiatrist [2.]) to this effect, took he

view “that no purpose would be served by continuing...present extradition proceedings”

-- notwithstanding Pinochet being fit for tea and cake with Margaret Thatcher. [3.]

Indeed, rather than reporting signs of mental deterioration, the Baroness advertised his

courage and fighting spirit! [4.]

....2/93

- 2/93 -

But Lady Thatcher is no doctor; according to the General‘s private medical report,

submitted under order of the British High Court on February 16, 2000 on a confidential

basis to government prosecuting officials of Belgium, France, Spain, and Switzerland

(but somehow leaked to the press in these countries), Pinochet [did] not have the mental

capacity to participate in a trial and understand the case against him. [5.]

On March 02, 2000, on humanitarian grounds relating to the General‘s poor health,

Home Secretary Straw finally released Pinochet [6.], who returned to a triumphal

reception amongst his many supporters (President Eduardo Frei and his ministers being

absent) in Chile, like a Caesar home from the wars; perhaps so spiritually transcendent

was his return home, that like Lazarus, the General arose from his wheel chair to walk

amongst his jubilant, confetti throwing supporters who had conferred upon him the

honour of a motorcade. [7.]

On December 01, 2000, this continuing bipolar drama seemed to come to a halt in

Santiago when Judge Juan Guzman Tapia indicted Pinochet for, in part, the “caravan of

death,” stating that the General and former dictator was the mastermind of a campaign in

which 74 suspected leftists disappeared or were killed during a roving helicopter borne

assault of detainees in the months following Pinochet’s coup against elected President

Salvador Allende. This helicopter-borne squad travelled around northern Chile, picking

out political prisoners from military installations; these prisoners were never seen again -

- 3/93 -

alive.[8.] Otherwise covered by his self dealt amnesty laws while still in power, Pinochet

was caught short by Guzman’s argument that 18 (or 19 - depending upon source) of the

74 “Caravan” victims never recovered or located could be considered as kidnapped - a

crime not covered by amnesty laws. [9.]

Ten days later, on December 11, the Chilean Court of Appeals struck down Pinochet’s

house arrest, ruling that Judge Guzman had failed to interrogate General Pinochet before

ordering his arrest and trial. [10.]

So it appears the long, rough voyage for the SS Justice for Pinochet is finally coming

into port. Throughout this turbulent period, commentators have characterized the

General’s case as a predicament. For example, Ricardo Lagos and Heraldo Munoz state

in The Pinochet Dilemma that Justice should be done, but on whose terms? [11.]

They ask a good question! To which it may be added, Justice according to whose

criteria? Perhaps the victors? Who were/are the victors? - and of what are the victors?

Ironically, Ricardo Lagos, a December/‘99 Socialist Presidential candidate, editorialized on this, admitting that under Allende, Chile‘s hyper-inflation, shortages, and economic collapse in 1972-73, reflected the Popular Unity‘s radicalism. He conceded that Under Allende, they even went far beyond the Communist Party in encouraging peasant land invasions, worker takeovers of factories, and even calling upon military units to mutiny, acknowledging that such actions helped to trigger the coup. [12.]

- 4/93 -

Was the Allende - Pinochet conflict merely another junta’s coup d‘etat - or a legitimate

civil war? Are General Pinochet‘s offences war crimes? - as defined by the victor against

the loser in a conflict [13.]; Was Pinochet not the victor of his domestic conflict?

Or are Pinochet‘s offences crimes against humanity, as established by the Nuremberg

Charter:

Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation against a civilian population as part of a campaign on political, racial, or religious grounds. [14.]

Would Plato define General Pinochet as a mutant Philosopher King and Perfect

Guardian; Do his subsequent free market reforms, and 1988 ceding of absolute power

(under his own 1980 Constitution) reflect his love of, and respect for, the State as Plato

and Augustine would have understood it? [15.]

In short, is General Pinochet a contemporary Cato the Elder, a classical Just Man -- or

the victim of what could be the latest, albeit sincere, fashion in situation ethics -- namely,

bringing dictators to justice for their abusive, antidemocratic rule? And if the latter,

what is the hidden agenda of Pinochet‘s righteous accusers? To what extent was/is there

concordance in the vision of justice for Pinochet as between his Chilean and non-Chilean

pursuers?

- 5/93 -

On another but related matter, said U. N. Secretary General Kofi Annan of the October

25, 2000 overthrow of the Ivory Coast’s regime of General Guei by Laurent Gbagbo:

“The days of a coup...of manipulating elections are over.” [16.]

The Secretary General was perhaps thinking - or failing to think of - his own country

next door; where President (Flt.-Lt.) Jerry John Rawlings (recently retired) had been at

the head of two of Ghana’s six coups since independence in 1957 and (depending upon

interpretation) has himself been the beneficiary of manipulated elections (again,

depending upon definitional semantics of coup and election). With foreign concerns

about the future legitimacy of a new American “president-by- a-vote,” could Annan have

had the Gore-Bush Florida/Washington Supreme Court bound slugfest in mind as proof

of the benchmark American democracy at work? - or as a stolen election, as a coup-by-

court? [17.] Could Annan also have been confident that indicted war criminal Slobodan

Milosevic would not re-emerge, sitting on the sidelines like a fox contemplating a new

way into the boarded up chicken hut? [18.]

For Pinochet, the honourable thief who mugged and robbed Chile of its’ democracy in

1973 and “returning” it to the country upon losing the “Yes/No” plebiscite of October 5,

1988, it is an ironically prophetic situation expressed in more timeless terms;

“Don’t forget that in the history of the world, there was a plebiscite in which Christ and Barabbas were being judged, and the people chose Barabbas” he declared three weeks later. [19.]

- 6/93 -

Who was General Pinochet (and no less, Flt.-Lt. Jerry John Rawlings): Christ or Barabbas?

And either way, is the answer absolute or relative?

It is this essay‘s position that General Augusto Pinochet Uguarte, for all of his alleged

faults -- stated with complete sensitivity and respect for his undisputed victims -- is the

latter; a victim of the human rights activist movements whose adherents became manipu-

lated by more mature, more cynical, practitioners of real world politics and diplomacy.

Should this include current Chilean authorities presiding over Pinochet’s legal disputes

active at the time of this writing? That is difficult to answer except by refractory

inferences based on current information. If anyone is entitled to see justice rendered for

the General, it is the Chilean people - but who amongst the Chilean people most want his

neck and who amongst his Chilean supporters [may] have sold him down the river?

These answers, if they emerge, it is suggested, will point more to justice by default and

(amongst some) to sacrificing him to preserve self interest within the current Santiago

regime.

The Senator-General, subsequent to his return to Chile from England, was stripped of his

senatorial immunities by his own Courts. Recently (November 3, 2000), the Chilean

Courts ruled that the General was obliged to undergo psychological tests before any trial

on human rights charges. [20.] So, with Judge Guzman’s December 01 order for

Pinochet’s house arrest - before the accused had been interrogated or had psychological

- 7/93 -

tests to determine legal competency, has due process been usurped? [21.] Or merely

made more “efficient,” perhaps not unlike the General’s own alleged summary

elimination of his own opponents? Or cleverly set itself up to be over ruled by the very

due process Chile so needs to prove itself a democracy once more?

On October 6, 1999, Margaret Thatcher characterized the affair as a judicial kidnapping,

motivated by the revenge [of] the left, not justice for the victim. [22.]

Thatcher is, of course, a partisan in the Pinochet issue; this inquiry neither endorses nor

criticizes her position. nor does it take issue with either current Labour Prime Minister

Tony Blair or his cabinet colleague Jack Straw having cut their teeth marching against

Pinochet in their student days [23.]

Note is merely made that Lady Thatcher, The Iron Lady, refers to Home Secretary Straw

as a very fair man [24.] as this discussion endeavours to determine questions and shape

conclusions based on how the issues and facts fit together. Central to this discussion was

Chile‘s stripping Pinochet of his immunity to prosecution in June, 2000 - but to this

shortly.

- 8/93 -

Realpolitik and the Compassionate Heart: Everything is grist to

the mill for Raisons d‘Etat

Sovereign states, it has long been noted, have no friends -- only self interests to protect

(with morality being optional [25.]); To create and maintain a nation state, leaders may

do unpleasant, unjust and intolerant things - including the shedding of blood. [26.] That

is to say, leaders running sovereign states practise realpolitik. Why else did the American

senate reject the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in a volte face on October 13, 1999?

With respect to a state‘s interest in respect of open conflict, Carl von Clausewitz‘ On

War is straightforward:

The aim of war must always be the overthrow of the enemy... [27.]

War can only be of two kinds; either the conquest of the enemy’s country [Offensive War], or the defense of [one‘s own] until better times [Defensive War]... [28.]

Whether the State‘s interests are compromised from without or from within -- or both --

is a matter of subjective interpretation by the authorities entrusted to protect them. If

divergent views emerge as to the state’s true interests, civil war is likely to result.

Did this happen to Chile in 1973? In its‘ own words, the military establishment felt that

Chile‘s interests (such as these may have been) had to be “liberated from...the Marxist

yoke,” revolted, and replaced Salvador Allende‘s plurality elected Popular Unity

government with a corrective regime intended, said Pinochet, to rebuild the country. [29.]- 9/93 -

Under realpolitik thinking, General Pinochet‘s detention in London at the request of

Spain‘s Judge Garzon - as authentic, courageous, and idealistic as his motivations may

be [30.] - was/is hypocritical and conveniently expedient for authorities using

humanitarian criteria to disguise traditional raisons d‘etat (for which justice and

compassion are at best a byproduct of other, self centred objectives).

Particularly with the backdrop of the military campaign by NATO against Yugoslavia in

the then heating (autumn/winter of 1998/99) war to be unleashed against Slobodan

Milosevic in Kosovo in March, 1999. To be sure, the Pinochet London detention and

extradition decision was/is timely. For with the genocidal brutality by the Serbs against

the Albanian Kosovars, civilized people are agreed upon the justifiability of Slobodan

Milosevic and his associates to eventually stand trial at the Hague.

But since torture, murder, and disappearances have been commonplace globally for decades -- is it decent to say for hundreds, thousands of years -- (just think Kosovo for now), what‘s the big deal?

Is this cyncism acceptable? From a humanitarian perspective, certainly not; no abuses

are. This is, however, a relative issue. For from a realpolitik perspective, What is the

Pinochet dilemma?

Human rights abuses attributed to the Chilean general were no problem for the British

Army acting against the IRA in Northern Ireland during the 1970s and 1980s; that the

- 10/93 -

European Court qualified British abuses as psychological injury short of physical torture

[31.] is surely a debatable issue for victims of either or both.

During the Salvador Allende period, then secretary of State Henry Kissinger said that the

Chileans should not have been so irresponsible as to have elected Allende. [32.]

Under the Centaur Plan, he authorized US $8 million to destabilize Allende‘s economy

between 1970 and 1973. [33.] As early as October 2, 1970 (Allende had been elected

only 21 days earlier!),the Nixon administration was resolved to “[push] forward...efforts

to create an atmosphere of economic doom in Chile.” [34.]

In setting up the League of Nations, Woodrow Wilson promoted self determination

(democratic or otherwise) for all nations following the release of several European

nations from Hapsburg, Russian, and German control after WWI. So just what did this

fellow, albeit more contemporary, American government official mean when he spoke of

irresponsible citizens. Via the Centaur Plan, was not Kissinger et al. interfering in the

internal affairs of another country?

Kissinger is an expert on Metternich, who believed that the only way to stop democrats

and their (conspiratorial) secret societies, the gangrene of society, was with monarchs at

the head of the army [35.]; Metternich mused that A[Conservative] Vienna is not

[anarchic] Paris in the aftermath of the liberal revolutions of 1848! [36.]

Perhaps Henry’s mind was somewhere in his hero‘s when he made this comment about

- 11/93 -

Allende‘s election. Perhaps Henry and Augusto are just part of those periodic swings that

move humanity back and forth, like mice on a clock pendulum, chiming out the eras!

Equally overlooked in the Pinochet imbroglio is probably that, in the heart of Latin

America‘s conservative heart, within its‘ various establishments, there is a mindset closer

to Ferdinand and Isabella‘s Inquisition than we are prepared to admit. Perhaps

compromising a straight line from Ferdinand‘s Spain through Franco right to

contemporary Latin America, its‘ new democracies notwithstanding? [37.]

Did not Guatemala, which has just come through a brutal 34 year/200,000 casualty

(killed) civil war, give right wing candidate Alfonso Portillo 48% of its recent

Presidential vote, notwithstanding his admission of having killed two men in Mexico in

1982? Was this not a platform credential for Portillo; as was said in a TV campaign: A

man who can defend his own life can defend yours! [38.] (Whether Portillo, unwilling or

unable to implement military reform and put an end to impunity, is able to deliver remains

another matter. [39.])

Thus, imitation of America‘s Constitution by Latin American republics in the early 19th

century created democracies on paper only. A closed circle or aristocrats and monied

classes who would have ruled society in any case has basically perpetuated itself in tight

power circles to this day. [40.]

- 12/93 -

Perhaps, probably (?), they retain control in shadows not killed by the illumination of

recent economic and democratic miracles in the region!

How conveniently ironic, then, was the impact of President Monroe’s edict against

corrupting intrusions of European pretensions to hegemony in the Americas. America‘s

determination and ability [41.] to stay clear of European entanglements created an

umbrella under which Latin American jurisdictions breaking away from Spain under

Bolivar and San Martin (sporting American style constitutions) perpetuated social

structures repugnant to Washington‘s sensibilities.

Extending this irony of the Monroe Doctrine by marrying it to Latin America‘s

intolerant, baroque conservatism, in the region‘s context, there was nothing deviant by

such events as the welcoming of fugitive Nazis by Juan Peron (a Mussolini understudy

and Hitler admirer) -- and Pinochet‘s coup d‘etat. Or, next door, Argentina‘s

simultaneous Dirty War under Generals Viola, Videla, & Galtieri, S.A.

Neither was there anything horrifying, from a Latin American perspective, about the

elimination of liberal influences under such programmes as Operation Condor

(authorizing rightist operatives to travel globally to assassinate left wing rebels). Condor

was regionally administered by authorities from several Latin American jurisdictions,

with General Pinochet‘s regime at its‘ helm. According to a 1976 Federal Bureau of

Investigation document, Operation Condor was a Chilean led effort to travel anywhere in

the world...to carry out sanctions, up to assassinations, against leftist rebels. [42.]

- 13/93 -

From a local military mindset, any campaign against liberal degeneracy was an equation

whereby Catholic decency -- in all of its‘ spiritual splendour and social inequalities (Said

Jesus, The poor will always be with us) -- had to replace creeping red totalitarianism and

the ethical decline of civilian power.

The Roman Catholic Church, meanwhile, was at best ambivalent and dichotomous to

developments from the right. In Chile, the Catholic Church‘s Vicariate of Solidarity

pushed for human rights redress and investigations into cases of desaparecidos. [43.]

Meanwhile, strongly anti-Marxist, a number of bishops hailed the coup as an act of

national liberation and ignored the oppression that followed. The Archbishop of

Valparaiso asserted that any bloodshed was outweighed by Chile‘s salvation as a free and

sovereign nation. Cardinal Silva, Chile‘s highest Catholic official, was more reserved; he

blessed the new authorities (though not in a cathedral) and offered them the same

collaboration provided to Allende. [44.]

For all of this, however, there does not appear to have been as widespread Church

support

in Chile for military dictatorship as in Argentina. There, Catholic priests (that is, those

not helping the persecuted, who were themselves persecuted and/or murdered by General

Videla‘s junta [45.]) not only blessed military officials involved in torturing and

murdering subversives, but were declared by priests to be patriotic acts...[which] God

knew was for the good of the country. [46.]

- 14/93 -

Similarly, leading members of the Argentinian Church, like the Cardinal Primate of

Buenos Aires, Juan Carlos Aramburu, always accepted invitations from the military to

attend public functions ranging from march pasts to Te Deums in which the unity of the

militarized state achieved its‘ ultimate symbol. [47.]

By contrast to trips to then Communist Poland, Pope John Paul II himself avoided

anything that might heighten indignation and revulsion toward Pinochet‘s government

during his April 1987 visit to Chile. [48.]

There seems to have been an uncompromising consistency between conservative Latin

American military thinking and the sacred, purifying role of the Spanish Inquisition.

During the Inquisition, for example, torture to the corporeal body did not matter if the

victim=s soul was saved through an Auto de Fe. This, according to Cecil Roth in The

Spanish Inquisition, was tantamount to conferring an act of love. [49.]

So what did it matter if Pinochet‘s forces threw degenerate subversives from helicopters

into bubbling volcanoes? Or, in neighbouring Argentina, if children born of captive

women in torture detention centres were transferred to decent military couples unable to

conceive (while these childrens‘ mothers became desaparecidas, murdered as hopeless

degenerates after giving birth)?

- 15/93 -

Communism, Catholicism, Genocide, Liberalism‘s Respect for Self Determination vs The Agony of Intervention, yada, yada! Disguising the real issue: Whose ox is being gored

From Chile to Kosovo to Mozambique: The interplay of recent case studies

Fidel Castro’s Cuban Revolution was an important influence upon Chilean Communists

during the 1960s. [50.]

Further afield, Europe‘s New Left of the 1960s and 1970s -- from the Baader Meinhoff

Gang of West Germany to the Red Brigade of Italy -- was deeply affected by Frantz

Fanon‘s concept of the liberating and cleansing effect of violence. Western Europe‘s

Anarchist Communists of the day, however, turned to violence not to fight for the

oppressed and exploited there, but to destroy the islands of wealth in Europe -- to act as

agents of the Third World. [51.]

Such thinking, with the brutal psychological torture and subsequent machine gunning

murder of Aldo Moro in 1978, must surely have been on the minds of military operatives

as they went about their job of creating desapareciodos of their victims.

As applicable to Pinochet is a quotation attributed to Admiral Emilio Massera (since

convicted of desaparecida child kidnappings) in Nunca Mas, President Alfonsin‘s report

of Argentina‘s National Commission on Disappeared People:

- 16/93 -

“...When we act in a political capacity, we continue to be Catholics; just as Catholic priests, when acting religiously,

continue to be citizens...” [52.]

So rationalized, military operatives acting against suspected subversives arrogated to

themselves the mentality of the Inquisition period.

How consistent had been this commitment to Spiritual Deliverance by Latin America’s

recent military authorities with Atahuallpa‘s Conversion (and execution) at Pizarro‘s

Court. -

If such was the prevailing mentality of Latin America‘s military rulers in the 1970s and

1980s, apparently they have since been converted to subordinating themselves to the

Civilian President as the final authority in matters of state. Some call this the Myth of

Constitutionalism (or in Latin American literary circles, Magic Realism!). Indeed, prior

to Venezuela’s May 28, 2000 presidential and low level elections, its’ Foreign Minister

had downplayed rumours of possible military unrest and possible coups under Hugo

Chavez - noting that such talk was merely typical during the buildup to national

elections. [53.]

Democracy is unfolding in Latin America as it should; Surely God looking down upon

this massive exercise of Free Will would say: It is Good.

Meanwhile, neo-fascism has been globalized as a subculture Columbine High School

massacre in Colorado, Aryan Nation websites, international neo-fascist revivals -- e.g.,

- 17/93 -

skinhead beatings of Czech gypsies, as three contemporary examples); Had the Kosovo

campaign gone in his favour, Slobodan Milosevic the chameleon Communist-turned-

fascist-ethnic-cleanser would assuredly have triumphed as an elected president. The

world would have never heard of Vojislav Kostunica.

How could this be so? What was/is its‘ link to General Pinochet?

In the international realm, things had been taking an ironic, ever spiralling twist evolving

into a moral quagmire since the collapse of the Soviet system. Old ethnic hatreds have

seeped into the global power vacuum created by the absence of Russia‘s international

presence.

Thus, it has been possible for atrocities to have been committed from Rwanda to Liberia

to Sierra Leone to Bosnia -- thence on to Kosovo. And, subsequently, to East Timor. Who

knows where the Grim reaper will appear next?

While local holocausts were under way, the U.N. debated like Nero fiddling as Rome

burned (United Nations officials, for example, failed to act upon Canadian General

Dallaire‘s genocide fax of January 11, 1994 - months before the genocidal fratricide of

that spring), predicting massacres in Rwanda in 1994; Dallaire had warned of plans to

exterminate the Tutsis in Kigali at a rate of 1,000 every 20 minutes. [54.]

Major General Lewis Mackenzie contends that the Security Council’s five permanent

- 18/93 -

members (PERM 5) probably knew of Dallaire‘s report before Secretary General Kofi

Annan. [55.]

General Dallaire‘s report indicated that the U.N.’s bureaucratic incompetence contributed

to Rwandan massacres. [56.] This documentation notwithstanding, there was

widespread concern that U.N. hearings involving General Dallaire‘s testimony was

simply designed to whitewash the U.N.’s blood spattered culpability. [57.] Interestingly,

with General Dallaire vindicated, Kofi Annan‘s symbolic acceptance of responsibility for

the U.N.’s failure to act seems to have let the Secretary General emerge unscathed.

Dallaire, meanwhile, besotten in grief, had lost himself in alcohol in Ottawa area parks.

[58.]

Amongst diplomats, there was what amounted to a lethargy cloaked in the mantle of non-

interference in another state‘s affair (the very opposite of what Kissinger was doing in

Allende‘s Chile!). Translated: the realpolitik of non-involvement where one‘s external

strategic interests were not at stake.

To elaborate:

Bismarck once said that the bones of a Pomeranian Grenadier were not worth being sacrificed in the Balkans. With action necessary against the Serbs by someone, NATO‘s deployment of Tomahawk Cruise Missiles and an overwhelming fleet of NATO attack aircraft against Yugoslavia, the German Chancellor‘s bald candour was made policy with NATO‘s victory, without the loss of a single allied soldier‘s life. (Not that Yuogslavia had a chance; Based on Russian equipment that defended Iraq in 1991's Desert Storm, and despite the downing of a Stealth 117A, the war’s outcome was decided before it started.)

- 19/93 -

The Serbs became the neighbourhood Master Race with their Ethnic cleansing in both

Bosnia and Kosovo. And despite NATO’s victory and the present role as peace keepers,

Albanians have of murdered Serbs left in Kosovo. [59.]

Considering the apparent mutual hatred between Yugoslavia‘s Orthodox Christian Serbs

and its‘ Islamic Albanian citizens, -- coupled with Tirana‘s own visions of a greater

Albania for its’ own peoples -- it is fair comment to ask if the Serbian Kosovars might

not have been victims of an Albanian campaign had the domestic military balance been

reversed from the start.

On March 23, 1999, President Clinton explained that NATO’s mission was humanitarian;

It would intervene in Kosovo to prevent bloodshed against people based on who they are

(non Serb Minorities). On September 21, 1999, Clinton told the United Nations General

Assembly that American responses to human strife would vary according to its‘ interests

and its’ ability to act...[60.]

Is Humanitarianism universal, or subject to triage -- subject, that is, to selective

compassion based on whose ox is being gored? [61.]

Said Gracia Machael, Nelson Mandela‘s current wife, over wealthy

countries‘ indifference and failure to aid Mozambique’s flooding tragedy

following Cyclone Gloria: The world has no conscience when it comes

to human life. Added Noticias, Mozambique’s main newspaper: “When

- 20/93 -

the West wants to intervene militarily, anywhere..., they get there in

record time.” [62.]

Augusto Pinochet, Alexander Dubcek, Expendability and Equipoise

The Devil one knows vs a Long Night‘s Journey into the Fog: Tradeoffs

African leaders requested a 15,000 man military contingent from the U.N. to address

intertribal conflict in the north east Congo (7,000 locals may initially have been

slaughtered); they were provisionally allotted an external contingent of 500 unarmed

military officers [63.]; a 5,500 strong protection force was subsequently approved -

subject to the combatants living up to the so far failed Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement that

they themselves signed in July, 1999, and with Secretary General Annan‘s satisfaction

that all intervening foreign factions (Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda) are

co-operating. Hopefully, this will be so; but based on performance to date, will this

happen? [64.]

So, while an Organization of African Unity report alleges that Western powers turned

their backs on the 1994 Rwandan genocide (with Stephen Lewis and Gerald Caplan

maintaining that Africa not be blamed for its‘ wars), a statesman no less than Nelson

- 21/93 -

Mandela has labelled central Africa‘s warlords (in this case, Burundi‘s) as barbarians

lacking either vision or talent. [65.]

As between these comments on a common issue, is it then fair to ask if local combatants

intend to transcend the violence, some might argue, that they created all by themselves?

Is Mandela a traitor to his own community? Is blame to be properly placed upon external

influences?

How far should the international community be prepared to go, and how much will it

pay, to let the UN prevent prevent future Rwandas? - a relevant question in view of

evidence that locals foment civil war civil wars to monopolize mineral riches (gold,

diamonds) under their control - and successfully bypassing “blood diamond“

embargoes. [66.] Using selective humanitarian criteria, the real question is will it?

Should it?

And if Humanitarianism is truly the name of the game, why was NATO not poised so

massively on behalf of Bosnia eight years before, before ethnic cleansing began in

earnest? Admittedly, the American brokered Dayton Accords were reached in 1995 --

much after the fact of the Balkan tragedy. But why were U.N. or NATO troops not

dispatched to Croatia when the Serbs laid siege to Vukovar in August, 1991. After all, -

- 22/93 -

Croatia had declared itself a sovereign country in June, two months before. [67.] Were

not the Serbs then engaged in Aggressive Warfare, as proclaimed by the Allies against

Nazi defendants at Nuremberg? With Slovenia‘s earlier breakaway independence

essentially unchallenged militarily by Belgrade’s symbolic resistance (a ten day border

“war” in July 1991), the Serbs could hardly justify their actions as Civil War with claims

of holding the country together; otherwise, why did they not pursue the Slovenes with

the same vigour as the Croats, Bosnians, and Kosovar Albanians?

Either way, at Vukovar, the Serbs had violated several provisions of several International

Geneva Conventions; 1864, governing treatment of wounded armies (first drafted under

Abraham Lincoln to benefit wounded soldiers during the American Civil War); 1899,

protecting civilians hors de combat; and 1949, specifically the Third (regarding

treatment of Prisoners of War) and the Fourth (regarding actions against protected

persons - such as deportations - not justified by military necessities). [68.]

The Humanitarian Doctrine of Intervention was a convenient sell, disguising real issues

of realpolitik relating to externalization of the Yugoslav civil war. It bears a striking

resemblance to the Brezhnev Doctrine of Soviet intervention into fellow socialist states

whenever threatened by subversion of socialist principles and solidarity -- as was

Alexander Dubcek‘s 1968 Prague Spring for Socialism with a human face deemed to be

by Moscow at the time. Which is to say, local assertion of independence by a satellite

Warsaw Pact member could rip apart the Kremlin‘s centralized hold over Eastern

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Europe - thereby destroying the cordon sanitaire created by Stalin to protect Russia after

its’ Nazi experience.

Bluntly speaking, humanitarianism aside, whose strategic interests in the West were hurt

by the conflicts in, say, Rwanda -- or the Balkans? - or for that matter, Chechnya, whose

conflict profile is not unlike that of Kosovo [69.]

What essential strategic or industrial mineral critical for western economic survival was

in danger of being cut off by the local chaos and violence?

Who has missed Rwandan coffee? The West could even do without Colombian coffee for

that matter - but putting up with its’ illegal drug exports, and/or a successful coup by

narcotics financed guerrillas are another thing; could this be why government

sanctions (under Ernesto Samper or Andrés Pastrana - take your pick!) against both

military and so-called paramilitary abuses - including more than 3,500 victims of

politically motivated violence last year, torture/mutiliation, “disappearances” and

internal displacement (250,000 last year) - are tolerated at best, and rendered lip service

commentary at worst? This, notwithstanding Botoga‘s 1999 ratification of the Inter-

American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture! [70.]

The fact is, Pinochet succeeded in Chile for the same reason that the Serbs succeeded

in the Balkans (rediscovered virtues of Geneva and the Hague notwithstanding);

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Chile’s copper and mineral resources were as critical to Western economic interests as ethnic animosity in Yugoslavia was not.

After the tragedy and debacle of Viet Nam, no bones of any American, Canadian, or EU

soldier would be wasted in the early stages of the Balkan tragedy. And NATO‘s

overwhelming hardware and ordinance superiority was designed to ensure that.

The fact is, Western Humanitarian peacekeeping humiliations from Beirut to Somalia

reinforced western wariness of commitments to intervening in fratricidal family feuds.

Indeed, Canada‘s U.N. ambassador Robert Fowler cast doubt on the world body‘s will to

prevent another Rwandan tragedy. In May, 2000, it became apparent that Western powers

hit upon a strategy of ferrying third world peacekeepers from such countries as India and

Bengladesh to troubled Sierra Leone rather than risk its‘ [the West‘s] troops and

overstretched resources to that brutalized state. In the face of questions about the efficacy

of this approach concerning the training standards of such new peacekeeping forces, will

Robert Fowler be proved correct? [71.] More recent commentary accuses the practicing a

“growing apartheid in our efforts to keep the peace, especially [the use of non-white

soldiers ] in non-white regions.“ [72.] Canada has been cited as accepting a relatively

straightforward peacekeeping mission in the Horn of Africa - leaving dangerous

assignments in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to armies of poor

countries. [73.]

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The wave of the future? Hopefully not. Will not historians equate this with moral

bankruptcy matching that of the late Roman Empire when citizens paid barbarians to

serve out their (the citizens’) military obligations for them? Will historians equate the

Hague with the Colosseum: like bread and circuses, it preserved stability by providing a

valve against collective outrage and riots by political victims in any region of the globe?

Rather than taking preemptive action against regional tyrants at the cost of peace keepers’

lives (and domestic budgets), War Tribunals provide redress of injustices on the cheap -

and after the fact?

In East Timor, a U.N. led peacekeeping force had been assembling quickly after the pro-

independence vote of August 30, 1999, held there. But this was apparently after the

Indonesian Army, fearing this as a precedent for other minorities to break up the country

[74.], had basically met its‘ objectives of removing separatist advocates in a manner

imitative of the Serbs acting against Albanians in Kosovo. The U.N. had been warned of

this many months before by Western Intelligence sources [75.]; why then were there not

U.N. peacekeeping troops present on August 30, 1999, to ensure a violent free separation

vote amongst the East Timorese on that date?

To early to determine the eventual success of the U.N. peace keeping force, the question

here is whether the Kosovo war had created inadvertently (and so, embarrassing) a

beneficial precedent for the Humanitarian Doctrine of Intervention.

For as in Rwanda, there was advance intelligence of dark intentions toward the locals.

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Looking back to the prelaunch days of the Kosovo War, the plight of Albanian citizens in

Kosovo displaced by Milosevic threatened to wash downriver the entire Yugoslav inspired

war; like a night voyage into violent seas cloaked in fog, no one could predict if this was

to be a relighting of the fuse that started WWI. Rather than taking a chance, NATO‘s

preemptive military action made more sense than trusting intentions of local Balkan

players - who might have recreated the powder keg as a prelude to WWIII.

Externalization of the Yugoslavian civil war is the endgame that the West, through

NATO, wished to prevent; that the Albanians and the Serbs were subsequently being kept

from each others‘ throats is wonderful. But that is a subset priority; creating a stable

protectorate within Kosovo that will hopefully avoid renewed political-military

instability in the region is NATO‘s agenda writ large...

Nelson Rockefeller addressing Juan Peron; Margaret Thatcher‘s help from General Pinochet

Faustian Deals and casting the first stone

As for humanitarian objectives, the same question could be asked many times elsewhere:

If the West is governed by Judeo-Christian principles of compassion for the underdog,

why was Guernica‘s civilian bombing by Hitler‘s Condors merely condemned by the

West in 1937 rather than intervening in Spain by those so horrified by it? Despite higher

principles of conduct in war by the Allies than the Nazis, when WWII was all but won

by

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the Allies, why were Dresden‘s civilians firebombed by the British in February, 1945?

Where was Humanitarianism at the time? [76.]

While the United States tried Nazi officials for crimes of the Holocaust at Nuremberg, in

exchange for the “forbidden fruit” of their research, the Americans secretly granted

immunity from prosecution to Japanese research members of Unit 731 - responsible for

at least 300,000 murders - which ranged from customized, individualized one-on-one

vivisection (sans anesthetic) to indiscriminate mass killings to test biological weapons.

[77.] Having just dropped two atomic bombs, were the Americans being magnanimous

in victory, granting immunity on compassion grounds? Or applying the logic of

realpolitik? - as insurance against Russia in days of the emerging Cold War?

Will NATO be held accountable for war crimes in Kosovo? [78.] Probably not; Canada‘s

Defence Minister‘s office indicated that, at least in respect of this country, Canadian

pilots adhered to the U.N.’s own rules of armed conflict. [79.] Ms. Carla del Ponte, the

current U.N. Tribunal’s chief prosecutor investigating Balkan war crimes, said definitely

not - mistakes were made, but there was no deliberate targetting of civilians. Besides, the

Tribunal had more urgent concerns than prosecuting Western leaders. [80.]

And while the New York based Human Rights Watch maintained that NATO‘s air

campaign disregarded the lives of ordinary Yugoslav citizens [81.], would the HRW not

be better off in focussing upon the U.N.’s mea culpa (its‘ third) of acknowledging its‘

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failure to commit sufficient resources to benefit Kosovo refugees; the U.N. also admitted

failing to anticipate genocide in innocents in Srebrenica in 1995 and Rwanda the year

before.

Which is more worthy of judgment: inadvertent deaths by NATO’ air strikes in the

decisive Kosovo campaign? Or the U.N.‘s tragic incompetence and indecisiveness --

three times, no less, in recent years? -

So the question begs itself: What is the West and its‘ values? Geographic space covered

by liberal democratic jurisdictions? Or a massive population sharing Judeo-Christian

beliefs expanding since Constantine‘s conversion from Rome‘s pagan traditions?

If the latter, then the recent growth of international jurisprudence recognizing that

murder, torture, and disappearances alleged to have been General Pinochet‘s

responsibility amounts to a policy recognition, to another codification of the

humanitarian ideology about life and liberty‘s sanctity; Another user‘s guide, making

Augustine‘s doctrine of the Just War more fair still!

This gives intervenor status sought by everyone out for Pinochet‘s neck; including,

presumably in the name of fairness, the Chilean government. Not to be overlooked is the

United States government, for which there is no longer room for dictatorship in the

Western Hemisphere now that democracies are blossoming like flowers; to promote

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Democratic Values and Practises, the Organization of American States has established

the Latin American Institute of Social Doctrine and Studies -- headquartered,

interestingly, in Santiago, Chile. [82.]

Plato‘s and Jesus‘ message that justice is not based on might -- but eternal,

uncompromising principles, and is an entity unto itself -- is finally getting through!

The fact is, however, that with the Soviet threat gone, General Pinochet has outlived his

usefulness. Realpolitik, not the rising waters of moral outrage‘ (with apologies once

again to all of his victims) made his apprehension possible.

England‘s Law Lords ruled against the General in its‘ decision on appeal. This same

England gave diplomatic recognition to General Pinochet‘s successful coup d‘etat within

ten days of Salvador Allende‘s overthrow in 1973. [83.] Indeed, Allende was attacked at

La Moneda by British made Hunter Hawkers -- but this is a gratuitous coincidence, since

the revolting Chilean military‘s weapons of choice were beyond England‘s control.

More seriously, Britain arranged with General Pinochet‘s government to use Punta

Arena’s airbase for Royal Air force planes, disguised by Chilean markings, against

Argentina during the Falklands War. [84.]

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Was Britain, which has authorized General Pinochet‘s extradition to Spain, the Humanitarian Britain of the Nobel Prize Amnesty International -- the same Amnesty International that accused Britain‘s Security Services of killing hundreds of people in Northern Ireland from 1969 (four years before

Pinochet‘s coup d‘etat?. [85.]

Or was Britain just another realpolitik player which, having granted Pinochet‘s de facto diplomatic recognition just a week after its‘ success, serendipitouslybenefitted from a coincidence of geography that had nothing to do with Santiago‘s new management team by accepting benefits from Pinochet‘s now pariah regime to prosecute its‘ side of the Falklands‘ War?

The Britain that on October 08, 1999 permitted General Pinochet‘s extradition to Spain ten days later assured President Jiang Zemin that Communist China’s ties with London would not be based solely on human rights: According to Prime Minister Tony Blair, economic ties with Asia‘s largest market‘ would be at the top of the agenda; as Europe‘s largest investor ($18 billion) in China, this position is understandable. [86.]

A curious thing indeed; London also extended to Pinochet diplomatic recognitionten days after his 1973 coup. Only William Blake could appreciate this fearful

symmetry!

Crudely put, was Pinochet, like Anastasio Somoza, a son of a bitch? To borrow Franklin

Roosevelt‘s characterization of the latter, was Pinochet our son of a bitch? [87.]

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If Pinochet‘s arrest was politically correct, it was and is not political realism; On this

matter, Douglas Hurd has stated:

“The scales of justice have always been uneven as between those who are caught and those whom it is not possible to pursue. Much more difficult is the case of those whom it is not expedient to pursue...This point lay at the heart of the Pinochet affair.” [88.]

Doug Hurd‘s commentary pits the idealism of human rights activists against diplomatic

policymakers and high ranking political officials (wherever they may be) directly against

each other. It forces the issue of martial law‘s legitimacy to the fore, whatever the moral

(de)merits of the regime that imposes it.

Pinochet‘s lawyers argued that the conduct of international affairs will become

impossible; in 1998, Washington, rightly or wrongly, refused to sign in Rome the treaty

on genocide as an aspect of creating an International Criminal Court lest its‘ own troops

and officials on peacekeeping missions be arrested on such charges by politically

motivated accusers lacking real evidence to back such allegations.

Who was/is more idealistically/politically correct: las Madres de Plaza de Mayo, whose

demands extended only to knowing the fate of their children? Or Nelson Rockefeller

offering to Juan Peron diplomatic recognition and U.N. membership in exchange for

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declaring war against Germany, even as Nazi assets were being transferred to Argentine

vaults? It could be fairly argued both -- in different ways, and at different levels, under

different criteria.

Dictator by force of arms, Dictator via the ballot box: Since when do patients question the doctor’s remedy?

Being a Dictator means being true to oneself, and never having to say sorry

For Latin Americans, the Pinochet issue is equally a moral quagmire, to be viewed by political leaders there strictly in terms of realpolitik.

Peru‘s Alberto Fujimori argued that Columbia should not negotiate with guerrillas. [89.]

Should Fujimori (up to his third “term“ in 1999, at any rate), whose methods against the

Sendero Luminoso and his storming of the 1996/7 storming of the guerrilla held Japanese

embassy have been applauded, be more exempt from seizure when abroad than Pinochet

because Alberto was elected? Adolf too had been elected.

Does being democratically elected confer more legitimacy for authorizing military violence against dissidents than a dissident military establishment that revolts and succeeds, becoming the incumbent?

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If so, how does Spain‘s government under, and after, Francisco Franco currently fit into

this question? Today, Spain is a constitutional democracy established on a rug under

which had been swept swirling arguments of Franco being the fascist who won v.s. his

being a traditional conservative who opportunistically used fascist help to win the Civil

War. Spain has been admitted to NATO and the EU; should it have been? And if so, on

what grounds: Realpolitik or Judeo-Christian forgiveness?

Generalissimo Franco was not tried, but given a state funeral. What of Pinochet?

Whether, as has occurred, he walks, got transferred to a Spanish or Chilean prison -- or

died of a convenient heart attack awaiting/during his trial -- was beside the point.

Pinochet’s troubles raise questions about the long term stability of Chile emerging as a

North American/Western European style liberal democracy. Or reversion to military rule,

either directly -- or indirectly, by Generals breathing down the necks of elected

Presidents. Ditto, Argentina and other Latin American jurisdictions.

Take the recent case of Ecuador: On January 21, 2000, a three member junta led by General Carlos Mendoza transferred control from the elected government of President Jamil Mahaud to Gustavo Noboa, Mahaud‘s vice president. [90.] To General Mendoza‘s credit, the transfer was peaceful. [91.]

But what if he had decided to stay?

As of the year 2000, Ecuador had seen five presidents come and go in the previous three years; With a potentially volatile alliance between the country‘s

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Indians and the military as partners to the coup [92.], the mix could easily havebecome a social Molotov cocktail.

What then? Mendoza could easily - and logically -- have decided that Ecuador needed him, as a Pinochet the Lesser, to straighten out the country‘s affairs. Voila! a replay of Santiago, 1973!

How well distributed are the rewards of expanded foreign trade will help determine the

legitimacy of Latin America‘s various democracies. For what difference does the right of

voting make if most citizens return from ballot boxes to villas miserias, while others soak

their mouths with champagne froth from freshly uncorked bottles. Said Alvaro Bardon (a

former Christian Democrat who headed Chile‘s Central Bank under Pinochet) in 1982:

The wealthy...are bothered by the fact that the trash are catching up...In ten years, they will have cars. Just imagine, there won‘t be any differences; the trash will look just like people... [93.]

It was this privileged upper class which felt most threatened by Allende‘s

[Popular Unity] experiment with socialism in the early 1970s...Wealthy families [dined] in the fine restaurants of Santiago‘s plush barrio, Providencia,...while five million Chileans [lived] in poverty, crammed into Santiago‘s shanty towns (poblaciones). [94.]

Unless there is a genuine distribution of economic benefits to the poorest levels of

society, unless the liberal democratic doctrine of equal opportunity (with universal

educational access as part of this) becomes a fact rather than fiction, the kettle will once

again whistle on the stove.

Look again at Ecuador: With inflation reaching 60 - 70% between 1998-2000 (defaulting on US $7B foreign debt during this period),

- 35/93 -

with 60% of its‘ 12.4 million citizens living in poverty and enduring a 17% unemployment rate in 1999, its‘ economy has progressively spiralled into its‘ worst crisis in decades. [95.]

Why should this be?

Despite evaporating oil prices, as an OPEC member, Ecuador has the potential to better distribute its‘ economic resources, through economic diversification programmes, more fairly amongst its‘ people. Quito‘s solution to economic stability, though, has largely been dollarization of the economy - using the American dollar as the country‘s currency benchmark. So it is fair to ask: does Ecuador have the political will to change, or are its‘ traditional elite interests content to milk the status quo? Less academically, that means to let its‘ population continue to languish in poverty.

Dollarization is popular as an economic quick fix in Latin America. In Ecuador, it has been at the expense of the poor becoming pauperized; dollarization inflated the sucre, the local currency, to 25,000/US$1.00. Said one Quito produce vendor: “Everything we buy has tripled in price, and there are no customers.” [96.]

While Menoza bowed out of power once the American and European endorsed coup was complete, Ecuador’s poor but numerically strong Indian peoples were ambivalent toward his successor, Gustavo Noboa, as President. According to Indian leader Salvador Quishpe, Mr. Noboa wants to take advantage of our people‘s fight to keep helping the same people as always, the corrupt bankers. [97.]

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Returning to the double standard issues the Pinochet detention raises, The

Peloponnesian War makes a worthy point. The Athenians explain to the Melians why

they have been subjugated in the transition of Athens from City State to Empire:

...Standards of justice depend upon the equality of power to compel, and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the

weak accept what they have to accept... [98.]

Yasar Arafat stood on the podium at the United Nations in 1974, on hand on his pistol,

the other wagging his finger as he eyed members of the General Assembly, admonishing

their hypocrisy toward his then terrorist Palestinian Liberation Organization,

confronting them with the fact that many of them had achieved legitimacy after defeating

previously incumbent regimes in their own countries. This would have to include Oliver

Cromwell, George Washington, -- Judge Baltazar Garzon’s theoretical boss, King Juan

Carlos, who came into power on the coattails of Generalissimo Franco! To say nothing of

the U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan’s compatriot, Flt.-Lt. Jerry John Rawlings,

President of Ghana.

Yasar Arafat brings forward, “writ large,“ Pinochet’s question of legitimacy: in this

world, do the people choose Christ? Or Barabbas?

Dovetailing this with the cynical Athenian lecture to the Melians, recognizing that Arafat,

now a politically legitimate Nobel Prize recipient, is the fate of all those innocent airline

-

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passengers the PLO massacred in its‘ outlaw days. What equation or parallel of

inconsequence can be made between Arafat‘s victims and those of the excesses of

Pinochet‘s regime?

Is this sophistry?

Let‘s consider that: If Pinochet was going to the prisoner‘s box (for now, in Spain), how

is it that Arafat avoided it? Why was Arafat not detained, some time, some where, to

stand trial no less than the Chilean General? How is it that Pinochet‘s victims are having

justice sought in their remembrance but Arafat‘s simply forgotten? Could it be that Arafat

now has respectability? An anguished Richard Nixon once announced to all the world

that he was no crook! -

Would Chile have sacrificed Pinochet by sending him to Spain with a window dressing

resistance - or follow through with noises about trying him at home (where Judge Juan

Guzman had been assessing nearly 200 lawsuits against him for two years) [99.],

nullifying the General‘s self dealt immunity (with the risk of a military revolt) as the

price of its‘ accreditation within the greater community of nations? Yes - or apparently

yes. For in August, 2000, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ decision to

deny Pinochet his immunity as Senator. And on December 01, 2000, Guzman went

another step, placing Pinochet under house arrest [100.] - only to see the Court of

Appeals suspend it four days later! This was not some contested municipal dog catcher

ordinance winding its’ way up through the judicial system. It was about the President of a

country

- 38/93 -

accused judicially of the most serious crimes. Considering time needed for

contemplation by appellate courts everywhere, was this a prepackaged, pre-scripted

decision; justice “to go?” Or merely learned justices clearly on top of the law?

At the time of writing, the General/Senator Pinochet’s case remained unresolved. Having

initiated proceedings, Santiago could have gone one of two ways: Find him guilty or

acquit him. Or (to borrow contemporary socialism‘s preferred label) a “Third way:“ By

dragging out the case, the General could die before he has properly had his day in court,

his case is unresolved. For the recent house arrest order notwithstanding, legal

manoeuvres and appeals could take years to resolve - perhaps more time than the General

has left!

Whichever way it goes, what seemed to have transpired were judicial commands issued,

seemingly in slow motion. Orders for determination of his mental competence were

ordered here, compassionate allowances for giving testimony from home issued there!

Which will it all add up to what? It is hard to say. According to American Enterprise

Institute based Mark Falcoff:

“Much has been going on behind the scenes that nobody will formally admit to. And the press...has been purposely playing dumb...The whole "judicial" proceeding is a charade. The government is betting Pinochet will die or be disabled mentally before the whole business comes to trial. Notice, please, how slowly the whole procedure is moving, even by Chilean standards...The military is obviously aware of the fact that...the vast majority of Chilean opinion supports the formal position of the government, [that] Pinochet should be held responsible for what happened. While the military class a whole,

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and conservative opinion as well, is angry and hurt about the whole business, the conservative politicians...are trying to distance themselves from Pinochet as a person, and emphasize the future rather than the past.

It is the left which wants to dwell upon the past for logical and illogical reasons; Logical because some people have lost relatives and friends; illogical because frying Pinochet in oil will not bring Allende back and will not push Chile into socialism, no matter what.” [101.]

Acquittal Scenario

Let’s assume that luck is with the General; that the Supreme Court acquits the General.

Both he and the military will be vindicated. He will be once more breathing in the sweet

smell of winds brushing his hair from the Andean Cordillera. Then what: he becomes an

asset for the nation - proof (to himself) that he was true to his word, that he “never

sought power for [himself]...:”

“When the time came to surrender it, under our Constitution, I did so loyally. No historian, no matter how biased or lacking in objectivity, can today or... tomorrow contend...that my public actions stemmed from...or any motive other than the good of Chile...” [102.]

Who knows? - perhaps Santiago will lobby to have his name put forward for a Nobel

Peace Prize? If acquitted, vindicated, what choice will Ricardo Lagos have! What else

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could Santiago do? Did Pinochet, the detested tyrant, disclaiming any lust for power,

standing his ground in his own courts, make it possible for Chile to verify its’ credentials

as an authentic democracy that respects due process of law?

To clarify: Pinochet murdered the democratic government of Salvador Allende in 1973. Chile’s Supreme Court will have given de facto validation to Pinochet’s “restoration” of democracy by way of his brutal coup. This is what? - hostage syndrome, terrorist victims identifying with their captors‘ grievances? Simple extortion: fear of a military insurrection had the court found otherwise? Political subversion of the judicial process? Magic realism? Or simply blind justice? - always a possibility to be sure!

Whatever it may be, there are fortunately precedents. For if Yasar can get the Nobel

Prize, why not Augusto?!

Jumping ahead to “the third way,” if death for the General tragically intervenes - whether

by heart attack, automobile accident, assassination or other natural cause - will it be a

relief for all concerned?

Not necessarily. What then to do with the body? Not just any body, but the corps of a

dictator regarded by nearly half the country as a saviour.

Does a former head of state not deserve a state funeral? Or does an accused but

unconvicted mass murderer merit at best only a private burial with only family

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members present? Certainly an unmarked grave in a cemetery for criminals

will not do.

Either way, will Pinochet in his grave become to those who share his sentiments a

martyr’s shrine: a Juan Peron, Phillipe Petain, or Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera? [103.]

If so, will the judgment of history suffice for vindication of the General cheated by death

of his day in court? Or will the military need more - say anything up to and including an

insurrection to protest against the establishment slurring Pinochet’s legacy. It is after all,

something with which General Izurieta and everyone beneath him will have to bear.

no matter what.”

Despite Izurieta’s sensitivity to the unacceptability (at home and abroad) of using force

[104.] to save face, Pinochet loyalists within his ranks may take matters into their own

hands. If not now, perhaps at a later date. For some, Pinochet may always rank with the

Lady of Carmel: Patron Saint of the Armed forces and of Chile. Did not Juan Peron

return from exile to rule Argentina again?

Pinochet’s legacy may be no less a sleeper; thousands of people participated in the

Orthodox Christian burial of Emperor Haile Selassie, whose remains were found under

concrete slabs on his palace grounds; although dead for a quarter century and himself a

relic to some, Selassie is still revered throughout Africa as the charismatic leader of

African independence. [105.]

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To a guilty verdict against the General shortly.

Nazi built Saturn V Rockets, Monica Lewinsky‘s Trysts, Pinochet in the Prisoner‘s Box: One Big Jigsaw

Catching Slobodan Milosevic and buying that $8 Chinese Pen, also parts of the puzzle

On the eve of President Clinton‘s impeachment hearings, the White House collaborated

with the Spaniards by declassifying information adverse to General Pinochet; as of

October, 1999, the State Department had initially released 1,100 U.S. government

records related to Pinochet‘s 1973 coup [106.]; Over 16,000 documents ultimately

released by Clinton’s administration acknowledged CIA support for (but not instigation

of) the Pinochet initiated coup - before Clinton‘s time -- and praised the Chileans “for

reclaiming [their democracy].“ [107.]

But getting tough once again with Saddam Hussein and simultaneously hitting Pinochet

when he was down had less to do with a commitment over human rights in international

affairs than with the impact of Clinton‘s liaisons with Monica Lewinski on international

affairs and the personal fate of Bill Clinton prior to his Impeachment Hearings. Brutal,

perverse thought. But, well, that‘s realpolitik!

In 1983, Arthur Rudolph, critical to designing the Saturn V rocket that took the

Americans to the moon, had his American citizenship relinquished after allegations of his

- 43/93 -

role in the use (and abuse) of slave labour during the war at the Mittelwerk V2 rocket

factory. [108.]

One would think that, with the evidence compiled to hang Nazi leaders at Nuremberg,

the Allies would have had the goods on Hitler‘s rocket scientists as well. However,

missiles

were important to both the U.S.A. and to the Soviet Union at the dawn of the Cold War.

Rudolph denied any role in deciding to hang particular workers as an incentive to

improve V2 assembly productivity. His word must have been enough at the time. Allied

officials, after all, were dealing with an intellectual and a gentleman, not a rabble rouser

like Goebbels or thugs like Goering and Himmler. -

But with the Moon Race won and over, with the Space Shuttle succeeding obsolete

multi-stage throwaway rockets, American officials correctly denaturalized Rudolph and

expelled him to Germany for having falsified information after the war.

Would Rudolph‘s continued presence in the United States have become an issue amongst

human rights and Jewish interest groups in the 1984 Presidential election? It was

doubtful. Just in case, though, his deportation was just the thing! But back to Pinochet.

Clinton was acquitted of High Crimes and Misdemeanours by the Senate. So, with

Clinton‘s help, if all declassified files have indeed been turned over to Judge Garzon,

Pinochet‘s fate may have been sealed by another president recently himself on trial in

Washington.

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Clinton‘s humanitarian impulses to let the General‘s victims have their day in court may,

by way of a footnote, establish Clinton‘s reputation as a leader who rises to the occasion

in ways other than recorded during his impeachment proceedings. Like Slobodan

Milosevic, Pinochet was the right culprit at the right time to help restore dignity to that

White House tenant.

And with Britain heavily involved in military action against Yugoslavia, can Home

Secretary Jack Straw‘s decision against Pinochet be viewed in isolation from the day

when Milosevic, now toppled, is brought to justice for his actions against the Albanians,

Bosnians, and Croatians during the 1990s?

Assuming Yugoslavia/Serbia’s new president Vojislav Kostunica permits Milosevic to be

transferred to the Hague (he prefers a home trial [109.]* ), a precedent would be nice:

Pinochet neatly fitted the bill. But in the same breath , the hovering question that went

unexpressed must be asked: Was Britain truly committed to Pinochet’s extradition? Along

with his possible guilty verdict in Chile, this will be revisited shortly.

As for possible impact upon Chile‘s nascent democracy, that is, again, another issue. A

guilty verdict against Pinochet by Garzon (with his defense to higher authorities, perhaps

________________________________________________________________________

*Vojislav Kostunica, Serbia’s saviour from Slobodan’s repression, has, by the way, recently decided to retain the services of discreditted Milosevic’s security services[109.i.], despite admitting their guilt in crimes before the Kosovo War. [109.ii.]

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to God!) may have brought the army out of the barracks. As a domestic trial in Santiago

could still do.

But an unrelated failure of the freemarket economy introduced by Milton Friedman's

"Chicago Boys" during Pinochet's presidency triggered by an Asian (or other) meltdown

could also do it.

Legal appeals...ripple and trickle down effects of the economy's invisible hand - these

things take time. By then, the sometime wheelchair bound Pinochet, had he remained in

Britain or been transferred to Spain for trial, could have died, floating in Purgatory, his

case still-born. Clinton would have scraped by, becoming the first "Millenium

President."

Looking to help President hopeful Al Gore (who stood before the Democratic

Convention “as [his] own man,” wanted Bill behind him all the way -- far behind!

[110.]), Clinton donned the golden halo of uncompromising moral rejuvenation for

America in the Third Millenium; No more White House sex or support for proxy Melian

dictators. Values which, of course, both Gore and George W. Bush had claimed as their

own. [111.]

On November 6, the day before the Presidential election, President Clinton signed a bill

for Third World debt relief. Then, as votes were being recounted in Florida, Clinton was

in Viet Nam spreading the gospel of democracy.

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Noble deeds; these could have been done at any time in the past eight years - was timing

coincidental? Or - with respect to his Hanoi visit especially -- would history define these

as a penitential pilgrimage for Bill’s avoidance of that war? Or, as he delivered homilies

in Hanoi on democracy and human rights, as a restatement of his conscientious objector

principles? [112.] (Either way, as Bush and Gore fought it out in Florida and Washington

to become the first Millenium-President-by-vote, to Asians his advice on democracy was

highly ironic. [113.] -

***

"Think globally, act locally" is today's "in" phrase for socially responsible people. Global

realpolitik morality problems face everyone, in private life and business life. For

example, whether to buy a great Chinese pen for $8 (probably made by political

prisoners) -- or have a satellite launched (with stolen American technology) for, say, $80

million less than by NASA; decisions, decisions! - each beguiled by the realpolitik of

weighing legitimate self interest obligations that may conflict with the greater good (such

as that may be).

But are such issues are any purchaser's personal or corporate moral problem? A pen's

export and a satellite's launch were both made possible by Western "constructive

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engagement" diplomats looking for access to massive Chinese markets and cheap labour/

specialty service sources -- who argued that democracy would thus ensue. As Appeasers

(including Vincent Massey) gave Hitler what he wanted, to make him go away! [114.]

Just north of Santiago, in Lima, Peru‘s ever controversial President Alberto Fujimori won

a questionable victory in May, 2000; a third term under an election whose legitimacy

was fiercely contested at home and abroad. At the June, 2000 Organization of

American

States‘ congress in Windsor, Canada, the Canadian Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy,

pushed with OAS Secretary General Cesar Gaviria, for an agenda calling into question

both Fujimori‘s election results and his record on human rights. [115.] Like the

Appeasers‘ moral outrage at Hitler‘s occupation of the Saarland in the 1930s, they used

all the right words and gestures of indignation. But at the end of the day, Hitler stayed in

the Saar; The League of Nations did not push Hitler out.

Did the OAS forcefully remove Alberto Fujimori from office? No, it was ultimately the

unhinging from power of his head of his intelligence chief, Vladimir Montesinos, that

basically finished Fujimori; Peru’s love/hate relationship with its’ dictator-by-popular-

vote has been decided by internal events, together with his own decision to prematurely

resign his position from Japan (where he enjoys dual citizenship, and has decided to

stay). [116.] (Can it be argued that Lloyd Axworthy‘s worthy achievement of scheduling

Peruvian elections for April 2001 only became possible in the shadow Montesinos‘ fall

from grace?)

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Similarly, will anyone challenge the legitimacy of the Chilean courts in respect of

Pinochet’s acquittal?

Guilty Scenario

In the event of Pinochet’s conviction by his Supreme Court, should there be widespread

unrest possibly leading to a military insurrection (not based on revenge or honour but,

offically justified in terms of maintaining public order), there will be for certain

universal moral condemnation. Perhaps there will be U.N. or O.A.S. sponsored motions

to embargo group excursions to Chile’s famed Lake district; perhaps to quarantine

Undurraga wine. But will the U.S. 7th Fleet be redeployed from Asian to Chilean

shores?

When Argentina was under the Generals after 1976, did Ottawa dismantle CANDU

reactors it had sold to that country? Soviet purchases of Argentine wheat actually

increased during that period, despite the Generals‘ brutal extermination of

“Communist subversives.”

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Britain‘s Home Secretary Jack Straw, The IRA‘s Gerry Adams, Pinochet‘s Nemesis Baltazar Garzon: Will the real Useful Idiot please step forward...

General Pinochet, The Big One that got away; Why they had to let him go.

In the spring of 1999, Santiago optimistically dispatched a plane to London for the

General's eventual return to Chile in advance of the Law Lords' second decision. Did

Eduardo Frei know something others didn't ? Or, considering the cost of such a flight,

was he just a whimsical, impetuous, incurable optimist?

On June 29, 1999, Spain's Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar announced that Spain would

respect England's decision (if it so did) to abandon extradition of Pinochet on

humanitarian grounds (June 29 being, coincidentally, the date of Chile's triumph with its'

Latin American counterparts at the Rio Conference to negotiate free trade with the

European Union -- of which both Britain and Spain are members).

On August 3, 1999, London confirmed General Pinochet would be freed if Spain dropped

its' extradition request.

Does this sound co-incidental?

Perhaps, but not quite. The British and Spanish foreign ministers met during the Rio

Summit, concluding a political decision, subsequently covered by medical reasons, that

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Pinochet could not be allowed to expire on British or Spanish soil. [117.] Nor did Chile

want the General becoming a martyr to his right wing supporters in South America.

[118.]

By August 10, Pinochet's legal team from Santiago was negotiating directly with Madrid

(Judge Baltazar Garzon excluded) for an arbitration to allow the General to avoid a

Spanish trial. (Spain reaffirmed its‘ support for Jack Straw‘s January 11, 2000 tentative

decision to let Pinochet go. [119.])

Magistrate Bartle's October 08th extradition authorization notwithstanding, did England

and Spain really wish to try Pinochet according to principles of justice (such as these

may be)? Or is there merit to Margaret Thatcher's allegation of a vengeful leftist "judicial

kidnapping?" Indeed, on October 19, the Spanish government added its' voice to that of

Chile, saying it (Madrid) would not object if Britain were to release Pinochet... [120.]

So why, then, did both governments go to such trouble and lengths, seemingly, to

accommodate Judge Garzon‘s extradition request, while announcing at the political level

(as judicial proceedings were winding their way along), that Pinochet may indeed never

stand before a judge in Spain?

Perhaps to create public acceptance of a fait accompli predetermined in Rio? Having

put people like Pinochet on notice around the world, was it then just a matter of saving

face by simply getting rid of him in a judicially acceptable way?

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Was Margaret Thatcher right all along?

As for Santiago, President Eduardo Frei pounded away on a televised national address

that if Pinochet faced trial, it was because no Chilean is above the law. Meanwhile,

Chile‘s Judge Juan Guzman had been examining potential lawsuits against Pinochet for

possible trial in his home country. Through the South American summer of 1999-2000,

Chilean lawyers were working to undo the General‘s self dealt immunity.

How are Thatcher’s allegations to be balanced against Santiago‘s Court of Appeals

having stripped Pinochet of his self dealt immunity in June, 2000? Was all this so much

theatrics for domestic and external consumption? The military establishment maintained

that its‘ courts supercede civilian tribunals and would not react with the same constraints

shown during the arrests of Pinochet era officials in 1999. How, then, does this reconcile

itself with an agreement between the military and human rights lawyers to bring forward

information on people still missing -- up to 1,000 -- during Pinochet‘s period of office?

[121.]

Some conservatives are putting distance between themselves and Pinochet (including

Joaquin Lavin. [122.] But according to Chilean human rights lawyer Nelson Caucoto,

Pinochet is remains a symbol of the military. While some say he has been sold down the

river [123.] Caucoto maintains he is their patriarch whom they will protect. [124.]

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And despite the brutality of his legacy, the General retains a strong following amongst

the middle and upper classes alienated from Salvador Allende‘s rule. [125.]

An outgoing President Eduardo Frei could have (and still could) easily relocate abroad;

his successor Ricardo Lagos (President by a 2.64% plurality) has had to walk a perilously

fine line between equal justice for all Chileans and a possible alliance between Pinochet‘s

former civilian backers with the military should the latter close ranks around their patron

saint.

In the event of Pinochet‘s legal vindication, what can be said - as accurately as tea leaf

reading can be - about possibilities of military intervention had the judiciary not decided

in the General‘s favour? The army -- seeming to reverse its‘ previous position by having

vowed on Friday, May 19, 2000 to respect Chile‘s constitutional law (and subsequent

declaration by the military, whereby it “Aspires to assume responsibility for its‘ past...”)

[126.], the Court of Appeals judges ostensibly arrived at their verdict without fear of

military reprisals.

The Court of Appeals decided against the General on Tuesday, May 23 -- thirty one days

after convening to consider the matter, four days after hands off assurances from the

army. [127.]

Can this be said to have been the civilian arm‘s response to the military‘s quid pro quo?

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Was a decision on such a critical precedent decided, hence free of concerns about

military reprisals in the event of a decision adverse to their General, in just four days?

This deserves a closer examination: Had the Appeals Court upheld Pinochet‘s immunity,

legal cases against him would have been closed. [128.] Social and political stability

would have been compromised with revolt of the General‘s opponents more than likely --

and its‘ suppression by military intervention even more likely. What could be said of

Chile, the democratic miracle, in that event?

So, a middle ground would save face on all sides: removal of immunity at the Court of

Appeals to mollify Pinochet‘s large constituency of opponents. An overturning of the

decision at the Supreme Court as a quid pro quo for the military‘s previous pledge to

observe the constitution by restoring the Senator‘s Congressional immunity and personal

dignity. Ecce! For all the world to see, Chile had come of age as a democratic nation

observing the due process of law.

Like competing claims about the truth of President Kennedy‘s assassination, it is an

interesting scenario.

There could also be a more “straightforward” explanation. To wit, internal conflict

amongst Pinochet’s supporters between old guard, hard line supporters and a crossover

with the generational change of guard, with a more liberal judiciary after nine years of

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civilian presidential rule and a change of military command that has yielded a younger,

more modern senior officer corps. [129. ]

Pinochet’s 1998 successor, General Ricardo Izurieta, for example, apparently did not

consult with the Senator/General when in July 1998 (three months before Pinochet’s

London arrest) he had the military hand over to a judge a list of hundreds of former

secret police agents with their code names to aid an investigation into the killings of 12

guerrillasin 1987. The case had been stalled in the courts for more than a decade. [130.]

This could explain why, on the one hand, Pinochet’s lawyers, seeking to have Judge Juan

Guzman removed from the case, had a court order issued compelling Guzman to show

cause within 24 hours for having indicted Pinochet; and so it was: a 3 - 0 Court of

Appeals vote on December 5 suspended Guzman‘s house arrest. [131.]

Whereas Court decisions normally take weeks, months, years to reverse, this was

reversed almost with the speed of a Bolivian coup! Which means what: an independent

judiciary determined to correct immediately a possible injustice. Wind from Pinochet’s

camp blowing from Ricardo Lagos’ office into the halls of justice? Or the playing out of

a script previously agreed upon as between the military, conservative classes, and

President Lagos? Had the General been sold out then bought back by his supporters?

Does his

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power base still have the potential to change governments vi et armis? All interesting

questions, and from afar possibly unfathomable except if explained in terms of Magic

Realism!

Meanwhile, General Izurieta had given utterances of support for his Pinochet commander

following his arrest - as nothing more than lip service to reassure the army’s base of

Pinochet supporters? [132.] Perhaps with his ear to the ground, and feeling no vibrations

of seismic activity or rumbling of moving tanks in this highly volcanic and earthquake

prone region, Izurieta felt that this would suffice to keep the situation in check.

(Could it also be that Ricardo Izurieta was playing the Talleyrand game - going with

whomever won the struggle? Perhaps he had been watching the Bush - Gore legal battle

for the Presidential victory, and decided that a proxy war through the courts first

was the wiser approach - with the option of calling out the troops before they do anyway

should Pinochet’s legal gambits fail?

Just how strong Pinochet’s true support will likely only be revealed when his legal battles

go from push to shove, should he continue to suffer legal reversals that push him all the

way to the prisoner’s box. Only then will it be known whether there has been a “natural”

shift resulting from a generation crossover? Only then will Izurieta’s true mettle be

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disclosed as a man throwing in his lot with those who came through the Pinochet years -

or being caught in the middle, trying to protect his personal position, by advocating what

Pinochet’s now vocal opponents are doing: “letting justice take its’ course.” In this

event, whom does the veil behind which Pinochet got sold down the river cover? The

determination of competing assessments will evolve more clearly with time - possibly

sooner should there be a leaking (or “issuance“) of official documents - to either smear

Pinochet, or to clear Chile. This, of course, probably depends upon one’s interpretive

bias.

Of these matters said Guelph University political science Professor J. Nef:

The script [between the military and Ricardo Lagos camp] still holds and explains what's happening. More than [tank] diesel engines [warming up for a revolt], there is the complex institutional machinery left behind by the military regime. The Supreme Court was, is, and will continue to be, a center-piece of this arrangement. That they tried to stop Guzman is not out of line. And so is --paradoxically-- the removal of Pinochet's immunities by this very Supreme Court. The house arrest was a move to prevent extradition to Argentina, where he faces criminal charges too.

Then, there is the sticky CIA payroll connection with Contreras and Pinochet and a whole slew of other generals and admirals (mostly retired). This has thepotential to destroy the military from within. In fact, there is some distancing between officers in active duty --who want to carry on enjoying their privileges-- and the General's entourage, who justify their "technical act of treason" resorting to Cold War standards and bravado.

Another point to ponder is the changing international scenario with a likely Bush presidency. Many officers may be tempted to go back to their old practices and see if Uncle Sam supports them, as

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it did in the 60s and 70s...In this context, burning diesel is not a bad idea.

How sustainable it is, is another matter...The Bush connection should not beunderestimated, especially since the reopening of the Letelier case(assasination in Embassy Row, Washington, DC, 1976). There arefar too many skeletons in the closet to be disposed ofcomfortably.

There are two constant (not always converging) things one must never underestimate...greed and stupidity. There is an over-abundance of both, and Chile is no exception... [133.]

***

With legality‘s appearances nicely sewn up in Santiago (but time will tell), looking back

to Pinochet‘s period in England, what then was to be made of the cute, strung out tango

danced amongst England, Chile, and Spain; legal and political affairs proceeding along

their own tracks (but of course, not crossing over), sovereign states cutting in on each

other‘s partner to the dance!

What explains the contradiction between the Britain that extradites Pinochet to Spain and the Britain that welcomed Pinochet's help against Argentina during the Falklands' War? Did England [and Spain] simply lack the moral courage to see it through [134.]

Why should Spain set the precedent of humanitarian justice on its‘ soil, to tie its‘ hands in dealing with its‘ longstanding and continuing problems of Basque separatism? Would Madrid compromise its‘ realpolitik prero-gatives in dealing with the ETA‘s terrorism, whose two car bombings on January 21, 2000 (in the midst of Spain‘s general election campaign) resulted in over a million Spaniards demonstrating against them? Should

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the Spanish place a higher value on justice for Pinochet, a foreigner, thanon the memory of Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Blanco Garcia, one of its‘ own, who was murdered by the Basques in demonstration of violence? [135.] (Most recently, Supreme Court Judge Jose Francisco Querol was murdered, with more than 60 bystanders wounded by a carbomb explosion in Madrid. [136.])

Just prior to Pinochet’s release by Britain, the Basque ETA had ended a 14 month ceasefire. How would it look to the world with Pinochet before Baltazar Garzon in some Spanish prisoner’s box, justifying the brutal oppressiveness of his 1973 coup, while Madrid worked to keep all options open to counter ETA terrorism? How could Madrid countenance Judge Garzon‘s evidence of torture against Pinochet while Amnesty International when Amnesty International had been accusing the Spanish government - under the auspices of paramilitary forces - of the same tactics in dealing with Basque terrorists! [137.]

Or would it be more expedient to let Santiago deal with Pinochet as the Chileans have done, rather than risk the diplomatic messiness of the General dying on European soil amidst delicate, historic legal proceedings? [138.]

True, Pinochet is the first head of state charged since Nuremberg, but the fact is -- recent

international humanitarian jurisprudence notwithstanding -- the 1970s Chilean civil

conflict did not occur on British soil. And (just as the Spanish with their Basque

problems) could [/would] Britain, with its‘ Irish problems, allow prosecution by reason

of political differences that threatened state security be equated as genocide?

Does/did London want to risk the definition being stretched that far, now that peace, hanging by a thread (and in danger of coming apart once more), had to be re-established with Gerry Adam‘s and the IRA? [139.]

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Whatever the explanation, what realpolitik leger de main themes have intervened,

pushing the "humanitarian resolve" to see "justice" for the General done?

For within a day of Britain's circumscribed second decision against Pinochet, Judge

Garzon added thirty three extra allegations against him -- received from a list sent to him

by a "far left" Chilean organization with no independent investigation of the allegations.

Why has no warrant been issued against the IRA's Gerry Adams, whose organization

claimed more than 3,000 victims? [140.] Interestingly, the number rivals Pinochet‘s own

body count in his 1973 coup.

Could it be that Adams (having long negotiated to make the 1998 Good Friday Peace Accord stick), is, like Arafat, now a critically useful member of the establishment (particularly with Direct Home Rule reimposed on February 11, 2000 [141.]) -- while "the likes of" Pinochet areexpendable? To borrow from Lenin‘s approach to human relationships, will Gerry Adams become what Pinochet once was: a useful idiot? Is there also a future here for Alberto Fujimori?

At the time, Whitehall announced that the British government decided thus far* to let the

rule of law take its' course;" [142.] as though, what? - the rule of law were an option!?

Adolf Hitler once vowed to become Chancellor of Germany, "by any means, even legal."

Did Labour's Prime Minister Tony Blair's last minute substitution of Chief Magistrate

Parkinson for Ronald Bartle (with known Conservative Party links) [143.] reflect

Britain's commitment to impartial justice, or suggest Machiavellian ulterior motives?

Media savvy

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politicians have always known that the public's memory is short, and that reporting is a

selective process; a parallel precept of the English legal profession is that "Justice must

be seen (is that, 'seem?') to be done."

Judge Baltazar Garzon and Standards of Humanitarianism: Unto Caesar and unto God those things that to each belong

Pinochet and the Spanish Judge: They beg to differ, but at least they are not hypocrites

In light of Judge Garzon‘s zeal for bringing Pinochet to Spanish soil, one has to ask why

he failed to nab an even more enticing human rights abuser who had already been in

Spain for years. Rifaat Assad, brother of Syria‘s deceased leader Hafez Assad, spent his

exile in Spain after failing to overthrow his brother in 1983; while in Hafez service the

year before, brother Rifaat put down political dissent in Hama (1982) by killing an

estimated 10 - 20,000 people. [144.]

This oversight by Judge Garzon was attributable to what?

_____________________________________________________________________________________* Italics those of the essayist.

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In light of Spain‘s expulsion of Islamic infidels when retaking the Iberian peninsula in

the fifteenth century, was this a cultural blind spot? Were up to 20,000 Muslims in Syria

not worth as much as 3,000 Christians in Chile?

If Lady Justice is blind, is this an example of her inability to see?

It would appear that the truer test of Spain's commitment to the new improved climate of

international justice would have been the granting of political asylum to 2,500

Colombian Embera-Katio Indians. [145.]

Seeking to escape Colombia's drawn out civil war, will Madrid, which once threw out the

Moors then brutally subjugated the societies of the Aztecs, the Incas (and everything in

between), [146.] grant land and liberty to those against whom it once committed

atrocities? [147.]

Not unlike those of General/Senator Pinochet -- who, by the way, in returning to

Socialist Party Ricardo Lagos winning Chile's December 12, 1999/January 16, 2000

(run-off) Presidential election, was confronted by a ghost: Lagos had been Allende‘s

Ambassador to the Soviet Union. And truly a ghost at that, for with just 51.32% of the

vote -- hardly a sweeping mandate -- Ricardo Lagos lacked a comfortable majority to

move legally against the General. For this reason, Lagos sent a message of stability and

continuity to conservatives by appointing more Christian Democrats to ministerial posts

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(including Foreign, Defence, and Economy) than from, other parties to his centre-left

Cencertacion coalition government. [148.]

In seeking the middle ground and the pivotal 10% swing vote, by posing for photographs

with David Rockefeller and George Soros [149.], was not Lagos like Peter denying

Christ on the third crow of the cock? By pledging to seek joint ventures with foreign

investors to expand Chile‘s international market reach (including privatizing copper

mines nationalized by Allende) [150.], has he not played into Pinochet‘s hands? If so,

this volte face practise of personal realpolitik (defined by Ricardo Lagos as 21st Century

Socialism) puts Lagos into good company: Alcibiades and the pirouetting Talleyrand:

In 1973, Lagos admitted he and his colleagues put the interests of the party before

the interests of the people [151.] ( Lagos could have resigned in protest during

Allende‘s flush of victory!). In 1999, by implicitly acknowledging the excesses of

the Pinochet era, was Lagos putting his personal ambitions above his historic,

albeit moderate, socialist principles? [152.]

If so, it was not just an ironic dilemma; it was doubly ironic. But with the

Supreme Court decision in the General‘s favour, Lagos can hold his head high.

He had done the right thing in a time of ambivalence and uncertainty.

So rather than Baltazar Garzon, we can thank the Caligula logic of Indonesia's President

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Habibie (who, fearing the security of his own self interest with threats of the World

Bank and IMF funding cut-offs [153.] more than injustices to the East Timorese people --

including Bosnia/Kosovo style massacres of men, allegedly by the army [154.]) for the

success and inadvertent but still questionable legitimacy of the Doctrine of Humanitarian

Intervention. [155.]

Questionable legitimacy? In November, 2000, the U.N. began discussions on “exit

strategies” to determine when UN “blue helmets” having fulfilled their mandates,

could be pulled out of trouble spots. [156.] The day following three UN workers were

butchered by pro-Indonesia gangs on Timor, the UN pulled out its’ staff - leaving 90,000

East Timorese sheltered in squalid camps looking to an uncertain future [157.]; Is this

consistent with the vision of “exit strategies?” Meanwhile, U.N. High Commissioner for

Refugees Sadako Ogata reported that entry restrictions imposed by North American and

European governments drove immigrants and refuees into the hands of unscrupulous

human traffickers; that the UNHCR should continue to exist reflected the international

community‘s continuing failure to prevent prejudice, persecution, and poverty and

realted caused of conflict and displacement, her report continued. [158.] Indeed, the

powerful “G20” international economic policy group excludes the poorest nations for a

reason; they are too poor to have any impact upon international markets! [159.] Perhaps

the logic of this is open to debate amongst people like Sadako Ogata.

Meanwhile, Judge Garzon, having made his point with Pinochet, immediately thereafter

went after known Dirty War figures from Argentina's 1976 - 1983 dictatorship [160.];

interestingly, curiously, this request was denied on January 05 by Buenos Aires’ new

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centre left government of President Fernando de la Rua. [161.] For having denied this

request of Baltazar Garzon, President de la Rua’s government requested Pinochet’s

extradition for the 1974 assassination of General Carlos Prats, exiled from Chile to

Buenos Aires by the 1973 coup. [162.]

Not a time honoured friend of the military as was the outgoing Peronist Carlos Menem,

was de la Rua‘s decision against Judge Garzon an act of Free Will, made without fear of

military reprisals?

Was his request for Pinochet’s extradition a demonstration of Latin America‘s Myth of

Constitutionalism at work? Or with Augusto now down on his luck, was it a painless

invocation of the more surrealistic Magic Realism?

For in the same breath, to take but one example, De la Rua‘s his own Dirty War

hero/villain, The Blonde Angel Alfredo Astiz received a suspended sentence in 1998 for

unverified comments about death to journalists in pursuit of him. [163.] But he has never

been imprisoned for his own atrocities.

In the case of Desaperacidos never located, Chilean prosecutors created the “kidnapped

[for up to 27 years] but not proven dead” doctrine to vitiate immunity protection

extended by Pinochet to his coup co-participants. [164.] Protected by Carlos Menem’s

immunity to Dirty War participants, de la Rua’s prosecutors could do the same.

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But by requesting Pinochet’s extradition, does de la Rua “look good” while avoiding a

coup (-- hypothetically remote, but with memories of Raul Alfonsin’s and Carlos

Menem’s problems with the military, not entirely remote [165.] --) by not invoking the

inventive doctrine of kidnapped/presumed alive?

With Pinochet now apparently expendable and every situation ethics humanitarian

advocate coming in for the kill, is this but another example of selective Humanitarianism

based on whose ox is gored? [166.]

Which, by the way, returns the discussion to Alberto Fujimori: in Peru, about 4,000

people have “disappreared “ - kidnapped and murdered by the army and police in their

fight against the Sendero Luminoso. [167.] Fujimori, since resigned (by reason of

domestic issues: abuse of office and the corruption of Vladimir Montesinos); although

waging an internal campaign similar to Pinochet’s, no genocide related extradition has

been issued against Alberto. But Fujimori, elected (even dubiously in 1999), had his 1992

“auto-coup” endorsed upon his re-election. Pinochet took power the Maoist way: through

the barrel of a gun. Returning to an earlier query, is this the difference between elected

human rights abusers and those who assume power by exercising it without the formality

of a vote. Like desire, seduction, and rape, consent seems to make all the difference.

Which is certainly critical to elected governments like England and Spain which have

been waging Pinochet like campaigns against their respective internal opponents, the IRA

and the ETA.

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A “Fourth Way:“ - NIMBY?

Speaking of which, De la Rua’s extradition request may not have come at a better time

for Chile!

Consider this: Racial riots, the moon race, the Viet Nam War, Richard Nixon’s

impeachment - all required Washington’s full attention while pulling the country in

different directions in the 1960s and 1970s. These almost simultaneous tugs had the

potential of bringing the house down, as did the abolition of Communism and the break

up of the Soviet Empire for Russia.

Resilience within the national soul - if there be such a thing - is most critical to any

country pulling out of such crises. Does Chile have what it takes should General Pinochet

be convicted? - Or acquitted! Does Santiago want to find out? If not, there may yet be a

“Fourth Way” for Ricardo Lagos’ government!

On November 8, 2000, Supreme Court Judge Luis Correa told Pinochet not to leave town

while considering Argentina’s extradition request for the 1974 assassination of General

Prats and his wife. [168.]

Argentina having denied Garzon’s request to extradite Argentine military officials to

Spain, Chile having succeeded in bringing Pinochet home from England rather than have

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him face the crusading Spanish judge, should the General/Senator win his appeal in his

own courts, is now contemplating extradition of its’ General to Buenos Aires!

Is the appearance of justice and saving face served by denying Pinochet the pain of

possible imprisonment on European soil - only to have him shipped off to a fellow Latin

American country? If imprisoned just across the hills, no doubt in a five star cell,

visitation privileges would be less onerous for admirers spared the brutality of recovering

from trans-Atlantic jet lag to Madrid and back.

More relevant for President Lagos, however, would be the “clean hands” solution offered

to him by an Argentine extradition.

Letting Buenos Aires decide Pinochet’s fate would likely let him side step dangerous

possible consequences already outlined above. Who knows? Perhaps with an acquittal,

Santiago may consider ceding southern territory long claimed by Argentina. Operation

Condor partnership notwithstanding, the two countries nearly went to war in the 1970s

over the Beagle Channel dispute, but was eventually mediated by the Vatican. [169.]

Perhaps divine justice shall again prevail by dropping Pinochet into the lap of Rome. In

which case the General may still walk if the Vatican reserves judgment on the ground that

Pinochet must ultimately be judged by an Authority Higher than itself.

For Santiago, this would be truly a solution made in heaven.

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As it happens, however, an appeal to heaven will be unnecessary: Judge Guzman, like his

Spanish counterpart Baltazar Garzon in his commitment to justice for Chile’s victims of

the 1973 coup, apparently outsmarted himself.

Guzman had used the fiction of “kidnapped but not proven dead” of desaperacidos to

get around Pinochet’s immunity. But in ordering his arrest, the Court of Appeals held that

Guzman’s reliance upon a preindictment interrogation questionnaire submitted to

Pinochet during his London detention (questions ignored, but countered with a statement

of innocence) was invalid - since the General, at the time still a senator for life - held

parliamentary immunity! [170.]

***

For Sr. Garzon, meanwhile, the question is: Who will be next? Should he act on behalf of

the America's indigenous peoples, it will have to be not only descendants of Spain‘s

conquistadors -- but the Puritans who landed at Plymouth Rock, and everyone

who came after them. Given his tenacity and ability to get results where NATO and the

U.N. may not, the good judge should keep his eye on the wily Slobodan Milosevic, lest

he return to power in Belgrade. [171.] Or the ever deteriorating mulit-sided civila war in

Colombia.

In 260 A.D., Rome‘s Emperor Valerian was captured by the Great King Shapur of Persia;

taken back there, Valerian ended his days as a foot stool for Shapur every time the King

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mounted his horse. This could still be the General‘s fate -- burdened by the weight of

human rights‘ activists now forever on his back -- no less than Judge Garzon‘s (and his

Chilean colleague Juan Guzman), outflanked by realpolitik practitioners, who, having

paid lip service to "humanitarianism," will carry on with their power games, business as

usual; The day after Jack Straw‘s announcement to stay proceedings against Pinochet, he

was giving a speech about wooly minded, Hampstead Liberals at a left wing think tank.

[172.]

Madrid went through the motions of forwarding Judge Garzon‘s demand Pinochet be

subjected to further medical tests [173.], then announced (again) two days later that it

would not appeal should London free Pinochet on humanitarian grounds. [174.]

Meanwhile, having maintained all along that the General‘s medical records would not be

released by reason of entitlement to doctor/patient privacy rules [175.], Jack Straw was

contradicted by the British Medical Association, which stated that the principle of

patient-doctor confidentiality was/is not absolute when it comes to vital information

needed by the courts. [176.]

Oxford professor Sir John Grimley, one of Pinochet‘s examining doctors, went further

with the acknowledgement that his team did not conclude that Pinochet was unfit for

trail. [177.]

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Mr. Straw, maintaining to the letter his legal obligations to Pinochet and his doctors at

home, must have been bumbfounded when the General‘s medical records were leaked to

the press abroad! Avoiding allegations of political manipulation or interference, the

foreign media, like Lenin‘s useful idiots, had fulfilled Jack‘s probable intentions by

publishing Pinochet‘s file. Submitted in confidence to four governments, how could this

be?

Whatever the truth, Spain‘s Foreign Minister Abel Matutes stated “The report is clear,

formal, and without fault as concerns General Pinochet‘s incapacity to undergo trial,”

adding that he expected Mr. Straw to send him home. [178.]

Insulated by the sovereignty of another state, countries away, the Home Secretary could

not have done better if Matutes had been on his payroll in London!

In view of Pinochet“s spirited Lazarus‘ like leap from his wheelchair in Santiago on

March 03, further, an interesting question arises: Could the renowned medical

specialists (with their state of the art equipment and training) retained by Home

Secretary Straw have been fooled by the wily General as to the true state of his

health? Or was their team report a fraudulent document, doctored by someone

in the British government, possibly with[/out] the knowledge of Mr. Straw?

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Mr. Straw timed the announcement of Pinochet‘s release on March 02 for 8:00 a.m. --

two hours before papers opposing the General‘s release could be filed in the High Court,

which opened at 10:00 a.m.

Under Operation Exit, Pinochet and his wife were driven in a three hour armed police

motorcade to RAF Waddington Air Base -- changed from nearby RAF Oxfordshire at the

last minute to avoid protesters and possible assassination attempts: with the switch, the

General and his wife Lucia had minimal time to pack valuables for the three hour drive

to the Chilean Air Force Boeing 707, on stand-by in England since January. [179.]

On stand-by for what? -- for Mr. Straw to approve extradition proceedings to Spain?

Carefully rehearsed exit procedures between British police and the Chilean Air Force

crew (including doctors and nurses) reflected an exit planned like a military operation.

[180.]

Were these exercises carried out without the Home Secretary‘s prior knowledge or

consent?

Interestingly, the British Foreign Office announced on the evening of March 01 (on the

eve of Mr. Straw‘s release of Pinochet) that a British minister would be flying to Chile to

attend the inauguration of President Lagos on March 10. [181.]

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When were these rehearsals planned and practised? During the period of Mr. Straw‘s

consideration of submissions opposing Pinochet‘s release by the states of Belgium,

France, Switzerland, and Spain?

Pinochet‘s brush with justice was no less remarkable than London‘s and Madrid‘s deft

maneouvring to avoid its‘ application to him - to say nothing of Santiago‘s use of justice

to avoid the same! Judicial kidnapping? We may never know. Certainly, it was a

judicious release!

But one can never be so glib, for real life stories seldom end like novels: Judge Baltazar

Garzon and his Chilean counterpart Judge Juan Guzman demonstrated an

uncompromising, if quixotic, idealism in their pursuit of Pinochet. Are the British Home

Secretary and the Chilean President like Garzon and Guzman Tapia: what Thatcher

would call men of conviction? [182.] Or are they (at least, the British Home Secretary,

of whom we may know more) like 1930s Appeasers, woolly minded Machiavellians men

straw?

Speaking of which, there may yet (assuming one prefers justice to realpolitik) be a ray of

golden light in the haystack: Judge Juan Guzman has relentlessly been working away to

establish the accountability of General Pinochet in respect of the deaths of nearly 200.

The General, should he live through these dragged out proceedings, may yet be found

guilty - or he may not. Former Salvadoran defence minister Guillermo Gracia (with

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former head of the Salvadoran National Guard, Carlos Vides Casanova) were tried in the

United States for 1980 the rape and murder of three nuns and a lay missionary - and

acquitted, by an American jury. [183.]

Does Judge Juan Guzman’s presence on and persistence in the case indicate that Chile

has earned its’ democratic stripes by an act of will - or by default, in that the General’s

own backers (now into their next generation) have written him off as a relic from a

previous generation in order to get on with their own? Or, in light of Guzman being

overruled, was the General saved by Guzman being used, set up as what the British

Home secretary would call a straw man, by the faction within Pinochet’s camp able to

bring President Lagos to his senses? This is a question to be addressed at a later date

when definitive documentation becomes available to historians rather than chroniclers.

Returning to the General’s own pronouncement of his actions in his era, is Juan Guzman

a Pontius Pilate, a type of second coming redux to redress recent history’s imbalances?

Were Chilean judicial officials rendering justice to the man who had appointed many of

them? - or playing out a script first drafted between the British and Spanish foreign

ministers in Rio, 1999. For whom have the courts decided: Christ of Barabbas?

Human rights advocates will understandably identify with in the American Vice

President; both were gored by the judicial process.

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Looking to the longer term, as General Pinochet’s shadow enemy and possible nemesis,

the Communists, would have said: let history judge. Let history judge not only the

General, but his pursuers - and defenders.

(Copyright, Peter B. Beeching, Toronto: December 16, 1998: Revised: April 6 & 19, 1999: May 1, 1999; July 29, 1999; August 9 & 23, 1999;

September 17 & 22, 1999; October 9, 15, 19, 20, 25. 30, 1999, November 4, 13, 15, 18, 1999; December 14, 1999; January 03, 17; February 07; March 06, 14; May 12; June

20, 23; July 07,10,11, 12; October 26 - 31; November 1 - December 18, 2000)

- 30 -

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Principles, Pinochet, and the Realpolitik of Humanitarianism

Footnotes and Appendices

1. "Wild Justice,@ The National Post, October 09, 1999.

2. Audrey Woods, Groups object to secrecy of Pinochet medical report, The Globe and Mail, January 19, 2000. 3. Paul Knox, Britain set to free Pinochet, The Globe and Mail, January 12, 2000; Alberto Manquel, Pinochet‘s great escape, The Globe and Mail, January 14, 2000.

4. Christopher Hitchens, A Salute to a true pseudo-humanitarian, The National Post, January 24, 2000.

5. Dan Trotta, Pinochet‘s brain damaged, papers say, The Toronto Star, February 17, 2000; Pinochet report causes furor, Reuters‘ reprint, The Globe and Mail, February 17, 2000, “Pinochet suffering memory loss; Report,” Agence France- Presse reprint, The National Post, February 17, 2000.

6. David Graves and Robert Shrimsley, Operation Exit set for release of Pinochet today, The National Post, March 02, 2000.

7. Linda Diebel, Supporters plan joyous welcome for Pinochet, The Toronto Star, January 31, 2000; T.R. Reid, Pinochet heads home to uncertain future, The Toronto Star, March 03, 2000; Jimmy Langman, Cheers, confetti, welcome Pinochet back to Chile, The Globe and Mail, March 04, 2000; David Graves, Jubilant supporters fill Santiago streets to welcome Pinochet, The National Post, March 04, 2000; Freed Pinochet ditches wheelchair, The Toronto Star, March 04, 2000.

8. Anthony Faiola and Pascale Bonnefoy, “Pinochet indicted for Chilean Atrocities,” The Washington Post, December 02, 2000, Pg. 01 - www.washingtonpost.com; Clifford Krauss, “Chile Places Pinochet Under House Arrest,” New York Times Online, December 02, 2000 9. Ibid.; “Double-cross in Chile,” The National Post, December 03, 2000, Pg. A19 “Pinochet's lawyers appeal indictment,” AP Wire Copy Story, The Toronto Star Online, December 3, 2000 Arrest,” New York Times Online, December 02, 2000

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10. Jimmy Langman, “Court overrules Pinochet decision, Former dictator’s fate in the hands of the country’s top judges,” The Globe and Mail, December 12, 2000, Pg. A12; “Chile appeals court blocks orders for Pinochet’s arrest; Human rights lawyers appeal judges’ ruling,” Reuters-AP wirecopy reprint, The Toronto Star, December 11, 2000, Pg. A11.

11. Ricardo Lagos and Heraldo Munoz, “The Pinochet Dilemma,” Foreign Policy, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, No. 114, Spring, 1999, Pp. 26-39.

12. Clifford Krauss, “Chilean Socialist candidate runs in Allende‘s shadow,” But Ricardo Lagos admits his party helped spark 1973 coup, New York Times Service, reprinted by The Globe and Mail, December 10, 1999.

13. Aryeh Neier, War Crimes, Brutality, Genocide, Terror, and the Struggle for Justice, Times Books/Random House, New York, 1998, Pg. 15.

14. Ibid., Pg. 20.

15. Ernest Barker, Greek Political Theory, Methuen & Co.., London, Reprint, 1964, Pp. 162, 194 - 208; St. Augustine, Editted, Vernon J. Bourke, The City of God, Book XIX, Ch. 7, Image Books/Doubleday & Co., Garden City, N.Y., 1958.

16. Paul Knox, “Protests topple president; Ivory Coast opposition leader takes power after crowds of supporters fill the streets,” The Globe and Mail, Thursday, October 26, 2000; Douglas Farah, “Ivory Coast‘s leader forced to flee,” The Toronto Star, October 26, 2000, Pg. A29.

17. “World voices fear Bush, Gore tainted,” The Globe and Mail, November 28, 2000, Pg. A19; Paul Koring, “Top Court grills Gore, Bush lawyers,” The Globe and Mail, December 02, 2000, Pg. A15

18. Juliana Mojsilovic, “Milosevic wins Socialist vote; former Yugoslavia leader makes defiant political comeback,” The Toronto Star, November 26, 2000, Pg. A2Gillian Sandford, “Feud splits coalition in Serbia,” The Globe and Mail, November 28, 2000, Pg. A20.

19. Pamela Constable and Aurturo Valenzuela, A nation of enemies; Chile under Pinochet, W.W. Norton & company, New York, 1991, Pp. 296 - 320.

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20. “Chile: Psychological tests ordered for Pinochet,” Reuters’ wire copy reprint, The Globe and Mail, Pg. A16, November 3, 2000

21. Jimmy Langman, “Pinochet under house arrest,” The Globe and Mail, December 02, 2000, Pg. A17; Tiffany Woods, “Pinochet arrested for kidnapping, homicide’ Accused of masterminding ‘Caravan of death,’” Reuters’ reprint, The National Post, December 02, 2000, Pg. A12

22. Alan Freeman, Thatcher sings praises of true friend Pinochet, The Globe and Mail, October 07, 1999.

23. Alexander Rose, Rights activist loses first big test, The National Post, January 12, 2000.

24. Jon Hibbs, “U.K. set to release ailing Pinochet,” The National Post, January 12, 2000.

25. Think of President Truman’s dilemma before Hiroshima: Edwin Fogelman, Editor: The Decision to use the A-Bomb, Charles Scribners Sons, New York, 1964.

26. Barbara Amiel, “Humanitarian callousness was the Arabs’ masterstroke,” The National Post, Toronto, Pg. A12 - A14, November 06, 2000.

27. Carl von Clausevitz, On War, Editor, Anatol Rapoport, Pelican Books, London, 1968, Pg. 38.

28. Ibid., Pg. 397.

29. Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies; Chile under Pinochet, W.W. Norton & Co., New York, 1991, Pp. 18, 19.

30. Marina Jimenez, “He rules the world: A Spanish judge‘s zeal for prosecuting foreigners raises troubling questions,” The National Post, November 13, 2000, Pg. A13.

31. Alan Freeman, Chilean abuse no worse than British Army, The Globe and Mail, September 30, 1999.

32. Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies; Chile under Pinochet, W.W. Norton & Co., New York, 1991, Pg. 23. 33. As confirmed by then CIA Director, William Colby: Chile, The State and

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Revolution, Ian Roxborough et al., Holmes & Meier Publishers Inc., New York, 1977, Pg. 152; and Arturo Valenzuela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes; Chile, U.S. Senate Report: Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, U.S. Senate, 1975, Washington, D.C., Pg. 120.

34. Jimmy Langman, “New documents show U.S. role in Chile’s past,” The Globe and Mail, November 23, 2000, Pg. A19. 35. Mack Walker, Editor, Metternich’s Europe, 1813 - 1848, Harper & Row, New York, 1968, Pp. 112 - 132.

36. Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored; Europe After Napoleon, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957, Reprinted, Peter Smith Co., Gloucester, Mass., 1973, Pg. 208.

37. Lawrence E. Harrison, The Pan American dream, Basic Books/Harper Collins Publishers, New York, 1997, Pg. 160.

38. W. George Lovell, Peace at Last, Not so Fast, Guatemala, The Globe and Mail, November 15, 1999.

39. David Gonzalez, “Rights in Guatemala: At Risk Still,” NYT Online , November 2, 2000

40. Obviously, a fluid issue, where evidence is pulled from sources biased to one‘s perspective. As this pertains to Chile, Lawrence Harrison maintains in The Pan American Dream that in 1972, Chile’s most affluent 10% of its’ population accounted for nearly 46% of national income - just slightly ahead of Guatemala and Honduras.

Not to be lightly dismiss is Davis S. Landes’ commentary (The Wealth and Poverty of Nations; Why some are rich and some are poor, W.W. Norton, New York, 1998, pp. 492 - 495) that despite recent Latin American wealth under free market economic reforms, new money keeps funding old debt -- as well as monies finding their way into safe havens such as Switzerland...

41. Often argued as being initially enforced by the Royal Navy, which is not in dispute here. Interestingly, though, as early as 1831, the U.S.S. Lexington wrested away control over whale fishing rights from Argentina - paving the way for the British to take control over these same islands in 1833. John A. Crow, The Epic of Latin America, Fourth Edition, University of California Press at Berkley, 1992, Pp. 677 - 678.

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42. “U.S. files may implicate Pinochet in torture, execution,” Associated Press, Quoted in The Globe and Mail, December 02, 1998.

43. Lake Sagaris, After the Frst Death, Sommerville House Publishing, Toronto, 1996, Pp. 109 - 110.

44. Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies; Chile under Pinochet, W.W. Norton & Co., New York, 1991, Pp. 92, 93.

45. Nunca Mas (Never Again), A Report by Argentina’s National Commission on Disappeared People, 1984, Buenos Aires, Translated by Writers and Scholars International Ltd., 1986, Faber & Faber, London, Pp. 337 - 354.

46. Ibid., Pp. 248 - 252.

47. Jimmy Burns, The Land that lost its’ heros; Argentina, The Falklands, and Alfonsin, Bloomsbury Publishing Ltd., London, 1987, Pg. 22 - 23.

48. Carl Bernstein and Marco Politi, His Holiness; Pope John Paul II and the Hidden History of Our Time, Doubleday Publishing Inc., New York, 1996, Pp. 457 - 465.

49. Cecil Roth, The Spanish Inquisition, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 1964.

50. Thomas T. Hammond, The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers, Yale University Press, 1975, Pg. 581.

51. Walter Laqueur, Terrorism, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1977, Pp. 205 - 207.

52. Nunca Mas (Never Again), A Report by Argentina’s National Commission on Disappeared People, 1984, Buenos Aires, Translated by Writers and Scholars International Ltd., 1986, Faber & Faber, London, Pg. 338

53. Venezuela: Coup threatened, The Toronto Star, March 02, 2000.

54. “U.N. admits failure over genocide fax,” The Toronto Star, December 08, 1998.

55. Major General Lewis Mackenzie (Ret.), “It’s not enough to say your sorry,“ The Globe and Mail, December 22, 1999.

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56. Steven Edwards, “Dallaire’s story,: U.N. failed Rwanda,” The National Post, December 17, 1999.

57. Steven Edwards, “Gen . Dallaire to face UN genocide panel,” The National Post, October 04, 1999.

58. Marcus Gee, “UN chief takes blame for inaction on genocide,” The Globe and Mail, December 17, 1999; Isabel Vincent, “Annan unscathed despite increased criticism of UN, “ The National Post, December 07, 1999; John Stackhouse, “Western Powers blamed for Rwandan genocide,“ The Globe and Mail, July 07, 2000.

59. “Ethnic cleansing reversed; UN envoy,” Agence France Press Wire Copy story, The Globe and Mail, June 22, 2000.

60. Paul Knox, “U.S. has cold feet about involvement in global hot spots; After Kosovo, Clinton steps away from role of global policeman in front of U.N. assembly, says U.S. cannot do everything, everywhere,” The Globe and Mail, September 22, 1999.

61. R.W. Apple Jr., “The U.S. finds itself in the position of the spoiler, Joins peace efforts only when its’ own ox is being gored,” The New York Times, reprinted by The National Post, October 15, 1999.

62. “World accused of lacking conscience,” AP-CP-Reuters” reprint, published in The Toronto Star, March 11, 2000.

63. Peter Goodspeed, “UN plans Congo mission as images of tribal massacre reach outside world,” The National Post, January 29, 2000.

64. Paul Knox, “African leaders ask UN for help to end fighting; Insuirgency against Congo seen by many as threat to the continent,” The Globe and Mail, January 25, 2000; “UN force for Congo proposed,” Reuters” reprint, The Toronto Star, February 09, 2000; “UN force authorized to monitor shaky Congo ceasefire; Annan must have co-operation of all factions before troops deployed,” Reuters’ reprint, The National Post, January 31, 2000.

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65. Jack Stackhouse, “Western powers blamed for Rwandan massacre,” The Globe and Mail, July 07, 2000; Stephen Lewis and Gerald Caplan, “Don’t blame Africa for its’ wars.” The Globe and Mail, July 12, 2000; Peter Goodspeed, “Mandela hopes to bring UN powers to Burundi crisis,“ The National Post, January 19, 2000; Johnathan Kay, “Burundi’s imminent catastrophe,” The National Post, January 31, 2000.

66. “What does the west do about the next Rewanda?” The Globe and Mail, December 18, 1999; Mats Berdal and David Malone, “Diamonds are a war’s best friend,” The Globe and Mail, May 23, 2000; Steven Edwards, “U.N. losing battle to halt ‘blood diamond trade,” The National Post, November 2, 2000, Pg A10.

67. Aryeh Neier, War Crimes: Brutality, Genocide, Terror, and the Struggle for Justice, Times Books/Random House, New York, 1998, Pp. 3-11.

68. Ibid., Pp. 14, 15, 19.

69. Richard Gwyn, “Where is our western Morality now,” The Toronto Star, December 10, 1999.

70. Amnesty International Report, 2000

71. Paul Knox, “Envoy doubts world powers’ will to halt next Rwandan bloodbath,” The Globe and Mail, December 29, 1999; Marcus Gee, “The poor keep the peace;” Jack Stackhouse, “Future role in peacekeeping threatened, defence expert says;“ Jeff Sallot, “UN forces set for clash with rebel fighters,” all, The Globe and Mail, May 11, 2000.

72. David Malone and Ramesh Thakur, “Racism in peacekeeping,” The Globe and Mail, October 30, 2000, Pg. A17.

73. Steven Edwards, “Canada accused of opting for easy U.N. mission; Armies from poor nations left with dangerous postings,” The National Post, November 17, 2000, Pg. A15.

74. Johnathan Thatcher, “Mass protest on Indonesian island rattles Jakarta, demand for independence - up to one million people take to the streets of Aceh,” The National Post, November 09, 1999.

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75. “How the Indonesian army plotted to destroy a nation; For nearly a year, generals hatched murderous plan to block independence for East Timor - and Western intelligence services knew about it,” London Observer Service, reprinted by The Globe and Mail, Sepember 13, 1999. See also: Eliot Cohen, “Goodness has nothing to do with it; East Timor and Serbia remind us that power politics trump humanitarian sentiment and cultural fellow feeling,” The Wall Street Journal, reprinted in The Globe and Mail, September 14, 1999.

76. Aryeh Neier, War Crimes, Brutality, Genocide, Terror, and the Struggle for Justice, Times Books/Random House, New York, 1998, Pg. 16.

77. Peter Goodspeed, “Details of horrifying experiments put Japan at war with its’ history: Trial unearths how thousands were tortured,” The National Post, December 7, 2000, Pg. A17.

78. Professor Michael Mandel, “Will NATO be held accountable for War Crimes? Alliance leaders can’t be permitted to wash their hands of responsibility for NATO’s contribution to the Kosovo tragedy,” The Globe and Mail, July 20, 1999; Marcus Gee, “Are Western leaders war criminals? - Group wants top officials tried by UN tribunal for NATO’s bombing campaign,” The Globe and Mail, January 29, 2000.

79. Robert Fife, “Tribunal won’t probe NATO bombing in Kosovo,” The National Post, December 31, 1999; Johnathan Tepperman, “NATO wrong about air war inquiry,” The Toronto Star, January 17, 2000.

80. “No war crimes probe into NATO bombing,” Reuters News Agency Reprint, The Toronto Star, June 03, 2000.

81. Patrick Graham, “Report critical of NATO airstrikes on Yugoslavia,” The National Post, February 07, 2000; “Kosovo report puts NATO under fire, Civilians killed by bombing, group charges,” The Toronto Star, February 07, 2000 Steven Edwards, “UN failed Kosovo refugees, its’ report finds Too little too late,” The National Post, February 12, 2000.

82. Annual report of the Secretary General of the Organization of the American States, 1996 - 1997, Washington, D.C., Pp. 96 - 97.

83. Alan Freeman, “Pinochet”s fate in the hands of Law Lords,” The Globe and Mail, November 05, 1998.

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84. Jimmy Burns, The Land that lost its’ heros; Argentina, The Falklands, and Alfonsin, Bloomsbury Publishing Ltd., London, 1987, Pg. 54.

85. “U.K. troops siding with Protestants, Rights group says,” The Toronto Star, February 09, 1994.

86. “China: Britain won’t base relations on human rights,” The Globe and Mail, October 19, 1999; “Human rights dogs Jiang in London; Chinese leader gets a warm welcome from Britain’s leaders and an earful from protesters,” The Globe and Mail, October 20, 1999.

87. Leslie Cockburn, Out of Control; The Reagan Administration’s secret war in Nicaragua, The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1987, Pp. 4,5; Blanche Wuiessen, Eleanor Roosevelt, 1933 - 1938, Volume 2, Viking/Penguin Putnam Inc., New York, 1999, Pp. 173, 174.

88. Douglas Hurd, “What do we do with someone like Pinochet?” The Globe and Mail, Toronto, November 13, 1998.

89. “Fujimori urges Colombia to be tough with terrorists,” Paul Knox, The Globe and Mail, October 30, 1998.

90. “Trio led by general seizes power in Ecuador,” The National Post, January 22, 2000; Paul Knox, “Ecuador shaken by indications of military coup,” The Globe and Mail, January 22, 2000; “Ecuador’s president is ousted; Military, Indians collaborate after rebellion,” The Toronto Star, January 22, 2000

91. Alistair Scrutton, “Ecuador’s vice president moves into top job,” Reuters’ reprint The Globe and Mail, January 24, 2000; “New Leader has his hands full in unstable Ecuador,” The National Post, January 24, 2000.

92. “Unhappy winners,“ Reuters’ reprint, The Toronto star, January 23, 2000

93. Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies; Chile under Pinochet, W.W. Norton & Co., New York, 1991, Pp. 169, 173. 99. - 88i Clifford Krauss, “Chile places Pinochet under house arrest,” The New York Times, December 2, 2000.

94. Editor, Tony Perrotet, Chile, APA Publications (HK) Ltd., Singapore, 1991, Pg. 67.

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95. “Trio led by general seizes power in Ecuador,” The National Post, January 22,

2000; “Unhappy Winners,” Reuters’ Reprint, The Toronto Star, January 23, 2000; “From banana republic to dollar republic,” The Globe and Mail, January 25, 2000; “Yes, we are not bananas,” The National Post, January 26, 2000.

96. Anthony dePalma, “Dollarization has helped some troubled economies,” New York Times reprint, The Globe and Mail, January 28, 2000; “Unhappy winners,” Reuters’ reprint, The Toronto Star, January 23, 2000.

97. “Unhappy winners,” Reuters’ reprint, The Toronto Star, January 23, 2000.

98. Thucycides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, Translated by Richard Crawley, J.M. Dent & sons, London, 1963, Pp. 300 - 306.

99. Philip Johnston, George Jones, and Philip Delves Broughton, “Pinochet could be unable to give coherent account of his rule; Straw,” The National Post, January 13, 2000; Jimmy Langman, “Chilean lawyers seek to end ex-dictator’s immunity,” The Globe and Mail, March 03, 2000; “Chile strips Pinochet of his immunity,” Reuters’ wire copy Story, The National Post, June 06, 2000 100. Jimmy Langman, “Pinochet under house arrest; Former dictator faces investigation in a case that involves Caravan of Death,” The Globe and Mail, December 02, 2000, Pg. A17.

101. E-mailed questionnaire response from Mark Falcoff, Fellow, American Enterprise Institute, Washington. D.C., October 06, 2000

102. Letter to the Chilean People, Presidente Augusto Pinochet Ugarte: http://www.fundacionpinochet.cl/doc_hist/letter.html

103. E-mailed questionnaire response from Mark Falcoff, Fellow, American Enterprise Institute, Washington. D.C., October 06, 2000

104. E-mailed questionnaire response from Mark Falcoff, Fellow, American Enterprise Institute, Washington. D.C., October 06, 2000}

105. “Ethopians honour Haile Selassie, their last Emperor; 25 years after his mysterious death, the ‘King of King, the Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah’ is laid to rest,” AP- Reuters’ Wire Copy stories, reprinted, The Toronto Star, November 5, 2000.

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106. George Gedda, “CIA may have played role in killing U.S. journalist after coup,” The Globe and Mail, October 09, 1999.

107. “U.S. admits it played role in Chile coup; CIA releases final batch of documents,” Reuters, reprinted, The Toronto Star, November 14, 2000, Pg. A17; “New documents show U.S. role in Chile’s past,” Jimmy Langman, The Globe and Mail, November 23, 2000, Pg. A19

108. Anthony Perry, “Some call rocket scientist brilliant, Others say he’s guilty of War Crimes,” Los Angeles Times, August 15, 1990.

109. R. Jeffrey Smith, Ellen Nakashima, “Serb leader hints at Milosevic trial; Clinton lifts sanctions as Kostunica tells envoys of possible prosecution,” Washington Post Foreign Service, October 13, 2000, Page A24.

109.i. “Yugoslavia: President resists call to oust Milosevic’s allies,” World Report, The Globe and Mail, November 15, 2000, Pg. A14;

109.ii. Kostunica: Yugoslav forces guilty of Kosovo ‘crimes,’” AP, Reuters Wire Copy Stories, reprinted, The Toronto Star, October 25, 2000, Pg. A18

110. Vice President Al Gore, “Remarks to the Democratic National Convention,” August 17, 2000

111. Vice President Al Gore, Collected Speeches:

- “Remarks,” World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland, January 29, 1999;- “Closing Remarks By Al Gore.” Global Forum On Fighting Corruption,

Washington, DC., February 26, 1999; - “Transcript of Al Gore's Remarks 50th Anniversary of NATO,” Ellis Island, April 21, 1999; - “Family Re-union Eight: Family and Community,” Nashville, TN, June 21, 1999

- “Remarks As Prepared For Delivery,” U.S. Military Academy Commencement, West Point, May 27, 2000.

All the above from the Gore-Lieberman 2000 official campaign web site: http://www.algore2000.com/

Governor George W. Bush, Presidential; 2000 Campaign Speeches:

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111. - continued:

- “Century of the Americas Speech,” Miami, August 25, 2000; - “Responsible Leadership,” Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 26, 2000; - “Bringing America Together,” Albuquerque, New Mexico, October 30, 2000; - “A distinctly American Internationalism,” Simi Valley, California,

November 19, 1999.

All the above from the George W. Bush for President Official Website:

http://www.georgewbush.com/

112. Miro Cernetig, “Hanoi crowds welcome Clinton,” The Globe and Mail, November 18, 2000, Pg. A17

113. Miro Certenig, “Asia chortles as U.S. chaos, offers advice on democracy,” The Globe and Mail, November 18, 2000, Pg. A17

114. Leonard Mosley, On Borrowed Time; How WWII Began, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1969, Pp. 43 - 70.

115. Paul Knox, Heather Scoffield, “Canada wins support for Peru Mission,” The Globe and Mail, June 06, 2000.

116. Paul Knox, “Fujimori quits Peru’s presidency,” The Globe and Mail, November 21, 2000, Pg. A15; Marina Jiminez, “Peru’s president leaves power gap after resignation,” The National Post, November 21, 2000; “Peru: Former president seeks haven in Japan,” AFP Wire copies, reprinted, The Globe and Mail, December 11, 2000, Pg. A17.

117. Christopher Hitchens, “A salute to a true pseudo-humanitarian,” The National Post, January 24, 2000.

118. David Sapsted, Neil Tweedie, and Peter Foster, “Former dictator spirited away in planned police exercise;” David Graves, “Pinochet flies home to Chile in Operation Exit,” - both from The National Post, March 3, 2000.

119. Jon Hibbs, “U.K. set to release ailing Pinochet,” The National Post, January 12, 2000.

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120. Johnathan Power, “A crime to free Pinochet now,” The Toronto Star, October 22, 1999.

121. Chris Aspin, “Could Pinochet die in Chile?” The Toronto Star, January 1`8, 2000; David Graves, “Jubilant supporters fill Santiago streets to welcome Pinochet,” The National Post, March 04, 2000; “Chile edges towards a settlement with its’ past,“ The Economist, July 1, 2000, Pg. 34.

122. Greg Brown, “Letter from Chile: A Santiago Spring For Democracy?” Businessweek Online, December 9, 1999;http://www.greg- brown.com/page9.html

123.E-Mailed Questionnaire response by Professor J. Nef, Department of Political Science, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, October 19, 2000

124. Linda Diebel, “Pinochet trial unlikely in Chile; The army would not allow it, says human rights lawyer,” The Toronto Star, February 02, 2000.

125. Mark Falcoff, “Who killed Latin democracy,” The Natiuonal Post, March 04, 2000.

126. “Chilean court rules to strip Pinochet of Immunity, Report,” Agence France Presse, wire copy story, The National Post, May 24, 2000; “Chile’s army apologizes for abuses of Pinochet,” Knight Ridder Wire Press story, The Toronto Star, June 14, 2000.

127. “Pinochet lawyers set to appeal loss of immunity,” Reuters-AP wire copy story, The Toronto Star, May 25, 2000.

128. “Chilean court rules to strip Pinochet of Immunity, Report,” Agence France Presse, wire copy story, The National Post, May 24, 2000.

129. Clifford Krauss, “Chilean military faces reckoning for its’ dark past,” New York Times, March 3, 1999.

130. Ibid.

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131. “Chile: Pinochet judge challenged,” Star’s wire services, The Toronto Star, December 4, 2000, Pg. A10; “Chile: Court sets deadline in Pinochet case,” AFP, reprinted, The Globe and Mail, December 5, 2000, Pg. A18; Eduardo Gallardo, “Court Blocks Pinochet House Arrest,” Associated Press On line, Dec. 5, 2000.

132.Philip Delves Broughton, “Pinochet supporters protest against order for his arrest,” The National Post, December 4, 2000, Pg. A11

133. E-mailed response to query by Dr. J. Jef, Department of Political Science, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, December 08, 2000, & December 11, 2000.

134. Alberto Manquel, “Pinochet‘s great escape,” The Globe and Mail, January 14, 2000.

135. Al Goodman, “Basque terrorists blamed for deadly car bombs; Military officer killed,” The National Post,. January 22, 2000; Matt Spetalnick, “One million Spaniards march against Basque violence.” The National Post, January 24, 2000.

136. Marcus Gee, “Basque assassins back with a vengeance; New campaign of bombing, killing reaches a peak with death of judge,” The Globe and Mail, October 31, 2000, Pg. A18.

137. Olivia Ward, “Terrorism and repression whipsaw Basques,” The Toronto Star, December 03, 2000, Pg. B1

138.Olivia Ward, “Pinochet’s opponents fight back, Mount challenges to British plan to send ex dictator home to Chile,” The Toronto Star, January 19, 2000.

139. “British MPs vote to suspend powers of N. Ireland council; Pause needed to save assembly from collapse over IRA’s refusal to disarm, minister says,” Associated Press reprint, The Globe and Mail, February 09, 2000; Professor John McGarry, “The IRA holds the key; Northern Ireland’s Catholics are not served by IRA intransigence,” The Globe and Mail, February 09, 2000; John Lloyd, “The Unravelling of Peace, The World‘s peace agreements are coming apart...Even the one that seemed the most stable, the Good Friday Accord, is in trouble,” The Globe and Mail, November 15, 2000, Pg A15.

140. “Wild Justice,” The National Post, October 09, 1999

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141. Alan Freeman, “Britain pulls plug in Ulster; Direct rule reimposed on Northern Ireland after IRA refuses to disarm,” The Globe and Mail, February 12, 2000; Olivia Ward, “Britain suspends Ulster Home rule,” The Toronto Star, February 12, 2000; Olivia Ward, “Ulster hopes peace holds as deal stalls,” The Toronto Star, February 13, 2000; David Sharrock and George Jones, “Sinn Fein winds Irish minister’s support on reinstating executive,” The National Post, February 15, 2000; “Northern Ireland peace talks at risk as IRA quits talks,” Reuters’ reprint, The Toronto Star, February 16, 2000.

142. Johnathan Power, “A crime to set Pinochet free now,” The Toronto Star, October 22, 1999.

143. “Magistrate chafes at suggestion of possible Conservative bias,” The Globe and Mail, October 09, 1999.

144. Susan Sachs, “Late president’s exiled brother wants control,” New York Times Service, reprinted, The Globe and Mail, June 13, 2000.

145. “Indians ask Spain for asylum,” The Globe and Mail, May 01, 1999.

146. Alfred Metraux, Translated from French by George Ordish, The History of the Incas, Random House, N.Y., 1979, Pp. 151 - 174; Historians differ on death by disease and/v.s.various forms of brutality (e.g., Potosi Mine labour), which combined are estimated to range between 50 - 75% of indigineous population loss within 30 years of Pizarro’s conquest Other sources may differ again.

147. Of course, 1999 humanitarian standards are not the same as the barbarism of bygone years (even though contemporary barbarism has been Aimproved@ by industrialization and technology. But this is relative to one’s ideology; in Liberal North America and England, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are important organizations. As seen in Rwanda and Kosovo, by contrast, perpetuated entrenchment of a ruling class or ethnic group, by virtue of this alone, justifies murder, torture, and disappearances of untermenschen classes. This dichotomy seems to be a law of history. Before Hitler, Ottoman Turks massacred a million Armenians in WWI...Stalin liquidated Kulaks during his farm collectivization programme. Genghis Khan, who did not understand agrarian society, was determined to destroy Chinese civilization, a la Pizarro and the Incas, when clever mandarins persuaded him that tribute from harvests was worth more than the country as grazing land for his horses.

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147 - Continued:

That has more realpolitik logic than do implications of Indonesia’s forces massacring East Timorese men (Paul Dillon and Jeff Sallot, “The chilling disappearance of East Timor‘s young men,” The Globe and Mail, September 16, 1999) after agreeing to allow in a U.N. international peacekeeping force and being given notice of the World Bank tying money to rights.

There is something bigger than the theme of this essay; self destruction based on self interest and ethno-centrism as the inherent converse side of mankind’s idealistic side.

148. Jimmy Langman, “Chile elects first socialist president since Allende,” The Globe and Mail, January 17, 2000; Jimmy Langman, “Pinochet‘s return tops list of challenges if Chile’s new President,” The Globe and Mail, March 11, 2000.

149. Clifford Krauss, “Chile Socialist candidate runs in Allende”s Shadow, but Ricardo Lagos admits his party helped spark the 1973 coup,” New York Times Service, reprinted by The Globe and Mail, December 10, 1999.

150. Ibid.; Jimmy Langman, “Pinochet‘s return tops list of challenges for Chile’s new President,” The Globe and Mail, March 11, 2000.

151. Clifford Krauss, “Chile Socialist candidate runs in Allende”s Shadow, but Ricardo Lagos admits his party helped spark the 1973 coup,” New York Times Service, reprinted by The Globe and Mail, December 10, 1999.

152. Jimmy Langman, “Chile elects first socialist president since Allende,” The Globe and Mail, January 17, 2000; “Beyond Chile‘s brutal past,” The Globe and Mail, September 15, 1999.

153. Shawn McCarthy, “Canada sending troops to East Timor,” The Globe and Mail, September 13, 1999; Paul Knox, “Key lenders tie money to rights,” The Globe and Mail, September 15, 1999.

154. Paul Dillon and Jeff Sallot, “The chilling disappearance of East Timor’s young men,“ The Globe and Mail, September 16, 1999;“Military terrorized East Timor, U.N. says,” The Toronto Star, February 01, 2000; “No tribunal for East Timor, Annan says,” The National Post, February 15, 2000

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155. Paul Knox, “UN’s actions don’t match words on human rights; Some members push

for humanitarianism, but other powerful nations consistently oppose intervention,” The Globe and Mail, September 21, 1999.

156. Steven Edwards, “U.N. starts debate on pulling out of missions,” The National Post, November 16, 2000.

157.“Refugees face grim future as UN departs; Disease, Hunger loom - World body quits West Timor after staffers killed,” Associated Press, AFP, Reuters, reprinted, The National Post, September 8, 2000, Pg. A14

158. “‘Prejudice, persecution, poverty prospering, U.n. report says,” The Toronto Star, November 14, 2000, Pg. A19.

159.. Roy Culpeper, “Can fat cats learn to share,” The Globe and Mail,October 24, 2000, Pg. A19

160. “Spain: Pinochet’s pursuer turns attention to Argentina,” Wire copy story from AFP, The Globe and Mail, Toronto, October 30, 1999; Paul Knox, “Spain charges Argentine Officers; “Judge behind Pinochet’s arrest moves against 98 former junta members, cites genocide,” The Globe and Mail, Toronto, November 03, 1999.

161. “Request to extradite 48 to Spain rejected,” The Globe and Mail, January 05, 2000; “De la Rua Argentina’s new president,” The Globe and Mail, October 25, 1999.

162.“Argentina Government requests Pinochet’s extradition,” Agence France Presse wire copy story, The Globe and Mail, October 28, 2000, Pg. A25

163. Stephen Brown , “Navy captain, known as ‘The Blond Angel’ Argentina's Astiz Sentenced for 'Dirty War' Boasts,“ Buenos Aires, Reuters, On line, Wednesday March 8 5:52 PM ET, 1998

164.Geoffrey Mohan, “Judge Ferrets Out Clues to Bring Justice in Chile's 'Disappearances,' “ Newsday, Reprint, The Salt Lake Tribune, February 27, 2000: ://www.sltrib.com/2000/feb/02272000/nation_w/29810.htm

165. David Rock, Authoritarian Argentina, University of California Press, Berkley, California, 1993, Pp. 233- 237.

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166. Internal Footnote 61; R.W. Apple Jr., “The U.S. finds itself in the position of the spoiler, Joins peace efforts only when its own ox is being gored,” The New York

Times, reprinted by The National Post, October 15, 1999.

167. “Peru: Report lists 4,000 “disappearances,’“ Reuters, reproduced in The Toronto Star, November 18, 2000, Pg A23

168. “Chile: Pinochet told to Stay,” The Toronto Star, November 9, 2000, Pg A24.

169. Milton R. Benjamin, “How to Keep Atom Bombs Out of Regional Wars,” December 8, 1978, The Washington Post, Page A16; “The Beagle Channel Dispute,” The Washington Post, January 11, 1979, Page A22; “Chile and Argentina expect to initial a treaty,” The Washington Post, October 16, 1984 ; Page A24.

170. Jimmy Langman, “Court overrules Pinochet decision, Former dictator’s fate in the hands of the country’s top judges,” The Globe and Mail, December 12, 2000, Pg. A12; “Chile appeals court blocks orders for Pinochet’s arrest; Human rights lawyers appeal judges’ ruling,” Reuters-AP wirecopy reprint, The Toronto Star, December 11, 2000, Pg. A11.

171.“Ousted Milosevic plotting return, officials in his Socialist party say,” Reuters, AP wire copy story, reprinted, The Toronto Star, November 21, 2000, Pg. A21

172. John Lloyd, “Is Jack Straw going soft?” - The Globe and Mail, Toronto, January 14, 2000.

173. Audrey Wood, “Groups object to secrecy of Pinochet medical report; Britain approves landing of general’s flight home as demands rise to challenge doctors’ evidence,” The Globe and Mail, January 19, 2000.

174. Jon Hibbs, “U.K. set to release ailing Pinochet; Former Chilean dicator unfit to stand trial,” The National Post, January 12, 2000; “Pinochet appeal ruled out,” The Toronto Star, January 21, 2000.

175. “Rights’ group challenges plan to release Pinochet,” The Toronto Star, January 13, 2000; John Lloyd, “Is Jack Straw going soft?” The Globe and Mail, January 14, 2000.

176. “Confidentiality disputed,” The Toronto Star, January 22, 2000.

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177. Linda Diebel, “Pinochet chats to son, supporters by phone; Son paints upbeat view of father as he awaits return to Chile,” The Toronto Star, Febvruary 01, 2000.

178. “Too transparent,” The National Post, February 17, 2000.

179. Alan Freeman, “Pinochet freed after 16 months, returns to Chile,” The Globe and Mail, March 03, 2000; David Sapsted, Neil Tweedie, and Peter Foster, “Former dictator spirited away in planned police exercise;” David Raves, “Pinochet flies home to Chile in Operation Exit,” both from The National Post, March 3, 2000.

180. David Sapsted, Neil Tweedie, and Peter Foster, “Former dictator spirited away in planned police exercise,” The National Post, March 3, 2000.

181..David graves and Robert Shrimsley, “’Operation Exit’ set for release of Pinochet today,” The National Post, March 02, 2000

182. Peter Cooke, “Is Mr. Blair a Man of Conviction?,” The Globe and Mail, March 01, 1999.

183. Karin Meadows, “Generals cleared in nuns’ murders,” The National Post, November 4, 2000, Pg. A13.

(Copyright, Peter B. Beeching, Toronto: December 16, 1998: Revised: April 6 & 19, 1999: May 1, 1999; July 29, 1999; August 9 & 23, 1999; September 17 & 22, 1999;

October 9, 15, 19, 20, 25. 30, 1999, November 4, 13, 15, 18, 1999; December 14, 1999; January 03, 17; February 07; March 06, 14; May 12; June 20, 23; July 07,10,11, 12;

October 26 - 31; November 1 - December 18, 2000)

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