A set of international banking regulations put forth by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, which set out the minimum capital requirements of financial institutions with the goal of minimizing credit risk. Banks that operate internationally are required to maintain a minimum amount (8%) of capital based on a percent of risk-weighted assets.

INVESTOPEDIA EXPLAINS 'Basel I'

The first accord was the Basel I. It was issued in 1988 and focused mainly on credit risk by creating a bank asset classification system. This classification system grouped a bank's assets into five risk categories:

0% - cash, central bank and government debt and any OECD government debt0%, 10%, 20% or 50% - public sector debt20% - development bank debt, OECD bank debt, OECD securities firm debt, non-OECD bank debt (under one year maturity) and non-OECD public sector debt, cash in collection50% - residential mortgages100% - private sector debt, non-OECD bank debt (maturity over a year), real estate, plant and equipment, capital instruments issued at other banks

The bank must maintain capital (Tier 1 and Tier 2) equal to at least 8% of its risk-weighted assets. For example, if a bank has risk-weighted assets of $100 million, it is required to maintain capital of at least $8 million.

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Submitted for review and approved 10 May 2008

Basel I, Basel II, and Emerging Markets:A Nontechnical AnalysisBryan J. BalinThe Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS),Washington DC 20036, USAAbstract:The Basel Accords, while extremely influential, are oftentimes too detailed and technical to be easilyaccessible to the nontechnical policymaker or interested scholar. This paper looks to fill that gap bydetailing the origin, regulation, implementation, criticism, and results of both Basel I and Basel II.Findings of not include (1) the limited scope and general language of Basel I gives banks excessiveleeway in their interpretation of its rules, and, in the end, allows financial institutions to take improperrisks and hold unduly low capital reserves; (2) Basel II seeks to extend the breath and precision ofBasel I, bringing in factors such as market and operational risk, market-based discipline andsurveillance, and regulatory mandates, but is oftentimes excessively long and complex; (3) both Basel Iand II effectively ignore the implications of their rules on emerging market banks; and that (4) althougheach accord states that its positions are not recommended for application in emerging marketeconomies, the use of Basel I and II by most private and public organizations as truly internationalbanking standards predicates the inclusion of emerging markets in each accord.Keywords: Basel Accord(s), Basel I, Basel II, International Convergence of Capital Measurements andCapital Standards, international bank supervision, emerging market banking supervision, bankregulation, emerging market banking regulation.1I. IntroductionThe Basel Accords are some of the most influential—and misunderstood—agreements in moderninternational finance. Drafted in 1988 and 2004, Basel I and II have ushered in a new era ofinternational banking cooperation. Through quantitative and technical benchmarks, both accords havehelped harmonize banking supervision, regulation, and capital adequacy standards across the elevencountries of the Basel Group and many other emerging market economies. On the other hand, the very

strength of both accords—their quantitative and technical focus—limits the understanding of theseagreements within policy circles, causing them to be misinterpreted and misused in many of theworld’s political economies. Moreover, even when the Basel accords have been applied accurately andfully, neither agreement has secured long-term stability within a country’s baking sector. Therefore, afull understanding of the rules, intentions, and shortcomings of Basel I and II is essential to assessingtheir impact on the international financial system. This paper aims to do just that—give a detailed, nontechnicalassessment of both Basel I and Basel II, and for both developed and emerging markets, showthe status, intentions, criticisms, and implications of each accord.II. The Basel CommitteeBoth Basel I and II are products of the Basel Committee—a group of eleven nations, that, after themessy 1974 liquidation of the Cologne-based Bank Herstatt, decided to form a cooperative council toharmonize banking standards and regulations within and between all member states. Their goal, asstated in the Founding Document of the Basel Committee, is to “…extend regulatory coverage,promote adequate banking supervision, and ensure that no foreign banking establishment can escapesupervision” (International Convergence…, 9). To achieve this goal, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, theNetherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Luxembourg agreed inBasel, Switzerland to form a quarterly committee comprising of each country’s central banker and leadbank supervisory authority. At each meeting, the authorities of each country are authorized to discussthe status of the international banking system and propose common standards that can assist theCommittee in achieving its goals, but as the Founding Document clearly states, the Basel Committeecannot enact legally binding banking standards. Therefore, it is up to the member states themselves toimplement and enforce the recommendations of the Basel Committee.II. Basel ISoon after the creation of the Basel Committee, its eleven member states (known as the G-10) began todiscuss a formal standard to ensure the proper capitalization of internationally active banks. During the21970s and 80s, some international banks were able to “skirt” regulatory authorities by exploiting the

inherent geographical limits of national banking legislation. Moreover, internationally active banks alsoencouraged a regulatory “race to the bottom,” where they would relocate to countries with less strictregulations. With the end of the petrodollar boom and the ensuing banking crises of the early 1980s,this desire for a common banking capitalization standard came to the forefront of the agendas of theBasel Committee’s member states. Six years of deliberations followed; in July of 1988, the G-10 (plusSpain) came to a final agreement: The International Convergence of Capital Measurements andCapital Standards, known informally as “Basel I.”ScopeIt should first be noted that Basel I was created to promote the harmonization of regulatory and capitaladequacy standards only within the member states of the Basel Committee. All the states of the G-10are considered developed markets by most (if not all) international organizations, and therefore, thestandards set forth in Basel I are tailored to banks operating within such markets. The agreementexpressly states that it is not intended for emerging market economies, and due to the unique risks andregulatory concerns in these economies, should not be seen as the “optimal” emerging market bankingreform. In sum, because Basel I gives considerable regulatory leeway to state central banks, viewsdomestic currency and debt as the most reliable and favorable financial instruments, sees FDIC-styledepositor insurance as risk-abating, and uses a “maximum” level of risk to calculate its capitalrequirements that is only appropriate for developed economies, its implementation could create a falsesense of security within an emerging economy’s financial sector while creating new, less obvious risksfor its banks.Secondly, it should also be noted that Basel I was written only to provide adequate capital to guardagainst risk in the creditworthiness of a bank’s loanbook. It does not mandate capital to guard againstrisks such as fluctuations in a nation’s currency, changes in interest rates, and general macroeconomicdownturns. Due to the great variability of these risks across countries, the Basel Committee decided notto draft general rules on these risks—it left these to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis within theG10 member states.

Thirdly, Basel I overtly states that it only proposes minimum capital requirements for internationallyactive banks, and invites sovereign authorities and central banks alike to be more conservative in theirbanking regulations. Moreover, it warns its readers that capital adequacy ratios cannot be viewed inisolation and as the ultimate arbiters of a bank’s solvency.3The AccordThe Basel I Accord divides itself into four “pillars.” The first, known as The Constituents of Capital,defines both what types of on-hand capital are counted as a bank’s reserves and how much of each typeof reserve capital a bank can hold. The accord divides capital reserves into two tiers. Capital in the firsttier, known as “Tier 1 Capital,” consists of only two types of funds—disclosed cash reserves and othercapital paid for by the sale of bank equity, i.e. stock and preferred shares. Tier 2 Capital is a bit moreambiguously defined. This capital can include reserves created to cover potential loan losses, holdingsof subordinated debt, hybrid debt/equity instrument holdings, and potential gains from the sale of assetspurchased through the sale of bank stock. To follow the Basel Accord, banks must hold the samequantity (in dollar terms) of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital.The second “pillar” of the Basel I Accord, Risk Weighting, creates a comprehensive system to riskweighta bank’s assets, or in other words, its loanbook. Five risk categories encompass all assets on abank’s balance sheet. The first category weights assets at 0%, effectively characterizing these assets as“riskless.” Such “riskless” assets are defined by Basel I as cash held by a bank, sovereign debt held andfunded in domestic currency, all OECD debt, and other claims on OECD central governments. Thesecond risk category weights assets at 20%, showing that instruments in this category are of low risk.Securities in this category include multilateral development bank debt, bank debt created by banksincorporated in the OECD, non-OECD bank debt with a maturity of less than one year, cash items incollection, and loans guaranteed by OECD public sector entities. The third, “moderate risk” categoryonly includes one type of asset—residential mortgages—and weights these assets at 50%. The fourth,“high risk” category is weighted at 100% of an asset’s value, and includes a bank’s claims on the

private sector, non-OECD bank debt with a maturity of more than one year, claims on non-OECDdollar-denominated debt or Eurobonds, equity assets held by the bank, and all other assets. The fifth,“variable” category encompasses claims on domestic public sector entities, which can be valued at 0,10, 20, or 50% depending on the central bank’s discretion.The third “pillar,” A Target Standard Ratio, unites the first and second pillars of the Basel I Accord. Itsets a universal standard whereby 8% of a bank’s risk-weighted assets must be covered by Tier 1 andTier 2 capital reserves. Moreover, Tier 1 capital must cover 4% of a bank’s risk-weighted assets. Thisratio is seen as “minimally adequate” to protect against credit risk in deposit insurance-backedinternational banks in all Basel Committee member states.4The fourth “pillar,” Transitional and Implementing Agreements, sets the stage for the implementationof the Basel Accords. Each country’s central bank is requested to create strong surveillance andenforcement mechanisms to ensure the Basel Accords are followed, and “transition weights” are givenso that Basel Committee banks can adapt over a four-year period to the standards of the accord.ImplementationBasel I’s adaptation and implementation occurred rather smoothly in the Basel Committee states. Withthe exception of Japan (which, due to the severity of its banking crisis in the late 1980s, could notimmediately adopt Basel I’s recommendations), all Basel Committee members implemented Basel I’srecommendations—including the 8% capital adequacy target—by the end of 1992. Japan laterharmonized its policies with those if Basel I in 1996. Although they were not intended to be included inthe Basel I framework, other emerging market economies also adopted its recommendations. Incontrast to the pointed warnings written into Basel I against implementation in industrializingcountries, the adoption of Basel I standards was seen by large investment banks as a sign of regulatorystrength and financial stability in emerging markets, causing capital-hungry states such as Mexico toassuage to Basel I in order to receive cheaper bank financing. By 1999, nearly all countries, includingChina, Russia, and India, had—at least on paper—implemented the Basel Accord.CriticismsCriticism of Basel I comes from four primary sources. One vein of criticism concentrates on perceivedomissions in the Accord. Because Basel I only covers credit risk and only targets G-10 countries, Basel

I is seen as too narrow in its scope to ensure adequate financial stability in the international financialsystem. Also, Basel I’s omission of market discipline is seen to limit the accord’s ability to influencecountries and banks to follow its guidelines. The second group of criticisms deals with the way inwhich Basel I was publicized and implemented by banking authorities. The inability of theseauthorities to translate Basel I’s recommendations properly into “layman’s terms” and the strong desireto enact its terms quickly caused regulators to over-generalize and oversell the terms of Basel I to theG-10’s public. This, in turn, created the misguided view that Basel I was the primary and last accord acountry needed to implement to achieve banking sector stability. While G-10 regulators saw this resultas rather benign because they already had most of the known regulatory foundations for long-termgrowth in place, they did not realize that the “oversale” of Basel I would influence large private banksin such a way that they would begin to demand that emerging market economies follow Basel I.5The third group critical of Basel I concentrates on the misaligned incentives the Accord gives to banks.Due to the wide breath and absoluteness of Basel I’s risk weightings, banks have found ways to“wiggle” around Basel I’s standards to put more risk on their loanbooks than what was intended by theframers of the Basel Accord. This is done through two primary vectors. In the first strategy, bankssecuritize their corporate loans and sell off the least risky securitized assets. By “splicing” the leastrisky bank loans from its loanbook, a bank makes its assets more risky in de facto terms, but, in the dejure terms of Basel I, the risk weight given to the bank’s corporate loans does not change. Moreover,the money gained through this securitization can be added to a bank’s asset reserves, allowing it to giveout even more risky loans. This method—called “cherry picking”—creates banks that, on paper, areproperly protecting themselves against credit risk, but in reality are taking on quantities of risk fargreater than what Basel I intended.The second method through which banks can cosmetically maintain a low risk profile under Basel Iwhile taking on increasing amounts of risk is through the sale and resale of short-run non-OECD bank

debt. Because short-run bank debt created by non-OECD banks is weighted at 20% and long-run debtin this category is weighted at 100%, banks can “swap” their long-term debt holdings for a string ofshort-run debt instruments. Therefore, the risk associated with holding longer-term debt—namely, therisk of default in volatile emerging markets—remains, while the bank’s risk weighting is reduced.The final source of Basel I’s criticisms relate to its application to emerging markets. Although Basel Iwas never intended to be implemented in emerging market economies, its application to theseeconomies under the pressure of the international business and policy communities created foreseenand unforeseen distortions within the banking sectors of industrializing economies. Firstly, ashighlighted in the Basel Accord itself, Basel I’s high degree of regulatory leeway, view of domesticcurrency and debt as the most reliable and favorable of asset instruments, and perception of FDIC-styledepositor insurance as risk-abating had significant negative effects within emerging economies. Incountries subject to high currency fluctuation and sovereign default risks, the Basel I accords actuallymade loanbooks riskier by encouraging the movement of both bank and sovereign debt holdings fromOECD sources to higher-yielding domestic sources. Next, FDIC-style deposit insurance, combinedwith lax regulation on what assets fall under Basel I’s risk weightings, caused emerging marketregulators to underestimate the credit default risks of a bank’s assets. This, in turn, created system-widedefaults within emerging market banking sectors when it became obvious that all banks had taken onexcessive risk and when it was revealed that the country’s central bank had the capital on hand to bailout some of the banking sector, but not enough to bail out the whole of the sector.6In addition to the foreseen drawbacks of Basel I in emerging markets, several unforeseen effects ofBasel I also served to make the accord less desirable for industrializing economies. The first unforeseenconsequence of Basel I is a side-effect of the way it risk-weights bank debt: because short-run non-OECD bank debt is risk-weighted at a lower relative riskiness than long-term debt, Basel I hasencouraged international investors to move from holding long-run emerging market bank debt toholding short-run developing market instruments. This has amplified the risk of “hot money” inemerging markets and has created more volatile emerging market currency fluctuations. The second

unforeseen effect of Basel I emerges from the difference between the risk weightings of sovereign andprivate debt. Because emerging market sovereign debt is seen as less risky than private debt, Basel Ihas created a scenario where the private sector is “squeezed out” of many banks’ emerging marketlending portfolios. This “squeezing” magnifies recessions in emerging markets, and moreover,amplifies the costs of a sovereign default because domestic banks more readily accept sovereign debt,causing banks to “double up” on the higher-yielding debt typically disbursed by a sovereign in themonths leading up to a default. Finally, the lack of deep and liquid capital markets in emerging marketsmake capital adequacy ratios less reliable in emerging economies. Because the prices of stock and debtheld by a bank are often incorrectly valued on illiquid emerging market exchanges, the risk-weightingsof such instruments and the inclusion of these instruments in the calculation of a bank’s capitaladequacy ratio oftentimes causes emerging market banks to show wildly incorrect capital adequacypositions.III. Basel IIIn response to the banking crises of the 1990s and the aforementioned criticisms of Basel I, the BaselCommittee decided in 1999 to propose a new, more comprehensive capital adequacy accord. Thisaccord, known formally as A Revised Framework on International Convergence of CapitalMeasurement and Capital Standards and informally as “Basel II” greatly expands the scope,technicality, and depth of the original Basel Accord. While maintaining the “pillar” framework ofBasel I, each pillar is greatly expanded in Basel II to cover new approaches to credit risk, adapt to thesecuritization of bank assets, cover market, operational, and interest rate risk, and incorporate marketbasedsurveillance and regulation.A. Pillar IThe first “pillar,” known again as Minimum Capital Requirements, shows the greatest amount ofexpansion since Basel I. In response to Basel I’s critics, Basel II creates a more sensitive measurement7of a bank’s risk-weighted assets and tries to eliminate the loopholes in Basel I that allow banks to takeon additional risk while cosmetically assuaging to minimum capital adequacy requirements. Its firstmandate is to broaden the scope of regulation to include assets of the holding company of aninternationally active bank. This is done to avoid the risk that a bank will “hide” risk-taking by

transferring its assets to other subsidiaries and also to incorporate the financial health of the entire firmin the calculation of capital requirements for its subsidiary bank.Credit Risk—the Standardized ApproachNext, the first “pillar” provides three methodologies to rate the riskiness of a bank’s assets. The first ofthese methodologies, the “standardized” approach, extends the approach to capital weights used inBasel I to include market-based rating agencies. Sovereign claims, instead of being discountedaccording to the participation of the sovereign in the OECD, are now discounted according to the creditrating assigned to a sovereign’s debt by an “authorized” rating institution—if debt is rated from AAAto AAA-, it is assigned a 0% weight; if it is rated from A+ to A-, it is assigned a 20% weight; if it israted from BBB+ to BBB-, it receives a 50% weight; if it is rated from BB+ to BB-, it receives a 100%weight; and if it is rated below B-, it receives a 150% weight. Unrated debt is weighted at 100%. If debtis denominated and funded in local currency, regulators can also assign a lower weight to its relativeriskiness.For bank debt, authorities can choose between two risk weighting options. In the first option,authorities can risk-weight this type of debt at one step less favorable than the debt of the bank’ssovereign government. For example, if a sovereign’s debt were rated as A+, the risk weight of thebanks under its jurisdiction would be 50%. Risk is capped at 100% if the sovereign’s rating is belowBB+ or unrated. The other option for the risk-weighting of bank debt follows a similar external creditassessment as sovereign bonds, where AAA to AAA- debt is weighted at 20%, A+ to BBB- debt isweighted at 50%, BB+ to BB- debt is weighted at 100%, and debt rated below B- is risk-weighted at150%. Unrated debt is weighted at 50%. Short-term bank claims with maturities of less than threemonths are weighted at one step lower than a sovereign bond, where BB+ debt is given a 50% weightinstead of a 100% value.In the “standard” approach, corporate debt is weighted in the same manner as bank debt, except the100% category is extended to include all debt that is rated between BBB+ and BB-. All debt ratedbelow BB-is weighted at 150%; unrated debt is risk-weighted at 100%. Home mortgages are, inaddition, risk-weighted at 35%, while corporate mortgages are weighted at 100%.8

Credit Risk—the Internal Ratings Based ApproachesBeyond the “standardized” approach, Basel II proposes—and incentivizes—two alternate approachestoward risk-weighting capital, each known as an Internal Ratings Based Approach, or IRB. Theseapproaches encourage banks to create their own internal systems to rate risk with the help of regulators.By forcing banks to “scale up” their risk-weighted reserves by 6% if they use the standardizedapproach, the Basel Committee offers banks the possibility of lower reserve holdings—and thus higherprofitability—if they adopt these internal approaches.The first internal ratings based approach is known as the Foundation IRB. In this approach, banks, withthe approval of regulators, can develop probability of default models that provide in-house riskweightings for their loanbooks. Regulators provide the “assumptions” in these models, namely theprobability of loss of each type of asset, the exposure of a bank to an at-risk asset at the time of itsdefault, and the maturity risk associated with each type of asset.The second internal ratings based approach, Advanced IRB, is essentially the same as Foundation IRB,except for one important difference: the banks themselves—rather than regulators—determine theassumptions of proprietary credit default models. Therefore, only the largest banks with the mostcomplex modes can use this standard.Both IRB approaches give regulators and bankers significant benefits. Firstly, they encourage banks totake on customers of all types with lower probabilities of default by allowing these customers lowerrisk weightings. These low risk weightings translate into lower reserve requirements, and ultimately,higher profitability for a bank. Also, the IRB approaches allow banks to engage in self-surveillance:excessive risk-taking will force them to hold more cash on had, causing banks to become unprofitable.Moreover, if a bank does become illiquid, regulators will be less apt to close the bank if it followed“standard” Basel II procedures. For regulators, self-surveillance also decreases the costs of regulationand potential legal battles with banks. Furthermore, the “tailoring” of risk weights allows additionalcapital to be channeled to the private sector—because public debt is no longer “more trusted” byassumption, banks will be more apt to lend to private sources. This, in turn, increases the depth of thebanking sector in a country’s economy, and in sum, encourages economic growth. “Poor” risks can no

longer hide under a rather arbitrary risk “category,” preventing the tendency of banks to “wiggle” risksaround category-based weights.9Business Line% of Profits Neededin ReservesCorporate Finance 18%Sales & Trading 18%Retail Banking 12%Commercial Banking 15%Settlement 18%Agency Services 15%Asset Management 12%Retail Brokerage 12%Operational RiskSecondly, Basel II extends its scope into the assessment of and protection against operational risks. Tocalculate the reserves needed to adequately guard against failures in internal processes, the decisionmakingof individuals, equipment, and other external events, Basel II proposes three mutuallyexclusive methods. The first method, known as the Basic Indicator Approach, recommends that bankshold capital equal to fifteen percent of the average gross income earned by a bank in the past threeyears. Regulators are allowed to adjust the 15% number according to their risk assessment of eachbank.The second method, known as the Standardized Approach, divides a bank by its business lines todetermine the amount of cash it must have onhand to protect itself against operational risk.Each line is weighted by its relative size withinthe company to create the percentage of assets thebank must hold. Figure (1) displays the reservestargets by business line. As shown to the left, lessoperationally risky business lines—such as retailbanking—have lower reserve targets, while morevariable and risky business lines—such ascorporate finance—have higher targets.The third method, the Advanced Measurement Approach, is much less arbitrary than its rivalmethodologies. On the other hand, it is much more demanding for regulators and banks alike: it allowsbanks to develop their own reserve calculations for operational risks. Regulators, of course, mustapprove the final results of these models. This approach, much like the IRB approaches shown in the

last section, is an attempt to bring market discipline and self-surveillance into banking legislation and amove to eliminate “wiggle room” where banks obey regulations in rule but not in spirit.Market RiskThe last risk evaluated in Pillar I of the Basel II accords attempts to quantify the reserves needed to beheld by banks due to market risk, i.e. the risk of loss due to movements in asset prices. In its evaluationof market risk, Basel II makes a clear distinction between fixed income and other products such asequity, commodity, and foreign exchange vehicles and also separates the two principal risks thatcontribute to overall market risk: interest rate and volatility risk. For fixed income assets, a proprietaryFigure 1: Standardized Approach Reserve TargetsSource: Basel II Accords, 2006 Revision10risk measurement called “value at risk” (VAR) is first proposed alongside the lines of the IRBapproaches and the Advanced Measurement Approach; banks can develop their own calculations todetermine the reserves needed to protect against interest rate and volatility risk for fixed income assetson a position-by-position basis. Again, regulators must approve of such an action.For banks that cannot or chose not to adopt VAR models to protect their fixed income assets againstvolatility or interest rate risk, Basel II recommends two separate risk protection methodologies. Forinterest rate risk—the risk that interest rates may fluctuate and decrease the value of a fixed-incomeasset—reserve recommendations are tied to thematurity of the asset. Figure (2) provides anoverview of the risk weights assigned to eachasset given its maturity. As seen to the right,depending on the time to maturity of the fixedincomeasset, Basel II recommends a bank holdanywhere between 0% and 12.5% of an asset’svalue in reserves to protect against movements ininterest rates.To guard against the volatility risk of fixed income assets, Basel II recommends risk weightings tied tothe credit risk ratings given to underlying bank assets. For assets rated by credit-rating agencies asAAA to AA-, a 0% weighting is assigned, while for A+ to BBB rated fixed income instruments, a0.25% weighting is given. Furthermore, for instruments receiving a BB+ to B- rating, an 8% weight is

assigned, and for instruments rated below B-, a 12% weight is allowed. Unrated assets are given an 8%risk weighting. For the final calculation of the total amount of reserves needed to protect against marketrisk for fixed income instruments, the value of each fixed income asset is multiplied against both riskweightings and then summed alongside all other fixed income assets.Basel II’s risk weightings for all other market-based assets—such as stocks, commodities, currencies,and hybrid instruments—is based on a second, separate group of methodologies. It would beexhaustive to provide a full summary of the methods used for the calculation of reserves needed toprotect against market risks, but this paper will provide a short summary of the three main types ofrating methodologies used to rate these assets. The first group of methodologies is called TheSimplified Approach, and uses systems similar to the “bucket” approaches used in non-VAR fixedincome reserve calculations. This group looks to divide assets by type, maturity, volatility, and origin,Time to Maturity Risk Weighting1 Month or Less 0.00%6 Months or Less 0.70%1 Year or Less 1.25%4 Years or Less 2.25%8 Years or Less 3.75%16 Years or Less 5.25%20 Years or Less 7.50%Over 20 Years 12.50%Figure 2: Interest Rate Risk WeightingsSource: Basel II Accords, 2006 Revision11and assign a risk weights along a spectrum of values, from 2.25% for the least risky assets to 100% forthe most risky assets.The second group of methodologies for assigning the reserves needed to protect against market riskinherent in stock, currency, commodities, and other holdings is called Scenario Analysis. Here, riskweights are not grouped according to the cosmetic features of an asset; instead, risk weights areallocated according to the possible scenarios assets may face in each country’s markets. This approach,while much more complex than the Simplified Approach, is much less conservative and therefore moreprofitable for a bank.The final methodological group outlined in Basel II that calculates the reserves needed to guard against

market risk is known as the Internal Model Approach, or IMA. Along the lines of the VAR and IRBapproaches, this methodology group encourages banks to develop their own internal models tocalculate a stock, currency, or commodity’s market risk on a case-by-case basis. On average, the IMAis seen to be the most complex, least conservative, and most profitable of the approaches towardmarket risk modeling.Total Capital AdequacyOnce a bank has calculated the reserves it needs on hand to guard against operational and market riskand has adjusted its asset base according to credit risk, it can calculate the on-hand capital reserves itneeds to achieve “capital adequacy” as defined by Basel II. Because of the wide range ofmethodologies used by banks and the diversity of bank loanbooks, Basel II allows a great deal ofvariation in its calculated reserve requirements. Additionally, no change is given to both therequirement that Tier 2 capital reserves must be equal to the amount of Tier 1 capital reserves and the8% reserve requirement for credit-default capital adequacy, making these two regulations applicable inBasel II. In sum, a bank’s needed reserves for “capital adequacy” is calculated as follows:Reserves = .08 * Risk Weighted Assets + Operational Risk Reserves + Market Risk ReservesB. Pillars II and IIIPillars II and III are much less complex and lengthy than Pillar I—they only occupy 40 of the 350pages of the Basel II Accord. Pillar II primarily addresses regulator-bank interaction, extending therights of the regulator in bank supervision and dissolution. Regulators are given the power to overseethe internal risk evaluation regimes proposed in Pillar I and change them to the simpler, moreconservative “bucket-based” approaches if they deem a bank unable to manage its credit, market, and12operational risks independently. Regulators can also review a bank’s capital assessment policy whenthey see fit, and are given the mandate to hold senior management responsible if a bank misrepresentsits risk positioning. Moreover, banks are charged with drafting their own risk profiles, and if thisreporting is not done, authorities have the right to penalize the at-fault bank.Two additional mandates also widen the breath of regulator power in Basel II. Firstly, regulators areallowed to create a “buffer” capital requirement in addition to the minimum capital requirements ascalculated in Pillar I if banks are seen to be “skirting” around the capital adequacy goals of the accord.Secondly, to avoid a repeat of the financial crises in countries like Korea and China, banking

supervisors are urged to mandate early action if capital reserves fall below minimum levels and aregiven significant authority by way of Basel II’s recommendations to prescribe rapid remedial action forbanks in such a situation.Pillar III looks to increase market discipline within a country’s banking sector. In sum, disclosures of abank’s capital and risk-taking positions that were once only available to regulators are recommended tobe released to the general public in the Basel II Accord. Statistics such as the aggregate amounts ofsurplus capital (both Tier 1 and Tier 2) held by a bank, risk-weighted capital adequacy ratios, reserverequirements for credit, market, and operational risk, and a full description (with assumptions) of therisk mitigation approaches of a bank are recommended for quarterly release to the general public underBasel II’s standards. With this action, Basel II hopes to empower shareholders to enforce discipline inthe risk-taking and reserve-holding methods of banks, where banks seen to hold too few reserves andtake on too much risk are punished by their own shareholders for doing so.C. ImplementationAfter its drafting in 1999, Basel II underwent seven years of deliberation and two revisions—one inSeptember and another in November of 2005—before a final agreement was agreed upon by all G-10nations and representatives from Spain in July 2006. Over the course of the Accord’s deliberation, thesize of the agreement ballooned to 347 pages—a far cry from the 37 pages of the original Basel accord.This was due to the addition—at the behest of the United States, Japan, and Britain—of internal riskevaluation and self-surveillance standards for banks. Another major sticking point in the negotiationsover the Basel II accord was the scope of the agreement: most European Union countries wanted theAccord to apply to all banks, while the U.S., Canada, and Great Britain wanted it to apply only to largeinternational banks. In the end, this second bloc won out.13Alongside the final draft of Basel II in 2006, all the G-10 countries, including the United States,pledged to implement Basel II in full by its target enaction date of December 2008. While progress tothis goal is uneven, all G-10 countries have approved their strategies for harmonization with Basel II

and have mandated its implementation by late 2008.Outside the G-10, 95 countries—accounting for 36% of world GDP—have announced their intention toadopt Basel II by 2015 (Cornford, 10). Including the G-10, Basel II is on target to cover approximately77% of the world’s GDP and 70% of its population. The timeline for adoption of Basel II among nonG-10 members is shown below in Figure (3).The only major country outside the G-10 that has not announced its intentions to adopt Basel II’sstandards is China: it asserts that its own domestic regulation and the adoption of Basel I standards willbe sufficient to ensure the stability of its banking system. On the other hand, recent reports show areversal in this decision and a target date of 2011 for implementation among a select few Chinesebanks, so there is a distinct possibility that even China will join most of the world in adopting Basel II(“Chinese Banks to Test Waters…,” 1). In addition, it must be noted that because Basel II covers thesubsidiaries of G-10 banks, many emerging markets will see de facto implementation of Basel II in2008. Argentina, for example, has a banking sector with a large foreign bank presence—approximately48% of all bank capitalization—and will therefore see the effects of Basel II much sooner than itsformal implementation date of 2013.D. Criticisms Related to Emerging Market EconomiesThe principle criticism of Basel II in terms of emerging market economies is that, once again, the BaselCommittee has expressly stated that its recommendations are for its G-10 member states and not fordeveloping economies. In parallel to the creation of Basel II, the Basel Committee created a set ofstandards for emerging market economies called Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision thatwere drafted in 1997, completed in 1999, and later revised in 2006. Although these standards aretailored to the needs of emerging market economies, their broadness and relative obscurity in thepolicymaking community have limited their impact upon international banking. Because multilateralFigure 3: Adoption of Basel IISource: Cornford, et. al.Year 2008 2010 2013 2015% Adoption Rate (World GDP) 46% 58% 69% 77%Selected Countries Adopting Basel IIG-10, Chile,Bahrain, SingaporeRussia, South Africa,Indonesia, BrazilIndia, Argentina Egypt, Pakistan

14institutions, international rating agencies, and large banks alike see the Basel Accords as the properstandard for banking regulation throughout the world’s economies, critics charge that the “splicing” ofemerging market bank policy into a less publicized and precise standard effectively causes the needs ofemerging market financial sectors to be ignored.Given that Basel II is intended for G-10 economies, its regulations have several possible adverseeffects on emerging market economies. Firstly, the strong responsibilities given to regulators and thegreat amount of regulatory variability allowed to banks in their calculation of loanbook reserves mayoverwhelm the regulatory systems of many emerging market economies. Because of the hightechnicality in Basel II and the inclusion of internal mechanisms in the measurement of risk, regulatorswill be forced to hire and hold highly skilled employees through the medium and long term.Unfortunately, the educational institutions needed to train such employees may not exist in a country,and many emerging market regulatory agencies do not have the budget to add costly high-skilledworkers to their ranks. Therefore, central banks may become lax in their regulation of private banks,allowing them to control risk internally without proper oversight. This, in turn, incentivizes privatebanks to take on increasing risk, heightening the possibility of a system-wide banking collapse (Barth,et. al, 44). In rich countries, Basel II assures its readers that market discipline would preclude such ascenario, but again, in emerging markets, markets may be so shallow and illiquid that banks couldeffectively take on excessive risk without a shareholder or creditor revolt.Another possible side-effect of Basel II in emerging market economies is a drawback of lending toemerging market banks. This is due to two factors. Firstly, because only larger firms can afford to hirerating agencies to asses their debt, it is likely that many banks in emerging markets will not have theirdebt rated by Moody’s, S&P, or Fitch. Therefore, global banks will be lest apt to loan to emergingmarket banks because such loans will have to be matched with larger capital reserve requirements thanthose made to larger, rated banks. Secondly, even if an emerging market bank is able to afford theservices of an international rating agency, experience has shown that the uncertainty surroundingdifferences in accounting practices and banking regulations causes rating agencies to assign unduly

unfavorable bond ratings to banks in industrializing states (Barth, et. al., 71). Simply put, a ratingagency would rather “cover its underside” with a low rating than make a major personnel investment inan emerging economy.More generally, Basel II’s reliance upon rating agencies to value risks may cause unfavorableimplications in industrialized and industrializing markets alike. Firstly, because most small borrowers15cannot afford the services of rating agencies, banks will tend to lose diversification on their loanbooks,causing them to be more exposed to sectoral shocks, and especially economic shocks that adverselyaffect larger banks and corporations. Secondly, because banks and corporations can choose the ratingagency they employ, they may bring about a “race to the bottom” among the world’s three large ratingagencies where business is given to the agency that assigns a firm the best rating possible. Therefore,over time, a bank’s risk exposure will tend to enlarge, even as, on paper, it retains the same amount ofcredit, operational, and market risk.Next, Basel II is criticized for its retention of the “sovereign ceiling” in its estimation of bank assetrisk. Although this standard is weakened by the availability of other options through which emergingmarket assets can be valued, the Standardized Approach still permits regulators to arbitrarily rate bankdebt as less creditworthy than the debt of the bank’s sovereign authority. Because many emergingmarket sovereigns have dubious debt histories, emerging market banks are unduly penalized by BaselII because their debt ratings—and therefore risk weightings—are mandated to be “one step” lessfavorable than that of their sovereign government. Thus, large international banks will likely limitloans to highly solvent, low-risk banks in emerging markets because they are forced to take on largecapital reserves to extend such loans.Finally, one additional criticism of Basel II will affect both emerging and industrialized economies.With the addition of internal risk measurements in the calculation of a bank’s capital reserves, Basel IImay cause banks to function in a way that is procyclical to the business cycle. Because risk weights arebased on expectations of future economic performance, banks will tend to withdraw credit in times

before and during a recession and extend additional credit once a recovery is underway. Although thismethod protects banks against additional economic risk, it is well known in the financial communitythat economic forecasters tend to exaggerate their predictions during periods of growth and recessionalike. Therefore, the expectations-based movement of credit will tend to amplify recessions andperhaps spur inflation during periods of high economic growth.IV. ConclusionWhile a full summary of this paper would be exhaustive, some stylized facts should be assessed beforeit concludes. One very important fact to assess is the achievements and limitations of each BaselAccord. The first Basel Accord, Basel I, was a groundbreaking accord in its time, and did much topromote regulatory harmony and the growth of international banking across the borders of the G-10and the world alike. On the other hand, its limited scope and rather general language gives banks16excessive leeway in their interpretation of its rules, and, in the end, allows financial institutions to takeimproper risks and hold unduly low capital reserves. Basel II, on the other hand, seeks to extend thebreath and precision of Basel I, bringing in factors such as market and operational risk, market-baseddiscipline and surveillance, and regulatory mandates. On the other hand, in the words of Evan Hawke,the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency under George W. Bush, Basel II is “complex beyond reason”(Jones, 37), extending to nearly four hundred pages without indices, and, in total, encompassing nearlyone thousands pages of regulation.The drawbacks of both accords, interestingly enough, are remarkably similar. Put simply, botheffectively ignore the implications of their rules on emerging market banks. Although each states thatits positions are not recommended for application in emerging market economies, the use of Basel Iand II by most private and public organizations as truly international banking standards predicates theinclusion of emerging markets in each accord. The failure of this inclusion has put emerging markets inan awkward position—they can either adopt Basel I and II, receive international capital flows, and faceexcessive risk-taking and an overwhelmed central bank, or they can be cut off from most internationalcapital. Therefore, it is highly beneficial to the safety and stability of the international financial

system—and moreover, the international economy—to include emerging market economies in futurerevisions of the Basel Accords.17Works Cited1. Barth, James, Caprio, Gerard, and Levine, Ross. Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till AnglesGovern. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006.2. Basel II - A Guide to <ew Capital Adequacy Standards for Lenders. The United KingdomCouncil of Mortgage Lenders, February 2008.3. International Convergence f Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A RevisedFramework, Comprehensive Version. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, June 2006.4. Ferry, John. “Taking the Slow Road to Basel II.” LatinRisk, September 2005.5. “Chinese Banks to Test Water Basel II in 2010.” SinoCast News Service, December 2007.6. Cornford, Andrew. “The Global Implementation of Basel II: Prospects and OutstandingProblems.” International Finance, June 2005.7. Implementation of the <ew Capital Adequacy Framework in <on-Basel Committee MemberCountries. BIS Occasional Papers, No 6, September 2006.8. Rojas-Suarez, Liliana. “Can International Capital Standards Strengthen Banks in EmergingMarkets?” Institute for International Economics, October 2001.9. The <ew Basel Accord: an Explanatory <ote. Secretariat of the Basel Committee on BankingSupervision, Bank for International Settlements, January 2001.10. “The Basel II Accord in Russia 2006: operational risks – the Fundamental problem facingbanks.” InfoWatch and the National Banking Journal, May 2006.11. Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework,Comprehensive Version. Basel Committee on International Banking Supervision, June 2006.12. International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards. Basle Committeeon Banking Supervision, July 1988.13. Cornford, Andrew. “Basel 2 at Mid-2006: Prospects for Implementation and Other RecentDevelopments.” Financial Stability Institute, July 2006.14. Basel II Implementation in Indonesia. Bank Indonesia Directorate of Banking Research andRegulation, June 2007.15. Jones, David. “Emerging problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory CapitalArbitrage and Related Issues.” Journal of Banking & Finance, No. 24, pp. 35-58, 2000.16. Santos, João. “Bank Capital Regulation in Contemporary Banking Theory: A Review of theLiterature.” BIS Working Papers, No 90, September 2008. Submitted for review and approved 10 May 2008

Basel I, Basel II, and Emerging Markets:A Nontechnical AnalysisBryan J. BalinThe Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS),Washington DC 20036, USAAbstract:The Basel Accords, while extremely influential, are oftentimes too detailed and technical to be easily

accessible to the nontechnical policymaker or interested scholar. This paper looks to fill that gap bydetailing the origin, regulation, implementation, criticism, and results of both Basel I and Basel II.Findings of not include (1) the limited scope and general language of Basel I gives banks excessiveleeway in their interpretation of its rules, and, in the end, allows financial institutions to take improperrisks and hold unduly low capital reserves; (2) Basel II seeks to extend the breath and precision ofBasel I, bringing in factors such as market and operational risk, market-based discipline andsurveillance, and regulatory mandates, but is oftentimes excessively long and complex; (3) both Basel Iand II effectively ignore the implications of their rules on emerging market banks; and that (4) althougheach accord states that its positions are not recommended for application in emerging marketeconomies, the use of Basel I and II by most private and public organizations as truly internationalbanking standards predicates the inclusion of emerging markets in each accord.Keywords: Basel Accord(s), Basel I, Basel II, International Convergence of Capital Measurements andCapital Standards, international bank supervision, emerging market banking supervision, bankregulation, emerging market banking regulation.1I. IntroductionThe Basel Accords are some of the most influential—and misunderstood—agreements in moderninternational finance. Drafted in 1988 and 2004, Basel I and II have ushered in a new era ofinternational banking cooperation. Through quantitative and technical benchmarks, both accords havehelped harmonize banking supervision, regulation, and capital adequacy standards across the elevencountries of the Basel Group and many other emerging market economies. On the other hand, the verystrength of both accords—their quantitative and technical focus—limits the understanding of theseagreements within policy circles, causing them to be misinterpreted and misused in many of theworld’s political economies. Moreover, even when the Basel accords have been applied accurately andfully, neither agreement has secured long-term stability within a country’s baking sector. Therefore, afull understanding of the rules, intentions, and shortcomings of Basel I and II is essential to assessingtheir impact on the international financial system. This paper aims to do just that—give a detailed, nontechnicalassessment of both Basel I and Basel II, and for both developed and emerging markets, show

the status, intentions, criticisms, and implications of each accord.II. The Basel CommitteeBoth Basel I and II are products of the Basel Committee—a group of eleven nations, that, after themessy 1974 liquidation of the Cologne-based Bank Herstatt, decided to form a cooperative council toharmonize banking standards and regulations within and between all member states. Their goal, asstated in the Founding Document of the Basel Committee, is to “…extend regulatory coverage,promote adequate banking supervision, and ensure that no foreign banking establishment can escapesupervision” (International Convergence…, 9). To achieve this goal, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, theNetherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Luxembourg agreed inBasel, Switzerland to form a quarterly committee comprising of each country’s central banker and leadbank supervisory authority. At each meeting, the authorities of each country are authorized to discussthe status of the international banking system and propose common standards that can assist theCommittee in achieving its goals, but as the Founding Document clearly states, the Basel Committeecannot enact legally binding banking standards. Therefore, it is up to the member states themselves toimplement and enforce the recommendations of the Basel Committee.II. Basel ISoon after the creation of the Basel Committee, its eleven member states (known as the G-10) began todiscuss a formal standard to ensure the proper capitalization of internationally active banks. During the21970s and 80s, some international banks were able to “skirt” regulatory authorities by exploiting theinherent geographical limits of national banking legislation. Moreover, internationally active banks alsoencouraged a regulatory “race to the bottom,” where they would relocate to countries with less strictregulations. With the end of the petrodollar boom and the ensuing banking crises of the early 1980s,this desire for a common banking capitalization standard came to the forefront of the agendas of theBasel Committee’s member states. Six years of deliberations followed; in July of 1988, the G-10 (plusSpain) came to a final agreement: The International Convergence of Capital Measurements andCapital Standards, known informally as “Basel I.”Scope

It should first be noted that Basel I was created to promote the harmonization of regulatory and capitaladequacy standards only within the member states of the Basel Committee. All the states of the G-10are considered developed markets by most (if not all) international organizations, and therefore, thestandards set forth in Basel I are tailored to banks operating within such markets. The agreementexpressly states that it is not intended for emerging market economies, and due to the unique risks andregulatory concerns in these economies, should not be seen as the “optimal” emerging market bankingreform. In sum, because Basel I gives considerable regulatory leeway to state central banks, viewsdomestic currency and debt as the most reliable and favorable financial instruments, sees FDIC-styledepositor insurance as risk-abating, and uses a “maximum” level of risk to calculate its capitalrequirements that is only appropriate for developed economies, its implementation could create a falsesense of security within an emerging economy’s financial sector while creating new, less obvious risksfor its banks.Secondly, it should also be noted that Basel I was written only to provide adequate capital to guardagainst risk in the creditworthiness of a bank’s loanbook. It does not mandate capital to guard againstrisks such as fluctuations in a nation’s currency, changes in interest rates, and general macroeconomicdownturns. Due to the great variability of these risks across countries, the Basel Committee decided notto draft general rules on these risks—it left these to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis within theG10 member states.Thirdly, Basel I overtly states that it only proposes minimum capital requirements for internationallyactive banks, and invites sovereign authorities and central banks alike to be more conservative in theirbanking regulations. Moreover, it warns its readers that capital adequacy ratios cannot be viewed inisolation and as the ultimate arbiters of a bank’s solvency.3The AccordThe Basel I Accord divides itself into four “pillars.” The first, known as The Constituents of Capital,defines both what types of on-hand capital are counted as a bank’s reserves and how much of each type

of reserve capital a bank can hold. The accord divides capital reserves into two tiers. Capital in the firsttier, known as “Tier 1 Capital,” consists of only two types of funds—disclosed cash reserves and othercapital paid for by the sale of bank equity, i.e. stock and preferred shares. Tier 2 Capital is a bit moreambiguously defined. This capital can include reserves created to cover potential loan losses, holdingsof subordinated debt, hybrid debt/equity instrument holdings, and potential gains from the sale of assetspurchased through the sale of bank stock. To follow the Basel Accord, banks must hold the samequantity (in dollar terms) of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital.The second “pillar” of the Basel I Accord, Risk Weighting, creates a comprehensive system to riskweighta bank’s assets, or in other words, its loanbook. Five risk categories encompass all assets on abank’s balance sheet. The first category weights assets at 0%, effectively characterizing these assets as“riskless.” Such “riskless” assets are defined by Basel I as cash held by a bank, sovereign debt held andfunded in domestic currency, all OECD debt, and other claims on OECD central governments. Thesecond risk category weights assets at 20%, showing that instruments in this category are of low risk.Securities in this category include multilateral development bank debt, bank debt created by banksincorporated in the OECD, non-OECD bank debt with a maturity of less than one year, cash items incollection, and loans guaranteed by OECD public sector entities. The third, “moderate risk” categoryonly includes one type of asset—residential mortgages—and weights these assets at 50%. The fourth,“high risk” category is weighted at 100% of an asset’s value, and includes a bank’s claims on theprivate sector, non-OECD bank debt with a maturity of more than one year, claims on non-OECDdollar-denominated debt or Eurobonds, equity assets held by the bank, and all other assets. The fifth,“variable” category encompasses claims on domestic public sector entities, which can be valued at 0,10, 20, or 50% depending on the central bank’s discretion.The third “pillar,” A Target Standard Ratio, unites the first and second pillars of the Basel I Accord. Itsets a universal standard whereby 8% of a bank’s risk-weighted assets must be covered by Tier 1 andTier 2 capital reserves. Moreover, Tier 1 capital must cover 4% of a bank’s risk-weighted assets. Thisratio is seen as “minimally adequate” to protect against credit risk in deposit insurance-backed

international banks in all Basel Committee member states.4The fourth “pillar,” Transitional and Implementing Agreements, sets the stage for the implementationof the Basel Accords. Each country’s central bank is requested to create strong surveillance andenforcement mechanisms to ensure the Basel Accords are followed, and “transition weights” are givenso that Basel Committee banks can adapt over a four-year period to the standards of the accord.ImplementationBasel I’s adaptation and implementation occurred rather smoothly in the Basel Committee states. Withthe exception of Japan (which, due to the severity of its banking crisis in the late 1980s, could notimmediately adopt Basel I’s recommendations), all Basel Committee members implemented Basel I’srecommendations—including the 8% capital adequacy target—by the end of 1992. Japan laterharmonized its policies with those if Basel I in 1996. Although they were not intended to be included inthe Basel I framework, other emerging market economies also adopted its recommendations. Incontrast to the pointed warnings written into Basel I against implementation in industrializingcountries, the adoption of Basel I standards was seen by large investment banks as a sign of regulatorystrength and financial stability in emerging markets, causing capital-hungry states such as Mexico toassuage to Basel I in order to receive cheaper bank financing. By 1999, nearly all countries, includingChina, Russia, and India, had—at least on paper—implemented the Basel Accord.CriticismsCriticism of Basel I comes from four primary sources. One vein of criticism concentrates on perceivedomissions in the Accord. Because Basel I only covers credit risk and only targets G-10 countries, BaselI is seen as too narrow in its scope to ensure adequate financial stability in the international financialsystem. Also, Basel I’s omission of market discipline is seen to limit the accord’s ability to influencecountries and banks to follow its guidelines. The second group of criticisms deals with the way inwhich Basel I was publicized and implemented by banking authorities. The inability of theseauthorities to translate Basel I’s recommendations properly into “layman’s terms” and the strong desireto enact its terms quickly caused regulators to over-generalize and oversell the terms of Basel I to theG-10’s public. This, in turn, created the misguided view that Basel I was the primary and last accord a

country needed to implement to achieve banking sector stability. While G-10 regulators saw this resultas rather benign because they already had most of the known regulatory foundations for long-termgrowth in place, they did not realize that the “oversale” of Basel I would influence large private banksin such a way that they would begin to demand that emerging market economies follow Basel I.5The third group critical of Basel I concentrates on the misaligned incentives the Accord gives to banks.Due to the wide breath and absoluteness of Basel I’s risk weightings, banks have found ways to“wiggle” around Basel I’s standards to put more risk on their loanbooks than what was intended by theframers of the Basel Accord. This is done through two primary vectors. In the first strategy, bankssecuritize their corporate loans and sell off the least risky securitized assets. By “splicing” the leastrisky bank loans from its loanbook, a bank makes its assets more risky in de facto terms, but, in the dejure terms of Basel I, the risk weight given to the bank’s corporate loans does not change. Moreover,the money gained through this securitization can be added to a bank’s asset reserves, allowing it to giveout even more risky loans. This method—called “cherry picking”—creates banks that, on paper, areproperly protecting themselves against credit risk, but in reality are taking on quantities of risk fargreater than what Basel I intended.The second method through which banks can cosmetically maintain a low risk profile under Basel Iwhile taking on increasing amounts of risk is through the sale and resale of short-run non-OECD bankdebt. Because short-run bank debt created by non-OECD banks is weighted at 20% and long-run debtin this category is weighted at 100%, banks can “swap” their long-term debt holdings for a string ofshort-run debt instruments. Therefore, the risk associated with holding longer-term debt—namely, therisk of default in volatile emerging markets—remains, while the bank’s risk weighting is reduced.The final source of Basel I’s criticisms relate to its application to emerging markets. Although Basel Iwas never intended to be implemented in emerging market economies, its application to theseeconomies under the pressure of the international business and policy communities created foreseenand unforeseen distortions within the banking sectors of industrializing economies. Firstly, as

highlighted in the Basel Accord itself, Basel I’s high degree of regulatory leeway, view of domesticcurrency and debt as the most reliable and favorable of asset instruments, and perception of FDIC-styledepositor insurance as risk-abating had significant negative effects within emerging economies. Incountries subject to high currency fluctuation and sovereign default risks, the Basel I accords actuallymade loanbooks riskier by encouraging the movement of both bank and sovereign debt holdings fromOECD sources to higher-yielding domestic sources. Next, FDIC-style deposit insurance, combinedwith lax regulation on what assets fall under Basel I’s risk weightings, caused emerging marketregulators to underestimate the credit default risks of a bank’s assets. This, in turn, created system-widedefaults within emerging market banking sectors when it became obvious that all banks had taken onexcessive risk and when it was revealed that the country’s central bank had the capital on hand to bailout some of the banking sector, but not enough to bail out the whole of the sector.6In addition to the foreseen drawbacks of Basel I in emerging markets, several unforeseen effects ofBasel I also served to make the accord less desirable for industrializing economies. The first unforeseenconsequence of Basel I is a side-effect of the way it risk-weights bank debt: because short-run non-OECD bank debt is risk-weighted at a lower relative riskiness than long-term debt, Basel I hasencouraged international investors to move from holding long-run emerging market bank debt toholding short-run developing market instruments. This has amplified the risk of “hot money” inemerging markets and has created more volatile emerging market currency fluctuations. The secondunforeseen effect of Basel I emerges from the difference between the risk weightings of sovereign andprivate debt. Because emerging market sovereign debt is seen as less risky than private debt, Basel Ihas created a scenario where the private sector is “squeezed out” of many banks’ emerging marketlending portfolios. This “squeezing” magnifies recessions in emerging markets, and moreover,amplifies the costs of a sovereign default because domestic banks more readily accept sovereign debt,causing banks to “double up” on the higher-yielding debt typically disbursed by a sovereign in themonths leading up to a default. Finally, the lack of deep and liquid capital markets in emerging markets

make capital adequacy ratios less reliable in emerging economies. Because the prices of stock and debtheld by a bank are often incorrectly valued on illiquid emerging market exchanges, the risk-weightingsof such instruments and the inclusion of these instruments in the calculation of a bank’s capitaladequacy ratio oftentimes causes emerging market banks to show wildly incorrect capital adequacypositions.III. Basel IIIn response to the banking crises of the 1990s and the aforementioned criticisms of Basel I, the BaselCommittee decided in 1999 to propose a new, more comprehensive capital adequacy accord. Thisaccord, known formally as A Revised Framework on International Convergence of CapitalMeasurement and Capital Standards and informally as “Basel II” greatly expands the scope,technicality, and depth of the original Basel Accord. While maintaining the “pillar” framework ofBasel I, each pillar is greatly expanded in Basel II to cover new approaches to credit risk, adapt to thesecuritization of bank assets, cover market, operational, and interest rate risk, and incorporate marketbasedsurveillance and regulation.A. Pillar IThe first “pillar,” known again as Minimum Capital Requirements, shows the greatest amount ofexpansion since Basel I. In response to Basel I’s critics, Basel II creates a more sensitive measurement7of a bank’s risk-weighted assets and tries to eliminate the loopholes in Basel I that allow banks to takeon additional risk while cosmetically assuaging to minimum capital adequacy requirements. Its firstmandate is to broaden the scope of regulation to include assets of the holding company of aninternationally active bank. This is done to avoid the risk that a bank will “hide” risk-taking bytransferring its assets to other subsidiaries and also to incorporate the financial health of the entire firmin the calculation of capital requirements for its subsidiary bank.Credit Risk—the Standardized ApproachNext, the first “pillar” provides three methodologies to rate the riskiness of a bank’s assets. The first ofthese methodologies, the “standardized” approach, extends the approach to capital weights used inBasel I to include market-based rating agencies. Sovereign claims, instead of being discountedaccording to the participation of the sovereign in the OECD, are now discounted according to the creditrating assigned to a sovereign’s debt by an “authorized” rating institution—if debt is rated from AAA

to AAA-, it is assigned a 0% weight; if it is rated from A+ to A-, it is assigned a 20% weight; if it israted from BBB+ to BBB-, it receives a 50% weight; if it is rated from BB+ to BB-, it receives a 100%weight; and if it is rated below B-, it receives a 150% weight. Unrated debt is weighted at 100%. If debtis denominated and funded in local currency, regulators can also assign a lower weight to its relativeriskiness.For bank debt, authorities can choose between two risk weighting options. In the first option,authorities can risk-weight this type of debt at one step less favorable than the debt of the bank’ssovereign government. For example, if a sovereign’s debt were rated as A+, the risk weight of thebanks under its jurisdiction would be 50%. Risk is capped at 100% if the sovereign’s rating is belowBB+ or unrated. The other option for the risk-weighting of bank debt follows a similar external creditassessment as sovereign bonds, where AAA to AAA- debt is weighted at 20%, A+ to BBB- debt isweighted at 50%, BB+ to BB- debt is weighted at 100%, and debt rated below B- is risk-weighted at150%. Unrated debt is weighted at 50%. Short-term bank claims with maturities of less than threemonths are weighted at one step lower than a sovereign bond, where BB+ debt is given a 50% weightinstead of a 100% value.In the “standard” approach, corporate debt is weighted in the same manner as bank debt, except the100% category is extended to include all debt that is rated between BBB+ and BB-. All debt ratedbelow BB-is weighted at 150%; unrated debt is risk-weighted at 100%. Home mortgages are, inaddition, risk-weighted at 35%, while corporate mortgages are weighted at 100%.8Credit Risk—the Internal Ratings Based ApproachesBeyond the “standardized” approach, Basel II proposes—and incentivizes—two alternate approachestoward risk-weighting capital, each known as an Internal Ratings Based Approach, or IRB. Theseapproaches encourage banks to create their own internal systems to rate risk with the help of regulators.By forcing banks to “scale up” their risk-weighted reserves by 6% if they use the standardizedapproach, the Basel Committee offers banks the possibility of lower reserve holdings—and thus higherprofitability—if they adopt these internal approaches.The first internal ratings based approach is known as the Foundation IRB. In this approach, banks, with

the approval of regulators, can develop probability of default models that provide in-house riskweightings for their loanbooks. Regulators provide the “assumptions” in these models, namely theprobability of loss of each type of asset, the exposure of a bank to an at-risk asset at the time of itsdefault, and the maturity risk associated with each type of asset.The second internal ratings based approach, Advanced IRB, is essentially the same as Foundation IRB,except for one important difference: the banks themselves—rather than regulators—determine theassumptions of proprietary credit default models. Therefore, only the largest banks with the mostcomplex modes can use this standard.Both IRB approaches give regulators and bankers significant benefits. Firstly, they encourage banks totake on customers of all types with lower probabilities of default by allowing these customers lowerrisk weightings. These low risk weightings translate into lower reserve requirements, and ultimately,higher profitability for a bank. Also, the IRB approaches allow banks to engage in self-surveillance:excessive risk-taking will force them to hold more cash on had, causing banks to become unprofitable.Moreover, if a bank does become illiquid, regulators will be less apt to close the bank if it followed“standard” Basel II procedures. For regulators, self-surveillance also decreases the costs of regulationand potential legal battles with banks. Furthermore, the “tailoring” of risk weights allows additionalcapital to be channeled to the private sector—because public debt is no longer “more trusted” byassumption, banks will be more apt to lend to private sources. This, in turn, increases the depth of thebanking sector in a country’s economy, and in sum, encourages economic growth. “Poor” risks can nolonger hide under a rather arbitrary risk “category,” preventing the tendency of banks to “wiggle” risksaround category-based weights.9Business Line% of Profits Neededin ReservesCorporate Finance 18%Sales & Trading 18%Retail Banking 12%Commercial Banking 15%Settlement 18%Agency Services 15%

Asset Management 12%Retail Brokerage 12%Operational RiskSecondly, Basel II extends its scope into the assessment of and protection against operational risks. Tocalculate the reserves needed to adequately guard against failures in internal processes, the decisionmakingof individuals, equipment, and other external events, Basel II proposes three mutuallyexclusive methods. The first method, known as the Basic Indicator Approach, recommends that bankshold capital equal to fifteen percent of the average gross income earned by a bank in the past threeyears. Regulators are allowed to adjust the 15% number according to their risk assessment of eachbank.The second method, known as the Standardized Approach, divides a bank by its business lines todetermine the amount of cash it must have onhand to protect itself against operational risk.Each line is weighted by its relative size withinthe company to create the percentage of assets thebank must hold. Figure (1) displays the reservestargets by business line. As shown to the left, lessoperationally risky business lines—such as retailbanking—have lower reserve targets, while morevariable and risky business lines—such ascorporate finance—have higher targets.The third method, the Advanced Measurement Approach, is much less arbitrary than its rivalmethodologies. On the other hand, it is much more demanding for regulators and banks alike: it allowsbanks to develop their own reserve calculations for operational risks. Regulators, of course, mustapprove the final results of these models. This approach, much like the IRB approaches shown in thelast section, is an attempt to bring market discipline and self-surveillance into banking legislation and amove to eliminate “wiggle room” where banks obey regulations in rule but not in spirit.Market RiskThe last risk evaluated in Pillar I of the Basel II accords attempts to quantify the reserves needed to beheld by banks due to market risk, i.e. the risk of loss due to movements in asset prices. In its evaluationof market risk, Basel II makes a clear distinction between fixed income and other products such asequity, commodity, and foreign exchange vehicles and also separates the two principal risks thatcontribute to overall market risk: interest rate and volatility risk. For fixed income assets, a proprietaryFigure 1: Standardized Approach Reserve Targets

Source: Basel II Accords, 2006 Revision10risk measurement called “value at risk” (VAR) is first proposed alongside the lines of the IRBapproaches and the Advanced Measurement Approach; banks can develop their own calculations todetermine the reserves needed to protect against interest rate and volatility risk for fixed income assetson a position-by-position basis. Again, regulators must approve of such an action.For banks that cannot or chose not to adopt VAR models to protect their fixed income assets againstvolatility or interest rate risk, Basel II recommends two separate risk protection methodologies. Forinterest rate risk—the risk that interest rates may fluctuate and decrease the value of a fixed-incomeasset—reserve recommendations are tied to thematurity of the asset. Figure (2) provides anoverview of the risk weights assigned to eachasset given its maturity. As seen to the right,depending on the time to maturity of the fixedincomeasset, Basel II recommends a bank holdanywhere between 0% and 12.5% of an asset’svalue in reserves to protect against movements ininterest rates.To guard against the volatility risk of fixed income assets, Basel II recommends risk weightings tied tothe credit risk ratings given to underlying bank assets. For assets rated by credit-rating agencies asAAA to AA-, a 0% weighting is assigned, while for A+ to BBB rated fixed income instruments, a0.25% weighting is given. Furthermore, for instruments receiving a BB+ to B- rating, an 8% weight isassigned, and for instruments rated below B-, a 12% weight is allowed. Unrated assets are given an 8%risk weighting. For the final calculation of the total amount of reserves needed to protect against marketrisk for fixed income instruments, the value of each fixed income asset is multiplied against both riskweightings and then summed alongside all other fixed income assets.Basel II’s risk weightings for all other market-based assets—such as stocks, commodities, currencies,and hybrid instruments—is based on a second, separate group of methodologies. It would beexhaustive to provide a full summary of the methods used for the calculation of reserves needed toprotect against market risks, but this paper will provide a short summary of the three main types ofrating methodologies used to rate these assets. The first group of methodologies is called The

Simplified Approach, and uses systems similar to the “bucket” approaches used in non-VAR fixedincome reserve calculations. This group looks to divide assets by type, maturity, volatility, and origin,Time to Maturity Risk Weighting1 Month or Less 0.00%6 Months or Less 0.70%1 Year or Less 1.25%4 Years or Less 2.25%8 Years or Less 3.75%16 Years or Less 5.25%20 Years or Less 7.50%Over 20 Years 12.50%Figure 2: Interest Rate Risk WeightingsSource: Basel II Accords, 2006 Revision11and assign a risk weights along a spectrum of values, from 2.25% for the least risky assets to 100% forthe most risky assets.The second group of methodologies for assigning the reserves needed to protect against market riskinherent in stock, currency, commodities, and other holdings is called Scenario Analysis. Here, riskweights are not grouped according to the cosmetic features of an asset; instead, risk weights areallocated according to the possible scenarios assets may face in each country’s markets. This approach,while much more complex than the Simplified Approach, is much less conservative and therefore moreprofitable for a bank.The final methodological group outlined in Basel II that calculates the reserves needed to guard againstmarket risk is known as the Internal Model Approach, or IMA. Along the lines of the VAR and IRBapproaches, this methodology group encourages banks to develop their own internal models tocalculate a stock, currency, or commodity’s market risk on a case-by-case basis. On average, the IMAis seen to be the most complex, least conservative, and most profitable of the approaches towardmarket risk modeling.Total Capital AdequacyOnce a bank has calculated the reserves it needs on hand to guard against operational and market riskand has adjusted its asset base according to credit risk, it can calculate the on-hand capital reserves itneeds to achieve “capital adequacy” as defined by Basel II. Because of the wide range ofmethodologies used by banks and the diversity of bank loanbooks, Basel II allows a great deal ofvariation in its calculated reserve requirements. Additionally, no change is given to both the

requirement that Tier 2 capital reserves must be equal to the amount of Tier 1 capital reserves and the8% reserve requirement for credit-default capital adequacy, making these two regulations applicable inBasel II. In sum, a bank’s needed reserves for “capital adequacy” is calculated as follows:Reserves = .08 * Risk Weighted Assets + Operational Risk Reserves + Market Risk ReservesB. Pillars II and IIIPillars II and III are much less complex and lengthy than Pillar I—they only occupy 40 of the 350pages of the Basel II Accord. Pillar II primarily addresses regulator-bank interaction, extending therights of the regulator in bank supervision and dissolution. Regulators are given the power to overseethe internal risk evaluation regimes proposed in Pillar I and change them to the simpler, moreconservative “bucket-based” approaches if they deem a bank unable to manage its credit, market, and12operational risks independently. Regulators can also review a bank’s capital assessment policy whenthey see fit, and are given the mandate to hold senior management responsible if a bank misrepresentsits risk positioning. Moreover, banks are charged with drafting their own risk profiles, and if thisreporting is not done, authorities have the right to penalize the at-fault bank.Two additional mandates also widen the breath of regulator power in Basel II. Firstly, regulators areallowed to create a “buffer” capital requirement in addition to the minimum capital requirements ascalculated in Pillar I if banks are seen to be “skirting” around the capital adequacy goals of the accord.Secondly, to avoid a repeat of the financial crises in countries like Korea and China, bankingsupervisors are urged to mandate early action if capital reserves fall below minimum levels and aregiven significant authority by way of Basel II’s recommendations to prescribe rapid remedial action forbanks in such a situation.Pillar III looks to increase market discipline within a country’s banking sector. In sum, disclosures of abank’s capital and risk-taking positions that were once only available to regulators are recommended tobe released to the general public in the Basel II Accord. Statistics such as the aggregate amounts ofsurplus capital (both Tier 1 and Tier 2) held by a bank, risk-weighted capital adequacy ratios, reserverequirements for credit, market, and operational risk, and a full description (with assumptions) of the

risk mitigation approaches of a bank are recommended for quarterly release to the general public underBasel II’s standards. With this action, Basel II hopes to empower shareholders to enforce discipline inthe risk-taking and reserve-holding methods of banks, where banks seen to hold too few reserves andtake on too much risk are punished by their own shareholders for doing so.C. ImplementationAfter its drafting in 1999, Basel II underwent seven years of deliberation and two revisions—one inSeptember and another in November of 2005—before a final agreement was agreed upon by all G-10nations and representatives from Spain in July 2006. Over the course of the Accord’s deliberation, thesize of the agreement ballooned to 347 pages—a far cry from the 37 pages of the original Basel accord.This was due to the addition—at the behest of the United States, Japan, and Britain—of internal riskevaluation and self-surveillance standards for banks. Another major sticking point in the negotiationsover the Basel II accord was the scope of the agreement: most European Union countries wanted theAccord to apply to all banks, while the U.S., Canada, and Great Britain wanted it to apply only to largeinternational banks. In the end, this second bloc won out.13Alongside the final draft of Basel II in 2006, all the G-10 countries, including the United States,pledged to implement Basel II in full by its target enaction date of December 2008. While progress tothis goal is uneven, all G-10 countries have approved their strategies for harmonization with Basel IIand have mandated its implementation by late 2008.Outside the G-10, 95 countries—accounting for 36% of world GDP—have announced their intention toadopt Basel II by 2015 (Cornford, 10). Including the G-10, Basel II is on target to cover approximately77% of the world’s GDP and 70% of its population. The timeline for adoption of Basel II among nonG-10 members is shown below in Figure (3).The only major country outside the G-10 that has not announced its intentions to adopt Basel II’sstandards is China: it asserts that its own domestic regulation and the adoption of Basel I standards willbe sufficient to ensure the stability of its banking system. On the other hand, recent reports show areversal in this decision and a target date of 2011 for implementation among a select few Chinese

banks, so there is a distinct possibility that even China will join most of the world in adopting Basel II(“Chinese Banks to Test Waters…,” 1). In addition, it must be noted that because Basel II covers thesubsidiaries of G-10 banks, many emerging markets will see de facto implementation of Basel II in2008. Argentina, for example, has a banking sector with a large foreign bank presence—approximately48% of all bank capitalization—and will therefore see the effects of Basel II much sooner than itsformal implementation date of 2013.D. Criticisms Related to Emerging Market EconomiesThe principle criticism of Basel II in terms of emerging market economies is that, once again, the BaselCommittee has expressly stated that its recommendations are for its G-10 member states and not fordeveloping economies. In parallel to the creation of Basel II, the Basel Committee created a set ofstandards for emerging market economies called Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision thatwere drafted in 1997, completed in 1999, and later revised in 2006. Although these standards aretailored to the needs of emerging market economies, their broadness and relative obscurity in thepolicymaking community have limited their impact upon international banking. Because multilateralFigure 3: Adoption of Basel IISource: Cornford, et. al.Year 2008 2010 2013 2015% Adoption Rate (World GDP) 46% 58% 69% 77%Selected Countries Adopting Basel IIG-10, Chile,Bahrain, SingaporeRussia, South Africa,Indonesia, BrazilIndia, Argentina Egypt, Pakistan14institutions, international rating agencies, and large banks alike see the Basel Accords as the properstandard for banking regulation throughout the world’s economies, critics charge that the “splicing” ofemerging market bank policy into a less publicized and precise standard effectively causes the needs ofemerging market financial sectors to be ignored.Given that Basel II is intended for G-10 economies, its regulations have several possible adverseeffects on emerging market economies. Firstly, the strong responsibilities given to regulators and thegreat amount of regulatory variability allowed to banks in their calculation of loanbook reserves mayoverwhelm the regulatory systems of many emerging market economies. Because of the high

technicality in Basel II and the inclusion of internal mechanisms in the measurement of risk, regulatorswill be forced to hire and hold highly skilled employees through the medium and long term.Unfortunately, the educational institutions needed to train such employees may not exist in a country,and many emerging market regulatory agencies do not have the budget to add costly high-skilledworkers to their ranks. Therefore, central banks may become lax in their regulation of private banks,allowing them to control risk internally without proper oversight. This, in turn, incentivizes privatebanks to take on increasing risk, heightening the possibility of a system-wide banking collapse (Barth,et. al, 44). In rich countries, Basel II assures its readers that market discipline would preclude such ascenario, but again, in emerging markets, markets may be so shallow and illiquid that banks couldeffectively take on excessive risk without a shareholder or creditor revolt.Another possible side-effect of Basel II in emerging market economies is a drawback of lending toemerging market banks. This is due to two factors. Firstly, because only larger firms can afford to hirerating agencies to asses their debt, it is likely that many banks in emerging markets will not have theirdebt rated by Moody’s, S&P, or Fitch. Therefore, global banks will be lest apt to loan to emergingmarket banks because such loans will have to be matched with larger capital reserve requirements thanthose made to larger, rated banks. Secondly, even if an emerging market bank is able to afford theservices of an international rating agency, experience has shown that the uncertainty surroundingdifferences in accounting practices and banking regulations causes rating agencies to assign undulyunfavorable bond ratings to banks in industrializing states (Barth, et. al., 71). Simply put, a ratingagency would rather “cover its underside” with a low rating than make a major personnel investment inan emerging economy.More generally, Basel II’s reliance upon rating agencies to value risks may cause unfavorableimplications in industrialized and industrializing markets alike. Firstly, because most small borrowers15cannot afford the services of rating agencies, banks will tend to lose diversification on their loanbooks,causing them to be more exposed to sectoral shocks, and especially economic shocks that adverselyaffect larger banks and corporations. Secondly, because banks and corporations can choose the rating

agency they employ, they may bring about a “race to the bottom” among the world’s three large ratingagencies where business is given to the agency that assigns a firm the best rating possible. Therefore,over time, a bank’s risk exposure will tend to enlarge, even as, on paper, it retains the same amount ofcredit, operational, and market risk.Next, Basel II is criticized for its retention of the “sovereign ceiling” in its estimation of bank assetrisk. Although this standard is weakened by the availability of other options through which emergingmarket assets can be valued, the Standardized Approach still permits regulators to arbitrarily rate bankdebt as less creditworthy than the debt of the bank’s sovereign authority. Because many emergingmarket sovereigns have dubious debt histories, emerging market banks are unduly penalized by BaselII because their debt ratings—and therefore risk weightings—are mandated to be “one step” lessfavorable than that of their sovereign government. Thus, large international banks will likely limitloans to highly solvent, low-risk banks in emerging markets because they are forced to take on largecapital reserves to extend such loans.Finally, one additional criticism of Basel II will affect both emerging and industrialized economies.With the addition of internal risk measurements in the calculation of a bank’s capital reserves, Basel IImay cause banks to function in a way that is procyclical to the business cycle. Because risk weights arebased on expectations of future economic performance, banks will tend to withdraw credit in timesbefore and during a recession and extend additional credit once a recovery is underway. Although thismethod protects banks against additional economic risk, it is well known in the financial communitythat economic forecasters tend to exaggerate their predictions during periods of growth and recessionalike. Therefore, the expectations-based movement of credit will tend to amplify recessions andperhaps spur inflation during periods of high economic growth.IV. ConclusionWhile a full summary of this paper would be exhaustive, some stylized facts should be assessed beforeit concludes. One very important fact to assess is the achievements and limitations of each BaselAccord. The first Basel Accord, Basel I, was a groundbreaking accord in its time, and did much to

promote regulatory harmony and the growth of international banking across the borders of the G-10and the world alike. On the other hand, its limited scope and rather general language gives banks16excessive leeway in their interpretation of its rules, and, in the end, allows financial institutions to takeimproper risks and hold unduly low capital reserves. Basel II, on the other hand, seeks to extend thebreath and precision of Basel I, bringing in factors such as market and operational risk, market-baseddiscipline and surveillance, and regulatory mandates. On the other hand, in the words of Evan Hawke,the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency under George W. Bush, Basel II is “complex beyond reason”(Jones, 37), extending to nearly four hundred pages without indices, and, in total, encompassing nearlyone thousands pages of regulation.The drawbacks of both accords, interestingly enough, are remarkably similar. Put simply, botheffectively ignore the implications of their rules on emerging market banks. Although each states thatits positions are not recommended for application in emerging market economies, the use of Basel Iand II by most private and public organizations as truly international banking standards predicates theinclusion of emerging markets in each accord. The failure of this inclusion has put emerging markets inan awkward position—they can either adopt Basel I and II, receive international capital flows, and faceexcessive risk-taking and an overwhelmed central bank, or they can be cut off from most internationalcapital. Therefore, it is highly beneficial to the safety and stability of the international financialsystem—and moreover, the international economy—to include emerging market economies in futurerevisions of the Basel Accords.17Works Cited1. Barth, James, Caprio, Gerard, and Levine, Ross. Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till AnglesGovern. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006.2. Basel II - A Guide to <ew Capital Adequacy Standards for Lenders. The United KingdomCouncil of Mortgage Lenders, February 2008.3. International Convergence f Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A RevisedFramework, Comprehensive Version. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, June 2006.4. Ferry, John. “Taking the Slow Road to Basel II.” LatinRisk, September 2005.5. “Chinese Banks to Test Water Basel II in 2010.” SinoCast News Service, December 2007.6. Cornford, Andrew. “The Global Implementation of Basel II: Prospects and OutstandingProblems.” International Finance, June 2005.

7. Implementation of the <ew Capital Adequacy Framework in <on-Basel Committee MemberCountries. BIS Occasional Papers, No 6, September 2006.8. Rojas-Suarez, Liliana. “Can International Capital Standards Strengthen Banks in EmergingMarkets?” Institute for International Economics, October 2001.9. The <ew Basel Accord: an Explanatory <ote. Secretariat of the Basel Committee on BankingSupervision, Bank for International Settlements, January 2001.10. “The Basel II Accord in Russia 2006: operational risks – the Fundamental problem facingbanks.” InfoWatch and the National Banking Journal, May 2006.11. Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework,Comprehensive Version. Basel Committee on International Banking Supervision, June 2006.12. International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards. Basle Committeeon Banking Supervision, July 1988.13. Cornford, Andrew. “Basel 2 at Mid-2006: Prospects for Implementation and Other RecentDevelopments.” Financial Stability Institute, July 2006.14. Basel II Implementation in Indonesia. Bank Indonesia Directorate of Banking Research andRegulation, June 2007.15. Jones, David. “Emerging problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory CapitalArbitrage and Related Issues.” Journal of Banking & Finance, No. 24, pp. 35-58, 2000.16. Santos, João. “Bank Capital Regulation in Contemporary Banking Theory: A Review of theLiterature.” BIS Working Papers, No 90, September 2008.

Basel IIIFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Basel III (or the Third Basel Accord) is a global, voluntary regulatory framework on bank capital adequacy, stress testing and market liquidity risk. It was agreed upon by the members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 2010–11, and was scheduled to be introduced from 2013 until 2015; however, changes from 1 April 2013 extended implementation until 31 March 2018 and again extended to 31 March 2019.[1][2] The third installment of the Basel Accords (see Basel I, Basel II) was developed in response to the deficiencies in financial regulation revealed by the financial crisis of 2007–08. Basel III was supposed to strengthen bank capital requirements by increasing bank liquidity and decreasing bank leverage.

Contents

1 Overview 2 Key principles

o 2.1 Capital requirementso 2.2 Leverage ratioo 2.3 Liquidity requirements

2.3.1 U.S. version of the Basel Liquidity Coverage Ratio requirements 3 Implementation

o 3.1 Summary of originally (2010) proposed changes in Basel Committee languageo 3.2 U.S. implementationo 3.3 Key milestones

3.3.1 Capital requirements 3.3.2 Leverage ratio 3.3.3 Liquidity requirements

4 Analysis of Basel III impact o 4.1 Macroeconomic impacto 4.2 Criticismo 4.3 Further studies

5 See also 6 References 7 External links

Overview

Unlike Basel I and Basel II, which focus primarily on the level of bank loss reserves that banks are required to hold, Basel III focuses primarily on the risk of a run on the bank by requiring differing levels of reserves for different forms of bank deposits and other borrowings. Therefore Basel III does not, for the most part, supersede the guidelines known as Basel I and Basel II; rather, it will work alongside them.

Key principles

Capital requirements

The original Basel III rule from 2010 was supposed to require banks to hold 4.5% of common equity (up from 2% in Basel II) and 6% of Tier I capital (including common equity and up from 4% in Basel II) of "risk-weighted assets" (RWAs).[3] Basel III introduced two additional "capital buffers"—a "mandatory capital conservation buffer" of 2.5% and a "discretionary counter-cyclical buffer" to allow national regulators to require up to an additional 2.5% of capital during periods of high credit growth.

Leverage ratio

Basel III introduced a minimum "leverage ratio". The leverage ratio was calculated by dividing Tier 1 capital by the bank's average total consolidated assets (not risk weighted);[4][5] The banks were expected to maintain a leverage ratio in excess of 3% under Basel III. In July 2013, the U.S. Federal Reserve announced that the minimum Basel III leverage ratio would be 6% for 8 Systemically important financial institution (SIFI) banks and 5% for their insured bank holding companies.[6]

Liquidity requirements

Basel III introduced two required liquidity ratios.[7] The "Liquidity Coverage Ratio" was supposed to require a bank to hold sufficient high-quality liquid assets to cover its total net cash outflows over 30 days; the Net Stable Funding Ratio was to require the available amount of stable funding to exceed the required amount of stable funding over a one-year period of extended stress.[8]

U.S. version of the Basel Liquidity Coverage Ratio requirements

On 24 October 2013, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors approved an interagency proposal for the U.S. version of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)'s Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). The ratio would apply to certain U.S. banking organizations and other systemically important financial institutions.[9] The comment period for the proposal is scheduled to close by 31 January 2014.

The United States' LCR proposal came out significantly tougher than BCBS’s version, especially for larger bank holding companies.[10] The proposal requires financial institutions and FSOC designated nonbank financial companies[11] to have an adequate stock of high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) that can be quickly liquidated to meet liquidity needs over a short period of time.

The LCR consists of two parts: the numerator is the value of HQLA, and the denominator consists of the total net cash outflows over a specified stress period (total expected cash outflows minus total expected cash inflows).[12]

The Liquidity Coverage Ratio applies to U.S. banking operations with assets of more than $10 billion. The proposal would require:

Large Bank Holding Companies (BHC) – those with over $250 billion in consolidated assets, or more in on-balance sheet foreign exposure, and to systemically important, non-

bank financial institutions;[11] to hold enough HQLA to cover 30 days of net cash outflow. That amount would be determined based on the peak cumulative amount within the 30-day period.[9]

Regional firms (those with between $50 and $250 billion in assets) would be subject to a “modified” LCR at the (BHC) level only. The modified LCR requires the regional firms to hold enough HQLA to cover 21 days of net cash outflow. The net cash outflow parameters are 70% of those applicable to the larger institutions and do not include the requirement to calculate the peak cumulative outflows[12]

Smaller BHCs, those under $50 billion, would remain subject to the prevailing qualitative supervisory framework.[13]

The U.S. proposal divides qualifying HQLAs into three specific categories (Level 1, Level 2A, and Level 2B). Across the categories the combination of Level 2A and 2B assets cannot exceed 40% HQLA with 2B assets limited to a maximum of 15% of HQLA.[12]

Level 1 represents assets that are highly liquid (generally those risk-weighted at 0% under the Basel III standardized approach for capital) and receive no haircut. Notably, the Fed chose not to include GSE-issued securities in Level 1, despite industry lobbying, on the basis that they are not guaranteed by the "full faith and credit" of the U.S. government.

Level 2A assets generally include assets that would be subject to a 20% risk-weighting under Basel III and includes assets such as GSE-issued and -guaranteed securities. These assets would be subject to a 15% haircut which is similar to the treatment of such securities under the BCBS version.

Level 2B assets include corporate debt and equity securities and are subject to a 50% haircut. The BCBS and U.S. version treats equities in a similar manner, but corporate debt under the BCBS version is split between 2A and 2B based on public credit ratings, unlike the U.S. proposal. This treatment of corporate debt securities is the direct impact of the Dodd–Frank Act's Section 939, which removed references to credit ratings, and further evidences the conservative bias of U.S. regulators’ approach to the LCR.

The proposal requires that the LCR be at least equal to or greater than 1.0 and includes a multiyear transition period that would require: 80% compliance starting 1 January 2015, 90% compliance starting 1 January 2016, and 100% compliance starting 1 January 2017.[14]

Lastly, the proposal requires both sets of firms (large bank holding companies and regional firms) subject to the LCR requirements to submit remediation plans to U.S. regulators to address what actions would be taken if the LCR falls below 100% for three or more consecutive days.

Implementation

Summary of originally (2010) proposed changes in Basel Committee language

First, the quality, consistency, and transparency of the capital base will be raised. o Tier 1 capital : the predominant form of Tier 1 capital must be common shares and

retained earnings

o Tier 2 capital : supplementary capital, however, the instruments will be harmonised

o Tier 3 capital will be eliminated.[15]

Second, the risk coverage of the capital framework will be strengthened. o Promote more integrated management of market and counterparty credit risko Add the credit valuation adjustment–risk due to deterioration in counterparty's

credit ratingo Strengthen the capital requirements for counterparty credit exposures arising from

banks' derivatives, repo and securities financing transactionso Raise the capital buffers backing these exposureso Reduce procyclicality ando Provide additional incentives to move OTC derivative contracts to qualifying

central counterparties (probably clearing houses). Currently, the BCBS has stated derivatives cleared with a QCCP will be risk-weighted at 2% (The rule is still yet to be finalized in the U.S.)

o Provide incentives to strengthen the risk management of counterparty credit exposures

o Raise counterparty credit risk management standards by including wrong-way risk

Third, a leverage ratio will be introduced as a supplementary measure to the Basel II risk-based framework. The ration was finalized on September 3, 2014 and is known as the Supplementary Leverage Ratio.[16]

o intended to achieve the following objectives: Put a floor under the buildup of leverage in the banking sector Introduce additional safeguards against model risk and measurement error

by supplementing the risk based measure with a simpler measure that is based on gross exposures.

Fourth, a series of measures is introduced to promote the buildup of capital buffers in good times that can be drawn upon in periods of stress ("Reducing procyclicality and promoting countercyclical buffers").

o Measures to address procyclicality: Dampen excess cyclicality of the minimum capital requirement; Promote more forward looking provisions; Conserve capital to build buffers at individual banks and the banking

sector that can be used in stress; ando Achieve the broader macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector from

periods of excess credit growth. Requirement to use long-term data horizons to estimate probabilities of

default, downturn loss-given-default estimates, recommended in Basel II, to

become mandatory Improved calibration of the risk functions, which convert loss estimates

into regulatory capital requirements. Banks must conduct stress tests that include widening credit spreads in

recessionary scenarios.o Promoting stronger provisioning practices (forward-looking provisioning):

Advocating a change in the accounting standards towards an expected loss (EL) approach (usually, EL amount := LGD*PD*EAD).[17]

Fifth,a global minimum liquidity standard for internationally active banks is introduced that includes a 30-day liquidity coverage ratio requirement underpinned by a longer-term structural liquidity ratio called the Net Stable Funding Ratio. (In January 2012, the oversight panel of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued a statement saying that regulators will allow banks to dip below their required liquidity levels, the liquidity coverage ratio, during periods of stress.[18])

The Committee also is reviewing the need for additional capital, liquidity or other supervisory measures to reduce the externalities created by systemically important institutions.

As of September 2010, proposed Basel III norms asked for ratios as: 7–9.5% (4.5% + 2.5% (conservation buffer) + 0–2.5% (seasonal buffer)) for common equity and 8.5–11% for Tier 1 capital and 10.5–13% for total capital.[19]

On 15 April, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) released the final version of its “Supervisory Framework for Measuring and Controlling Large Exposures” (SFLE) that builds on longstanding BCBS guidance on credit exposure concentrations.[20]

On September 3, 2014, the U.S. banking agencies (Federal Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) issued their final rule implementing the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR).[21] The LCR is a short-term liquidity measure intended to ensure that banking organizations maintain a sufficient pool of liquid assets to cover net cash outflows over a 30-day stress period.

U.S. implementation

The U.S. Federal Reserve announced in December 2011 that it would implement substantially all of the Basel III rules.[22] It summarized them as follows, and made clear they would apply not only to banks but also to all institutions with more than US$50 billion in assets:

"Risk-based capital and leverage requirements" including first annual capital plans, conduct stress tests, and capital adequacy "including a tier one common risk-based capital ratio greater than 5 percent, under both expected and stressed conditions" – see scenario analysis on this. A risk-based capital surcharge

Market liquidity , first based on the United States' own "interagency liquidity risk-management guidance issued in March 2010" that require liquidity stress tests and set internal quantitative limits, later moving to a full Basel III regime - see below.

The Federal Reserve Board itself would conduct tests annually "using three economic and financial market scenarios". Institutions would be encouraged to use at least five scenarios reflecting improbable events, and especially those considered impossible by management, but no standards apply yet to extreme scenarios. Only a summary of the three official Fed scenarios "including company-specific information, would be made public" but one or more internal company-run stress tests must be run each year with summaries published.

Single-counterparty credit limits to cut "credit exposure of a covered financial firm to a single counterparty as a percentage of the firm's regulatory capital. Credit exposure between the largest financial companies would be subject to a tighter limit".

"Early remediation requirements" to ensure that "financial weaknesses are addressed at an early stage". One or more "triggers for remediation—such as capital levels, stress test results, and risk-management weaknesses—in some cases calibrated to be forward-looking" would be proposed by the Board in 2012. "Required actions would vary based on the severity of the situation, but could include restrictions on growth, capital distributions, and executive compensation, as well as capital raising or asset sales".[23]

As of January 2014, the United States has been on track to implement many of the Basel III rules, despite differences in ratio requirements and calculations.[24]

Key milestones

Capital requirements

Date Milestone: Capital requirement

2014Minimum capital requirements: Start of the gradual phasing-in of the higher minimum capital requirements.

2015Minimum capital requirements: Higher minimum capital requirements are fully implemented.

2016 Conservation buffer: Start of the gradual phasing-in of the conservation buffer.2019 Conservation buffer: The conservation buffer is fully implemented.

Leverage ratio

Date Milestone: Leverage ratio

2011Supervisory monitoring: Developing templates to track the leverage ratio and the underlying components.

2013Parallel run I: The leverage ratio and its components will be tracked by supervisors but not disclosed and not mandatory.

2015Parallel run II: The leverage ratio and its components will be tracked and disclosed but not mandatory.

2017Final adjustments: Based on the results of the parallel run period, any final adjustments to the leverage ratio.

2018Mandatory requirement: The leverage ratio will become a mandatory part of Basel III requirements.

Liquidity requirements

Date Milestone: Liquidity requirements

2011Observation period: Developing templates and supervisory monitoring of the liquidity ratios.

2015 Introduction of the LCR: Initial introduction of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), with

a 60% requirement. This will increase by ten percentage points each year until 2019.2018 Introduction of the NSFR: Introduction of the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR).2019 LCR comes into full effect: 100% LCR is expected.

Analysis of Basel III impact

Macroeconomic impact

An OECD study released on 17 February 2011, estimated that the medium-term impact of Basel III implementation on GDP growth would be in the range of −0.05% to −0.15% per year.[25] Economic output would be mainly affected by an increase in bank lending spreads, as banks pass a rise in bank funding costs, due to higher capital requirements, to their customers. To meet the capital requirements originally effective in 2015 banks were estimated to increase their lending spreads on average by about 15 basis points. Capital requirements effective as of 2019 (7% for the common equity ratio, 8.5% for the Tier 1 capital ratio) could increase bank lending spreads by about 50 basis points.[26] The estimated effects on GDP growth assume no active response from monetary policy. To the extent that monetary policy would no longer be constrained by the zero lower bound, the Basel III impact on economic output could be offset by a reduction (or delayed increase) in monetary policy rates by about 30 to 80 basis points.[25]

Criticism

Think tanks such as the World Pensions Council have argued that Basel III merely builds on and further expands the existing Basel II regulatory base without fundamentally questioning its core tenets, notably the ever-growing reliance on standardized assessments of "credit risk" marketed by two private sector agencies- Moody's and S&P, thus using public policy to strengthen anti-competitive duopolistic practices.[27][28] The conflicted and unreliable credit ratings of these agencies is generally seen as a major contributor to the US housing bubble.

Opaque treatment of all derivatives contracts is also criticized. While institutions have many legitimate ("hedging", "insurance") risk reduction reasons to deal in derivatives, the Basel III accords:

treat insurance buyers and sellers equally even though sellers take on more concentrated risks (literally purchasing them) which they are then expected to offset correctly without regulation

do not require organizations to investigate correlations of all internal risks they own do not tax or charge institutions for the systematic or aggressive externalization or

conflicted marketing of risk - other than requiring an orderly unravelling of derivatives in a crisis and stricter record keeping

Since derivatives present major unknowns in a crisis these are seen as major failings by some critics [29] causing several to claim that the "too big to fail" status remains with respect to major derivatives dealers who aggressively took on risk of an event they did not believe would happen - but did. As Basel III does not absolutely require extreme scenarios that management flatly

rejects to be included in stress testing this remains a vulnerability. Standardized external auditing and modelling is an issue proposed to be addressed in Basel 4 however.

A few critics argue that capitalization regulation is inherently fruitless due to these and similar problems and - despite an opposite ideological view of regulation - agree that "too big to fail" persists.[30]

Basel III has been criticized similarly for its paper burden and risk inhibition by banks, organized in the Institute of International Finance, an international association of global banks based in Washington, D.C., who argue that it would "hurt" both their business and overall economic growth. The OECD estimated that implementation of Basel III would decrease annual GDP growth by 0.05–0.15%,[25][31] blaming the slow recovery from the financial crisis of 2007–08 on the regulation.[32][33] Basel III was also criticized as negatively affecting the stability of the financial system by increasing incentives of banks to game the regulatory framework.[34] The American Bankers Association,[35] community banks organized in the Independent Community Bankers of America, and some of the most liberal Democrats in the U.S. Congress, including the entire Maryland congressional delegation with Democratic Senators Ben Cardin and Barbara Mikulski and Representatives Chris Van Hollen and Elijah Cummings, voiced opposition to Basel III in their comments to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,[36] saying that the Basel III proposals, if implemented, would hurt small banks by increasing "their capital holdings dramatically on mortgage and small business loans".[37]

Others[who?] have argued that Basel III did not go far enough to regulate banks as inadequate regulation was a cause of the financial crisis.[38] On 6 January 2013 the global banking sector won a significant easing of Basel III Rules, when the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision extended not only the implementation schedule to 2019, but broadened the definition of liquid assets.[39]

Further studies

In addition to articles used for references (see References), this section lists links to publicly available high-quality studies on Basel III. This section may be updated frequently as Basel III remains under development.

Date Source Article Title / Link CommentsFeb 2012

BNP Paribas Fortis

Basel III for dummiesVideo

"All you need to know about Basel III in 10 minutes." Updated for 6 January 2013 decisions.

Dec 2011

OECD: Economics Department

Systemically Important Banks

OECD analysis on the failure of bank regulation and markets to discipline systemically important banks.

Jun 2011

BNP Paribas: Economic Research Department

Basel III: no Achilles' spear

BNP Paribas' Economic Research Department study on Basel III.

Feb 2011

Georg, co-Pierre Basel III and Systemic Risk Regulation –

An overview article of Basel III with a focus on how to regulate systemic risk.

What Way Forward?

Feb 2011

OECD: Economics Department

Macroeconomic Impact of Basel III

OECD analysis on the macroeconomic impact of Basel III.

May 2010

OECD Journal:Financial Market Trends

Thinking Beyond Basel III

OECD study on Basel I, Basel II and III.

May 2010

BloombergBusinessweek

FDIC's Bair Says Europe Should Make Banks Hold More Capital

Bair said regulators around the world need to work together on the next round of capital standards for banks ... the next round of international standards, known as Basel III, which Bair said must meet "very aggressive" goals.

May 2010

ReutersFACTBOX-G20 progress on financial regulation

Finance ministers from the G20 group of industrial and emerging countries meet in Busan, Korea, on 4–5 June to review pledges made in 2009 to strengthen regulation and learn lessons from the financial crisis.

May 2010

The Economist

The banks battle backA behind-the-scenes brawl over new capital and liquidity rules

"The most important bit of reform is the international set of rules known as "Basel 3", which will govern the capital and liquidity buffers banks carry. It is here that the most vicious and least public skirmish between banks and their regulators is taking place."

See also

Basel I Basel II Basel 4 Systemically important financial institution Operational risk Operational risk management