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Climate Change and Conflict:The Migration Link

International Peace Academy

Nils Petter Gleditsch, Ragnhild Nordåsand Idean Salehyan May 2007

Coping with CrisisWorking Paper Series

About the Authors (in alphabetical order)

Nils Petter Gleditsch is a research professor at the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo

(PRIO), Editor of the bi-monthly Journal of Peace Research and Professor of Political Science at the Norwegian University of Science and

Technology in Trondheim. His articles have appeared in American Political Science Review, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of

Conflict Resolution, and numerous other journals. Among his books are Globalization and Armed Conflict (co-edited with Gerald Schneider

and Katherine Barbieri, 2003) and Conflict and the Environment (co-edited with Paul Diehl, 2001).

Ragnhild Nordås is a research fellow of the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) and

a PhD student in political science at Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU). Her research interests include religion and

conflict, terrorism, and human rights. She is the co-author of an article on religion and human rights violations forthcoming in International

Studies Quarterly.

Idean Salehyan is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of North Texas. He received his PhD in Political Science from

the University of California, San Diego. His research interests include interstate and civil conflict, international migration/refugee flows,

ethnic politics, and human rights. In 2005, he was Visiting Scholar at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo. His recent publica-

tions have appeared in the journals International Organization and the Journal of Peace Research.

AcknowledgementsIPA owes a great debt of thanks to its many donors to Coping with Crisis. Their support for this Program reflects a widespread demand for

innovative thinking on practical solutions to international challenges. In particular, IPA is grateful to the Governments of Australia, Belgium,

Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. This Working Papers

Series would also not have been possible without the support of the Greentree Foundation, which generously allowed IPA the use of the

Whitney family’s Greentree Estate for a meeting of the authors of these papers at a crucial moment in their development in October 2006.

An earlier version of this work was presented to a Workshop on Human Security and Climate Change, Holmen Fjordhotell, Asker, Norway,

22–23 June 2005. The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Research Council of Norway. We are also grateful to

Michael E. Mann for supplying the data in Figure 1 and to Ole Magnus Theisen for computing the graph.

Cover Photo: Cracked earth from lack of water and baked from the heat of the sun forms a pattern in the Nature Reserve of Popenguine,

Senegal. ©Evan Schneider/UN Photos.

The views expressed in this paper represent those of the authors and not necessarily those of IPA. IPA welcomes consideration of a wide

range of perspectives in the pursuit of a well-informed debate on critical policies and issues in international affairs.

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Foreword, Terje Rød-Larsen i

Introduction 1

Current Knowledge 1

Challenges: Environment-Induced Migration 4

Links between Migration and Conflict inReceiving Areas

Capacities 7

Scenarios 8

Worst Case: The Catastrophic Scenario

Best Case: The Golden Scenario

Muddling Through: The Middle Scenario

Policy Recommendations 10

Further Reading 12

CONTENTS

Foreword

Terje Rød-LarsenPresident, International Peace Academy

The International Peace Academy (IPA) is pleased to introduce a new series of Working Papers within theprogram Coping with Crisis, Conflict, and Change:The United Nations and Evolving Capacities for Managing GlobalCrises, a four-year research and policy-facilitation program designed to generate fresh thinking about globalcrises and capacities for effective prevention and response.

In this series of Working Papers, IPA has asked leading experts to undertake a mapping exercise, presentingan assessment of critical challenges to human and international security. A first group of papers provides ahorizontal perspective, examining the intersection of multiple challenges in specific regions of the world.Asecond group takes a vertical approach, providing in-depth analysis of global challenges relating to organizedviolence, poverty, population trends, public health, and climate change, among other topics. The WorkingPapers have three main objectives: to advance the understanding of these critical challenges and theirinterlinkages; to assess capacities to cope with these challenges and to draw scenarios for plausible futuredevelopments; and to offer a baseline for longer-term research and policy development.

Out of these initial Working Papers, a grave picture already emerges.The Papers make clear that commonchallenges take different forms in different regions of the world. At the same time, they show that complexityand interconnectedness will be a crucial attribute of crises in the foreseeable future.

First, new challenges are emerging, such as climate change and demographic trends. At least two billionadditional inhabitants, and perhaps closer to three billion, will be added to the world over the next fivedecades, virtually all in the less developed regions, especially among the poorest countries in Africa and Asia.As a result of climate change, the magnitude and frequency of floods may increase in many regions; floodsin coastal Bangladesh and India, for example, are expected to affect several million people.The demand fornatural resources—notably water—will increase as a result of population growth and economic develop-ment; but some areas may have diminished access to clean water.

Second, some challenges are evolving in more dangerous global configurations such as transnationalorganized crime and terrorism. Illicit and violent organizations are gaining increasing control over territory,markets, and populations around the world. Non-state armed groups complicate peacemaking efforts due totheir continued access to global commodity and arms markets. Many countries, even if they are not directlyaffected, can suffer from the economic impact of a major terrorist attack. States with ineffective andcorrupted institutions may prove to be weak links in global arrangements to deal with threats ranging fromthe avian flu to transnational terrorism.

Finally, as these complex challenges emerge and evolve, “old” problems still persist. While the number ofviolent conflicts waged around the world has recently declined, inequality—particularly between groupswithin the same country—is on the rise.When this intergroup inequality aligns with religious, ethnic, racialand language divides, the prospect of tension rises. Meanwhile, at the state level, the number of actual andaspirant nuclear-armed countries is growing, as is their ability to acquire weapons through illicit global trade.

As the international institutions created in the aftermath of World War II enter their seventh decade, theircapacity to cope with this complex, rapidly evolving and interconnected security landscape is being sharplytested.The United Nations has made important progress in some of its core functions—“keeping the peace,”providing humanitarian relief, and helping advance human development and security. However, there are


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reasons to question whether the broad UN crisis management system for prevention and response is up tothe test.

Not only the UN, but also regional and state mechanisms are challenged by this complex landscape and thenature and scale of crises. In the Middle East, for example, interlinked conflicts are complicated bydemographic and socioeconomic trends and regional institutions capable of coping with crisis are lacking.In both Latin America and Africa,“old” problems of domestic insecurity arising from weak institutions andincomplete democratization intersect with “new” transnational challenges such as organized crime. Overall,there is reason for concern about net global capacities to cope with these challenges, generating a growingsense of global crisis.

Reading these Working Papers, the first step in a four-year research program, one is left with a sense ofurgency about the need for action and change: action where policies and mechanisms have already beenidentified; change where institutions are deemed inadequate and require innovation. The diversity ofchallenges suggests that solutions cannot rest in one actor or mechanism alone. For example, greater multilat-eral engagement can produce a regulatory framework to combat small arms proliferation and misuse, whileprivate actors, including both industry and local communities, will need to play indispensable roles in forgingglobal solutions to public health provision and food security. At the same time, the complexity andintertwined nature of the challenges require solutions at multiple levels. For example, governments will needto confront the realities that demographic change will impose on them in coming years, while internationalorganizations such as the UN have a key role to play in technical assistance and norm-setting in areas asdiverse as education, urban planning and environmental control.

That the world is changing is hardly news.What is new is a faster rate of change than ever before and anunprecedented interconnectedness between different domains of human activity—and the crises they canprecipitate. This series of Working Papers aims to contribute to understanding these complexities and theresponses that are needed from institutions and decision-makers to cope with these crises, challenges andchange.

Terje Rød-Larsen


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IntroductionIn October 2003, a report to the US Department ofDefense received wide public attention for presentinga grim future scenario with warring states and massivesocial disturbance as a result of dramatic climatechange.1 Although not intended to be a prediction, theauthors nevertheless argued the plausibility of ascenario for rapid climate change which could resultin a significant drop in the human carrying capacity ofthe earth’s environment—food, water, and energyshortages, as well as extreme weather patterns. In turn,resource constraints and environmental damage couldlead to geopolitical destabilization, skirmishes andeven war.

Similar warnings can be found in numerousmedia statements and policy documents. TheChristian Aid charity warns that 184 million peoplecould die in Africa alone as a result of climate changebefore the end of the twenty-first century, throughfloods, famine, drought, and conflict. Similarly, Oxfamrelates climate change to droughts in northern Kenya,in turn leading to conflict between the Turkhanapastoralists and their neighbors. The GermanEnvironment Ministry finds that “evidence ismounting that the adverse effects of climate changecan, particularly by interaction with a number ofsocioeconomic factors, contribute to an increasingpotential for conflict.” And in October 2006, the UKTreasury-commissioned Stern Review argued thatclimate change is likely to cause additional hundredsof millions to suffer hunger, water shortages, andcoastal flooding. Although the report focused mostdirectly on the economic consequences of climatechange, it also foresaw mass migration and conflict inparts of the developing world. However, the link madebetween climate change and violent conflict thatappears so frequently in the media and politicaldiscourse is rarely substantiated with direct empiricalevidence. Some scholars, such as Jon Barnett and NeilAdger, caution that the link between climate changeand conflict is not well established. Egbert Sondorpand Preeti Patel argue that both climate change andconflict may produce serious health consequences, butthat there is insufficient evidence that climate changeleads to violent conflict.

In this paper, we review the current state ofknowledge regarding climate change and violent

conflict, paying special attention to the influentialIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)reports.We find that much of the literature is specula-tive and difficult to substantiate given data constraints.Indeed, current debates frequently focus on possiblescenarios in the future, which are inherently difficultto test, although they should not be discounted.Then,we focus on what we believe to be a plausible linkbetween climate shifts and problems for humansecurity: mass migration. Climate change is likely tobe a significant factor leading to mass exodus fromincreasingly uninhabitable areas, and population shiftsstemming directly or indirectly from environmentalpressures can place significant burdens on migrant-receiving areas. However, we emphasize theimportance of good governance, local integrationcapacity, and international agents as mitigating factors,and discuss effective policy responses. We concludethat given the many serious warnings from prominentvoices, climate change warrants consideration by theUnited Nations as a security threat, although notnecessarily in the traditional sense of military security.

Current KnowledgeThe reports from the IPCC have largely set theagenda for the debate on climate change. Thesereports represent an effort to produce a consensussummary of the best available knowledge about thecauses and effects of climate change. While a fullconsensus has not been achieved, the reportsrepresent a majority viewpoint among scientists andone that is accepted by most governments, with a fewsignificant exceptions such as the US. Figure 1—popularly called “the hockey stick”—depicts the bestevidence regarding the long-term temperaturedeviations in the northern hemisphere. While therehave been warm periods in previous centuries, therecent temperature rise is unprecedented and is hardto explain without reference to the influence ofhuman activities.

Many of the predicted outcomes of climatechange may leave areas uninhabitable or decrease thebasis of subsistence because of changes in rainfallpatterns, leading to drought and floods, extreme andunpredictable weather, the melting of the polar icecapsresulting in sea-level rise, and a temperature rise withheavy impact on the potential for agriculture.

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1 Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall,“An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security,”Washington, DC:Environmental Media Services, available at www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/3566_AbruptClimateChange.pdf. In April 2007 a high-levelpanel of retired US Generals and Admirals also asserted (in less dramatic language) that climate change poses a serious threat to US national security:National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (Alexandria,VA: CNA Corporation), available at http://securityandclimate.cna.org/.

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Although most areas are expected to become warmer,some will heat up more than others. Parts of the worldmay become more fertile and available for growingcrops that traditionally would not survive in thecurrent climate. Other areas may become too hot forhuman habitation. Total rainfall is predicted toincrease, but at the local level trends are much lesscertain. The frequency and intensity of extremeweather events, such as storms and hurricanes, mayrise. Most changes will be gradual, but rapid andunexpected climate transitions cannot be ruled out.One of the most dramatic changes would be a rapidcollapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, which wouldlead to a catastrophic rise in sea-level and changes inocean circulation. Another would be a slowing orreversal of the Gulf Stream, which would makenorthern Europe uninhabitable.

The IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR), issuedin 2001, points out that scarcity of clean freshwater

often constrains economic development and thatchanges in the cycling of water between land, sea, andair could have significant impacts across many sectorsof the economy, society, and the environment. As aresult of climate change, the magnitude and frequencyof floods may increase in many regions; floods incoastal Bangladesh and India, for example, areexpected to affect several million people.The demandfor water will increase as a result of population growthand economic development, but some areas may havediminished access to clean water. Major cities such asQuito, La Paz, and Lima in South America may be atrisk if Andean glaciers melt, since they currently serveas sources of freshwater during dry seasons.The SternReview predicts that 40 million people in these areasmay face such risks by 2025.Also, the glacier-fed riversfrom the Himalayas provide freshwater to one third ofthe world’s population, and these areas couldpotentially be hit by similar problems. More efficient

2 This graph was computed by Ole Magnus Theisen from data posted at www.meteo.psu.edu/~mann/shared/research/old/mbh99.html for an articleby Michael E. Mann, Raymond S. Bradley, and Malcolm K. Hughes (in Geophysical Research Letters 1999). It shows temperatures for the northernhemisphere for AD 1000–1998, measured in °C as deviations from the 1902–1980 mean (indicated by a straight thick line). From 1902 the graphshows the trend in measured data, while for the earlier period the trend is reconstructed using proxies. Estimates prior to AD 1400 are considerablyless reliable than the latter period, due to fewer available proxies. For a survey of the debate about the accuracy of this so-called “hockey stick,” seehttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/3569604.stm.

Figure 1. Temperature Deviations AD 1000–1998 for the Northern Hemisphere2

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water utilization and desalination may mitigate thisdemand, but the capacity to adapt may vary acrosscountries.

The IPCC asserts that the relative vulnerability ofdifferent regions to climatic change is largelydetermined by their access to resources, information,and technology, and by the stability and effectivenessof their institutions. Climate change is likely toincrease world and country-scale inequity, as somecountries and areas within states are better able toadapt. It is also expected to have wide-rangingconsequences for human health through factors suchas food, safe drinking water, secure shelter, and theincreased spread of infectious diseases like malaria,dengue, cholera, and yellow fever. Large epidemicscould have serious socioeconomic impacts, and alterthe relations between communities and countries interms of power and material resources. This couldpotentially lead to some level of instability or conflict,but large-scale violence seems unlikely. Past healthepidemics such as H5N1 avian flu and SARS have notlead to political violence.

Poverty is the factor that can most negativelyaffect a society’s vulnerability to climate change. TheIPCC finds that changes in global climate andatmospheric composition are likely to have an impacton ecosystems and economic sectors, such as forests,wetlands, and agriculture, with significant impacts onsocioeconomic systems. In conjunction with otherglobal changes, such as population growth andmigration, the degradation of natural resources islikely to hinder increases in agricultural productivityand make it more difficult to satisfy the growing worlddemand for food. Developing countries are particu-larly vulnerable because of greater reliance on climatesensitive sectors, such as agriculture. Poverty alsoprevents long-term planning and provisioning at thehousehold level. People and societies with poorfinances and technical ability are less likely to be ableto meet the challenge of climate change.

In addition to national wealth, political institu-tions are also likely to affect the adaptive capacity ofsocieties. Possible coping mechanisms include movingsettlements away from coastal regions, improvingwater conservation in drought-affected areas, andcreating infrastructure in cities expected to facepopulation inflows from affected regions. Poor,authoritarian, and corrupt states that are not respon-

sive to the needs of their citizens are unlikely toimplement needed reforms. Reforms such as popula-tion relocation, energy conservation, and technolog-ical change may be politically costly in the short-termeven if they provide long-term benefits. This time-inconsistency problem may require institutionalchanges that facilitate long-term planning and coordi-nation at the international level.

The IPCC reports make only scattered commentsabout violent conflict as a consequence of climatechange and these are largely based on secondary andpoliticized sources.While violent conflict may indeedbe related to environmental changes, the few system-atic studies show mixed evidence. Moreover, severalmitigating factors are likely to complicate the relation-ship between climate change and conflict.

One concrete link between climate change andviolent conflict is suggested by the TAR, whichobserves that “much has been written about thepotential for international conflict (hot or cold) overwater resources.”3 The report comments that a changein water availability has the potential to induceconflict between different users. But such disputesneed not be violent; they could even stimulatecooperation. The sources cited by the IPCC provideweak support for the idea of conflict over scarce waterresources.The writings of Peter Gleick, Michael Klare,and others suggest a potential for water wars, but otherscholars such as Peter Beaumont and Aaron Wolf arguethat cooperation generally trumps conflict in handlingshared water resources. Statistical studies have foundthat neighboring countries that share rivers experi-ence low-level interstate conflict somewhat morefrequently, but that they also tend to cooperate more.Whether conflict or cooperation will dominate is nota simple function of scarcity but depends on othervariables such as mediation and dispute resolutionmechanisms, the nature of property rights, and theability to enforce agreements.

The overall impression from the IPCC report isthat the link between climate change and conflict isunclear.Where such a link is mentioned, it is weaklysubstantiated with evidence.The Stern Review on theeconomics of climate change invites the same charac-terization. Its references to how conflict “may” occuras a result of climate change are mostly based onsecond-hand sources of the same nature as those usedby the IPCC.4 The expected causal link from climate

3 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Third Assessment Report: Climate Change, 2001 Vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2001) p. 225.

4 Some recent econometric work on the relationship between internal conflict and rainfall changes (as a proxy for economic instability) is also cited,but the implications of this work are not discussed at any length.

illustrates two causal pathways from environmentalstress, to migration, and to conflict. First, environ-mental problems may lead to emigration directly.Secondly, environmental stress may lead to resourceconflicts, and these conflicts may produce refugees.Each type of migration may lead to conflict inreceiving areas; however, they may not have the sameeffects. Migration directly caused by environmentalfactors may lead to social tensions and sporadicviolence in receiving areas, but is not likely to causesustained, organized armed conflict. In contrast,political refugees from violent regions are more likelyto become involved in militant activities, althougheven this is not a foregone conclusion.

Environmental change can contribute directly tomigration by pushing people out of uninhabitableareas. Catastrophic events and disasters—such ashurricanes and floods—can serve as an immediatepush; long-term changes such as desertification canlead to a decline in living standards that increase thecosts of staying versus leaving.

Research on global climate change suggestsseveral possible mechanisms through which peoplemay be forced out of their current habitat. Sea-levelrise caused by a reduction in glacial coverage may leadto the flooding of coastal areas. Low-lying, coastalregions may be evacuated as water encroaches uponhuman habitats. Desertification may cause people tomigrate out of unproductive and water-scarce areas.Greater variability in weather patterns lead todramatic climate events such as hurricanes, typhoons,and extreme cold which may disrupt human settle-ments. And unpredictable rainfall will lead to periodsof flooding and drought, making certain areasuninhabitable.

change to conflict seems to be cited uncritically fromone source to the next.

The possible consequences of climate change aremany and varied, and some of them potentially veryserious. Impacts on biodiversity, agriculture, watersupply, and so on, will certainly alter current patternsof consumption and production, as well as humansettlement patterns.The economic consequences havebeen modeled in the Stern Review as well as byindependent scholars such as William Nordhaus andWilliam Cline. But the link to violent conflict hasuntil very recently been largely unexplored. It isentirely plausible—though not predetermined—thatviolent conflict will emerge as the result of climaticshifts. One of the more likely and most discussedscenarios, as we explore below, is that conflict couldemerge as a result of environmentally inducedmigration.

Challenges: Environment-InducedMigrationIn this section, we will discuss at some length popula-tion migration as one of the most plausible links fromclimate change to conflict. There is some relevantempirical research in this area, although conclusionsare still tentative. As one example, the Stern Reviewcites an estimate that by the middle of the century, 200million people may become permanently displaced“climate refugees” due to rising sea levels, heavierfloods, and more intense droughts.

Migration may lead to conflict in receiving areasif not properly managed, but the motives formigration affect the propensity for violence. Figure 2

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Figure 2. Environmental Stress, Migration, and Conflict: Direct and Indirect Pathways

Environmental stresses may also lead to migrationindirectly. Resource scarcity and competition can leadto conflict within a country or region, and suchconflict may increase emigration. Grievance models ofconflict argue that people will fight if they see adecline in their living conditions, particularly inrelation to others. For example, people working inagriculture may be more affected by drought or floodsthan people in urban areas, leading to higher incomeinequality within societies and greater relativedeprivation. Furthermore, if certain ethnic groups areconcentrated in particular regions adversely affectedby climate change, they may demand compensation orredress to counter growing inequalities. Ethnicdivisions need not be conflictual, but when they arecoupled with income inequality between ethnicgroups, violence is more likely. Eventually, the scarcityof resources such as water, farmland, and timber maylead to Malthusian conflict between peoplecompeting over the same limited supply goods.

A large body of literature in political science andeconomics suggests, however, that while grievancesmay be important, they are not sufficient explanationsfor conflict. Grievances and resource competition,combined with lack of representative institutions,economic redistribution mechanisms, and poor statecapacity to deter violence, present the greatest risk ofconflict. For example, although Botswana faces manycharacteristics that are typically associated withviolence in Africa—HIV/AIDS, poverty, ethnicdivisions, and diamond resources—democratic institu-tions have prevented violent outbreaks by providingalternative dispute resolution mechanisms.

There is some limited statistical evidence tosuggest that environmental problems have led toconflict in the past. A frequently cited study byWenche Hauge and Tanja Ellingsen found a positivelink between environmental degradation andviolence; while they suggest that this effect is quitesmall, future climate change may make environmentalstress a more substantively significant predictor ofviolence.The Phase II Report of the US State FailureTask Force concluded that the link is weak and arecent study by Ole Magnus Theisen failed to replicatethe Hauge and Ellingsen results. Nevertheless,environmental conflicts may emerge in the future ifclimate change exacerbates conflict patterns. Severalstudies have found a relationship between conflict andvariations in the pattern of rainfall. For example,

pastoral conflicts are heightened during downturns inenvironmental conditions, and aridity and resourcedepletion in West Africa has led to greater tensions.

If climate change does lead to an increase inarmed conflict, emigration is likely. A large body ofstatistical research confirms a strong relationshipbetween civil conflict and refugee migration(although most of these conflicts do not have directroots in environmental problems). Sometimes, thesemigration flows can be substantial. For example,conflicts in Mozambique,Afghanistan, Israel/Palestine,and Iraq have each generated millions of refugees. Forreceiving areas, the sudden influx of large numbers ofpeople can be especially burdensome and disruptive.The size of refugee communities relative to the hostsociety can be very large (1:3 in Jordan in 2001, 1:11in Lebanon)5; such flows can significantly impact labormarket conditions and the demographic balancebetween ethnic groups. Thus, if environmentalpressures do lead to conflict, it is quite likely that theseconflicts will lead to substantial population disloca-tions.

Links between Migration and Conflict in ReceivingAreasSeveral studies have suggested that internal as well asinternational migration can lead to tensions inreceiving areas. However, immigrants can also addeconomic skills and cultural vibrancy to theirreceiving areas. Nevertheless, at times conflicts havearisen from migration inflows, particularly if theinflow is large-scale and disorderly. For instance, theChittagong Hill tribes in Bangladesh have beeninvolved in violent conflict with the state over theinflux of Bengalis from the plains, whom they view asa threat. Bengali migration to the north-east Indianregion of Assam has also contributed to socialfrictions. Increased migration rates can further fuelsocial tensions in these regions, particularly asBangladesh is a frequently mentioned victim of futuresea-level rise and vast population dislocation.

Conflict and human security are frequently usedas catch-all terms to describe a wide array of issues,but political violence involving migrants and localsmay take a variety of forms. Unorganized interper-sonal violence such as assault, property damage,murder, and riots rarely develop into sustainedcampaigns. By contrast, rebellions and full-blown civilwars involve long-term organization and substantial

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5 However, the two largest refugee streams recorded in 2001 (over two million) went to large countries, where they made up a smaller proportion ofthe population, 1:26 in Iran and 1:72 in Pakistan.

resources. All violence is disruptive, but organizedrebellion has a much more deleterious impact oneconomic and social conditions because it oftenendures for a long time and places greater strains onstate resources.

While migration has the potential to provoke aviolent reaction, there are important differencesbetween conflict patterns stemming from “environ-mental migrants” versus “classic” refugees. Migrantsfleeing directly from natural disasters such as flooding,hurricanes, and desertification are not likely tocontribute to organized violence, although sporadicviolence may arise. Many environmental stressesrelating to climate change are gradual and will lead tosmall, though sustained migration streams.Desertification and sea-level rise, for instance, areprocesses that will develop over several decades, if notcenturies, and are not likely to provoke massiveemigration over the short-term. Receiving areas canadapt to gradual migration. Even massive emigrationsparked by environmental disasters has not led towidespread, sustained fighting. Hurricanes Mitch andKatrina, and the Asian Tsunami (which was caused bya geological, not a meteorological phenomenon) eachled to the displacement of thousands of people. But inthose cases receiving areas did not experienceorganized violence.

Classic refugees pose a different set of challenges.In some circumstances the emergence of refugeecommunities has generated violent conflict inreceiving areas, as Idean Salehyan and Kristian S.Gleditsch have found. While a majority of thecountries with an influx of refugees since the 1950sremain peaceful, the probability of armed conflict(that generates at least 25 battle-related deaths) is morethan tripled by the presence of refugees. Migrantsfrom conflict areas have a direct stake in the outcomeof fighting in their home country, especially the ex postdistribution of resources. Many refugees also have apersonal experience of victimization or persecutionand therefore demand the removal of the regime inpower, or significant political concessions.Furthermore, during periods of civil conflict, thehyper-politicized political environment encouragesrefugee mobilization for one side or the other.Thus,Tamil refugees in India, Afghan refugees in Pakistan,Rwandan refugees in DR Congo, to name but a fewexamples, maintain ties with combatant factions intheir countries of origin. These refugees are oftenrecruited directly into militant groups and are oftenrelied upon for material support.Along with migrantsthemselves, receiving areas often “import” arms,

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organizational structures, resources, and ideologiesconducive to violence. Refugees can expand rebelsocial networks to receiving areas and may serve asconduits for the spread of armed conflict.

Refugees from conflict zones frequently engagein cross-border attacks against their home govern-ment, and pursuit by state forces jeopardizes nationalsecurity and the safety of local populations. Burmeserefugees in Thailand and Nicaraguan refugees inHonduras, for example, often launched attacks ontheir home countries, and these were frequently metwith government raids across the border. As such,refugee flows can threaten relations between sendingand receiving countries. Receiving countries areaccused of harboring militants and sending countriesare blamed for imposing a refugee burden on theirneighbors. Thus, cross-border fighting betweenrefugee communities and sending states has thepotential to drag the receiving country into the war.In extreme cases, the presence of militarized refugeecommunities across the border has led to large-scaleinvasions of neighboring territory. For instance, in1982 Israel invaded and held part of Lebaneseterritory in order to deprive the Palestine LiberationOrganization of its external bases, and Rwandabecame involved in the Congo after Hutu refugeesbegan to organize opposition groups in the camps.Forced migration following internal violence can alsocause a conflict to spread to new areas.

Purely environmental migrants, on the otherhand, often do not have political agendas in theirhome region and they do not necessarily regardthemselves as victims of persecution deserving justice.If people flee for economic or environmental reasonsrather than because of armed conflict, the risk ofimporting organized and sustained conflict should belower. Current migration patterns are instructive inthis regard. Across Europe and North America,hundreds of thousands of economic migrants gainaccess each year. Although racist attacks, ethnic riots,and murders do occur, such incidents have generallybeen short-lived and without large-scale organization.The 2005 riots in ethnic ghettoes across France havehighlighted the potential for interethnic violence. Inthe British cities of Bradford, Oldham, and Burnleyracial tensions erupted into widespread riots in thesummer of 2001, and the July 2005 terrorist attacks onthe London transportation system created widespreadfear of inter-communal conflict involving Muslimimmigrants and their children born in the UK. Yet,these incidents primarily underscore the importanceof social and economic integration. Economic

migrants have also caused strains in other immigrantreceiving countries such as Saudi Arabia (South-EastAsians), South Africa (other Africans), Indonesia andMalaysia (Chinese), and Costa Rica (Nicaraguans), butthese migrant streams have not generated sustained,organized violence. Astri Suhrke argues that whetheror not environmentally induced migration producesconflict in the receiving area depends on the role ofthe state in the host community. The potential forsocial tensions stemming from environmentally-induced migration should not be dismissed, but thelikelihood of sustained armed conflict is low.Moreover, effective immigrant integration andincorporation can greatly reduce social friction.

The link between climate change, migration, andconflict remains conjectural. Because it is difficult toisolate different causes of migration, it is unclearwhether specific population movements haveoccurred as a direct result of environmental stressesrooted in climatic shift.There is good evidence linkingconflict and emigration in sending areas and immigra-tion and conflict in receiving areas. On the otherhand, there is a lack of consensus and systematic dataon the effects of climate change on migration and onthe effect of climate-induced migration on conflict.Clearly identifying the sources of environmentally-induced migration and environmental conflicts is adifficult, yet much needed endeavor.

Empirical evidence can only reveal patterns ofsocial behavior that have already occurred. Much ofthe debate about climate change involves futureforecasts and possible scenarios. It is quite possible thatthe most disruptive effects of climate change willoccur at some point in the future. Thus, preparationfor future events must be rooted in an analysis of bestand worst case scenarios and firm theoretical founda-tions.

CapacitiesMigration challenges can be met at different levels,and dealt with differently depending on states’ capaci-ties.Wealthy states in firm control of their borders aremore likely to be able to control immigration thanstates with more limited resources. The capacity tocontrol the large influx of immigrants from Africa toEurope by way of the sea is currently being tested, asShada Islam’s Working Paper in this series indicates.6

European states exert diplomatic pressure on thesending countries to limit migration. Southern

European states have also started using satellites,surveillance planes, naval vessels, and border fences tohinder refugees from entering their territory, as hasthe US in its attempts to control immigration fromMexico and the Caribbean. Again, in the event oflarge flows of immigrants due to climate change, richcountries in the West are likely to have the capacity toadopt policies to counter immigration, and thoseresponses may become increasingly harsh. Countriesthat have limited capacity to regulate the influx will beconfronted with the challenges that occur oncerefugees settle within their borders.

In meeting the challenge of environmentalmigration and the possibility of conflict, three layers ofresponses are likely to be important. First, migration ismost acutely felt at the local level, and local govern-mental agencies are often the first to respond. Localgovernments must be equipped with the capacity todeal with the needs of both internal and internationalmigrants. This will include standard responses topopulation growth such as increased electricity andwater provision, housing, sanitation, and publicservices. Migrants may also pose special challenges aslocal service providers must deal with new languagesand customs. Refugees from conflict zones often havefaced physical and psychological trauma, and localhealth care providers must also have the ability torespond to these needs.

Second, national-level capacities can also beimproved to deal with migration. National govern-ments can work to coordinate and systematize localresponses rather than having local regulations applyhaphazardly. States are also tasked with immigrationand customs enforcement. National agencies will beresponsible for determining which migrants deserveaccess to the state, where immigrants are allowed tosettle, the types of jobs and services they are able topursue, citizenship policies and so on.Wise immigra-tion and integration policies may dampen potentialconflicts in receiving countries.

Third, international agencies such as the UnitedNations High Commissioner for Refugees(UNHCR) and the International Organization forMigration can assist national and local authorities indeveloping their capacities to respond to migrationwhen resources are insufficient. Wealthy donor statescan use such organizations and their technicalexpertise to assist developing countries, which oftenlack the ability to effectively deal with mass immi-gration. Aside from direct humanitarian relief, such

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6 See Shada Islam,“Europe: Crises of Identity,” Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series, International Peace Academy, New York, March 2007.

agencies have also proven effective in developingemployment programs, health care facilities, andeducation for youth. In addition, the UNHCR oftenworks with national immigration and border enforce-ment agencies to improve the capacity of such actorsto screen migrants and regulate the admissionsprocess.

ScenariosThe long and uncertain causal chains from climatechange to social consequences like conflict leavepolicy advocates to tend toward speculation—some ofit irresponsible or with special agendas in mind.Predictions about the future of climate change varyfrom the apocalyptic to the reassuring. Futurescenarios vary on two dimensions: one is whether ornot the models of the IPCC accurately reflect reality;a minority of skeptics question whether the long-termtemperature rise is reliably estimated and whether theman-made contribution to climate change has asignificant impact over and above natural variation.The second dimension concerns the ability of theinternational community to cope with the challengesof climate change—in order to slow it down and/ormitigate some of the consequences through adapta-tion and technological change. The timescale overwhich climate change and such dramaticconsequences as severe sea-level rise occurs is crucialfor societal adaptation.The worst case or catastrophicscenario discussed below assumes that climate changewill be severe and that there will be an inadequateresponse to the challenge. The best case or goldenscenario applies if either the model’s results areexaggerated or the response is adequate. In the middlescenario (“muddling through”), the environmentalchallenge will be present, while the responses will varywith the willingness and ability to act.

Worst Case: The Catastrophic ScenarioA dramatic scenario for how climate change couldlead to internal and external conflict is found in thewidely-publicized report to the Pentagon by PeterSchwartz and Doug Randall, who start from a worst-case reading of the IPCC and do not consider adapta-tion mechanisms.The report points to the possibilityof relatively abrupt changes in temperature andoutlines how wealthy nations would fortify theirborders in order to preserve their resources. Less

fortunate countries, especially those involved indisputes with their neighbors may initiate strugglesover access to food, clean water, or energy resulting inunlikely alliances as defense objectives and prioritieschange from abstract issues, like religion or nationalhonor, to resources for survival. These authors evenforesee skirmishes within the EU over food and watersupplies and a conflict between Germany and Franceover the Rhine for commercial purposes—as well assouthward population movements to countries such asAlgeria, Morocco, Egypt, and Israel.As famine, diseaseand weather-related disasters strike due to the abruptclimate change, many countries’ needs will exceedtheir carrying capacity, generating a sense of despera-tion and the likely proliferation of nuclear weapons ascountries respond to diminishing global oil reserves byturning to nuclear energy.

The Schwartz and Randall report argues that it isnot unlikely that we are rapidly approaching athreshold of climate change, where the pace of changewill pick up dramatically. With its potentiallyapocalyptic visions, it belongs to a tradition ofenvironmental doomsday scenarios inspired byThomas Malthus. Climate change fits nicely into thisapocalyptic tradition because its possible consequencesare so wide-ranging and drastic. Tim Flannery, forinstance, argues that non-adaptation to climate changeis equivalent to genocide and that if we pursuebusiness as usual for the next fifty years, “the collapseof civilization due to climate change is inevitable.”7

The Stern Review seems on somewhat firmerground when discussing model-based assessments ofthe economic impacts of climate change.While formalmodels have generally concluded that 2-3ºC warmingwould involve a loss of 0–3 percent of global GDP(more in poor countries), Stern assumes that “businessas usual” policies may lead to 5-6ºC warming by theend of this century, corresponding to 5-10 percent lossof global GDP.When taking into account a wider setof risks (health and social and political instability,amplifying feedbacks in the climate system, andassigning a greater relative weight to the effects on thepoor), the economic effect of climate change couldapproach 20 percent of global GDP.

During the last two years the possibility of a“tipping point” appears more frequently in the climatechange literature—the idea that after a certainthreshold there might be unexpected systemresponses, and changes in climate will accelerate

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7 Tim Flannery, The Weather Makers: How Man is Changing the Climate and What it Means for Life on Earth, (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2005) p. 208.

rapidly and irreversibly. One very drastic climatechange scenario is the collapse of the West Antarcticand Greenland Ice Sheets, events that could conceiv-ably raise sea levels by more than 15 meters, and thepossibility of another catastrophic event, the failure ofthe Gulf Stream. Should the larger and more stableEast Antarctic Ice Sheet also melt, this would raise theearth’s sea-levels by another 60 meters according toresearch by Peter Clark and his colleagues. In theabsence of adequate countermeasures, this could flooddozens of main cities, including London and NewYork, putting millions of people at risk.

The worst-case combination—cataclysmicclimate change and little adaptation—also affects themigration-conflict dynamic. The Stern Reviewforesees an additional 200 million climate changemigrants. Widespread resource scarcity will lead tomass migration to areas with better opportunities.Attempts to limit or manage migration will beswamped by the sheer numbers of environmentalrefugees. Attempts to seal off wealthier regions willlead to social conflict as the “have-nots” attempt toenter.

The worst-case scenario is possible, but unlikely. Itinvolves uncertainty both in the degree and speed ofclimate change and in the success or failure of adapta-tion. It is impossible at this stage to assign credibleprobabilities to the extreme outcomes.

Best Case: The Golden Scenario

A small, but vocal minority of scholars argue thatclimate change scenarios are still fraught with toomany uncertainties for us to act upon them at present.They suggest that the evidence for a long-termtemperature rise is not persuasive, that a forecast of a 6ºC temperature rise is too high, and that the man-made contribution to such a rise remains uncertain.Other contrarians basically accept the climate changescenarios, but argue that the costs of the conventionalcountermeasures are too high. Limiting or reversingcarbon (CO2) emissions to the atmosphere is likely todampen economic activity. It is better to let economicgrowth continue and use part of the gains to alleviatethe consequences of climate change, if and when theyoccur.Current forecasts of world growth, and even theIPCC’s own scenarios, foreshadow a world that will beso much richer in, say, 2050 that it will be able tocover the cost of global warming—assuming thatindustrialized countries are willing to take on some ofthe costs of developing countries. Many leadingeconomists argue that human welfare would be betterserved by giving priority to combating HIV, providing

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clean freshwater to poor countries, or engage in otherhealth measures that promise to save thousands of livesat low cost. At present money would be better spenton solutions for these problems and until moreproductive proposals emerge, action to reverse climatechange should remain lower on the agenda.

The Stern Review’s migration projections are basedon an estimate that more than 200 million peoplecurrently live in coastal floodplains at less than onemeter elevation. However, a one-meter sea level rise isabove the IPCC’s highest estimate for 2100 and noconsideration is given to possible countermeasures,such as dikes. Of course, even if climate changeproduces a much smaller number of environmentalrefugees or none at all, there will still be a largenumber of people who migrate for traditionaleconomic or political reasons, and so climate changemigration does not present a new category ofconcern.

The best case scenario for climate change and forthe human-induced component clearly represents aminority opinion among the leading experts.But evensome of those who are greatly concerned aboutclimate change (such as Al Gore and the Stern Review)remain optimistic about our capacity to counteract it,if the political will can be mobilized.

Muddling Through: The Middle ScenarioIf the majority position of the scientific community iscorrect, we are likely to see a substantial temperatureshift and sea-level rise approaching one meter in thiscentury, and in part this will be caused by humanactivity. The uncertainties surrounding the degree ofglobal warming, the potential effects for humancivilization, and the costs of prevention and mitiga-tion, pose a cruel dilemma, which William Nordhaushas formulated as follows: Should we be ultraconser-vative and preserve nature at the expense of economicdevelopment? Or, should we put human bettermentabove the preservation of natural systems and trusthuman ingenuity to find a solution?

There is no easy answer to this dilemma, but inthis third scenario we assume that global warming isaccurately depicted in Figure 1, that a substantialelement of the warming is due to human activities,and that the challenge needs to be addressed, even if ithas less dramatic consequences than those envisaged inthe worst-case scenario. Finding ways to preserveeconomic growth and meet people’s basic needs whilemitigating the negative effects of environmentalchange is the key issue.

The response to climate change may in part be

technical. A partial solution may lie in technologicalinnovation and cleaner energy sources such as solar,nuclear, and wind power. More efficient irrigation, soilconservation, and food production techniques mayalso be developed. Technological transfers todeveloping countries will be important in this regard,allowing poor countries to leapfrog the pollutingproduction techniques used in the last century byindustrialized states.

Other responses will be political. Internationalcooperation with a view to reducing the emission ofgreenhouse gases is one such strategy for tackling thisproblem.The Kyoto Protocol is far from satisfactory inthis regard because of its arbitrary target (reducingemissions of high-income countries to 1990 levels),because it punishes efficiency and rewards slowgrowth, and because too many important countriesremain outside the protocol. Strong global leadershipby major powers, particularly the US, will be neededto foster international collective action. Writers likeJon Barnett and Thomas Homer-Dixon alsoemphasize the importance of proper governance atthe national and local level in order to mitigate theeffects of global warming. A common theme is thateffective governing institutions can reduce some ofthe negative effects of environmental change andimprove adaptive capacity. Yet, time-inconsistencyproblems may hamper needed reform. Changes incurrent policies are likely to be costly in the short-term—particularly for economic actors who have aninterest in maintaining the status quo—and politicalleaders may not be willing to make necessary changesnow in order to avert future dilemmas.

In the short term, the poorest governments willhave the least capacity to engage in efforts to mitigatethe effects of climate change. While natural disastersaffect rich and poor countries alike, floods, typhoons,and earthquakes cause more severe destruction of lifeand property in the developing world. Thus, povertyand environmental stresses interact to create severeoutcomes not experienced in areas with betterresources for crisis management. Therefore, theassistance of wealthy donor states will be necessary toimprove local adaptive capacity and to facilitate thetraining of local service providers in developingcountries. Doing so is not merely an altruisticendeavor. Because environmental disasters indeveloping countries may lead to greater migration,providing generous assistance programs will serve tolimit emigration at its source and is likely to be more

efficient than reactive (and often unsuccessful) borderenforcement.

In addition to tackling environmental problems,the governance of migration flows when they occurwill be vital in preventing the adverse consequences ofpopulation dislocations. Many migrant communitiesco-exist peacefully among local populations and makeimportant contributions to their host societies.Whileconflict can certainly emerge as the result ofmigration, this is by no means a given fact; policies toeffectively integrate migrants into society and theeconomy are likely to be a decisive element indetermining its consequences. Countries that adopteffective policies, some of which we consider below,will face much less of a risk from mass migration thanthose which do not.

Policy RecommendationsOur recommendations focus on what can be done toprevent environment-induced migration from leadingto conflict. Because of the wide nature of negativeeffects that are foreseen in climate change scenarios,some of which are very serious, we think that theUnited Nations should be centrally involved. Climatechange is essentially an international problem, sincegreenhouse gases cannot be contained and limited toa particular part of the globe. There is considerableuncertainty about the geophysical scenarios, evenmore so on the social and economic consequences.Although the dramatic scenarios outlined in thePentagon report and in the Stern Review are by nomeans universally accepted, the emerging consensusamong scientists is that some degree of climate changewill occur and that changes in human settlementpatterns and economic production will follow.

In order to foster a global dialogue, it would beuseful to call a special session of the UN GeneralAssembly. Such special sessions have been called todiscuss disarmament (1978), small island states (1999),the situation of children (2002), and to commemoratethe sixtieth anniversary of the liberation of the Naziconcentration camps (2005). Climate change wouldcertainly warrant special attention in the GeneralAssembly. For a more extended discussion, the mattermight be referred to the Economic and SocialCouncil. However, it would have considerably greaterweight if the issue could be put on the agenda of theSecurity Council as it has “primary responsibility forthe maintenance of international peace and security.”8

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8 See Article 24, UN Charter.As this paper went to press, a first such session was held on April 17th at the request of the Security Council chair fromthe UK.The Secretary-General has said that the UN is also considering a “high-level meeting” on climate change (Agence France Press,April 12, 2007).

For the Council to discuss the consequences ofclimate change implies a new and wider interpretationof security. Such a reinterpretation has been made bythe governments of many member states, by interna-tional organizations such as NATO, by the NorwegianNobel Committee (which awards the Nobel PeacePrize), and others. The UN should face the issue ofclimate change as a crisis that threatens the security ofits member states and humanity, even if armed conflictis not a major component of that threat. Some scholarshave argued that the UN should broaden its securityagenda and the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panelon Threats, Challenges, and Change (2004) also offerssome cautious support for such a view.

With reference to climate change specifically,relevant policy measures might include encouragingpeople to move out of flood plains and assisting withrelocation costs; the development and use of cleanerenergy technologies; fostering more efficient irriga-tion and water consumption; improving shelters toprevent damage during severe weather events; andimproving disaster preparedness and response strate-gies.

As noted, wealthy industrialized democracies aremore likely to be able to adopt these recommenda-tions than poor, corrupt, and non-democratic states.Therefore, the UN—through existing agencies ornew ones—should make technological transfers todeveloping states a key priority. Where politicaltransparency is lacking, providing oversightmechanisms to ensure that new technologies anddonor funds are used appropriately for their intendedpurpose is also critical. Dealing with the sensitive issueof intellectual property rights must also be addressedin a comprehensive manner.

Even in developed democracies, however,implementing needed reforms may be difficult forpoliticians with immediate reelection pressures,especially if such changes will be politically costly.Moving the discussion on climate change up to theUN level, providing positive leadership and induce-ments, and giving decision-making rights to actorswho are independent of electoral pressures could helpbridge this gap in priorities.

For mitigating the risks of refugee flows associatedwith environmental conflicts, several measures are inorder. These include locating refugees away fromconflict zones, particularly border regions; preventingthe infiltration of arms and combatants into civilianrefugee communities and encampments; providingmeaningful alternatives to violence to refugees by

allowing productive employment; and fosteringdialogue with local communities to address theeconomic and social concerns of receiving areas.Furthermore, assistance from donor states and agenciessuch as the UN High Commissioner for Refugeeswill be important for developing countries that lackthe capacity to adequately govern refugee communi-ties.

In dealing with environmental migrants as well as“classic” refugees, receiving areas can also engage in anumber of additional positive measures to preventhostilities. Cases where violence has emerged havegenerally suffered from a lack of cultural awarenessand sensitivity by locals and immigrants, as well asbarriers to the full incorporation of migrants in theirreceiving areas. Steps to address these problems mayinclude preventing discrimination against immigrantsin the workplace; insuring access to governmentservices and social activities; revising citizenship lawsto allow immigrants to become naturalized citizensand full participants in the political life of thecommunity; promoting tolerance and respect fordiversity through public education programs; andfacilitating language acquisition and civic awarenessamong immigrant communities.

Along these lines, the UN sorely needs a newinternational agreement on migration, as BimalGhosh has argued. An international regime onmigration must include comprehensive legal measureson the rights of migrants, refugees from combat zones,migrants interdicted at sea, and environmentalmigration. The current UN Refugee Convention isoutdated and is fraught with ambiguities which haveled to the uneven application of refugee and asylumpolicies. Given that migration pressures are likely torise as the result of climate change, and the haphazardand inconsistent policies of numerous receivingcountries, the UN must exercise leadership on thisissue.

In sum, climate change is likely to be a realproblem in the coming decades. Even if the emissionof greenhouse gases is reduced now, a certain degreeof climate change is inevitable. Internationalmigration, which has already become a hot politicalissue in many states, is likely to be exacerbated byclimatic shifts. However, human adaptability, techno-logical planning, and foresight promise to assuage themost severe effects.Therefore, developing appropriateresponses to environmental pressures and preparingfor shifting settlement patterns now should be high onthe UN’s agenda.

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Further Reading

There are many “must read” publications on climate change and we list only a few of them, but there are very fewon its possible consequences for conflict. In addition to the works listed below, we have compiled a more extensivelist of references as well as references to our data sources.This document can be found on our replication page atwww.prio.no/cscw/datasets.A number of papers relevant to the topic of this paper were presented at theWorkshop on Human Security and Climate Change at Holmen Fjordhotell,Asker, Norway on 21–22 June 2005,see www.cicero.uio.no/humsec. Particularly relevant are the papers by Barnett & Adger; Hendrix & Glaser; Levy etal.; Meier & Bond; Niasse; Nordås & Gleditsch; Obioha; Patnaik & Narayanan; Raleigh & Urdal; Reuveny; andSalehyan.A selection of revised papers will be published as a special issue of Political Geography in the fall of 2007.

Flannery,Tim. The Weather Makers: How Man is Changing the Climate and What It Means for Life on Earth. New York:Atlantic Monthly Press, 2005.

A masterful popular survey of the environmental aspects of climate change written by a paleontologist inspiredby the Gaia hypothesis.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter.“Armed Conflict and The Environment:A Critique of the Literature.” Journal of PeaceResearch 35, no.3 (1998): 381–400.

A critical review of the literature on environmental conflict on theoretical, empirical, and methodological grounds. Relevant to the climate change debate but does not deal with it directly.

Homer-Dixon,Thomas. Environment, Scarcity and Violence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999.

A classic work drawing on theory and cases relating resource scarcity to civil violence, particularly where itinteracts with social and distributional factors.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. IPCC Third Assessment Report: Climate Change, 2001. 5 Vols. Geneva:Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change & Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.Availableat www.ipcc.ch.

The authoritative synthesis of the best available science, although it has also been criticized for political compromises.A Fourth Assessment Report, Climate Change 2007, is in the process of being finalized forpublication in 2007 and will set a new agenda for the discussion of climate change.

Lomborg, Bjørn, ed. Global Crises, Global Solutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

An ambitious attempt to have academic experts review the major challenges of our time, including climatechange, and put forward proposals for tackling them. Less skeptical of the mainstream climate change literaturethan Lomborg’s earlier work (The Skeptical Environmentalist, Cambridge University Press, 2001), but in areview by a panel of prominent economists the specific proposals for reducing climate change gain scant supportrelative to proposals for improvements in public health and nutrition.

Nordhaus,William D. and Joseph Boyer. Warming the World: Economic Models of Global Warming. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press, 2000.

A basic text on modeling the economic effects of climate change. In a recent critique of the Stern Review (available at http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/) Nordhaus argues that its radically much larger economic

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effects are driven by an extreme assumption about discounting, i.e., the relative weight of future and presentpayoffs.

Salehyan, Idean and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch.“Refugee Flows and the Spread of Civil War.” International Organization 60, no.2 (2000): 335–366.

The authors find that part of the explanation for the observed geographic clustering of civil wars lies in refugeeflows and transnational rebel networks.While the emphasis is not on environmental migration per se, thisstudy suggests that environmental conflict can spread to other states given large-scale refugee migration.

Schwartz, Peter and Doug Randall.“An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United StatesNational Security.” Washington, DC: Environmental Media Services, 2003.Available atwww.environmentaldefense.org/documents/3566_AbruptClimateChange.pdf.

The best-publicized apocalyptic scenario linking climate change to conflict. Gained wide publicity and providesa useful illustration of a view found in much neomalthusian writing about environmental change, but shouldbe read critically.

Stern, Nicholas et al. The Economics of Climate Change (The Stern Review). Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2007.Available at:www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/stern_review_report.cfm.

The most widely-publicized work to date on the economic effects of climate change. Some backgrounddocuments can be found at www.tyndall.ac.uk/ and critiques have been circulated by Lomborg, Nordhaus,and others.

Suhrke,Astri.“Environmental Degradation, Migration, and the Potential for Violent Conflict.” In Conflict and theEnvironment. Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., eds. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1997.

An early and balanced assessment of the interaction of environmental, political, and social factors in conflict,with direct reference to climate change and migration. Draws on extensive case evidence from Asia and Africain particular.

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The International Peace Academy is an independent, international institution dedicated to promotingthe prevention and settlement of armed conflicts between and within states through policy research anddevelopment.

Coping with Crisis is a multi-year research and policy-facilitation program on emerging human andinternational security challenges and institutional response capacities.

The Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series

The Middle East: Fragility and CrisisMarkus Bouillon

Africa: Confronting Complex ThreatsKwesi Aning

Asia: Towards Security CooperationMichael Vatikiotis

Central Asia and the Caucasus:A Vulnerable CrescentThomas de Waal and Anna Matveeva

Europe: Crises of IdentityShada Islam

Latin America and the Caribbean:Domestic and Transnational InsecurityArlene Tickner

Global Political Violence: Explaining thePost-Cold War DeclineAndrew Mack

New Challenges for Peacekeeping: Protection,Peacebuilding and the “War on Terror”Richard Gowan and Ian Johnstone

Small Arms and Light Weapons: Towards GlobalPublic PolicyKeith Krause

Ending Wars and Building PeaceCharles Call and Elizabeth Cousens

Peacemaking and Mediation: Dynamics of aChanging FieldChester Crocker

Nuclear Weapons: The Challenges AheadChristine Wing

Transnational Organized Crime: MultilateralResponses to a Rising ThreatJames Cockayne

Global Terrorism: Multilateral Responses to anExtraordinary ThreatEric Rosand

Global Public Health and Biosecurity: ManagingTwenty-First Century RisksMargaret Kruk

Population Trends: Humanity in TransitionJoseph Chamie

Energy Security: Investment or InsecurityFatih Birol

Food Security: Vulnerability Despite AbundanceMarc Cohen

Climate Change and Conflict: The Migration LinkNils Petter Gleditsch, Ragnhild Nordås, and Idean Salehyan

Poverty and Conflict: The Inequality LinkRavi Kanbur

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For more information about the series and electronic access to additional papers go towww.ipacademy.org/our-work/coping-with-crisis/working-papers.

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