Intern Report:

Coordinating Efforts by Volunteer and Technical Communities for Disaster

Preparedness, Response, and Relief

Erin Boehmer, Research Assistant

Commons Lab of the Science and Technology Innovation Program

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

July 22, 2011

On my honor as a University student, on this assignment I have neither given nor received

unauthorized aid as defined by the Honor Guidelines for papers in Science, Technology and

Society courses.

Erin Boehmer

i

Executive Summary

Volunteer and Technical Communities (V&TCs), are global networks composed of

technical professionals and volunteers with expertise in social media, geographic information

systems (GIS), database management, and/or online campaigns. These communities are quickly

redefining disaster preparedness, response, and relief, but face organizational, technical, social,

and political challenges (detailed in this paper). For example, many V&TCs’ have distributed

internal structures that support open source software development and prevent against slow-

moving bureaucracy. This design challenges the status quo of humanitarian aid organizations and

government agencies and makes interactions amongst parties challenging as V&TCs work to

gain trust and acceptance and adhere to established protocols and procedures.

The coordination of future endeavors among V&TCs would assist in addressing such

issues. It is unclear, however, what coordinated step would most effectively mitigate or eliminate

the effects of current challenges within the disaster response community. In this analysis, I

propose four alternative strategies. The first calls for the discussion and establishment of

protocols to which relevant V&TCs must adhere. The second establishes a coordination board,

composed of leaders in modern disaster relief, to develop standard systems that V&TCs are

encouraged to implement. The third develops V&TCs’ presence in academia. The final option

suggests that V&TCs continue developing separately and informally interact when necessary.

After rating the alternatives based on efficacy, cost, time, and political feasibility, I

conclude that establishing protocols and standards specific to the different types of V&TCs,

developing a standard plug-in for after-action data collection, and branding the term “V&TC,”

will best bolster V&TCs efforts to enhance data collection and communication during disasters

and crises.

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary i

List of Figures iii

Acknowledgements iv

Introduction 1

Current Issues within the V&TC Community 5

Strategizing Future Relationships Among V&TCs 11

Proposed Alternatives 11

Establish a Set of Protocols and Standards 11

Establish a V&TC Coordination Board 13

Develop a Presence in Academia 14

Continue Developing Separately with Informal Interactions 15

Criteria for Evaluation 15

Analysis of Alternatives 16

Recommendations and Conclusion 23

Appendix A: V&TC Profiles 26

Geeks Without Bounds 26

Standby Task Force (Crisis Mappers) 29

CrisisCommons 35

Works Cited 39

iii

List of Figures

Table 1: Ability of Alternatives to Address V&TCs' Challenges ................................................. 19

Table 2: Evaluation Matrix ........................................................................................................... 19

Figure 1: Ushahidi-Haiti map. ........................................................................................................ 3

Figure 2: Internal structure of GWOB.. ........................................................................................ 20

Figure 3: Internal structure of the Standby Task Force. ............................................................... 20

Figure 4: SBTF Workflow. ........................................................................................................... 20

Figure 5: SBTF Webinar Interface ............................................................................................... 20

Figure 6: CrisisCommons Structure. ............................................................................................ 20

iv

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank all those with the Science and Technology Innovation Program at

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars for exposing me to the excitement and

challenges inherent within emerging technology policy. I would specifically like to express my

gratitude to Lea Shanley and David Rejeski for their dedication and mentorship during my time

at the Center.

I would also like to thank the Policy Internship Program at the University of Virginia,

specifically Michael Rodemeyer and Jim Turner, for providing me with the opportunity to

explore the world of technology policy in Washington, DC.

Thank you to all of those within the Volunteer and Technical Communities (V&TCs) and

related organizations for giving me your time and explaining the intricacies of V&TCs’

structures and interactions, specifically Andrew Turner (CrisisCommons), Kirk Morris (Standby

Task Force), Willow Brugh (Geeks Without Bounds), Mark Prutsalis (Sahana Software

Foundation), Nigel McNie (Programming Volunteer for CrisisMappers, CrisisCommons, and

SBTF), John Crowley (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative), and Stuart Gill and Will Pate (Global

Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery). Without your contributions, this endeavor would

not have been possible.

I would also like to acknowledge those who reviewed earlier versions of this report and

offered their valuable edits and insight, including Joe Filvarof, Robbin Boehmer, Lea Shanley,

Kirk Morris, Patrick Meier, Nigel McNie, and Mark Prutsalis.

1

Introduction

In the past, officials and volunteers responding to disasters reported a sense of chaos and

desperation resulting from devastated communications infrastructures on the ground. A 2006

committee commissioned by the Executive Office of the President to report on lessons learned

from the federal response to Hurricane Katrina describes the scene:

On the day of landfall, authoritative reporting from the field was extremely difficult to

obtain because of the widespread destruction of communications infrastructure….

[L]ocal, State, and Federal officials were forced to depend on a variety of conflicting

reports from a combination of media, government and private sources, many of which

continued to provide inaccurate or incomplete information throughout the day, further

clouding the understanding of what was occurring in New Orleans…. The New Orleans

Mayor’s Office operated out of a Hyatt Hotel for several days after Hurricane Katrina’s

landfall, unable to establish reliable communications with anyone outside the hotel for

nearly forty-eight hours. This meant that the Mayor was neither able to effectively

command the local efforts, nor was he able to guide the State and Federal support for two

days following the storm…. Louisiana State Senator Robert Barham, chairman of the

State Senate's homeland security committee, summed up the situation in Louisiana by

stating, “People could not communicate. It got to the point that people were literally

writing messages on paper, putting them in bottles and dropping them from helicopters to

other people on the ground. (Executive Office of the President, 2006, pp. 42-43)

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Since Hurricane Katrina, the world has seen cellphones transform from simple voice devices to

digital devices as people send text messages, browse and post content online, and explore the

functionalities of applications. The norm for most people is no longer a landline home phone, but

rather personal, high-bandwidth cell phones running on a 3G or 4G network. Therefore, in

response to communication failures during crises and the new standards of communication

technologies, the disaster relief community has seen the rise of Volunteer and Technical

Communities (V&TCs)1. V&TCs are networks of “technical professionals with deep expertise in

social media, geographic information systems (GIS), database management, [and] online

campaigns [who apply] their skills to some of the hardest elements of the disaster risk

management process” (GFDRR Labs, 2010). These volunteers are able to harness the growing

power of applications like Twitter and Facebook, devices such as Androids and iPads, skills like

database design and computer hacking, and methodologies such as Scrum development or

Extreme Programming (XP) in order to improve on ground communication and organization

practices.

During the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, V&TCs worked with a noticeable presence. Remotely

located technical volunteers developed Mission 4636, which established a free phone number

(4636) in order to “allow people on the ground to text their requests for medical care, food,

1 The term “V&TC” is used in this paper as the official terminology for a network of volunteer and professional

technical workers. Both “VTC” and “V&TC” are commonly used to describe the organizations (due to the different brandings in the “Volunteer and Technical Communities: Open Development” report and the “Disaster 2.0: The Future of Information Sharing in Humanitarian Emergencies” report). To some, the title “Volunteer Technology Community” only credits volunteer positions, disregarding the dedicated workers within the field who are paid (M. Prutsalis, personal communication, July 17, 2011). Therefore, only the term “V&TC” should be used in the future in order to credit all those who give their time within the community and to avoiding wasting valuable volunteer time on a relatively unproductive debate. In order for the nascent network to establish a professional reputation, the community must agree on how to officially refer to itself.

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water, security and shelter from any Digicel / Comcel-Voila device and receive aid” (Mission

4636, n.d.). This service garnered about 80,000 messages, predominantly in Haitian Kreyol,

which workers and volunteers translated, geolocated, and categorized via online crowdsourcing

platforms which “sorted the information by need and priority, and distributed it to various

emergency responders and aid organizations…. [T]he service scaled up about one week after the

earthquake to include [responses such as] serious injuries, requests for fresh drinking water,

security, unaccompanied children and clusters of requests for food, and even childbirths”

(Mission 4636, n.d.). Often these technologists mapped the Mission 4636 messages and other

crowdsourced data using open source platforms such as Ushahidi or OpenStreetMap (see the

Ushahidi-Haiti map below in Figure 1).

Figure 1: Ushahidi-Haiti map. Red circles show the number of reports within that area. When clicked, a user may choose to view the contents of the reports. On the right side panel, users may choose to display only certain categories of messages and requests (taken from http://haiti.ushahidi.com).

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Others created applications such as the We Have, We Need application, which could be accessed

via smart phone or computer. The application worked as a sort of Craigslist, pairing victims in

need of resources and aid organizations navigating to where help was most needed. The

application helped officials by routing information out of the disaster, where communication

systems were devastated, into information systems in Washington, DC or New Zealand where

volunteers could quickly, calmly, and intelligently coordinate response efforts (HaitiVoiceNeeds,

2010). V&TCs also were able to “provide reachback support to the United Nations (UN), the

European Union, United States and across the globe, making their supercomputers and large

storage arrays available for processing imagery, managing translation workflows, and serving

large data sets” (GFDRR Labs, 2010).

The Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (2011) also recognized V&TCs as a powerful tool for

community empowerment: “When crisis responders ask for (or themselves build) new features,

they are also asking the community to change the range of possible behaviors that users perform

in the software which is roughly analogous to asking for a change to law of policy in a real-world

town or city” (p. 40). In this way, the applications and tools that V&TCs develop may play a

growing role in disaster preparedness and planning, as crowdsourced data can be gathered from

local residents to inform authorities of failing infrastructure or, in reverse, preparedness lessons

can be disseminated to at risk communities.

Many of the prevalent V&TCs today have brought forth beneficial changes within the realm of

disaster response; their formulation, however, has led to a new set of challenges and complexities

within and among the V&TCs, humanitarian relief organizations, and Federal and State and local

governments.

5

Current Issues within the V&TC Community

Volunteers and professionals working in the nascent field of volunteer-based technology

development for disaster preparedness, response, and relief have expressed various problems that

V&TCs must address in order to improve their effectiveness. While some of these issues deal

with the organizational and technical aspects of software development, others are social and

political in nature and surface when the groups interact.

Disaster-affected communities are often a diverse group of people as crises affect individuals

differing in age, culture, and economic background. Therefore, one of the most fundamental

considerations when building applications and technologies for modern disaster relief is to

understand the needs of people of different backgrounds in divergent contexts – especially if

developers intend to deploy the project during more than one event. Yet the challenge of creating

a universal design is inherent in consumer technology and has been described as the need to

balance “ideals and the pragmatics of incorporating those ideals within a context of multiple

voices, cultural differences, material constraints, localized needs, and – as ironic as it may sound

– other ideals.” (Coleman, 2004).

Strategic design, however, has proven to be especially challenging for V&TC developers due to

the unpredictable nature of disasters and the limited availability of volunteers involved in

V&TCs. Many organizations have only a few regularly active members during static times, but

witness an influx of interest when a disaster strikes (A. Turner, personal communication, June 8,

2011). A lack of activity during times of non-disaster leads to a lack of planning and preventative

measures and results in volunteers having to “catch-up” to the influx of pleas from victims after a

crisis takes place (M. Prutsalis, personal communication, July 18, 2011). Some organizations,

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such as Random Hacks of Kindness, the Standby Task Force, and Geeks Without Bounds, have

notably risen to the challenge of inspiring volunteerism and development during static times by

engaging in tasks such as creating custom Ushahidi instances ready for deployment and hosting

mobile disaster app “hackathons” (see Appendix A). Yet there still exists a need to devise a

robust post-crisis system to regularly and methodically collect user feedback and to gather

statistical and qualitative data regarding the technologies. One reason for the lack of post-crisis

analysis of projects’ effectiveness and usability is that volunteers feel “burnt-out, [feel] no

responsibility, [are] not receiving pay, and [do not want to] deal with paperwork” (N. McNie,

personal communication, June 3, 2011).

Some V&TCs have devised ways to collect feedback on applications and response systems, but

focus mainly on feedback from volunteers rather than victims. Feedback, in these circumstances,

is often collected through Skype chats and forums after the disaster has taken place. Nigel

McNie, a volunteer during the Christchurch earthquake in New Zealand, emphasizes the

importance of collecting information from crisis victims by interviewing people face-to-face

(personal communication, August 23, 2011). Personal surveying would mitigate the possibility

of data suffering from "user bias." If information is only collected digitally or through secondary

sources (such as the volunteers who interacted with victims), the feedback will fail to incorporate

the opinions of people who looked at an app and “got confused/frustrated [and left the app]

without giving any feedback” (Nigel McNie, personal communication, August 23, 2011).

Collecting information on the ground also would allow V&TCs to “gauge how far knowledge of

the map percolated throughout the community…. [If information is collected through other

means, it is likely that] only people who have heard of the [apps] will be giving feedback” (Nigel

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McNie, personal communication, August 23, 2011). Despite the potential for personal surveying

on the ground to reveal critical information about how an application was used, few V&TCs

have established protocols for promptly interviewing victims and collecting information on

applications after a disaster.

Another issue for V&TCs with dwindling volunteer bases during static times is raising

awareness of their group’s existence within the general public. Even within the disaster response

and relief community “some field staff members [during the earthquake in Haiti] were [only]

tangentially aware of the resources that were available, [and] were too busy to take advantage of

the resources or to consider the changes to workflows and methods that these new information

resources would entail” (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011). While some groups, such as

Ushahidi (a non-profit organization that develops free and open source software for information

collection, visualization and interactive mapping) have enjoyed publicity in widely viewed

sources such as The Washington Post and The New York Times (Turner, 2009) (Giridharadas,

2010), others have yet to gain recognition beyond their direct circles despite significant

contributions to the field. Some V&TCs find, however, that they gain significant recognition

from government, humanitarian organizations, and IT companies during disasters when

authorities in the disaster afflicted regions turn to crowdsourcing technologies to mitigate the

effects of the crises and stimulate communication (McManus, 2011).

Including more volunteers in the V&TCs’ operations highlights the importance of cultivating

trust with partnering organizations and with victims and volunteers working on the ground. As

John Hagel III of McKinsey & Co. and John Seely Brown of the University of Southern

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California (2006) explain, “knowledge does not ‘flow’ – it tends to be, in fact, very ‘sticky’….

Unlike information which can be more readily codified and disseminated, knowledge tends to

reside in individuals and it is very context specific. For this reason, knowledge sharing typically

requires trust-based relationships and a sharing of practice” (p. 11). A feasible way to increase

trust among V&TCs, established disaster aid organizations, and victims is to work in

coordination with established humanitarian communities and governments; yet “many of the

technologists that are building new platforms for imagery, mapping, and information sharing

have [or are perceived as having] limited field experience and [supposedly] an engineer’s

approach of ‘just do it’” (GFDRR Labs, 2010). This stereotype of the V&TC “hacker”

community clashes with national and international systems established within the context of

government to government or government to international institution interactions (GFDRR Labs,

2010). This issue, however, is less about the engineering/hacker mentality among V&TC

members (as many of the members also have experience in humanitarian aid), and more

addressing the often inaccurate perception of what type of person a V&TC represents.

Governments and formal organizations in the past have also struggled in partnering with certain

V&TCs (especially if the V&TC requires funding) due to a loosely defined internal structure or

lack of an officially established organization. Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and

Recovery Labs (GFDRR Labs) at the World Bank describes the difficulty of funding open

development groups with loosely defined structures, as GFDRR Labs can only provide projects

with resources through a formal, internationally competitive process (S. Gill, personal

communication, July 20, 2011). In short, there is “no easy way to push money to [those]

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organizations that do not formally exist [on paper]” (S. Gill, personal communication, July 20,

2011).

Another issue to consider is the increased potential for security threats and liability issues if a

given V&TC does not plan for the distant future. The V&TC movement is largely based on open

source software and cloud-computing, which aim to “harness the power of distributed peer

review and transparency of process” (Open Source Initiative, n.d.). The open source nature of

this data means that, if a V&TC does not prioritize security and data verification, the projects and

data could be accessible to terrorists, corrupt leaders seeking to shut-down or punish activists,

and individuals lacking the knowledge and skill necessary to organize disaster relief efforts (K.

Morris, personal communication, June 3, 2011). Data, such as volunteered geographic

information (VGI), generates specific concerns regarding abuse as it is “user-generated content,

with very little moderation or control by the site’s owners and very little restriction on the nature

of content. In some cases users [can] even edit the content created by others” (Goodchild, 2007).

However, many groups have demonstrated strategies that can be used to reduce the possibility of

encountering unforeseen vulnerabilities and security threats (Chameles, 2011), such as through

the development of a new Ushahidi instance that specifically addresses vulnerabilities or by

gathering all volunteers after a crisis to discuss lessons learned (K. Morris, personal

communication, August 21, 2011). Furthermore, a recent report conducted by Yahoo researchers

shows that, during the earthquake in Chile, 95.5% of tweets related to confirmed-truths validate

the information. Yet in the case of a false-rumor, 50% of related tweets will deny that

information (much of the remaining population will tweet related questions)(Mendoza, Poblete,

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Castillo, 2011). This study demonstrates the often undermined power of a community to correct

itself.

Sharing data amongst V&TCs and other open source initiatives has raised the possibility of

licensing issues. For example, an application may scrape data from multiple websites and display

the data within the context of its own site. If the sources all have licenses for redistribution or

commercial purposes, the user must ensure that he abides by the rules of each license or face

legal penalties. This could be seen with Google’s missing persons data2, which could include

user-specified dates for when their data should be destroyed. Developers could pull data into

their applications using the Person Finder API, but could easily violate the contract if they did

not remove the data from their application by the specified date (M. Prutsalis, personal

communication, July 18, 2011).

Some groups within the V&TC community have also experienced internal challenges. One

instance of this was described in the 2011 Disaster Relief 2.0 report, “Communities that need

each other’s strengths are being forced to compete for money in the donor pool, and some are

finding the need to compete in areas of overlap or are being asked to tackle issues where other

V&TCs are already working” (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, p. 51). Individuals within

the community have also begun to differentiate between paid versus unpaid workers, praising

volunteers for their altruistic efforts, implicitly suggesting that paid volunteers are less selfless

and less valuable within the community. These relationships are at times detrimental to the

2 Visit http://code.google.com/p/googlepersonfinder for more information about Google’s missing persons data or

http://code.google.com/p/googlepersonfinder/wiki/DataAPI for the application’s API.

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overall effort and must be controlled in order to sustain a benevolent partnership amongst and

within divergent entities.

Strategizing Future Relationships Among V&TCs

John Hagel III and John Seely Brown (2006) accurately describe the V&TC movement:

Individuals and organizations come together and collaborate in evolving networks of

creation…. They play off each other, appropriating each other’s work, learning from it,

building on top of it, and then watching and learning from what others do with their own

creations. They often work in parallel and then fight and learn from each other when the

time comes to try to integrate their work into a broader offering.” (p. 10)

This has led some leaders within humanitarian organizations and V&TCs to suggest coordinating

efforts among the many different groups in order to mitigate the current problems within the

field (Crowley, 2011)(Verity, 2011). Others, however, see competition as a positive force and are

comfortable with the present situation. Therefore, the remainder of this paper will seek to answer

the question: what coordinated step should Volunteer and Technical Communities take in order

to reduce the effects of or eliminate the issues currently experienced during technical disaster

preparedness, response, and relief?

Proposed Alternatives

Alternative 1: Establish a Set of Protocols and Standards

Many V&TCs were founded within the last few years and are relatively new entities in the world

of international humanitarian response, although they represent a set of skills much needed in

disaster relief (refer to Appendix A). In order to partner with and gain the respect of governments

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and established humanitarian organizations, V&TCs at the 2010 International Crisis Mappers

conference discussed “an ‘API for the UN’… with the core notion being that the UN should

partner with the V&TCs to establish a common set of protocols to connect their people,

workflows, and data flows.” (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, p.44). The discussion

should be mediated by a neutral party. The discussion should include pertinent groups such as

the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) at the World Bank and the

Red Cross as well as all known V&TCs.

Among the goals of such an effort will be to establish standard accountability controls to ensure

compliance with a large range of international agreements and internal processes and policies

(Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, p. 41). Such protocols will also establish a means to deal

with the accidental release of data that would put vulnerable populations at risk as well as

protocols to address licensing discrepancies and to establish a baseline of trust among

organizations. Some V&TCs do have methods for dealing with these issues, especially those that

work in human rights (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, p. 41).

As David Aylward explains in the Disaster Relief 2.0 report, the end product of this effort will be

agreed upon V&TC architectures, standards, and protocols:

It [should be] possible to say to organizations when they arrive, ‘you are not playing

unless you are playing according to this architecture, standards, and protocols. Use any

software you want, as long as it conforms to these standards.’ The UN could use its bully

pulpit role to enforce that. Otherwise you get the same wonderful people who do the best

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they can with the electronic equivalent of duct tape. It’s absurd to keep doing it over and

over.’ (as cited in Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, p. 42)

Alternative 2: Establish a V&TC Coordination Board

John Hagel and John Seely Brown (2006) describe a “global practice network” which connects

participants with similar sensibilities and practices through a centralized “practice orchestrator”

who defines a system for participation within the network and for integrated activity (p. 9). The

practice orchestrators can successfully play a less active role in terms of recruitment and

management of specific creation initiatives because participants share similar mentalities and

practices (Hagel & Brown, 2006, p. 8).

Therefore, this alternative suggests V&TCs should focus their efforts on forming a global

practice network in the form of a “coordination board” rather than developing standardized

systems and protocols without the establishment of a higher level entity. This board would be

nominated by members of V&TCs based on skill, reputation, and ability to lead and would

consist of unbiased individuals (who are not associated with any particular V&TC). Assembling

members who have a deep and diverse knowledge of the crisis community, but are not

volunteering all of their time to V&TCs, will assist in ensuring that the board members have time

to convene when necessary. The individual members would not be paid and would only convene

when a defined proportion of V&TCs within the community solicits their attention.

The board would be approached with problem statements by the V&TCs and their humanitarian

or government partners and would work, with feedback from the V&TC community, to define

systematic workflows that V&TCs could then be encouraged to adopt. An example of one of the

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board’s primary foci will be to implement strategies to support risk reduction and prevention

among V&TCs during static periods as a more effective way to save lives when crises do strike

(GFDRR Labs, 2010). The board would leave the establishment of specific protocols and

standards to individual V&TCs.

Alternative 3: Develop a Presence in Academia

The V&TC effort is in need of a neutral venue where problems faced both by the international

humanitarian relief communities and the V&TCs can be discussed by individuals with different

belief structures without fear of harsh confrontation (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, p.

55). Schools and academia are recognized by those involved in development work as a means to

bypass the complications that arise through politics (Boehmer, Smith, Schoppa, 2010) and

students have historically made major contributions to V&TC efforts (such as those at Tufts’

Fletcher School who ran Ushahidi-Haiti). By involving academia more prominently in the

V&TCs’ development and deployment efforts, a iterative process of design, development,

evaluation of successes and failures, and redesign may be supported.

Furthermore, academia will both serve as a form of advertisement and a means to provide

V&TCs with a dedicated source of trusted labor. Students will be mentored by experienced

faculty within related departments and will work together on teams. Students from many

different academic, ethnic, economic, and racial backgrounds should also be encouraged in this

endeavor in order to continue and further V&TCs’ diverse support. This will be achieved in part

by emphasizing the international aspects of projects (which will attract students who speak other

languages or have experience living in other countries). This will also be achieved by forming

partnerships not only with universities in the United States, but also in at-risk locations such as

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Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. This model has already been adopted by the crisis mapping

NGO, Ushahidi, through their Universities for Ushahidi program (see http://u4u.ushahidi.com/

for more information) (Himelfarb, 2011). This example will serve as a preliminary case study on

which other V&TCs can develop their future academic partnerships.

Alternative 4: Continue Developing Separately with Informal Interactions

The possibility remains that V&TCs may not need to embark on a coordinated effort to reform

their developing disaster response and relief strategies. Some experts argue that the ability “to

provide reliable… information depends upon motivated citizens, the accessibility and usability of

data collection tools and techniques, and the infrastructures used to store, validate, and share

contributed data” (Elwood, 2008). Appendix A demonstrates how each V&TC is designing an

internal system that best suits its needs given its specific mission and is forming a “competitive

architecture that can accelerate capability building” (Hagel & Brown, 2006, p. 13), within the

V&TC community as a whole. While some endeavors will experience success, others will fail in

their attempts due to the natural competition among competitors engaged in similar pursuits. This

form of “natural selection” among V&TCs will eliminate the need to establish protocols, invest

in academia, or devise a coordination board as systems ill-designed to handle liability, trust, and

other issues will become obsolete.

Criteria

The four stated alternatives will be evaluated based on the follow set of criteria: efficacy, cost,

time, and political feasibility.

Efficacy refers to the ability of each alternative to bring about significant and desired change

within V&TCs, among multiple V&TCs, and within the disaster response community as a whole.

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Cost refers to the monetary cost of the endeavor, which is a necessary consideration given the

non-profit or completely volunteer status of the organizations. The time required to complete the

task demands attention given the limited time that volunteers are able to dedicate. Political

feasibility will assess the likelihood that V&TCs and humanitarian organizations adopt the

alternative given the potential existing positions and tensions within the community. This

criterion will also take into account the possibility of local, federal, and state governments to

support the action and involving the outcomes of the endeavor in relief efforts.

Analysis

The four alternatives are compared in Table 1 below by their ability to address the problem

statements discussed earlier in this paper. This highlights the potential successes and

inadequacies of each of the four alternatives.

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Alternative 1:

Establish a Set of

Protocols and

Standards

Alternative 2: Establish a V&TC

Coordination

Board

Alternative 3: Develop a

Presence in

Academia

Alternative 4: Continue

Developing

Separately with

Informal

Interactions

Address different

communities and

contexts

No

This would still be

the responsibility of

V&TC project teams

Maybe

Would have the

potential to promote

best workflows for

incorporating a

large, diverse user

base or for preparing

puppet scripts and

then customizing for

deployment

Yes

Will include

participants from a

range of

backgrounds and will

promote disaster

preparedness in

many regions

Maybe

V&TCs may devise

their own strategies

for this

Attract

volunteers

during static

periods

Maybe

Protocols will lead

to a higher level of

professionalism,

which may lead to

publicity, which

would attract static

period volunteerism

Maybe

May devise

successful systems

that cause V&TCs to

gain recognition

from potential

volunteers

Yes

Student and

professors will work

during static times

Maybe

V&TCs may devise

their own strategies

for this

Gather after-

action data

Yes

Protocols will

require V&TCs to

collect after-action

data

Yes

Will devise a post-

crisis data collection

workflow

Yes

A system for post-

disaster data

collection can be

devised or students

can be enlisted to

collect data on the

ground

Maybe

V&TCs may devise

their own strategies

for this

Raise awareness

of

V&TCs/projects

Yes

Protocols will help

to professionalize

V&TCs, which will

better allow them to

interact with groups

such as UN OCHA

or the Red Cross.

This will lead to

better publicity.

Maybe

If devised systems

are adopted, may

lead to greater

success and

therefore publicity.

Yes

Would become a

campaign across

many universities

Maybe

V&TCs will

experience varying

levels of publicity

based on their

marketing and

success

Cultivate trust of

volunteers and

V&TCs

Yes

At least to some

extent, protocols

ensure a level of

V&TC

responsibility

Maybe

If V&TCs adopt the

workflows and they

are successful, may

lead to more trust

No

May lead to a lack of

trust by

victims/organizations

on a design level, but

students may be

trusted more easily

on an ethical level

Maybe

V&TCs may begin

to gain trust

naturally as the

groups mature

V&TCs need to:

18

Improve

coordination

with established

organizations

Yes

Can create protocols

such as the

requirements to

become an official

V&TC. This may

later be used to

apply for funding.

Maybe

If V&TCs adopt the

standardized

systems, other

organizations will be

familiar with certain

aspects of all

V&TCs before

beginning a project

No

Does not address this

issue

Maybe

V&TCs may devise

their own strategies

for this

Address the

possibility of

liability issues

Yes

Specific protocols

should be

established for each

generalized category

of V&TC (exp.

hackathon-based,

crowdsourced map-

based)

No

Liability strategies

will be determined

by individual

V&TCs.

No

Does not address this

issue, although

universities may be

used as a forum for

discussion

Maybe

V&TCs may devise

their own strategies

for this

Address the

possibility of

security threats

Yes

Specific protocols

should be

established for each

generalized category

of V&TC

Maybe

The Board will not

address how groups

should handle

security breaches,

but may recommend

systems that protect

against security

threats (exp. web

scripts that filter out

bad data such as

spam or verification

teams)

No

Does not address this

issue, although

universities may be

used as a forum for

discussion

Maybe

V&TCs may devise

their own strategies

for this

Address the

possibility of

licensing issues

Yes

For example, a

protocol may require

data providers to

clearly show users

when the data must

be deleted

No

This will be handled

by individual

V&TCs

No

Does not address this

issue, although

universities may be

used as a forum for

discussion

Maybe

V&TCs may devise

their own strategies

for this

Reduce the

instances of

project overlap

Maybe

Could simulate

better coordination

and communication

among V&TCs

No

Because the board

can only suggest

workflows, unlikely

that it will

significantly impact

possible project

overlap

No

It is more likely that

spreading V&TCs

efforts among many

different universities

will increase project

overlap (this may be

helpful though -

projects can be

designed specifically

for an area and

population)

Maybe

Certain V&TCs may

establish a

reputation for

specific tasks as they

mature, thereby

reducing overlap

19

Table 1: Ability of Alternatives to Address V&TCs' Challenges.

The results from Table 1 indicate the first alternative’s success in addressing a majority of the

problems many V&TCs are facing, especially relative to the other three alternatives’ outcomes.

Using the information from Table 1, each of the four alternatives is evaluated by the proposed

criteria. The results of this comparison are shown in Table 2 and explained below.

Table 2: Evaluation Matrix. The proposed alternatives are evaluated on a scale of 1 to 3. A score of 3, in this analysis,

represents an effective, inexpensive, and politically feasible option with minimal time requirements. The rationale for

these ratings is described below.

Create a sense of

equity between

volunteers and

professionals

Yes

Standardize use of

“V&TC” to include

both volunteers and

professionals

No

Will not be able to

have much impact

on intra-V&TC

relationships

No

Does not address this

issue

Maybe

V&TCs may devise

their own strategies

for this

Efficacy Cost Time

Political

Feasibility Total Score

Alternative 1:

Establish a Set of

Protocols and

Standards

3 2 2 3 10

Alternative 2: Establish a V&TC

Coordination

Board

2 3 1 1 7

Alternative 3: Develop a

Presence in

Academia

2 1 1 3 7

Alternative 4: Continue

Developing

Separately with

Informal

Interactions

1 3 3 2 9

20

Alternative 1 would be extremely effective due to the large span of protocols that could be

implemented. Although this alternative does not immediately address the lack of volunteers

during static periods, protocols could be established to demand the collection of after-action data.

By establishing protocols, the V&TCs would be more easily able to collaborate with existing

humanitarian organizations and governments and therefore would gain recognition and trust

from disaster-stricken communities. Similarly, determining how similar organizations should

deal with difficult issues such as liability, licensing, and security (such as through the use of a

disclaimer notice or a data filtering script) would set a standard on which V&TCs could

collaborate and build. Clear, official protocols would also aid with intra-V&TC problems

through mandates such as making the term “V&TC” official rather than “VTC,” as V&TC

highlights the participation of both volunteers and professionals in the movement. Furthermore,

the protocols would be made publicly available in keeping with the open source nature of

V&TCs. Though the protocols may require more than a year to discuss and establish throughout

the network of V&TCs it would be politically feasible as few groups are opposed to the

establishment of protocols within the network (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, p. 44).

The primary costs of the endeavor would be paying for travel and the coordination of meetings,

but that cost may be covered by a significant grant or several individual grants to V&TCs. If the

UN becomes involved in the endeavor, it may also shoulder certain aspects of the financial

burden.

The second alternative has the capacity to produce similar results to the first alternative, as the

board would be able to establish some standards with the added ability to develop standardized

systems (ie, designs for disaster preparedness programs) that V&TCs would be encouraged to

21

implement. These systems would provide a baseline from which V&TCs would build. However,

there are several concerns that must be considered. The first is the political feasibility of this

alternative given the many different personalities and opinions involved in the V&TC

movement. It is likely that the groups may have a difficult time selecting individuals to serve of

the board without contentious, which could lead to a complex set of political boundaries among

V&TCs. This would restrict collaboration amongst the groups, damage the open source nature of

the groups, and possibly lead to the board’s rejection within certain crowds. In order to ensure

that this does not occur, a significant amount of time must be allotted for discussion and debate

among relevant organizations, from FEMA to the Red Cross to CrisisCommons. The fact that

membership on the board is an honorary, versus professional, position increases the likelihood

that those involved would not be able to prioritize their positions when in conflict with their

professional schedules. This would delay efforts and render the board less effective, as

organizations often need to quickly decide on internal structures and policies – especially during

a crisis. The board’s determinations would therefore be recommended rather than mandatory and

would mainly be adopted during static periods. The alternative would also be critiqued by

V&TCs who would view the board as an added layer of bureaucracy in a system that is

intentionally designed to function from a grassroots level.

Investing in an advertising campaign within academia and coordinating the development of

student groups and research projects in support of V&TCs would engage a reliable and large

group of diverse volunteers before, during, and after a crisis. The diversity of the group, in terms

of academic, economic, and cultural backgrounds, would help to facilitate discussions of how to

best design projects for similarly diverse user populations. V&TCs will establish a level of trust

22

with student groups as they work with the groups to discuss problems and possible project

designs. The involvement of student groups, however, could lead to a weakened trust of V&TCs’

application designs by major organizations, as it is unclear what skill level a given student

represents. Allotting tasks to students may save organizations valuable time, yet it will also

demand time and patience as V&TC mentors answer questions and review students’ efforts (M.

Prutsalis, personal communication, July 17, 2011). Although the advertising campaign within

universities may be costly if groups decide to invest in marking strategies such as online

advertisements or publicity events at Universities, the option is one of the most politically

feasible. It only requires a loose coordination among V&TCs in order to increase the efficacy of

the effort, and would be welcomed by students and universities seeking to get involved in the

nascent and exciting field. Furthermore, academia provides a “safe space where those with

different belief structures around [their] work can safely raise issues and explore alternative

mindsets…. [The academic forum is] open to everyone from donors and beneficiaries to

technologists at operational organizations and the agencies that contract with them” (Harvard

Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, p. 55). This politically neutral forum would also make feasible

future, potentially contentious, discussions and changes within the community.

The final alternative, which suggests no changes to the current system, would produce no

additional costs or volunteered time. It is also likely that, even if V&TCs do not take action to

coordinate their efforts more closely, innovation within organizations will solve some of the

problems that the community currently faces, such as developing a plug-in to be used in all

platforms for after-action data collection. Yet, the current networks are advised against

continuing without further coordination of interactions. V&TCs were formed in times of rapid

23

change such as during the Indian Ocean Earthquake (Sahana Software Foundation) or post-

election violence in Kenya (Ushahidi). While this caused V&TCs to adopt a “bootstrapping

mindset” and potentially act as catalysts to re-shape and re-focus institutions, “knowledge

sharing and shared understanding become even more effective when participants come together

on a regular basis to undertake new collaborative creation efforts” (Hagel & Brown, 2006, p. 11).

Therefore, separate development might be possible, but it is not recommended.

Recommendations and Conclusion

Leaders from within humanitarian organizations, governmental agencies, and V&TCs agree that

coordinating efforts among the many different players is critical to resolving problems

surrounding current disaster relief efforts (Crowley, 2011). The quantitative results from the

evaluation matrix and supporting rationale show that the best coordination alternative to pursue

(among those proposed) is Alternative 1: Establishing a Set of Protocols and Standards. This

will help organizations to systematically deal with difficult issues such as liability and licensing,

while leaving strategic operations (such as recruiting and retaining volunteers during static

periods) to the individuals groups. This will allow natural competition among organizations to

ensue, while establishing a standard level of trust to allow the routine incorporation of V&TC

efforts within the larger framework of governmental and humanitarian relief.

Volunteer and Technical Communities should begin establishing protocols and developing

internal systems by studying reports from the open source, education, healthcare, and other

relevant communities (S. Gill, personal communication, July 20, 2011). Through this lateral

learning, the leaders of technology-driven crisis response will understand what processes and

methodologies succeeded and failed in the field and why. Stuart Gill, leader of the new GFDRR

24

Labs initiative at the World Bank, explains that people are benefitting from well-designed

systems that Volunteer and Technical Communities have never heard about because of the small

scale of the successful ventures; yet “I know for a fact it would be of value to these communities

to understand [how and] why the systems are successful” (personal communication, July 20,

2011).

Additionally, it is critical that groups work to collect data on projects that have been deployed so

as to understand the successes and failures of the applications. Nigel McNie (2011), a

programmer for CrisisCommons, Crisis Mappers, and the SBTF, says it is crucial that “V&TCs

make a point of returning to the location post-crisis and asking the community questions like,

‘Did you see the map?’, ‘Was it useful?’, ‘Was it easy to use?’, ‘Were your needs met?’, and

‘What could we do to improve the service?’” This should be done by sending volunteers back to

the location after the disaster has hit to gather first-hand data on how the applications were used.

It would also be beneficial for V&TCs to use a plug-in that can be deployed through applications

on any platform. The plug-in will ask questions such as “Was this app useful? How?” and will

only record personal information if the user gives permission. This will provide V&TCs with a

standardized means to collect data on the effectiveness of their projects. This information should

then be filtered into an open source repository where V&TCs can observe what applications exist

and how they can be improved based upon user feedback.

By discussing and establishing protocols and standards, conducting post-crisis surveys with

application users, and developing a standard plug-in for after-action data collection, the newly

established “creation net” of groups like Geeks Without Bounds, the Standby Task Force, and

25

CrisisCommons will revolutionize data collection and communication during disasters and

crises.

26

Appendix A: V&TC Profiles

Geeks Without Bounds (GWOB)

Style: Hackathons

I. Stated Mission

Geeks Without Bounds was founded in 2010 as a “not-for-profit alliance of hackers, coders

and geeks united by the common goal of assisting communities in distress. [GWOB

members] actively organize and help promote coding/hacking events to facilitate the

building of tools and systems meant to alleviate many of the technical problems

encountered during emergency and disaster situations” (GWOB, n.d.).

II. Current Organizational Structure

Geeks Without Bounds centers around the concept of a “hackathon,” an event where

software developers and technical experts gather to program and create applications with

little restrictive overhead. During GWOB’s weekend hackathons, which occur throughout

the year, humanitarian response officials (sometimes from the government) approach the

group with problem definitions which technical volunteers work to address during the

hackathon by building applications and other tools (W. Brugh, personal communication,

July 6, 2011). The volunteers are sometimes rewarded with prizes, introducing a level of

competition and therefore motivation.

GWOB was founded less than a year ago, and therefore is still working to define an internal

structure (W. Brugh, personal communication, July 6, 2011). At this point, however, the

group functions under a two tiered management structure, as shown in Figure 1 below. On

the top most level are the group coordinators – currently a small team of three individuals

with significant coding and software development experience. The two founders, Johnny

Diggz and Willow Brugh, are working to hire a Project Coordinator as a fourth core team

member. The core management team aims to effectively coordinate among the many

different projects that form during Geeks Without Bounds’s hackathons.

a. Project Management

The group currently uses Atrium, a task management system offered through

School Factory, Inc., to organize projects (see

http://atrium.schoolfactory.org/gwoborg/). The service allows members to list

tasks to be completed and then maintain an open dashboard where the current

state of the task is updated and discussed. The Atrium site also includes tabs that

display tweets from members’ Twitter accounts, a calendar with upcoming events,

a list of members who have registered within the service, and a GWOB blog. The

projects are encouraged to be open source, yet teams are ultimately the owners of

their developments and sometimes form businesses around their technologies. For

this reason, documentation is often disparate (a reason why the group has begun

using Atrium). GWOB does offer hosting

27

services to developers, but many also choose to host their own applications (W.

Brugh, personal communication, July 6, 2011).

Program Director Willow Brugh is responsible for tracking projects based on

contacts made during GWOB hackathons. She ensures that projects volunteers

continue to make progress after leaving the hackathon, have the structure and

resources they need to continue, have opportunities to publicize their work, and

that they are able to pass their projects to other volunteers if necessary (W. Brugh,

personal communication, July 6, 2011). She also encourages project volunteers to

bring their work to future hackathons to continue working on them.

Eventually, GWOB aims to establish an online “tool box” where GWOB

coordinators, who are aware of where different tools related to V&TC efforts are

located, publish that knowledge to the internet and encourage individuals to keep

current tools updated and to build ones where none exist (W. Brugh, personal

communication, July 6, 2011).

Figure 2: Internal structure of GWOB. While the core management team is a completely represented by the top tier, the number of projects (point of contact(s) or POC(s) and volunteers) is greater than what is pictured and expanding with each GWOB sponsored hackathon. The green coloring of the Project POC(s) and Project Volunteers indicates that some projects branch off from the GWOB structure and form their own, independent businesses (W. Brugh, personal communication, July 6, 2011).

28

b. Volunteer Management

Currently, if volunteers “don’t already have some self-drive, [GWOB] doesn’t

work well” (W. Brugh, personal communication, July 6, 2011). This stems from

the group’s basis within the hacker community, which typically “expect[s]

volunteers to just catch on” (W. Brugh, personal communication, July 6, 2011), in

this case, to the organizational and technical aspects of the V&TC effort. GWOB

recognizes the importance of designing a framework within which novice

volunteers can adapt and grow. The current leadership expects the future Project

Coordinator (in conjunction with the Program Director and volunteers) to develop

this aspect of the GWOB infrastructure. Coordination with other V&TCs is also

expected to be helpful as it clarifies where to “send people with certain skill sets

[in order to put them to] fuller use and [make them] feel better about their

experience” (W. Brugh, personal communication, July 6, 2011).

GWOB aims to stay in contact with project teams both to ensure that the team has

the necessary resources and continues to make progress. This process also helps

to establish trust between the coordinators and volunteers. By understanding the

different personalities and skill levels within the groups, the team as a whole

benefits. As Willow Brugh explains, “I see that there are two kinds of

trustworthiness: one where you always tell the truth, and the other where you can

keep a secret. Both are necessary in different contexts” (personal communication,

July 6, 2011).

III. Project Deployment

When disasters strike, GWOB examines which projects are fully developed and available

for use. If the application is relevant, the GWOB coordinators call the individual project

directors and ask to use the tool. Once GWOB has the group’s permission, it then asks the

developers to teach others how to use and support the tool.

Geeks Without Bounds has not specified how they would deal with liability issues resulting

from a user being harmed through the use of a GWOB developed application. The

possibility of this occurring is seen as negligible because when people working within the

context of a disaster are given tools, “they will know what is appropriate, because they're in

it” (W. Brugh, personal communication, July 6, 2011). As Program Director Willow Brugh

states, “I'm willing to take the liability of potentially harming someone if it also potentially

saves a lot of people. So, I guess the answer [to ‘how will GWOB deal with liability

issues?’] is ‘we'll figure that out if it ever happens’” (personal communication, July 6,

2011).

GWOBs primary strategy is, therefore, proactive. GWOB asks hackers to attempt to break

the apps that are built and to manipulate the tool for misuse and corruption (an idea familiar

to military and hacker communities, but new to humanitarians) (W. Brugh, personal

communication, July 6, 2011). This allows GWOB to understand not only how to prevent

these situations from occurring, but also how to damage the people trying to use it for evil

in the process (W. Brugh, personal communication, July 6, 2011).

29

Standby Task Force (SBTF)

Style: Volunteer Network

I. Stated Mission

The Standby Task Force was created in response to the need for crisis responders to have “a

trained and professionalized volunteer force [that could] be on standby and activated within

hours” (Meier, 2010).The SBTF is therefore different from many V&TCs as its primary

focus is not to conceive and develop ideas for disaster technologies, but rather to “provide

humanitarian organizations [working in crisis affected communities] with real-time Crisis

Mapping support” (Standby Task Force, n.d.). In order to achieve this end, the group’s core

team works to increase the ability and skills of SBTF volunteers and the sustainability of the

effort through a continuous dialogue and coordination with other tech and crisis mapping

endeavors (Standby Task Force, n.d.). The core management of the Standby Task Force

aims to eventually become “superfluous [in order to] fulfill the goal of the SBTF: creat[e] a

space of empowerment where people learn how to work together and can do it independent

of the core team” (Ayala, 2011). The team has made significant progress towards this end, as

evidenced by the creation of the Sudan and Mumbai crisis maps by volunteers’ of their own

volition (Kirk Morris, personal communication, August 21, 2011).

II. Current Organizational Structure

The SBTF was launched in 2010 at the International Conference on Crisis Mapping (ICCM

2010) after being proposed by Patrick Meier, Director of Crisis Mapping at Ushahidi and

co-founder of the International Network of Crisis Mappers (Meier, 2010). The Force, which

is not an organization, works to streamline the informal distributed network of volunteers

through an interface for crisis mapping based on lessons learned during prior disasters, such

as Haiti, Chile and Pakistan (Standby Task Force, n.d.). While the SBTF was originally

divided into three teams, the SBTF currently consists of ten teams: the Geo-Location Team,

Humanitarian Team, Report Team, Media Monitoring Team, SMS Team, Task Team, Tech

Team, Translation Team, Verification Team, and Analysis Team. Each of the ten teams is

managed by several team coordinators who also act as the point of contact for the team.

30

Figure 3: Internal structure of the Standby Task Force. Each team is a self-sustaining entity with volunteers selected by the Volunteer Coordinators. All teams work together during a crisis, performing well-defined tasks (Standby Task Force, n.d.).

31

Like many V&TCs, the SBTF is open source endeavor. It uses open source platforms such as

Ushahidi, OpenStreetMap, and Frontline SMS, and sends electronic invitations to join the SBTF

to any individual wishing to become a part of the effort (K. Morris, personal communication,

August 21, 2011). This invitation contains instructions for filling out a member profile, joining a

team, and signing up to the SBTF Google Group (K. Morris, personal communication, August

21, 2011). This process ensures a higher level of trust between volunteers as they work together

during static times and also among the highly organized and structured organizations like the

United Nation’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (Meier, 2010).

a. Project Management

The Task Force is able to prepare for disasters by maintaining a customized

instance of a Ushahidi map during static periods (K. Morris, personal

communication, June 3, 2011). The SBTF also customizes the Ushahidi platform

based on the lessons learned from previous deployments and puppet scripts are

written, debugged, and then hosted on the popular, online, open source code

repository, Github, in order to quickly deploy Ushahidi instances during crises (K.

Morris, personal communication, June 3, 2011). This ensures that, when a disaster

occurs, most structural work has already been completed.

The SBTF will not deploy any volunteer teams until a relevant authority solicits

their help (such as UN OCHA during the political crisis in Libya)( K. Morris,

personal communication, June 3, 2011). This allows the partner to make requests

so that data is tailored to the specific needs of the community (K. Morris, personal

communication, August 21, 2011), while it also legitimizes the Task Force’s work

and supports a high level of trust. When the SBTF does become involved, they

use GitHub in order to support code sharing amongst the many different SBTF

members and their partners (K. Morris, personal communication, June 3, 2011).

b. Volunteer Management

The SBTF uses a customized group website in order to organize and coordinate

amongst the ten different project groups. Each team creates a workflow for new

volunteers in order to quickly establish an understanding of their responsibilities

within the context of the group. An example of a workflow representing the

organization of the Task Force can be seen in Figure 3 below.

32

The teams provide a variety of training materials to new members, often in the

form of PowerPoint slides. However, training is also available through online

webinars hosted via the AnyMeeting web conferencing service. The webinars

allow a more senior member of the team to educate a large number of people on

topics such as how to use OpenStreetMap or the ethical protocols of disaster

mapping (Morris, 2011).

III. Project Deployment

Once an authority requests the SBTF’s aid, the teams deploy a Ushahidi instance and begin

monitoring and mapping media in the form of YouTube videos, Twitter feeds, SMS

messages, blog posts, live UStream channels, etc. The issue of whether or not a piece of data

is a rumor or true has arisen during several occasions. However, the Verification Team (one

of the ten subdivisions of the SBTF) has been successful using forensic evidence from the

message or video in order to determine its validity (K. Morris, personal communication,

June 3, 2011). However, the group is also able to rely on the senders’ histories and the

reactions of neighboring individuals on the ground in order to determine the validity of the

data. A recent study by a research team at Yahoo showed that 95% of tweets related to

confirmed reports validated that information while a miniscule 0.03% of tweets denied the

validity of these true cases (see Table 3 below). Yet, when false information is tweeted, the

results show that the percentage of tweets denying the information increases to about 50%

(Mendoza, Poblete, Castillo, 2011). This conclusion suggests that data verification may be

possible through the aggregate analysis of tweets (Meier, 2011).

Figure 4: SBTF Workflow. (Standby Task Force, n.d.b).

33

Table 3: Classification results for cases studied of confirmed truths and false rumors. (Mendoza, Poblete, Castillo, 2011).

The Standby Task Force also utilizes the concept of a “handle” in order to map data. This

means that, instead of asking individuals to tweet information whenever they deem

necessary, the SBTF asks groups to periodically report information to be mapped – this

enables a higher level of trust for both the volunteers and the community (Morris, 2011).

During the course of the project, the group rotates among volunteers to prevent against

physical, mental, and emotional fatigue (Morris, 2011). This is made possible by the fact

that there are about 600 volunteers for the SBTF who reside in about sixty countries

(Morris, 2011). Projects also aim to return control of the project to local authorities after the

course of about ten days (Morris, 2011).

34

Figure 5: SBTF Webinar Interface. This online conferencing service was used to train volunteers from across the globe on the SBTF's geolocation tools. A PowerPoint presentation appeared on the “Screen Share” tab later in the session (Morris, 2011).

35

CrisisCommons

Style: Bar Camp

I. Stated Mission

CrisisCommons is currently working to become a primary resource in linking the disparate

elements of a disconnected bureaucracy of crisis response organizations (CROs), V&TCs,

and interested individuals (A. Turner, personal communication, June 8, 2011).

CrisisCommons is a grassroots movement that “provides tools to supports aid workers on the

ground, hosts CrisisCamps where tools are produced , and maintains and supports a network

of volunteers to provide tools and respond to crises” (Lurie, 2010). During CrisisCamps a

global network of volunteers, developers, and professionals collaborate to build open source

tools to support aid workers (CrisisCommons, n.d.).

More specifically, CrisisCommons seeks to:

1. Empower Communities – Encouraging CrisisCamps

2. Become a Partnership Broker – proactively engaging crisis actors to facilitate technology

challenges during crisis; citizen advocate

3. Share Technology Tools – Building the “Sourceforge” of Crisis Response OSS

4. Innovate Crisis Tools of Tomorrow - Hackathon

5. Create Cross Response Collaboration – International aid & domestic response (closing

the gap)

6. Respond to Crises – Development of the CrisisCommons Action Team (both virtual and

physical)

7. Cultivate World Sensors – Empowering independent reporting & aggregation during

crisis

8. Build Global Citizen Action - Empowering digital literacy to save lives

9. Advocate for Access – Empowering global access to and freedom of expression

(CrisisCommons Charter, n.d.)

II. Current Organizational Structure

The idea of a “CrisisCamp” was founded in March 2009 as a barcamp event intended to

“connect crisis management and global development practitioners to the technology

volunteer community” (CrisisCommons, n.d.). During the crisis in Haiti, CrisisCamp events

became an official movement; CrisisCommons has since worked with “over 3,000 people …

worldwide in over 30 cities across 10 countries including France, United Kingdom, Canada,

New Zealand, Chile and Colombia” (CrisisCommons, n.d.).

CrisisCommons is working to define their governance structure. Presently however, a core

management team oversees the marketing, technical development, and general coordination

of CrisisCommons. Each CrisisCamp is its own entity and often has a group leader who is

the point of contact (POC) for the project (although volunteers’s and POCs’ contact

information is not routinely collected)(CrisisCommons, 2010, pp. 7-9). Some CrisisCamps,

36

such as CrisisCampLdn, have clearly defined structures and protocols for organizing

volunteers during crises and have begun to branch off from CrisisCommons in an effort to

clearly define their mission and structure (London Governance Discussion, n.d.). Others are

more ad hoc and depend on the CrisisCommons core team for governance and coordination

with other CrisisCamp teams.

a. Project Management

CrisisCommons is primarily organized through the use of a wiki and blog where

members post ideas regarding individual applications, governance structures, after-

action reports, and general information useful to the CrisisCommons community and

other V&TCs. While the organization hosts these pages internally, it also offers ad

hoc hosting services to developers working through individual CrisisCamps during

disasters (A. Turner, personal communication, June 8, 2011). This causes an

increased demand for server space and bandwidth during disasters and a lapse during

static periods. In order to address this issue and to offer effective support services,

CrisisCommons plans to coordinate their efforts through Oregon State University

OpenSource Lab (OSL) (Infrastructure/Plan, 2011). OSL’s responsibilities will

include providing core services for running CrisisCommons during static times (ie,

supporting the wiki); defining the environment, process, criteria, and lifecycle for

supporting new development; and defining the environment, process, criteria, and

lifecycle for launching and supporting new sites (Infrastructure/Plan, 2011).

CrisisCommons is also reorganizing their use of collaboration tools (ie, Skype),

content management tools, and project management tools (ie, Basecamp)

(Infrastructure/Plan, 2011). One of the primary concerns with the use of

Figure 6: CrisisCommons Structure. A core team within CrisisCommons oversees the efforts of individual CrisisCamps (these individuals are not all listed in this figure). While most of the Camps are self-driven, some specific Camps, such as CrisisCampLdn, are gaining independence as they work to define their own structures and protocols. The loose connections between independent CrisisCamps and CrisisCommons are highlighted by the broken lines on the left of the figure and the green color of the boxes.

37

organizational and collaborative tools is the monthly or yearly expenses associated

with the services.

The CrisisCommons Infrastructure Working Group (CCIWG) has been tasked with

developing a code-of-conduct, developing a 6 month CCIWG plan, updating the CCIWG 2-

year roadmap that exists, “gardening” the wiki, collecting and filing “documents,” collecting

and filing “files,” improving rapid-fire/on-demand workflow management for disaster tasks,

and developing podcasts for new members to the CCIWG.

b. Volunteer Management

CrisisCommons is unique within the V&TC network as it has managed to attract

people with backgrounds in technology as well as individuals with nontechnical

expertise, such as marketing (M. Prutsalis, personal communication, July 17, 2011).

This unique feature is expressed on the CrisisCommons homepage: “CrisisCampers

are not only technical folks like coders, programmers, geospatial and visualization

ninjas but we are also filled to the brim with super creative and smart folks who can

lead teams, manage projects, share information, search the internet, translate

languages, know usability, can write a research paper and can help us edit wikis”

(CrisisCommons, n.d.).

In order to better coordinate the efforts of volunteers, the CrisisCommons

Infrastructure Working Group (CCIWG) is searching for people willing to volunteer

their time on an ongoing basis in exchange for an opportunity to use their technology

specific skills, work on problems important to the CrisisCommons community, and

provide input to the future direction of the CCIWG (Infrastructure/Plan, 2011). The

CCIWG also aims to create both an Opportunity Model and Operational Model that

volunteers can use to find incomplete projects requiring attention and understand

procedural standards for developing projects (Infrastructure/Plan, 2011).

CrisisCommons is also planning to “go on tour” during September 2011 (National

Preparedness Month ) by “literally driving around the country in a tour bus… in order

to raise awareness, educate and connect people about how technology – especially the

Internet – can enhance disaster preparedness and response” (CrisisCommons, n.d.).

The tour bus will drive from the USA’s east coast to the west coast, inviting

individuals from local communities to ride on the bus for any given distance, hacking

with members or CrisisCommons and CrisisCamps along the way (CrisisCommons,

n.d.). The goals of this journey are to “support and train local emergency managers,

public health officials, and community organizers…. host an open data scavenger

hunt…. learn from the crisis experts…. learn from the tech community…. and raise

$1M of volunteer time” (CrisisCommons, n.d.).

III. Project Deployment When a disaster hits, individual CrisisCamps (such as CrisisCampNZ or CrisisCampLdn) form or

reconvene, thereby joining the efforts of volunteers not necessarily near the location of the disaster.

While the camps work to solve the technical problems that are brought to their attention,

CrisisCommons provides a forum where they can post and discuss critical data, such as existing

projects, contact information, application code, training materials, or relevant hashtags.

38

After the disaster, the Commons is also used to post after-action reports, or reflections from team

members on what strategies were successful and which strategies are in need of revision.

CrisisCommons is one of the few V&TCs that has prioritized the collection of reflection material on

past deployments.

39

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