Convergence of GDP per capita in EU25 - DiVA...
Transcript of Convergence of GDP per capita in EU25 - DiVA...
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS Uppsala University Masterrsquos thesis Fall 2006
Convergence of GDP per capita in EU25
Does it happen and how can it be explained
Author Martin Nybom
Supervisor Christian Nilsson Abstract
The EU25 Member Statesrsquo GDP per capita levels converged in 1994-2005 Convergence
occurred at an average speed of approximately 15 percent per year In the first part of this
paper unconditional convergence is analyzed by looking at both β- and σ-convergence and the
performances of the catch-up economies are compared discussed and related to the
convergence definition In a second stage the catch-up performances are analyzed in relation
to theory of economic integration Substantial increases in labor productivity explain a great
deal of the catch-up for poorer economies such as the Baltic states while increases in
employment have been relatively more important for the less poorer economies such as Spain
Portugal and Slovenia Labor productivity is further elaborated and it is found that both FDIs
and internal savings have been consistently higher for the catch-up economies than the non-
catching-up economies FDIs are also assumed to have indirect effects such as promoting
incorporation of technology
Key words Convergence catch-up EU25 the European Union Economic integration
2
Table of contents 1 Introduction 4 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging6
21 How to measure convergence 7 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β 8 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ 10
3 Are some catching up faster than others11 31 An expanded β-model 11 32 The estimation results 12 33 A descriptive approach 13
4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained14 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration 14 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital 17 43 Integration through capital mobility 18 44 Integration through migration 20 45 Integration through trade 22 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence 23
5 Explaining catch-up performances 24 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence 24 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology 25 52 Human capital and technology 28 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration 29 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade 31 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe 33
6 Conclusions35 References 36 Appendices 38
3
1 Introduction
Real convergence the process by which poorer economies over the phase of time catch up on
richer ones in terms of income or output has in empirical studies been shown to be far from
automatic Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) have found convincing evidence of convergence in
per capita incomes between US states but on the other hand also found that divergence
rather than convergence seems to be the norm when comparing countries on a global level
(1995 chapter 12) Further studies have reinforced the idea that the convergence concept is
conditioned on some level of homogeneity between the compared economies (eg Fagerberg
and Verspagen 1996 Tondl 1999)
This notion is related to whether a set of crucial theoretical assumptions hold and if the
production functions across the economies are of similar form Islam (1995) has by using a
panel data approach and controlling for cross-sectional fixed effects shown that there can be
convergence however to different steady states Hence one can separate between catch-up
when controlling for different production functions (conditional convergence) and
unconditional catch-up (absolute convergence) Islam and his followers have shown that
conditional convergence is more common than absolute convergence
The European Union which is the region of interest in this paper is first of all a political
project with the fundamental purpose to prevent war in Europe However this project has
since the beginning been carried out by the means of economic integration This is to
understand as the process in which national markets for goods services capital and labor
merge to form larger regional markets The enlarged economic area enables more efficient
allocations of resources such as the factors of production A properly functioning reallocation
process fosters convergence in prices as well as returns to capital and labor which in turn is
expected to give rise to convergence of GDP per capita Thus convergence theory and theory
of economic integration are closely related and to some extent teach us the same things
mainly because of their direct derivation from neo-classical growth theory
4
This paper focuses on economic integration and absolute convergence in Europe 1994-2005
Most empirical studies have found significant absolute convergence for the area of EU151
(see eg Hlouskova and Wagner 2002) while studies of a wider Europe (eg including the
Balkans the ex-Soviet Republics etc) or the whole world at best find conditional
convergence and on occasion also divergence In this paper the area of interest will be the
enlarged EU (hereinafter EU252) - an area more heterogeneous than EU15 but probably more
homogeneous than a wider Europe or the whole world The fall of the iron curtain and the
course towards EU enlargement are events that most likely have initiated large scale
integration processes resembling the idea outlined above Since economic integration and real
convergence can be seen as two sides of the same coin both concepts will be treated here
Convergence theory is applied in the first step in order to estimate if and at which rate
absolute convergence has taken place in the EU25 Theory of economic integration will be
used in a second step in order to look at the mechanisms causing convergence
The focus will solely be on absolute convergence in per capita GDP Thus I will not control
for different steady states Evidence of absolute convergence is of greater relevance for policy
making and can easier be linked to the discussion based on the integration concept Absolute
convergence in per capita GDP will be estimated by looking at β- and σ-convergence two
measures introduced by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) Since the definition of absolute
convergence states that the lower the initial GDP level is the faster the country is expected to
grow I will differentiate between catch-up economies3 to see if this has been the case In a
closing analysis there will be an attempt to explain catch-up performances by relating growth
rates to integration mechanisms such as trade investments and migration
The following section includes a brief outlining of the convergence concept and the methods
which will be applied to test for absolute convergence Further assessments of absolute
convergence will be provided and the performances of the catch-up countries will be
compared In section 4 the mechanisms of economic integration are presented Based on the
fundamentals of growth theory and theory of economic integration section 5 analyzes likely
1 The European Union before the eastward enlargement in 2004 but after the accession of Austria Finland and Sweden in 1995 consisted of 15 Member States and is referred to as EU15 2 The EU after the eastward enlargement in 2004 but before the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 consisted of 25 countries and is referred to as EU25 3 The 11 member states with per capita GDPs below the average of EU25 ie Czech Republic Estonia Greece Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Slovenia and Spain (Cyprus and Malta are actually also below the EU-average but are excluded from the analysis)
5
explanatory factors that may account for the catch-up performances Within a theoretical
framework the catch-up performances found in section 3 are compared and analyzed Finally
I conclude and give suggestions on further possible research topics
2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
Convergence in per capita levels of GDP and income has been a popular research topic since
the early 1990s The empirical evidence found up until now follow a couple of seemingly
consistent patterns Firstly convergence in general and particularly absolute convergence
appears to be highly dependent on how similar the studied economies are Studies only
including economies with large industrial and service sectors show more significant
convergence than studies which also include economies that are more dependent on eg
agriculture and tourism (see Fagerberg and Verspagen 1996) Trade barriers between the
studied economies as well as considerable political and judicial asymmetries also seem to
hamper convergence The fastest convergence has thus been estimated within more
homogenous economic areas with low internal barriers of trade such as among the US states
or the countries of EU124 and EU15 (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992 1995 Tondl 1999
Kaitala 2004)
Although convergence seems to be conditioned on a certain degree of homogeneity it is
difficult to separate the importance of eg trade barriers and what sectors the economy is
based on This due to the fact that these two factors usually correspond strongly with each
other Economic regions with similar economies often have lower barriers of trade and vice
versa Another factor worth mentioning is if and how the business cycle affects convergence
Since many estimations of convergence (including the one in this paper) are based on rather
short time periods the impact of business cycles on the convergence process could be crucial
McGranahan (2003) has studied this relationship for regions in the US and found a positive
correlation between inter-regional inequality and the expansion of the economy Divergence
in incomes was the norm during the upswing of the 1980s while the economic decline in the
early 1990s was associated with convergence However since this paperrsquos period of focus did
not see any remarkable booms or busts this aspect will not be analyzed in detail
4 EU12 includes the 12 Member States up until the accession of Austria Finland and Sweden in 1995
6
21 How to measure convergence
A frequently used and well documented method when looking at absolute convergence within
a region of economies is to estimate so called β-convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992)
This measure is obtained by the means of a straightforward econometric model in which
growth in per capita GDP is explained by the per capita GDP level in the preceding period
Barro and Sala-i-Martin originally estimated the β-coefficient on a cross-section of countries
with the starting GDP per capita level as regressor although followers within the field of
study have shown that it can be performed using panel data as well (see eg Islam 1996) The
panel approach is useful among other things because it generates more degrees of freedom
than the cross-section approach Because of these advantages this is the approach that will be
applied in this paper The equation to estimate is of the following form
iititit yyy εβα ++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2hellip n (21)
and the dependent variable since it is the first difference of a logarithmic scale is an
approximation of the annual growth rate in percent Another clear-cut method to use when
one wants to study convergence is to follow the development of the dispersion of per capita
GDP levels within the region of interest So called σ-convergence takes place if the dispersion
within the region decreases over time (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992) The dispersion in per
capita GDP between countries can be calculated in different ways but two convenient
measures are the coefficient of variance c and the standard deviation of the log GDP per
capita v ie
2
1
1sum=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ minus=
n
i
i
yyy
nc sum
=
equivn
iiy
ny
1
1 (22)
2
1
log1sum=
lowast ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
n
i
i
yy
nv sum
=
lowast equivn
iiy
ny
1log1log (23)
These two measures c and v do not seem to differ much at first glance and one expects to
find similar information Yet it has been shown that they in some situations can give rise to
conflicting results above all when the dispersion between the observed countries is large
(Dalgaard and Vastrup 2001) In this case the measures will differ since they put a different
7
weight to how far from the average observations are located The two measures have as an
example given contradictory estimates of global convergence from 1960 and onwards The
countries that were among the poorest in 1960 have not converged towards mean while the
countries above the poorest group have converged quite rapidly The result will in this case
depend on how you weight the countries with respect to their deviation from the mean
22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
Using the three measures of convergence outlined above a brief picture of whether absolute
convergence has taken place will now to be provided The observed period stretches from
1994 until 2005 and all but three of the EU25 countries are included The three small member
states Cyprus Malta and Luxembourg were for different reasons excluded from the analysis
As regards Cyprus and Malta the main reason was insufficient GDP data (comparable data
was only available from 1998 and onwards) Further these two Mediterranean economies
with dominant tourism and farming sectors can also not be expected to have much in common
with the other member states in terms of level and shape of production functions
Luxembourg is typically removed from analyses like these because of its economyrsquos
distinctive character In particular the per capita approach is because of the massive inward
commuting to Luxemburg meaningless to compare with that of the other member states
As the eight accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe went through rough transition
in the early 1990s with slumping production levels and fleeing populations the estimation
period was restricted to 1994-2005 although seemingly reliable data from around 1991 exist
for most them Latvia had for example a negative change in real GDP of about 31 percent in
1992 In Lithuania it fell by about 19 percent the same year In 1994 their respective
economies were about half the size of the estimated pre-transition levels Although the
transition itself as well as effects and counter-effects from it might have played an important
role also in the development after 1994 this choice of starting point seems to be consistent
with some sort of normalization in these economies Included data for the Western European
economies was also restricted to the period 1994-2005 in order to keep the panel balanced
Thus one has to keep in mind that the estimates do not account for the most intensive
transition period for the CEECs5 which most certainly affects the results6
5 CEECs refers to the eight rsquoCentral and Eastern European countriesrsquo of the EU ie the catch-up economies included in this paper less Greece Portugal and Spain
8
Table 1
Least square β-estimation dependent variable is itit yy 1 loglog minusminus
Coefficient value Standard error t-Statistic α 01757 00157 111711
β -01537 00017 -90545
R2 of model is 02562 Source data Eurostat (2006)
The results received from the estimation of the β-coefficient are shown in table 1 and indicate
that significant convergence in terms of per capita GDP has taken place in the region over the
studied time period The β-coefficient is estimated to -0015 corresponding to an annual
speed of convergence of about 15 percent7 This means that a member state on average
decreases the gap to the average level of per capita GDP in EU25 with 15 percent per year A
practical method of symbolizing what this means is to apply the half-life measure8 ie the
time necessary for an economy given an estimated convergence speed to close half of the
gap separating it from the average Assuming that the estimated convergence speed will be
consistent over the future it will take an economy 48 years to close half of the gap separating
it from the average A scatter plot and regression line showing the relationship between yearly
change in GDP per capita and the GDP per capita level the year before is graphed below
6 The data which this paper is based upon is exclusively collected from Eurostat (2006 see link in references) the EU statistics institution The GDP-data is in real terms (1995 Euros) Data on capital formation FDI trade etc are all in 1995 Euros Population labor force etc are measured at mid-year (first of July) in order to get more unbiased estimates when using the per capita measures 7 The speed of convergence is found by solving for λ in the equation β = eλt-1 where t in this case equals 1 8 The half-life measure is defined by ( ) ( )βτ +minus= 1ln2ln
9
Figure 1
Annual growth vs starting level
-004-002
000200400600801
012014016
7 75 8 85 9 95 10 105
GDP per capita the year before (logs)
Cha
nge
in G
DP
per c
apita
(log
s)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
The two measures of dispersion indicate that the dispersion in per capita GDP among the
studied economies has gradually fallen over time The trend in dispersion when using the
coefficient of variance c as well as the standard deviation of the log GDP per capita v are
presented in appendix 1 and shown graphically in figure 2 If the coefficient of variation is
applied the dispersion fell however only marginally (from 055 to 054 ie by about 2
percent) When using the v-measure the fall in dispersion was more significant Over the
period it changed from 099 to 084 a decrease of about 18 percent That the latter measure
gives a more significant proof of convergence is probably related to the fact that it puts
greater weight to observations with a large deviation from the mean (eg the Baltic states) and
that these economies have converged faster relative the ones closer to the mean
10
Figure 2
σ-convergence
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Disp
ersi
on in
per
cap
ita G
DPs
vc
v is the standard deviation of per capita GDPs in logs (equation 23) and c is the coefficient
of variance (eq 22)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
3 Are some catching up faster than others
31 An expanded β-model
The original equation used to estimate theβ -coefficient was of the following form
iititit yyy εβα ++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2hellip n (31)
By expanding this model with dummy variables groupings of catch-up-economies can be
analyzed with respect to their catch-up performance Three groups of Member States (MS)
were formed based on their initial gaps in per capita GDP to the EU-average (see figure 3 in
section 33) which also coincide rather strongly with geographical location The groups are
(1) the Baltic MS (Estonia Latvia and Lithuania) (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS (Poland Czech Republic Slovak Republic and Hungary) and (3) SE4 ie the
poorer than average MS of Southern Europe (Slovenia Greece Spain and Portugal)
The definition of absolute convergence states that poorer economies are suppose to grow at a
faster rate than richer ones however the yearly gap reduction in percent is expected to be
equal among the economies A necessary condition for absolute convergence is that the
poorer a country is at an initial stage the faster it should grow By assigning dummies for
11
these three groups and leaving the others as reference possible fixed growth effects for these
three groups can be distinguished In doing so the dummies will make variations in the size
of the intercept possible thus indicating whether a group of countries is converging faster or
slower than a reference point Thus the dummy coefficients in the model below indicate the
groupsrsquo deviation from the intercept of the reference group
iSSCCBBitRitit DDDyyy εαααβα +++++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog (32)
where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2 hellip n
and takes on the value one for the Baltic member states is one for the CEE4 and
is one for the SE4 The intercept of the reference group
BD CD SD
Rα indicates a ldquocorerdquo growth rate
and the dummy coefficients are the three groupsrsquo respective fixed deviation from this
intercept
32 The estimation results
The estimation of the equation outlined above gives results indicating that the Baltic group
has a somewhat higher speed of convergence relative the reference group The coefficients for
the other two groups are negative indicating a lower intercept and a lower speed of
convergence relative the reference group The fixed deviations are all insignificant at a five
percent significance level Thus a hypothesis stating that all the groups converge towards the
mean with equal speeds would not be rejected The group SE4 has a negative deviation from
the reference intercept which at the ten percent level would be weakly significant
Table 2
Least square estimation with group dummies dependent variable itit yy 1 loglog minusminus
Coefficient value Standard error t-Statistic
Rα 01607 00579 27744
β -00135 00058 -23440
Bα 00126 00145 08677
Cα -00083 00101 -08225
12
Sα -00098 00056 -17407
R2 of model is 03152 Source data Eurostat (2006)
Summing up the speeds of convergence for the three groups are at a conventional five
percent level neither significantly higher nor significantly lower than the reference grouprsquos
Yet the results do give a weak indication of faster convergence for the Baltic group than the
other two groups Of these two SE4 seems to converge marginally slower than CEE4
although the difference is small Below there will be a brief description of the growth
performances of the catch-up economies included in the three groups
33 A descriptive approach
Figure 3 below shows the total per capita GDP growth over the time period for the 11
countries below the average of EU259 The Baltic economies all doubled their per capita GDP
(Estonia was the most impressive with a growth close to 130 percent) The economies of
CEE4 grew by around 50 to 60 percent with the Czech Republic as a negative deviator The
economies of SE4 grew by around 40 percent with Slovenia deviating positively All of the
11 catch-up economies grew faster than the average of EU25 which had a positive change of
less than 13 percent between 1994 and 2005 Thus all 11 catch-up economies answered to the
theoretical expectations and actually caught-up and closed the gap to the average The
definition of absolute convergence said that the growth should be higher the lower the initial
level of GDP per capita From the figure below this more or less seems to have been the case
9 The average is weighted with respect to the sizes of the countries Thus a positive change in Germany affects the average more than an equal change in eg Sweden
13
Figure 3
Per capita GDP growth vs initial level
020406080
100120140
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
EU-25
Perc
ent
Period growth (1995-2005)Level in 1994 ( of EU-25)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
When talking about economic integration one has to distinguish between real and monetary
integration (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006) The former concerns real variables such as level of
output and allocation of production factors while the latter concerns the integration of
monetary systems and currencies eg the introduction of the Euro This paper focuses
exclusively on integration in real terms Further integration can take place at both macro and
micro levels States can force integration through macroeconomic decisions regarding trade
agreements and currency unions but at least as important for the integration process is the
behavior of firms and individuals Tools from microeconomic theory will be the basis of the
theoretical framework that is to be presented below
41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
A set of integration mechanisms which can function as driving forces behind convergence in
GDP levels will be presented below They are (1) internal accumulation of capital (ie
savings) (2) cross-border capital mobility (3) cross-border labor migration and (4) trade
They will be briefly illustrated with Edgeworth boxes and linked to how they affect per capita
GDP The mechanisms are derived from the neo-classical growth models presented by
14
Ramsey (1928) Solow (1956) and Koopmans (1965) and the standard production function of
the form
αα minus= 1
tttt LKAY with 10 ltltα (41)
where output Y for an exogenously given level of technology A depends on capital K and
labor L In the original model the savings rate is assumed to be exogenous and constant
Although K generally has been restricted to physical capital one may also think of it in a
broader sense comprising of physical capital and human capital (Mankiw Romer and Weil
1992) The main characteristics of this production function are constant returns to scale (since
the coefficients sum to 1) and diminishing marginal products of the production factors K and
L Hence imagining given levels of technology labor and savings rate additional capital
yields decreasing rates of return and growth rates This implies a steady state where capital
per worker k and output per worker y are constant
( kfy = )
)
(42)
The steady state output y is above all determined by the exogenously given level of
technology A which all economies are supposed to have free access to The assumption of
equal access to available technology or fast technological dispersion can be regarded as valid
for highly open economies with similar levels of education This may be expected for
advanced economies in general eg Western Europe but a critical issue is whether it can be
expanded to include the CEECs as well In the analysis section there will be a discussion of
how technological dispersion can function as a factor behind convergence but for the time
being the term indicating level of technology A is dropped Expression (41) can be rewritten
as
( LKfY = (43)
By dividing by total population N we get the following expression for per capita output
y = ( )NL
LLKf
NY
times= (44)
15
Thus output per capita depends on output per hour of labor (labor productivity) and hours of
labor to total population The latter can be further elaborated in order to take into account the
number of economically active (ie size of the labor force) and the size of the working age
population so that (44) becomes
( )N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKfy timestimestimes=
(45)
where LF is the size of the labor force and WA working age population GDP per capita now
depends on labor productivity hours of labor per economically active LLF the participation
rate LFWA and the size of the working age population to total population In order to
conveniently follow the changes in GDP per capita for a panel of countries the function is on
logarithmic scale and the subscripts i and t indicating country and year are added
( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tititi N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKf
y
lnlnln
lnln (46)
where ln yit ndash ln yit-1 is an approximation of the yearly growth in GDP per capita (for
relatively small changes in y) The mechanisms of economic integration will now be
presented They are illustrated with the well-known Edgeworth-box named after Francis
Ysidro Edgeworth A frequently used way of illustrating the integration process is otherwise
the Solow-diagram (see eg Baldwin 1989) However when comparing two or more
countries in a process of resource reallocation the Edgeworth-box serves as a more suitable
tool Finland and Estonia are used as a hypothetical example of how a richer economy with a
relatively higher degree of capital intensity in the production process can be integrated with a
poorer one with a relatively higher degree of labor intensity
The initial position with an allocation where Finnish production is more capital intensive than
the Estonian is shown below The interpretation is as follows labor increases in Finland
relative Estonia when L(Fin) moves to the right on the horizontal axis Capital in Finland
increases relative Estonia when K(Fin) moves upwards on the vertical axis Labor increases in
Estonia relative Finland when L(Est) moves to the left on the horizontal axis and capital
increases in Estonia relative Finland when K(Est) moves downwards The different
16
allocations between the countries are purely relative measures where K and L are in terms of
the otherrsquos disposal and the vertical and horizontal axis of the box symbolizes the aggregate
supply of the two factors in the region The capital intensity in Finland is K(Fin)L(Fin) and in
the proposed allocation below it is higher than in Estonia this since K(Fin)L(Fin) gt
K(Est)L(Est) Allocations along the diagonal line imply equal intensities and complete
integration in terms of factor prices and factor intensities
Figure 4
42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
In this case the level of output depends on savings rate productivity depreciation and
employment Only growth in productivity and employment rate can increase per capita
output given that the investment rate equals the rate of depreciation ie the economy is in
steady state If not in steady state the economy will grow as long as the marginal product of
capital yields an investment rate higher than the rate of depreciation However because of the
assumption of diminishing marginal returns to capital economies will over the phase of time
converge to the similar level given that they have matching production functions The figure
below shows a situation where Estonia by internal saving accumulates own capital up to its
steady state Thus the aggregate capital stock in the whole region grows (the box grows
upwards) the capital intensity in Estonia increases relative Finlandrsquos and there is convergence
between the two countries In the analysis of section 5 the impact of internal accumulation of
17
capital will be analyzed by comparing data on gross fixed capital formation stemming from
domestic sources
Figure 5
The constraint connected with the basic Solow model when studying integration and
convergence is that it treats the economy as closed Thus internal accumulation of capital can
only force absolute convergence if production functions are identical and the resulting
convergence speed will be low (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7) Economic integration
becomes more dynamic when allowing the factors of production to be internationally mobile
A theoretical situation in which borders are open better resembles the European reality and
results in new possibilities to efficiently allocate capital and labor
43 Integration through capital mobility
In the following sections the basic Solow model is extended to allow for cross border
reallocation of capital and labor Capital mobility in an enlarged economic area gives capital
owners the opportunity to reallocate their resources more efficiently This means intra-
regional reallocation (within the box) as well as a relative change in investments from non-EU
economies (from outside the box) Another difference compared to integration only through
internal accumulation is that the expected speed of convergence in this case is higher
(Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7)
18
One could consider the reallocation of capital to a less capital-rich economy as giving this
economy an ldquoinduced capital formation effectrdquo or ldquomedium-run growth bonusrdquo concepts
introduced by Baldwin (1989) This effect could be seen as an exogenous increase in the
investment rate in the relatively capital-poor country and vice versa in the capital-richer In
the original Solow-setting the investment rate equaled the savings rate and was assumed to be
constant From a welfare perspective this implied that citizens in order to invest more must
save more and consume less In the case where capital is reallocated across borders an
economy can enjoy increased investment activity without forgoing consumption
Figure 6
The figure above illustrates a situation in which capital is reallocated from the relatively
capital-richer Finland to the relatively capital-poorer Estonia This takes place since the
marginal returns to capital diminish and are higher in the relatively capital-poor economy
)()( kfL
LKFy == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the marginal returns to capital and
0)acuteacute()acute(lt=
partpart kf
kkf based on the law of diminishing returns
19
Thus the derivation of this integration mechanism as well as convergence theory in general
is highly dependent on the assumption of diminishing returns to capital This integration
mechanism will be analyzed by comparing inward foreign direct investments (FDI) in the
catch-up economies both as a share of GDP and as a share of gross fixed capital formation
This mechanism is expected to have a large impact on labor productivity thus decisive for
GDP growth and catch-up speed FDI affects labor productivity directly by increasing the
capital intensity in the production process but is also expected to augment the incorporation
of technology in the economy and therefore boost total factor productivity
44 Integration through migration
When borders are opened up for migration movement from poorer economies to richer ones is
expected according to the theory (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 chapter 8) In the capital-rich
economy the labor productivity and the wages are higher In the economy where capital is less
abundant labor productivity and wages are lower The wage asymmetry leads to net migration
from the capital-poor economy to the capital-rich Assuming perfect competition on the factor
markets the relationship between wages and capital intensity can be derived in the following
way
LFFw L partpart
equiv= is the wage
LLKFkfy )()( == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the unit cost of capital
kkfrk )acute(= is the per capita cost of capital in the economy which gives that
wkkfy =minus )`( since the per capita labor cost equals the average wage
By taking the derivative of the last expression with respect to k we get the effect on wages
when the capital intensity is increased
0)acuteacute( gtminus=partpart kkf
kw since facuteacute(k)lt 0
20
Less capital intensive production processes thus have a less productive labor force (the
marginal product of labor is lower) and lower wages other things equal If the assumptions
hold labor migration eg from Estonia to Finland lowers the wages in Finland (since the
capital intensity falls) and increases the wages in Estonia (because of increased capital
intensity) other things equal If overlooking externalities and changeover costs (and assuming
that the migrants are active laborers) the effect on GDP will be unambiguously positive in
Finland and negative in Estonia
Figure 7
In the figure above labor migrates from Estonia to Finland Capital intensity will increase in
Estonia given that to rapid capital depreciation not counteracts boosting convergence in
factor prices and labor productivity (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 8) Although this aspect
of economic integration unambiguously hampers convergence in GDP the effect on per
capita GDP is ambiguous The effect on convergence in per capita GDP depends on whether
the migrants were working in Estonia and if they find a job in Finland Other aspects eg
crowding out on the respective labor markets and the level of skills of the migrants are also
important to take into account but are beyond the scope of this paper Therefore the analysis
will be restricted to solely relate the expected (and most basic) effects from changes in
employment and population to the respective catch-up performances Other things equal
increases in hours of labor per economically active participation rate and the share of the
population in working age will have positive effects on per capita GDP while an increase in
21
total population will affect per capita GDP negatively Accordingly these variables will be
the basis of the analysis in section 5
45 Integration through trade
Cross-border trade and specialization can also function as a mechanism of integration causing
convergence Based on a set of assumptions it can be showed that countries can converge
through the prices of traded goods (and services) without the need for mobility of capital and
labor A fundamental concept is Ricardian trade and comparative advantages which shows
how trade leads to complete specialization in the production of goods (Ricardo 1821) In the
case with only two goods and two countries each country would end up supplying only the
good it produces the most efficiently and trade with each other Heckscher and Ohlin (1933)
and Samuelson (1948) has taken the concept further and shown that international trade gives
rise to factor price equalization through the goods markets given equal levels of technology
Figure 8
Factor price equalization takes place within a restricted area in which incomplete
specialization prevails However the countries keep producing both goods although they tend
to export the one which is produced more efficiently Thus convergence in factor prices can
be brought about without cross-border mobility of capital and labor given that the goods and
services are traded on an international market and that further specialization is possible What
22
factor price equalization does demand is that the factors of production are mobile between
sectors and industries If eg laborers are unwilling to switch sector or accept lower wages the
resulting effect will be unemployment Thus given that convergence of factor prices gives
rise to convergence in per capita output (this will be elaborated in section 54) the degree of
openness to trade will influence the catch-up performances I will analyze this relationship by
comparing data on trade integration (ie the average of imports and exports to GDP)
46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
Based on the outline above a number of important variables affecting growth in per capita
GDP and thus the convergence (or divergence) of economies can be listed The productivity
of labor is a crucial factor affecting the growth rate and the convergence trend If the
productivity of labor increases faster in a poorer economy than in a richer counterpart
convergence will be fostered other things equal Labor productivity is determined by total
factor productivity and the capital intensity in the production process The capital intensity
can be enhanced by internal accumulation of capital and foreign investments
Since the per capita GDP for a given size of the population depends positively on hours of
work per economically active an increase in this variable will boost convergence Holding the
other variables constant positive changes in the participation rate and the share of total
population in working age will affect GDP per capita positively Because of the per capita
approach total population will be negatively correlated with the speed of convergence when
holding the amount of work constant Based on the fourth integration mechanism it is also to
expect that the degree of openness to trade affects the speed of convergence A proxy for the
degree of openness is the economyrsquos trade integration of goods and services as a share of
GDP In the following section these variables (which are summarized in table 3 on the
following page) will be compared with the convergence performances of the catch-up
countries
Table 3
Summary of key variables affecting speed of convergence
23
Variable of interest Expected effect on per capita GDP and convergence speed other things equal
Technology Positive
Internal accumulation of capital Positive
Foreign direct investment Positive
Hours of work per economically active Positive
Participation rate Positive
Working age population Positive
Total population Negative
Trade integration Positive
5 Explaining catch-up performances
In the preceding section basic theory on economic integration and possible mechanisms
fostering convergence was outlined These mechanisms will now be related to the
performances of the catch-up economies that were briefly presented in section 3 The analysis
is based on descriptive statistics on the key variables presented above and their relation to
economic theory The grouping of the catch-up economies introduced in section 3 is applied
The three groups are (1) the Baltic Member States (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS and (3) SE4 ie the Southern European MS It was showed in section 3 that
the Baltic group had the lowest initial per capita GDPs and grew faster than CEE4 SE4 had
initial per capita GDPs closest to the average of EU25 and grew slower than CEE4
51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
On the basis of the production function the factors contributing to growth are labor
productivity and employment Labor productivity in turn is a broad concept which depends
on both available capital per worker ie the capital intensity and the way in which the factors
of production are exogenously turned into output ie level of technology or TFP Further the
amount of capital depends on internal capital formation and inward foreign direct
investments as well as the consumption of fixed capital ie capital depreciation Evolutions
in capital formation as well as level of technology are expected to be highly decisive for
growth in per capita GDP Firstly the average annual change in labor productivity and per
capita GDP are graphed against each other
24
Figure 9
Labor productivity vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
SpainAv
erag
e an
nual
cha
nge
(in
)
Per capita GDPLabor productivity
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As expected labor productivity and per capita GDP co-varies strongly Although the data is
rather convincing in stressing the importance of the broad concept of labor productivity to
growth and thus catch-up speed there are a few remarks to be done before this concept is to
be further elaborated From the bars above one can distinguish a pattern in which labor
productivity increases by more than per capita GDP for poorer economies and vice versa (the
higher the initial level of per capita GDP the farther to the right the country is located on the
x-axis) The extreme case seems to be Spain for which labor productivity played a relatively
unimportant role in explaining increases in per capita GDP Other comparatively rich nations
such as Greece Portugal and Slovenia also had lower impacts from labor productivity in
contrast to eg Estonia Lithuania and Poland Nevertheless the figures are (with the
exception of Spain) considerably higher than for the non-catching up economies and thus help
to explain convergence In the Euro area as an example the corresponding average annual
labor productivity growth was just one percent (Kaitala 2004)
52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
As it nearly seems to be an explain-it-all correlation between catch-up and labor productivity
the concept has to be further investigated In section 4 it was showed how internal savings and
cross-border reallocation of capital can deepen economic integration and foster convergence
Besides capital formation an important factor in the integration process is the dispersion and
25
incorporation of technology ie changes in TFP The evolution in TFP can be derived by
estimating the so-called Solow residual However this either demands access to reliable and
comparable capital stock data or own estimations of the respective capital stocks eg under
the perpetual inventory method Since there is a scarcity of comparable capital stock data for
the CEECs the alternative is own estimations This in turn would require baseline
benchmarks of capital-to-output ratios stocks of human capital etc and is beyond the scope
of this paper For the time being the focus will be on formation of physical capital although
some recent findings on dynamics in TFP will be reported
Figure 10
Annual gross fixed capital formation
05
10152025303540
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Perc
ent o
f GDP Baltic
CEE4SE4NCU
Source data Eurostat (2006)
In the figure above the evolution in annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a share of
GDP for the three groups and the non-catching up economies of EU25 (NCU) is graphed The
statistical aggregate of GFCF is a measure of the net new investment in the domestic economy
in fixed capital assets although not accounting for capital depreciation Obviously GFCF is
not a measure of total investment because all kinds of financial assets are excluded but is a
good indicator of the level of investment activity relevant for real variables such as output
The levels have been consistently high for all three groups of catch-up economies over the
time period As a contrast the investment level for the NCUs has been consistently below 20
percent of GDP for the time period When comparing the groups the most striking trend is the
consistent intensification of investment activity in the Baltic economies Although the general
26
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
Author Martin Nybom
Supervisor Christian Nilsson Abstract
The EU25 Member Statesrsquo GDP per capita levels converged in 1994-2005 Convergence
occurred at an average speed of approximately 15 percent per year In the first part of this
paper unconditional convergence is analyzed by looking at both β- and σ-convergence and the
performances of the catch-up economies are compared discussed and related to the
convergence definition In a second stage the catch-up performances are analyzed in relation
to theory of economic integration Substantial increases in labor productivity explain a great
deal of the catch-up for poorer economies such as the Baltic states while increases in
employment have been relatively more important for the less poorer economies such as Spain
Portugal and Slovenia Labor productivity is further elaborated and it is found that both FDIs
and internal savings have been consistently higher for the catch-up economies than the non-
catching-up economies FDIs are also assumed to have indirect effects such as promoting
incorporation of technology
Key words Convergence catch-up EU25 the European Union Economic integration
2
Table of contents 1 Introduction 4 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging6
21 How to measure convergence 7 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β 8 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ 10
3 Are some catching up faster than others11 31 An expanded β-model 11 32 The estimation results 12 33 A descriptive approach 13
4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained14 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration 14 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital 17 43 Integration through capital mobility 18 44 Integration through migration 20 45 Integration through trade 22 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence 23
5 Explaining catch-up performances 24 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence 24 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology 25 52 Human capital and technology 28 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration 29 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade 31 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe 33
6 Conclusions35 References 36 Appendices 38
3
1 Introduction
Real convergence the process by which poorer economies over the phase of time catch up on
richer ones in terms of income or output has in empirical studies been shown to be far from
automatic Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) have found convincing evidence of convergence in
per capita incomes between US states but on the other hand also found that divergence
rather than convergence seems to be the norm when comparing countries on a global level
(1995 chapter 12) Further studies have reinforced the idea that the convergence concept is
conditioned on some level of homogeneity between the compared economies (eg Fagerberg
and Verspagen 1996 Tondl 1999)
This notion is related to whether a set of crucial theoretical assumptions hold and if the
production functions across the economies are of similar form Islam (1995) has by using a
panel data approach and controlling for cross-sectional fixed effects shown that there can be
convergence however to different steady states Hence one can separate between catch-up
when controlling for different production functions (conditional convergence) and
unconditional catch-up (absolute convergence) Islam and his followers have shown that
conditional convergence is more common than absolute convergence
The European Union which is the region of interest in this paper is first of all a political
project with the fundamental purpose to prevent war in Europe However this project has
since the beginning been carried out by the means of economic integration This is to
understand as the process in which national markets for goods services capital and labor
merge to form larger regional markets The enlarged economic area enables more efficient
allocations of resources such as the factors of production A properly functioning reallocation
process fosters convergence in prices as well as returns to capital and labor which in turn is
expected to give rise to convergence of GDP per capita Thus convergence theory and theory
of economic integration are closely related and to some extent teach us the same things
mainly because of their direct derivation from neo-classical growth theory
4
This paper focuses on economic integration and absolute convergence in Europe 1994-2005
Most empirical studies have found significant absolute convergence for the area of EU151
(see eg Hlouskova and Wagner 2002) while studies of a wider Europe (eg including the
Balkans the ex-Soviet Republics etc) or the whole world at best find conditional
convergence and on occasion also divergence In this paper the area of interest will be the
enlarged EU (hereinafter EU252) - an area more heterogeneous than EU15 but probably more
homogeneous than a wider Europe or the whole world The fall of the iron curtain and the
course towards EU enlargement are events that most likely have initiated large scale
integration processes resembling the idea outlined above Since economic integration and real
convergence can be seen as two sides of the same coin both concepts will be treated here
Convergence theory is applied in the first step in order to estimate if and at which rate
absolute convergence has taken place in the EU25 Theory of economic integration will be
used in a second step in order to look at the mechanisms causing convergence
The focus will solely be on absolute convergence in per capita GDP Thus I will not control
for different steady states Evidence of absolute convergence is of greater relevance for policy
making and can easier be linked to the discussion based on the integration concept Absolute
convergence in per capita GDP will be estimated by looking at β- and σ-convergence two
measures introduced by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) Since the definition of absolute
convergence states that the lower the initial GDP level is the faster the country is expected to
grow I will differentiate between catch-up economies3 to see if this has been the case In a
closing analysis there will be an attempt to explain catch-up performances by relating growth
rates to integration mechanisms such as trade investments and migration
The following section includes a brief outlining of the convergence concept and the methods
which will be applied to test for absolute convergence Further assessments of absolute
convergence will be provided and the performances of the catch-up countries will be
compared In section 4 the mechanisms of economic integration are presented Based on the
fundamentals of growth theory and theory of economic integration section 5 analyzes likely
1 The European Union before the eastward enlargement in 2004 but after the accession of Austria Finland and Sweden in 1995 consisted of 15 Member States and is referred to as EU15 2 The EU after the eastward enlargement in 2004 but before the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 consisted of 25 countries and is referred to as EU25 3 The 11 member states with per capita GDPs below the average of EU25 ie Czech Republic Estonia Greece Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Slovenia and Spain (Cyprus and Malta are actually also below the EU-average but are excluded from the analysis)
5
explanatory factors that may account for the catch-up performances Within a theoretical
framework the catch-up performances found in section 3 are compared and analyzed Finally
I conclude and give suggestions on further possible research topics
2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
Convergence in per capita levels of GDP and income has been a popular research topic since
the early 1990s The empirical evidence found up until now follow a couple of seemingly
consistent patterns Firstly convergence in general and particularly absolute convergence
appears to be highly dependent on how similar the studied economies are Studies only
including economies with large industrial and service sectors show more significant
convergence than studies which also include economies that are more dependent on eg
agriculture and tourism (see Fagerberg and Verspagen 1996) Trade barriers between the
studied economies as well as considerable political and judicial asymmetries also seem to
hamper convergence The fastest convergence has thus been estimated within more
homogenous economic areas with low internal barriers of trade such as among the US states
or the countries of EU124 and EU15 (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992 1995 Tondl 1999
Kaitala 2004)
Although convergence seems to be conditioned on a certain degree of homogeneity it is
difficult to separate the importance of eg trade barriers and what sectors the economy is
based on This due to the fact that these two factors usually correspond strongly with each
other Economic regions with similar economies often have lower barriers of trade and vice
versa Another factor worth mentioning is if and how the business cycle affects convergence
Since many estimations of convergence (including the one in this paper) are based on rather
short time periods the impact of business cycles on the convergence process could be crucial
McGranahan (2003) has studied this relationship for regions in the US and found a positive
correlation between inter-regional inequality and the expansion of the economy Divergence
in incomes was the norm during the upswing of the 1980s while the economic decline in the
early 1990s was associated with convergence However since this paperrsquos period of focus did
not see any remarkable booms or busts this aspect will not be analyzed in detail
4 EU12 includes the 12 Member States up until the accession of Austria Finland and Sweden in 1995
6
21 How to measure convergence
A frequently used and well documented method when looking at absolute convergence within
a region of economies is to estimate so called β-convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992)
This measure is obtained by the means of a straightforward econometric model in which
growth in per capita GDP is explained by the per capita GDP level in the preceding period
Barro and Sala-i-Martin originally estimated the β-coefficient on a cross-section of countries
with the starting GDP per capita level as regressor although followers within the field of
study have shown that it can be performed using panel data as well (see eg Islam 1996) The
panel approach is useful among other things because it generates more degrees of freedom
than the cross-section approach Because of these advantages this is the approach that will be
applied in this paper The equation to estimate is of the following form
iititit yyy εβα ++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2hellip n (21)
and the dependent variable since it is the first difference of a logarithmic scale is an
approximation of the annual growth rate in percent Another clear-cut method to use when
one wants to study convergence is to follow the development of the dispersion of per capita
GDP levels within the region of interest So called σ-convergence takes place if the dispersion
within the region decreases over time (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992) The dispersion in per
capita GDP between countries can be calculated in different ways but two convenient
measures are the coefficient of variance c and the standard deviation of the log GDP per
capita v ie
2
1
1sum=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ minus=
n
i
i
yyy
nc sum
=
equivn
iiy
ny
1
1 (22)
2
1
log1sum=
lowast ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
n
i
i
yy
nv sum
=
lowast equivn
iiy
ny
1log1log (23)
These two measures c and v do not seem to differ much at first glance and one expects to
find similar information Yet it has been shown that they in some situations can give rise to
conflicting results above all when the dispersion between the observed countries is large
(Dalgaard and Vastrup 2001) In this case the measures will differ since they put a different
7
weight to how far from the average observations are located The two measures have as an
example given contradictory estimates of global convergence from 1960 and onwards The
countries that were among the poorest in 1960 have not converged towards mean while the
countries above the poorest group have converged quite rapidly The result will in this case
depend on how you weight the countries with respect to their deviation from the mean
22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
Using the three measures of convergence outlined above a brief picture of whether absolute
convergence has taken place will now to be provided The observed period stretches from
1994 until 2005 and all but three of the EU25 countries are included The three small member
states Cyprus Malta and Luxembourg were for different reasons excluded from the analysis
As regards Cyprus and Malta the main reason was insufficient GDP data (comparable data
was only available from 1998 and onwards) Further these two Mediterranean economies
with dominant tourism and farming sectors can also not be expected to have much in common
with the other member states in terms of level and shape of production functions
Luxembourg is typically removed from analyses like these because of its economyrsquos
distinctive character In particular the per capita approach is because of the massive inward
commuting to Luxemburg meaningless to compare with that of the other member states
As the eight accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe went through rough transition
in the early 1990s with slumping production levels and fleeing populations the estimation
period was restricted to 1994-2005 although seemingly reliable data from around 1991 exist
for most them Latvia had for example a negative change in real GDP of about 31 percent in
1992 In Lithuania it fell by about 19 percent the same year In 1994 their respective
economies were about half the size of the estimated pre-transition levels Although the
transition itself as well as effects and counter-effects from it might have played an important
role also in the development after 1994 this choice of starting point seems to be consistent
with some sort of normalization in these economies Included data for the Western European
economies was also restricted to the period 1994-2005 in order to keep the panel balanced
Thus one has to keep in mind that the estimates do not account for the most intensive
transition period for the CEECs5 which most certainly affects the results6
5 CEECs refers to the eight rsquoCentral and Eastern European countriesrsquo of the EU ie the catch-up economies included in this paper less Greece Portugal and Spain
8
Table 1
Least square β-estimation dependent variable is itit yy 1 loglog minusminus
Coefficient value Standard error t-Statistic α 01757 00157 111711
β -01537 00017 -90545
R2 of model is 02562 Source data Eurostat (2006)
The results received from the estimation of the β-coefficient are shown in table 1 and indicate
that significant convergence in terms of per capita GDP has taken place in the region over the
studied time period The β-coefficient is estimated to -0015 corresponding to an annual
speed of convergence of about 15 percent7 This means that a member state on average
decreases the gap to the average level of per capita GDP in EU25 with 15 percent per year A
practical method of symbolizing what this means is to apply the half-life measure8 ie the
time necessary for an economy given an estimated convergence speed to close half of the
gap separating it from the average Assuming that the estimated convergence speed will be
consistent over the future it will take an economy 48 years to close half of the gap separating
it from the average A scatter plot and regression line showing the relationship between yearly
change in GDP per capita and the GDP per capita level the year before is graphed below
6 The data which this paper is based upon is exclusively collected from Eurostat (2006 see link in references) the EU statistics institution The GDP-data is in real terms (1995 Euros) Data on capital formation FDI trade etc are all in 1995 Euros Population labor force etc are measured at mid-year (first of July) in order to get more unbiased estimates when using the per capita measures 7 The speed of convergence is found by solving for λ in the equation β = eλt-1 where t in this case equals 1 8 The half-life measure is defined by ( ) ( )βτ +minus= 1ln2ln
9
Figure 1
Annual growth vs starting level
-004-002
000200400600801
012014016
7 75 8 85 9 95 10 105
GDP per capita the year before (logs)
Cha
nge
in G
DP
per c
apita
(log
s)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
The two measures of dispersion indicate that the dispersion in per capita GDP among the
studied economies has gradually fallen over time The trend in dispersion when using the
coefficient of variance c as well as the standard deviation of the log GDP per capita v are
presented in appendix 1 and shown graphically in figure 2 If the coefficient of variation is
applied the dispersion fell however only marginally (from 055 to 054 ie by about 2
percent) When using the v-measure the fall in dispersion was more significant Over the
period it changed from 099 to 084 a decrease of about 18 percent That the latter measure
gives a more significant proof of convergence is probably related to the fact that it puts
greater weight to observations with a large deviation from the mean (eg the Baltic states) and
that these economies have converged faster relative the ones closer to the mean
10
Figure 2
σ-convergence
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Disp
ersi
on in
per
cap
ita G
DPs
vc
v is the standard deviation of per capita GDPs in logs (equation 23) and c is the coefficient
of variance (eq 22)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
3 Are some catching up faster than others
31 An expanded β-model
The original equation used to estimate theβ -coefficient was of the following form
iititit yyy εβα ++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2hellip n (31)
By expanding this model with dummy variables groupings of catch-up-economies can be
analyzed with respect to their catch-up performance Three groups of Member States (MS)
were formed based on their initial gaps in per capita GDP to the EU-average (see figure 3 in
section 33) which also coincide rather strongly with geographical location The groups are
(1) the Baltic MS (Estonia Latvia and Lithuania) (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS (Poland Czech Republic Slovak Republic and Hungary) and (3) SE4 ie the
poorer than average MS of Southern Europe (Slovenia Greece Spain and Portugal)
The definition of absolute convergence states that poorer economies are suppose to grow at a
faster rate than richer ones however the yearly gap reduction in percent is expected to be
equal among the economies A necessary condition for absolute convergence is that the
poorer a country is at an initial stage the faster it should grow By assigning dummies for
11
these three groups and leaving the others as reference possible fixed growth effects for these
three groups can be distinguished In doing so the dummies will make variations in the size
of the intercept possible thus indicating whether a group of countries is converging faster or
slower than a reference point Thus the dummy coefficients in the model below indicate the
groupsrsquo deviation from the intercept of the reference group
iSSCCBBitRitit DDDyyy εαααβα +++++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog (32)
where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2 hellip n
and takes on the value one for the Baltic member states is one for the CEE4 and
is one for the SE4 The intercept of the reference group
BD CD SD
Rα indicates a ldquocorerdquo growth rate
and the dummy coefficients are the three groupsrsquo respective fixed deviation from this
intercept
32 The estimation results
The estimation of the equation outlined above gives results indicating that the Baltic group
has a somewhat higher speed of convergence relative the reference group The coefficients for
the other two groups are negative indicating a lower intercept and a lower speed of
convergence relative the reference group The fixed deviations are all insignificant at a five
percent significance level Thus a hypothesis stating that all the groups converge towards the
mean with equal speeds would not be rejected The group SE4 has a negative deviation from
the reference intercept which at the ten percent level would be weakly significant
Table 2
Least square estimation with group dummies dependent variable itit yy 1 loglog minusminus
Coefficient value Standard error t-Statistic
Rα 01607 00579 27744
β -00135 00058 -23440
Bα 00126 00145 08677
Cα -00083 00101 -08225
12
Sα -00098 00056 -17407
R2 of model is 03152 Source data Eurostat (2006)
Summing up the speeds of convergence for the three groups are at a conventional five
percent level neither significantly higher nor significantly lower than the reference grouprsquos
Yet the results do give a weak indication of faster convergence for the Baltic group than the
other two groups Of these two SE4 seems to converge marginally slower than CEE4
although the difference is small Below there will be a brief description of the growth
performances of the catch-up economies included in the three groups
33 A descriptive approach
Figure 3 below shows the total per capita GDP growth over the time period for the 11
countries below the average of EU259 The Baltic economies all doubled their per capita GDP
(Estonia was the most impressive with a growth close to 130 percent) The economies of
CEE4 grew by around 50 to 60 percent with the Czech Republic as a negative deviator The
economies of SE4 grew by around 40 percent with Slovenia deviating positively All of the
11 catch-up economies grew faster than the average of EU25 which had a positive change of
less than 13 percent between 1994 and 2005 Thus all 11 catch-up economies answered to the
theoretical expectations and actually caught-up and closed the gap to the average The
definition of absolute convergence said that the growth should be higher the lower the initial
level of GDP per capita From the figure below this more or less seems to have been the case
9 The average is weighted with respect to the sizes of the countries Thus a positive change in Germany affects the average more than an equal change in eg Sweden
13
Figure 3
Per capita GDP growth vs initial level
020406080
100120140
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
EU-25
Perc
ent
Period growth (1995-2005)Level in 1994 ( of EU-25)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
When talking about economic integration one has to distinguish between real and monetary
integration (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006) The former concerns real variables such as level of
output and allocation of production factors while the latter concerns the integration of
monetary systems and currencies eg the introduction of the Euro This paper focuses
exclusively on integration in real terms Further integration can take place at both macro and
micro levels States can force integration through macroeconomic decisions regarding trade
agreements and currency unions but at least as important for the integration process is the
behavior of firms and individuals Tools from microeconomic theory will be the basis of the
theoretical framework that is to be presented below
41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
A set of integration mechanisms which can function as driving forces behind convergence in
GDP levels will be presented below They are (1) internal accumulation of capital (ie
savings) (2) cross-border capital mobility (3) cross-border labor migration and (4) trade
They will be briefly illustrated with Edgeworth boxes and linked to how they affect per capita
GDP The mechanisms are derived from the neo-classical growth models presented by
14
Ramsey (1928) Solow (1956) and Koopmans (1965) and the standard production function of
the form
αα minus= 1
tttt LKAY with 10 ltltα (41)
where output Y for an exogenously given level of technology A depends on capital K and
labor L In the original model the savings rate is assumed to be exogenous and constant
Although K generally has been restricted to physical capital one may also think of it in a
broader sense comprising of physical capital and human capital (Mankiw Romer and Weil
1992) The main characteristics of this production function are constant returns to scale (since
the coefficients sum to 1) and diminishing marginal products of the production factors K and
L Hence imagining given levels of technology labor and savings rate additional capital
yields decreasing rates of return and growth rates This implies a steady state where capital
per worker k and output per worker y are constant
( kfy = )
)
(42)
The steady state output y is above all determined by the exogenously given level of
technology A which all economies are supposed to have free access to The assumption of
equal access to available technology or fast technological dispersion can be regarded as valid
for highly open economies with similar levels of education This may be expected for
advanced economies in general eg Western Europe but a critical issue is whether it can be
expanded to include the CEECs as well In the analysis section there will be a discussion of
how technological dispersion can function as a factor behind convergence but for the time
being the term indicating level of technology A is dropped Expression (41) can be rewritten
as
( LKfY = (43)
By dividing by total population N we get the following expression for per capita output
y = ( )NL
LLKf
NY
times= (44)
15
Thus output per capita depends on output per hour of labor (labor productivity) and hours of
labor to total population The latter can be further elaborated in order to take into account the
number of economically active (ie size of the labor force) and the size of the working age
population so that (44) becomes
( )N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKfy timestimestimes=
(45)
where LF is the size of the labor force and WA working age population GDP per capita now
depends on labor productivity hours of labor per economically active LLF the participation
rate LFWA and the size of the working age population to total population In order to
conveniently follow the changes in GDP per capita for a panel of countries the function is on
logarithmic scale and the subscripts i and t indicating country and year are added
( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tititi N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKf
y
lnlnln
lnln (46)
where ln yit ndash ln yit-1 is an approximation of the yearly growth in GDP per capita (for
relatively small changes in y) The mechanisms of economic integration will now be
presented They are illustrated with the well-known Edgeworth-box named after Francis
Ysidro Edgeworth A frequently used way of illustrating the integration process is otherwise
the Solow-diagram (see eg Baldwin 1989) However when comparing two or more
countries in a process of resource reallocation the Edgeworth-box serves as a more suitable
tool Finland and Estonia are used as a hypothetical example of how a richer economy with a
relatively higher degree of capital intensity in the production process can be integrated with a
poorer one with a relatively higher degree of labor intensity
The initial position with an allocation where Finnish production is more capital intensive than
the Estonian is shown below The interpretation is as follows labor increases in Finland
relative Estonia when L(Fin) moves to the right on the horizontal axis Capital in Finland
increases relative Estonia when K(Fin) moves upwards on the vertical axis Labor increases in
Estonia relative Finland when L(Est) moves to the left on the horizontal axis and capital
increases in Estonia relative Finland when K(Est) moves downwards The different
16
allocations between the countries are purely relative measures where K and L are in terms of
the otherrsquos disposal and the vertical and horizontal axis of the box symbolizes the aggregate
supply of the two factors in the region The capital intensity in Finland is K(Fin)L(Fin) and in
the proposed allocation below it is higher than in Estonia this since K(Fin)L(Fin) gt
K(Est)L(Est) Allocations along the diagonal line imply equal intensities and complete
integration in terms of factor prices and factor intensities
Figure 4
42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
In this case the level of output depends on savings rate productivity depreciation and
employment Only growth in productivity and employment rate can increase per capita
output given that the investment rate equals the rate of depreciation ie the economy is in
steady state If not in steady state the economy will grow as long as the marginal product of
capital yields an investment rate higher than the rate of depreciation However because of the
assumption of diminishing marginal returns to capital economies will over the phase of time
converge to the similar level given that they have matching production functions The figure
below shows a situation where Estonia by internal saving accumulates own capital up to its
steady state Thus the aggregate capital stock in the whole region grows (the box grows
upwards) the capital intensity in Estonia increases relative Finlandrsquos and there is convergence
between the two countries In the analysis of section 5 the impact of internal accumulation of
17
capital will be analyzed by comparing data on gross fixed capital formation stemming from
domestic sources
Figure 5
The constraint connected with the basic Solow model when studying integration and
convergence is that it treats the economy as closed Thus internal accumulation of capital can
only force absolute convergence if production functions are identical and the resulting
convergence speed will be low (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7) Economic integration
becomes more dynamic when allowing the factors of production to be internationally mobile
A theoretical situation in which borders are open better resembles the European reality and
results in new possibilities to efficiently allocate capital and labor
43 Integration through capital mobility
In the following sections the basic Solow model is extended to allow for cross border
reallocation of capital and labor Capital mobility in an enlarged economic area gives capital
owners the opportunity to reallocate their resources more efficiently This means intra-
regional reallocation (within the box) as well as a relative change in investments from non-EU
economies (from outside the box) Another difference compared to integration only through
internal accumulation is that the expected speed of convergence in this case is higher
(Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7)
18
One could consider the reallocation of capital to a less capital-rich economy as giving this
economy an ldquoinduced capital formation effectrdquo or ldquomedium-run growth bonusrdquo concepts
introduced by Baldwin (1989) This effect could be seen as an exogenous increase in the
investment rate in the relatively capital-poor country and vice versa in the capital-richer In
the original Solow-setting the investment rate equaled the savings rate and was assumed to be
constant From a welfare perspective this implied that citizens in order to invest more must
save more and consume less In the case where capital is reallocated across borders an
economy can enjoy increased investment activity without forgoing consumption
Figure 6
The figure above illustrates a situation in which capital is reallocated from the relatively
capital-richer Finland to the relatively capital-poorer Estonia This takes place since the
marginal returns to capital diminish and are higher in the relatively capital-poor economy
)()( kfL
LKFy == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the marginal returns to capital and
0)acuteacute()acute(lt=
partpart kf
kkf based on the law of diminishing returns
19
Thus the derivation of this integration mechanism as well as convergence theory in general
is highly dependent on the assumption of diminishing returns to capital This integration
mechanism will be analyzed by comparing inward foreign direct investments (FDI) in the
catch-up economies both as a share of GDP and as a share of gross fixed capital formation
This mechanism is expected to have a large impact on labor productivity thus decisive for
GDP growth and catch-up speed FDI affects labor productivity directly by increasing the
capital intensity in the production process but is also expected to augment the incorporation
of technology in the economy and therefore boost total factor productivity
44 Integration through migration
When borders are opened up for migration movement from poorer economies to richer ones is
expected according to the theory (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 chapter 8) In the capital-rich
economy the labor productivity and the wages are higher In the economy where capital is less
abundant labor productivity and wages are lower The wage asymmetry leads to net migration
from the capital-poor economy to the capital-rich Assuming perfect competition on the factor
markets the relationship between wages and capital intensity can be derived in the following
way
LFFw L partpart
equiv= is the wage
LLKFkfy )()( == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the unit cost of capital
kkfrk )acute(= is the per capita cost of capital in the economy which gives that
wkkfy =minus )`( since the per capita labor cost equals the average wage
By taking the derivative of the last expression with respect to k we get the effect on wages
when the capital intensity is increased
0)acuteacute( gtminus=partpart kkf
kw since facuteacute(k)lt 0
20
Less capital intensive production processes thus have a less productive labor force (the
marginal product of labor is lower) and lower wages other things equal If the assumptions
hold labor migration eg from Estonia to Finland lowers the wages in Finland (since the
capital intensity falls) and increases the wages in Estonia (because of increased capital
intensity) other things equal If overlooking externalities and changeover costs (and assuming
that the migrants are active laborers) the effect on GDP will be unambiguously positive in
Finland and negative in Estonia
Figure 7
In the figure above labor migrates from Estonia to Finland Capital intensity will increase in
Estonia given that to rapid capital depreciation not counteracts boosting convergence in
factor prices and labor productivity (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 8) Although this aspect
of economic integration unambiguously hampers convergence in GDP the effect on per
capita GDP is ambiguous The effect on convergence in per capita GDP depends on whether
the migrants were working in Estonia and if they find a job in Finland Other aspects eg
crowding out on the respective labor markets and the level of skills of the migrants are also
important to take into account but are beyond the scope of this paper Therefore the analysis
will be restricted to solely relate the expected (and most basic) effects from changes in
employment and population to the respective catch-up performances Other things equal
increases in hours of labor per economically active participation rate and the share of the
population in working age will have positive effects on per capita GDP while an increase in
21
total population will affect per capita GDP negatively Accordingly these variables will be
the basis of the analysis in section 5
45 Integration through trade
Cross-border trade and specialization can also function as a mechanism of integration causing
convergence Based on a set of assumptions it can be showed that countries can converge
through the prices of traded goods (and services) without the need for mobility of capital and
labor A fundamental concept is Ricardian trade and comparative advantages which shows
how trade leads to complete specialization in the production of goods (Ricardo 1821) In the
case with only two goods and two countries each country would end up supplying only the
good it produces the most efficiently and trade with each other Heckscher and Ohlin (1933)
and Samuelson (1948) has taken the concept further and shown that international trade gives
rise to factor price equalization through the goods markets given equal levels of technology
Figure 8
Factor price equalization takes place within a restricted area in which incomplete
specialization prevails However the countries keep producing both goods although they tend
to export the one which is produced more efficiently Thus convergence in factor prices can
be brought about without cross-border mobility of capital and labor given that the goods and
services are traded on an international market and that further specialization is possible What
22
factor price equalization does demand is that the factors of production are mobile between
sectors and industries If eg laborers are unwilling to switch sector or accept lower wages the
resulting effect will be unemployment Thus given that convergence of factor prices gives
rise to convergence in per capita output (this will be elaborated in section 54) the degree of
openness to trade will influence the catch-up performances I will analyze this relationship by
comparing data on trade integration (ie the average of imports and exports to GDP)
46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
Based on the outline above a number of important variables affecting growth in per capita
GDP and thus the convergence (or divergence) of economies can be listed The productivity
of labor is a crucial factor affecting the growth rate and the convergence trend If the
productivity of labor increases faster in a poorer economy than in a richer counterpart
convergence will be fostered other things equal Labor productivity is determined by total
factor productivity and the capital intensity in the production process The capital intensity
can be enhanced by internal accumulation of capital and foreign investments
Since the per capita GDP for a given size of the population depends positively on hours of
work per economically active an increase in this variable will boost convergence Holding the
other variables constant positive changes in the participation rate and the share of total
population in working age will affect GDP per capita positively Because of the per capita
approach total population will be negatively correlated with the speed of convergence when
holding the amount of work constant Based on the fourth integration mechanism it is also to
expect that the degree of openness to trade affects the speed of convergence A proxy for the
degree of openness is the economyrsquos trade integration of goods and services as a share of
GDP In the following section these variables (which are summarized in table 3 on the
following page) will be compared with the convergence performances of the catch-up
countries
Table 3
Summary of key variables affecting speed of convergence
23
Variable of interest Expected effect on per capita GDP and convergence speed other things equal
Technology Positive
Internal accumulation of capital Positive
Foreign direct investment Positive
Hours of work per economically active Positive
Participation rate Positive
Working age population Positive
Total population Negative
Trade integration Positive
5 Explaining catch-up performances
In the preceding section basic theory on economic integration and possible mechanisms
fostering convergence was outlined These mechanisms will now be related to the
performances of the catch-up economies that were briefly presented in section 3 The analysis
is based on descriptive statistics on the key variables presented above and their relation to
economic theory The grouping of the catch-up economies introduced in section 3 is applied
The three groups are (1) the Baltic Member States (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS and (3) SE4 ie the Southern European MS It was showed in section 3 that
the Baltic group had the lowest initial per capita GDPs and grew faster than CEE4 SE4 had
initial per capita GDPs closest to the average of EU25 and grew slower than CEE4
51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
On the basis of the production function the factors contributing to growth are labor
productivity and employment Labor productivity in turn is a broad concept which depends
on both available capital per worker ie the capital intensity and the way in which the factors
of production are exogenously turned into output ie level of technology or TFP Further the
amount of capital depends on internal capital formation and inward foreign direct
investments as well as the consumption of fixed capital ie capital depreciation Evolutions
in capital formation as well as level of technology are expected to be highly decisive for
growth in per capita GDP Firstly the average annual change in labor productivity and per
capita GDP are graphed against each other
24
Figure 9
Labor productivity vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
SpainAv
erag
e an
nual
cha
nge
(in
)
Per capita GDPLabor productivity
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As expected labor productivity and per capita GDP co-varies strongly Although the data is
rather convincing in stressing the importance of the broad concept of labor productivity to
growth and thus catch-up speed there are a few remarks to be done before this concept is to
be further elaborated From the bars above one can distinguish a pattern in which labor
productivity increases by more than per capita GDP for poorer economies and vice versa (the
higher the initial level of per capita GDP the farther to the right the country is located on the
x-axis) The extreme case seems to be Spain for which labor productivity played a relatively
unimportant role in explaining increases in per capita GDP Other comparatively rich nations
such as Greece Portugal and Slovenia also had lower impacts from labor productivity in
contrast to eg Estonia Lithuania and Poland Nevertheless the figures are (with the
exception of Spain) considerably higher than for the non-catching up economies and thus help
to explain convergence In the Euro area as an example the corresponding average annual
labor productivity growth was just one percent (Kaitala 2004)
52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
As it nearly seems to be an explain-it-all correlation between catch-up and labor productivity
the concept has to be further investigated In section 4 it was showed how internal savings and
cross-border reallocation of capital can deepen economic integration and foster convergence
Besides capital formation an important factor in the integration process is the dispersion and
25
incorporation of technology ie changes in TFP The evolution in TFP can be derived by
estimating the so-called Solow residual However this either demands access to reliable and
comparable capital stock data or own estimations of the respective capital stocks eg under
the perpetual inventory method Since there is a scarcity of comparable capital stock data for
the CEECs the alternative is own estimations This in turn would require baseline
benchmarks of capital-to-output ratios stocks of human capital etc and is beyond the scope
of this paper For the time being the focus will be on formation of physical capital although
some recent findings on dynamics in TFP will be reported
Figure 10
Annual gross fixed capital formation
05
10152025303540
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Perc
ent o
f GDP Baltic
CEE4SE4NCU
Source data Eurostat (2006)
In the figure above the evolution in annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a share of
GDP for the three groups and the non-catching up economies of EU25 (NCU) is graphed The
statistical aggregate of GFCF is a measure of the net new investment in the domestic economy
in fixed capital assets although not accounting for capital depreciation Obviously GFCF is
not a measure of total investment because all kinds of financial assets are excluded but is a
good indicator of the level of investment activity relevant for real variables such as output
The levels have been consistently high for all three groups of catch-up economies over the
time period As a contrast the investment level for the NCUs has been consistently below 20
percent of GDP for the time period When comparing the groups the most striking trend is the
consistent intensification of investment activity in the Baltic economies Although the general
26
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
Table of contents 1 Introduction 4 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging6
21 How to measure convergence 7 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β 8 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ 10
3 Are some catching up faster than others11 31 An expanded β-model 11 32 The estimation results 12 33 A descriptive approach 13
4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained14 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration 14 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital 17 43 Integration through capital mobility 18 44 Integration through migration 20 45 Integration through trade 22 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence 23
5 Explaining catch-up performances 24 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence 24 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology 25 52 Human capital and technology 28 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration 29 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade 31 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe 33
6 Conclusions35 References 36 Appendices 38
3
1 Introduction
Real convergence the process by which poorer economies over the phase of time catch up on
richer ones in terms of income or output has in empirical studies been shown to be far from
automatic Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) have found convincing evidence of convergence in
per capita incomes between US states but on the other hand also found that divergence
rather than convergence seems to be the norm when comparing countries on a global level
(1995 chapter 12) Further studies have reinforced the idea that the convergence concept is
conditioned on some level of homogeneity between the compared economies (eg Fagerberg
and Verspagen 1996 Tondl 1999)
This notion is related to whether a set of crucial theoretical assumptions hold and if the
production functions across the economies are of similar form Islam (1995) has by using a
panel data approach and controlling for cross-sectional fixed effects shown that there can be
convergence however to different steady states Hence one can separate between catch-up
when controlling for different production functions (conditional convergence) and
unconditional catch-up (absolute convergence) Islam and his followers have shown that
conditional convergence is more common than absolute convergence
The European Union which is the region of interest in this paper is first of all a political
project with the fundamental purpose to prevent war in Europe However this project has
since the beginning been carried out by the means of economic integration This is to
understand as the process in which national markets for goods services capital and labor
merge to form larger regional markets The enlarged economic area enables more efficient
allocations of resources such as the factors of production A properly functioning reallocation
process fosters convergence in prices as well as returns to capital and labor which in turn is
expected to give rise to convergence of GDP per capita Thus convergence theory and theory
of economic integration are closely related and to some extent teach us the same things
mainly because of their direct derivation from neo-classical growth theory
4
This paper focuses on economic integration and absolute convergence in Europe 1994-2005
Most empirical studies have found significant absolute convergence for the area of EU151
(see eg Hlouskova and Wagner 2002) while studies of a wider Europe (eg including the
Balkans the ex-Soviet Republics etc) or the whole world at best find conditional
convergence and on occasion also divergence In this paper the area of interest will be the
enlarged EU (hereinafter EU252) - an area more heterogeneous than EU15 but probably more
homogeneous than a wider Europe or the whole world The fall of the iron curtain and the
course towards EU enlargement are events that most likely have initiated large scale
integration processes resembling the idea outlined above Since economic integration and real
convergence can be seen as two sides of the same coin both concepts will be treated here
Convergence theory is applied in the first step in order to estimate if and at which rate
absolute convergence has taken place in the EU25 Theory of economic integration will be
used in a second step in order to look at the mechanisms causing convergence
The focus will solely be on absolute convergence in per capita GDP Thus I will not control
for different steady states Evidence of absolute convergence is of greater relevance for policy
making and can easier be linked to the discussion based on the integration concept Absolute
convergence in per capita GDP will be estimated by looking at β- and σ-convergence two
measures introduced by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) Since the definition of absolute
convergence states that the lower the initial GDP level is the faster the country is expected to
grow I will differentiate between catch-up economies3 to see if this has been the case In a
closing analysis there will be an attempt to explain catch-up performances by relating growth
rates to integration mechanisms such as trade investments and migration
The following section includes a brief outlining of the convergence concept and the methods
which will be applied to test for absolute convergence Further assessments of absolute
convergence will be provided and the performances of the catch-up countries will be
compared In section 4 the mechanisms of economic integration are presented Based on the
fundamentals of growth theory and theory of economic integration section 5 analyzes likely
1 The European Union before the eastward enlargement in 2004 but after the accession of Austria Finland and Sweden in 1995 consisted of 15 Member States and is referred to as EU15 2 The EU after the eastward enlargement in 2004 but before the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 consisted of 25 countries and is referred to as EU25 3 The 11 member states with per capita GDPs below the average of EU25 ie Czech Republic Estonia Greece Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Slovenia and Spain (Cyprus and Malta are actually also below the EU-average but are excluded from the analysis)
5
explanatory factors that may account for the catch-up performances Within a theoretical
framework the catch-up performances found in section 3 are compared and analyzed Finally
I conclude and give suggestions on further possible research topics
2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
Convergence in per capita levels of GDP and income has been a popular research topic since
the early 1990s The empirical evidence found up until now follow a couple of seemingly
consistent patterns Firstly convergence in general and particularly absolute convergence
appears to be highly dependent on how similar the studied economies are Studies only
including economies with large industrial and service sectors show more significant
convergence than studies which also include economies that are more dependent on eg
agriculture and tourism (see Fagerberg and Verspagen 1996) Trade barriers between the
studied economies as well as considerable political and judicial asymmetries also seem to
hamper convergence The fastest convergence has thus been estimated within more
homogenous economic areas with low internal barriers of trade such as among the US states
or the countries of EU124 and EU15 (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992 1995 Tondl 1999
Kaitala 2004)
Although convergence seems to be conditioned on a certain degree of homogeneity it is
difficult to separate the importance of eg trade barriers and what sectors the economy is
based on This due to the fact that these two factors usually correspond strongly with each
other Economic regions with similar economies often have lower barriers of trade and vice
versa Another factor worth mentioning is if and how the business cycle affects convergence
Since many estimations of convergence (including the one in this paper) are based on rather
short time periods the impact of business cycles on the convergence process could be crucial
McGranahan (2003) has studied this relationship for regions in the US and found a positive
correlation between inter-regional inequality and the expansion of the economy Divergence
in incomes was the norm during the upswing of the 1980s while the economic decline in the
early 1990s was associated with convergence However since this paperrsquos period of focus did
not see any remarkable booms or busts this aspect will not be analyzed in detail
4 EU12 includes the 12 Member States up until the accession of Austria Finland and Sweden in 1995
6
21 How to measure convergence
A frequently used and well documented method when looking at absolute convergence within
a region of economies is to estimate so called β-convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992)
This measure is obtained by the means of a straightforward econometric model in which
growth in per capita GDP is explained by the per capita GDP level in the preceding period
Barro and Sala-i-Martin originally estimated the β-coefficient on a cross-section of countries
with the starting GDP per capita level as regressor although followers within the field of
study have shown that it can be performed using panel data as well (see eg Islam 1996) The
panel approach is useful among other things because it generates more degrees of freedom
than the cross-section approach Because of these advantages this is the approach that will be
applied in this paper The equation to estimate is of the following form
iititit yyy εβα ++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2hellip n (21)
and the dependent variable since it is the first difference of a logarithmic scale is an
approximation of the annual growth rate in percent Another clear-cut method to use when
one wants to study convergence is to follow the development of the dispersion of per capita
GDP levels within the region of interest So called σ-convergence takes place if the dispersion
within the region decreases over time (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992) The dispersion in per
capita GDP between countries can be calculated in different ways but two convenient
measures are the coefficient of variance c and the standard deviation of the log GDP per
capita v ie
2
1
1sum=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ minus=
n
i
i
yyy
nc sum
=
equivn
iiy
ny
1
1 (22)
2
1
log1sum=
lowast ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
n
i
i
yy
nv sum
=
lowast equivn
iiy
ny
1log1log (23)
These two measures c and v do not seem to differ much at first glance and one expects to
find similar information Yet it has been shown that they in some situations can give rise to
conflicting results above all when the dispersion between the observed countries is large
(Dalgaard and Vastrup 2001) In this case the measures will differ since they put a different
7
weight to how far from the average observations are located The two measures have as an
example given contradictory estimates of global convergence from 1960 and onwards The
countries that were among the poorest in 1960 have not converged towards mean while the
countries above the poorest group have converged quite rapidly The result will in this case
depend on how you weight the countries with respect to their deviation from the mean
22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
Using the three measures of convergence outlined above a brief picture of whether absolute
convergence has taken place will now to be provided The observed period stretches from
1994 until 2005 and all but three of the EU25 countries are included The three small member
states Cyprus Malta and Luxembourg were for different reasons excluded from the analysis
As regards Cyprus and Malta the main reason was insufficient GDP data (comparable data
was only available from 1998 and onwards) Further these two Mediterranean economies
with dominant tourism and farming sectors can also not be expected to have much in common
with the other member states in terms of level and shape of production functions
Luxembourg is typically removed from analyses like these because of its economyrsquos
distinctive character In particular the per capita approach is because of the massive inward
commuting to Luxemburg meaningless to compare with that of the other member states
As the eight accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe went through rough transition
in the early 1990s with slumping production levels and fleeing populations the estimation
period was restricted to 1994-2005 although seemingly reliable data from around 1991 exist
for most them Latvia had for example a negative change in real GDP of about 31 percent in
1992 In Lithuania it fell by about 19 percent the same year In 1994 their respective
economies were about half the size of the estimated pre-transition levels Although the
transition itself as well as effects and counter-effects from it might have played an important
role also in the development after 1994 this choice of starting point seems to be consistent
with some sort of normalization in these economies Included data for the Western European
economies was also restricted to the period 1994-2005 in order to keep the panel balanced
Thus one has to keep in mind that the estimates do not account for the most intensive
transition period for the CEECs5 which most certainly affects the results6
5 CEECs refers to the eight rsquoCentral and Eastern European countriesrsquo of the EU ie the catch-up economies included in this paper less Greece Portugal and Spain
8
Table 1
Least square β-estimation dependent variable is itit yy 1 loglog minusminus
Coefficient value Standard error t-Statistic α 01757 00157 111711
β -01537 00017 -90545
R2 of model is 02562 Source data Eurostat (2006)
The results received from the estimation of the β-coefficient are shown in table 1 and indicate
that significant convergence in terms of per capita GDP has taken place in the region over the
studied time period The β-coefficient is estimated to -0015 corresponding to an annual
speed of convergence of about 15 percent7 This means that a member state on average
decreases the gap to the average level of per capita GDP in EU25 with 15 percent per year A
practical method of symbolizing what this means is to apply the half-life measure8 ie the
time necessary for an economy given an estimated convergence speed to close half of the
gap separating it from the average Assuming that the estimated convergence speed will be
consistent over the future it will take an economy 48 years to close half of the gap separating
it from the average A scatter plot and regression line showing the relationship between yearly
change in GDP per capita and the GDP per capita level the year before is graphed below
6 The data which this paper is based upon is exclusively collected from Eurostat (2006 see link in references) the EU statistics institution The GDP-data is in real terms (1995 Euros) Data on capital formation FDI trade etc are all in 1995 Euros Population labor force etc are measured at mid-year (first of July) in order to get more unbiased estimates when using the per capita measures 7 The speed of convergence is found by solving for λ in the equation β = eλt-1 where t in this case equals 1 8 The half-life measure is defined by ( ) ( )βτ +minus= 1ln2ln
9
Figure 1
Annual growth vs starting level
-004-002
000200400600801
012014016
7 75 8 85 9 95 10 105
GDP per capita the year before (logs)
Cha
nge
in G
DP
per c
apita
(log
s)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
The two measures of dispersion indicate that the dispersion in per capita GDP among the
studied economies has gradually fallen over time The trend in dispersion when using the
coefficient of variance c as well as the standard deviation of the log GDP per capita v are
presented in appendix 1 and shown graphically in figure 2 If the coefficient of variation is
applied the dispersion fell however only marginally (from 055 to 054 ie by about 2
percent) When using the v-measure the fall in dispersion was more significant Over the
period it changed from 099 to 084 a decrease of about 18 percent That the latter measure
gives a more significant proof of convergence is probably related to the fact that it puts
greater weight to observations with a large deviation from the mean (eg the Baltic states) and
that these economies have converged faster relative the ones closer to the mean
10
Figure 2
σ-convergence
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Disp
ersi
on in
per
cap
ita G
DPs
vc
v is the standard deviation of per capita GDPs in logs (equation 23) and c is the coefficient
of variance (eq 22)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
3 Are some catching up faster than others
31 An expanded β-model
The original equation used to estimate theβ -coefficient was of the following form
iititit yyy εβα ++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2hellip n (31)
By expanding this model with dummy variables groupings of catch-up-economies can be
analyzed with respect to their catch-up performance Three groups of Member States (MS)
were formed based on their initial gaps in per capita GDP to the EU-average (see figure 3 in
section 33) which also coincide rather strongly with geographical location The groups are
(1) the Baltic MS (Estonia Latvia and Lithuania) (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS (Poland Czech Republic Slovak Republic and Hungary) and (3) SE4 ie the
poorer than average MS of Southern Europe (Slovenia Greece Spain and Portugal)
The definition of absolute convergence states that poorer economies are suppose to grow at a
faster rate than richer ones however the yearly gap reduction in percent is expected to be
equal among the economies A necessary condition for absolute convergence is that the
poorer a country is at an initial stage the faster it should grow By assigning dummies for
11
these three groups and leaving the others as reference possible fixed growth effects for these
three groups can be distinguished In doing so the dummies will make variations in the size
of the intercept possible thus indicating whether a group of countries is converging faster or
slower than a reference point Thus the dummy coefficients in the model below indicate the
groupsrsquo deviation from the intercept of the reference group
iSSCCBBitRitit DDDyyy εαααβα +++++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog (32)
where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2 hellip n
and takes on the value one for the Baltic member states is one for the CEE4 and
is one for the SE4 The intercept of the reference group
BD CD SD
Rα indicates a ldquocorerdquo growth rate
and the dummy coefficients are the three groupsrsquo respective fixed deviation from this
intercept
32 The estimation results
The estimation of the equation outlined above gives results indicating that the Baltic group
has a somewhat higher speed of convergence relative the reference group The coefficients for
the other two groups are negative indicating a lower intercept and a lower speed of
convergence relative the reference group The fixed deviations are all insignificant at a five
percent significance level Thus a hypothesis stating that all the groups converge towards the
mean with equal speeds would not be rejected The group SE4 has a negative deviation from
the reference intercept which at the ten percent level would be weakly significant
Table 2
Least square estimation with group dummies dependent variable itit yy 1 loglog minusminus
Coefficient value Standard error t-Statistic
Rα 01607 00579 27744
β -00135 00058 -23440
Bα 00126 00145 08677
Cα -00083 00101 -08225
12
Sα -00098 00056 -17407
R2 of model is 03152 Source data Eurostat (2006)
Summing up the speeds of convergence for the three groups are at a conventional five
percent level neither significantly higher nor significantly lower than the reference grouprsquos
Yet the results do give a weak indication of faster convergence for the Baltic group than the
other two groups Of these two SE4 seems to converge marginally slower than CEE4
although the difference is small Below there will be a brief description of the growth
performances of the catch-up economies included in the three groups
33 A descriptive approach
Figure 3 below shows the total per capita GDP growth over the time period for the 11
countries below the average of EU259 The Baltic economies all doubled their per capita GDP
(Estonia was the most impressive with a growth close to 130 percent) The economies of
CEE4 grew by around 50 to 60 percent with the Czech Republic as a negative deviator The
economies of SE4 grew by around 40 percent with Slovenia deviating positively All of the
11 catch-up economies grew faster than the average of EU25 which had a positive change of
less than 13 percent between 1994 and 2005 Thus all 11 catch-up economies answered to the
theoretical expectations and actually caught-up and closed the gap to the average The
definition of absolute convergence said that the growth should be higher the lower the initial
level of GDP per capita From the figure below this more or less seems to have been the case
9 The average is weighted with respect to the sizes of the countries Thus a positive change in Germany affects the average more than an equal change in eg Sweden
13
Figure 3
Per capita GDP growth vs initial level
020406080
100120140
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
EU-25
Perc
ent
Period growth (1995-2005)Level in 1994 ( of EU-25)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
When talking about economic integration one has to distinguish between real and monetary
integration (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006) The former concerns real variables such as level of
output and allocation of production factors while the latter concerns the integration of
monetary systems and currencies eg the introduction of the Euro This paper focuses
exclusively on integration in real terms Further integration can take place at both macro and
micro levels States can force integration through macroeconomic decisions regarding trade
agreements and currency unions but at least as important for the integration process is the
behavior of firms and individuals Tools from microeconomic theory will be the basis of the
theoretical framework that is to be presented below
41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
A set of integration mechanisms which can function as driving forces behind convergence in
GDP levels will be presented below They are (1) internal accumulation of capital (ie
savings) (2) cross-border capital mobility (3) cross-border labor migration and (4) trade
They will be briefly illustrated with Edgeworth boxes and linked to how they affect per capita
GDP The mechanisms are derived from the neo-classical growth models presented by
14
Ramsey (1928) Solow (1956) and Koopmans (1965) and the standard production function of
the form
αα minus= 1
tttt LKAY with 10 ltltα (41)
where output Y for an exogenously given level of technology A depends on capital K and
labor L In the original model the savings rate is assumed to be exogenous and constant
Although K generally has been restricted to physical capital one may also think of it in a
broader sense comprising of physical capital and human capital (Mankiw Romer and Weil
1992) The main characteristics of this production function are constant returns to scale (since
the coefficients sum to 1) and diminishing marginal products of the production factors K and
L Hence imagining given levels of technology labor and savings rate additional capital
yields decreasing rates of return and growth rates This implies a steady state where capital
per worker k and output per worker y are constant
( kfy = )
)
(42)
The steady state output y is above all determined by the exogenously given level of
technology A which all economies are supposed to have free access to The assumption of
equal access to available technology or fast technological dispersion can be regarded as valid
for highly open economies with similar levels of education This may be expected for
advanced economies in general eg Western Europe but a critical issue is whether it can be
expanded to include the CEECs as well In the analysis section there will be a discussion of
how technological dispersion can function as a factor behind convergence but for the time
being the term indicating level of technology A is dropped Expression (41) can be rewritten
as
( LKfY = (43)
By dividing by total population N we get the following expression for per capita output
y = ( )NL
LLKf
NY
times= (44)
15
Thus output per capita depends on output per hour of labor (labor productivity) and hours of
labor to total population The latter can be further elaborated in order to take into account the
number of economically active (ie size of the labor force) and the size of the working age
population so that (44) becomes
( )N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKfy timestimestimes=
(45)
where LF is the size of the labor force and WA working age population GDP per capita now
depends on labor productivity hours of labor per economically active LLF the participation
rate LFWA and the size of the working age population to total population In order to
conveniently follow the changes in GDP per capita for a panel of countries the function is on
logarithmic scale and the subscripts i and t indicating country and year are added
( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tititi N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKf
y
lnlnln
lnln (46)
where ln yit ndash ln yit-1 is an approximation of the yearly growth in GDP per capita (for
relatively small changes in y) The mechanisms of economic integration will now be
presented They are illustrated with the well-known Edgeworth-box named after Francis
Ysidro Edgeworth A frequently used way of illustrating the integration process is otherwise
the Solow-diagram (see eg Baldwin 1989) However when comparing two or more
countries in a process of resource reallocation the Edgeworth-box serves as a more suitable
tool Finland and Estonia are used as a hypothetical example of how a richer economy with a
relatively higher degree of capital intensity in the production process can be integrated with a
poorer one with a relatively higher degree of labor intensity
The initial position with an allocation where Finnish production is more capital intensive than
the Estonian is shown below The interpretation is as follows labor increases in Finland
relative Estonia when L(Fin) moves to the right on the horizontal axis Capital in Finland
increases relative Estonia when K(Fin) moves upwards on the vertical axis Labor increases in
Estonia relative Finland when L(Est) moves to the left on the horizontal axis and capital
increases in Estonia relative Finland when K(Est) moves downwards The different
16
allocations between the countries are purely relative measures where K and L are in terms of
the otherrsquos disposal and the vertical and horizontal axis of the box symbolizes the aggregate
supply of the two factors in the region The capital intensity in Finland is K(Fin)L(Fin) and in
the proposed allocation below it is higher than in Estonia this since K(Fin)L(Fin) gt
K(Est)L(Est) Allocations along the diagonal line imply equal intensities and complete
integration in terms of factor prices and factor intensities
Figure 4
42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
In this case the level of output depends on savings rate productivity depreciation and
employment Only growth in productivity and employment rate can increase per capita
output given that the investment rate equals the rate of depreciation ie the economy is in
steady state If not in steady state the economy will grow as long as the marginal product of
capital yields an investment rate higher than the rate of depreciation However because of the
assumption of diminishing marginal returns to capital economies will over the phase of time
converge to the similar level given that they have matching production functions The figure
below shows a situation where Estonia by internal saving accumulates own capital up to its
steady state Thus the aggregate capital stock in the whole region grows (the box grows
upwards) the capital intensity in Estonia increases relative Finlandrsquos and there is convergence
between the two countries In the analysis of section 5 the impact of internal accumulation of
17
capital will be analyzed by comparing data on gross fixed capital formation stemming from
domestic sources
Figure 5
The constraint connected with the basic Solow model when studying integration and
convergence is that it treats the economy as closed Thus internal accumulation of capital can
only force absolute convergence if production functions are identical and the resulting
convergence speed will be low (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7) Economic integration
becomes more dynamic when allowing the factors of production to be internationally mobile
A theoretical situation in which borders are open better resembles the European reality and
results in new possibilities to efficiently allocate capital and labor
43 Integration through capital mobility
In the following sections the basic Solow model is extended to allow for cross border
reallocation of capital and labor Capital mobility in an enlarged economic area gives capital
owners the opportunity to reallocate their resources more efficiently This means intra-
regional reallocation (within the box) as well as a relative change in investments from non-EU
economies (from outside the box) Another difference compared to integration only through
internal accumulation is that the expected speed of convergence in this case is higher
(Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7)
18
One could consider the reallocation of capital to a less capital-rich economy as giving this
economy an ldquoinduced capital formation effectrdquo or ldquomedium-run growth bonusrdquo concepts
introduced by Baldwin (1989) This effect could be seen as an exogenous increase in the
investment rate in the relatively capital-poor country and vice versa in the capital-richer In
the original Solow-setting the investment rate equaled the savings rate and was assumed to be
constant From a welfare perspective this implied that citizens in order to invest more must
save more and consume less In the case where capital is reallocated across borders an
economy can enjoy increased investment activity without forgoing consumption
Figure 6
The figure above illustrates a situation in which capital is reallocated from the relatively
capital-richer Finland to the relatively capital-poorer Estonia This takes place since the
marginal returns to capital diminish and are higher in the relatively capital-poor economy
)()( kfL
LKFy == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the marginal returns to capital and
0)acuteacute()acute(lt=
partpart kf
kkf based on the law of diminishing returns
19
Thus the derivation of this integration mechanism as well as convergence theory in general
is highly dependent on the assumption of diminishing returns to capital This integration
mechanism will be analyzed by comparing inward foreign direct investments (FDI) in the
catch-up economies both as a share of GDP and as a share of gross fixed capital formation
This mechanism is expected to have a large impact on labor productivity thus decisive for
GDP growth and catch-up speed FDI affects labor productivity directly by increasing the
capital intensity in the production process but is also expected to augment the incorporation
of technology in the economy and therefore boost total factor productivity
44 Integration through migration
When borders are opened up for migration movement from poorer economies to richer ones is
expected according to the theory (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 chapter 8) In the capital-rich
economy the labor productivity and the wages are higher In the economy where capital is less
abundant labor productivity and wages are lower The wage asymmetry leads to net migration
from the capital-poor economy to the capital-rich Assuming perfect competition on the factor
markets the relationship between wages and capital intensity can be derived in the following
way
LFFw L partpart
equiv= is the wage
LLKFkfy )()( == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the unit cost of capital
kkfrk )acute(= is the per capita cost of capital in the economy which gives that
wkkfy =minus )`( since the per capita labor cost equals the average wage
By taking the derivative of the last expression with respect to k we get the effect on wages
when the capital intensity is increased
0)acuteacute( gtminus=partpart kkf
kw since facuteacute(k)lt 0
20
Less capital intensive production processes thus have a less productive labor force (the
marginal product of labor is lower) and lower wages other things equal If the assumptions
hold labor migration eg from Estonia to Finland lowers the wages in Finland (since the
capital intensity falls) and increases the wages in Estonia (because of increased capital
intensity) other things equal If overlooking externalities and changeover costs (and assuming
that the migrants are active laborers) the effect on GDP will be unambiguously positive in
Finland and negative in Estonia
Figure 7
In the figure above labor migrates from Estonia to Finland Capital intensity will increase in
Estonia given that to rapid capital depreciation not counteracts boosting convergence in
factor prices and labor productivity (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 8) Although this aspect
of economic integration unambiguously hampers convergence in GDP the effect on per
capita GDP is ambiguous The effect on convergence in per capita GDP depends on whether
the migrants were working in Estonia and if they find a job in Finland Other aspects eg
crowding out on the respective labor markets and the level of skills of the migrants are also
important to take into account but are beyond the scope of this paper Therefore the analysis
will be restricted to solely relate the expected (and most basic) effects from changes in
employment and population to the respective catch-up performances Other things equal
increases in hours of labor per economically active participation rate and the share of the
population in working age will have positive effects on per capita GDP while an increase in
21
total population will affect per capita GDP negatively Accordingly these variables will be
the basis of the analysis in section 5
45 Integration through trade
Cross-border trade and specialization can also function as a mechanism of integration causing
convergence Based on a set of assumptions it can be showed that countries can converge
through the prices of traded goods (and services) without the need for mobility of capital and
labor A fundamental concept is Ricardian trade and comparative advantages which shows
how trade leads to complete specialization in the production of goods (Ricardo 1821) In the
case with only two goods and two countries each country would end up supplying only the
good it produces the most efficiently and trade with each other Heckscher and Ohlin (1933)
and Samuelson (1948) has taken the concept further and shown that international trade gives
rise to factor price equalization through the goods markets given equal levels of technology
Figure 8
Factor price equalization takes place within a restricted area in which incomplete
specialization prevails However the countries keep producing both goods although they tend
to export the one which is produced more efficiently Thus convergence in factor prices can
be brought about without cross-border mobility of capital and labor given that the goods and
services are traded on an international market and that further specialization is possible What
22
factor price equalization does demand is that the factors of production are mobile between
sectors and industries If eg laborers are unwilling to switch sector or accept lower wages the
resulting effect will be unemployment Thus given that convergence of factor prices gives
rise to convergence in per capita output (this will be elaborated in section 54) the degree of
openness to trade will influence the catch-up performances I will analyze this relationship by
comparing data on trade integration (ie the average of imports and exports to GDP)
46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
Based on the outline above a number of important variables affecting growth in per capita
GDP and thus the convergence (or divergence) of economies can be listed The productivity
of labor is a crucial factor affecting the growth rate and the convergence trend If the
productivity of labor increases faster in a poorer economy than in a richer counterpart
convergence will be fostered other things equal Labor productivity is determined by total
factor productivity and the capital intensity in the production process The capital intensity
can be enhanced by internal accumulation of capital and foreign investments
Since the per capita GDP for a given size of the population depends positively on hours of
work per economically active an increase in this variable will boost convergence Holding the
other variables constant positive changes in the participation rate and the share of total
population in working age will affect GDP per capita positively Because of the per capita
approach total population will be negatively correlated with the speed of convergence when
holding the amount of work constant Based on the fourth integration mechanism it is also to
expect that the degree of openness to trade affects the speed of convergence A proxy for the
degree of openness is the economyrsquos trade integration of goods and services as a share of
GDP In the following section these variables (which are summarized in table 3 on the
following page) will be compared with the convergence performances of the catch-up
countries
Table 3
Summary of key variables affecting speed of convergence
23
Variable of interest Expected effect on per capita GDP and convergence speed other things equal
Technology Positive
Internal accumulation of capital Positive
Foreign direct investment Positive
Hours of work per economically active Positive
Participation rate Positive
Working age population Positive
Total population Negative
Trade integration Positive
5 Explaining catch-up performances
In the preceding section basic theory on economic integration and possible mechanisms
fostering convergence was outlined These mechanisms will now be related to the
performances of the catch-up economies that were briefly presented in section 3 The analysis
is based on descriptive statistics on the key variables presented above and their relation to
economic theory The grouping of the catch-up economies introduced in section 3 is applied
The three groups are (1) the Baltic Member States (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS and (3) SE4 ie the Southern European MS It was showed in section 3 that
the Baltic group had the lowest initial per capita GDPs and grew faster than CEE4 SE4 had
initial per capita GDPs closest to the average of EU25 and grew slower than CEE4
51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
On the basis of the production function the factors contributing to growth are labor
productivity and employment Labor productivity in turn is a broad concept which depends
on both available capital per worker ie the capital intensity and the way in which the factors
of production are exogenously turned into output ie level of technology or TFP Further the
amount of capital depends on internal capital formation and inward foreign direct
investments as well as the consumption of fixed capital ie capital depreciation Evolutions
in capital formation as well as level of technology are expected to be highly decisive for
growth in per capita GDP Firstly the average annual change in labor productivity and per
capita GDP are graphed against each other
24
Figure 9
Labor productivity vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
SpainAv
erag
e an
nual
cha
nge
(in
)
Per capita GDPLabor productivity
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As expected labor productivity and per capita GDP co-varies strongly Although the data is
rather convincing in stressing the importance of the broad concept of labor productivity to
growth and thus catch-up speed there are a few remarks to be done before this concept is to
be further elaborated From the bars above one can distinguish a pattern in which labor
productivity increases by more than per capita GDP for poorer economies and vice versa (the
higher the initial level of per capita GDP the farther to the right the country is located on the
x-axis) The extreme case seems to be Spain for which labor productivity played a relatively
unimportant role in explaining increases in per capita GDP Other comparatively rich nations
such as Greece Portugal and Slovenia also had lower impacts from labor productivity in
contrast to eg Estonia Lithuania and Poland Nevertheless the figures are (with the
exception of Spain) considerably higher than for the non-catching up economies and thus help
to explain convergence In the Euro area as an example the corresponding average annual
labor productivity growth was just one percent (Kaitala 2004)
52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
As it nearly seems to be an explain-it-all correlation between catch-up and labor productivity
the concept has to be further investigated In section 4 it was showed how internal savings and
cross-border reallocation of capital can deepen economic integration and foster convergence
Besides capital formation an important factor in the integration process is the dispersion and
25
incorporation of technology ie changes in TFP The evolution in TFP can be derived by
estimating the so-called Solow residual However this either demands access to reliable and
comparable capital stock data or own estimations of the respective capital stocks eg under
the perpetual inventory method Since there is a scarcity of comparable capital stock data for
the CEECs the alternative is own estimations This in turn would require baseline
benchmarks of capital-to-output ratios stocks of human capital etc and is beyond the scope
of this paper For the time being the focus will be on formation of physical capital although
some recent findings on dynamics in TFP will be reported
Figure 10
Annual gross fixed capital formation
05
10152025303540
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Perc
ent o
f GDP Baltic
CEE4SE4NCU
Source data Eurostat (2006)
In the figure above the evolution in annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a share of
GDP for the three groups and the non-catching up economies of EU25 (NCU) is graphed The
statistical aggregate of GFCF is a measure of the net new investment in the domestic economy
in fixed capital assets although not accounting for capital depreciation Obviously GFCF is
not a measure of total investment because all kinds of financial assets are excluded but is a
good indicator of the level of investment activity relevant for real variables such as output
The levels have been consistently high for all three groups of catch-up economies over the
time period As a contrast the investment level for the NCUs has been consistently below 20
percent of GDP for the time period When comparing the groups the most striking trend is the
consistent intensification of investment activity in the Baltic economies Although the general
26
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
1 Introduction
Real convergence the process by which poorer economies over the phase of time catch up on
richer ones in terms of income or output has in empirical studies been shown to be far from
automatic Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) have found convincing evidence of convergence in
per capita incomes between US states but on the other hand also found that divergence
rather than convergence seems to be the norm when comparing countries on a global level
(1995 chapter 12) Further studies have reinforced the idea that the convergence concept is
conditioned on some level of homogeneity between the compared economies (eg Fagerberg
and Verspagen 1996 Tondl 1999)
This notion is related to whether a set of crucial theoretical assumptions hold and if the
production functions across the economies are of similar form Islam (1995) has by using a
panel data approach and controlling for cross-sectional fixed effects shown that there can be
convergence however to different steady states Hence one can separate between catch-up
when controlling for different production functions (conditional convergence) and
unconditional catch-up (absolute convergence) Islam and his followers have shown that
conditional convergence is more common than absolute convergence
The European Union which is the region of interest in this paper is first of all a political
project with the fundamental purpose to prevent war in Europe However this project has
since the beginning been carried out by the means of economic integration This is to
understand as the process in which national markets for goods services capital and labor
merge to form larger regional markets The enlarged economic area enables more efficient
allocations of resources such as the factors of production A properly functioning reallocation
process fosters convergence in prices as well as returns to capital and labor which in turn is
expected to give rise to convergence of GDP per capita Thus convergence theory and theory
of economic integration are closely related and to some extent teach us the same things
mainly because of their direct derivation from neo-classical growth theory
4
This paper focuses on economic integration and absolute convergence in Europe 1994-2005
Most empirical studies have found significant absolute convergence for the area of EU151
(see eg Hlouskova and Wagner 2002) while studies of a wider Europe (eg including the
Balkans the ex-Soviet Republics etc) or the whole world at best find conditional
convergence and on occasion also divergence In this paper the area of interest will be the
enlarged EU (hereinafter EU252) - an area more heterogeneous than EU15 but probably more
homogeneous than a wider Europe or the whole world The fall of the iron curtain and the
course towards EU enlargement are events that most likely have initiated large scale
integration processes resembling the idea outlined above Since economic integration and real
convergence can be seen as two sides of the same coin both concepts will be treated here
Convergence theory is applied in the first step in order to estimate if and at which rate
absolute convergence has taken place in the EU25 Theory of economic integration will be
used in a second step in order to look at the mechanisms causing convergence
The focus will solely be on absolute convergence in per capita GDP Thus I will not control
for different steady states Evidence of absolute convergence is of greater relevance for policy
making and can easier be linked to the discussion based on the integration concept Absolute
convergence in per capita GDP will be estimated by looking at β- and σ-convergence two
measures introduced by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) Since the definition of absolute
convergence states that the lower the initial GDP level is the faster the country is expected to
grow I will differentiate between catch-up economies3 to see if this has been the case In a
closing analysis there will be an attempt to explain catch-up performances by relating growth
rates to integration mechanisms such as trade investments and migration
The following section includes a brief outlining of the convergence concept and the methods
which will be applied to test for absolute convergence Further assessments of absolute
convergence will be provided and the performances of the catch-up countries will be
compared In section 4 the mechanisms of economic integration are presented Based on the
fundamentals of growth theory and theory of economic integration section 5 analyzes likely
1 The European Union before the eastward enlargement in 2004 but after the accession of Austria Finland and Sweden in 1995 consisted of 15 Member States and is referred to as EU15 2 The EU after the eastward enlargement in 2004 but before the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 consisted of 25 countries and is referred to as EU25 3 The 11 member states with per capita GDPs below the average of EU25 ie Czech Republic Estonia Greece Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Slovenia and Spain (Cyprus and Malta are actually also below the EU-average but are excluded from the analysis)
5
explanatory factors that may account for the catch-up performances Within a theoretical
framework the catch-up performances found in section 3 are compared and analyzed Finally
I conclude and give suggestions on further possible research topics
2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
Convergence in per capita levels of GDP and income has been a popular research topic since
the early 1990s The empirical evidence found up until now follow a couple of seemingly
consistent patterns Firstly convergence in general and particularly absolute convergence
appears to be highly dependent on how similar the studied economies are Studies only
including economies with large industrial and service sectors show more significant
convergence than studies which also include economies that are more dependent on eg
agriculture and tourism (see Fagerberg and Verspagen 1996) Trade barriers between the
studied economies as well as considerable political and judicial asymmetries also seem to
hamper convergence The fastest convergence has thus been estimated within more
homogenous economic areas with low internal barriers of trade such as among the US states
or the countries of EU124 and EU15 (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992 1995 Tondl 1999
Kaitala 2004)
Although convergence seems to be conditioned on a certain degree of homogeneity it is
difficult to separate the importance of eg trade barriers and what sectors the economy is
based on This due to the fact that these two factors usually correspond strongly with each
other Economic regions with similar economies often have lower barriers of trade and vice
versa Another factor worth mentioning is if and how the business cycle affects convergence
Since many estimations of convergence (including the one in this paper) are based on rather
short time periods the impact of business cycles on the convergence process could be crucial
McGranahan (2003) has studied this relationship for regions in the US and found a positive
correlation between inter-regional inequality and the expansion of the economy Divergence
in incomes was the norm during the upswing of the 1980s while the economic decline in the
early 1990s was associated with convergence However since this paperrsquos period of focus did
not see any remarkable booms or busts this aspect will not be analyzed in detail
4 EU12 includes the 12 Member States up until the accession of Austria Finland and Sweden in 1995
6
21 How to measure convergence
A frequently used and well documented method when looking at absolute convergence within
a region of economies is to estimate so called β-convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992)
This measure is obtained by the means of a straightforward econometric model in which
growth in per capita GDP is explained by the per capita GDP level in the preceding period
Barro and Sala-i-Martin originally estimated the β-coefficient on a cross-section of countries
with the starting GDP per capita level as regressor although followers within the field of
study have shown that it can be performed using panel data as well (see eg Islam 1996) The
panel approach is useful among other things because it generates more degrees of freedom
than the cross-section approach Because of these advantages this is the approach that will be
applied in this paper The equation to estimate is of the following form
iititit yyy εβα ++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2hellip n (21)
and the dependent variable since it is the first difference of a logarithmic scale is an
approximation of the annual growth rate in percent Another clear-cut method to use when
one wants to study convergence is to follow the development of the dispersion of per capita
GDP levels within the region of interest So called σ-convergence takes place if the dispersion
within the region decreases over time (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992) The dispersion in per
capita GDP between countries can be calculated in different ways but two convenient
measures are the coefficient of variance c and the standard deviation of the log GDP per
capita v ie
2
1
1sum=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ minus=
n
i
i
yyy
nc sum
=
equivn
iiy
ny
1
1 (22)
2
1
log1sum=
lowast ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
n
i
i
yy
nv sum
=
lowast equivn
iiy
ny
1log1log (23)
These two measures c and v do not seem to differ much at first glance and one expects to
find similar information Yet it has been shown that they in some situations can give rise to
conflicting results above all when the dispersion between the observed countries is large
(Dalgaard and Vastrup 2001) In this case the measures will differ since they put a different
7
weight to how far from the average observations are located The two measures have as an
example given contradictory estimates of global convergence from 1960 and onwards The
countries that were among the poorest in 1960 have not converged towards mean while the
countries above the poorest group have converged quite rapidly The result will in this case
depend on how you weight the countries with respect to their deviation from the mean
22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
Using the three measures of convergence outlined above a brief picture of whether absolute
convergence has taken place will now to be provided The observed period stretches from
1994 until 2005 and all but three of the EU25 countries are included The three small member
states Cyprus Malta and Luxembourg were for different reasons excluded from the analysis
As regards Cyprus and Malta the main reason was insufficient GDP data (comparable data
was only available from 1998 and onwards) Further these two Mediterranean economies
with dominant tourism and farming sectors can also not be expected to have much in common
with the other member states in terms of level and shape of production functions
Luxembourg is typically removed from analyses like these because of its economyrsquos
distinctive character In particular the per capita approach is because of the massive inward
commuting to Luxemburg meaningless to compare with that of the other member states
As the eight accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe went through rough transition
in the early 1990s with slumping production levels and fleeing populations the estimation
period was restricted to 1994-2005 although seemingly reliable data from around 1991 exist
for most them Latvia had for example a negative change in real GDP of about 31 percent in
1992 In Lithuania it fell by about 19 percent the same year In 1994 their respective
economies were about half the size of the estimated pre-transition levels Although the
transition itself as well as effects and counter-effects from it might have played an important
role also in the development after 1994 this choice of starting point seems to be consistent
with some sort of normalization in these economies Included data for the Western European
economies was also restricted to the period 1994-2005 in order to keep the panel balanced
Thus one has to keep in mind that the estimates do not account for the most intensive
transition period for the CEECs5 which most certainly affects the results6
5 CEECs refers to the eight rsquoCentral and Eastern European countriesrsquo of the EU ie the catch-up economies included in this paper less Greece Portugal and Spain
8
Table 1
Least square β-estimation dependent variable is itit yy 1 loglog minusminus
Coefficient value Standard error t-Statistic α 01757 00157 111711
β -01537 00017 -90545
R2 of model is 02562 Source data Eurostat (2006)
The results received from the estimation of the β-coefficient are shown in table 1 and indicate
that significant convergence in terms of per capita GDP has taken place in the region over the
studied time period The β-coefficient is estimated to -0015 corresponding to an annual
speed of convergence of about 15 percent7 This means that a member state on average
decreases the gap to the average level of per capita GDP in EU25 with 15 percent per year A
practical method of symbolizing what this means is to apply the half-life measure8 ie the
time necessary for an economy given an estimated convergence speed to close half of the
gap separating it from the average Assuming that the estimated convergence speed will be
consistent over the future it will take an economy 48 years to close half of the gap separating
it from the average A scatter plot and regression line showing the relationship between yearly
change in GDP per capita and the GDP per capita level the year before is graphed below
6 The data which this paper is based upon is exclusively collected from Eurostat (2006 see link in references) the EU statistics institution The GDP-data is in real terms (1995 Euros) Data on capital formation FDI trade etc are all in 1995 Euros Population labor force etc are measured at mid-year (first of July) in order to get more unbiased estimates when using the per capita measures 7 The speed of convergence is found by solving for λ in the equation β = eλt-1 where t in this case equals 1 8 The half-life measure is defined by ( ) ( )βτ +minus= 1ln2ln
9
Figure 1
Annual growth vs starting level
-004-002
000200400600801
012014016
7 75 8 85 9 95 10 105
GDP per capita the year before (logs)
Cha
nge
in G
DP
per c
apita
(log
s)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
The two measures of dispersion indicate that the dispersion in per capita GDP among the
studied economies has gradually fallen over time The trend in dispersion when using the
coefficient of variance c as well as the standard deviation of the log GDP per capita v are
presented in appendix 1 and shown graphically in figure 2 If the coefficient of variation is
applied the dispersion fell however only marginally (from 055 to 054 ie by about 2
percent) When using the v-measure the fall in dispersion was more significant Over the
period it changed from 099 to 084 a decrease of about 18 percent That the latter measure
gives a more significant proof of convergence is probably related to the fact that it puts
greater weight to observations with a large deviation from the mean (eg the Baltic states) and
that these economies have converged faster relative the ones closer to the mean
10
Figure 2
σ-convergence
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Disp
ersi
on in
per
cap
ita G
DPs
vc
v is the standard deviation of per capita GDPs in logs (equation 23) and c is the coefficient
of variance (eq 22)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
3 Are some catching up faster than others
31 An expanded β-model
The original equation used to estimate theβ -coefficient was of the following form
iititit yyy εβα ++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2hellip n (31)
By expanding this model with dummy variables groupings of catch-up-economies can be
analyzed with respect to their catch-up performance Three groups of Member States (MS)
were formed based on their initial gaps in per capita GDP to the EU-average (see figure 3 in
section 33) which also coincide rather strongly with geographical location The groups are
(1) the Baltic MS (Estonia Latvia and Lithuania) (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS (Poland Czech Republic Slovak Republic and Hungary) and (3) SE4 ie the
poorer than average MS of Southern Europe (Slovenia Greece Spain and Portugal)
The definition of absolute convergence states that poorer economies are suppose to grow at a
faster rate than richer ones however the yearly gap reduction in percent is expected to be
equal among the economies A necessary condition for absolute convergence is that the
poorer a country is at an initial stage the faster it should grow By assigning dummies for
11
these three groups and leaving the others as reference possible fixed growth effects for these
three groups can be distinguished In doing so the dummies will make variations in the size
of the intercept possible thus indicating whether a group of countries is converging faster or
slower than a reference point Thus the dummy coefficients in the model below indicate the
groupsrsquo deviation from the intercept of the reference group
iSSCCBBitRitit DDDyyy εαααβα +++++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog (32)
where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2 hellip n
and takes on the value one for the Baltic member states is one for the CEE4 and
is one for the SE4 The intercept of the reference group
BD CD SD
Rα indicates a ldquocorerdquo growth rate
and the dummy coefficients are the three groupsrsquo respective fixed deviation from this
intercept
32 The estimation results
The estimation of the equation outlined above gives results indicating that the Baltic group
has a somewhat higher speed of convergence relative the reference group The coefficients for
the other two groups are negative indicating a lower intercept and a lower speed of
convergence relative the reference group The fixed deviations are all insignificant at a five
percent significance level Thus a hypothesis stating that all the groups converge towards the
mean with equal speeds would not be rejected The group SE4 has a negative deviation from
the reference intercept which at the ten percent level would be weakly significant
Table 2
Least square estimation with group dummies dependent variable itit yy 1 loglog minusminus
Coefficient value Standard error t-Statistic
Rα 01607 00579 27744
β -00135 00058 -23440
Bα 00126 00145 08677
Cα -00083 00101 -08225
12
Sα -00098 00056 -17407
R2 of model is 03152 Source data Eurostat (2006)
Summing up the speeds of convergence for the three groups are at a conventional five
percent level neither significantly higher nor significantly lower than the reference grouprsquos
Yet the results do give a weak indication of faster convergence for the Baltic group than the
other two groups Of these two SE4 seems to converge marginally slower than CEE4
although the difference is small Below there will be a brief description of the growth
performances of the catch-up economies included in the three groups
33 A descriptive approach
Figure 3 below shows the total per capita GDP growth over the time period for the 11
countries below the average of EU259 The Baltic economies all doubled their per capita GDP
(Estonia was the most impressive with a growth close to 130 percent) The economies of
CEE4 grew by around 50 to 60 percent with the Czech Republic as a negative deviator The
economies of SE4 grew by around 40 percent with Slovenia deviating positively All of the
11 catch-up economies grew faster than the average of EU25 which had a positive change of
less than 13 percent between 1994 and 2005 Thus all 11 catch-up economies answered to the
theoretical expectations and actually caught-up and closed the gap to the average The
definition of absolute convergence said that the growth should be higher the lower the initial
level of GDP per capita From the figure below this more or less seems to have been the case
9 The average is weighted with respect to the sizes of the countries Thus a positive change in Germany affects the average more than an equal change in eg Sweden
13
Figure 3
Per capita GDP growth vs initial level
020406080
100120140
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
EU-25
Perc
ent
Period growth (1995-2005)Level in 1994 ( of EU-25)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
When talking about economic integration one has to distinguish between real and monetary
integration (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006) The former concerns real variables such as level of
output and allocation of production factors while the latter concerns the integration of
monetary systems and currencies eg the introduction of the Euro This paper focuses
exclusively on integration in real terms Further integration can take place at both macro and
micro levels States can force integration through macroeconomic decisions regarding trade
agreements and currency unions but at least as important for the integration process is the
behavior of firms and individuals Tools from microeconomic theory will be the basis of the
theoretical framework that is to be presented below
41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
A set of integration mechanisms which can function as driving forces behind convergence in
GDP levels will be presented below They are (1) internal accumulation of capital (ie
savings) (2) cross-border capital mobility (3) cross-border labor migration and (4) trade
They will be briefly illustrated with Edgeworth boxes and linked to how they affect per capita
GDP The mechanisms are derived from the neo-classical growth models presented by
14
Ramsey (1928) Solow (1956) and Koopmans (1965) and the standard production function of
the form
αα minus= 1
tttt LKAY with 10 ltltα (41)
where output Y for an exogenously given level of technology A depends on capital K and
labor L In the original model the savings rate is assumed to be exogenous and constant
Although K generally has been restricted to physical capital one may also think of it in a
broader sense comprising of physical capital and human capital (Mankiw Romer and Weil
1992) The main characteristics of this production function are constant returns to scale (since
the coefficients sum to 1) and diminishing marginal products of the production factors K and
L Hence imagining given levels of technology labor and savings rate additional capital
yields decreasing rates of return and growth rates This implies a steady state where capital
per worker k and output per worker y are constant
( kfy = )
)
(42)
The steady state output y is above all determined by the exogenously given level of
technology A which all economies are supposed to have free access to The assumption of
equal access to available technology or fast technological dispersion can be regarded as valid
for highly open economies with similar levels of education This may be expected for
advanced economies in general eg Western Europe but a critical issue is whether it can be
expanded to include the CEECs as well In the analysis section there will be a discussion of
how technological dispersion can function as a factor behind convergence but for the time
being the term indicating level of technology A is dropped Expression (41) can be rewritten
as
( LKfY = (43)
By dividing by total population N we get the following expression for per capita output
y = ( )NL
LLKf
NY
times= (44)
15
Thus output per capita depends on output per hour of labor (labor productivity) and hours of
labor to total population The latter can be further elaborated in order to take into account the
number of economically active (ie size of the labor force) and the size of the working age
population so that (44) becomes
( )N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKfy timestimestimes=
(45)
where LF is the size of the labor force and WA working age population GDP per capita now
depends on labor productivity hours of labor per economically active LLF the participation
rate LFWA and the size of the working age population to total population In order to
conveniently follow the changes in GDP per capita for a panel of countries the function is on
logarithmic scale and the subscripts i and t indicating country and year are added
( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tititi N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKf
y
lnlnln
lnln (46)
where ln yit ndash ln yit-1 is an approximation of the yearly growth in GDP per capita (for
relatively small changes in y) The mechanisms of economic integration will now be
presented They are illustrated with the well-known Edgeworth-box named after Francis
Ysidro Edgeworth A frequently used way of illustrating the integration process is otherwise
the Solow-diagram (see eg Baldwin 1989) However when comparing two or more
countries in a process of resource reallocation the Edgeworth-box serves as a more suitable
tool Finland and Estonia are used as a hypothetical example of how a richer economy with a
relatively higher degree of capital intensity in the production process can be integrated with a
poorer one with a relatively higher degree of labor intensity
The initial position with an allocation where Finnish production is more capital intensive than
the Estonian is shown below The interpretation is as follows labor increases in Finland
relative Estonia when L(Fin) moves to the right on the horizontal axis Capital in Finland
increases relative Estonia when K(Fin) moves upwards on the vertical axis Labor increases in
Estonia relative Finland when L(Est) moves to the left on the horizontal axis and capital
increases in Estonia relative Finland when K(Est) moves downwards The different
16
allocations between the countries are purely relative measures where K and L are in terms of
the otherrsquos disposal and the vertical and horizontal axis of the box symbolizes the aggregate
supply of the two factors in the region The capital intensity in Finland is K(Fin)L(Fin) and in
the proposed allocation below it is higher than in Estonia this since K(Fin)L(Fin) gt
K(Est)L(Est) Allocations along the diagonal line imply equal intensities and complete
integration in terms of factor prices and factor intensities
Figure 4
42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
In this case the level of output depends on savings rate productivity depreciation and
employment Only growth in productivity and employment rate can increase per capita
output given that the investment rate equals the rate of depreciation ie the economy is in
steady state If not in steady state the economy will grow as long as the marginal product of
capital yields an investment rate higher than the rate of depreciation However because of the
assumption of diminishing marginal returns to capital economies will over the phase of time
converge to the similar level given that they have matching production functions The figure
below shows a situation where Estonia by internal saving accumulates own capital up to its
steady state Thus the aggregate capital stock in the whole region grows (the box grows
upwards) the capital intensity in Estonia increases relative Finlandrsquos and there is convergence
between the two countries In the analysis of section 5 the impact of internal accumulation of
17
capital will be analyzed by comparing data on gross fixed capital formation stemming from
domestic sources
Figure 5
The constraint connected with the basic Solow model when studying integration and
convergence is that it treats the economy as closed Thus internal accumulation of capital can
only force absolute convergence if production functions are identical and the resulting
convergence speed will be low (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7) Economic integration
becomes more dynamic when allowing the factors of production to be internationally mobile
A theoretical situation in which borders are open better resembles the European reality and
results in new possibilities to efficiently allocate capital and labor
43 Integration through capital mobility
In the following sections the basic Solow model is extended to allow for cross border
reallocation of capital and labor Capital mobility in an enlarged economic area gives capital
owners the opportunity to reallocate their resources more efficiently This means intra-
regional reallocation (within the box) as well as a relative change in investments from non-EU
economies (from outside the box) Another difference compared to integration only through
internal accumulation is that the expected speed of convergence in this case is higher
(Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7)
18
One could consider the reallocation of capital to a less capital-rich economy as giving this
economy an ldquoinduced capital formation effectrdquo or ldquomedium-run growth bonusrdquo concepts
introduced by Baldwin (1989) This effect could be seen as an exogenous increase in the
investment rate in the relatively capital-poor country and vice versa in the capital-richer In
the original Solow-setting the investment rate equaled the savings rate and was assumed to be
constant From a welfare perspective this implied that citizens in order to invest more must
save more and consume less In the case where capital is reallocated across borders an
economy can enjoy increased investment activity without forgoing consumption
Figure 6
The figure above illustrates a situation in which capital is reallocated from the relatively
capital-richer Finland to the relatively capital-poorer Estonia This takes place since the
marginal returns to capital diminish and are higher in the relatively capital-poor economy
)()( kfL
LKFy == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the marginal returns to capital and
0)acuteacute()acute(lt=
partpart kf
kkf based on the law of diminishing returns
19
Thus the derivation of this integration mechanism as well as convergence theory in general
is highly dependent on the assumption of diminishing returns to capital This integration
mechanism will be analyzed by comparing inward foreign direct investments (FDI) in the
catch-up economies both as a share of GDP and as a share of gross fixed capital formation
This mechanism is expected to have a large impact on labor productivity thus decisive for
GDP growth and catch-up speed FDI affects labor productivity directly by increasing the
capital intensity in the production process but is also expected to augment the incorporation
of technology in the economy and therefore boost total factor productivity
44 Integration through migration
When borders are opened up for migration movement from poorer economies to richer ones is
expected according to the theory (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 chapter 8) In the capital-rich
economy the labor productivity and the wages are higher In the economy where capital is less
abundant labor productivity and wages are lower The wage asymmetry leads to net migration
from the capital-poor economy to the capital-rich Assuming perfect competition on the factor
markets the relationship between wages and capital intensity can be derived in the following
way
LFFw L partpart
equiv= is the wage
LLKFkfy )()( == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the unit cost of capital
kkfrk )acute(= is the per capita cost of capital in the economy which gives that
wkkfy =minus )`( since the per capita labor cost equals the average wage
By taking the derivative of the last expression with respect to k we get the effect on wages
when the capital intensity is increased
0)acuteacute( gtminus=partpart kkf
kw since facuteacute(k)lt 0
20
Less capital intensive production processes thus have a less productive labor force (the
marginal product of labor is lower) and lower wages other things equal If the assumptions
hold labor migration eg from Estonia to Finland lowers the wages in Finland (since the
capital intensity falls) and increases the wages in Estonia (because of increased capital
intensity) other things equal If overlooking externalities and changeover costs (and assuming
that the migrants are active laborers) the effect on GDP will be unambiguously positive in
Finland and negative in Estonia
Figure 7
In the figure above labor migrates from Estonia to Finland Capital intensity will increase in
Estonia given that to rapid capital depreciation not counteracts boosting convergence in
factor prices and labor productivity (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 8) Although this aspect
of economic integration unambiguously hampers convergence in GDP the effect on per
capita GDP is ambiguous The effect on convergence in per capita GDP depends on whether
the migrants were working in Estonia and if they find a job in Finland Other aspects eg
crowding out on the respective labor markets and the level of skills of the migrants are also
important to take into account but are beyond the scope of this paper Therefore the analysis
will be restricted to solely relate the expected (and most basic) effects from changes in
employment and population to the respective catch-up performances Other things equal
increases in hours of labor per economically active participation rate and the share of the
population in working age will have positive effects on per capita GDP while an increase in
21
total population will affect per capita GDP negatively Accordingly these variables will be
the basis of the analysis in section 5
45 Integration through trade
Cross-border trade and specialization can also function as a mechanism of integration causing
convergence Based on a set of assumptions it can be showed that countries can converge
through the prices of traded goods (and services) without the need for mobility of capital and
labor A fundamental concept is Ricardian trade and comparative advantages which shows
how trade leads to complete specialization in the production of goods (Ricardo 1821) In the
case with only two goods and two countries each country would end up supplying only the
good it produces the most efficiently and trade with each other Heckscher and Ohlin (1933)
and Samuelson (1948) has taken the concept further and shown that international trade gives
rise to factor price equalization through the goods markets given equal levels of technology
Figure 8
Factor price equalization takes place within a restricted area in which incomplete
specialization prevails However the countries keep producing both goods although they tend
to export the one which is produced more efficiently Thus convergence in factor prices can
be brought about without cross-border mobility of capital and labor given that the goods and
services are traded on an international market and that further specialization is possible What
22
factor price equalization does demand is that the factors of production are mobile between
sectors and industries If eg laborers are unwilling to switch sector or accept lower wages the
resulting effect will be unemployment Thus given that convergence of factor prices gives
rise to convergence in per capita output (this will be elaborated in section 54) the degree of
openness to trade will influence the catch-up performances I will analyze this relationship by
comparing data on trade integration (ie the average of imports and exports to GDP)
46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
Based on the outline above a number of important variables affecting growth in per capita
GDP and thus the convergence (or divergence) of economies can be listed The productivity
of labor is a crucial factor affecting the growth rate and the convergence trend If the
productivity of labor increases faster in a poorer economy than in a richer counterpart
convergence will be fostered other things equal Labor productivity is determined by total
factor productivity and the capital intensity in the production process The capital intensity
can be enhanced by internal accumulation of capital and foreign investments
Since the per capita GDP for a given size of the population depends positively on hours of
work per economically active an increase in this variable will boost convergence Holding the
other variables constant positive changes in the participation rate and the share of total
population in working age will affect GDP per capita positively Because of the per capita
approach total population will be negatively correlated with the speed of convergence when
holding the amount of work constant Based on the fourth integration mechanism it is also to
expect that the degree of openness to trade affects the speed of convergence A proxy for the
degree of openness is the economyrsquos trade integration of goods and services as a share of
GDP In the following section these variables (which are summarized in table 3 on the
following page) will be compared with the convergence performances of the catch-up
countries
Table 3
Summary of key variables affecting speed of convergence
23
Variable of interest Expected effect on per capita GDP and convergence speed other things equal
Technology Positive
Internal accumulation of capital Positive
Foreign direct investment Positive
Hours of work per economically active Positive
Participation rate Positive
Working age population Positive
Total population Negative
Trade integration Positive
5 Explaining catch-up performances
In the preceding section basic theory on economic integration and possible mechanisms
fostering convergence was outlined These mechanisms will now be related to the
performances of the catch-up economies that were briefly presented in section 3 The analysis
is based on descriptive statistics on the key variables presented above and their relation to
economic theory The grouping of the catch-up economies introduced in section 3 is applied
The three groups are (1) the Baltic Member States (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS and (3) SE4 ie the Southern European MS It was showed in section 3 that
the Baltic group had the lowest initial per capita GDPs and grew faster than CEE4 SE4 had
initial per capita GDPs closest to the average of EU25 and grew slower than CEE4
51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
On the basis of the production function the factors contributing to growth are labor
productivity and employment Labor productivity in turn is a broad concept which depends
on both available capital per worker ie the capital intensity and the way in which the factors
of production are exogenously turned into output ie level of technology or TFP Further the
amount of capital depends on internal capital formation and inward foreign direct
investments as well as the consumption of fixed capital ie capital depreciation Evolutions
in capital formation as well as level of technology are expected to be highly decisive for
growth in per capita GDP Firstly the average annual change in labor productivity and per
capita GDP are graphed against each other
24
Figure 9
Labor productivity vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
SpainAv
erag
e an
nual
cha
nge
(in
)
Per capita GDPLabor productivity
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As expected labor productivity and per capita GDP co-varies strongly Although the data is
rather convincing in stressing the importance of the broad concept of labor productivity to
growth and thus catch-up speed there are a few remarks to be done before this concept is to
be further elaborated From the bars above one can distinguish a pattern in which labor
productivity increases by more than per capita GDP for poorer economies and vice versa (the
higher the initial level of per capita GDP the farther to the right the country is located on the
x-axis) The extreme case seems to be Spain for which labor productivity played a relatively
unimportant role in explaining increases in per capita GDP Other comparatively rich nations
such as Greece Portugal and Slovenia also had lower impacts from labor productivity in
contrast to eg Estonia Lithuania and Poland Nevertheless the figures are (with the
exception of Spain) considerably higher than for the non-catching up economies and thus help
to explain convergence In the Euro area as an example the corresponding average annual
labor productivity growth was just one percent (Kaitala 2004)
52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
As it nearly seems to be an explain-it-all correlation between catch-up and labor productivity
the concept has to be further investigated In section 4 it was showed how internal savings and
cross-border reallocation of capital can deepen economic integration and foster convergence
Besides capital formation an important factor in the integration process is the dispersion and
25
incorporation of technology ie changes in TFP The evolution in TFP can be derived by
estimating the so-called Solow residual However this either demands access to reliable and
comparable capital stock data or own estimations of the respective capital stocks eg under
the perpetual inventory method Since there is a scarcity of comparable capital stock data for
the CEECs the alternative is own estimations This in turn would require baseline
benchmarks of capital-to-output ratios stocks of human capital etc and is beyond the scope
of this paper For the time being the focus will be on formation of physical capital although
some recent findings on dynamics in TFP will be reported
Figure 10
Annual gross fixed capital formation
05
10152025303540
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Perc
ent o
f GDP Baltic
CEE4SE4NCU
Source data Eurostat (2006)
In the figure above the evolution in annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a share of
GDP for the three groups and the non-catching up economies of EU25 (NCU) is graphed The
statistical aggregate of GFCF is a measure of the net new investment in the domestic economy
in fixed capital assets although not accounting for capital depreciation Obviously GFCF is
not a measure of total investment because all kinds of financial assets are excluded but is a
good indicator of the level of investment activity relevant for real variables such as output
The levels have been consistently high for all three groups of catch-up economies over the
time period As a contrast the investment level for the NCUs has been consistently below 20
percent of GDP for the time period When comparing the groups the most striking trend is the
consistent intensification of investment activity in the Baltic economies Although the general
26
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
This paper focuses on economic integration and absolute convergence in Europe 1994-2005
Most empirical studies have found significant absolute convergence for the area of EU151
(see eg Hlouskova and Wagner 2002) while studies of a wider Europe (eg including the
Balkans the ex-Soviet Republics etc) or the whole world at best find conditional
convergence and on occasion also divergence In this paper the area of interest will be the
enlarged EU (hereinafter EU252) - an area more heterogeneous than EU15 but probably more
homogeneous than a wider Europe or the whole world The fall of the iron curtain and the
course towards EU enlargement are events that most likely have initiated large scale
integration processes resembling the idea outlined above Since economic integration and real
convergence can be seen as two sides of the same coin both concepts will be treated here
Convergence theory is applied in the first step in order to estimate if and at which rate
absolute convergence has taken place in the EU25 Theory of economic integration will be
used in a second step in order to look at the mechanisms causing convergence
The focus will solely be on absolute convergence in per capita GDP Thus I will not control
for different steady states Evidence of absolute convergence is of greater relevance for policy
making and can easier be linked to the discussion based on the integration concept Absolute
convergence in per capita GDP will be estimated by looking at β- and σ-convergence two
measures introduced by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) Since the definition of absolute
convergence states that the lower the initial GDP level is the faster the country is expected to
grow I will differentiate between catch-up economies3 to see if this has been the case In a
closing analysis there will be an attempt to explain catch-up performances by relating growth
rates to integration mechanisms such as trade investments and migration
The following section includes a brief outlining of the convergence concept and the methods
which will be applied to test for absolute convergence Further assessments of absolute
convergence will be provided and the performances of the catch-up countries will be
compared In section 4 the mechanisms of economic integration are presented Based on the
fundamentals of growth theory and theory of economic integration section 5 analyzes likely
1 The European Union before the eastward enlargement in 2004 but after the accession of Austria Finland and Sweden in 1995 consisted of 15 Member States and is referred to as EU15 2 The EU after the eastward enlargement in 2004 but before the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 consisted of 25 countries and is referred to as EU25 3 The 11 member states with per capita GDPs below the average of EU25 ie Czech Republic Estonia Greece Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Slovenia and Spain (Cyprus and Malta are actually also below the EU-average but are excluded from the analysis)
5
explanatory factors that may account for the catch-up performances Within a theoretical
framework the catch-up performances found in section 3 are compared and analyzed Finally
I conclude and give suggestions on further possible research topics
2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
Convergence in per capita levels of GDP and income has been a popular research topic since
the early 1990s The empirical evidence found up until now follow a couple of seemingly
consistent patterns Firstly convergence in general and particularly absolute convergence
appears to be highly dependent on how similar the studied economies are Studies only
including economies with large industrial and service sectors show more significant
convergence than studies which also include economies that are more dependent on eg
agriculture and tourism (see Fagerberg and Verspagen 1996) Trade barriers between the
studied economies as well as considerable political and judicial asymmetries also seem to
hamper convergence The fastest convergence has thus been estimated within more
homogenous economic areas with low internal barriers of trade such as among the US states
or the countries of EU124 and EU15 (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992 1995 Tondl 1999
Kaitala 2004)
Although convergence seems to be conditioned on a certain degree of homogeneity it is
difficult to separate the importance of eg trade barriers and what sectors the economy is
based on This due to the fact that these two factors usually correspond strongly with each
other Economic regions with similar economies often have lower barriers of trade and vice
versa Another factor worth mentioning is if and how the business cycle affects convergence
Since many estimations of convergence (including the one in this paper) are based on rather
short time periods the impact of business cycles on the convergence process could be crucial
McGranahan (2003) has studied this relationship for regions in the US and found a positive
correlation between inter-regional inequality and the expansion of the economy Divergence
in incomes was the norm during the upswing of the 1980s while the economic decline in the
early 1990s was associated with convergence However since this paperrsquos period of focus did
not see any remarkable booms or busts this aspect will not be analyzed in detail
4 EU12 includes the 12 Member States up until the accession of Austria Finland and Sweden in 1995
6
21 How to measure convergence
A frequently used and well documented method when looking at absolute convergence within
a region of economies is to estimate so called β-convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992)
This measure is obtained by the means of a straightforward econometric model in which
growth in per capita GDP is explained by the per capita GDP level in the preceding period
Barro and Sala-i-Martin originally estimated the β-coefficient on a cross-section of countries
with the starting GDP per capita level as regressor although followers within the field of
study have shown that it can be performed using panel data as well (see eg Islam 1996) The
panel approach is useful among other things because it generates more degrees of freedom
than the cross-section approach Because of these advantages this is the approach that will be
applied in this paper The equation to estimate is of the following form
iititit yyy εβα ++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2hellip n (21)
and the dependent variable since it is the first difference of a logarithmic scale is an
approximation of the annual growth rate in percent Another clear-cut method to use when
one wants to study convergence is to follow the development of the dispersion of per capita
GDP levels within the region of interest So called σ-convergence takes place if the dispersion
within the region decreases over time (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992) The dispersion in per
capita GDP between countries can be calculated in different ways but two convenient
measures are the coefficient of variance c and the standard deviation of the log GDP per
capita v ie
2
1
1sum=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ minus=
n
i
i
yyy
nc sum
=
equivn
iiy
ny
1
1 (22)
2
1
log1sum=
lowast ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
n
i
i
yy
nv sum
=
lowast equivn
iiy
ny
1log1log (23)
These two measures c and v do not seem to differ much at first glance and one expects to
find similar information Yet it has been shown that they in some situations can give rise to
conflicting results above all when the dispersion between the observed countries is large
(Dalgaard and Vastrup 2001) In this case the measures will differ since they put a different
7
weight to how far from the average observations are located The two measures have as an
example given contradictory estimates of global convergence from 1960 and onwards The
countries that were among the poorest in 1960 have not converged towards mean while the
countries above the poorest group have converged quite rapidly The result will in this case
depend on how you weight the countries with respect to their deviation from the mean
22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
Using the three measures of convergence outlined above a brief picture of whether absolute
convergence has taken place will now to be provided The observed period stretches from
1994 until 2005 and all but three of the EU25 countries are included The three small member
states Cyprus Malta and Luxembourg were for different reasons excluded from the analysis
As regards Cyprus and Malta the main reason was insufficient GDP data (comparable data
was only available from 1998 and onwards) Further these two Mediterranean economies
with dominant tourism and farming sectors can also not be expected to have much in common
with the other member states in terms of level and shape of production functions
Luxembourg is typically removed from analyses like these because of its economyrsquos
distinctive character In particular the per capita approach is because of the massive inward
commuting to Luxemburg meaningless to compare with that of the other member states
As the eight accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe went through rough transition
in the early 1990s with slumping production levels and fleeing populations the estimation
period was restricted to 1994-2005 although seemingly reliable data from around 1991 exist
for most them Latvia had for example a negative change in real GDP of about 31 percent in
1992 In Lithuania it fell by about 19 percent the same year In 1994 their respective
economies were about half the size of the estimated pre-transition levels Although the
transition itself as well as effects and counter-effects from it might have played an important
role also in the development after 1994 this choice of starting point seems to be consistent
with some sort of normalization in these economies Included data for the Western European
economies was also restricted to the period 1994-2005 in order to keep the panel balanced
Thus one has to keep in mind that the estimates do not account for the most intensive
transition period for the CEECs5 which most certainly affects the results6
5 CEECs refers to the eight rsquoCentral and Eastern European countriesrsquo of the EU ie the catch-up economies included in this paper less Greece Portugal and Spain
8
Table 1
Least square β-estimation dependent variable is itit yy 1 loglog minusminus
Coefficient value Standard error t-Statistic α 01757 00157 111711
β -01537 00017 -90545
R2 of model is 02562 Source data Eurostat (2006)
The results received from the estimation of the β-coefficient are shown in table 1 and indicate
that significant convergence in terms of per capita GDP has taken place in the region over the
studied time period The β-coefficient is estimated to -0015 corresponding to an annual
speed of convergence of about 15 percent7 This means that a member state on average
decreases the gap to the average level of per capita GDP in EU25 with 15 percent per year A
practical method of symbolizing what this means is to apply the half-life measure8 ie the
time necessary for an economy given an estimated convergence speed to close half of the
gap separating it from the average Assuming that the estimated convergence speed will be
consistent over the future it will take an economy 48 years to close half of the gap separating
it from the average A scatter plot and regression line showing the relationship between yearly
change in GDP per capita and the GDP per capita level the year before is graphed below
6 The data which this paper is based upon is exclusively collected from Eurostat (2006 see link in references) the EU statistics institution The GDP-data is in real terms (1995 Euros) Data on capital formation FDI trade etc are all in 1995 Euros Population labor force etc are measured at mid-year (first of July) in order to get more unbiased estimates when using the per capita measures 7 The speed of convergence is found by solving for λ in the equation β = eλt-1 where t in this case equals 1 8 The half-life measure is defined by ( ) ( )βτ +minus= 1ln2ln
9
Figure 1
Annual growth vs starting level
-004-002
000200400600801
012014016
7 75 8 85 9 95 10 105
GDP per capita the year before (logs)
Cha
nge
in G
DP
per c
apita
(log
s)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
The two measures of dispersion indicate that the dispersion in per capita GDP among the
studied economies has gradually fallen over time The trend in dispersion when using the
coefficient of variance c as well as the standard deviation of the log GDP per capita v are
presented in appendix 1 and shown graphically in figure 2 If the coefficient of variation is
applied the dispersion fell however only marginally (from 055 to 054 ie by about 2
percent) When using the v-measure the fall in dispersion was more significant Over the
period it changed from 099 to 084 a decrease of about 18 percent That the latter measure
gives a more significant proof of convergence is probably related to the fact that it puts
greater weight to observations with a large deviation from the mean (eg the Baltic states) and
that these economies have converged faster relative the ones closer to the mean
10
Figure 2
σ-convergence
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Disp
ersi
on in
per
cap
ita G
DPs
vc
v is the standard deviation of per capita GDPs in logs (equation 23) and c is the coefficient
of variance (eq 22)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
3 Are some catching up faster than others
31 An expanded β-model
The original equation used to estimate theβ -coefficient was of the following form
iititit yyy εβα ++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2hellip n (31)
By expanding this model with dummy variables groupings of catch-up-economies can be
analyzed with respect to their catch-up performance Three groups of Member States (MS)
were formed based on their initial gaps in per capita GDP to the EU-average (see figure 3 in
section 33) which also coincide rather strongly with geographical location The groups are
(1) the Baltic MS (Estonia Latvia and Lithuania) (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS (Poland Czech Republic Slovak Republic and Hungary) and (3) SE4 ie the
poorer than average MS of Southern Europe (Slovenia Greece Spain and Portugal)
The definition of absolute convergence states that poorer economies are suppose to grow at a
faster rate than richer ones however the yearly gap reduction in percent is expected to be
equal among the economies A necessary condition for absolute convergence is that the
poorer a country is at an initial stage the faster it should grow By assigning dummies for
11
these three groups and leaving the others as reference possible fixed growth effects for these
three groups can be distinguished In doing so the dummies will make variations in the size
of the intercept possible thus indicating whether a group of countries is converging faster or
slower than a reference point Thus the dummy coefficients in the model below indicate the
groupsrsquo deviation from the intercept of the reference group
iSSCCBBitRitit DDDyyy εαααβα +++++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog (32)
where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2 hellip n
and takes on the value one for the Baltic member states is one for the CEE4 and
is one for the SE4 The intercept of the reference group
BD CD SD
Rα indicates a ldquocorerdquo growth rate
and the dummy coefficients are the three groupsrsquo respective fixed deviation from this
intercept
32 The estimation results
The estimation of the equation outlined above gives results indicating that the Baltic group
has a somewhat higher speed of convergence relative the reference group The coefficients for
the other two groups are negative indicating a lower intercept and a lower speed of
convergence relative the reference group The fixed deviations are all insignificant at a five
percent significance level Thus a hypothesis stating that all the groups converge towards the
mean with equal speeds would not be rejected The group SE4 has a negative deviation from
the reference intercept which at the ten percent level would be weakly significant
Table 2
Least square estimation with group dummies dependent variable itit yy 1 loglog minusminus
Coefficient value Standard error t-Statistic
Rα 01607 00579 27744
β -00135 00058 -23440
Bα 00126 00145 08677
Cα -00083 00101 -08225
12
Sα -00098 00056 -17407
R2 of model is 03152 Source data Eurostat (2006)
Summing up the speeds of convergence for the three groups are at a conventional five
percent level neither significantly higher nor significantly lower than the reference grouprsquos
Yet the results do give a weak indication of faster convergence for the Baltic group than the
other two groups Of these two SE4 seems to converge marginally slower than CEE4
although the difference is small Below there will be a brief description of the growth
performances of the catch-up economies included in the three groups
33 A descriptive approach
Figure 3 below shows the total per capita GDP growth over the time period for the 11
countries below the average of EU259 The Baltic economies all doubled their per capita GDP
(Estonia was the most impressive with a growth close to 130 percent) The economies of
CEE4 grew by around 50 to 60 percent with the Czech Republic as a negative deviator The
economies of SE4 grew by around 40 percent with Slovenia deviating positively All of the
11 catch-up economies grew faster than the average of EU25 which had a positive change of
less than 13 percent between 1994 and 2005 Thus all 11 catch-up economies answered to the
theoretical expectations and actually caught-up and closed the gap to the average The
definition of absolute convergence said that the growth should be higher the lower the initial
level of GDP per capita From the figure below this more or less seems to have been the case
9 The average is weighted with respect to the sizes of the countries Thus a positive change in Germany affects the average more than an equal change in eg Sweden
13
Figure 3
Per capita GDP growth vs initial level
020406080
100120140
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
EU-25
Perc
ent
Period growth (1995-2005)Level in 1994 ( of EU-25)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
When talking about economic integration one has to distinguish between real and monetary
integration (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006) The former concerns real variables such as level of
output and allocation of production factors while the latter concerns the integration of
monetary systems and currencies eg the introduction of the Euro This paper focuses
exclusively on integration in real terms Further integration can take place at both macro and
micro levels States can force integration through macroeconomic decisions regarding trade
agreements and currency unions but at least as important for the integration process is the
behavior of firms and individuals Tools from microeconomic theory will be the basis of the
theoretical framework that is to be presented below
41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
A set of integration mechanisms which can function as driving forces behind convergence in
GDP levels will be presented below They are (1) internal accumulation of capital (ie
savings) (2) cross-border capital mobility (3) cross-border labor migration and (4) trade
They will be briefly illustrated with Edgeworth boxes and linked to how they affect per capita
GDP The mechanisms are derived from the neo-classical growth models presented by
14
Ramsey (1928) Solow (1956) and Koopmans (1965) and the standard production function of
the form
αα minus= 1
tttt LKAY with 10 ltltα (41)
where output Y for an exogenously given level of technology A depends on capital K and
labor L In the original model the savings rate is assumed to be exogenous and constant
Although K generally has been restricted to physical capital one may also think of it in a
broader sense comprising of physical capital and human capital (Mankiw Romer and Weil
1992) The main characteristics of this production function are constant returns to scale (since
the coefficients sum to 1) and diminishing marginal products of the production factors K and
L Hence imagining given levels of technology labor and savings rate additional capital
yields decreasing rates of return and growth rates This implies a steady state where capital
per worker k and output per worker y are constant
( kfy = )
)
(42)
The steady state output y is above all determined by the exogenously given level of
technology A which all economies are supposed to have free access to The assumption of
equal access to available technology or fast technological dispersion can be regarded as valid
for highly open economies with similar levels of education This may be expected for
advanced economies in general eg Western Europe but a critical issue is whether it can be
expanded to include the CEECs as well In the analysis section there will be a discussion of
how technological dispersion can function as a factor behind convergence but for the time
being the term indicating level of technology A is dropped Expression (41) can be rewritten
as
( LKfY = (43)
By dividing by total population N we get the following expression for per capita output
y = ( )NL
LLKf
NY
times= (44)
15
Thus output per capita depends on output per hour of labor (labor productivity) and hours of
labor to total population The latter can be further elaborated in order to take into account the
number of economically active (ie size of the labor force) and the size of the working age
population so that (44) becomes
( )N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKfy timestimestimes=
(45)
where LF is the size of the labor force and WA working age population GDP per capita now
depends on labor productivity hours of labor per economically active LLF the participation
rate LFWA and the size of the working age population to total population In order to
conveniently follow the changes in GDP per capita for a panel of countries the function is on
logarithmic scale and the subscripts i and t indicating country and year are added
( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tititi N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKf
y
lnlnln
lnln (46)
where ln yit ndash ln yit-1 is an approximation of the yearly growth in GDP per capita (for
relatively small changes in y) The mechanisms of economic integration will now be
presented They are illustrated with the well-known Edgeworth-box named after Francis
Ysidro Edgeworth A frequently used way of illustrating the integration process is otherwise
the Solow-diagram (see eg Baldwin 1989) However when comparing two or more
countries in a process of resource reallocation the Edgeworth-box serves as a more suitable
tool Finland and Estonia are used as a hypothetical example of how a richer economy with a
relatively higher degree of capital intensity in the production process can be integrated with a
poorer one with a relatively higher degree of labor intensity
The initial position with an allocation where Finnish production is more capital intensive than
the Estonian is shown below The interpretation is as follows labor increases in Finland
relative Estonia when L(Fin) moves to the right on the horizontal axis Capital in Finland
increases relative Estonia when K(Fin) moves upwards on the vertical axis Labor increases in
Estonia relative Finland when L(Est) moves to the left on the horizontal axis and capital
increases in Estonia relative Finland when K(Est) moves downwards The different
16
allocations between the countries are purely relative measures where K and L are in terms of
the otherrsquos disposal and the vertical and horizontal axis of the box symbolizes the aggregate
supply of the two factors in the region The capital intensity in Finland is K(Fin)L(Fin) and in
the proposed allocation below it is higher than in Estonia this since K(Fin)L(Fin) gt
K(Est)L(Est) Allocations along the diagonal line imply equal intensities and complete
integration in terms of factor prices and factor intensities
Figure 4
42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
In this case the level of output depends on savings rate productivity depreciation and
employment Only growth in productivity and employment rate can increase per capita
output given that the investment rate equals the rate of depreciation ie the economy is in
steady state If not in steady state the economy will grow as long as the marginal product of
capital yields an investment rate higher than the rate of depreciation However because of the
assumption of diminishing marginal returns to capital economies will over the phase of time
converge to the similar level given that they have matching production functions The figure
below shows a situation where Estonia by internal saving accumulates own capital up to its
steady state Thus the aggregate capital stock in the whole region grows (the box grows
upwards) the capital intensity in Estonia increases relative Finlandrsquos and there is convergence
between the two countries In the analysis of section 5 the impact of internal accumulation of
17
capital will be analyzed by comparing data on gross fixed capital formation stemming from
domestic sources
Figure 5
The constraint connected with the basic Solow model when studying integration and
convergence is that it treats the economy as closed Thus internal accumulation of capital can
only force absolute convergence if production functions are identical and the resulting
convergence speed will be low (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7) Economic integration
becomes more dynamic when allowing the factors of production to be internationally mobile
A theoretical situation in which borders are open better resembles the European reality and
results in new possibilities to efficiently allocate capital and labor
43 Integration through capital mobility
In the following sections the basic Solow model is extended to allow for cross border
reallocation of capital and labor Capital mobility in an enlarged economic area gives capital
owners the opportunity to reallocate their resources more efficiently This means intra-
regional reallocation (within the box) as well as a relative change in investments from non-EU
economies (from outside the box) Another difference compared to integration only through
internal accumulation is that the expected speed of convergence in this case is higher
(Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7)
18
One could consider the reallocation of capital to a less capital-rich economy as giving this
economy an ldquoinduced capital formation effectrdquo or ldquomedium-run growth bonusrdquo concepts
introduced by Baldwin (1989) This effect could be seen as an exogenous increase in the
investment rate in the relatively capital-poor country and vice versa in the capital-richer In
the original Solow-setting the investment rate equaled the savings rate and was assumed to be
constant From a welfare perspective this implied that citizens in order to invest more must
save more and consume less In the case where capital is reallocated across borders an
economy can enjoy increased investment activity without forgoing consumption
Figure 6
The figure above illustrates a situation in which capital is reallocated from the relatively
capital-richer Finland to the relatively capital-poorer Estonia This takes place since the
marginal returns to capital diminish and are higher in the relatively capital-poor economy
)()( kfL
LKFy == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the marginal returns to capital and
0)acuteacute()acute(lt=
partpart kf
kkf based on the law of diminishing returns
19
Thus the derivation of this integration mechanism as well as convergence theory in general
is highly dependent on the assumption of diminishing returns to capital This integration
mechanism will be analyzed by comparing inward foreign direct investments (FDI) in the
catch-up economies both as a share of GDP and as a share of gross fixed capital formation
This mechanism is expected to have a large impact on labor productivity thus decisive for
GDP growth and catch-up speed FDI affects labor productivity directly by increasing the
capital intensity in the production process but is also expected to augment the incorporation
of technology in the economy and therefore boost total factor productivity
44 Integration through migration
When borders are opened up for migration movement from poorer economies to richer ones is
expected according to the theory (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 chapter 8) In the capital-rich
economy the labor productivity and the wages are higher In the economy where capital is less
abundant labor productivity and wages are lower The wage asymmetry leads to net migration
from the capital-poor economy to the capital-rich Assuming perfect competition on the factor
markets the relationship between wages and capital intensity can be derived in the following
way
LFFw L partpart
equiv= is the wage
LLKFkfy )()( == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the unit cost of capital
kkfrk )acute(= is the per capita cost of capital in the economy which gives that
wkkfy =minus )`( since the per capita labor cost equals the average wage
By taking the derivative of the last expression with respect to k we get the effect on wages
when the capital intensity is increased
0)acuteacute( gtminus=partpart kkf
kw since facuteacute(k)lt 0
20
Less capital intensive production processes thus have a less productive labor force (the
marginal product of labor is lower) and lower wages other things equal If the assumptions
hold labor migration eg from Estonia to Finland lowers the wages in Finland (since the
capital intensity falls) and increases the wages in Estonia (because of increased capital
intensity) other things equal If overlooking externalities and changeover costs (and assuming
that the migrants are active laborers) the effect on GDP will be unambiguously positive in
Finland and negative in Estonia
Figure 7
In the figure above labor migrates from Estonia to Finland Capital intensity will increase in
Estonia given that to rapid capital depreciation not counteracts boosting convergence in
factor prices and labor productivity (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 8) Although this aspect
of economic integration unambiguously hampers convergence in GDP the effect on per
capita GDP is ambiguous The effect on convergence in per capita GDP depends on whether
the migrants were working in Estonia and if they find a job in Finland Other aspects eg
crowding out on the respective labor markets and the level of skills of the migrants are also
important to take into account but are beyond the scope of this paper Therefore the analysis
will be restricted to solely relate the expected (and most basic) effects from changes in
employment and population to the respective catch-up performances Other things equal
increases in hours of labor per economically active participation rate and the share of the
population in working age will have positive effects on per capita GDP while an increase in
21
total population will affect per capita GDP negatively Accordingly these variables will be
the basis of the analysis in section 5
45 Integration through trade
Cross-border trade and specialization can also function as a mechanism of integration causing
convergence Based on a set of assumptions it can be showed that countries can converge
through the prices of traded goods (and services) without the need for mobility of capital and
labor A fundamental concept is Ricardian trade and comparative advantages which shows
how trade leads to complete specialization in the production of goods (Ricardo 1821) In the
case with only two goods and two countries each country would end up supplying only the
good it produces the most efficiently and trade with each other Heckscher and Ohlin (1933)
and Samuelson (1948) has taken the concept further and shown that international trade gives
rise to factor price equalization through the goods markets given equal levels of technology
Figure 8
Factor price equalization takes place within a restricted area in which incomplete
specialization prevails However the countries keep producing both goods although they tend
to export the one which is produced more efficiently Thus convergence in factor prices can
be brought about without cross-border mobility of capital and labor given that the goods and
services are traded on an international market and that further specialization is possible What
22
factor price equalization does demand is that the factors of production are mobile between
sectors and industries If eg laborers are unwilling to switch sector or accept lower wages the
resulting effect will be unemployment Thus given that convergence of factor prices gives
rise to convergence in per capita output (this will be elaborated in section 54) the degree of
openness to trade will influence the catch-up performances I will analyze this relationship by
comparing data on trade integration (ie the average of imports and exports to GDP)
46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
Based on the outline above a number of important variables affecting growth in per capita
GDP and thus the convergence (or divergence) of economies can be listed The productivity
of labor is a crucial factor affecting the growth rate and the convergence trend If the
productivity of labor increases faster in a poorer economy than in a richer counterpart
convergence will be fostered other things equal Labor productivity is determined by total
factor productivity and the capital intensity in the production process The capital intensity
can be enhanced by internal accumulation of capital and foreign investments
Since the per capita GDP for a given size of the population depends positively on hours of
work per economically active an increase in this variable will boost convergence Holding the
other variables constant positive changes in the participation rate and the share of total
population in working age will affect GDP per capita positively Because of the per capita
approach total population will be negatively correlated with the speed of convergence when
holding the amount of work constant Based on the fourth integration mechanism it is also to
expect that the degree of openness to trade affects the speed of convergence A proxy for the
degree of openness is the economyrsquos trade integration of goods and services as a share of
GDP In the following section these variables (which are summarized in table 3 on the
following page) will be compared with the convergence performances of the catch-up
countries
Table 3
Summary of key variables affecting speed of convergence
23
Variable of interest Expected effect on per capita GDP and convergence speed other things equal
Technology Positive
Internal accumulation of capital Positive
Foreign direct investment Positive
Hours of work per economically active Positive
Participation rate Positive
Working age population Positive
Total population Negative
Trade integration Positive
5 Explaining catch-up performances
In the preceding section basic theory on economic integration and possible mechanisms
fostering convergence was outlined These mechanisms will now be related to the
performances of the catch-up economies that were briefly presented in section 3 The analysis
is based on descriptive statistics on the key variables presented above and their relation to
economic theory The grouping of the catch-up economies introduced in section 3 is applied
The three groups are (1) the Baltic Member States (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS and (3) SE4 ie the Southern European MS It was showed in section 3 that
the Baltic group had the lowest initial per capita GDPs and grew faster than CEE4 SE4 had
initial per capita GDPs closest to the average of EU25 and grew slower than CEE4
51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
On the basis of the production function the factors contributing to growth are labor
productivity and employment Labor productivity in turn is a broad concept which depends
on both available capital per worker ie the capital intensity and the way in which the factors
of production are exogenously turned into output ie level of technology or TFP Further the
amount of capital depends on internal capital formation and inward foreign direct
investments as well as the consumption of fixed capital ie capital depreciation Evolutions
in capital formation as well as level of technology are expected to be highly decisive for
growth in per capita GDP Firstly the average annual change in labor productivity and per
capita GDP are graphed against each other
24
Figure 9
Labor productivity vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
SpainAv
erag
e an
nual
cha
nge
(in
)
Per capita GDPLabor productivity
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As expected labor productivity and per capita GDP co-varies strongly Although the data is
rather convincing in stressing the importance of the broad concept of labor productivity to
growth and thus catch-up speed there are a few remarks to be done before this concept is to
be further elaborated From the bars above one can distinguish a pattern in which labor
productivity increases by more than per capita GDP for poorer economies and vice versa (the
higher the initial level of per capita GDP the farther to the right the country is located on the
x-axis) The extreme case seems to be Spain for which labor productivity played a relatively
unimportant role in explaining increases in per capita GDP Other comparatively rich nations
such as Greece Portugal and Slovenia also had lower impacts from labor productivity in
contrast to eg Estonia Lithuania and Poland Nevertheless the figures are (with the
exception of Spain) considerably higher than for the non-catching up economies and thus help
to explain convergence In the Euro area as an example the corresponding average annual
labor productivity growth was just one percent (Kaitala 2004)
52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
As it nearly seems to be an explain-it-all correlation between catch-up and labor productivity
the concept has to be further investigated In section 4 it was showed how internal savings and
cross-border reallocation of capital can deepen economic integration and foster convergence
Besides capital formation an important factor in the integration process is the dispersion and
25
incorporation of technology ie changes in TFP The evolution in TFP can be derived by
estimating the so-called Solow residual However this either demands access to reliable and
comparable capital stock data or own estimations of the respective capital stocks eg under
the perpetual inventory method Since there is a scarcity of comparable capital stock data for
the CEECs the alternative is own estimations This in turn would require baseline
benchmarks of capital-to-output ratios stocks of human capital etc and is beyond the scope
of this paper For the time being the focus will be on formation of physical capital although
some recent findings on dynamics in TFP will be reported
Figure 10
Annual gross fixed capital formation
05
10152025303540
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Perc
ent o
f GDP Baltic
CEE4SE4NCU
Source data Eurostat (2006)
In the figure above the evolution in annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a share of
GDP for the three groups and the non-catching up economies of EU25 (NCU) is graphed The
statistical aggregate of GFCF is a measure of the net new investment in the domestic economy
in fixed capital assets although not accounting for capital depreciation Obviously GFCF is
not a measure of total investment because all kinds of financial assets are excluded but is a
good indicator of the level of investment activity relevant for real variables such as output
The levels have been consistently high for all three groups of catch-up economies over the
time period As a contrast the investment level for the NCUs has been consistently below 20
percent of GDP for the time period When comparing the groups the most striking trend is the
consistent intensification of investment activity in the Baltic economies Although the general
26
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
explanatory factors that may account for the catch-up performances Within a theoretical
framework the catch-up performances found in section 3 are compared and analyzed Finally
I conclude and give suggestions on further possible research topics
2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
Convergence in per capita levels of GDP and income has been a popular research topic since
the early 1990s The empirical evidence found up until now follow a couple of seemingly
consistent patterns Firstly convergence in general and particularly absolute convergence
appears to be highly dependent on how similar the studied economies are Studies only
including economies with large industrial and service sectors show more significant
convergence than studies which also include economies that are more dependent on eg
agriculture and tourism (see Fagerberg and Verspagen 1996) Trade barriers between the
studied economies as well as considerable political and judicial asymmetries also seem to
hamper convergence The fastest convergence has thus been estimated within more
homogenous economic areas with low internal barriers of trade such as among the US states
or the countries of EU124 and EU15 (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992 1995 Tondl 1999
Kaitala 2004)
Although convergence seems to be conditioned on a certain degree of homogeneity it is
difficult to separate the importance of eg trade barriers and what sectors the economy is
based on This due to the fact that these two factors usually correspond strongly with each
other Economic regions with similar economies often have lower barriers of trade and vice
versa Another factor worth mentioning is if and how the business cycle affects convergence
Since many estimations of convergence (including the one in this paper) are based on rather
short time periods the impact of business cycles on the convergence process could be crucial
McGranahan (2003) has studied this relationship for regions in the US and found a positive
correlation between inter-regional inequality and the expansion of the economy Divergence
in incomes was the norm during the upswing of the 1980s while the economic decline in the
early 1990s was associated with convergence However since this paperrsquos period of focus did
not see any remarkable booms or busts this aspect will not be analyzed in detail
4 EU12 includes the 12 Member States up until the accession of Austria Finland and Sweden in 1995
6
21 How to measure convergence
A frequently used and well documented method when looking at absolute convergence within
a region of economies is to estimate so called β-convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992)
This measure is obtained by the means of a straightforward econometric model in which
growth in per capita GDP is explained by the per capita GDP level in the preceding period
Barro and Sala-i-Martin originally estimated the β-coefficient on a cross-section of countries
with the starting GDP per capita level as regressor although followers within the field of
study have shown that it can be performed using panel data as well (see eg Islam 1996) The
panel approach is useful among other things because it generates more degrees of freedom
than the cross-section approach Because of these advantages this is the approach that will be
applied in this paper The equation to estimate is of the following form
iititit yyy εβα ++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2hellip n (21)
and the dependent variable since it is the first difference of a logarithmic scale is an
approximation of the annual growth rate in percent Another clear-cut method to use when
one wants to study convergence is to follow the development of the dispersion of per capita
GDP levels within the region of interest So called σ-convergence takes place if the dispersion
within the region decreases over time (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992) The dispersion in per
capita GDP between countries can be calculated in different ways but two convenient
measures are the coefficient of variance c and the standard deviation of the log GDP per
capita v ie
2
1
1sum=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ minus=
n
i
i
yyy
nc sum
=
equivn
iiy
ny
1
1 (22)
2
1
log1sum=
lowast ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
n
i
i
yy
nv sum
=
lowast equivn
iiy
ny
1log1log (23)
These two measures c and v do not seem to differ much at first glance and one expects to
find similar information Yet it has been shown that they in some situations can give rise to
conflicting results above all when the dispersion between the observed countries is large
(Dalgaard and Vastrup 2001) In this case the measures will differ since they put a different
7
weight to how far from the average observations are located The two measures have as an
example given contradictory estimates of global convergence from 1960 and onwards The
countries that were among the poorest in 1960 have not converged towards mean while the
countries above the poorest group have converged quite rapidly The result will in this case
depend on how you weight the countries with respect to their deviation from the mean
22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
Using the three measures of convergence outlined above a brief picture of whether absolute
convergence has taken place will now to be provided The observed period stretches from
1994 until 2005 and all but three of the EU25 countries are included The three small member
states Cyprus Malta and Luxembourg were for different reasons excluded from the analysis
As regards Cyprus and Malta the main reason was insufficient GDP data (comparable data
was only available from 1998 and onwards) Further these two Mediterranean economies
with dominant tourism and farming sectors can also not be expected to have much in common
with the other member states in terms of level and shape of production functions
Luxembourg is typically removed from analyses like these because of its economyrsquos
distinctive character In particular the per capita approach is because of the massive inward
commuting to Luxemburg meaningless to compare with that of the other member states
As the eight accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe went through rough transition
in the early 1990s with slumping production levels and fleeing populations the estimation
period was restricted to 1994-2005 although seemingly reliable data from around 1991 exist
for most them Latvia had for example a negative change in real GDP of about 31 percent in
1992 In Lithuania it fell by about 19 percent the same year In 1994 their respective
economies were about half the size of the estimated pre-transition levels Although the
transition itself as well as effects and counter-effects from it might have played an important
role also in the development after 1994 this choice of starting point seems to be consistent
with some sort of normalization in these economies Included data for the Western European
economies was also restricted to the period 1994-2005 in order to keep the panel balanced
Thus one has to keep in mind that the estimates do not account for the most intensive
transition period for the CEECs5 which most certainly affects the results6
5 CEECs refers to the eight rsquoCentral and Eastern European countriesrsquo of the EU ie the catch-up economies included in this paper less Greece Portugal and Spain
8
Table 1
Least square β-estimation dependent variable is itit yy 1 loglog minusminus
Coefficient value Standard error t-Statistic α 01757 00157 111711
β -01537 00017 -90545
R2 of model is 02562 Source data Eurostat (2006)
The results received from the estimation of the β-coefficient are shown in table 1 and indicate
that significant convergence in terms of per capita GDP has taken place in the region over the
studied time period The β-coefficient is estimated to -0015 corresponding to an annual
speed of convergence of about 15 percent7 This means that a member state on average
decreases the gap to the average level of per capita GDP in EU25 with 15 percent per year A
practical method of symbolizing what this means is to apply the half-life measure8 ie the
time necessary for an economy given an estimated convergence speed to close half of the
gap separating it from the average Assuming that the estimated convergence speed will be
consistent over the future it will take an economy 48 years to close half of the gap separating
it from the average A scatter plot and regression line showing the relationship between yearly
change in GDP per capita and the GDP per capita level the year before is graphed below
6 The data which this paper is based upon is exclusively collected from Eurostat (2006 see link in references) the EU statistics institution The GDP-data is in real terms (1995 Euros) Data on capital formation FDI trade etc are all in 1995 Euros Population labor force etc are measured at mid-year (first of July) in order to get more unbiased estimates when using the per capita measures 7 The speed of convergence is found by solving for λ in the equation β = eλt-1 where t in this case equals 1 8 The half-life measure is defined by ( ) ( )βτ +minus= 1ln2ln
9
Figure 1
Annual growth vs starting level
-004-002
000200400600801
012014016
7 75 8 85 9 95 10 105
GDP per capita the year before (logs)
Cha
nge
in G
DP
per c
apita
(log
s)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
The two measures of dispersion indicate that the dispersion in per capita GDP among the
studied economies has gradually fallen over time The trend in dispersion when using the
coefficient of variance c as well as the standard deviation of the log GDP per capita v are
presented in appendix 1 and shown graphically in figure 2 If the coefficient of variation is
applied the dispersion fell however only marginally (from 055 to 054 ie by about 2
percent) When using the v-measure the fall in dispersion was more significant Over the
period it changed from 099 to 084 a decrease of about 18 percent That the latter measure
gives a more significant proof of convergence is probably related to the fact that it puts
greater weight to observations with a large deviation from the mean (eg the Baltic states) and
that these economies have converged faster relative the ones closer to the mean
10
Figure 2
σ-convergence
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Disp
ersi
on in
per
cap
ita G
DPs
vc
v is the standard deviation of per capita GDPs in logs (equation 23) and c is the coefficient
of variance (eq 22)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
3 Are some catching up faster than others
31 An expanded β-model
The original equation used to estimate theβ -coefficient was of the following form
iititit yyy εβα ++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2hellip n (31)
By expanding this model with dummy variables groupings of catch-up-economies can be
analyzed with respect to their catch-up performance Three groups of Member States (MS)
were formed based on their initial gaps in per capita GDP to the EU-average (see figure 3 in
section 33) which also coincide rather strongly with geographical location The groups are
(1) the Baltic MS (Estonia Latvia and Lithuania) (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS (Poland Czech Republic Slovak Republic and Hungary) and (3) SE4 ie the
poorer than average MS of Southern Europe (Slovenia Greece Spain and Portugal)
The definition of absolute convergence states that poorer economies are suppose to grow at a
faster rate than richer ones however the yearly gap reduction in percent is expected to be
equal among the economies A necessary condition for absolute convergence is that the
poorer a country is at an initial stage the faster it should grow By assigning dummies for
11
these three groups and leaving the others as reference possible fixed growth effects for these
three groups can be distinguished In doing so the dummies will make variations in the size
of the intercept possible thus indicating whether a group of countries is converging faster or
slower than a reference point Thus the dummy coefficients in the model below indicate the
groupsrsquo deviation from the intercept of the reference group
iSSCCBBitRitit DDDyyy εαααβα +++++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog (32)
where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2 hellip n
and takes on the value one for the Baltic member states is one for the CEE4 and
is one for the SE4 The intercept of the reference group
BD CD SD
Rα indicates a ldquocorerdquo growth rate
and the dummy coefficients are the three groupsrsquo respective fixed deviation from this
intercept
32 The estimation results
The estimation of the equation outlined above gives results indicating that the Baltic group
has a somewhat higher speed of convergence relative the reference group The coefficients for
the other two groups are negative indicating a lower intercept and a lower speed of
convergence relative the reference group The fixed deviations are all insignificant at a five
percent significance level Thus a hypothesis stating that all the groups converge towards the
mean with equal speeds would not be rejected The group SE4 has a negative deviation from
the reference intercept which at the ten percent level would be weakly significant
Table 2
Least square estimation with group dummies dependent variable itit yy 1 loglog minusminus
Coefficient value Standard error t-Statistic
Rα 01607 00579 27744
β -00135 00058 -23440
Bα 00126 00145 08677
Cα -00083 00101 -08225
12
Sα -00098 00056 -17407
R2 of model is 03152 Source data Eurostat (2006)
Summing up the speeds of convergence for the three groups are at a conventional five
percent level neither significantly higher nor significantly lower than the reference grouprsquos
Yet the results do give a weak indication of faster convergence for the Baltic group than the
other two groups Of these two SE4 seems to converge marginally slower than CEE4
although the difference is small Below there will be a brief description of the growth
performances of the catch-up economies included in the three groups
33 A descriptive approach
Figure 3 below shows the total per capita GDP growth over the time period for the 11
countries below the average of EU259 The Baltic economies all doubled their per capita GDP
(Estonia was the most impressive with a growth close to 130 percent) The economies of
CEE4 grew by around 50 to 60 percent with the Czech Republic as a negative deviator The
economies of SE4 grew by around 40 percent with Slovenia deviating positively All of the
11 catch-up economies grew faster than the average of EU25 which had a positive change of
less than 13 percent between 1994 and 2005 Thus all 11 catch-up economies answered to the
theoretical expectations and actually caught-up and closed the gap to the average The
definition of absolute convergence said that the growth should be higher the lower the initial
level of GDP per capita From the figure below this more or less seems to have been the case
9 The average is weighted with respect to the sizes of the countries Thus a positive change in Germany affects the average more than an equal change in eg Sweden
13
Figure 3
Per capita GDP growth vs initial level
020406080
100120140
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
EU-25
Perc
ent
Period growth (1995-2005)Level in 1994 ( of EU-25)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
When talking about economic integration one has to distinguish between real and monetary
integration (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006) The former concerns real variables such as level of
output and allocation of production factors while the latter concerns the integration of
monetary systems and currencies eg the introduction of the Euro This paper focuses
exclusively on integration in real terms Further integration can take place at both macro and
micro levels States can force integration through macroeconomic decisions regarding trade
agreements and currency unions but at least as important for the integration process is the
behavior of firms and individuals Tools from microeconomic theory will be the basis of the
theoretical framework that is to be presented below
41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
A set of integration mechanisms which can function as driving forces behind convergence in
GDP levels will be presented below They are (1) internal accumulation of capital (ie
savings) (2) cross-border capital mobility (3) cross-border labor migration and (4) trade
They will be briefly illustrated with Edgeworth boxes and linked to how they affect per capita
GDP The mechanisms are derived from the neo-classical growth models presented by
14
Ramsey (1928) Solow (1956) and Koopmans (1965) and the standard production function of
the form
αα minus= 1
tttt LKAY with 10 ltltα (41)
where output Y for an exogenously given level of technology A depends on capital K and
labor L In the original model the savings rate is assumed to be exogenous and constant
Although K generally has been restricted to physical capital one may also think of it in a
broader sense comprising of physical capital and human capital (Mankiw Romer and Weil
1992) The main characteristics of this production function are constant returns to scale (since
the coefficients sum to 1) and diminishing marginal products of the production factors K and
L Hence imagining given levels of technology labor and savings rate additional capital
yields decreasing rates of return and growth rates This implies a steady state where capital
per worker k and output per worker y are constant
( kfy = )
)
(42)
The steady state output y is above all determined by the exogenously given level of
technology A which all economies are supposed to have free access to The assumption of
equal access to available technology or fast technological dispersion can be regarded as valid
for highly open economies with similar levels of education This may be expected for
advanced economies in general eg Western Europe but a critical issue is whether it can be
expanded to include the CEECs as well In the analysis section there will be a discussion of
how technological dispersion can function as a factor behind convergence but for the time
being the term indicating level of technology A is dropped Expression (41) can be rewritten
as
( LKfY = (43)
By dividing by total population N we get the following expression for per capita output
y = ( )NL
LLKf
NY
times= (44)
15
Thus output per capita depends on output per hour of labor (labor productivity) and hours of
labor to total population The latter can be further elaborated in order to take into account the
number of economically active (ie size of the labor force) and the size of the working age
population so that (44) becomes
( )N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKfy timestimestimes=
(45)
where LF is the size of the labor force and WA working age population GDP per capita now
depends on labor productivity hours of labor per economically active LLF the participation
rate LFWA and the size of the working age population to total population In order to
conveniently follow the changes in GDP per capita for a panel of countries the function is on
logarithmic scale and the subscripts i and t indicating country and year are added
( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tititi N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKf
y
lnlnln
lnln (46)
where ln yit ndash ln yit-1 is an approximation of the yearly growth in GDP per capita (for
relatively small changes in y) The mechanisms of economic integration will now be
presented They are illustrated with the well-known Edgeworth-box named after Francis
Ysidro Edgeworth A frequently used way of illustrating the integration process is otherwise
the Solow-diagram (see eg Baldwin 1989) However when comparing two or more
countries in a process of resource reallocation the Edgeworth-box serves as a more suitable
tool Finland and Estonia are used as a hypothetical example of how a richer economy with a
relatively higher degree of capital intensity in the production process can be integrated with a
poorer one with a relatively higher degree of labor intensity
The initial position with an allocation where Finnish production is more capital intensive than
the Estonian is shown below The interpretation is as follows labor increases in Finland
relative Estonia when L(Fin) moves to the right on the horizontal axis Capital in Finland
increases relative Estonia when K(Fin) moves upwards on the vertical axis Labor increases in
Estonia relative Finland when L(Est) moves to the left on the horizontal axis and capital
increases in Estonia relative Finland when K(Est) moves downwards The different
16
allocations between the countries are purely relative measures where K and L are in terms of
the otherrsquos disposal and the vertical and horizontal axis of the box symbolizes the aggregate
supply of the two factors in the region The capital intensity in Finland is K(Fin)L(Fin) and in
the proposed allocation below it is higher than in Estonia this since K(Fin)L(Fin) gt
K(Est)L(Est) Allocations along the diagonal line imply equal intensities and complete
integration in terms of factor prices and factor intensities
Figure 4
42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
In this case the level of output depends on savings rate productivity depreciation and
employment Only growth in productivity and employment rate can increase per capita
output given that the investment rate equals the rate of depreciation ie the economy is in
steady state If not in steady state the economy will grow as long as the marginal product of
capital yields an investment rate higher than the rate of depreciation However because of the
assumption of diminishing marginal returns to capital economies will over the phase of time
converge to the similar level given that they have matching production functions The figure
below shows a situation where Estonia by internal saving accumulates own capital up to its
steady state Thus the aggregate capital stock in the whole region grows (the box grows
upwards) the capital intensity in Estonia increases relative Finlandrsquos and there is convergence
between the two countries In the analysis of section 5 the impact of internal accumulation of
17
capital will be analyzed by comparing data on gross fixed capital formation stemming from
domestic sources
Figure 5
The constraint connected with the basic Solow model when studying integration and
convergence is that it treats the economy as closed Thus internal accumulation of capital can
only force absolute convergence if production functions are identical and the resulting
convergence speed will be low (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7) Economic integration
becomes more dynamic when allowing the factors of production to be internationally mobile
A theoretical situation in which borders are open better resembles the European reality and
results in new possibilities to efficiently allocate capital and labor
43 Integration through capital mobility
In the following sections the basic Solow model is extended to allow for cross border
reallocation of capital and labor Capital mobility in an enlarged economic area gives capital
owners the opportunity to reallocate their resources more efficiently This means intra-
regional reallocation (within the box) as well as a relative change in investments from non-EU
economies (from outside the box) Another difference compared to integration only through
internal accumulation is that the expected speed of convergence in this case is higher
(Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7)
18
One could consider the reallocation of capital to a less capital-rich economy as giving this
economy an ldquoinduced capital formation effectrdquo or ldquomedium-run growth bonusrdquo concepts
introduced by Baldwin (1989) This effect could be seen as an exogenous increase in the
investment rate in the relatively capital-poor country and vice versa in the capital-richer In
the original Solow-setting the investment rate equaled the savings rate and was assumed to be
constant From a welfare perspective this implied that citizens in order to invest more must
save more and consume less In the case where capital is reallocated across borders an
economy can enjoy increased investment activity without forgoing consumption
Figure 6
The figure above illustrates a situation in which capital is reallocated from the relatively
capital-richer Finland to the relatively capital-poorer Estonia This takes place since the
marginal returns to capital diminish and are higher in the relatively capital-poor economy
)()( kfL
LKFy == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the marginal returns to capital and
0)acuteacute()acute(lt=
partpart kf
kkf based on the law of diminishing returns
19
Thus the derivation of this integration mechanism as well as convergence theory in general
is highly dependent on the assumption of diminishing returns to capital This integration
mechanism will be analyzed by comparing inward foreign direct investments (FDI) in the
catch-up economies both as a share of GDP and as a share of gross fixed capital formation
This mechanism is expected to have a large impact on labor productivity thus decisive for
GDP growth and catch-up speed FDI affects labor productivity directly by increasing the
capital intensity in the production process but is also expected to augment the incorporation
of technology in the economy and therefore boost total factor productivity
44 Integration through migration
When borders are opened up for migration movement from poorer economies to richer ones is
expected according to the theory (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 chapter 8) In the capital-rich
economy the labor productivity and the wages are higher In the economy where capital is less
abundant labor productivity and wages are lower The wage asymmetry leads to net migration
from the capital-poor economy to the capital-rich Assuming perfect competition on the factor
markets the relationship between wages and capital intensity can be derived in the following
way
LFFw L partpart
equiv= is the wage
LLKFkfy )()( == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the unit cost of capital
kkfrk )acute(= is the per capita cost of capital in the economy which gives that
wkkfy =minus )`( since the per capita labor cost equals the average wage
By taking the derivative of the last expression with respect to k we get the effect on wages
when the capital intensity is increased
0)acuteacute( gtminus=partpart kkf
kw since facuteacute(k)lt 0
20
Less capital intensive production processes thus have a less productive labor force (the
marginal product of labor is lower) and lower wages other things equal If the assumptions
hold labor migration eg from Estonia to Finland lowers the wages in Finland (since the
capital intensity falls) and increases the wages in Estonia (because of increased capital
intensity) other things equal If overlooking externalities and changeover costs (and assuming
that the migrants are active laborers) the effect on GDP will be unambiguously positive in
Finland and negative in Estonia
Figure 7
In the figure above labor migrates from Estonia to Finland Capital intensity will increase in
Estonia given that to rapid capital depreciation not counteracts boosting convergence in
factor prices and labor productivity (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 8) Although this aspect
of economic integration unambiguously hampers convergence in GDP the effect on per
capita GDP is ambiguous The effect on convergence in per capita GDP depends on whether
the migrants were working in Estonia and if they find a job in Finland Other aspects eg
crowding out on the respective labor markets and the level of skills of the migrants are also
important to take into account but are beyond the scope of this paper Therefore the analysis
will be restricted to solely relate the expected (and most basic) effects from changes in
employment and population to the respective catch-up performances Other things equal
increases in hours of labor per economically active participation rate and the share of the
population in working age will have positive effects on per capita GDP while an increase in
21
total population will affect per capita GDP negatively Accordingly these variables will be
the basis of the analysis in section 5
45 Integration through trade
Cross-border trade and specialization can also function as a mechanism of integration causing
convergence Based on a set of assumptions it can be showed that countries can converge
through the prices of traded goods (and services) without the need for mobility of capital and
labor A fundamental concept is Ricardian trade and comparative advantages which shows
how trade leads to complete specialization in the production of goods (Ricardo 1821) In the
case with only two goods and two countries each country would end up supplying only the
good it produces the most efficiently and trade with each other Heckscher and Ohlin (1933)
and Samuelson (1948) has taken the concept further and shown that international trade gives
rise to factor price equalization through the goods markets given equal levels of technology
Figure 8
Factor price equalization takes place within a restricted area in which incomplete
specialization prevails However the countries keep producing both goods although they tend
to export the one which is produced more efficiently Thus convergence in factor prices can
be brought about without cross-border mobility of capital and labor given that the goods and
services are traded on an international market and that further specialization is possible What
22
factor price equalization does demand is that the factors of production are mobile between
sectors and industries If eg laborers are unwilling to switch sector or accept lower wages the
resulting effect will be unemployment Thus given that convergence of factor prices gives
rise to convergence in per capita output (this will be elaborated in section 54) the degree of
openness to trade will influence the catch-up performances I will analyze this relationship by
comparing data on trade integration (ie the average of imports and exports to GDP)
46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
Based on the outline above a number of important variables affecting growth in per capita
GDP and thus the convergence (or divergence) of economies can be listed The productivity
of labor is a crucial factor affecting the growth rate and the convergence trend If the
productivity of labor increases faster in a poorer economy than in a richer counterpart
convergence will be fostered other things equal Labor productivity is determined by total
factor productivity and the capital intensity in the production process The capital intensity
can be enhanced by internal accumulation of capital and foreign investments
Since the per capita GDP for a given size of the population depends positively on hours of
work per economically active an increase in this variable will boost convergence Holding the
other variables constant positive changes in the participation rate and the share of total
population in working age will affect GDP per capita positively Because of the per capita
approach total population will be negatively correlated with the speed of convergence when
holding the amount of work constant Based on the fourth integration mechanism it is also to
expect that the degree of openness to trade affects the speed of convergence A proxy for the
degree of openness is the economyrsquos trade integration of goods and services as a share of
GDP In the following section these variables (which are summarized in table 3 on the
following page) will be compared with the convergence performances of the catch-up
countries
Table 3
Summary of key variables affecting speed of convergence
23
Variable of interest Expected effect on per capita GDP and convergence speed other things equal
Technology Positive
Internal accumulation of capital Positive
Foreign direct investment Positive
Hours of work per economically active Positive
Participation rate Positive
Working age population Positive
Total population Negative
Trade integration Positive
5 Explaining catch-up performances
In the preceding section basic theory on economic integration and possible mechanisms
fostering convergence was outlined These mechanisms will now be related to the
performances of the catch-up economies that were briefly presented in section 3 The analysis
is based on descriptive statistics on the key variables presented above and their relation to
economic theory The grouping of the catch-up economies introduced in section 3 is applied
The three groups are (1) the Baltic Member States (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS and (3) SE4 ie the Southern European MS It was showed in section 3 that
the Baltic group had the lowest initial per capita GDPs and grew faster than CEE4 SE4 had
initial per capita GDPs closest to the average of EU25 and grew slower than CEE4
51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
On the basis of the production function the factors contributing to growth are labor
productivity and employment Labor productivity in turn is a broad concept which depends
on both available capital per worker ie the capital intensity and the way in which the factors
of production are exogenously turned into output ie level of technology or TFP Further the
amount of capital depends on internal capital formation and inward foreign direct
investments as well as the consumption of fixed capital ie capital depreciation Evolutions
in capital formation as well as level of technology are expected to be highly decisive for
growth in per capita GDP Firstly the average annual change in labor productivity and per
capita GDP are graphed against each other
24
Figure 9
Labor productivity vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
SpainAv
erag
e an
nual
cha
nge
(in
)
Per capita GDPLabor productivity
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As expected labor productivity and per capita GDP co-varies strongly Although the data is
rather convincing in stressing the importance of the broad concept of labor productivity to
growth and thus catch-up speed there are a few remarks to be done before this concept is to
be further elaborated From the bars above one can distinguish a pattern in which labor
productivity increases by more than per capita GDP for poorer economies and vice versa (the
higher the initial level of per capita GDP the farther to the right the country is located on the
x-axis) The extreme case seems to be Spain for which labor productivity played a relatively
unimportant role in explaining increases in per capita GDP Other comparatively rich nations
such as Greece Portugal and Slovenia also had lower impacts from labor productivity in
contrast to eg Estonia Lithuania and Poland Nevertheless the figures are (with the
exception of Spain) considerably higher than for the non-catching up economies and thus help
to explain convergence In the Euro area as an example the corresponding average annual
labor productivity growth was just one percent (Kaitala 2004)
52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
As it nearly seems to be an explain-it-all correlation between catch-up and labor productivity
the concept has to be further investigated In section 4 it was showed how internal savings and
cross-border reallocation of capital can deepen economic integration and foster convergence
Besides capital formation an important factor in the integration process is the dispersion and
25
incorporation of technology ie changes in TFP The evolution in TFP can be derived by
estimating the so-called Solow residual However this either demands access to reliable and
comparable capital stock data or own estimations of the respective capital stocks eg under
the perpetual inventory method Since there is a scarcity of comparable capital stock data for
the CEECs the alternative is own estimations This in turn would require baseline
benchmarks of capital-to-output ratios stocks of human capital etc and is beyond the scope
of this paper For the time being the focus will be on formation of physical capital although
some recent findings on dynamics in TFP will be reported
Figure 10
Annual gross fixed capital formation
05
10152025303540
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Perc
ent o
f GDP Baltic
CEE4SE4NCU
Source data Eurostat (2006)
In the figure above the evolution in annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a share of
GDP for the three groups and the non-catching up economies of EU25 (NCU) is graphed The
statistical aggregate of GFCF is a measure of the net new investment in the domestic economy
in fixed capital assets although not accounting for capital depreciation Obviously GFCF is
not a measure of total investment because all kinds of financial assets are excluded but is a
good indicator of the level of investment activity relevant for real variables such as output
The levels have been consistently high for all three groups of catch-up economies over the
time period As a contrast the investment level for the NCUs has been consistently below 20
percent of GDP for the time period When comparing the groups the most striking trend is the
consistent intensification of investment activity in the Baltic economies Although the general
26
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
21 How to measure convergence
A frequently used and well documented method when looking at absolute convergence within
a region of economies is to estimate so called β-convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992)
This measure is obtained by the means of a straightforward econometric model in which
growth in per capita GDP is explained by the per capita GDP level in the preceding period
Barro and Sala-i-Martin originally estimated the β-coefficient on a cross-section of countries
with the starting GDP per capita level as regressor although followers within the field of
study have shown that it can be performed using panel data as well (see eg Islam 1996) The
panel approach is useful among other things because it generates more degrees of freedom
than the cross-section approach Because of these advantages this is the approach that will be
applied in this paper The equation to estimate is of the following form
iititit yyy εβα ++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2hellip n (21)
and the dependent variable since it is the first difference of a logarithmic scale is an
approximation of the annual growth rate in percent Another clear-cut method to use when
one wants to study convergence is to follow the development of the dispersion of per capita
GDP levels within the region of interest So called σ-convergence takes place if the dispersion
within the region decreases over time (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992) The dispersion in per
capita GDP between countries can be calculated in different ways but two convenient
measures are the coefficient of variance c and the standard deviation of the log GDP per
capita v ie
2
1
1sum=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ minus=
n
i
i
yyy
nc sum
=
equivn
iiy
ny
1
1 (22)
2
1
log1sum=
lowast ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
n
i
i
yy
nv sum
=
lowast equivn
iiy
ny
1log1log (23)
These two measures c and v do not seem to differ much at first glance and one expects to
find similar information Yet it has been shown that they in some situations can give rise to
conflicting results above all when the dispersion between the observed countries is large
(Dalgaard and Vastrup 2001) In this case the measures will differ since they put a different
7
weight to how far from the average observations are located The two measures have as an
example given contradictory estimates of global convergence from 1960 and onwards The
countries that were among the poorest in 1960 have not converged towards mean while the
countries above the poorest group have converged quite rapidly The result will in this case
depend on how you weight the countries with respect to their deviation from the mean
22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
Using the three measures of convergence outlined above a brief picture of whether absolute
convergence has taken place will now to be provided The observed period stretches from
1994 until 2005 and all but three of the EU25 countries are included The three small member
states Cyprus Malta and Luxembourg were for different reasons excluded from the analysis
As regards Cyprus and Malta the main reason was insufficient GDP data (comparable data
was only available from 1998 and onwards) Further these two Mediterranean economies
with dominant tourism and farming sectors can also not be expected to have much in common
with the other member states in terms of level and shape of production functions
Luxembourg is typically removed from analyses like these because of its economyrsquos
distinctive character In particular the per capita approach is because of the massive inward
commuting to Luxemburg meaningless to compare with that of the other member states
As the eight accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe went through rough transition
in the early 1990s with slumping production levels and fleeing populations the estimation
period was restricted to 1994-2005 although seemingly reliable data from around 1991 exist
for most them Latvia had for example a negative change in real GDP of about 31 percent in
1992 In Lithuania it fell by about 19 percent the same year In 1994 their respective
economies were about half the size of the estimated pre-transition levels Although the
transition itself as well as effects and counter-effects from it might have played an important
role also in the development after 1994 this choice of starting point seems to be consistent
with some sort of normalization in these economies Included data for the Western European
economies was also restricted to the period 1994-2005 in order to keep the panel balanced
Thus one has to keep in mind that the estimates do not account for the most intensive
transition period for the CEECs5 which most certainly affects the results6
5 CEECs refers to the eight rsquoCentral and Eastern European countriesrsquo of the EU ie the catch-up economies included in this paper less Greece Portugal and Spain
8
Table 1
Least square β-estimation dependent variable is itit yy 1 loglog minusminus
Coefficient value Standard error t-Statistic α 01757 00157 111711
β -01537 00017 -90545
R2 of model is 02562 Source data Eurostat (2006)
The results received from the estimation of the β-coefficient are shown in table 1 and indicate
that significant convergence in terms of per capita GDP has taken place in the region over the
studied time period The β-coefficient is estimated to -0015 corresponding to an annual
speed of convergence of about 15 percent7 This means that a member state on average
decreases the gap to the average level of per capita GDP in EU25 with 15 percent per year A
practical method of symbolizing what this means is to apply the half-life measure8 ie the
time necessary for an economy given an estimated convergence speed to close half of the
gap separating it from the average Assuming that the estimated convergence speed will be
consistent over the future it will take an economy 48 years to close half of the gap separating
it from the average A scatter plot and regression line showing the relationship between yearly
change in GDP per capita and the GDP per capita level the year before is graphed below
6 The data which this paper is based upon is exclusively collected from Eurostat (2006 see link in references) the EU statistics institution The GDP-data is in real terms (1995 Euros) Data on capital formation FDI trade etc are all in 1995 Euros Population labor force etc are measured at mid-year (first of July) in order to get more unbiased estimates when using the per capita measures 7 The speed of convergence is found by solving for λ in the equation β = eλt-1 where t in this case equals 1 8 The half-life measure is defined by ( ) ( )βτ +minus= 1ln2ln
9
Figure 1
Annual growth vs starting level
-004-002
000200400600801
012014016
7 75 8 85 9 95 10 105
GDP per capita the year before (logs)
Cha
nge
in G
DP
per c
apita
(log
s)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
The two measures of dispersion indicate that the dispersion in per capita GDP among the
studied economies has gradually fallen over time The trend in dispersion when using the
coefficient of variance c as well as the standard deviation of the log GDP per capita v are
presented in appendix 1 and shown graphically in figure 2 If the coefficient of variation is
applied the dispersion fell however only marginally (from 055 to 054 ie by about 2
percent) When using the v-measure the fall in dispersion was more significant Over the
period it changed from 099 to 084 a decrease of about 18 percent That the latter measure
gives a more significant proof of convergence is probably related to the fact that it puts
greater weight to observations with a large deviation from the mean (eg the Baltic states) and
that these economies have converged faster relative the ones closer to the mean
10
Figure 2
σ-convergence
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Disp
ersi
on in
per
cap
ita G
DPs
vc
v is the standard deviation of per capita GDPs in logs (equation 23) and c is the coefficient
of variance (eq 22)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
3 Are some catching up faster than others
31 An expanded β-model
The original equation used to estimate theβ -coefficient was of the following form
iititit yyy εβα ++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2hellip n (31)
By expanding this model with dummy variables groupings of catch-up-economies can be
analyzed with respect to their catch-up performance Three groups of Member States (MS)
were formed based on their initial gaps in per capita GDP to the EU-average (see figure 3 in
section 33) which also coincide rather strongly with geographical location The groups are
(1) the Baltic MS (Estonia Latvia and Lithuania) (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS (Poland Czech Republic Slovak Republic and Hungary) and (3) SE4 ie the
poorer than average MS of Southern Europe (Slovenia Greece Spain and Portugal)
The definition of absolute convergence states that poorer economies are suppose to grow at a
faster rate than richer ones however the yearly gap reduction in percent is expected to be
equal among the economies A necessary condition for absolute convergence is that the
poorer a country is at an initial stage the faster it should grow By assigning dummies for
11
these three groups and leaving the others as reference possible fixed growth effects for these
three groups can be distinguished In doing so the dummies will make variations in the size
of the intercept possible thus indicating whether a group of countries is converging faster or
slower than a reference point Thus the dummy coefficients in the model below indicate the
groupsrsquo deviation from the intercept of the reference group
iSSCCBBitRitit DDDyyy εαααβα +++++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog (32)
where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2 hellip n
and takes on the value one for the Baltic member states is one for the CEE4 and
is one for the SE4 The intercept of the reference group
BD CD SD
Rα indicates a ldquocorerdquo growth rate
and the dummy coefficients are the three groupsrsquo respective fixed deviation from this
intercept
32 The estimation results
The estimation of the equation outlined above gives results indicating that the Baltic group
has a somewhat higher speed of convergence relative the reference group The coefficients for
the other two groups are negative indicating a lower intercept and a lower speed of
convergence relative the reference group The fixed deviations are all insignificant at a five
percent significance level Thus a hypothesis stating that all the groups converge towards the
mean with equal speeds would not be rejected The group SE4 has a negative deviation from
the reference intercept which at the ten percent level would be weakly significant
Table 2
Least square estimation with group dummies dependent variable itit yy 1 loglog minusminus
Coefficient value Standard error t-Statistic
Rα 01607 00579 27744
β -00135 00058 -23440
Bα 00126 00145 08677
Cα -00083 00101 -08225
12
Sα -00098 00056 -17407
R2 of model is 03152 Source data Eurostat (2006)
Summing up the speeds of convergence for the three groups are at a conventional five
percent level neither significantly higher nor significantly lower than the reference grouprsquos
Yet the results do give a weak indication of faster convergence for the Baltic group than the
other two groups Of these two SE4 seems to converge marginally slower than CEE4
although the difference is small Below there will be a brief description of the growth
performances of the catch-up economies included in the three groups
33 A descriptive approach
Figure 3 below shows the total per capita GDP growth over the time period for the 11
countries below the average of EU259 The Baltic economies all doubled their per capita GDP
(Estonia was the most impressive with a growth close to 130 percent) The economies of
CEE4 grew by around 50 to 60 percent with the Czech Republic as a negative deviator The
economies of SE4 grew by around 40 percent with Slovenia deviating positively All of the
11 catch-up economies grew faster than the average of EU25 which had a positive change of
less than 13 percent between 1994 and 2005 Thus all 11 catch-up economies answered to the
theoretical expectations and actually caught-up and closed the gap to the average The
definition of absolute convergence said that the growth should be higher the lower the initial
level of GDP per capita From the figure below this more or less seems to have been the case
9 The average is weighted with respect to the sizes of the countries Thus a positive change in Germany affects the average more than an equal change in eg Sweden
13
Figure 3
Per capita GDP growth vs initial level
020406080
100120140
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
EU-25
Perc
ent
Period growth (1995-2005)Level in 1994 ( of EU-25)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
When talking about economic integration one has to distinguish between real and monetary
integration (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006) The former concerns real variables such as level of
output and allocation of production factors while the latter concerns the integration of
monetary systems and currencies eg the introduction of the Euro This paper focuses
exclusively on integration in real terms Further integration can take place at both macro and
micro levels States can force integration through macroeconomic decisions regarding trade
agreements and currency unions but at least as important for the integration process is the
behavior of firms and individuals Tools from microeconomic theory will be the basis of the
theoretical framework that is to be presented below
41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
A set of integration mechanisms which can function as driving forces behind convergence in
GDP levels will be presented below They are (1) internal accumulation of capital (ie
savings) (2) cross-border capital mobility (3) cross-border labor migration and (4) trade
They will be briefly illustrated with Edgeworth boxes and linked to how they affect per capita
GDP The mechanisms are derived from the neo-classical growth models presented by
14
Ramsey (1928) Solow (1956) and Koopmans (1965) and the standard production function of
the form
αα minus= 1
tttt LKAY with 10 ltltα (41)
where output Y for an exogenously given level of technology A depends on capital K and
labor L In the original model the savings rate is assumed to be exogenous and constant
Although K generally has been restricted to physical capital one may also think of it in a
broader sense comprising of physical capital and human capital (Mankiw Romer and Weil
1992) The main characteristics of this production function are constant returns to scale (since
the coefficients sum to 1) and diminishing marginal products of the production factors K and
L Hence imagining given levels of technology labor and savings rate additional capital
yields decreasing rates of return and growth rates This implies a steady state where capital
per worker k and output per worker y are constant
( kfy = )
)
(42)
The steady state output y is above all determined by the exogenously given level of
technology A which all economies are supposed to have free access to The assumption of
equal access to available technology or fast technological dispersion can be regarded as valid
for highly open economies with similar levels of education This may be expected for
advanced economies in general eg Western Europe but a critical issue is whether it can be
expanded to include the CEECs as well In the analysis section there will be a discussion of
how technological dispersion can function as a factor behind convergence but for the time
being the term indicating level of technology A is dropped Expression (41) can be rewritten
as
( LKfY = (43)
By dividing by total population N we get the following expression for per capita output
y = ( )NL
LLKf
NY
times= (44)
15
Thus output per capita depends on output per hour of labor (labor productivity) and hours of
labor to total population The latter can be further elaborated in order to take into account the
number of economically active (ie size of the labor force) and the size of the working age
population so that (44) becomes
( )N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKfy timestimestimes=
(45)
where LF is the size of the labor force and WA working age population GDP per capita now
depends on labor productivity hours of labor per economically active LLF the participation
rate LFWA and the size of the working age population to total population In order to
conveniently follow the changes in GDP per capita for a panel of countries the function is on
logarithmic scale and the subscripts i and t indicating country and year are added
( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tititi N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKf
y
lnlnln
lnln (46)
where ln yit ndash ln yit-1 is an approximation of the yearly growth in GDP per capita (for
relatively small changes in y) The mechanisms of economic integration will now be
presented They are illustrated with the well-known Edgeworth-box named after Francis
Ysidro Edgeworth A frequently used way of illustrating the integration process is otherwise
the Solow-diagram (see eg Baldwin 1989) However when comparing two or more
countries in a process of resource reallocation the Edgeworth-box serves as a more suitable
tool Finland and Estonia are used as a hypothetical example of how a richer economy with a
relatively higher degree of capital intensity in the production process can be integrated with a
poorer one with a relatively higher degree of labor intensity
The initial position with an allocation where Finnish production is more capital intensive than
the Estonian is shown below The interpretation is as follows labor increases in Finland
relative Estonia when L(Fin) moves to the right on the horizontal axis Capital in Finland
increases relative Estonia when K(Fin) moves upwards on the vertical axis Labor increases in
Estonia relative Finland when L(Est) moves to the left on the horizontal axis and capital
increases in Estonia relative Finland when K(Est) moves downwards The different
16
allocations between the countries are purely relative measures where K and L are in terms of
the otherrsquos disposal and the vertical and horizontal axis of the box symbolizes the aggregate
supply of the two factors in the region The capital intensity in Finland is K(Fin)L(Fin) and in
the proposed allocation below it is higher than in Estonia this since K(Fin)L(Fin) gt
K(Est)L(Est) Allocations along the diagonal line imply equal intensities and complete
integration in terms of factor prices and factor intensities
Figure 4
42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
In this case the level of output depends on savings rate productivity depreciation and
employment Only growth in productivity and employment rate can increase per capita
output given that the investment rate equals the rate of depreciation ie the economy is in
steady state If not in steady state the economy will grow as long as the marginal product of
capital yields an investment rate higher than the rate of depreciation However because of the
assumption of diminishing marginal returns to capital economies will over the phase of time
converge to the similar level given that they have matching production functions The figure
below shows a situation where Estonia by internal saving accumulates own capital up to its
steady state Thus the aggregate capital stock in the whole region grows (the box grows
upwards) the capital intensity in Estonia increases relative Finlandrsquos and there is convergence
between the two countries In the analysis of section 5 the impact of internal accumulation of
17
capital will be analyzed by comparing data on gross fixed capital formation stemming from
domestic sources
Figure 5
The constraint connected with the basic Solow model when studying integration and
convergence is that it treats the economy as closed Thus internal accumulation of capital can
only force absolute convergence if production functions are identical and the resulting
convergence speed will be low (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7) Economic integration
becomes more dynamic when allowing the factors of production to be internationally mobile
A theoretical situation in which borders are open better resembles the European reality and
results in new possibilities to efficiently allocate capital and labor
43 Integration through capital mobility
In the following sections the basic Solow model is extended to allow for cross border
reallocation of capital and labor Capital mobility in an enlarged economic area gives capital
owners the opportunity to reallocate their resources more efficiently This means intra-
regional reallocation (within the box) as well as a relative change in investments from non-EU
economies (from outside the box) Another difference compared to integration only through
internal accumulation is that the expected speed of convergence in this case is higher
(Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7)
18
One could consider the reallocation of capital to a less capital-rich economy as giving this
economy an ldquoinduced capital formation effectrdquo or ldquomedium-run growth bonusrdquo concepts
introduced by Baldwin (1989) This effect could be seen as an exogenous increase in the
investment rate in the relatively capital-poor country and vice versa in the capital-richer In
the original Solow-setting the investment rate equaled the savings rate and was assumed to be
constant From a welfare perspective this implied that citizens in order to invest more must
save more and consume less In the case where capital is reallocated across borders an
economy can enjoy increased investment activity without forgoing consumption
Figure 6
The figure above illustrates a situation in which capital is reallocated from the relatively
capital-richer Finland to the relatively capital-poorer Estonia This takes place since the
marginal returns to capital diminish and are higher in the relatively capital-poor economy
)()( kfL
LKFy == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the marginal returns to capital and
0)acuteacute()acute(lt=
partpart kf
kkf based on the law of diminishing returns
19
Thus the derivation of this integration mechanism as well as convergence theory in general
is highly dependent on the assumption of diminishing returns to capital This integration
mechanism will be analyzed by comparing inward foreign direct investments (FDI) in the
catch-up economies both as a share of GDP and as a share of gross fixed capital formation
This mechanism is expected to have a large impact on labor productivity thus decisive for
GDP growth and catch-up speed FDI affects labor productivity directly by increasing the
capital intensity in the production process but is also expected to augment the incorporation
of technology in the economy and therefore boost total factor productivity
44 Integration through migration
When borders are opened up for migration movement from poorer economies to richer ones is
expected according to the theory (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 chapter 8) In the capital-rich
economy the labor productivity and the wages are higher In the economy where capital is less
abundant labor productivity and wages are lower The wage asymmetry leads to net migration
from the capital-poor economy to the capital-rich Assuming perfect competition on the factor
markets the relationship between wages and capital intensity can be derived in the following
way
LFFw L partpart
equiv= is the wage
LLKFkfy )()( == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the unit cost of capital
kkfrk )acute(= is the per capita cost of capital in the economy which gives that
wkkfy =minus )`( since the per capita labor cost equals the average wage
By taking the derivative of the last expression with respect to k we get the effect on wages
when the capital intensity is increased
0)acuteacute( gtminus=partpart kkf
kw since facuteacute(k)lt 0
20
Less capital intensive production processes thus have a less productive labor force (the
marginal product of labor is lower) and lower wages other things equal If the assumptions
hold labor migration eg from Estonia to Finland lowers the wages in Finland (since the
capital intensity falls) and increases the wages in Estonia (because of increased capital
intensity) other things equal If overlooking externalities and changeover costs (and assuming
that the migrants are active laborers) the effect on GDP will be unambiguously positive in
Finland and negative in Estonia
Figure 7
In the figure above labor migrates from Estonia to Finland Capital intensity will increase in
Estonia given that to rapid capital depreciation not counteracts boosting convergence in
factor prices and labor productivity (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 8) Although this aspect
of economic integration unambiguously hampers convergence in GDP the effect on per
capita GDP is ambiguous The effect on convergence in per capita GDP depends on whether
the migrants were working in Estonia and if they find a job in Finland Other aspects eg
crowding out on the respective labor markets and the level of skills of the migrants are also
important to take into account but are beyond the scope of this paper Therefore the analysis
will be restricted to solely relate the expected (and most basic) effects from changes in
employment and population to the respective catch-up performances Other things equal
increases in hours of labor per economically active participation rate and the share of the
population in working age will have positive effects on per capita GDP while an increase in
21
total population will affect per capita GDP negatively Accordingly these variables will be
the basis of the analysis in section 5
45 Integration through trade
Cross-border trade and specialization can also function as a mechanism of integration causing
convergence Based on a set of assumptions it can be showed that countries can converge
through the prices of traded goods (and services) without the need for mobility of capital and
labor A fundamental concept is Ricardian trade and comparative advantages which shows
how trade leads to complete specialization in the production of goods (Ricardo 1821) In the
case with only two goods and two countries each country would end up supplying only the
good it produces the most efficiently and trade with each other Heckscher and Ohlin (1933)
and Samuelson (1948) has taken the concept further and shown that international trade gives
rise to factor price equalization through the goods markets given equal levels of technology
Figure 8
Factor price equalization takes place within a restricted area in which incomplete
specialization prevails However the countries keep producing both goods although they tend
to export the one which is produced more efficiently Thus convergence in factor prices can
be brought about without cross-border mobility of capital and labor given that the goods and
services are traded on an international market and that further specialization is possible What
22
factor price equalization does demand is that the factors of production are mobile between
sectors and industries If eg laborers are unwilling to switch sector or accept lower wages the
resulting effect will be unemployment Thus given that convergence of factor prices gives
rise to convergence in per capita output (this will be elaborated in section 54) the degree of
openness to trade will influence the catch-up performances I will analyze this relationship by
comparing data on trade integration (ie the average of imports and exports to GDP)
46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
Based on the outline above a number of important variables affecting growth in per capita
GDP and thus the convergence (or divergence) of economies can be listed The productivity
of labor is a crucial factor affecting the growth rate and the convergence trend If the
productivity of labor increases faster in a poorer economy than in a richer counterpart
convergence will be fostered other things equal Labor productivity is determined by total
factor productivity and the capital intensity in the production process The capital intensity
can be enhanced by internal accumulation of capital and foreign investments
Since the per capita GDP for a given size of the population depends positively on hours of
work per economically active an increase in this variable will boost convergence Holding the
other variables constant positive changes in the participation rate and the share of total
population in working age will affect GDP per capita positively Because of the per capita
approach total population will be negatively correlated with the speed of convergence when
holding the amount of work constant Based on the fourth integration mechanism it is also to
expect that the degree of openness to trade affects the speed of convergence A proxy for the
degree of openness is the economyrsquos trade integration of goods and services as a share of
GDP In the following section these variables (which are summarized in table 3 on the
following page) will be compared with the convergence performances of the catch-up
countries
Table 3
Summary of key variables affecting speed of convergence
23
Variable of interest Expected effect on per capita GDP and convergence speed other things equal
Technology Positive
Internal accumulation of capital Positive
Foreign direct investment Positive
Hours of work per economically active Positive
Participation rate Positive
Working age population Positive
Total population Negative
Trade integration Positive
5 Explaining catch-up performances
In the preceding section basic theory on economic integration and possible mechanisms
fostering convergence was outlined These mechanisms will now be related to the
performances of the catch-up economies that were briefly presented in section 3 The analysis
is based on descriptive statistics on the key variables presented above and their relation to
economic theory The grouping of the catch-up economies introduced in section 3 is applied
The three groups are (1) the Baltic Member States (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS and (3) SE4 ie the Southern European MS It was showed in section 3 that
the Baltic group had the lowest initial per capita GDPs and grew faster than CEE4 SE4 had
initial per capita GDPs closest to the average of EU25 and grew slower than CEE4
51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
On the basis of the production function the factors contributing to growth are labor
productivity and employment Labor productivity in turn is a broad concept which depends
on both available capital per worker ie the capital intensity and the way in which the factors
of production are exogenously turned into output ie level of technology or TFP Further the
amount of capital depends on internal capital formation and inward foreign direct
investments as well as the consumption of fixed capital ie capital depreciation Evolutions
in capital formation as well as level of technology are expected to be highly decisive for
growth in per capita GDP Firstly the average annual change in labor productivity and per
capita GDP are graphed against each other
24
Figure 9
Labor productivity vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
SpainAv
erag
e an
nual
cha
nge
(in
)
Per capita GDPLabor productivity
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As expected labor productivity and per capita GDP co-varies strongly Although the data is
rather convincing in stressing the importance of the broad concept of labor productivity to
growth and thus catch-up speed there are a few remarks to be done before this concept is to
be further elaborated From the bars above one can distinguish a pattern in which labor
productivity increases by more than per capita GDP for poorer economies and vice versa (the
higher the initial level of per capita GDP the farther to the right the country is located on the
x-axis) The extreme case seems to be Spain for which labor productivity played a relatively
unimportant role in explaining increases in per capita GDP Other comparatively rich nations
such as Greece Portugal and Slovenia also had lower impacts from labor productivity in
contrast to eg Estonia Lithuania and Poland Nevertheless the figures are (with the
exception of Spain) considerably higher than for the non-catching up economies and thus help
to explain convergence In the Euro area as an example the corresponding average annual
labor productivity growth was just one percent (Kaitala 2004)
52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
As it nearly seems to be an explain-it-all correlation between catch-up and labor productivity
the concept has to be further investigated In section 4 it was showed how internal savings and
cross-border reallocation of capital can deepen economic integration and foster convergence
Besides capital formation an important factor in the integration process is the dispersion and
25
incorporation of technology ie changes in TFP The evolution in TFP can be derived by
estimating the so-called Solow residual However this either demands access to reliable and
comparable capital stock data or own estimations of the respective capital stocks eg under
the perpetual inventory method Since there is a scarcity of comparable capital stock data for
the CEECs the alternative is own estimations This in turn would require baseline
benchmarks of capital-to-output ratios stocks of human capital etc and is beyond the scope
of this paper For the time being the focus will be on formation of physical capital although
some recent findings on dynamics in TFP will be reported
Figure 10
Annual gross fixed capital formation
05
10152025303540
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Perc
ent o
f GDP Baltic
CEE4SE4NCU
Source data Eurostat (2006)
In the figure above the evolution in annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a share of
GDP for the three groups and the non-catching up economies of EU25 (NCU) is graphed The
statistical aggregate of GFCF is a measure of the net new investment in the domestic economy
in fixed capital assets although not accounting for capital depreciation Obviously GFCF is
not a measure of total investment because all kinds of financial assets are excluded but is a
good indicator of the level of investment activity relevant for real variables such as output
The levels have been consistently high for all three groups of catch-up economies over the
time period As a contrast the investment level for the NCUs has been consistently below 20
percent of GDP for the time period When comparing the groups the most striking trend is the
consistent intensification of investment activity in the Baltic economies Although the general
26
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
weight to how far from the average observations are located The two measures have as an
example given contradictory estimates of global convergence from 1960 and onwards The
countries that were among the poorest in 1960 have not converged towards mean while the
countries above the poorest group have converged quite rapidly The result will in this case
depend on how you weight the countries with respect to their deviation from the mean
22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
Using the three measures of convergence outlined above a brief picture of whether absolute
convergence has taken place will now to be provided The observed period stretches from
1994 until 2005 and all but three of the EU25 countries are included The three small member
states Cyprus Malta and Luxembourg were for different reasons excluded from the analysis
As regards Cyprus and Malta the main reason was insufficient GDP data (comparable data
was only available from 1998 and onwards) Further these two Mediterranean economies
with dominant tourism and farming sectors can also not be expected to have much in common
with the other member states in terms of level and shape of production functions
Luxembourg is typically removed from analyses like these because of its economyrsquos
distinctive character In particular the per capita approach is because of the massive inward
commuting to Luxemburg meaningless to compare with that of the other member states
As the eight accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe went through rough transition
in the early 1990s with slumping production levels and fleeing populations the estimation
period was restricted to 1994-2005 although seemingly reliable data from around 1991 exist
for most them Latvia had for example a negative change in real GDP of about 31 percent in
1992 In Lithuania it fell by about 19 percent the same year In 1994 their respective
economies were about half the size of the estimated pre-transition levels Although the
transition itself as well as effects and counter-effects from it might have played an important
role also in the development after 1994 this choice of starting point seems to be consistent
with some sort of normalization in these economies Included data for the Western European
economies was also restricted to the period 1994-2005 in order to keep the panel balanced
Thus one has to keep in mind that the estimates do not account for the most intensive
transition period for the CEECs5 which most certainly affects the results6
5 CEECs refers to the eight rsquoCentral and Eastern European countriesrsquo of the EU ie the catch-up economies included in this paper less Greece Portugal and Spain
8
Table 1
Least square β-estimation dependent variable is itit yy 1 loglog minusminus
Coefficient value Standard error t-Statistic α 01757 00157 111711
β -01537 00017 -90545
R2 of model is 02562 Source data Eurostat (2006)
The results received from the estimation of the β-coefficient are shown in table 1 and indicate
that significant convergence in terms of per capita GDP has taken place in the region over the
studied time period The β-coefficient is estimated to -0015 corresponding to an annual
speed of convergence of about 15 percent7 This means that a member state on average
decreases the gap to the average level of per capita GDP in EU25 with 15 percent per year A
practical method of symbolizing what this means is to apply the half-life measure8 ie the
time necessary for an economy given an estimated convergence speed to close half of the
gap separating it from the average Assuming that the estimated convergence speed will be
consistent over the future it will take an economy 48 years to close half of the gap separating
it from the average A scatter plot and regression line showing the relationship between yearly
change in GDP per capita and the GDP per capita level the year before is graphed below
6 The data which this paper is based upon is exclusively collected from Eurostat (2006 see link in references) the EU statistics institution The GDP-data is in real terms (1995 Euros) Data on capital formation FDI trade etc are all in 1995 Euros Population labor force etc are measured at mid-year (first of July) in order to get more unbiased estimates when using the per capita measures 7 The speed of convergence is found by solving for λ in the equation β = eλt-1 where t in this case equals 1 8 The half-life measure is defined by ( ) ( )βτ +minus= 1ln2ln
9
Figure 1
Annual growth vs starting level
-004-002
000200400600801
012014016
7 75 8 85 9 95 10 105
GDP per capita the year before (logs)
Cha
nge
in G
DP
per c
apita
(log
s)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
The two measures of dispersion indicate that the dispersion in per capita GDP among the
studied economies has gradually fallen over time The trend in dispersion when using the
coefficient of variance c as well as the standard deviation of the log GDP per capita v are
presented in appendix 1 and shown graphically in figure 2 If the coefficient of variation is
applied the dispersion fell however only marginally (from 055 to 054 ie by about 2
percent) When using the v-measure the fall in dispersion was more significant Over the
period it changed from 099 to 084 a decrease of about 18 percent That the latter measure
gives a more significant proof of convergence is probably related to the fact that it puts
greater weight to observations with a large deviation from the mean (eg the Baltic states) and
that these economies have converged faster relative the ones closer to the mean
10
Figure 2
σ-convergence
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Disp
ersi
on in
per
cap
ita G
DPs
vc
v is the standard deviation of per capita GDPs in logs (equation 23) and c is the coefficient
of variance (eq 22)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
3 Are some catching up faster than others
31 An expanded β-model
The original equation used to estimate theβ -coefficient was of the following form
iititit yyy εβα ++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2hellip n (31)
By expanding this model with dummy variables groupings of catch-up-economies can be
analyzed with respect to their catch-up performance Three groups of Member States (MS)
were formed based on their initial gaps in per capita GDP to the EU-average (see figure 3 in
section 33) which also coincide rather strongly with geographical location The groups are
(1) the Baltic MS (Estonia Latvia and Lithuania) (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS (Poland Czech Republic Slovak Republic and Hungary) and (3) SE4 ie the
poorer than average MS of Southern Europe (Slovenia Greece Spain and Portugal)
The definition of absolute convergence states that poorer economies are suppose to grow at a
faster rate than richer ones however the yearly gap reduction in percent is expected to be
equal among the economies A necessary condition for absolute convergence is that the
poorer a country is at an initial stage the faster it should grow By assigning dummies for
11
these three groups and leaving the others as reference possible fixed growth effects for these
three groups can be distinguished In doing so the dummies will make variations in the size
of the intercept possible thus indicating whether a group of countries is converging faster or
slower than a reference point Thus the dummy coefficients in the model below indicate the
groupsrsquo deviation from the intercept of the reference group
iSSCCBBitRitit DDDyyy εαααβα +++++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog (32)
where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2 hellip n
and takes on the value one for the Baltic member states is one for the CEE4 and
is one for the SE4 The intercept of the reference group
BD CD SD
Rα indicates a ldquocorerdquo growth rate
and the dummy coefficients are the three groupsrsquo respective fixed deviation from this
intercept
32 The estimation results
The estimation of the equation outlined above gives results indicating that the Baltic group
has a somewhat higher speed of convergence relative the reference group The coefficients for
the other two groups are negative indicating a lower intercept and a lower speed of
convergence relative the reference group The fixed deviations are all insignificant at a five
percent significance level Thus a hypothesis stating that all the groups converge towards the
mean with equal speeds would not be rejected The group SE4 has a negative deviation from
the reference intercept which at the ten percent level would be weakly significant
Table 2
Least square estimation with group dummies dependent variable itit yy 1 loglog minusminus
Coefficient value Standard error t-Statistic
Rα 01607 00579 27744
β -00135 00058 -23440
Bα 00126 00145 08677
Cα -00083 00101 -08225
12
Sα -00098 00056 -17407
R2 of model is 03152 Source data Eurostat (2006)
Summing up the speeds of convergence for the three groups are at a conventional five
percent level neither significantly higher nor significantly lower than the reference grouprsquos
Yet the results do give a weak indication of faster convergence for the Baltic group than the
other two groups Of these two SE4 seems to converge marginally slower than CEE4
although the difference is small Below there will be a brief description of the growth
performances of the catch-up economies included in the three groups
33 A descriptive approach
Figure 3 below shows the total per capita GDP growth over the time period for the 11
countries below the average of EU259 The Baltic economies all doubled their per capita GDP
(Estonia was the most impressive with a growth close to 130 percent) The economies of
CEE4 grew by around 50 to 60 percent with the Czech Republic as a negative deviator The
economies of SE4 grew by around 40 percent with Slovenia deviating positively All of the
11 catch-up economies grew faster than the average of EU25 which had a positive change of
less than 13 percent between 1994 and 2005 Thus all 11 catch-up economies answered to the
theoretical expectations and actually caught-up and closed the gap to the average The
definition of absolute convergence said that the growth should be higher the lower the initial
level of GDP per capita From the figure below this more or less seems to have been the case
9 The average is weighted with respect to the sizes of the countries Thus a positive change in Germany affects the average more than an equal change in eg Sweden
13
Figure 3
Per capita GDP growth vs initial level
020406080
100120140
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
EU-25
Perc
ent
Period growth (1995-2005)Level in 1994 ( of EU-25)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
When talking about economic integration one has to distinguish between real and monetary
integration (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006) The former concerns real variables such as level of
output and allocation of production factors while the latter concerns the integration of
monetary systems and currencies eg the introduction of the Euro This paper focuses
exclusively on integration in real terms Further integration can take place at both macro and
micro levels States can force integration through macroeconomic decisions regarding trade
agreements and currency unions but at least as important for the integration process is the
behavior of firms and individuals Tools from microeconomic theory will be the basis of the
theoretical framework that is to be presented below
41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
A set of integration mechanisms which can function as driving forces behind convergence in
GDP levels will be presented below They are (1) internal accumulation of capital (ie
savings) (2) cross-border capital mobility (3) cross-border labor migration and (4) trade
They will be briefly illustrated with Edgeworth boxes and linked to how they affect per capita
GDP The mechanisms are derived from the neo-classical growth models presented by
14
Ramsey (1928) Solow (1956) and Koopmans (1965) and the standard production function of
the form
αα minus= 1
tttt LKAY with 10 ltltα (41)
where output Y for an exogenously given level of technology A depends on capital K and
labor L In the original model the savings rate is assumed to be exogenous and constant
Although K generally has been restricted to physical capital one may also think of it in a
broader sense comprising of physical capital and human capital (Mankiw Romer and Weil
1992) The main characteristics of this production function are constant returns to scale (since
the coefficients sum to 1) and diminishing marginal products of the production factors K and
L Hence imagining given levels of technology labor and savings rate additional capital
yields decreasing rates of return and growth rates This implies a steady state where capital
per worker k and output per worker y are constant
( kfy = )
)
(42)
The steady state output y is above all determined by the exogenously given level of
technology A which all economies are supposed to have free access to The assumption of
equal access to available technology or fast technological dispersion can be regarded as valid
for highly open economies with similar levels of education This may be expected for
advanced economies in general eg Western Europe but a critical issue is whether it can be
expanded to include the CEECs as well In the analysis section there will be a discussion of
how technological dispersion can function as a factor behind convergence but for the time
being the term indicating level of technology A is dropped Expression (41) can be rewritten
as
( LKfY = (43)
By dividing by total population N we get the following expression for per capita output
y = ( )NL
LLKf
NY
times= (44)
15
Thus output per capita depends on output per hour of labor (labor productivity) and hours of
labor to total population The latter can be further elaborated in order to take into account the
number of economically active (ie size of the labor force) and the size of the working age
population so that (44) becomes
( )N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKfy timestimestimes=
(45)
where LF is the size of the labor force and WA working age population GDP per capita now
depends on labor productivity hours of labor per economically active LLF the participation
rate LFWA and the size of the working age population to total population In order to
conveniently follow the changes in GDP per capita for a panel of countries the function is on
logarithmic scale and the subscripts i and t indicating country and year are added
( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tititi N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKf
y
lnlnln
lnln (46)
where ln yit ndash ln yit-1 is an approximation of the yearly growth in GDP per capita (for
relatively small changes in y) The mechanisms of economic integration will now be
presented They are illustrated with the well-known Edgeworth-box named after Francis
Ysidro Edgeworth A frequently used way of illustrating the integration process is otherwise
the Solow-diagram (see eg Baldwin 1989) However when comparing two or more
countries in a process of resource reallocation the Edgeworth-box serves as a more suitable
tool Finland and Estonia are used as a hypothetical example of how a richer economy with a
relatively higher degree of capital intensity in the production process can be integrated with a
poorer one with a relatively higher degree of labor intensity
The initial position with an allocation where Finnish production is more capital intensive than
the Estonian is shown below The interpretation is as follows labor increases in Finland
relative Estonia when L(Fin) moves to the right on the horizontal axis Capital in Finland
increases relative Estonia when K(Fin) moves upwards on the vertical axis Labor increases in
Estonia relative Finland when L(Est) moves to the left on the horizontal axis and capital
increases in Estonia relative Finland when K(Est) moves downwards The different
16
allocations between the countries are purely relative measures where K and L are in terms of
the otherrsquos disposal and the vertical and horizontal axis of the box symbolizes the aggregate
supply of the two factors in the region The capital intensity in Finland is K(Fin)L(Fin) and in
the proposed allocation below it is higher than in Estonia this since K(Fin)L(Fin) gt
K(Est)L(Est) Allocations along the diagonal line imply equal intensities and complete
integration in terms of factor prices and factor intensities
Figure 4
42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
In this case the level of output depends on savings rate productivity depreciation and
employment Only growth in productivity and employment rate can increase per capita
output given that the investment rate equals the rate of depreciation ie the economy is in
steady state If not in steady state the economy will grow as long as the marginal product of
capital yields an investment rate higher than the rate of depreciation However because of the
assumption of diminishing marginal returns to capital economies will over the phase of time
converge to the similar level given that they have matching production functions The figure
below shows a situation where Estonia by internal saving accumulates own capital up to its
steady state Thus the aggregate capital stock in the whole region grows (the box grows
upwards) the capital intensity in Estonia increases relative Finlandrsquos and there is convergence
between the two countries In the analysis of section 5 the impact of internal accumulation of
17
capital will be analyzed by comparing data on gross fixed capital formation stemming from
domestic sources
Figure 5
The constraint connected with the basic Solow model when studying integration and
convergence is that it treats the economy as closed Thus internal accumulation of capital can
only force absolute convergence if production functions are identical and the resulting
convergence speed will be low (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7) Economic integration
becomes more dynamic when allowing the factors of production to be internationally mobile
A theoretical situation in which borders are open better resembles the European reality and
results in new possibilities to efficiently allocate capital and labor
43 Integration through capital mobility
In the following sections the basic Solow model is extended to allow for cross border
reallocation of capital and labor Capital mobility in an enlarged economic area gives capital
owners the opportunity to reallocate their resources more efficiently This means intra-
regional reallocation (within the box) as well as a relative change in investments from non-EU
economies (from outside the box) Another difference compared to integration only through
internal accumulation is that the expected speed of convergence in this case is higher
(Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7)
18
One could consider the reallocation of capital to a less capital-rich economy as giving this
economy an ldquoinduced capital formation effectrdquo or ldquomedium-run growth bonusrdquo concepts
introduced by Baldwin (1989) This effect could be seen as an exogenous increase in the
investment rate in the relatively capital-poor country and vice versa in the capital-richer In
the original Solow-setting the investment rate equaled the savings rate and was assumed to be
constant From a welfare perspective this implied that citizens in order to invest more must
save more and consume less In the case where capital is reallocated across borders an
economy can enjoy increased investment activity without forgoing consumption
Figure 6
The figure above illustrates a situation in which capital is reallocated from the relatively
capital-richer Finland to the relatively capital-poorer Estonia This takes place since the
marginal returns to capital diminish and are higher in the relatively capital-poor economy
)()( kfL
LKFy == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the marginal returns to capital and
0)acuteacute()acute(lt=
partpart kf
kkf based on the law of diminishing returns
19
Thus the derivation of this integration mechanism as well as convergence theory in general
is highly dependent on the assumption of diminishing returns to capital This integration
mechanism will be analyzed by comparing inward foreign direct investments (FDI) in the
catch-up economies both as a share of GDP and as a share of gross fixed capital formation
This mechanism is expected to have a large impact on labor productivity thus decisive for
GDP growth and catch-up speed FDI affects labor productivity directly by increasing the
capital intensity in the production process but is also expected to augment the incorporation
of technology in the economy and therefore boost total factor productivity
44 Integration through migration
When borders are opened up for migration movement from poorer economies to richer ones is
expected according to the theory (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 chapter 8) In the capital-rich
economy the labor productivity and the wages are higher In the economy where capital is less
abundant labor productivity and wages are lower The wage asymmetry leads to net migration
from the capital-poor economy to the capital-rich Assuming perfect competition on the factor
markets the relationship between wages and capital intensity can be derived in the following
way
LFFw L partpart
equiv= is the wage
LLKFkfy )()( == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the unit cost of capital
kkfrk )acute(= is the per capita cost of capital in the economy which gives that
wkkfy =minus )`( since the per capita labor cost equals the average wage
By taking the derivative of the last expression with respect to k we get the effect on wages
when the capital intensity is increased
0)acuteacute( gtminus=partpart kkf
kw since facuteacute(k)lt 0
20
Less capital intensive production processes thus have a less productive labor force (the
marginal product of labor is lower) and lower wages other things equal If the assumptions
hold labor migration eg from Estonia to Finland lowers the wages in Finland (since the
capital intensity falls) and increases the wages in Estonia (because of increased capital
intensity) other things equal If overlooking externalities and changeover costs (and assuming
that the migrants are active laborers) the effect on GDP will be unambiguously positive in
Finland and negative in Estonia
Figure 7
In the figure above labor migrates from Estonia to Finland Capital intensity will increase in
Estonia given that to rapid capital depreciation not counteracts boosting convergence in
factor prices and labor productivity (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 8) Although this aspect
of economic integration unambiguously hampers convergence in GDP the effect on per
capita GDP is ambiguous The effect on convergence in per capita GDP depends on whether
the migrants were working in Estonia and if they find a job in Finland Other aspects eg
crowding out on the respective labor markets and the level of skills of the migrants are also
important to take into account but are beyond the scope of this paper Therefore the analysis
will be restricted to solely relate the expected (and most basic) effects from changes in
employment and population to the respective catch-up performances Other things equal
increases in hours of labor per economically active participation rate and the share of the
population in working age will have positive effects on per capita GDP while an increase in
21
total population will affect per capita GDP negatively Accordingly these variables will be
the basis of the analysis in section 5
45 Integration through trade
Cross-border trade and specialization can also function as a mechanism of integration causing
convergence Based on a set of assumptions it can be showed that countries can converge
through the prices of traded goods (and services) without the need for mobility of capital and
labor A fundamental concept is Ricardian trade and comparative advantages which shows
how trade leads to complete specialization in the production of goods (Ricardo 1821) In the
case with only two goods and two countries each country would end up supplying only the
good it produces the most efficiently and trade with each other Heckscher and Ohlin (1933)
and Samuelson (1948) has taken the concept further and shown that international trade gives
rise to factor price equalization through the goods markets given equal levels of technology
Figure 8
Factor price equalization takes place within a restricted area in which incomplete
specialization prevails However the countries keep producing both goods although they tend
to export the one which is produced more efficiently Thus convergence in factor prices can
be brought about without cross-border mobility of capital and labor given that the goods and
services are traded on an international market and that further specialization is possible What
22
factor price equalization does demand is that the factors of production are mobile between
sectors and industries If eg laborers are unwilling to switch sector or accept lower wages the
resulting effect will be unemployment Thus given that convergence of factor prices gives
rise to convergence in per capita output (this will be elaborated in section 54) the degree of
openness to trade will influence the catch-up performances I will analyze this relationship by
comparing data on trade integration (ie the average of imports and exports to GDP)
46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
Based on the outline above a number of important variables affecting growth in per capita
GDP and thus the convergence (or divergence) of economies can be listed The productivity
of labor is a crucial factor affecting the growth rate and the convergence trend If the
productivity of labor increases faster in a poorer economy than in a richer counterpart
convergence will be fostered other things equal Labor productivity is determined by total
factor productivity and the capital intensity in the production process The capital intensity
can be enhanced by internal accumulation of capital and foreign investments
Since the per capita GDP for a given size of the population depends positively on hours of
work per economically active an increase in this variable will boost convergence Holding the
other variables constant positive changes in the participation rate and the share of total
population in working age will affect GDP per capita positively Because of the per capita
approach total population will be negatively correlated with the speed of convergence when
holding the amount of work constant Based on the fourth integration mechanism it is also to
expect that the degree of openness to trade affects the speed of convergence A proxy for the
degree of openness is the economyrsquos trade integration of goods and services as a share of
GDP In the following section these variables (which are summarized in table 3 on the
following page) will be compared with the convergence performances of the catch-up
countries
Table 3
Summary of key variables affecting speed of convergence
23
Variable of interest Expected effect on per capita GDP and convergence speed other things equal
Technology Positive
Internal accumulation of capital Positive
Foreign direct investment Positive
Hours of work per economically active Positive
Participation rate Positive
Working age population Positive
Total population Negative
Trade integration Positive
5 Explaining catch-up performances
In the preceding section basic theory on economic integration and possible mechanisms
fostering convergence was outlined These mechanisms will now be related to the
performances of the catch-up economies that were briefly presented in section 3 The analysis
is based on descriptive statistics on the key variables presented above and their relation to
economic theory The grouping of the catch-up economies introduced in section 3 is applied
The three groups are (1) the Baltic Member States (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS and (3) SE4 ie the Southern European MS It was showed in section 3 that
the Baltic group had the lowest initial per capita GDPs and grew faster than CEE4 SE4 had
initial per capita GDPs closest to the average of EU25 and grew slower than CEE4
51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
On the basis of the production function the factors contributing to growth are labor
productivity and employment Labor productivity in turn is a broad concept which depends
on both available capital per worker ie the capital intensity and the way in which the factors
of production are exogenously turned into output ie level of technology or TFP Further the
amount of capital depends on internal capital formation and inward foreign direct
investments as well as the consumption of fixed capital ie capital depreciation Evolutions
in capital formation as well as level of technology are expected to be highly decisive for
growth in per capita GDP Firstly the average annual change in labor productivity and per
capita GDP are graphed against each other
24
Figure 9
Labor productivity vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
SpainAv
erag
e an
nual
cha
nge
(in
)
Per capita GDPLabor productivity
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As expected labor productivity and per capita GDP co-varies strongly Although the data is
rather convincing in stressing the importance of the broad concept of labor productivity to
growth and thus catch-up speed there are a few remarks to be done before this concept is to
be further elaborated From the bars above one can distinguish a pattern in which labor
productivity increases by more than per capita GDP for poorer economies and vice versa (the
higher the initial level of per capita GDP the farther to the right the country is located on the
x-axis) The extreme case seems to be Spain for which labor productivity played a relatively
unimportant role in explaining increases in per capita GDP Other comparatively rich nations
such as Greece Portugal and Slovenia also had lower impacts from labor productivity in
contrast to eg Estonia Lithuania and Poland Nevertheless the figures are (with the
exception of Spain) considerably higher than for the non-catching up economies and thus help
to explain convergence In the Euro area as an example the corresponding average annual
labor productivity growth was just one percent (Kaitala 2004)
52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
As it nearly seems to be an explain-it-all correlation between catch-up and labor productivity
the concept has to be further investigated In section 4 it was showed how internal savings and
cross-border reallocation of capital can deepen economic integration and foster convergence
Besides capital formation an important factor in the integration process is the dispersion and
25
incorporation of technology ie changes in TFP The evolution in TFP can be derived by
estimating the so-called Solow residual However this either demands access to reliable and
comparable capital stock data or own estimations of the respective capital stocks eg under
the perpetual inventory method Since there is a scarcity of comparable capital stock data for
the CEECs the alternative is own estimations This in turn would require baseline
benchmarks of capital-to-output ratios stocks of human capital etc and is beyond the scope
of this paper For the time being the focus will be on formation of physical capital although
some recent findings on dynamics in TFP will be reported
Figure 10
Annual gross fixed capital formation
05
10152025303540
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Perc
ent o
f GDP Baltic
CEE4SE4NCU
Source data Eurostat (2006)
In the figure above the evolution in annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a share of
GDP for the three groups and the non-catching up economies of EU25 (NCU) is graphed The
statistical aggregate of GFCF is a measure of the net new investment in the domestic economy
in fixed capital assets although not accounting for capital depreciation Obviously GFCF is
not a measure of total investment because all kinds of financial assets are excluded but is a
good indicator of the level of investment activity relevant for real variables such as output
The levels have been consistently high for all three groups of catch-up economies over the
time period As a contrast the investment level for the NCUs has been consistently below 20
percent of GDP for the time period When comparing the groups the most striking trend is the
consistent intensification of investment activity in the Baltic economies Although the general
26
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
Table 1
Least square β-estimation dependent variable is itit yy 1 loglog minusminus
Coefficient value Standard error t-Statistic α 01757 00157 111711
β -01537 00017 -90545
R2 of model is 02562 Source data Eurostat (2006)
The results received from the estimation of the β-coefficient are shown in table 1 and indicate
that significant convergence in terms of per capita GDP has taken place in the region over the
studied time period The β-coefficient is estimated to -0015 corresponding to an annual
speed of convergence of about 15 percent7 This means that a member state on average
decreases the gap to the average level of per capita GDP in EU25 with 15 percent per year A
practical method of symbolizing what this means is to apply the half-life measure8 ie the
time necessary for an economy given an estimated convergence speed to close half of the
gap separating it from the average Assuming that the estimated convergence speed will be
consistent over the future it will take an economy 48 years to close half of the gap separating
it from the average A scatter plot and regression line showing the relationship between yearly
change in GDP per capita and the GDP per capita level the year before is graphed below
6 The data which this paper is based upon is exclusively collected from Eurostat (2006 see link in references) the EU statistics institution The GDP-data is in real terms (1995 Euros) Data on capital formation FDI trade etc are all in 1995 Euros Population labor force etc are measured at mid-year (first of July) in order to get more unbiased estimates when using the per capita measures 7 The speed of convergence is found by solving for λ in the equation β = eλt-1 where t in this case equals 1 8 The half-life measure is defined by ( ) ( )βτ +minus= 1ln2ln
9
Figure 1
Annual growth vs starting level
-004-002
000200400600801
012014016
7 75 8 85 9 95 10 105
GDP per capita the year before (logs)
Cha
nge
in G
DP
per c
apita
(log
s)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
The two measures of dispersion indicate that the dispersion in per capita GDP among the
studied economies has gradually fallen over time The trend in dispersion when using the
coefficient of variance c as well as the standard deviation of the log GDP per capita v are
presented in appendix 1 and shown graphically in figure 2 If the coefficient of variation is
applied the dispersion fell however only marginally (from 055 to 054 ie by about 2
percent) When using the v-measure the fall in dispersion was more significant Over the
period it changed from 099 to 084 a decrease of about 18 percent That the latter measure
gives a more significant proof of convergence is probably related to the fact that it puts
greater weight to observations with a large deviation from the mean (eg the Baltic states) and
that these economies have converged faster relative the ones closer to the mean
10
Figure 2
σ-convergence
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Disp
ersi
on in
per
cap
ita G
DPs
vc
v is the standard deviation of per capita GDPs in logs (equation 23) and c is the coefficient
of variance (eq 22)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
3 Are some catching up faster than others
31 An expanded β-model
The original equation used to estimate theβ -coefficient was of the following form
iititit yyy εβα ++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2hellip n (31)
By expanding this model with dummy variables groupings of catch-up-economies can be
analyzed with respect to their catch-up performance Three groups of Member States (MS)
were formed based on their initial gaps in per capita GDP to the EU-average (see figure 3 in
section 33) which also coincide rather strongly with geographical location The groups are
(1) the Baltic MS (Estonia Latvia and Lithuania) (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS (Poland Czech Republic Slovak Republic and Hungary) and (3) SE4 ie the
poorer than average MS of Southern Europe (Slovenia Greece Spain and Portugal)
The definition of absolute convergence states that poorer economies are suppose to grow at a
faster rate than richer ones however the yearly gap reduction in percent is expected to be
equal among the economies A necessary condition for absolute convergence is that the
poorer a country is at an initial stage the faster it should grow By assigning dummies for
11
these three groups and leaving the others as reference possible fixed growth effects for these
three groups can be distinguished In doing so the dummies will make variations in the size
of the intercept possible thus indicating whether a group of countries is converging faster or
slower than a reference point Thus the dummy coefficients in the model below indicate the
groupsrsquo deviation from the intercept of the reference group
iSSCCBBitRitit DDDyyy εαααβα +++++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog (32)
where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2 hellip n
and takes on the value one for the Baltic member states is one for the CEE4 and
is one for the SE4 The intercept of the reference group
BD CD SD
Rα indicates a ldquocorerdquo growth rate
and the dummy coefficients are the three groupsrsquo respective fixed deviation from this
intercept
32 The estimation results
The estimation of the equation outlined above gives results indicating that the Baltic group
has a somewhat higher speed of convergence relative the reference group The coefficients for
the other two groups are negative indicating a lower intercept and a lower speed of
convergence relative the reference group The fixed deviations are all insignificant at a five
percent significance level Thus a hypothesis stating that all the groups converge towards the
mean with equal speeds would not be rejected The group SE4 has a negative deviation from
the reference intercept which at the ten percent level would be weakly significant
Table 2
Least square estimation with group dummies dependent variable itit yy 1 loglog minusminus
Coefficient value Standard error t-Statistic
Rα 01607 00579 27744
β -00135 00058 -23440
Bα 00126 00145 08677
Cα -00083 00101 -08225
12
Sα -00098 00056 -17407
R2 of model is 03152 Source data Eurostat (2006)
Summing up the speeds of convergence for the three groups are at a conventional five
percent level neither significantly higher nor significantly lower than the reference grouprsquos
Yet the results do give a weak indication of faster convergence for the Baltic group than the
other two groups Of these two SE4 seems to converge marginally slower than CEE4
although the difference is small Below there will be a brief description of the growth
performances of the catch-up economies included in the three groups
33 A descriptive approach
Figure 3 below shows the total per capita GDP growth over the time period for the 11
countries below the average of EU259 The Baltic economies all doubled their per capita GDP
(Estonia was the most impressive with a growth close to 130 percent) The economies of
CEE4 grew by around 50 to 60 percent with the Czech Republic as a negative deviator The
economies of SE4 grew by around 40 percent with Slovenia deviating positively All of the
11 catch-up economies grew faster than the average of EU25 which had a positive change of
less than 13 percent between 1994 and 2005 Thus all 11 catch-up economies answered to the
theoretical expectations and actually caught-up and closed the gap to the average The
definition of absolute convergence said that the growth should be higher the lower the initial
level of GDP per capita From the figure below this more or less seems to have been the case
9 The average is weighted with respect to the sizes of the countries Thus a positive change in Germany affects the average more than an equal change in eg Sweden
13
Figure 3
Per capita GDP growth vs initial level
020406080
100120140
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
EU-25
Perc
ent
Period growth (1995-2005)Level in 1994 ( of EU-25)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
When talking about economic integration one has to distinguish between real and monetary
integration (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006) The former concerns real variables such as level of
output and allocation of production factors while the latter concerns the integration of
monetary systems and currencies eg the introduction of the Euro This paper focuses
exclusively on integration in real terms Further integration can take place at both macro and
micro levels States can force integration through macroeconomic decisions regarding trade
agreements and currency unions but at least as important for the integration process is the
behavior of firms and individuals Tools from microeconomic theory will be the basis of the
theoretical framework that is to be presented below
41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
A set of integration mechanisms which can function as driving forces behind convergence in
GDP levels will be presented below They are (1) internal accumulation of capital (ie
savings) (2) cross-border capital mobility (3) cross-border labor migration and (4) trade
They will be briefly illustrated with Edgeworth boxes and linked to how they affect per capita
GDP The mechanisms are derived from the neo-classical growth models presented by
14
Ramsey (1928) Solow (1956) and Koopmans (1965) and the standard production function of
the form
αα minus= 1
tttt LKAY with 10 ltltα (41)
where output Y for an exogenously given level of technology A depends on capital K and
labor L In the original model the savings rate is assumed to be exogenous and constant
Although K generally has been restricted to physical capital one may also think of it in a
broader sense comprising of physical capital and human capital (Mankiw Romer and Weil
1992) The main characteristics of this production function are constant returns to scale (since
the coefficients sum to 1) and diminishing marginal products of the production factors K and
L Hence imagining given levels of technology labor and savings rate additional capital
yields decreasing rates of return and growth rates This implies a steady state where capital
per worker k and output per worker y are constant
( kfy = )
)
(42)
The steady state output y is above all determined by the exogenously given level of
technology A which all economies are supposed to have free access to The assumption of
equal access to available technology or fast technological dispersion can be regarded as valid
for highly open economies with similar levels of education This may be expected for
advanced economies in general eg Western Europe but a critical issue is whether it can be
expanded to include the CEECs as well In the analysis section there will be a discussion of
how technological dispersion can function as a factor behind convergence but for the time
being the term indicating level of technology A is dropped Expression (41) can be rewritten
as
( LKfY = (43)
By dividing by total population N we get the following expression for per capita output
y = ( )NL
LLKf
NY
times= (44)
15
Thus output per capita depends on output per hour of labor (labor productivity) and hours of
labor to total population The latter can be further elaborated in order to take into account the
number of economically active (ie size of the labor force) and the size of the working age
population so that (44) becomes
( )N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKfy timestimestimes=
(45)
where LF is the size of the labor force and WA working age population GDP per capita now
depends on labor productivity hours of labor per economically active LLF the participation
rate LFWA and the size of the working age population to total population In order to
conveniently follow the changes in GDP per capita for a panel of countries the function is on
logarithmic scale and the subscripts i and t indicating country and year are added
( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tititi N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKf
y
lnlnln
lnln (46)
where ln yit ndash ln yit-1 is an approximation of the yearly growth in GDP per capita (for
relatively small changes in y) The mechanisms of economic integration will now be
presented They are illustrated with the well-known Edgeworth-box named after Francis
Ysidro Edgeworth A frequently used way of illustrating the integration process is otherwise
the Solow-diagram (see eg Baldwin 1989) However when comparing two or more
countries in a process of resource reallocation the Edgeworth-box serves as a more suitable
tool Finland and Estonia are used as a hypothetical example of how a richer economy with a
relatively higher degree of capital intensity in the production process can be integrated with a
poorer one with a relatively higher degree of labor intensity
The initial position with an allocation where Finnish production is more capital intensive than
the Estonian is shown below The interpretation is as follows labor increases in Finland
relative Estonia when L(Fin) moves to the right on the horizontal axis Capital in Finland
increases relative Estonia when K(Fin) moves upwards on the vertical axis Labor increases in
Estonia relative Finland when L(Est) moves to the left on the horizontal axis and capital
increases in Estonia relative Finland when K(Est) moves downwards The different
16
allocations between the countries are purely relative measures where K and L are in terms of
the otherrsquos disposal and the vertical and horizontal axis of the box symbolizes the aggregate
supply of the two factors in the region The capital intensity in Finland is K(Fin)L(Fin) and in
the proposed allocation below it is higher than in Estonia this since K(Fin)L(Fin) gt
K(Est)L(Est) Allocations along the diagonal line imply equal intensities and complete
integration in terms of factor prices and factor intensities
Figure 4
42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
In this case the level of output depends on savings rate productivity depreciation and
employment Only growth in productivity and employment rate can increase per capita
output given that the investment rate equals the rate of depreciation ie the economy is in
steady state If not in steady state the economy will grow as long as the marginal product of
capital yields an investment rate higher than the rate of depreciation However because of the
assumption of diminishing marginal returns to capital economies will over the phase of time
converge to the similar level given that they have matching production functions The figure
below shows a situation where Estonia by internal saving accumulates own capital up to its
steady state Thus the aggregate capital stock in the whole region grows (the box grows
upwards) the capital intensity in Estonia increases relative Finlandrsquos and there is convergence
between the two countries In the analysis of section 5 the impact of internal accumulation of
17
capital will be analyzed by comparing data on gross fixed capital formation stemming from
domestic sources
Figure 5
The constraint connected with the basic Solow model when studying integration and
convergence is that it treats the economy as closed Thus internal accumulation of capital can
only force absolute convergence if production functions are identical and the resulting
convergence speed will be low (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7) Economic integration
becomes more dynamic when allowing the factors of production to be internationally mobile
A theoretical situation in which borders are open better resembles the European reality and
results in new possibilities to efficiently allocate capital and labor
43 Integration through capital mobility
In the following sections the basic Solow model is extended to allow for cross border
reallocation of capital and labor Capital mobility in an enlarged economic area gives capital
owners the opportunity to reallocate their resources more efficiently This means intra-
regional reallocation (within the box) as well as a relative change in investments from non-EU
economies (from outside the box) Another difference compared to integration only through
internal accumulation is that the expected speed of convergence in this case is higher
(Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7)
18
One could consider the reallocation of capital to a less capital-rich economy as giving this
economy an ldquoinduced capital formation effectrdquo or ldquomedium-run growth bonusrdquo concepts
introduced by Baldwin (1989) This effect could be seen as an exogenous increase in the
investment rate in the relatively capital-poor country and vice versa in the capital-richer In
the original Solow-setting the investment rate equaled the savings rate and was assumed to be
constant From a welfare perspective this implied that citizens in order to invest more must
save more and consume less In the case where capital is reallocated across borders an
economy can enjoy increased investment activity without forgoing consumption
Figure 6
The figure above illustrates a situation in which capital is reallocated from the relatively
capital-richer Finland to the relatively capital-poorer Estonia This takes place since the
marginal returns to capital diminish and are higher in the relatively capital-poor economy
)()( kfL
LKFy == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the marginal returns to capital and
0)acuteacute()acute(lt=
partpart kf
kkf based on the law of diminishing returns
19
Thus the derivation of this integration mechanism as well as convergence theory in general
is highly dependent on the assumption of diminishing returns to capital This integration
mechanism will be analyzed by comparing inward foreign direct investments (FDI) in the
catch-up economies both as a share of GDP and as a share of gross fixed capital formation
This mechanism is expected to have a large impact on labor productivity thus decisive for
GDP growth and catch-up speed FDI affects labor productivity directly by increasing the
capital intensity in the production process but is also expected to augment the incorporation
of technology in the economy and therefore boost total factor productivity
44 Integration through migration
When borders are opened up for migration movement from poorer economies to richer ones is
expected according to the theory (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 chapter 8) In the capital-rich
economy the labor productivity and the wages are higher In the economy where capital is less
abundant labor productivity and wages are lower The wage asymmetry leads to net migration
from the capital-poor economy to the capital-rich Assuming perfect competition on the factor
markets the relationship between wages and capital intensity can be derived in the following
way
LFFw L partpart
equiv= is the wage
LLKFkfy )()( == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the unit cost of capital
kkfrk )acute(= is the per capita cost of capital in the economy which gives that
wkkfy =minus )`( since the per capita labor cost equals the average wage
By taking the derivative of the last expression with respect to k we get the effect on wages
when the capital intensity is increased
0)acuteacute( gtminus=partpart kkf
kw since facuteacute(k)lt 0
20
Less capital intensive production processes thus have a less productive labor force (the
marginal product of labor is lower) and lower wages other things equal If the assumptions
hold labor migration eg from Estonia to Finland lowers the wages in Finland (since the
capital intensity falls) and increases the wages in Estonia (because of increased capital
intensity) other things equal If overlooking externalities and changeover costs (and assuming
that the migrants are active laborers) the effect on GDP will be unambiguously positive in
Finland and negative in Estonia
Figure 7
In the figure above labor migrates from Estonia to Finland Capital intensity will increase in
Estonia given that to rapid capital depreciation not counteracts boosting convergence in
factor prices and labor productivity (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 8) Although this aspect
of economic integration unambiguously hampers convergence in GDP the effect on per
capita GDP is ambiguous The effect on convergence in per capita GDP depends on whether
the migrants were working in Estonia and if they find a job in Finland Other aspects eg
crowding out on the respective labor markets and the level of skills of the migrants are also
important to take into account but are beyond the scope of this paper Therefore the analysis
will be restricted to solely relate the expected (and most basic) effects from changes in
employment and population to the respective catch-up performances Other things equal
increases in hours of labor per economically active participation rate and the share of the
population in working age will have positive effects on per capita GDP while an increase in
21
total population will affect per capita GDP negatively Accordingly these variables will be
the basis of the analysis in section 5
45 Integration through trade
Cross-border trade and specialization can also function as a mechanism of integration causing
convergence Based on a set of assumptions it can be showed that countries can converge
through the prices of traded goods (and services) without the need for mobility of capital and
labor A fundamental concept is Ricardian trade and comparative advantages which shows
how trade leads to complete specialization in the production of goods (Ricardo 1821) In the
case with only two goods and two countries each country would end up supplying only the
good it produces the most efficiently and trade with each other Heckscher and Ohlin (1933)
and Samuelson (1948) has taken the concept further and shown that international trade gives
rise to factor price equalization through the goods markets given equal levels of technology
Figure 8
Factor price equalization takes place within a restricted area in which incomplete
specialization prevails However the countries keep producing both goods although they tend
to export the one which is produced more efficiently Thus convergence in factor prices can
be brought about without cross-border mobility of capital and labor given that the goods and
services are traded on an international market and that further specialization is possible What
22
factor price equalization does demand is that the factors of production are mobile between
sectors and industries If eg laborers are unwilling to switch sector or accept lower wages the
resulting effect will be unemployment Thus given that convergence of factor prices gives
rise to convergence in per capita output (this will be elaborated in section 54) the degree of
openness to trade will influence the catch-up performances I will analyze this relationship by
comparing data on trade integration (ie the average of imports and exports to GDP)
46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
Based on the outline above a number of important variables affecting growth in per capita
GDP and thus the convergence (or divergence) of economies can be listed The productivity
of labor is a crucial factor affecting the growth rate and the convergence trend If the
productivity of labor increases faster in a poorer economy than in a richer counterpart
convergence will be fostered other things equal Labor productivity is determined by total
factor productivity and the capital intensity in the production process The capital intensity
can be enhanced by internal accumulation of capital and foreign investments
Since the per capita GDP for a given size of the population depends positively on hours of
work per economically active an increase in this variable will boost convergence Holding the
other variables constant positive changes in the participation rate and the share of total
population in working age will affect GDP per capita positively Because of the per capita
approach total population will be negatively correlated with the speed of convergence when
holding the amount of work constant Based on the fourth integration mechanism it is also to
expect that the degree of openness to trade affects the speed of convergence A proxy for the
degree of openness is the economyrsquos trade integration of goods and services as a share of
GDP In the following section these variables (which are summarized in table 3 on the
following page) will be compared with the convergence performances of the catch-up
countries
Table 3
Summary of key variables affecting speed of convergence
23
Variable of interest Expected effect on per capita GDP and convergence speed other things equal
Technology Positive
Internal accumulation of capital Positive
Foreign direct investment Positive
Hours of work per economically active Positive
Participation rate Positive
Working age population Positive
Total population Negative
Trade integration Positive
5 Explaining catch-up performances
In the preceding section basic theory on economic integration and possible mechanisms
fostering convergence was outlined These mechanisms will now be related to the
performances of the catch-up economies that were briefly presented in section 3 The analysis
is based on descriptive statistics on the key variables presented above and their relation to
economic theory The grouping of the catch-up economies introduced in section 3 is applied
The three groups are (1) the Baltic Member States (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS and (3) SE4 ie the Southern European MS It was showed in section 3 that
the Baltic group had the lowest initial per capita GDPs and grew faster than CEE4 SE4 had
initial per capita GDPs closest to the average of EU25 and grew slower than CEE4
51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
On the basis of the production function the factors contributing to growth are labor
productivity and employment Labor productivity in turn is a broad concept which depends
on both available capital per worker ie the capital intensity and the way in which the factors
of production are exogenously turned into output ie level of technology or TFP Further the
amount of capital depends on internal capital formation and inward foreign direct
investments as well as the consumption of fixed capital ie capital depreciation Evolutions
in capital formation as well as level of technology are expected to be highly decisive for
growth in per capita GDP Firstly the average annual change in labor productivity and per
capita GDP are graphed against each other
24
Figure 9
Labor productivity vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
SpainAv
erag
e an
nual
cha
nge
(in
)
Per capita GDPLabor productivity
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As expected labor productivity and per capita GDP co-varies strongly Although the data is
rather convincing in stressing the importance of the broad concept of labor productivity to
growth and thus catch-up speed there are a few remarks to be done before this concept is to
be further elaborated From the bars above one can distinguish a pattern in which labor
productivity increases by more than per capita GDP for poorer economies and vice versa (the
higher the initial level of per capita GDP the farther to the right the country is located on the
x-axis) The extreme case seems to be Spain for which labor productivity played a relatively
unimportant role in explaining increases in per capita GDP Other comparatively rich nations
such as Greece Portugal and Slovenia also had lower impacts from labor productivity in
contrast to eg Estonia Lithuania and Poland Nevertheless the figures are (with the
exception of Spain) considerably higher than for the non-catching up economies and thus help
to explain convergence In the Euro area as an example the corresponding average annual
labor productivity growth was just one percent (Kaitala 2004)
52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
As it nearly seems to be an explain-it-all correlation between catch-up and labor productivity
the concept has to be further investigated In section 4 it was showed how internal savings and
cross-border reallocation of capital can deepen economic integration and foster convergence
Besides capital formation an important factor in the integration process is the dispersion and
25
incorporation of technology ie changes in TFP The evolution in TFP can be derived by
estimating the so-called Solow residual However this either demands access to reliable and
comparable capital stock data or own estimations of the respective capital stocks eg under
the perpetual inventory method Since there is a scarcity of comparable capital stock data for
the CEECs the alternative is own estimations This in turn would require baseline
benchmarks of capital-to-output ratios stocks of human capital etc and is beyond the scope
of this paper For the time being the focus will be on formation of physical capital although
some recent findings on dynamics in TFP will be reported
Figure 10
Annual gross fixed capital formation
05
10152025303540
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Perc
ent o
f GDP Baltic
CEE4SE4NCU
Source data Eurostat (2006)
In the figure above the evolution in annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a share of
GDP for the three groups and the non-catching up economies of EU25 (NCU) is graphed The
statistical aggregate of GFCF is a measure of the net new investment in the domestic economy
in fixed capital assets although not accounting for capital depreciation Obviously GFCF is
not a measure of total investment because all kinds of financial assets are excluded but is a
good indicator of the level of investment activity relevant for real variables such as output
The levels have been consistently high for all three groups of catch-up economies over the
time period As a contrast the investment level for the NCUs has been consistently below 20
percent of GDP for the time period When comparing the groups the most striking trend is the
consistent intensification of investment activity in the Baltic economies Although the general
26
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
Figure 1
Annual growth vs starting level
-004-002
000200400600801
012014016
7 75 8 85 9 95 10 105
GDP per capita the year before (logs)
Cha
nge
in G
DP
per c
apita
(log
s)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
The two measures of dispersion indicate that the dispersion in per capita GDP among the
studied economies has gradually fallen over time The trend in dispersion when using the
coefficient of variance c as well as the standard deviation of the log GDP per capita v are
presented in appendix 1 and shown graphically in figure 2 If the coefficient of variation is
applied the dispersion fell however only marginally (from 055 to 054 ie by about 2
percent) When using the v-measure the fall in dispersion was more significant Over the
period it changed from 099 to 084 a decrease of about 18 percent That the latter measure
gives a more significant proof of convergence is probably related to the fact that it puts
greater weight to observations with a large deviation from the mean (eg the Baltic states) and
that these economies have converged faster relative the ones closer to the mean
10
Figure 2
σ-convergence
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Disp
ersi
on in
per
cap
ita G
DPs
vc
v is the standard deviation of per capita GDPs in logs (equation 23) and c is the coefficient
of variance (eq 22)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
3 Are some catching up faster than others
31 An expanded β-model
The original equation used to estimate theβ -coefficient was of the following form
iititit yyy εβα ++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2hellip n (31)
By expanding this model with dummy variables groupings of catch-up-economies can be
analyzed with respect to their catch-up performance Three groups of Member States (MS)
were formed based on their initial gaps in per capita GDP to the EU-average (see figure 3 in
section 33) which also coincide rather strongly with geographical location The groups are
(1) the Baltic MS (Estonia Latvia and Lithuania) (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS (Poland Czech Republic Slovak Republic and Hungary) and (3) SE4 ie the
poorer than average MS of Southern Europe (Slovenia Greece Spain and Portugal)
The definition of absolute convergence states that poorer economies are suppose to grow at a
faster rate than richer ones however the yearly gap reduction in percent is expected to be
equal among the economies A necessary condition for absolute convergence is that the
poorer a country is at an initial stage the faster it should grow By assigning dummies for
11
these three groups and leaving the others as reference possible fixed growth effects for these
three groups can be distinguished In doing so the dummies will make variations in the size
of the intercept possible thus indicating whether a group of countries is converging faster or
slower than a reference point Thus the dummy coefficients in the model below indicate the
groupsrsquo deviation from the intercept of the reference group
iSSCCBBitRitit DDDyyy εαααβα +++++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog (32)
where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2 hellip n
and takes on the value one for the Baltic member states is one for the CEE4 and
is one for the SE4 The intercept of the reference group
BD CD SD
Rα indicates a ldquocorerdquo growth rate
and the dummy coefficients are the three groupsrsquo respective fixed deviation from this
intercept
32 The estimation results
The estimation of the equation outlined above gives results indicating that the Baltic group
has a somewhat higher speed of convergence relative the reference group The coefficients for
the other two groups are negative indicating a lower intercept and a lower speed of
convergence relative the reference group The fixed deviations are all insignificant at a five
percent significance level Thus a hypothesis stating that all the groups converge towards the
mean with equal speeds would not be rejected The group SE4 has a negative deviation from
the reference intercept which at the ten percent level would be weakly significant
Table 2
Least square estimation with group dummies dependent variable itit yy 1 loglog minusminus
Coefficient value Standard error t-Statistic
Rα 01607 00579 27744
β -00135 00058 -23440
Bα 00126 00145 08677
Cα -00083 00101 -08225
12
Sα -00098 00056 -17407
R2 of model is 03152 Source data Eurostat (2006)
Summing up the speeds of convergence for the three groups are at a conventional five
percent level neither significantly higher nor significantly lower than the reference grouprsquos
Yet the results do give a weak indication of faster convergence for the Baltic group than the
other two groups Of these two SE4 seems to converge marginally slower than CEE4
although the difference is small Below there will be a brief description of the growth
performances of the catch-up economies included in the three groups
33 A descriptive approach
Figure 3 below shows the total per capita GDP growth over the time period for the 11
countries below the average of EU259 The Baltic economies all doubled their per capita GDP
(Estonia was the most impressive with a growth close to 130 percent) The economies of
CEE4 grew by around 50 to 60 percent with the Czech Republic as a negative deviator The
economies of SE4 grew by around 40 percent with Slovenia deviating positively All of the
11 catch-up economies grew faster than the average of EU25 which had a positive change of
less than 13 percent between 1994 and 2005 Thus all 11 catch-up economies answered to the
theoretical expectations and actually caught-up and closed the gap to the average The
definition of absolute convergence said that the growth should be higher the lower the initial
level of GDP per capita From the figure below this more or less seems to have been the case
9 The average is weighted with respect to the sizes of the countries Thus a positive change in Germany affects the average more than an equal change in eg Sweden
13
Figure 3
Per capita GDP growth vs initial level
020406080
100120140
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
EU-25
Perc
ent
Period growth (1995-2005)Level in 1994 ( of EU-25)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
When talking about economic integration one has to distinguish between real and monetary
integration (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006) The former concerns real variables such as level of
output and allocation of production factors while the latter concerns the integration of
monetary systems and currencies eg the introduction of the Euro This paper focuses
exclusively on integration in real terms Further integration can take place at both macro and
micro levels States can force integration through macroeconomic decisions regarding trade
agreements and currency unions but at least as important for the integration process is the
behavior of firms and individuals Tools from microeconomic theory will be the basis of the
theoretical framework that is to be presented below
41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
A set of integration mechanisms which can function as driving forces behind convergence in
GDP levels will be presented below They are (1) internal accumulation of capital (ie
savings) (2) cross-border capital mobility (3) cross-border labor migration and (4) trade
They will be briefly illustrated with Edgeworth boxes and linked to how they affect per capita
GDP The mechanisms are derived from the neo-classical growth models presented by
14
Ramsey (1928) Solow (1956) and Koopmans (1965) and the standard production function of
the form
αα minus= 1
tttt LKAY with 10 ltltα (41)
where output Y for an exogenously given level of technology A depends on capital K and
labor L In the original model the savings rate is assumed to be exogenous and constant
Although K generally has been restricted to physical capital one may also think of it in a
broader sense comprising of physical capital and human capital (Mankiw Romer and Weil
1992) The main characteristics of this production function are constant returns to scale (since
the coefficients sum to 1) and diminishing marginal products of the production factors K and
L Hence imagining given levels of technology labor and savings rate additional capital
yields decreasing rates of return and growth rates This implies a steady state where capital
per worker k and output per worker y are constant
( kfy = )
)
(42)
The steady state output y is above all determined by the exogenously given level of
technology A which all economies are supposed to have free access to The assumption of
equal access to available technology or fast technological dispersion can be regarded as valid
for highly open economies with similar levels of education This may be expected for
advanced economies in general eg Western Europe but a critical issue is whether it can be
expanded to include the CEECs as well In the analysis section there will be a discussion of
how technological dispersion can function as a factor behind convergence but for the time
being the term indicating level of technology A is dropped Expression (41) can be rewritten
as
( LKfY = (43)
By dividing by total population N we get the following expression for per capita output
y = ( )NL
LLKf
NY
times= (44)
15
Thus output per capita depends on output per hour of labor (labor productivity) and hours of
labor to total population The latter can be further elaborated in order to take into account the
number of economically active (ie size of the labor force) and the size of the working age
population so that (44) becomes
( )N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKfy timestimestimes=
(45)
where LF is the size of the labor force and WA working age population GDP per capita now
depends on labor productivity hours of labor per economically active LLF the participation
rate LFWA and the size of the working age population to total population In order to
conveniently follow the changes in GDP per capita for a panel of countries the function is on
logarithmic scale and the subscripts i and t indicating country and year are added
( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tititi N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKf
y
lnlnln
lnln (46)
where ln yit ndash ln yit-1 is an approximation of the yearly growth in GDP per capita (for
relatively small changes in y) The mechanisms of economic integration will now be
presented They are illustrated with the well-known Edgeworth-box named after Francis
Ysidro Edgeworth A frequently used way of illustrating the integration process is otherwise
the Solow-diagram (see eg Baldwin 1989) However when comparing two or more
countries in a process of resource reallocation the Edgeworth-box serves as a more suitable
tool Finland and Estonia are used as a hypothetical example of how a richer economy with a
relatively higher degree of capital intensity in the production process can be integrated with a
poorer one with a relatively higher degree of labor intensity
The initial position with an allocation where Finnish production is more capital intensive than
the Estonian is shown below The interpretation is as follows labor increases in Finland
relative Estonia when L(Fin) moves to the right on the horizontal axis Capital in Finland
increases relative Estonia when K(Fin) moves upwards on the vertical axis Labor increases in
Estonia relative Finland when L(Est) moves to the left on the horizontal axis and capital
increases in Estonia relative Finland when K(Est) moves downwards The different
16
allocations between the countries are purely relative measures where K and L are in terms of
the otherrsquos disposal and the vertical and horizontal axis of the box symbolizes the aggregate
supply of the two factors in the region The capital intensity in Finland is K(Fin)L(Fin) and in
the proposed allocation below it is higher than in Estonia this since K(Fin)L(Fin) gt
K(Est)L(Est) Allocations along the diagonal line imply equal intensities and complete
integration in terms of factor prices and factor intensities
Figure 4
42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
In this case the level of output depends on savings rate productivity depreciation and
employment Only growth in productivity and employment rate can increase per capita
output given that the investment rate equals the rate of depreciation ie the economy is in
steady state If not in steady state the economy will grow as long as the marginal product of
capital yields an investment rate higher than the rate of depreciation However because of the
assumption of diminishing marginal returns to capital economies will over the phase of time
converge to the similar level given that they have matching production functions The figure
below shows a situation where Estonia by internal saving accumulates own capital up to its
steady state Thus the aggregate capital stock in the whole region grows (the box grows
upwards) the capital intensity in Estonia increases relative Finlandrsquos and there is convergence
between the two countries In the analysis of section 5 the impact of internal accumulation of
17
capital will be analyzed by comparing data on gross fixed capital formation stemming from
domestic sources
Figure 5
The constraint connected with the basic Solow model when studying integration and
convergence is that it treats the economy as closed Thus internal accumulation of capital can
only force absolute convergence if production functions are identical and the resulting
convergence speed will be low (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7) Economic integration
becomes more dynamic when allowing the factors of production to be internationally mobile
A theoretical situation in which borders are open better resembles the European reality and
results in new possibilities to efficiently allocate capital and labor
43 Integration through capital mobility
In the following sections the basic Solow model is extended to allow for cross border
reallocation of capital and labor Capital mobility in an enlarged economic area gives capital
owners the opportunity to reallocate their resources more efficiently This means intra-
regional reallocation (within the box) as well as a relative change in investments from non-EU
economies (from outside the box) Another difference compared to integration only through
internal accumulation is that the expected speed of convergence in this case is higher
(Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7)
18
One could consider the reallocation of capital to a less capital-rich economy as giving this
economy an ldquoinduced capital formation effectrdquo or ldquomedium-run growth bonusrdquo concepts
introduced by Baldwin (1989) This effect could be seen as an exogenous increase in the
investment rate in the relatively capital-poor country and vice versa in the capital-richer In
the original Solow-setting the investment rate equaled the savings rate and was assumed to be
constant From a welfare perspective this implied that citizens in order to invest more must
save more and consume less In the case where capital is reallocated across borders an
economy can enjoy increased investment activity without forgoing consumption
Figure 6
The figure above illustrates a situation in which capital is reallocated from the relatively
capital-richer Finland to the relatively capital-poorer Estonia This takes place since the
marginal returns to capital diminish and are higher in the relatively capital-poor economy
)()( kfL
LKFy == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the marginal returns to capital and
0)acuteacute()acute(lt=
partpart kf
kkf based on the law of diminishing returns
19
Thus the derivation of this integration mechanism as well as convergence theory in general
is highly dependent on the assumption of diminishing returns to capital This integration
mechanism will be analyzed by comparing inward foreign direct investments (FDI) in the
catch-up economies both as a share of GDP and as a share of gross fixed capital formation
This mechanism is expected to have a large impact on labor productivity thus decisive for
GDP growth and catch-up speed FDI affects labor productivity directly by increasing the
capital intensity in the production process but is also expected to augment the incorporation
of technology in the economy and therefore boost total factor productivity
44 Integration through migration
When borders are opened up for migration movement from poorer economies to richer ones is
expected according to the theory (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 chapter 8) In the capital-rich
economy the labor productivity and the wages are higher In the economy where capital is less
abundant labor productivity and wages are lower The wage asymmetry leads to net migration
from the capital-poor economy to the capital-rich Assuming perfect competition on the factor
markets the relationship between wages and capital intensity can be derived in the following
way
LFFw L partpart
equiv= is the wage
LLKFkfy )()( == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the unit cost of capital
kkfrk )acute(= is the per capita cost of capital in the economy which gives that
wkkfy =minus )`( since the per capita labor cost equals the average wage
By taking the derivative of the last expression with respect to k we get the effect on wages
when the capital intensity is increased
0)acuteacute( gtminus=partpart kkf
kw since facuteacute(k)lt 0
20
Less capital intensive production processes thus have a less productive labor force (the
marginal product of labor is lower) and lower wages other things equal If the assumptions
hold labor migration eg from Estonia to Finland lowers the wages in Finland (since the
capital intensity falls) and increases the wages in Estonia (because of increased capital
intensity) other things equal If overlooking externalities and changeover costs (and assuming
that the migrants are active laborers) the effect on GDP will be unambiguously positive in
Finland and negative in Estonia
Figure 7
In the figure above labor migrates from Estonia to Finland Capital intensity will increase in
Estonia given that to rapid capital depreciation not counteracts boosting convergence in
factor prices and labor productivity (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 8) Although this aspect
of economic integration unambiguously hampers convergence in GDP the effect on per
capita GDP is ambiguous The effect on convergence in per capita GDP depends on whether
the migrants were working in Estonia and if they find a job in Finland Other aspects eg
crowding out on the respective labor markets and the level of skills of the migrants are also
important to take into account but are beyond the scope of this paper Therefore the analysis
will be restricted to solely relate the expected (and most basic) effects from changes in
employment and population to the respective catch-up performances Other things equal
increases in hours of labor per economically active participation rate and the share of the
population in working age will have positive effects on per capita GDP while an increase in
21
total population will affect per capita GDP negatively Accordingly these variables will be
the basis of the analysis in section 5
45 Integration through trade
Cross-border trade and specialization can also function as a mechanism of integration causing
convergence Based on a set of assumptions it can be showed that countries can converge
through the prices of traded goods (and services) without the need for mobility of capital and
labor A fundamental concept is Ricardian trade and comparative advantages which shows
how trade leads to complete specialization in the production of goods (Ricardo 1821) In the
case with only two goods and two countries each country would end up supplying only the
good it produces the most efficiently and trade with each other Heckscher and Ohlin (1933)
and Samuelson (1948) has taken the concept further and shown that international trade gives
rise to factor price equalization through the goods markets given equal levels of technology
Figure 8
Factor price equalization takes place within a restricted area in which incomplete
specialization prevails However the countries keep producing both goods although they tend
to export the one which is produced more efficiently Thus convergence in factor prices can
be brought about without cross-border mobility of capital and labor given that the goods and
services are traded on an international market and that further specialization is possible What
22
factor price equalization does demand is that the factors of production are mobile between
sectors and industries If eg laborers are unwilling to switch sector or accept lower wages the
resulting effect will be unemployment Thus given that convergence of factor prices gives
rise to convergence in per capita output (this will be elaborated in section 54) the degree of
openness to trade will influence the catch-up performances I will analyze this relationship by
comparing data on trade integration (ie the average of imports and exports to GDP)
46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
Based on the outline above a number of important variables affecting growth in per capita
GDP and thus the convergence (or divergence) of economies can be listed The productivity
of labor is a crucial factor affecting the growth rate and the convergence trend If the
productivity of labor increases faster in a poorer economy than in a richer counterpart
convergence will be fostered other things equal Labor productivity is determined by total
factor productivity and the capital intensity in the production process The capital intensity
can be enhanced by internal accumulation of capital and foreign investments
Since the per capita GDP for a given size of the population depends positively on hours of
work per economically active an increase in this variable will boost convergence Holding the
other variables constant positive changes in the participation rate and the share of total
population in working age will affect GDP per capita positively Because of the per capita
approach total population will be negatively correlated with the speed of convergence when
holding the amount of work constant Based on the fourth integration mechanism it is also to
expect that the degree of openness to trade affects the speed of convergence A proxy for the
degree of openness is the economyrsquos trade integration of goods and services as a share of
GDP In the following section these variables (which are summarized in table 3 on the
following page) will be compared with the convergence performances of the catch-up
countries
Table 3
Summary of key variables affecting speed of convergence
23
Variable of interest Expected effect on per capita GDP and convergence speed other things equal
Technology Positive
Internal accumulation of capital Positive
Foreign direct investment Positive
Hours of work per economically active Positive
Participation rate Positive
Working age population Positive
Total population Negative
Trade integration Positive
5 Explaining catch-up performances
In the preceding section basic theory on economic integration and possible mechanisms
fostering convergence was outlined These mechanisms will now be related to the
performances of the catch-up economies that were briefly presented in section 3 The analysis
is based on descriptive statistics on the key variables presented above and their relation to
economic theory The grouping of the catch-up economies introduced in section 3 is applied
The three groups are (1) the Baltic Member States (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS and (3) SE4 ie the Southern European MS It was showed in section 3 that
the Baltic group had the lowest initial per capita GDPs and grew faster than CEE4 SE4 had
initial per capita GDPs closest to the average of EU25 and grew slower than CEE4
51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
On the basis of the production function the factors contributing to growth are labor
productivity and employment Labor productivity in turn is a broad concept which depends
on both available capital per worker ie the capital intensity and the way in which the factors
of production are exogenously turned into output ie level of technology or TFP Further the
amount of capital depends on internal capital formation and inward foreign direct
investments as well as the consumption of fixed capital ie capital depreciation Evolutions
in capital formation as well as level of technology are expected to be highly decisive for
growth in per capita GDP Firstly the average annual change in labor productivity and per
capita GDP are graphed against each other
24
Figure 9
Labor productivity vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
SpainAv
erag
e an
nual
cha
nge
(in
)
Per capita GDPLabor productivity
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As expected labor productivity and per capita GDP co-varies strongly Although the data is
rather convincing in stressing the importance of the broad concept of labor productivity to
growth and thus catch-up speed there are a few remarks to be done before this concept is to
be further elaborated From the bars above one can distinguish a pattern in which labor
productivity increases by more than per capita GDP for poorer economies and vice versa (the
higher the initial level of per capita GDP the farther to the right the country is located on the
x-axis) The extreme case seems to be Spain for which labor productivity played a relatively
unimportant role in explaining increases in per capita GDP Other comparatively rich nations
such as Greece Portugal and Slovenia also had lower impacts from labor productivity in
contrast to eg Estonia Lithuania and Poland Nevertheless the figures are (with the
exception of Spain) considerably higher than for the non-catching up economies and thus help
to explain convergence In the Euro area as an example the corresponding average annual
labor productivity growth was just one percent (Kaitala 2004)
52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
As it nearly seems to be an explain-it-all correlation between catch-up and labor productivity
the concept has to be further investigated In section 4 it was showed how internal savings and
cross-border reallocation of capital can deepen economic integration and foster convergence
Besides capital formation an important factor in the integration process is the dispersion and
25
incorporation of technology ie changes in TFP The evolution in TFP can be derived by
estimating the so-called Solow residual However this either demands access to reliable and
comparable capital stock data or own estimations of the respective capital stocks eg under
the perpetual inventory method Since there is a scarcity of comparable capital stock data for
the CEECs the alternative is own estimations This in turn would require baseline
benchmarks of capital-to-output ratios stocks of human capital etc and is beyond the scope
of this paper For the time being the focus will be on formation of physical capital although
some recent findings on dynamics in TFP will be reported
Figure 10
Annual gross fixed capital formation
05
10152025303540
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Perc
ent o
f GDP Baltic
CEE4SE4NCU
Source data Eurostat (2006)
In the figure above the evolution in annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a share of
GDP for the three groups and the non-catching up economies of EU25 (NCU) is graphed The
statistical aggregate of GFCF is a measure of the net new investment in the domestic economy
in fixed capital assets although not accounting for capital depreciation Obviously GFCF is
not a measure of total investment because all kinds of financial assets are excluded but is a
good indicator of the level of investment activity relevant for real variables such as output
The levels have been consistently high for all three groups of catch-up economies over the
time period As a contrast the investment level for the NCUs has been consistently below 20
percent of GDP for the time period When comparing the groups the most striking trend is the
consistent intensification of investment activity in the Baltic economies Although the general
26
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
Figure 2
σ-convergence
0
02
04
06
08
1
12
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Disp
ersi
on in
per
cap
ita G
DPs
vc
v is the standard deviation of per capita GDPs in logs (equation 23) and c is the coefficient
of variance (eq 22)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
3 Are some catching up faster than others
31 An expanded β-model
The original equation used to estimate theβ -coefficient was of the following form
iititit yyy εβα ++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2hellip n (31)
By expanding this model with dummy variables groupings of catch-up-economies can be
analyzed with respect to their catch-up performance Three groups of Member States (MS)
were formed based on their initial gaps in per capita GDP to the EU-average (see figure 3 in
section 33) which also coincide rather strongly with geographical location The groups are
(1) the Baltic MS (Estonia Latvia and Lithuania) (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS (Poland Czech Republic Slovak Republic and Hungary) and (3) SE4 ie the
poorer than average MS of Southern Europe (Slovenia Greece Spain and Portugal)
The definition of absolute convergence states that poorer economies are suppose to grow at a
faster rate than richer ones however the yearly gap reduction in percent is expected to be
equal among the economies A necessary condition for absolute convergence is that the
poorer a country is at an initial stage the faster it should grow By assigning dummies for
11
these three groups and leaving the others as reference possible fixed growth effects for these
three groups can be distinguished In doing so the dummies will make variations in the size
of the intercept possible thus indicating whether a group of countries is converging faster or
slower than a reference point Thus the dummy coefficients in the model below indicate the
groupsrsquo deviation from the intercept of the reference group
iSSCCBBitRitit DDDyyy εαααβα +++++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog (32)
where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2 hellip n
and takes on the value one for the Baltic member states is one for the CEE4 and
is one for the SE4 The intercept of the reference group
BD CD SD
Rα indicates a ldquocorerdquo growth rate
and the dummy coefficients are the three groupsrsquo respective fixed deviation from this
intercept
32 The estimation results
The estimation of the equation outlined above gives results indicating that the Baltic group
has a somewhat higher speed of convergence relative the reference group The coefficients for
the other two groups are negative indicating a lower intercept and a lower speed of
convergence relative the reference group The fixed deviations are all insignificant at a five
percent significance level Thus a hypothesis stating that all the groups converge towards the
mean with equal speeds would not be rejected The group SE4 has a negative deviation from
the reference intercept which at the ten percent level would be weakly significant
Table 2
Least square estimation with group dummies dependent variable itit yy 1 loglog minusminus
Coefficient value Standard error t-Statistic
Rα 01607 00579 27744
β -00135 00058 -23440
Bα 00126 00145 08677
Cα -00083 00101 -08225
12
Sα -00098 00056 -17407
R2 of model is 03152 Source data Eurostat (2006)
Summing up the speeds of convergence for the three groups are at a conventional five
percent level neither significantly higher nor significantly lower than the reference grouprsquos
Yet the results do give a weak indication of faster convergence for the Baltic group than the
other two groups Of these two SE4 seems to converge marginally slower than CEE4
although the difference is small Below there will be a brief description of the growth
performances of the catch-up economies included in the three groups
33 A descriptive approach
Figure 3 below shows the total per capita GDP growth over the time period for the 11
countries below the average of EU259 The Baltic economies all doubled their per capita GDP
(Estonia was the most impressive with a growth close to 130 percent) The economies of
CEE4 grew by around 50 to 60 percent with the Czech Republic as a negative deviator The
economies of SE4 grew by around 40 percent with Slovenia deviating positively All of the
11 catch-up economies grew faster than the average of EU25 which had a positive change of
less than 13 percent between 1994 and 2005 Thus all 11 catch-up economies answered to the
theoretical expectations and actually caught-up and closed the gap to the average The
definition of absolute convergence said that the growth should be higher the lower the initial
level of GDP per capita From the figure below this more or less seems to have been the case
9 The average is weighted with respect to the sizes of the countries Thus a positive change in Germany affects the average more than an equal change in eg Sweden
13
Figure 3
Per capita GDP growth vs initial level
020406080
100120140
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
EU-25
Perc
ent
Period growth (1995-2005)Level in 1994 ( of EU-25)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
When talking about economic integration one has to distinguish between real and monetary
integration (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006) The former concerns real variables such as level of
output and allocation of production factors while the latter concerns the integration of
monetary systems and currencies eg the introduction of the Euro This paper focuses
exclusively on integration in real terms Further integration can take place at both macro and
micro levels States can force integration through macroeconomic decisions regarding trade
agreements and currency unions but at least as important for the integration process is the
behavior of firms and individuals Tools from microeconomic theory will be the basis of the
theoretical framework that is to be presented below
41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
A set of integration mechanisms which can function as driving forces behind convergence in
GDP levels will be presented below They are (1) internal accumulation of capital (ie
savings) (2) cross-border capital mobility (3) cross-border labor migration and (4) trade
They will be briefly illustrated with Edgeworth boxes and linked to how they affect per capita
GDP The mechanisms are derived from the neo-classical growth models presented by
14
Ramsey (1928) Solow (1956) and Koopmans (1965) and the standard production function of
the form
αα minus= 1
tttt LKAY with 10 ltltα (41)
where output Y for an exogenously given level of technology A depends on capital K and
labor L In the original model the savings rate is assumed to be exogenous and constant
Although K generally has been restricted to physical capital one may also think of it in a
broader sense comprising of physical capital and human capital (Mankiw Romer and Weil
1992) The main characteristics of this production function are constant returns to scale (since
the coefficients sum to 1) and diminishing marginal products of the production factors K and
L Hence imagining given levels of technology labor and savings rate additional capital
yields decreasing rates of return and growth rates This implies a steady state where capital
per worker k and output per worker y are constant
( kfy = )
)
(42)
The steady state output y is above all determined by the exogenously given level of
technology A which all economies are supposed to have free access to The assumption of
equal access to available technology or fast technological dispersion can be regarded as valid
for highly open economies with similar levels of education This may be expected for
advanced economies in general eg Western Europe but a critical issue is whether it can be
expanded to include the CEECs as well In the analysis section there will be a discussion of
how technological dispersion can function as a factor behind convergence but for the time
being the term indicating level of technology A is dropped Expression (41) can be rewritten
as
( LKfY = (43)
By dividing by total population N we get the following expression for per capita output
y = ( )NL
LLKf
NY
times= (44)
15
Thus output per capita depends on output per hour of labor (labor productivity) and hours of
labor to total population The latter can be further elaborated in order to take into account the
number of economically active (ie size of the labor force) and the size of the working age
population so that (44) becomes
( )N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKfy timestimestimes=
(45)
where LF is the size of the labor force and WA working age population GDP per capita now
depends on labor productivity hours of labor per economically active LLF the participation
rate LFWA and the size of the working age population to total population In order to
conveniently follow the changes in GDP per capita for a panel of countries the function is on
logarithmic scale and the subscripts i and t indicating country and year are added
( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tititi N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKf
y
lnlnln
lnln (46)
where ln yit ndash ln yit-1 is an approximation of the yearly growth in GDP per capita (for
relatively small changes in y) The mechanisms of economic integration will now be
presented They are illustrated with the well-known Edgeworth-box named after Francis
Ysidro Edgeworth A frequently used way of illustrating the integration process is otherwise
the Solow-diagram (see eg Baldwin 1989) However when comparing two or more
countries in a process of resource reallocation the Edgeworth-box serves as a more suitable
tool Finland and Estonia are used as a hypothetical example of how a richer economy with a
relatively higher degree of capital intensity in the production process can be integrated with a
poorer one with a relatively higher degree of labor intensity
The initial position with an allocation where Finnish production is more capital intensive than
the Estonian is shown below The interpretation is as follows labor increases in Finland
relative Estonia when L(Fin) moves to the right on the horizontal axis Capital in Finland
increases relative Estonia when K(Fin) moves upwards on the vertical axis Labor increases in
Estonia relative Finland when L(Est) moves to the left on the horizontal axis and capital
increases in Estonia relative Finland when K(Est) moves downwards The different
16
allocations between the countries are purely relative measures where K and L are in terms of
the otherrsquos disposal and the vertical and horizontal axis of the box symbolizes the aggregate
supply of the two factors in the region The capital intensity in Finland is K(Fin)L(Fin) and in
the proposed allocation below it is higher than in Estonia this since K(Fin)L(Fin) gt
K(Est)L(Est) Allocations along the diagonal line imply equal intensities and complete
integration in terms of factor prices and factor intensities
Figure 4
42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
In this case the level of output depends on savings rate productivity depreciation and
employment Only growth in productivity and employment rate can increase per capita
output given that the investment rate equals the rate of depreciation ie the economy is in
steady state If not in steady state the economy will grow as long as the marginal product of
capital yields an investment rate higher than the rate of depreciation However because of the
assumption of diminishing marginal returns to capital economies will over the phase of time
converge to the similar level given that they have matching production functions The figure
below shows a situation where Estonia by internal saving accumulates own capital up to its
steady state Thus the aggregate capital stock in the whole region grows (the box grows
upwards) the capital intensity in Estonia increases relative Finlandrsquos and there is convergence
between the two countries In the analysis of section 5 the impact of internal accumulation of
17
capital will be analyzed by comparing data on gross fixed capital formation stemming from
domestic sources
Figure 5
The constraint connected with the basic Solow model when studying integration and
convergence is that it treats the economy as closed Thus internal accumulation of capital can
only force absolute convergence if production functions are identical and the resulting
convergence speed will be low (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7) Economic integration
becomes more dynamic when allowing the factors of production to be internationally mobile
A theoretical situation in which borders are open better resembles the European reality and
results in new possibilities to efficiently allocate capital and labor
43 Integration through capital mobility
In the following sections the basic Solow model is extended to allow for cross border
reallocation of capital and labor Capital mobility in an enlarged economic area gives capital
owners the opportunity to reallocate their resources more efficiently This means intra-
regional reallocation (within the box) as well as a relative change in investments from non-EU
economies (from outside the box) Another difference compared to integration only through
internal accumulation is that the expected speed of convergence in this case is higher
(Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7)
18
One could consider the reallocation of capital to a less capital-rich economy as giving this
economy an ldquoinduced capital formation effectrdquo or ldquomedium-run growth bonusrdquo concepts
introduced by Baldwin (1989) This effect could be seen as an exogenous increase in the
investment rate in the relatively capital-poor country and vice versa in the capital-richer In
the original Solow-setting the investment rate equaled the savings rate and was assumed to be
constant From a welfare perspective this implied that citizens in order to invest more must
save more and consume less In the case where capital is reallocated across borders an
economy can enjoy increased investment activity without forgoing consumption
Figure 6
The figure above illustrates a situation in which capital is reallocated from the relatively
capital-richer Finland to the relatively capital-poorer Estonia This takes place since the
marginal returns to capital diminish and are higher in the relatively capital-poor economy
)()( kfL
LKFy == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the marginal returns to capital and
0)acuteacute()acute(lt=
partpart kf
kkf based on the law of diminishing returns
19
Thus the derivation of this integration mechanism as well as convergence theory in general
is highly dependent on the assumption of diminishing returns to capital This integration
mechanism will be analyzed by comparing inward foreign direct investments (FDI) in the
catch-up economies both as a share of GDP and as a share of gross fixed capital formation
This mechanism is expected to have a large impact on labor productivity thus decisive for
GDP growth and catch-up speed FDI affects labor productivity directly by increasing the
capital intensity in the production process but is also expected to augment the incorporation
of technology in the economy and therefore boost total factor productivity
44 Integration through migration
When borders are opened up for migration movement from poorer economies to richer ones is
expected according to the theory (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 chapter 8) In the capital-rich
economy the labor productivity and the wages are higher In the economy where capital is less
abundant labor productivity and wages are lower The wage asymmetry leads to net migration
from the capital-poor economy to the capital-rich Assuming perfect competition on the factor
markets the relationship between wages and capital intensity can be derived in the following
way
LFFw L partpart
equiv= is the wage
LLKFkfy )()( == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the unit cost of capital
kkfrk )acute(= is the per capita cost of capital in the economy which gives that
wkkfy =minus )`( since the per capita labor cost equals the average wage
By taking the derivative of the last expression with respect to k we get the effect on wages
when the capital intensity is increased
0)acuteacute( gtminus=partpart kkf
kw since facuteacute(k)lt 0
20
Less capital intensive production processes thus have a less productive labor force (the
marginal product of labor is lower) and lower wages other things equal If the assumptions
hold labor migration eg from Estonia to Finland lowers the wages in Finland (since the
capital intensity falls) and increases the wages in Estonia (because of increased capital
intensity) other things equal If overlooking externalities and changeover costs (and assuming
that the migrants are active laborers) the effect on GDP will be unambiguously positive in
Finland and negative in Estonia
Figure 7
In the figure above labor migrates from Estonia to Finland Capital intensity will increase in
Estonia given that to rapid capital depreciation not counteracts boosting convergence in
factor prices and labor productivity (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 8) Although this aspect
of economic integration unambiguously hampers convergence in GDP the effect on per
capita GDP is ambiguous The effect on convergence in per capita GDP depends on whether
the migrants were working in Estonia and if they find a job in Finland Other aspects eg
crowding out on the respective labor markets and the level of skills of the migrants are also
important to take into account but are beyond the scope of this paper Therefore the analysis
will be restricted to solely relate the expected (and most basic) effects from changes in
employment and population to the respective catch-up performances Other things equal
increases in hours of labor per economically active participation rate and the share of the
population in working age will have positive effects on per capita GDP while an increase in
21
total population will affect per capita GDP negatively Accordingly these variables will be
the basis of the analysis in section 5
45 Integration through trade
Cross-border trade and specialization can also function as a mechanism of integration causing
convergence Based on a set of assumptions it can be showed that countries can converge
through the prices of traded goods (and services) without the need for mobility of capital and
labor A fundamental concept is Ricardian trade and comparative advantages which shows
how trade leads to complete specialization in the production of goods (Ricardo 1821) In the
case with only two goods and two countries each country would end up supplying only the
good it produces the most efficiently and trade with each other Heckscher and Ohlin (1933)
and Samuelson (1948) has taken the concept further and shown that international trade gives
rise to factor price equalization through the goods markets given equal levels of technology
Figure 8
Factor price equalization takes place within a restricted area in which incomplete
specialization prevails However the countries keep producing both goods although they tend
to export the one which is produced more efficiently Thus convergence in factor prices can
be brought about without cross-border mobility of capital and labor given that the goods and
services are traded on an international market and that further specialization is possible What
22
factor price equalization does demand is that the factors of production are mobile between
sectors and industries If eg laborers are unwilling to switch sector or accept lower wages the
resulting effect will be unemployment Thus given that convergence of factor prices gives
rise to convergence in per capita output (this will be elaborated in section 54) the degree of
openness to trade will influence the catch-up performances I will analyze this relationship by
comparing data on trade integration (ie the average of imports and exports to GDP)
46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
Based on the outline above a number of important variables affecting growth in per capita
GDP and thus the convergence (or divergence) of economies can be listed The productivity
of labor is a crucial factor affecting the growth rate and the convergence trend If the
productivity of labor increases faster in a poorer economy than in a richer counterpart
convergence will be fostered other things equal Labor productivity is determined by total
factor productivity and the capital intensity in the production process The capital intensity
can be enhanced by internal accumulation of capital and foreign investments
Since the per capita GDP for a given size of the population depends positively on hours of
work per economically active an increase in this variable will boost convergence Holding the
other variables constant positive changes in the participation rate and the share of total
population in working age will affect GDP per capita positively Because of the per capita
approach total population will be negatively correlated with the speed of convergence when
holding the amount of work constant Based on the fourth integration mechanism it is also to
expect that the degree of openness to trade affects the speed of convergence A proxy for the
degree of openness is the economyrsquos trade integration of goods and services as a share of
GDP In the following section these variables (which are summarized in table 3 on the
following page) will be compared with the convergence performances of the catch-up
countries
Table 3
Summary of key variables affecting speed of convergence
23
Variable of interest Expected effect on per capita GDP and convergence speed other things equal
Technology Positive
Internal accumulation of capital Positive
Foreign direct investment Positive
Hours of work per economically active Positive
Participation rate Positive
Working age population Positive
Total population Negative
Trade integration Positive
5 Explaining catch-up performances
In the preceding section basic theory on economic integration and possible mechanisms
fostering convergence was outlined These mechanisms will now be related to the
performances of the catch-up economies that were briefly presented in section 3 The analysis
is based on descriptive statistics on the key variables presented above and their relation to
economic theory The grouping of the catch-up economies introduced in section 3 is applied
The three groups are (1) the Baltic Member States (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS and (3) SE4 ie the Southern European MS It was showed in section 3 that
the Baltic group had the lowest initial per capita GDPs and grew faster than CEE4 SE4 had
initial per capita GDPs closest to the average of EU25 and grew slower than CEE4
51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
On the basis of the production function the factors contributing to growth are labor
productivity and employment Labor productivity in turn is a broad concept which depends
on both available capital per worker ie the capital intensity and the way in which the factors
of production are exogenously turned into output ie level of technology or TFP Further the
amount of capital depends on internal capital formation and inward foreign direct
investments as well as the consumption of fixed capital ie capital depreciation Evolutions
in capital formation as well as level of technology are expected to be highly decisive for
growth in per capita GDP Firstly the average annual change in labor productivity and per
capita GDP are graphed against each other
24
Figure 9
Labor productivity vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
SpainAv
erag
e an
nual
cha
nge
(in
)
Per capita GDPLabor productivity
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As expected labor productivity and per capita GDP co-varies strongly Although the data is
rather convincing in stressing the importance of the broad concept of labor productivity to
growth and thus catch-up speed there are a few remarks to be done before this concept is to
be further elaborated From the bars above one can distinguish a pattern in which labor
productivity increases by more than per capita GDP for poorer economies and vice versa (the
higher the initial level of per capita GDP the farther to the right the country is located on the
x-axis) The extreme case seems to be Spain for which labor productivity played a relatively
unimportant role in explaining increases in per capita GDP Other comparatively rich nations
such as Greece Portugal and Slovenia also had lower impacts from labor productivity in
contrast to eg Estonia Lithuania and Poland Nevertheless the figures are (with the
exception of Spain) considerably higher than for the non-catching up economies and thus help
to explain convergence In the Euro area as an example the corresponding average annual
labor productivity growth was just one percent (Kaitala 2004)
52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
As it nearly seems to be an explain-it-all correlation between catch-up and labor productivity
the concept has to be further investigated In section 4 it was showed how internal savings and
cross-border reallocation of capital can deepen economic integration and foster convergence
Besides capital formation an important factor in the integration process is the dispersion and
25
incorporation of technology ie changes in TFP The evolution in TFP can be derived by
estimating the so-called Solow residual However this either demands access to reliable and
comparable capital stock data or own estimations of the respective capital stocks eg under
the perpetual inventory method Since there is a scarcity of comparable capital stock data for
the CEECs the alternative is own estimations This in turn would require baseline
benchmarks of capital-to-output ratios stocks of human capital etc and is beyond the scope
of this paper For the time being the focus will be on formation of physical capital although
some recent findings on dynamics in TFP will be reported
Figure 10
Annual gross fixed capital formation
05
10152025303540
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Perc
ent o
f GDP Baltic
CEE4SE4NCU
Source data Eurostat (2006)
In the figure above the evolution in annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a share of
GDP for the three groups and the non-catching up economies of EU25 (NCU) is graphed The
statistical aggregate of GFCF is a measure of the net new investment in the domestic economy
in fixed capital assets although not accounting for capital depreciation Obviously GFCF is
not a measure of total investment because all kinds of financial assets are excluded but is a
good indicator of the level of investment activity relevant for real variables such as output
The levels have been consistently high for all three groups of catch-up economies over the
time period As a contrast the investment level for the NCUs has been consistently below 20
percent of GDP for the time period When comparing the groups the most striking trend is the
consistent intensification of investment activity in the Baltic economies Although the general
26
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
these three groups and leaving the others as reference possible fixed growth effects for these
three groups can be distinguished In doing so the dummies will make variations in the size
of the intercept possible thus indicating whether a group of countries is converging faster or
slower than a reference point Thus the dummy coefficients in the model below indicate the
groupsrsquo deviation from the intercept of the reference group
iSSCCBBitRitit DDDyyy εαααβα +++++=minus minusminus 11 logloglog (32)
where t = 1 2hellip T and i = 1 2 hellip n
and takes on the value one for the Baltic member states is one for the CEE4 and
is one for the SE4 The intercept of the reference group
BD CD SD
Rα indicates a ldquocorerdquo growth rate
and the dummy coefficients are the three groupsrsquo respective fixed deviation from this
intercept
32 The estimation results
The estimation of the equation outlined above gives results indicating that the Baltic group
has a somewhat higher speed of convergence relative the reference group The coefficients for
the other two groups are negative indicating a lower intercept and a lower speed of
convergence relative the reference group The fixed deviations are all insignificant at a five
percent significance level Thus a hypothesis stating that all the groups converge towards the
mean with equal speeds would not be rejected The group SE4 has a negative deviation from
the reference intercept which at the ten percent level would be weakly significant
Table 2
Least square estimation with group dummies dependent variable itit yy 1 loglog minusminus
Coefficient value Standard error t-Statistic
Rα 01607 00579 27744
β -00135 00058 -23440
Bα 00126 00145 08677
Cα -00083 00101 -08225
12
Sα -00098 00056 -17407
R2 of model is 03152 Source data Eurostat (2006)
Summing up the speeds of convergence for the three groups are at a conventional five
percent level neither significantly higher nor significantly lower than the reference grouprsquos
Yet the results do give a weak indication of faster convergence for the Baltic group than the
other two groups Of these two SE4 seems to converge marginally slower than CEE4
although the difference is small Below there will be a brief description of the growth
performances of the catch-up economies included in the three groups
33 A descriptive approach
Figure 3 below shows the total per capita GDP growth over the time period for the 11
countries below the average of EU259 The Baltic economies all doubled their per capita GDP
(Estonia was the most impressive with a growth close to 130 percent) The economies of
CEE4 grew by around 50 to 60 percent with the Czech Republic as a negative deviator The
economies of SE4 grew by around 40 percent with Slovenia deviating positively All of the
11 catch-up economies grew faster than the average of EU25 which had a positive change of
less than 13 percent between 1994 and 2005 Thus all 11 catch-up economies answered to the
theoretical expectations and actually caught-up and closed the gap to the average The
definition of absolute convergence said that the growth should be higher the lower the initial
level of GDP per capita From the figure below this more or less seems to have been the case
9 The average is weighted with respect to the sizes of the countries Thus a positive change in Germany affects the average more than an equal change in eg Sweden
13
Figure 3
Per capita GDP growth vs initial level
020406080
100120140
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
EU-25
Perc
ent
Period growth (1995-2005)Level in 1994 ( of EU-25)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
When talking about economic integration one has to distinguish between real and monetary
integration (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006) The former concerns real variables such as level of
output and allocation of production factors while the latter concerns the integration of
monetary systems and currencies eg the introduction of the Euro This paper focuses
exclusively on integration in real terms Further integration can take place at both macro and
micro levels States can force integration through macroeconomic decisions regarding trade
agreements and currency unions but at least as important for the integration process is the
behavior of firms and individuals Tools from microeconomic theory will be the basis of the
theoretical framework that is to be presented below
41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
A set of integration mechanisms which can function as driving forces behind convergence in
GDP levels will be presented below They are (1) internal accumulation of capital (ie
savings) (2) cross-border capital mobility (3) cross-border labor migration and (4) trade
They will be briefly illustrated with Edgeworth boxes and linked to how they affect per capita
GDP The mechanisms are derived from the neo-classical growth models presented by
14
Ramsey (1928) Solow (1956) and Koopmans (1965) and the standard production function of
the form
αα minus= 1
tttt LKAY with 10 ltltα (41)
where output Y for an exogenously given level of technology A depends on capital K and
labor L In the original model the savings rate is assumed to be exogenous and constant
Although K generally has been restricted to physical capital one may also think of it in a
broader sense comprising of physical capital and human capital (Mankiw Romer and Weil
1992) The main characteristics of this production function are constant returns to scale (since
the coefficients sum to 1) and diminishing marginal products of the production factors K and
L Hence imagining given levels of technology labor and savings rate additional capital
yields decreasing rates of return and growth rates This implies a steady state where capital
per worker k and output per worker y are constant
( kfy = )
)
(42)
The steady state output y is above all determined by the exogenously given level of
technology A which all economies are supposed to have free access to The assumption of
equal access to available technology or fast technological dispersion can be regarded as valid
for highly open economies with similar levels of education This may be expected for
advanced economies in general eg Western Europe but a critical issue is whether it can be
expanded to include the CEECs as well In the analysis section there will be a discussion of
how technological dispersion can function as a factor behind convergence but for the time
being the term indicating level of technology A is dropped Expression (41) can be rewritten
as
( LKfY = (43)
By dividing by total population N we get the following expression for per capita output
y = ( )NL
LLKf
NY
times= (44)
15
Thus output per capita depends on output per hour of labor (labor productivity) and hours of
labor to total population The latter can be further elaborated in order to take into account the
number of economically active (ie size of the labor force) and the size of the working age
population so that (44) becomes
( )N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKfy timestimestimes=
(45)
where LF is the size of the labor force and WA working age population GDP per capita now
depends on labor productivity hours of labor per economically active LLF the participation
rate LFWA and the size of the working age population to total population In order to
conveniently follow the changes in GDP per capita for a panel of countries the function is on
logarithmic scale and the subscripts i and t indicating country and year are added
( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tititi N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKf
y
lnlnln
lnln (46)
where ln yit ndash ln yit-1 is an approximation of the yearly growth in GDP per capita (for
relatively small changes in y) The mechanisms of economic integration will now be
presented They are illustrated with the well-known Edgeworth-box named after Francis
Ysidro Edgeworth A frequently used way of illustrating the integration process is otherwise
the Solow-diagram (see eg Baldwin 1989) However when comparing two or more
countries in a process of resource reallocation the Edgeworth-box serves as a more suitable
tool Finland and Estonia are used as a hypothetical example of how a richer economy with a
relatively higher degree of capital intensity in the production process can be integrated with a
poorer one with a relatively higher degree of labor intensity
The initial position with an allocation where Finnish production is more capital intensive than
the Estonian is shown below The interpretation is as follows labor increases in Finland
relative Estonia when L(Fin) moves to the right on the horizontal axis Capital in Finland
increases relative Estonia when K(Fin) moves upwards on the vertical axis Labor increases in
Estonia relative Finland when L(Est) moves to the left on the horizontal axis and capital
increases in Estonia relative Finland when K(Est) moves downwards The different
16
allocations between the countries are purely relative measures where K and L are in terms of
the otherrsquos disposal and the vertical and horizontal axis of the box symbolizes the aggregate
supply of the two factors in the region The capital intensity in Finland is K(Fin)L(Fin) and in
the proposed allocation below it is higher than in Estonia this since K(Fin)L(Fin) gt
K(Est)L(Est) Allocations along the diagonal line imply equal intensities and complete
integration in terms of factor prices and factor intensities
Figure 4
42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
In this case the level of output depends on savings rate productivity depreciation and
employment Only growth in productivity and employment rate can increase per capita
output given that the investment rate equals the rate of depreciation ie the economy is in
steady state If not in steady state the economy will grow as long as the marginal product of
capital yields an investment rate higher than the rate of depreciation However because of the
assumption of diminishing marginal returns to capital economies will over the phase of time
converge to the similar level given that they have matching production functions The figure
below shows a situation where Estonia by internal saving accumulates own capital up to its
steady state Thus the aggregate capital stock in the whole region grows (the box grows
upwards) the capital intensity in Estonia increases relative Finlandrsquos and there is convergence
between the two countries In the analysis of section 5 the impact of internal accumulation of
17
capital will be analyzed by comparing data on gross fixed capital formation stemming from
domestic sources
Figure 5
The constraint connected with the basic Solow model when studying integration and
convergence is that it treats the economy as closed Thus internal accumulation of capital can
only force absolute convergence if production functions are identical and the resulting
convergence speed will be low (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7) Economic integration
becomes more dynamic when allowing the factors of production to be internationally mobile
A theoretical situation in which borders are open better resembles the European reality and
results in new possibilities to efficiently allocate capital and labor
43 Integration through capital mobility
In the following sections the basic Solow model is extended to allow for cross border
reallocation of capital and labor Capital mobility in an enlarged economic area gives capital
owners the opportunity to reallocate their resources more efficiently This means intra-
regional reallocation (within the box) as well as a relative change in investments from non-EU
economies (from outside the box) Another difference compared to integration only through
internal accumulation is that the expected speed of convergence in this case is higher
(Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7)
18
One could consider the reallocation of capital to a less capital-rich economy as giving this
economy an ldquoinduced capital formation effectrdquo or ldquomedium-run growth bonusrdquo concepts
introduced by Baldwin (1989) This effect could be seen as an exogenous increase in the
investment rate in the relatively capital-poor country and vice versa in the capital-richer In
the original Solow-setting the investment rate equaled the savings rate and was assumed to be
constant From a welfare perspective this implied that citizens in order to invest more must
save more and consume less In the case where capital is reallocated across borders an
economy can enjoy increased investment activity without forgoing consumption
Figure 6
The figure above illustrates a situation in which capital is reallocated from the relatively
capital-richer Finland to the relatively capital-poorer Estonia This takes place since the
marginal returns to capital diminish and are higher in the relatively capital-poor economy
)()( kfL
LKFy == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the marginal returns to capital and
0)acuteacute()acute(lt=
partpart kf
kkf based on the law of diminishing returns
19
Thus the derivation of this integration mechanism as well as convergence theory in general
is highly dependent on the assumption of diminishing returns to capital This integration
mechanism will be analyzed by comparing inward foreign direct investments (FDI) in the
catch-up economies both as a share of GDP and as a share of gross fixed capital formation
This mechanism is expected to have a large impact on labor productivity thus decisive for
GDP growth and catch-up speed FDI affects labor productivity directly by increasing the
capital intensity in the production process but is also expected to augment the incorporation
of technology in the economy and therefore boost total factor productivity
44 Integration through migration
When borders are opened up for migration movement from poorer economies to richer ones is
expected according to the theory (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 chapter 8) In the capital-rich
economy the labor productivity and the wages are higher In the economy where capital is less
abundant labor productivity and wages are lower The wage asymmetry leads to net migration
from the capital-poor economy to the capital-rich Assuming perfect competition on the factor
markets the relationship between wages and capital intensity can be derived in the following
way
LFFw L partpart
equiv= is the wage
LLKFkfy )()( == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the unit cost of capital
kkfrk )acute(= is the per capita cost of capital in the economy which gives that
wkkfy =minus )`( since the per capita labor cost equals the average wage
By taking the derivative of the last expression with respect to k we get the effect on wages
when the capital intensity is increased
0)acuteacute( gtminus=partpart kkf
kw since facuteacute(k)lt 0
20
Less capital intensive production processes thus have a less productive labor force (the
marginal product of labor is lower) and lower wages other things equal If the assumptions
hold labor migration eg from Estonia to Finland lowers the wages in Finland (since the
capital intensity falls) and increases the wages in Estonia (because of increased capital
intensity) other things equal If overlooking externalities and changeover costs (and assuming
that the migrants are active laborers) the effect on GDP will be unambiguously positive in
Finland and negative in Estonia
Figure 7
In the figure above labor migrates from Estonia to Finland Capital intensity will increase in
Estonia given that to rapid capital depreciation not counteracts boosting convergence in
factor prices and labor productivity (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 8) Although this aspect
of economic integration unambiguously hampers convergence in GDP the effect on per
capita GDP is ambiguous The effect on convergence in per capita GDP depends on whether
the migrants were working in Estonia and if they find a job in Finland Other aspects eg
crowding out on the respective labor markets and the level of skills of the migrants are also
important to take into account but are beyond the scope of this paper Therefore the analysis
will be restricted to solely relate the expected (and most basic) effects from changes in
employment and population to the respective catch-up performances Other things equal
increases in hours of labor per economically active participation rate and the share of the
population in working age will have positive effects on per capita GDP while an increase in
21
total population will affect per capita GDP negatively Accordingly these variables will be
the basis of the analysis in section 5
45 Integration through trade
Cross-border trade and specialization can also function as a mechanism of integration causing
convergence Based on a set of assumptions it can be showed that countries can converge
through the prices of traded goods (and services) without the need for mobility of capital and
labor A fundamental concept is Ricardian trade and comparative advantages which shows
how trade leads to complete specialization in the production of goods (Ricardo 1821) In the
case with only two goods and two countries each country would end up supplying only the
good it produces the most efficiently and trade with each other Heckscher and Ohlin (1933)
and Samuelson (1948) has taken the concept further and shown that international trade gives
rise to factor price equalization through the goods markets given equal levels of technology
Figure 8
Factor price equalization takes place within a restricted area in which incomplete
specialization prevails However the countries keep producing both goods although they tend
to export the one which is produced more efficiently Thus convergence in factor prices can
be brought about without cross-border mobility of capital and labor given that the goods and
services are traded on an international market and that further specialization is possible What
22
factor price equalization does demand is that the factors of production are mobile between
sectors and industries If eg laborers are unwilling to switch sector or accept lower wages the
resulting effect will be unemployment Thus given that convergence of factor prices gives
rise to convergence in per capita output (this will be elaborated in section 54) the degree of
openness to trade will influence the catch-up performances I will analyze this relationship by
comparing data on trade integration (ie the average of imports and exports to GDP)
46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
Based on the outline above a number of important variables affecting growth in per capita
GDP and thus the convergence (or divergence) of economies can be listed The productivity
of labor is a crucial factor affecting the growth rate and the convergence trend If the
productivity of labor increases faster in a poorer economy than in a richer counterpart
convergence will be fostered other things equal Labor productivity is determined by total
factor productivity and the capital intensity in the production process The capital intensity
can be enhanced by internal accumulation of capital and foreign investments
Since the per capita GDP for a given size of the population depends positively on hours of
work per economically active an increase in this variable will boost convergence Holding the
other variables constant positive changes in the participation rate and the share of total
population in working age will affect GDP per capita positively Because of the per capita
approach total population will be negatively correlated with the speed of convergence when
holding the amount of work constant Based on the fourth integration mechanism it is also to
expect that the degree of openness to trade affects the speed of convergence A proxy for the
degree of openness is the economyrsquos trade integration of goods and services as a share of
GDP In the following section these variables (which are summarized in table 3 on the
following page) will be compared with the convergence performances of the catch-up
countries
Table 3
Summary of key variables affecting speed of convergence
23
Variable of interest Expected effect on per capita GDP and convergence speed other things equal
Technology Positive
Internal accumulation of capital Positive
Foreign direct investment Positive
Hours of work per economically active Positive
Participation rate Positive
Working age population Positive
Total population Negative
Trade integration Positive
5 Explaining catch-up performances
In the preceding section basic theory on economic integration and possible mechanisms
fostering convergence was outlined These mechanisms will now be related to the
performances of the catch-up economies that were briefly presented in section 3 The analysis
is based on descriptive statistics on the key variables presented above and their relation to
economic theory The grouping of the catch-up economies introduced in section 3 is applied
The three groups are (1) the Baltic Member States (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS and (3) SE4 ie the Southern European MS It was showed in section 3 that
the Baltic group had the lowest initial per capita GDPs and grew faster than CEE4 SE4 had
initial per capita GDPs closest to the average of EU25 and grew slower than CEE4
51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
On the basis of the production function the factors contributing to growth are labor
productivity and employment Labor productivity in turn is a broad concept which depends
on both available capital per worker ie the capital intensity and the way in which the factors
of production are exogenously turned into output ie level of technology or TFP Further the
amount of capital depends on internal capital formation and inward foreign direct
investments as well as the consumption of fixed capital ie capital depreciation Evolutions
in capital formation as well as level of technology are expected to be highly decisive for
growth in per capita GDP Firstly the average annual change in labor productivity and per
capita GDP are graphed against each other
24
Figure 9
Labor productivity vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
SpainAv
erag
e an
nual
cha
nge
(in
)
Per capita GDPLabor productivity
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As expected labor productivity and per capita GDP co-varies strongly Although the data is
rather convincing in stressing the importance of the broad concept of labor productivity to
growth and thus catch-up speed there are a few remarks to be done before this concept is to
be further elaborated From the bars above one can distinguish a pattern in which labor
productivity increases by more than per capita GDP for poorer economies and vice versa (the
higher the initial level of per capita GDP the farther to the right the country is located on the
x-axis) The extreme case seems to be Spain for which labor productivity played a relatively
unimportant role in explaining increases in per capita GDP Other comparatively rich nations
such as Greece Portugal and Slovenia also had lower impacts from labor productivity in
contrast to eg Estonia Lithuania and Poland Nevertheless the figures are (with the
exception of Spain) considerably higher than for the non-catching up economies and thus help
to explain convergence In the Euro area as an example the corresponding average annual
labor productivity growth was just one percent (Kaitala 2004)
52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
As it nearly seems to be an explain-it-all correlation between catch-up and labor productivity
the concept has to be further investigated In section 4 it was showed how internal savings and
cross-border reallocation of capital can deepen economic integration and foster convergence
Besides capital formation an important factor in the integration process is the dispersion and
25
incorporation of technology ie changes in TFP The evolution in TFP can be derived by
estimating the so-called Solow residual However this either demands access to reliable and
comparable capital stock data or own estimations of the respective capital stocks eg under
the perpetual inventory method Since there is a scarcity of comparable capital stock data for
the CEECs the alternative is own estimations This in turn would require baseline
benchmarks of capital-to-output ratios stocks of human capital etc and is beyond the scope
of this paper For the time being the focus will be on formation of physical capital although
some recent findings on dynamics in TFP will be reported
Figure 10
Annual gross fixed capital formation
05
10152025303540
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Perc
ent o
f GDP Baltic
CEE4SE4NCU
Source data Eurostat (2006)
In the figure above the evolution in annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a share of
GDP for the three groups and the non-catching up economies of EU25 (NCU) is graphed The
statistical aggregate of GFCF is a measure of the net new investment in the domestic economy
in fixed capital assets although not accounting for capital depreciation Obviously GFCF is
not a measure of total investment because all kinds of financial assets are excluded but is a
good indicator of the level of investment activity relevant for real variables such as output
The levels have been consistently high for all three groups of catch-up economies over the
time period As a contrast the investment level for the NCUs has been consistently below 20
percent of GDP for the time period When comparing the groups the most striking trend is the
consistent intensification of investment activity in the Baltic economies Although the general
26
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
Sα -00098 00056 -17407
R2 of model is 03152 Source data Eurostat (2006)
Summing up the speeds of convergence for the three groups are at a conventional five
percent level neither significantly higher nor significantly lower than the reference grouprsquos
Yet the results do give a weak indication of faster convergence for the Baltic group than the
other two groups Of these two SE4 seems to converge marginally slower than CEE4
although the difference is small Below there will be a brief description of the growth
performances of the catch-up economies included in the three groups
33 A descriptive approach
Figure 3 below shows the total per capita GDP growth over the time period for the 11
countries below the average of EU259 The Baltic economies all doubled their per capita GDP
(Estonia was the most impressive with a growth close to 130 percent) The economies of
CEE4 grew by around 50 to 60 percent with the Czech Republic as a negative deviator The
economies of SE4 grew by around 40 percent with Slovenia deviating positively All of the
11 catch-up economies grew faster than the average of EU25 which had a positive change of
less than 13 percent between 1994 and 2005 Thus all 11 catch-up economies answered to the
theoretical expectations and actually caught-up and closed the gap to the average The
definition of absolute convergence said that the growth should be higher the lower the initial
level of GDP per capita From the figure below this more or less seems to have been the case
9 The average is weighted with respect to the sizes of the countries Thus a positive change in Germany affects the average more than an equal change in eg Sweden
13
Figure 3
Per capita GDP growth vs initial level
020406080
100120140
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
EU-25
Perc
ent
Period growth (1995-2005)Level in 1994 ( of EU-25)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
When talking about economic integration one has to distinguish between real and monetary
integration (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006) The former concerns real variables such as level of
output and allocation of production factors while the latter concerns the integration of
monetary systems and currencies eg the introduction of the Euro This paper focuses
exclusively on integration in real terms Further integration can take place at both macro and
micro levels States can force integration through macroeconomic decisions regarding trade
agreements and currency unions but at least as important for the integration process is the
behavior of firms and individuals Tools from microeconomic theory will be the basis of the
theoretical framework that is to be presented below
41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
A set of integration mechanisms which can function as driving forces behind convergence in
GDP levels will be presented below They are (1) internal accumulation of capital (ie
savings) (2) cross-border capital mobility (3) cross-border labor migration and (4) trade
They will be briefly illustrated with Edgeworth boxes and linked to how they affect per capita
GDP The mechanisms are derived from the neo-classical growth models presented by
14
Ramsey (1928) Solow (1956) and Koopmans (1965) and the standard production function of
the form
αα minus= 1
tttt LKAY with 10 ltltα (41)
where output Y for an exogenously given level of technology A depends on capital K and
labor L In the original model the savings rate is assumed to be exogenous and constant
Although K generally has been restricted to physical capital one may also think of it in a
broader sense comprising of physical capital and human capital (Mankiw Romer and Weil
1992) The main characteristics of this production function are constant returns to scale (since
the coefficients sum to 1) and diminishing marginal products of the production factors K and
L Hence imagining given levels of technology labor and savings rate additional capital
yields decreasing rates of return and growth rates This implies a steady state where capital
per worker k and output per worker y are constant
( kfy = )
)
(42)
The steady state output y is above all determined by the exogenously given level of
technology A which all economies are supposed to have free access to The assumption of
equal access to available technology or fast technological dispersion can be regarded as valid
for highly open economies with similar levels of education This may be expected for
advanced economies in general eg Western Europe but a critical issue is whether it can be
expanded to include the CEECs as well In the analysis section there will be a discussion of
how technological dispersion can function as a factor behind convergence but for the time
being the term indicating level of technology A is dropped Expression (41) can be rewritten
as
( LKfY = (43)
By dividing by total population N we get the following expression for per capita output
y = ( )NL
LLKf
NY
times= (44)
15
Thus output per capita depends on output per hour of labor (labor productivity) and hours of
labor to total population The latter can be further elaborated in order to take into account the
number of economically active (ie size of the labor force) and the size of the working age
population so that (44) becomes
( )N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKfy timestimestimes=
(45)
where LF is the size of the labor force and WA working age population GDP per capita now
depends on labor productivity hours of labor per economically active LLF the participation
rate LFWA and the size of the working age population to total population In order to
conveniently follow the changes in GDP per capita for a panel of countries the function is on
logarithmic scale and the subscripts i and t indicating country and year are added
( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tititi N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKf
y
lnlnln
lnln (46)
where ln yit ndash ln yit-1 is an approximation of the yearly growth in GDP per capita (for
relatively small changes in y) The mechanisms of economic integration will now be
presented They are illustrated with the well-known Edgeworth-box named after Francis
Ysidro Edgeworth A frequently used way of illustrating the integration process is otherwise
the Solow-diagram (see eg Baldwin 1989) However when comparing two or more
countries in a process of resource reallocation the Edgeworth-box serves as a more suitable
tool Finland and Estonia are used as a hypothetical example of how a richer economy with a
relatively higher degree of capital intensity in the production process can be integrated with a
poorer one with a relatively higher degree of labor intensity
The initial position with an allocation where Finnish production is more capital intensive than
the Estonian is shown below The interpretation is as follows labor increases in Finland
relative Estonia when L(Fin) moves to the right on the horizontal axis Capital in Finland
increases relative Estonia when K(Fin) moves upwards on the vertical axis Labor increases in
Estonia relative Finland when L(Est) moves to the left on the horizontal axis and capital
increases in Estonia relative Finland when K(Est) moves downwards The different
16
allocations between the countries are purely relative measures where K and L are in terms of
the otherrsquos disposal and the vertical and horizontal axis of the box symbolizes the aggregate
supply of the two factors in the region The capital intensity in Finland is K(Fin)L(Fin) and in
the proposed allocation below it is higher than in Estonia this since K(Fin)L(Fin) gt
K(Est)L(Est) Allocations along the diagonal line imply equal intensities and complete
integration in terms of factor prices and factor intensities
Figure 4
42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
In this case the level of output depends on savings rate productivity depreciation and
employment Only growth in productivity and employment rate can increase per capita
output given that the investment rate equals the rate of depreciation ie the economy is in
steady state If not in steady state the economy will grow as long as the marginal product of
capital yields an investment rate higher than the rate of depreciation However because of the
assumption of diminishing marginal returns to capital economies will over the phase of time
converge to the similar level given that they have matching production functions The figure
below shows a situation where Estonia by internal saving accumulates own capital up to its
steady state Thus the aggregate capital stock in the whole region grows (the box grows
upwards) the capital intensity in Estonia increases relative Finlandrsquos and there is convergence
between the two countries In the analysis of section 5 the impact of internal accumulation of
17
capital will be analyzed by comparing data on gross fixed capital formation stemming from
domestic sources
Figure 5
The constraint connected with the basic Solow model when studying integration and
convergence is that it treats the economy as closed Thus internal accumulation of capital can
only force absolute convergence if production functions are identical and the resulting
convergence speed will be low (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7) Economic integration
becomes more dynamic when allowing the factors of production to be internationally mobile
A theoretical situation in which borders are open better resembles the European reality and
results in new possibilities to efficiently allocate capital and labor
43 Integration through capital mobility
In the following sections the basic Solow model is extended to allow for cross border
reallocation of capital and labor Capital mobility in an enlarged economic area gives capital
owners the opportunity to reallocate their resources more efficiently This means intra-
regional reallocation (within the box) as well as a relative change in investments from non-EU
economies (from outside the box) Another difference compared to integration only through
internal accumulation is that the expected speed of convergence in this case is higher
(Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7)
18
One could consider the reallocation of capital to a less capital-rich economy as giving this
economy an ldquoinduced capital formation effectrdquo or ldquomedium-run growth bonusrdquo concepts
introduced by Baldwin (1989) This effect could be seen as an exogenous increase in the
investment rate in the relatively capital-poor country and vice versa in the capital-richer In
the original Solow-setting the investment rate equaled the savings rate and was assumed to be
constant From a welfare perspective this implied that citizens in order to invest more must
save more and consume less In the case where capital is reallocated across borders an
economy can enjoy increased investment activity without forgoing consumption
Figure 6
The figure above illustrates a situation in which capital is reallocated from the relatively
capital-richer Finland to the relatively capital-poorer Estonia This takes place since the
marginal returns to capital diminish and are higher in the relatively capital-poor economy
)()( kfL
LKFy == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the marginal returns to capital and
0)acuteacute()acute(lt=
partpart kf
kkf based on the law of diminishing returns
19
Thus the derivation of this integration mechanism as well as convergence theory in general
is highly dependent on the assumption of diminishing returns to capital This integration
mechanism will be analyzed by comparing inward foreign direct investments (FDI) in the
catch-up economies both as a share of GDP and as a share of gross fixed capital formation
This mechanism is expected to have a large impact on labor productivity thus decisive for
GDP growth and catch-up speed FDI affects labor productivity directly by increasing the
capital intensity in the production process but is also expected to augment the incorporation
of technology in the economy and therefore boost total factor productivity
44 Integration through migration
When borders are opened up for migration movement from poorer economies to richer ones is
expected according to the theory (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 chapter 8) In the capital-rich
economy the labor productivity and the wages are higher In the economy where capital is less
abundant labor productivity and wages are lower The wage asymmetry leads to net migration
from the capital-poor economy to the capital-rich Assuming perfect competition on the factor
markets the relationship between wages and capital intensity can be derived in the following
way
LFFw L partpart
equiv= is the wage
LLKFkfy )()( == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the unit cost of capital
kkfrk )acute(= is the per capita cost of capital in the economy which gives that
wkkfy =minus )`( since the per capita labor cost equals the average wage
By taking the derivative of the last expression with respect to k we get the effect on wages
when the capital intensity is increased
0)acuteacute( gtminus=partpart kkf
kw since facuteacute(k)lt 0
20
Less capital intensive production processes thus have a less productive labor force (the
marginal product of labor is lower) and lower wages other things equal If the assumptions
hold labor migration eg from Estonia to Finland lowers the wages in Finland (since the
capital intensity falls) and increases the wages in Estonia (because of increased capital
intensity) other things equal If overlooking externalities and changeover costs (and assuming
that the migrants are active laborers) the effect on GDP will be unambiguously positive in
Finland and negative in Estonia
Figure 7
In the figure above labor migrates from Estonia to Finland Capital intensity will increase in
Estonia given that to rapid capital depreciation not counteracts boosting convergence in
factor prices and labor productivity (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 8) Although this aspect
of economic integration unambiguously hampers convergence in GDP the effect on per
capita GDP is ambiguous The effect on convergence in per capita GDP depends on whether
the migrants were working in Estonia and if they find a job in Finland Other aspects eg
crowding out on the respective labor markets and the level of skills of the migrants are also
important to take into account but are beyond the scope of this paper Therefore the analysis
will be restricted to solely relate the expected (and most basic) effects from changes in
employment and population to the respective catch-up performances Other things equal
increases in hours of labor per economically active participation rate and the share of the
population in working age will have positive effects on per capita GDP while an increase in
21
total population will affect per capita GDP negatively Accordingly these variables will be
the basis of the analysis in section 5
45 Integration through trade
Cross-border trade and specialization can also function as a mechanism of integration causing
convergence Based on a set of assumptions it can be showed that countries can converge
through the prices of traded goods (and services) without the need for mobility of capital and
labor A fundamental concept is Ricardian trade and comparative advantages which shows
how trade leads to complete specialization in the production of goods (Ricardo 1821) In the
case with only two goods and two countries each country would end up supplying only the
good it produces the most efficiently and trade with each other Heckscher and Ohlin (1933)
and Samuelson (1948) has taken the concept further and shown that international trade gives
rise to factor price equalization through the goods markets given equal levels of technology
Figure 8
Factor price equalization takes place within a restricted area in which incomplete
specialization prevails However the countries keep producing both goods although they tend
to export the one which is produced more efficiently Thus convergence in factor prices can
be brought about without cross-border mobility of capital and labor given that the goods and
services are traded on an international market and that further specialization is possible What
22
factor price equalization does demand is that the factors of production are mobile between
sectors and industries If eg laborers are unwilling to switch sector or accept lower wages the
resulting effect will be unemployment Thus given that convergence of factor prices gives
rise to convergence in per capita output (this will be elaborated in section 54) the degree of
openness to trade will influence the catch-up performances I will analyze this relationship by
comparing data on trade integration (ie the average of imports and exports to GDP)
46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
Based on the outline above a number of important variables affecting growth in per capita
GDP and thus the convergence (or divergence) of economies can be listed The productivity
of labor is a crucial factor affecting the growth rate and the convergence trend If the
productivity of labor increases faster in a poorer economy than in a richer counterpart
convergence will be fostered other things equal Labor productivity is determined by total
factor productivity and the capital intensity in the production process The capital intensity
can be enhanced by internal accumulation of capital and foreign investments
Since the per capita GDP for a given size of the population depends positively on hours of
work per economically active an increase in this variable will boost convergence Holding the
other variables constant positive changes in the participation rate and the share of total
population in working age will affect GDP per capita positively Because of the per capita
approach total population will be negatively correlated with the speed of convergence when
holding the amount of work constant Based on the fourth integration mechanism it is also to
expect that the degree of openness to trade affects the speed of convergence A proxy for the
degree of openness is the economyrsquos trade integration of goods and services as a share of
GDP In the following section these variables (which are summarized in table 3 on the
following page) will be compared with the convergence performances of the catch-up
countries
Table 3
Summary of key variables affecting speed of convergence
23
Variable of interest Expected effect on per capita GDP and convergence speed other things equal
Technology Positive
Internal accumulation of capital Positive
Foreign direct investment Positive
Hours of work per economically active Positive
Participation rate Positive
Working age population Positive
Total population Negative
Trade integration Positive
5 Explaining catch-up performances
In the preceding section basic theory on economic integration and possible mechanisms
fostering convergence was outlined These mechanisms will now be related to the
performances of the catch-up economies that were briefly presented in section 3 The analysis
is based on descriptive statistics on the key variables presented above and their relation to
economic theory The grouping of the catch-up economies introduced in section 3 is applied
The three groups are (1) the Baltic Member States (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS and (3) SE4 ie the Southern European MS It was showed in section 3 that
the Baltic group had the lowest initial per capita GDPs and grew faster than CEE4 SE4 had
initial per capita GDPs closest to the average of EU25 and grew slower than CEE4
51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
On the basis of the production function the factors contributing to growth are labor
productivity and employment Labor productivity in turn is a broad concept which depends
on both available capital per worker ie the capital intensity and the way in which the factors
of production are exogenously turned into output ie level of technology or TFP Further the
amount of capital depends on internal capital formation and inward foreign direct
investments as well as the consumption of fixed capital ie capital depreciation Evolutions
in capital formation as well as level of technology are expected to be highly decisive for
growth in per capita GDP Firstly the average annual change in labor productivity and per
capita GDP are graphed against each other
24
Figure 9
Labor productivity vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
SpainAv
erag
e an
nual
cha
nge
(in
)
Per capita GDPLabor productivity
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As expected labor productivity and per capita GDP co-varies strongly Although the data is
rather convincing in stressing the importance of the broad concept of labor productivity to
growth and thus catch-up speed there are a few remarks to be done before this concept is to
be further elaborated From the bars above one can distinguish a pattern in which labor
productivity increases by more than per capita GDP for poorer economies and vice versa (the
higher the initial level of per capita GDP the farther to the right the country is located on the
x-axis) The extreme case seems to be Spain for which labor productivity played a relatively
unimportant role in explaining increases in per capita GDP Other comparatively rich nations
such as Greece Portugal and Slovenia also had lower impacts from labor productivity in
contrast to eg Estonia Lithuania and Poland Nevertheless the figures are (with the
exception of Spain) considerably higher than for the non-catching up economies and thus help
to explain convergence In the Euro area as an example the corresponding average annual
labor productivity growth was just one percent (Kaitala 2004)
52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
As it nearly seems to be an explain-it-all correlation between catch-up and labor productivity
the concept has to be further investigated In section 4 it was showed how internal savings and
cross-border reallocation of capital can deepen economic integration and foster convergence
Besides capital formation an important factor in the integration process is the dispersion and
25
incorporation of technology ie changes in TFP The evolution in TFP can be derived by
estimating the so-called Solow residual However this either demands access to reliable and
comparable capital stock data or own estimations of the respective capital stocks eg under
the perpetual inventory method Since there is a scarcity of comparable capital stock data for
the CEECs the alternative is own estimations This in turn would require baseline
benchmarks of capital-to-output ratios stocks of human capital etc and is beyond the scope
of this paper For the time being the focus will be on formation of physical capital although
some recent findings on dynamics in TFP will be reported
Figure 10
Annual gross fixed capital formation
05
10152025303540
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Perc
ent o
f GDP Baltic
CEE4SE4NCU
Source data Eurostat (2006)
In the figure above the evolution in annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a share of
GDP for the three groups and the non-catching up economies of EU25 (NCU) is graphed The
statistical aggregate of GFCF is a measure of the net new investment in the domestic economy
in fixed capital assets although not accounting for capital depreciation Obviously GFCF is
not a measure of total investment because all kinds of financial assets are excluded but is a
good indicator of the level of investment activity relevant for real variables such as output
The levels have been consistently high for all three groups of catch-up economies over the
time period As a contrast the investment level for the NCUs has been consistently below 20
percent of GDP for the time period When comparing the groups the most striking trend is the
consistent intensification of investment activity in the Baltic economies Although the general
26
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
Figure 3
Per capita GDP growth vs initial level
020406080
100120140
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
EU-25
Perc
ent
Period growth (1995-2005)Level in 1994 ( of EU-25)
Source data Eurostat (2006)
4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
When talking about economic integration one has to distinguish between real and monetary
integration (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006) The former concerns real variables such as level of
output and allocation of production factors while the latter concerns the integration of
monetary systems and currencies eg the introduction of the Euro This paper focuses
exclusively on integration in real terms Further integration can take place at both macro and
micro levels States can force integration through macroeconomic decisions regarding trade
agreements and currency unions but at least as important for the integration process is the
behavior of firms and individuals Tools from microeconomic theory will be the basis of the
theoretical framework that is to be presented below
41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
A set of integration mechanisms which can function as driving forces behind convergence in
GDP levels will be presented below They are (1) internal accumulation of capital (ie
savings) (2) cross-border capital mobility (3) cross-border labor migration and (4) trade
They will be briefly illustrated with Edgeworth boxes and linked to how they affect per capita
GDP The mechanisms are derived from the neo-classical growth models presented by
14
Ramsey (1928) Solow (1956) and Koopmans (1965) and the standard production function of
the form
αα minus= 1
tttt LKAY with 10 ltltα (41)
where output Y for an exogenously given level of technology A depends on capital K and
labor L In the original model the savings rate is assumed to be exogenous and constant
Although K generally has been restricted to physical capital one may also think of it in a
broader sense comprising of physical capital and human capital (Mankiw Romer and Weil
1992) The main characteristics of this production function are constant returns to scale (since
the coefficients sum to 1) and diminishing marginal products of the production factors K and
L Hence imagining given levels of technology labor and savings rate additional capital
yields decreasing rates of return and growth rates This implies a steady state where capital
per worker k and output per worker y are constant
( kfy = )
)
(42)
The steady state output y is above all determined by the exogenously given level of
technology A which all economies are supposed to have free access to The assumption of
equal access to available technology or fast technological dispersion can be regarded as valid
for highly open economies with similar levels of education This may be expected for
advanced economies in general eg Western Europe but a critical issue is whether it can be
expanded to include the CEECs as well In the analysis section there will be a discussion of
how technological dispersion can function as a factor behind convergence but for the time
being the term indicating level of technology A is dropped Expression (41) can be rewritten
as
( LKfY = (43)
By dividing by total population N we get the following expression for per capita output
y = ( )NL
LLKf
NY
times= (44)
15
Thus output per capita depends on output per hour of labor (labor productivity) and hours of
labor to total population The latter can be further elaborated in order to take into account the
number of economically active (ie size of the labor force) and the size of the working age
population so that (44) becomes
( )N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKfy timestimestimes=
(45)
where LF is the size of the labor force and WA working age population GDP per capita now
depends on labor productivity hours of labor per economically active LLF the participation
rate LFWA and the size of the working age population to total population In order to
conveniently follow the changes in GDP per capita for a panel of countries the function is on
logarithmic scale and the subscripts i and t indicating country and year are added
( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tititi N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKf
y
lnlnln
lnln (46)
where ln yit ndash ln yit-1 is an approximation of the yearly growth in GDP per capita (for
relatively small changes in y) The mechanisms of economic integration will now be
presented They are illustrated with the well-known Edgeworth-box named after Francis
Ysidro Edgeworth A frequently used way of illustrating the integration process is otherwise
the Solow-diagram (see eg Baldwin 1989) However when comparing two or more
countries in a process of resource reallocation the Edgeworth-box serves as a more suitable
tool Finland and Estonia are used as a hypothetical example of how a richer economy with a
relatively higher degree of capital intensity in the production process can be integrated with a
poorer one with a relatively higher degree of labor intensity
The initial position with an allocation where Finnish production is more capital intensive than
the Estonian is shown below The interpretation is as follows labor increases in Finland
relative Estonia when L(Fin) moves to the right on the horizontal axis Capital in Finland
increases relative Estonia when K(Fin) moves upwards on the vertical axis Labor increases in
Estonia relative Finland when L(Est) moves to the left on the horizontal axis and capital
increases in Estonia relative Finland when K(Est) moves downwards The different
16
allocations between the countries are purely relative measures where K and L are in terms of
the otherrsquos disposal and the vertical and horizontal axis of the box symbolizes the aggregate
supply of the two factors in the region The capital intensity in Finland is K(Fin)L(Fin) and in
the proposed allocation below it is higher than in Estonia this since K(Fin)L(Fin) gt
K(Est)L(Est) Allocations along the diagonal line imply equal intensities and complete
integration in terms of factor prices and factor intensities
Figure 4
42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
In this case the level of output depends on savings rate productivity depreciation and
employment Only growth in productivity and employment rate can increase per capita
output given that the investment rate equals the rate of depreciation ie the economy is in
steady state If not in steady state the economy will grow as long as the marginal product of
capital yields an investment rate higher than the rate of depreciation However because of the
assumption of diminishing marginal returns to capital economies will over the phase of time
converge to the similar level given that they have matching production functions The figure
below shows a situation where Estonia by internal saving accumulates own capital up to its
steady state Thus the aggregate capital stock in the whole region grows (the box grows
upwards) the capital intensity in Estonia increases relative Finlandrsquos and there is convergence
between the two countries In the analysis of section 5 the impact of internal accumulation of
17
capital will be analyzed by comparing data on gross fixed capital formation stemming from
domestic sources
Figure 5
The constraint connected with the basic Solow model when studying integration and
convergence is that it treats the economy as closed Thus internal accumulation of capital can
only force absolute convergence if production functions are identical and the resulting
convergence speed will be low (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7) Economic integration
becomes more dynamic when allowing the factors of production to be internationally mobile
A theoretical situation in which borders are open better resembles the European reality and
results in new possibilities to efficiently allocate capital and labor
43 Integration through capital mobility
In the following sections the basic Solow model is extended to allow for cross border
reallocation of capital and labor Capital mobility in an enlarged economic area gives capital
owners the opportunity to reallocate their resources more efficiently This means intra-
regional reallocation (within the box) as well as a relative change in investments from non-EU
economies (from outside the box) Another difference compared to integration only through
internal accumulation is that the expected speed of convergence in this case is higher
(Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7)
18
One could consider the reallocation of capital to a less capital-rich economy as giving this
economy an ldquoinduced capital formation effectrdquo or ldquomedium-run growth bonusrdquo concepts
introduced by Baldwin (1989) This effect could be seen as an exogenous increase in the
investment rate in the relatively capital-poor country and vice versa in the capital-richer In
the original Solow-setting the investment rate equaled the savings rate and was assumed to be
constant From a welfare perspective this implied that citizens in order to invest more must
save more and consume less In the case where capital is reallocated across borders an
economy can enjoy increased investment activity without forgoing consumption
Figure 6
The figure above illustrates a situation in which capital is reallocated from the relatively
capital-richer Finland to the relatively capital-poorer Estonia This takes place since the
marginal returns to capital diminish and are higher in the relatively capital-poor economy
)()( kfL
LKFy == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the marginal returns to capital and
0)acuteacute()acute(lt=
partpart kf
kkf based on the law of diminishing returns
19
Thus the derivation of this integration mechanism as well as convergence theory in general
is highly dependent on the assumption of diminishing returns to capital This integration
mechanism will be analyzed by comparing inward foreign direct investments (FDI) in the
catch-up economies both as a share of GDP and as a share of gross fixed capital formation
This mechanism is expected to have a large impact on labor productivity thus decisive for
GDP growth and catch-up speed FDI affects labor productivity directly by increasing the
capital intensity in the production process but is also expected to augment the incorporation
of technology in the economy and therefore boost total factor productivity
44 Integration through migration
When borders are opened up for migration movement from poorer economies to richer ones is
expected according to the theory (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 chapter 8) In the capital-rich
economy the labor productivity and the wages are higher In the economy where capital is less
abundant labor productivity and wages are lower The wage asymmetry leads to net migration
from the capital-poor economy to the capital-rich Assuming perfect competition on the factor
markets the relationship between wages and capital intensity can be derived in the following
way
LFFw L partpart
equiv= is the wage
LLKFkfy )()( == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the unit cost of capital
kkfrk )acute(= is the per capita cost of capital in the economy which gives that
wkkfy =minus )`( since the per capita labor cost equals the average wage
By taking the derivative of the last expression with respect to k we get the effect on wages
when the capital intensity is increased
0)acuteacute( gtminus=partpart kkf
kw since facuteacute(k)lt 0
20
Less capital intensive production processes thus have a less productive labor force (the
marginal product of labor is lower) and lower wages other things equal If the assumptions
hold labor migration eg from Estonia to Finland lowers the wages in Finland (since the
capital intensity falls) and increases the wages in Estonia (because of increased capital
intensity) other things equal If overlooking externalities and changeover costs (and assuming
that the migrants are active laborers) the effect on GDP will be unambiguously positive in
Finland and negative in Estonia
Figure 7
In the figure above labor migrates from Estonia to Finland Capital intensity will increase in
Estonia given that to rapid capital depreciation not counteracts boosting convergence in
factor prices and labor productivity (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 8) Although this aspect
of economic integration unambiguously hampers convergence in GDP the effect on per
capita GDP is ambiguous The effect on convergence in per capita GDP depends on whether
the migrants were working in Estonia and if they find a job in Finland Other aspects eg
crowding out on the respective labor markets and the level of skills of the migrants are also
important to take into account but are beyond the scope of this paper Therefore the analysis
will be restricted to solely relate the expected (and most basic) effects from changes in
employment and population to the respective catch-up performances Other things equal
increases in hours of labor per economically active participation rate and the share of the
population in working age will have positive effects on per capita GDP while an increase in
21
total population will affect per capita GDP negatively Accordingly these variables will be
the basis of the analysis in section 5
45 Integration through trade
Cross-border trade and specialization can also function as a mechanism of integration causing
convergence Based on a set of assumptions it can be showed that countries can converge
through the prices of traded goods (and services) without the need for mobility of capital and
labor A fundamental concept is Ricardian trade and comparative advantages which shows
how trade leads to complete specialization in the production of goods (Ricardo 1821) In the
case with only two goods and two countries each country would end up supplying only the
good it produces the most efficiently and trade with each other Heckscher and Ohlin (1933)
and Samuelson (1948) has taken the concept further and shown that international trade gives
rise to factor price equalization through the goods markets given equal levels of technology
Figure 8
Factor price equalization takes place within a restricted area in which incomplete
specialization prevails However the countries keep producing both goods although they tend
to export the one which is produced more efficiently Thus convergence in factor prices can
be brought about without cross-border mobility of capital and labor given that the goods and
services are traded on an international market and that further specialization is possible What
22
factor price equalization does demand is that the factors of production are mobile between
sectors and industries If eg laborers are unwilling to switch sector or accept lower wages the
resulting effect will be unemployment Thus given that convergence of factor prices gives
rise to convergence in per capita output (this will be elaborated in section 54) the degree of
openness to trade will influence the catch-up performances I will analyze this relationship by
comparing data on trade integration (ie the average of imports and exports to GDP)
46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
Based on the outline above a number of important variables affecting growth in per capita
GDP and thus the convergence (or divergence) of economies can be listed The productivity
of labor is a crucial factor affecting the growth rate and the convergence trend If the
productivity of labor increases faster in a poorer economy than in a richer counterpart
convergence will be fostered other things equal Labor productivity is determined by total
factor productivity and the capital intensity in the production process The capital intensity
can be enhanced by internal accumulation of capital and foreign investments
Since the per capita GDP for a given size of the population depends positively on hours of
work per economically active an increase in this variable will boost convergence Holding the
other variables constant positive changes in the participation rate and the share of total
population in working age will affect GDP per capita positively Because of the per capita
approach total population will be negatively correlated with the speed of convergence when
holding the amount of work constant Based on the fourth integration mechanism it is also to
expect that the degree of openness to trade affects the speed of convergence A proxy for the
degree of openness is the economyrsquos trade integration of goods and services as a share of
GDP In the following section these variables (which are summarized in table 3 on the
following page) will be compared with the convergence performances of the catch-up
countries
Table 3
Summary of key variables affecting speed of convergence
23
Variable of interest Expected effect on per capita GDP and convergence speed other things equal
Technology Positive
Internal accumulation of capital Positive
Foreign direct investment Positive
Hours of work per economically active Positive
Participation rate Positive
Working age population Positive
Total population Negative
Trade integration Positive
5 Explaining catch-up performances
In the preceding section basic theory on economic integration and possible mechanisms
fostering convergence was outlined These mechanisms will now be related to the
performances of the catch-up economies that were briefly presented in section 3 The analysis
is based on descriptive statistics on the key variables presented above and their relation to
economic theory The grouping of the catch-up economies introduced in section 3 is applied
The three groups are (1) the Baltic Member States (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS and (3) SE4 ie the Southern European MS It was showed in section 3 that
the Baltic group had the lowest initial per capita GDPs and grew faster than CEE4 SE4 had
initial per capita GDPs closest to the average of EU25 and grew slower than CEE4
51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
On the basis of the production function the factors contributing to growth are labor
productivity and employment Labor productivity in turn is a broad concept which depends
on both available capital per worker ie the capital intensity and the way in which the factors
of production are exogenously turned into output ie level of technology or TFP Further the
amount of capital depends on internal capital formation and inward foreign direct
investments as well as the consumption of fixed capital ie capital depreciation Evolutions
in capital formation as well as level of technology are expected to be highly decisive for
growth in per capita GDP Firstly the average annual change in labor productivity and per
capita GDP are graphed against each other
24
Figure 9
Labor productivity vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
SpainAv
erag
e an
nual
cha
nge
(in
)
Per capita GDPLabor productivity
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As expected labor productivity and per capita GDP co-varies strongly Although the data is
rather convincing in stressing the importance of the broad concept of labor productivity to
growth and thus catch-up speed there are a few remarks to be done before this concept is to
be further elaborated From the bars above one can distinguish a pattern in which labor
productivity increases by more than per capita GDP for poorer economies and vice versa (the
higher the initial level of per capita GDP the farther to the right the country is located on the
x-axis) The extreme case seems to be Spain for which labor productivity played a relatively
unimportant role in explaining increases in per capita GDP Other comparatively rich nations
such as Greece Portugal and Slovenia also had lower impacts from labor productivity in
contrast to eg Estonia Lithuania and Poland Nevertheless the figures are (with the
exception of Spain) considerably higher than for the non-catching up economies and thus help
to explain convergence In the Euro area as an example the corresponding average annual
labor productivity growth was just one percent (Kaitala 2004)
52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
As it nearly seems to be an explain-it-all correlation between catch-up and labor productivity
the concept has to be further investigated In section 4 it was showed how internal savings and
cross-border reallocation of capital can deepen economic integration and foster convergence
Besides capital formation an important factor in the integration process is the dispersion and
25
incorporation of technology ie changes in TFP The evolution in TFP can be derived by
estimating the so-called Solow residual However this either demands access to reliable and
comparable capital stock data or own estimations of the respective capital stocks eg under
the perpetual inventory method Since there is a scarcity of comparable capital stock data for
the CEECs the alternative is own estimations This in turn would require baseline
benchmarks of capital-to-output ratios stocks of human capital etc and is beyond the scope
of this paper For the time being the focus will be on formation of physical capital although
some recent findings on dynamics in TFP will be reported
Figure 10
Annual gross fixed capital formation
05
10152025303540
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Perc
ent o
f GDP Baltic
CEE4SE4NCU
Source data Eurostat (2006)
In the figure above the evolution in annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a share of
GDP for the three groups and the non-catching up economies of EU25 (NCU) is graphed The
statistical aggregate of GFCF is a measure of the net new investment in the domestic economy
in fixed capital assets although not accounting for capital depreciation Obviously GFCF is
not a measure of total investment because all kinds of financial assets are excluded but is a
good indicator of the level of investment activity relevant for real variables such as output
The levels have been consistently high for all three groups of catch-up economies over the
time period As a contrast the investment level for the NCUs has been consistently below 20
percent of GDP for the time period When comparing the groups the most striking trend is the
consistent intensification of investment activity in the Baltic economies Although the general
26
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
Ramsey (1928) Solow (1956) and Koopmans (1965) and the standard production function of
the form
αα minus= 1
tttt LKAY with 10 ltltα (41)
where output Y for an exogenously given level of technology A depends on capital K and
labor L In the original model the savings rate is assumed to be exogenous and constant
Although K generally has been restricted to physical capital one may also think of it in a
broader sense comprising of physical capital and human capital (Mankiw Romer and Weil
1992) The main characteristics of this production function are constant returns to scale (since
the coefficients sum to 1) and diminishing marginal products of the production factors K and
L Hence imagining given levels of technology labor and savings rate additional capital
yields decreasing rates of return and growth rates This implies a steady state where capital
per worker k and output per worker y are constant
( kfy = )
)
(42)
The steady state output y is above all determined by the exogenously given level of
technology A which all economies are supposed to have free access to The assumption of
equal access to available technology or fast technological dispersion can be regarded as valid
for highly open economies with similar levels of education This may be expected for
advanced economies in general eg Western Europe but a critical issue is whether it can be
expanded to include the CEECs as well In the analysis section there will be a discussion of
how technological dispersion can function as a factor behind convergence but for the time
being the term indicating level of technology A is dropped Expression (41) can be rewritten
as
( LKfY = (43)
By dividing by total population N we get the following expression for per capita output
y = ( )NL
LLKf
NY
times= (44)
15
Thus output per capita depends on output per hour of labor (labor productivity) and hours of
labor to total population The latter can be further elaborated in order to take into account the
number of economically active (ie size of the labor force) and the size of the working age
population so that (44) becomes
( )N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKfy timestimestimes=
(45)
where LF is the size of the labor force and WA working age population GDP per capita now
depends on labor productivity hours of labor per economically active LLF the participation
rate LFWA and the size of the working age population to total population In order to
conveniently follow the changes in GDP per capita for a panel of countries the function is on
logarithmic scale and the subscripts i and t indicating country and year are added
( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tititi N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKf
y
lnlnln
lnln (46)
where ln yit ndash ln yit-1 is an approximation of the yearly growth in GDP per capita (for
relatively small changes in y) The mechanisms of economic integration will now be
presented They are illustrated with the well-known Edgeworth-box named after Francis
Ysidro Edgeworth A frequently used way of illustrating the integration process is otherwise
the Solow-diagram (see eg Baldwin 1989) However when comparing two or more
countries in a process of resource reallocation the Edgeworth-box serves as a more suitable
tool Finland and Estonia are used as a hypothetical example of how a richer economy with a
relatively higher degree of capital intensity in the production process can be integrated with a
poorer one with a relatively higher degree of labor intensity
The initial position with an allocation where Finnish production is more capital intensive than
the Estonian is shown below The interpretation is as follows labor increases in Finland
relative Estonia when L(Fin) moves to the right on the horizontal axis Capital in Finland
increases relative Estonia when K(Fin) moves upwards on the vertical axis Labor increases in
Estonia relative Finland when L(Est) moves to the left on the horizontal axis and capital
increases in Estonia relative Finland when K(Est) moves downwards The different
16
allocations between the countries are purely relative measures where K and L are in terms of
the otherrsquos disposal and the vertical and horizontal axis of the box symbolizes the aggregate
supply of the two factors in the region The capital intensity in Finland is K(Fin)L(Fin) and in
the proposed allocation below it is higher than in Estonia this since K(Fin)L(Fin) gt
K(Est)L(Est) Allocations along the diagonal line imply equal intensities and complete
integration in terms of factor prices and factor intensities
Figure 4
42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
In this case the level of output depends on savings rate productivity depreciation and
employment Only growth in productivity and employment rate can increase per capita
output given that the investment rate equals the rate of depreciation ie the economy is in
steady state If not in steady state the economy will grow as long as the marginal product of
capital yields an investment rate higher than the rate of depreciation However because of the
assumption of diminishing marginal returns to capital economies will over the phase of time
converge to the similar level given that they have matching production functions The figure
below shows a situation where Estonia by internal saving accumulates own capital up to its
steady state Thus the aggregate capital stock in the whole region grows (the box grows
upwards) the capital intensity in Estonia increases relative Finlandrsquos and there is convergence
between the two countries In the analysis of section 5 the impact of internal accumulation of
17
capital will be analyzed by comparing data on gross fixed capital formation stemming from
domestic sources
Figure 5
The constraint connected with the basic Solow model when studying integration and
convergence is that it treats the economy as closed Thus internal accumulation of capital can
only force absolute convergence if production functions are identical and the resulting
convergence speed will be low (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7) Economic integration
becomes more dynamic when allowing the factors of production to be internationally mobile
A theoretical situation in which borders are open better resembles the European reality and
results in new possibilities to efficiently allocate capital and labor
43 Integration through capital mobility
In the following sections the basic Solow model is extended to allow for cross border
reallocation of capital and labor Capital mobility in an enlarged economic area gives capital
owners the opportunity to reallocate their resources more efficiently This means intra-
regional reallocation (within the box) as well as a relative change in investments from non-EU
economies (from outside the box) Another difference compared to integration only through
internal accumulation is that the expected speed of convergence in this case is higher
(Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7)
18
One could consider the reallocation of capital to a less capital-rich economy as giving this
economy an ldquoinduced capital formation effectrdquo or ldquomedium-run growth bonusrdquo concepts
introduced by Baldwin (1989) This effect could be seen as an exogenous increase in the
investment rate in the relatively capital-poor country and vice versa in the capital-richer In
the original Solow-setting the investment rate equaled the savings rate and was assumed to be
constant From a welfare perspective this implied that citizens in order to invest more must
save more and consume less In the case where capital is reallocated across borders an
economy can enjoy increased investment activity without forgoing consumption
Figure 6
The figure above illustrates a situation in which capital is reallocated from the relatively
capital-richer Finland to the relatively capital-poorer Estonia This takes place since the
marginal returns to capital diminish and are higher in the relatively capital-poor economy
)()( kfL
LKFy == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the marginal returns to capital and
0)acuteacute()acute(lt=
partpart kf
kkf based on the law of diminishing returns
19
Thus the derivation of this integration mechanism as well as convergence theory in general
is highly dependent on the assumption of diminishing returns to capital This integration
mechanism will be analyzed by comparing inward foreign direct investments (FDI) in the
catch-up economies both as a share of GDP and as a share of gross fixed capital formation
This mechanism is expected to have a large impact on labor productivity thus decisive for
GDP growth and catch-up speed FDI affects labor productivity directly by increasing the
capital intensity in the production process but is also expected to augment the incorporation
of technology in the economy and therefore boost total factor productivity
44 Integration through migration
When borders are opened up for migration movement from poorer economies to richer ones is
expected according to the theory (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 chapter 8) In the capital-rich
economy the labor productivity and the wages are higher In the economy where capital is less
abundant labor productivity and wages are lower The wage asymmetry leads to net migration
from the capital-poor economy to the capital-rich Assuming perfect competition on the factor
markets the relationship between wages and capital intensity can be derived in the following
way
LFFw L partpart
equiv= is the wage
LLKFkfy )()( == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the unit cost of capital
kkfrk )acute(= is the per capita cost of capital in the economy which gives that
wkkfy =minus )`( since the per capita labor cost equals the average wage
By taking the derivative of the last expression with respect to k we get the effect on wages
when the capital intensity is increased
0)acuteacute( gtminus=partpart kkf
kw since facuteacute(k)lt 0
20
Less capital intensive production processes thus have a less productive labor force (the
marginal product of labor is lower) and lower wages other things equal If the assumptions
hold labor migration eg from Estonia to Finland lowers the wages in Finland (since the
capital intensity falls) and increases the wages in Estonia (because of increased capital
intensity) other things equal If overlooking externalities and changeover costs (and assuming
that the migrants are active laborers) the effect on GDP will be unambiguously positive in
Finland and negative in Estonia
Figure 7
In the figure above labor migrates from Estonia to Finland Capital intensity will increase in
Estonia given that to rapid capital depreciation not counteracts boosting convergence in
factor prices and labor productivity (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 8) Although this aspect
of economic integration unambiguously hampers convergence in GDP the effect on per
capita GDP is ambiguous The effect on convergence in per capita GDP depends on whether
the migrants were working in Estonia and if they find a job in Finland Other aspects eg
crowding out on the respective labor markets and the level of skills of the migrants are also
important to take into account but are beyond the scope of this paper Therefore the analysis
will be restricted to solely relate the expected (and most basic) effects from changes in
employment and population to the respective catch-up performances Other things equal
increases in hours of labor per economically active participation rate and the share of the
population in working age will have positive effects on per capita GDP while an increase in
21
total population will affect per capita GDP negatively Accordingly these variables will be
the basis of the analysis in section 5
45 Integration through trade
Cross-border trade and specialization can also function as a mechanism of integration causing
convergence Based on a set of assumptions it can be showed that countries can converge
through the prices of traded goods (and services) without the need for mobility of capital and
labor A fundamental concept is Ricardian trade and comparative advantages which shows
how trade leads to complete specialization in the production of goods (Ricardo 1821) In the
case with only two goods and two countries each country would end up supplying only the
good it produces the most efficiently and trade with each other Heckscher and Ohlin (1933)
and Samuelson (1948) has taken the concept further and shown that international trade gives
rise to factor price equalization through the goods markets given equal levels of technology
Figure 8
Factor price equalization takes place within a restricted area in which incomplete
specialization prevails However the countries keep producing both goods although they tend
to export the one which is produced more efficiently Thus convergence in factor prices can
be brought about without cross-border mobility of capital and labor given that the goods and
services are traded on an international market and that further specialization is possible What
22
factor price equalization does demand is that the factors of production are mobile between
sectors and industries If eg laborers are unwilling to switch sector or accept lower wages the
resulting effect will be unemployment Thus given that convergence of factor prices gives
rise to convergence in per capita output (this will be elaborated in section 54) the degree of
openness to trade will influence the catch-up performances I will analyze this relationship by
comparing data on trade integration (ie the average of imports and exports to GDP)
46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
Based on the outline above a number of important variables affecting growth in per capita
GDP and thus the convergence (or divergence) of economies can be listed The productivity
of labor is a crucial factor affecting the growth rate and the convergence trend If the
productivity of labor increases faster in a poorer economy than in a richer counterpart
convergence will be fostered other things equal Labor productivity is determined by total
factor productivity and the capital intensity in the production process The capital intensity
can be enhanced by internal accumulation of capital and foreign investments
Since the per capita GDP for a given size of the population depends positively on hours of
work per economically active an increase in this variable will boost convergence Holding the
other variables constant positive changes in the participation rate and the share of total
population in working age will affect GDP per capita positively Because of the per capita
approach total population will be negatively correlated with the speed of convergence when
holding the amount of work constant Based on the fourth integration mechanism it is also to
expect that the degree of openness to trade affects the speed of convergence A proxy for the
degree of openness is the economyrsquos trade integration of goods and services as a share of
GDP In the following section these variables (which are summarized in table 3 on the
following page) will be compared with the convergence performances of the catch-up
countries
Table 3
Summary of key variables affecting speed of convergence
23
Variable of interest Expected effect on per capita GDP and convergence speed other things equal
Technology Positive
Internal accumulation of capital Positive
Foreign direct investment Positive
Hours of work per economically active Positive
Participation rate Positive
Working age population Positive
Total population Negative
Trade integration Positive
5 Explaining catch-up performances
In the preceding section basic theory on economic integration and possible mechanisms
fostering convergence was outlined These mechanisms will now be related to the
performances of the catch-up economies that were briefly presented in section 3 The analysis
is based on descriptive statistics on the key variables presented above and their relation to
economic theory The grouping of the catch-up economies introduced in section 3 is applied
The three groups are (1) the Baltic Member States (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS and (3) SE4 ie the Southern European MS It was showed in section 3 that
the Baltic group had the lowest initial per capita GDPs and grew faster than CEE4 SE4 had
initial per capita GDPs closest to the average of EU25 and grew slower than CEE4
51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
On the basis of the production function the factors contributing to growth are labor
productivity and employment Labor productivity in turn is a broad concept which depends
on both available capital per worker ie the capital intensity and the way in which the factors
of production are exogenously turned into output ie level of technology or TFP Further the
amount of capital depends on internal capital formation and inward foreign direct
investments as well as the consumption of fixed capital ie capital depreciation Evolutions
in capital formation as well as level of technology are expected to be highly decisive for
growth in per capita GDP Firstly the average annual change in labor productivity and per
capita GDP are graphed against each other
24
Figure 9
Labor productivity vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
SpainAv
erag
e an
nual
cha
nge
(in
)
Per capita GDPLabor productivity
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As expected labor productivity and per capita GDP co-varies strongly Although the data is
rather convincing in stressing the importance of the broad concept of labor productivity to
growth and thus catch-up speed there are a few remarks to be done before this concept is to
be further elaborated From the bars above one can distinguish a pattern in which labor
productivity increases by more than per capita GDP for poorer economies and vice versa (the
higher the initial level of per capita GDP the farther to the right the country is located on the
x-axis) The extreme case seems to be Spain for which labor productivity played a relatively
unimportant role in explaining increases in per capita GDP Other comparatively rich nations
such as Greece Portugal and Slovenia also had lower impacts from labor productivity in
contrast to eg Estonia Lithuania and Poland Nevertheless the figures are (with the
exception of Spain) considerably higher than for the non-catching up economies and thus help
to explain convergence In the Euro area as an example the corresponding average annual
labor productivity growth was just one percent (Kaitala 2004)
52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
As it nearly seems to be an explain-it-all correlation between catch-up and labor productivity
the concept has to be further investigated In section 4 it was showed how internal savings and
cross-border reallocation of capital can deepen economic integration and foster convergence
Besides capital formation an important factor in the integration process is the dispersion and
25
incorporation of technology ie changes in TFP The evolution in TFP can be derived by
estimating the so-called Solow residual However this either demands access to reliable and
comparable capital stock data or own estimations of the respective capital stocks eg under
the perpetual inventory method Since there is a scarcity of comparable capital stock data for
the CEECs the alternative is own estimations This in turn would require baseline
benchmarks of capital-to-output ratios stocks of human capital etc and is beyond the scope
of this paper For the time being the focus will be on formation of physical capital although
some recent findings on dynamics in TFP will be reported
Figure 10
Annual gross fixed capital formation
05
10152025303540
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Perc
ent o
f GDP Baltic
CEE4SE4NCU
Source data Eurostat (2006)
In the figure above the evolution in annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a share of
GDP for the three groups and the non-catching up economies of EU25 (NCU) is graphed The
statistical aggregate of GFCF is a measure of the net new investment in the domestic economy
in fixed capital assets although not accounting for capital depreciation Obviously GFCF is
not a measure of total investment because all kinds of financial assets are excluded but is a
good indicator of the level of investment activity relevant for real variables such as output
The levels have been consistently high for all three groups of catch-up economies over the
time period As a contrast the investment level for the NCUs has been consistently below 20
percent of GDP for the time period When comparing the groups the most striking trend is the
consistent intensification of investment activity in the Baltic economies Although the general
26
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
Thus output per capita depends on output per hour of labor (labor productivity) and hours of
labor to total population The latter can be further elaborated in order to take into account the
number of economically active (ie size of the labor force) and the size of the working age
population so that (44) becomes
( )N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKfy timestimestimes=
(45)
where LF is the size of the labor force and WA working age population GDP per capita now
depends on labor productivity hours of labor per economically active LLF the participation
rate LFWA and the size of the working age population to total population In order to
conveniently follow the changes in GDP per capita for a panel of countries the function is on
logarithmic scale and the subscripts i and t indicating country and year are added
( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
tititi N
WAWALF
LFL
LLKf
y
lnlnln
lnln (46)
where ln yit ndash ln yit-1 is an approximation of the yearly growth in GDP per capita (for
relatively small changes in y) The mechanisms of economic integration will now be
presented They are illustrated with the well-known Edgeworth-box named after Francis
Ysidro Edgeworth A frequently used way of illustrating the integration process is otherwise
the Solow-diagram (see eg Baldwin 1989) However when comparing two or more
countries in a process of resource reallocation the Edgeworth-box serves as a more suitable
tool Finland and Estonia are used as a hypothetical example of how a richer economy with a
relatively higher degree of capital intensity in the production process can be integrated with a
poorer one with a relatively higher degree of labor intensity
The initial position with an allocation where Finnish production is more capital intensive than
the Estonian is shown below The interpretation is as follows labor increases in Finland
relative Estonia when L(Fin) moves to the right on the horizontal axis Capital in Finland
increases relative Estonia when K(Fin) moves upwards on the vertical axis Labor increases in
Estonia relative Finland when L(Est) moves to the left on the horizontal axis and capital
increases in Estonia relative Finland when K(Est) moves downwards The different
16
allocations between the countries are purely relative measures where K and L are in terms of
the otherrsquos disposal and the vertical and horizontal axis of the box symbolizes the aggregate
supply of the two factors in the region The capital intensity in Finland is K(Fin)L(Fin) and in
the proposed allocation below it is higher than in Estonia this since K(Fin)L(Fin) gt
K(Est)L(Est) Allocations along the diagonal line imply equal intensities and complete
integration in terms of factor prices and factor intensities
Figure 4
42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
In this case the level of output depends on savings rate productivity depreciation and
employment Only growth in productivity and employment rate can increase per capita
output given that the investment rate equals the rate of depreciation ie the economy is in
steady state If not in steady state the economy will grow as long as the marginal product of
capital yields an investment rate higher than the rate of depreciation However because of the
assumption of diminishing marginal returns to capital economies will over the phase of time
converge to the similar level given that they have matching production functions The figure
below shows a situation where Estonia by internal saving accumulates own capital up to its
steady state Thus the aggregate capital stock in the whole region grows (the box grows
upwards) the capital intensity in Estonia increases relative Finlandrsquos and there is convergence
between the two countries In the analysis of section 5 the impact of internal accumulation of
17
capital will be analyzed by comparing data on gross fixed capital formation stemming from
domestic sources
Figure 5
The constraint connected with the basic Solow model when studying integration and
convergence is that it treats the economy as closed Thus internal accumulation of capital can
only force absolute convergence if production functions are identical and the resulting
convergence speed will be low (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7) Economic integration
becomes more dynamic when allowing the factors of production to be internationally mobile
A theoretical situation in which borders are open better resembles the European reality and
results in new possibilities to efficiently allocate capital and labor
43 Integration through capital mobility
In the following sections the basic Solow model is extended to allow for cross border
reallocation of capital and labor Capital mobility in an enlarged economic area gives capital
owners the opportunity to reallocate their resources more efficiently This means intra-
regional reallocation (within the box) as well as a relative change in investments from non-EU
economies (from outside the box) Another difference compared to integration only through
internal accumulation is that the expected speed of convergence in this case is higher
(Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7)
18
One could consider the reallocation of capital to a less capital-rich economy as giving this
economy an ldquoinduced capital formation effectrdquo or ldquomedium-run growth bonusrdquo concepts
introduced by Baldwin (1989) This effect could be seen as an exogenous increase in the
investment rate in the relatively capital-poor country and vice versa in the capital-richer In
the original Solow-setting the investment rate equaled the savings rate and was assumed to be
constant From a welfare perspective this implied that citizens in order to invest more must
save more and consume less In the case where capital is reallocated across borders an
economy can enjoy increased investment activity without forgoing consumption
Figure 6
The figure above illustrates a situation in which capital is reallocated from the relatively
capital-richer Finland to the relatively capital-poorer Estonia This takes place since the
marginal returns to capital diminish and are higher in the relatively capital-poor economy
)()( kfL
LKFy == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the marginal returns to capital and
0)acuteacute()acute(lt=
partpart kf
kkf based on the law of diminishing returns
19
Thus the derivation of this integration mechanism as well as convergence theory in general
is highly dependent on the assumption of diminishing returns to capital This integration
mechanism will be analyzed by comparing inward foreign direct investments (FDI) in the
catch-up economies both as a share of GDP and as a share of gross fixed capital formation
This mechanism is expected to have a large impact on labor productivity thus decisive for
GDP growth and catch-up speed FDI affects labor productivity directly by increasing the
capital intensity in the production process but is also expected to augment the incorporation
of technology in the economy and therefore boost total factor productivity
44 Integration through migration
When borders are opened up for migration movement from poorer economies to richer ones is
expected according to the theory (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 chapter 8) In the capital-rich
economy the labor productivity and the wages are higher In the economy where capital is less
abundant labor productivity and wages are lower The wage asymmetry leads to net migration
from the capital-poor economy to the capital-rich Assuming perfect competition on the factor
markets the relationship between wages and capital intensity can be derived in the following
way
LFFw L partpart
equiv= is the wage
LLKFkfy )()( == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the unit cost of capital
kkfrk )acute(= is the per capita cost of capital in the economy which gives that
wkkfy =minus )`( since the per capita labor cost equals the average wage
By taking the derivative of the last expression with respect to k we get the effect on wages
when the capital intensity is increased
0)acuteacute( gtminus=partpart kkf
kw since facuteacute(k)lt 0
20
Less capital intensive production processes thus have a less productive labor force (the
marginal product of labor is lower) and lower wages other things equal If the assumptions
hold labor migration eg from Estonia to Finland lowers the wages in Finland (since the
capital intensity falls) and increases the wages in Estonia (because of increased capital
intensity) other things equal If overlooking externalities and changeover costs (and assuming
that the migrants are active laborers) the effect on GDP will be unambiguously positive in
Finland and negative in Estonia
Figure 7
In the figure above labor migrates from Estonia to Finland Capital intensity will increase in
Estonia given that to rapid capital depreciation not counteracts boosting convergence in
factor prices and labor productivity (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 8) Although this aspect
of economic integration unambiguously hampers convergence in GDP the effect on per
capita GDP is ambiguous The effect on convergence in per capita GDP depends on whether
the migrants were working in Estonia and if they find a job in Finland Other aspects eg
crowding out on the respective labor markets and the level of skills of the migrants are also
important to take into account but are beyond the scope of this paper Therefore the analysis
will be restricted to solely relate the expected (and most basic) effects from changes in
employment and population to the respective catch-up performances Other things equal
increases in hours of labor per economically active participation rate and the share of the
population in working age will have positive effects on per capita GDP while an increase in
21
total population will affect per capita GDP negatively Accordingly these variables will be
the basis of the analysis in section 5
45 Integration through trade
Cross-border trade and specialization can also function as a mechanism of integration causing
convergence Based on a set of assumptions it can be showed that countries can converge
through the prices of traded goods (and services) without the need for mobility of capital and
labor A fundamental concept is Ricardian trade and comparative advantages which shows
how trade leads to complete specialization in the production of goods (Ricardo 1821) In the
case with only two goods and two countries each country would end up supplying only the
good it produces the most efficiently and trade with each other Heckscher and Ohlin (1933)
and Samuelson (1948) has taken the concept further and shown that international trade gives
rise to factor price equalization through the goods markets given equal levels of technology
Figure 8
Factor price equalization takes place within a restricted area in which incomplete
specialization prevails However the countries keep producing both goods although they tend
to export the one which is produced more efficiently Thus convergence in factor prices can
be brought about without cross-border mobility of capital and labor given that the goods and
services are traded on an international market and that further specialization is possible What
22
factor price equalization does demand is that the factors of production are mobile between
sectors and industries If eg laborers are unwilling to switch sector or accept lower wages the
resulting effect will be unemployment Thus given that convergence of factor prices gives
rise to convergence in per capita output (this will be elaborated in section 54) the degree of
openness to trade will influence the catch-up performances I will analyze this relationship by
comparing data on trade integration (ie the average of imports and exports to GDP)
46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
Based on the outline above a number of important variables affecting growth in per capita
GDP and thus the convergence (or divergence) of economies can be listed The productivity
of labor is a crucial factor affecting the growth rate and the convergence trend If the
productivity of labor increases faster in a poorer economy than in a richer counterpart
convergence will be fostered other things equal Labor productivity is determined by total
factor productivity and the capital intensity in the production process The capital intensity
can be enhanced by internal accumulation of capital and foreign investments
Since the per capita GDP for a given size of the population depends positively on hours of
work per economically active an increase in this variable will boost convergence Holding the
other variables constant positive changes in the participation rate and the share of total
population in working age will affect GDP per capita positively Because of the per capita
approach total population will be negatively correlated with the speed of convergence when
holding the amount of work constant Based on the fourth integration mechanism it is also to
expect that the degree of openness to trade affects the speed of convergence A proxy for the
degree of openness is the economyrsquos trade integration of goods and services as a share of
GDP In the following section these variables (which are summarized in table 3 on the
following page) will be compared with the convergence performances of the catch-up
countries
Table 3
Summary of key variables affecting speed of convergence
23
Variable of interest Expected effect on per capita GDP and convergence speed other things equal
Technology Positive
Internal accumulation of capital Positive
Foreign direct investment Positive
Hours of work per economically active Positive
Participation rate Positive
Working age population Positive
Total population Negative
Trade integration Positive
5 Explaining catch-up performances
In the preceding section basic theory on economic integration and possible mechanisms
fostering convergence was outlined These mechanisms will now be related to the
performances of the catch-up economies that were briefly presented in section 3 The analysis
is based on descriptive statistics on the key variables presented above and their relation to
economic theory The grouping of the catch-up economies introduced in section 3 is applied
The three groups are (1) the Baltic Member States (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS and (3) SE4 ie the Southern European MS It was showed in section 3 that
the Baltic group had the lowest initial per capita GDPs and grew faster than CEE4 SE4 had
initial per capita GDPs closest to the average of EU25 and grew slower than CEE4
51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
On the basis of the production function the factors contributing to growth are labor
productivity and employment Labor productivity in turn is a broad concept which depends
on both available capital per worker ie the capital intensity and the way in which the factors
of production are exogenously turned into output ie level of technology or TFP Further the
amount of capital depends on internal capital formation and inward foreign direct
investments as well as the consumption of fixed capital ie capital depreciation Evolutions
in capital formation as well as level of technology are expected to be highly decisive for
growth in per capita GDP Firstly the average annual change in labor productivity and per
capita GDP are graphed against each other
24
Figure 9
Labor productivity vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
SpainAv
erag
e an
nual
cha
nge
(in
)
Per capita GDPLabor productivity
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As expected labor productivity and per capita GDP co-varies strongly Although the data is
rather convincing in stressing the importance of the broad concept of labor productivity to
growth and thus catch-up speed there are a few remarks to be done before this concept is to
be further elaborated From the bars above one can distinguish a pattern in which labor
productivity increases by more than per capita GDP for poorer economies and vice versa (the
higher the initial level of per capita GDP the farther to the right the country is located on the
x-axis) The extreme case seems to be Spain for which labor productivity played a relatively
unimportant role in explaining increases in per capita GDP Other comparatively rich nations
such as Greece Portugal and Slovenia also had lower impacts from labor productivity in
contrast to eg Estonia Lithuania and Poland Nevertheless the figures are (with the
exception of Spain) considerably higher than for the non-catching up economies and thus help
to explain convergence In the Euro area as an example the corresponding average annual
labor productivity growth was just one percent (Kaitala 2004)
52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
As it nearly seems to be an explain-it-all correlation between catch-up and labor productivity
the concept has to be further investigated In section 4 it was showed how internal savings and
cross-border reallocation of capital can deepen economic integration and foster convergence
Besides capital formation an important factor in the integration process is the dispersion and
25
incorporation of technology ie changes in TFP The evolution in TFP can be derived by
estimating the so-called Solow residual However this either demands access to reliable and
comparable capital stock data or own estimations of the respective capital stocks eg under
the perpetual inventory method Since there is a scarcity of comparable capital stock data for
the CEECs the alternative is own estimations This in turn would require baseline
benchmarks of capital-to-output ratios stocks of human capital etc and is beyond the scope
of this paper For the time being the focus will be on formation of physical capital although
some recent findings on dynamics in TFP will be reported
Figure 10
Annual gross fixed capital formation
05
10152025303540
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Perc
ent o
f GDP Baltic
CEE4SE4NCU
Source data Eurostat (2006)
In the figure above the evolution in annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a share of
GDP for the three groups and the non-catching up economies of EU25 (NCU) is graphed The
statistical aggregate of GFCF is a measure of the net new investment in the domestic economy
in fixed capital assets although not accounting for capital depreciation Obviously GFCF is
not a measure of total investment because all kinds of financial assets are excluded but is a
good indicator of the level of investment activity relevant for real variables such as output
The levels have been consistently high for all three groups of catch-up economies over the
time period As a contrast the investment level for the NCUs has been consistently below 20
percent of GDP for the time period When comparing the groups the most striking trend is the
consistent intensification of investment activity in the Baltic economies Although the general
26
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
allocations between the countries are purely relative measures where K and L are in terms of
the otherrsquos disposal and the vertical and horizontal axis of the box symbolizes the aggregate
supply of the two factors in the region The capital intensity in Finland is K(Fin)L(Fin) and in
the proposed allocation below it is higher than in Estonia this since K(Fin)L(Fin) gt
K(Est)L(Est) Allocations along the diagonal line imply equal intensities and complete
integration in terms of factor prices and factor intensities
Figure 4
42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
In this case the level of output depends on savings rate productivity depreciation and
employment Only growth in productivity and employment rate can increase per capita
output given that the investment rate equals the rate of depreciation ie the economy is in
steady state If not in steady state the economy will grow as long as the marginal product of
capital yields an investment rate higher than the rate of depreciation However because of the
assumption of diminishing marginal returns to capital economies will over the phase of time
converge to the similar level given that they have matching production functions The figure
below shows a situation where Estonia by internal saving accumulates own capital up to its
steady state Thus the aggregate capital stock in the whole region grows (the box grows
upwards) the capital intensity in Estonia increases relative Finlandrsquos and there is convergence
between the two countries In the analysis of section 5 the impact of internal accumulation of
17
capital will be analyzed by comparing data on gross fixed capital formation stemming from
domestic sources
Figure 5
The constraint connected with the basic Solow model when studying integration and
convergence is that it treats the economy as closed Thus internal accumulation of capital can
only force absolute convergence if production functions are identical and the resulting
convergence speed will be low (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7) Economic integration
becomes more dynamic when allowing the factors of production to be internationally mobile
A theoretical situation in which borders are open better resembles the European reality and
results in new possibilities to efficiently allocate capital and labor
43 Integration through capital mobility
In the following sections the basic Solow model is extended to allow for cross border
reallocation of capital and labor Capital mobility in an enlarged economic area gives capital
owners the opportunity to reallocate their resources more efficiently This means intra-
regional reallocation (within the box) as well as a relative change in investments from non-EU
economies (from outside the box) Another difference compared to integration only through
internal accumulation is that the expected speed of convergence in this case is higher
(Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7)
18
One could consider the reallocation of capital to a less capital-rich economy as giving this
economy an ldquoinduced capital formation effectrdquo or ldquomedium-run growth bonusrdquo concepts
introduced by Baldwin (1989) This effect could be seen as an exogenous increase in the
investment rate in the relatively capital-poor country and vice versa in the capital-richer In
the original Solow-setting the investment rate equaled the savings rate and was assumed to be
constant From a welfare perspective this implied that citizens in order to invest more must
save more and consume less In the case where capital is reallocated across borders an
economy can enjoy increased investment activity without forgoing consumption
Figure 6
The figure above illustrates a situation in which capital is reallocated from the relatively
capital-richer Finland to the relatively capital-poorer Estonia This takes place since the
marginal returns to capital diminish and are higher in the relatively capital-poor economy
)()( kfL
LKFy == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the marginal returns to capital and
0)acuteacute()acute(lt=
partpart kf
kkf based on the law of diminishing returns
19
Thus the derivation of this integration mechanism as well as convergence theory in general
is highly dependent on the assumption of diminishing returns to capital This integration
mechanism will be analyzed by comparing inward foreign direct investments (FDI) in the
catch-up economies both as a share of GDP and as a share of gross fixed capital formation
This mechanism is expected to have a large impact on labor productivity thus decisive for
GDP growth and catch-up speed FDI affects labor productivity directly by increasing the
capital intensity in the production process but is also expected to augment the incorporation
of technology in the economy and therefore boost total factor productivity
44 Integration through migration
When borders are opened up for migration movement from poorer economies to richer ones is
expected according to the theory (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 chapter 8) In the capital-rich
economy the labor productivity and the wages are higher In the economy where capital is less
abundant labor productivity and wages are lower The wage asymmetry leads to net migration
from the capital-poor economy to the capital-rich Assuming perfect competition on the factor
markets the relationship between wages and capital intensity can be derived in the following
way
LFFw L partpart
equiv= is the wage
LLKFkfy )()( == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the unit cost of capital
kkfrk )acute(= is the per capita cost of capital in the economy which gives that
wkkfy =minus )`( since the per capita labor cost equals the average wage
By taking the derivative of the last expression with respect to k we get the effect on wages
when the capital intensity is increased
0)acuteacute( gtminus=partpart kkf
kw since facuteacute(k)lt 0
20
Less capital intensive production processes thus have a less productive labor force (the
marginal product of labor is lower) and lower wages other things equal If the assumptions
hold labor migration eg from Estonia to Finland lowers the wages in Finland (since the
capital intensity falls) and increases the wages in Estonia (because of increased capital
intensity) other things equal If overlooking externalities and changeover costs (and assuming
that the migrants are active laborers) the effect on GDP will be unambiguously positive in
Finland and negative in Estonia
Figure 7
In the figure above labor migrates from Estonia to Finland Capital intensity will increase in
Estonia given that to rapid capital depreciation not counteracts boosting convergence in
factor prices and labor productivity (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 8) Although this aspect
of economic integration unambiguously hampers convergence in GDP the effect on per
capita GDP is ambiguous The effect on convergence in per capita GDP depends on whether
the migrants were working in Estonia and if they find a job in Finland Other aspects eg
crowding out on the respective labor markets and the level of skills of the migrants are also
important to take into account but are beyond the scope of this paper Therefore the analysis
will be restricted to solely relate the expected (and most basic) effects from changes in
employment and population to the respective catch-up performances Other things equal
increases in hours of labor per economically active participation rate and the share of the
population in working age will have positive effects on per capita GDP while an increase in
21
total population will affect per capita GDP negatively Accordingly these variables will be
the basis of the analysis in section 5
45 Integration through trade
Cross-border trade and specialization can also function as a mechanism of integration causing
convergence Based on a set of assumptions it can be showed that countries can converge
through the prices of traded goods (and services) without the need for mobility of capital and
labor A fundamental concept is Ricardian trade and comparative advantages which shows
how trade leads to complete specialization in the production of goods (Ricardo 1821) In the
case with only two goods and two countries each country would end up supplying only the
good it produces the most efficiently and trade with each other Heckscher and Ohlin (1933)
and Samuelson (1948) has taken the concept further and shown that international trade gives
rise to factor price equalization through the goods markets given equal levels of technology
Figure 8
Factor price equalization takes place within a restricted area in which incomplete
specialization prevails However the countries keep producing both goods although they tend
to export the one which is produced more efficiently Thus convergence in factor prices can
be brought about without cross-border mobility of capital and labor given that the goods and
services are traded on an international market and that further specialization is possible What
22
factor price equalization does demand is that the factors of production are mobile between
sectors and industries If eg laborers are unwilling to switch sector or accept lower wages the
resulting effect will be unemployment Thus given that convergence of factor prices gives
rise to convergence in per capita output (this will be elaborated in section 54) the degree of
openness to trade will influence the catch-up performances I will analyze this relationship by
comparing data on trade integration (ie the average of imports and exports to GDP)
46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
Based on the outline above a number of important variables affecting growth in per capita
GDP and thus the convergence (or divergence) of economies can be listed The productivity
of labor is a crucial factor affecting the growth rate and the convergence trend If the
productivity of labor increases faster in a poorer economy than in a richer counterpart
convergence will be fostered other things equal Labor productivity is determined by total
factor productivity and the capital intensity in the production process The capital intensity
can be enhanced by internal accumulation of capital and foreign investments
Since the per capita GDP for a given size of the population depends positively on hours of
work per economically active an increase in this variable will boost convergence Holding the
other variables constant positive changes in the participation rate and the share of total
population in working age will affect GDP per capita positively Because of the per capita
approach total population will be negatively correlated with the speed of convergence when
holding the amount of work constant Based on the fourth integration mechanism it is also to
expect that the degree of openness to trade affects the speed of convergence A proxy for the
degree of openness is the economyrsquos trade integration of goods and services as a share of
GDP In the following section these variables (which are summarized in table 3 on the
following page) will be compared with the convergence performances of the catch-up
countries
Table 3
Summary of key variables affecting speed of convergence
23
Variable of interest Expected effect on per capita GDP and convergence speed other things equal
Technology Positive
Internal accumulation of capital Positive
Foreign direct investment Positive
Hours of work per economically active Positive
Participation rate Positive
Working age population Positive
Total population Negative
Trade integration Positive
5 Explaining catch-up performances
In the preceding section basic theory on economic integration and possible mechanisms
fostering convergence was outlined These mechanisms will now be related to the
performances of the catch-up economies that were briefly presented in section 3 The analysis
is based on descriptive statistics on the key variables presented above and their relation to
economic theory The grouping of the catch-up economies introduced in section 3 is applied
The three groups are (1) the Baltic Member States (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS and (3) SE4 ie the Southern European MS It was showed in section 3 that
the Baltic group had the lowest initial per capita GDPs and grew faster than CEE4 SE4 had
initial per capita GDPs closest to the average of EU25 and grew slower than CEE4
51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
On the basis of the production function the factors contributing to growth are labor
productivity and employment Labor productivity in turn is a broad concept which depends
on both available capital per worker ie the capital intensity and the way in which the factors
of production are exogenously turned into output ie level of technology or TFP Further the
amount of capital depends on internal capital formation and inward foreign direct
investments as well as the consumption of fixed capital ie capital depreciation Evolutions
in capital formation as well as level of technology are expected to be highly decisive for
growth in per capita GDP Firstly the average annual change in labor productivity and per
capita GDP are graphed against each other
24
Figure 9
Labor productivity vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
SpainAv
erag
e an
nual
cha
nge
(in
)
Per capita GDPLabor productivity
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As expected labor productivity and per capita GDP co-varies strongly Although the data is
rather convincing in stressing the importance of the broad concept of labor productivity to
growth and thus catch-up speed there are a few remarks to be done before this concept is to
be further elaborated From the bars above one can distinguish a pattern in which labor
productivity increases by more than per capita GDP for poorer economies and vice versa (the
higher the initial level of per capita GDP the farther to the right the country is located on the
x-axis) The extreme case seems to be Spain for which labor productivity played a relatively
unimportant role in explaining increases in per capita GDP Other comparatively rich nations
such as Greece Portugal and Slovenia also had lower impacts from labor productivity in
contrast to eg Estonia Lithuania and Poland Nevertheless the figures are (with the
exception of Spain) considerably higher than for the non-catching up economies and thus help
to explain convergence In the Euro area as an example the corresponding average annual
labor productivity growth was just one percent (Kaitala 2004)
52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
As it nearly seems to be an explain-it-all correlation between catch-up and labor productivity
the concept has to be further investigated In section 4 it was showed how internal savings and
cross-border reallocation of capital can deepen economic integration and foster convergence
Besides capital formation an important factor in the integration process is the dispersion and
25
incorporation of technology ie changes in TFP The evolution in TFP can be derived by
estimating the so-called Solow residual However this either demands access to reliable and
comparable capital stock data or own estimations of the respective capital stocks eg under
the perpetual inventory method Since there is a scarcity of comparable capital stock data for
the CEECs the alternative is own estimations This in turn would require baseline
benchmarks of capital-to-output ratios stocks of human capital etc and is beyond the scope
of this paper For the time being the focus will be on formation of physical capital although
some recent findings on dynamics in TFP will be reported
Figure 10
Annual gross fixed capital formation
05
10152025303540
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Perc
ent o
f GDP Baltic
CEE4SE4NCU
Source data Eurostat (2006)
In the figure above the evolution in annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a share of
GDP for the three groups and the non-catching up economies of EU25 (NCU) is graphed The
statistical aggregate of GFCF is a measure of the net new investment in the domestic economy
in fixed capital assets although not accounting for capital depreciation Obviously GFCF is
not a measure of total investment because all kinds of financial assets are excluded but is a
good indicator of the level of investment activity relevant for real variables such as output
The levels have been consistently high for all three groups of catch-up economies over the
time period As a contrast the investment level for the NCUs has been consistently below 20
percent of GDP for the time period When comparing the groups the most striking trend is the
consistent intensification of investment activity in the Baltic economies Although the general
26
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
capital will be analyzed by comparing data on gross fixed capital formation stemming from
domestic sources
Figure 5
The constraint connected with the basic Solow model when studying integration and
convergence is that it treats the economy as closed Thus internal accumulation of capital can
only force absolute convergence if production functions are identical and the resulting
convergence speed will be low (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7) Economic integration
becomes more dynamic when allowing the factors of production to be internationally mobile
A theoretical situation in which borders are open better resembles the European reality and
results in new possibilities to efficiently allocate capital and labor
43 Integration through capital mobility
In the following sections the basic Solow model is extended to allow for cross border
reallocation of capital and labor Capital mobility in an enlarged economic area gives capital
owners the opportunity to reallocate their resources more efficiently This means intra-
regional reallocation (within the box) as well as a relative change in investments from non-EU
economies (from outside the box) Another difference compared to integration only through
internal accumulation is that the expected speed of convergence in this case is higher
(Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 7)
18
One could consider the reallocation of capital to a less capital-rich economy as giving this
economy an ldquoinduced capital formation effectrdquo or ldquomedium-run growth bonusrdquo concepts
introduced by Baldwin (1989) This effect could be seen as an exogenous increase in the
investment rate in the relatively capital-poor country and vice versa in the capital-richer In
the original Solow-setting the investment rate equaled the savings rate and was assumed to be
constant From a welfare perspective this implied that citizens in order to invest more must
save more and consume less In the case where capital is reallocated across borders an
economy can enjoy increased investment activity without forgoing consumption
Figure 6
The figure above illustrates a situation in which capital is reallocated from the relatively
capital-richer Finland to the relatively capital-poorer Estonia This takes place since the
marginal returns to capital diminish and are higher in the relatively capital-poor economy
)()( kfL
LKFy == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the marginal returns to capital and
0)acuteacute()acute(lt=
partpart kf
kkf based on the law of diminishing returns
19
Thus the derivation of this integration mechanism as well as convergence theory in general
is highly dependent on the assumption of diminishing returns to capital This integration
mechanism will be analyzed by comparing inward foreign direct investments (FDI) in the
catch-up economies both as a share of GDP and as a share of gross fixed capital formation
This mechanism is expected to have a large impact on labor productivity thus decisive for
GDP growth and catch-up speed FDI affects labor productivity directly by increasing the
capital intensity in the production process but is also expected to augment the incorporation
of technology in the economy and therefore boost total factor productivity
44 Integration through migration
When borders are opened up for migration movement from poorer economies to richer ones is
expected according to the theory (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 chapter 8) In the capital-rich
economy the labor productivity and the wages are higher In the economy where capital is less
abundant labor productivity and wages are lower The wage asymmetry leads to net migration
from the capital-poor economy to the capital-rich Assuming perfect competition on the factor
markets the relationship between wages and capital intensity can be derived in the following
way
LFFw L partpart
equiv= is the wage
LLKFkfy )()( == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the unit cost of capital
kkfrk )acute(= is the per capita cost of capital in the economy which gives that
wkkfy =minus )`( since the per capita labor cost equals the average wage
By taking the derivative of the last expression with respect to k we get the effect on wages
when the capital intensity is increased
0)acuteacute( gtminus=partpart kkf
kw since facuteacute(k)lt 0
20
Less capital intensive production processes thus have a less productive labor force (the
marginal product of labor is lower) and lower wages other things equal If the assumptions
hold labor migration eg from Estonia to Finland lowers the wages in Finland (since the
capital intensity falls) and increases the wages in Estonia (because of increased capital
intensity) other things equal If overlooking externalities and changeover costs (and assuming
that the migrants are active laborers) the effect on GDP will be unambiguously positive in
Finland and negative in Estonia
Figure 7
In the figure above labor migrates from Estonia to Finland Capital intensity will increase in
Estonia given that to rapid capital depreciation not counteracts boosting convergence in
factor prices and labor productivity (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 8) Although this aspect
of economic integration unambiguously hampers convergence in GDP the effect on per
capita GDP is ambiguous The effect on convergence in per capita GDP depends on whether
the migrants were working in Estonia and if they find a job in Finland Other aspects eg
crowding out on the respective labor markets and the level of skills of the migrants are also
important to take into account but are beyond the scope of this paper Therefore the analysis
will be restricted to solely relate the expected (and most basic) effects from changes in
employment and population to the respective catch-up performances Other things equal
increases in hours of labor per economically active participation rate and the share of the
population in working age will have positive effects on per capita GDP while an increase in
21
total population will affect per capita GDP negatively Accordingly these variables will be
the basis of the analysis in section 5
45 Integration through trade
Cross-border trade and specialization can also function as a mechanism of integration causing
convergence Based on a set of assumptions it can be showed that countries can converge
through the prices of traded goods (and services) without the need for mobility of capital and
labor A fundamental concept is Ricardian trade and comparative advantages which shows
how trade leads to complete specialization in the production of goods (Ricardo 1821) In the
case with only two goods and two countries each country would end up supplying only the
good it produces the most efficiently and trade with each other Heckscher and Ohlin (1933)
and Samuelson (1948) has taken the concept further and shown that international trade gives
rise to factor price equalization through the goods markets given equal levels of technology
Figure 8
Factor price equalization takes place within a restricted area in which incomplete
specialization prevails However the countries keep producing both goods although they tend
to export the one which is produced more efficiently Thus convergence in factor prices can
be brought about without cross-border mobility of capital and labor given that the goods and
services are traded on an international market and that further specialization is possible What
22
factor price equalization does demand is that the factors of production are mobile between
sectors and industries If eg laborers are unwilling to switch sector or accept lower wages the
resulting effect will be unemployment Thus given that convergence of factor prices gives
rise to convergence in per capita output (this will be elaborated in section 54) the degree of
openness to trade will influence the catch-up performances I will analyze this relationship by
comparing data on trade integration (ie the average of imports and exports to GDP)
46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
Based on the outline above a number of important variables affecting growth in per capita
GDP and thus the convergence (or divergence) of economies can be listed The productivity
of labor is a crucial factor affecting the growth rate and the convergence trend If the
productivity of labor increases faster in a poorer economy than in a richer counterpart
convergence will be fostered other things equal Labor productivity is determined by total
factor productivity and the capital intensity in the production process The capital intensity
can be enhanced by internal accumulation of capital and foreign investments
Since the per capita GDP for a given size of the population depends positively on hours of
work per economically active an increase in this variable will boost convergence Holding the
other variables constant positive changes in the participation rate and the share of total
population in working age will affect GDP per capita positively Because of the per capita
approach total population will be negatively correlated with the speed of convergence when
holding the amount of work constant Based on the fourth integration mechanism it is also to
expect that the degree of openness to trade affects the speed of convergence A proxy for the
degree of openness is the economyrsquos trade integration of goods and services as a share of
GDP In the following section these variables (which are summarized in table 3 on the
following page) will be compared with the convergence performances of the catch-up
countries
Table 3
Summary of key variables affecting speed of convergence
23
Variable of interest Expected effect on per capita GDP and convergence speed other things equal
Technology Positive
Internal accumulation of capital Positive
Foreign direct investment Positive
Hours of work per economically active Positive
Participation rate Positive
Working age population Positive
Total population Negative
Trade integration Positive
5 Explaining catch-up performances
In the preceding section basic theory on economic integration and possible mechanisms
fostering convergence was outlined These mechanisms will now be related to the
performances of the catch-up economies that were briefly presented in section 3 The analysis
is based on descriptive statistics on the key variables presented above and their relation to
economic theory The grouping of the catch-up economies introduced in section 3 is applied
The three groups are (1) the Baltic Member States (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS and (3) SE4 ie the Southern European MS It was showed in section 3 that
the Baltic group had the lowest initial per capita GDPs and grew faster than CEE4 SE4 had
initial per capita GDPs closest to the average of EU25 and grew slower than CEE4
51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
On the basis of the production function the factors contributing to growth are labor
productivity and employment Labor productivity in turn is a broad concept which depends
on both available capital per worker ie the capital intensity and the way in which the factors
of production are exogenously turned into output ie level of technology or TFP Further the
amount of capital depends on internal capital formation and inward foreign direct
investments as well as the consumption of fixed capital ie capital depreciation Evolutions
in capital formation as well as level of technology are expected to be highly decisive for
growth in per capita GDP Firstly the average annual change in labor productivity and per
capita GDP are graphed against each other
24
Figure 9
Labor productivity vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
SpainAv
erag
e an
nual
cha
nge
(in
)
Per capita GDPLabor productivity
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As expected labor productivity and per capita GDP co-varies strongly Although the data is
rather convincing in stressing the importance of the broad concept of labor productivity to
growth and thus catch-up speed there are a few remarks to be done before this concept is to
be further elaborated From the bars above one can distinguish a pattern in which labor
productivity increases by more than per capita GDP for poorer economies and vice versa (the
higher the initial level of per capita GDP the farther to the right the country is located on the
x-axis) The extreme case seems to be Spain for which labor productivity played a relatively
unimportant role in explaining increases in per capita GDP Other comparatively rich nations
such as Greece Portugal and Slovenia also had lower impacts from labor productivity in
contrast to eg Estonia Lithuania and Poland Nevertheless the figures are (with the
exception of Spain) considerably higher than for the non-catching up economies and thus help
to explain convergence In the Euro area as an example the corresponding average annual
labor productivity growth was just one percent (Kaitala 2004)
52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
As it nearly seems to be an explain-it-all correlation between catch-up and labor productivity
the concept has to be further investigated In section 4 it was showed how internal savings and
cross-border reallocation of capital can deepen economic integration and foster convergence
Besides capital formation an important factor in the integration process is the dispersion and
25
incorporation of technology ie changes in TFP The evolution in TFP can be derived by
estimating the so-called Solow residual However this either demands access to reliable and
comparable capital stock data or own estimations of the respective capital stocks eg under
the perpetual inventory method Since there is a scarcity of comparable capital stock data for
the CEECs the alternative is own estimations This in turn would require baseline
benchmarks of capital-to-output ratios stocks of human capital etc and is beyond the scope
of this paper For the time being the focus will be on formation of physical capital although
some recent findings on dynamics in TFP will be reported
Figure 10
Annual gross fixed capital formation
05
10152025303540
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Perc
ent o
f GDP Baltic
CEE4SE4NCU
Source data Eurostat (2006)
In the figure above the evolution in annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a share of
GDP for the three groups and the non-catching up economies of EU25 (NCU) is graphed The
statistical aggregate of GFCF is a measure of the net new investment in the domestic economy
in fixed capital assets although not accounting for capital depreciation Obviously GFCF is
not a measure of total investment because all kinds of financial assets are excluded but is a
good indicator of the level of investment activity relevant for real variables such as output
The levels have been consistently high for all three groups of catch-up economies over the
time period As a contrast the investment level for the NCUs has been consistently below 20
percent of GDP for the time period When comparing the groups the most striking trend is the
consistent intensification of investment activity in the Baltic economies Although the general
26
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
One could consider the reallocation of capital to a less capital-rich economy as giving this
economy an ldquoinduced capital formation effectrdquo or ldquomedium-run growth bonusrdquo concepts
introduced by Baldwin (1989) This effect could be seen as an exogenous increase in the
investment rate in the relatively capital-poor country and vice versa in the capital-richer In
the original Solow-setting the investment rate equaled the savings rate and was assumed to be
constant From a welfare perspective this implied that citizens in order to invest more must
save more and consume less In the case where capital is reallocated across borders an
economy can enjoy increased investment activity without forgoing consumption
Figure 6
The figure above illustrates a situation in which capital is reallocated from the relatively
capital-richer Finland to the relatively capital-poorer Estonia This takes place since the
marginal returns to capital diminish and are higher in the relatively capital-poor economy
)()( kfL
LKFy == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the marginal returns to capital and
0)acuteacute()acute(lt=
partpart kf
kkf based on the law of diminishing returns
19
Thus the derivation of this integration mechanism as well as convergence theory in general
is highly dependent on the assumption of diminishing returns to capital This integration
mechanism will be analyzed by comparing inward foreign direct investments (FDI) in the
catch-up economies both as a share of GDP and as a share of gross fixed capital formation
This mechanism is expected to have a large impact on labor productivity thus decisive for
GDP growth and catch-up speed FDI affects labor productivity directly by increasing the
capital intensity in the production process but is also expected to augment the incorporation
of technology in the economy and therefore boost total factor productivity
44 Integration through migration
When borders are opened up for migration movement from poorer economies to richer ones is
expected according to the theory (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 chapter 8) In the capital-rich
economy the labor productivity and the wages are higher In the economy where capital is less
abundant labor productivity and wages are lower The wage asymmetry leads to net migration
from the capital-poor economy to the capital-rich Assuming perfect competition on the factor
markets the relationship between wages and capital intensity can be derived in the following
way
LFFw L partpart
equiv= is the wage
LLKFkfy )()( == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the unit cost of capital
kkfrk )acute(= is the per capita cost of capital in the economy which gives that
wkkfy =minus )`( since the per capita labor cost equals the average wage
By taking the derivative of the last expression with respect to k we get the effect on wages
when the capital intensity is increased
0)acuteacute( gtminus=partpart kkf
kw since facuteacute(k)lt 0
20
Less capital intensive production processes thus have a less productive labor force (the
marginal product of labor is lower) and lower wages other things equal If the assumptions
hold labor migration eg from Estonia to Finland lowers the wages in Finland (since the
capital intensity falls) and increases the wages in Estonia (because of increased capital
intensity) other things equal If overlooking externalities and changeover costs (and assuming
that the migrants are active laborers) the effect on GDP will be unambiguously positive in
Finland and negative in Estonia
Figure 7
In the figure above labor migrates from Estonia to Finland Capital intensity will increase in
Estonia given that to rapid capital depreciation not counteracts boosting convergence in
factor prices and labor productivity (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 8) Although this aspect
of economic integration unambiguously hampers convergence in GDP the effect on per
capita GDP is ambiguous The effect on convergence in per capita GDP depends on whether
the migrants were working in Estonia and if they find a job in Finland Other aspects eg
crowding out on the respective labor markets and the level of skills of the migrants are also
important to take into account but are beyond the scope of this paper Therefore the analysis
will be restricted to solely relate the expected (and most basic) effects from changes in
employment and population to the respective catch-up performances Other things equal
increases in hours of labor per economically active participation rate and the share of the
population in working age will have positive effects on per capita GDP while an increase in
21
total population will affect per capita GDP negatively Accordingly these variables will be
the basis of the analysis in section 5
45 Integration through trade
Cross-border trade and specialization can also function as a mechanism of integration causing
convergence Based on a set of assumptions it can be showed that countries can converge
through the prices of traded goods (and services) without the need for mobility of capital and
labor A fundamental concept is Ricardian trade and comparative advantages which shows
how trade leads to complete specialization in the production of goods (Ricardo 1821) In the
case with only two goods and two countries each country would end up supplying only the
good it produces the most efficiently and trade with each other Heckscher and Ohlin (1933)
and Samuelson (1948) has taken the concept further and shown that international trade gives
rise to factor price equalization through the goods markets given equal levels of technology
Figure 8
Factor price equalization takes place within a restricted area in which incomplete
specialization prevails However the countries keep producing both goods although they tend
to export the one which is produced more efficiently Thus convergence in factor prices can
be brought about without cross-border mobility of capital and labor given that the goods and
services are traded on an international market and that further specialization is possible What
22
factor price equalization does demand is that the factors of production are mobile between
sectors and industries If eg laborers are unwilling to switch sector or accept lower wages the
resulting effect will be unemployment Thus given that convergence of factor prices gives
rise to convergence in per capita output (this will be elaborated in section 54) the degree of
openness to trade will influence the catch-up performances I will analyze this relationship by
comparing data on trade integration (ie the average of imports and exports to GDP)
46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
Based on the outline above a number of important variables affecting growth in per capita
GDP and thus the convergence (or divergence) of economies can be listed The productivity
of labor is a crucial factor affecting the growth rate and the convergence trend If the
productivity of labor increases faster in a poorer economy than in a richer counterpart
convergence will be fostered other things equal Labor productivity is determined by total
factor productivity and the capital intensity in the production process The capital intensity
can be enhanced by internal accumulation of capital and foreign investments
Since the per capita GDP for a given size of the population depends positively on hours of
work per economically active an increase in this variable will boost convergence Holding the
other variables constant positive changes in the participation rate and the share of total
population in working age will affect GDP per capita positively Because of the per capita
approach total population will be negatively correlated with the speed of convergence when
holding the amount of work constant Based on the fourth integration mechanism it is also to
expect that the degree of openness to trade affects the speed of convergence A proxy for the
degree of openness is the economyrsquos trade integration of goods and services as a share of
GDP In the following section these variables (which are summarized in table 3 on the
following page) will be compared with the convergence performances of the catch-up
countries
Table 3
Summary of key variables affecting speed of convergence
23
Variable of interest Expected effect on per capita GDP and convergence speed other things equal
Technology Positive
Internal accumulation of capital Positive
Foreign direct investment Positive
Hours of work per economically active Positive
Participation rate Positive
Working age population Positive
Total population Negative
Trade integration Positive
5 Explaining catch-up performances
In the preceding section basic theory on economic integration and possible mechanisms
fostering convergence was outlined These mechanisms will now be related to the
performances of the catch-up economies that were briefly presented in section 3 The analysis
is based on descriptive statistics on the key variables presented above and their relation to
economic theory The grouping of the catch-up economies introduced in section 3 is applied
The three groups are (1) the Baltic Member States (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS and (3) SE4 ie the Southern European MS It was showed in section 3 that
the Baltic group had the lowest initial per capita GDPs and grew faster than CEE4 SE4 had
initial per capita GDPs closest to the average of EU25 and grew slower than CEE4
51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
On the basis of the production function the factors contributing to growth are labor
productivity and employment Labor productivity in turn is a broad concept which depends
on both available capital per worker ie the capital intensity and the way in which the factors
of production are exogenously turned into output ie level of technology or TFP Further the
amount of capital depends on internal capital formation and inward foreign direct
investments as well as the consumption of fixed capital ie capital depreciation Evolutions
in capital formation as well as level of technology are expected to be highly decisive for
growth in per capita GDP Firstly the average annual change in labor productivity and per
capita GDP are graphed against each other
24
Figure 9
Labor productivity vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
SpainAv
erag
e an
nual
cha
nge
(in
)
Per capita GDPLabor productivity
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As expected labor productivity and per capita GDP co-varies strongly Although the data is
rather convincing in stressing the importance of the broad concept of labor productivity to
growth and thus catch-up speed there are a few remarks to be done before this concept is to
be further elaborated From the bars above one can distinguish a pattern in which labor
productivity increases by more than per capita GDP for poorer economies and vice versa (the
higher the initial level of per capita GDP the farther to the right the country is located on the
x-axis) The extreme case seems to be Spain for which labor productivity played a relatively
unimportant role in explaining increases in per capita GDP Other comparatively rich nations
such as Greece Portugal and Slovenia also had lower impacts from labor productivity in
contrast to eg Estonia Lithuania and Poland Nevertheless the figures are (with the
exception of Spain) considerably higher than for the non-catching up economies and thus help
to explain convergence In the Euro area as an example the corresponding average annual
labor productivity growth was just one percent (Kaitala 2004)
52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
As it nearly seems to be an explain-it-all correlation between catch-up and labor productivity
the concept has to be further investigated In section 4 it was showed how internal savings and
cross-border reallocation of capital can deepen economic integration and foster convergence
Besides capital formation an important factor in the integration process is the dispersion and
25
incorporation of technology ie changes in TFP The evolution in TFP can be derived by
estimating the so-called Solow residual However this either demands access to reliable and
comparable capital stock data or own estimations of the respective capital stocks eg under
the perpetual inventory method Since there is a scarcity of comparable capital stock data for
the CEECs the alternative is own estimations This in turn would require baseline
benchmarks of capital-to-output ratios stocks of human capital etc and is beyond the scope
of this paper For the time being the focus will be on formation of physical capital although
some recent findings on dynamics in TFP will be reported
Figure 10
Annual gross fixed capital formation
05
10152025303540
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Perc
ent o
f GDP Baltic
CEE4SE4NCU
Source data Eurostat (2006)
In the figure above the evolution in annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a share of
GDP for the three groups and the non-catching up economies of EU25 (NCU) is graphed The
statistical aggregate of GFCF is a measure of the net new investment in the domestic economy
in fixed capital assets although not accounting for capital depreciation Obviously GFCF is
not a measure of total investment because all kinds of financial assets are excluded but is a
good indicator of the level of investment activity relevant for real variables such as output
The levels have been consistently high for all three groups of catch-up economies over the
time period As a contrast the investment level for the NCUs has been consistently below 20
percent of GDP for the time period When comparing the groups the most striking trend is the
consistent intensification of investment activity in the Baltic economies Although the general
26
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
Thus the derivation of this integration mechanism as well as convergence theory in general
is highly dependent on the assumption of diminishing returns to capital This integration
mechanism will be analyzed by comparing inward foreign direct investments (FDI) in the
catch-up economies both as a share of GDP and as a share of gross fixed capital formation
This mechanism is expected to have a large impact on labor productivity thus decisive for
GDP growth and catch-up speed FDI affects labor productivity directly by increasing the
capital intensity in the production process but is also expected to augment the incorporation
of technology in the economy and therefore boost total factor productivity
44 Integration through migration
When borders are opened up for migration movement from poorer economies to richer ones is
expected according to the theory (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 chapter 8) In the capital-rich
economy the labor productivity and the wages are higher In the economy where capital is less
abundant labor productivity and wages are lower The wage asymmetry leads to net migration
from the capital-poor economy to the capital-rich Assuming perfect competition on the factor
markets the relationship between wages and capital intensity can be derived in the following
way
LFFw L partpart
equiv= is the wage
LLKFkfy )()( == is output per capita (or worker)
)acute(kfr = is the unit cost of capital
kkfrk )acute(= is the per capita cost of capital in the economy which gives that
wkkfy =minus )`( since the per capita labor cost equals the average wage
By taking the derivative of the last expression with respect to k we get the effect on wages
when the capital intensity is increased
0)acuteacute( gtminus=partpart kkf
kw since facuteacute(k)lt 0
20
Less capital intensive production processes thus have a less productive labor force (the
marginal product of labor is lower) and lower wages other things equal If the assumptions
hold labor migration eg from Estonia to Finland lowers the wages in Finland (since the
capital intensity falls) and increases the wages in Estonia (because of increased capital
intensity) other things equal If overlooking externalities and changeover costs (and assuming
that the migrants are active laborers) the effect on GDP will be unambiguously positive in
Finland and negative in Estonia
Figure 7
In the figure above labor migrates from Estonia to Finland Capital intensity will increase in
Estonia given that to rapid capital depreciation not counteracts boosting convergence in
factor prices and labor productivity (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 8) Although this aspect
of economic integration unambiguously hampers convergence in GDP the effect on per
capita GDP is ambiguous The effect on convergence in per capita GDP depends on whether
the migrants were working in Estonia and if they find a job in Finland Other aspects eg
crowding out on the respective labor markets and the level of skills of the migrants are also
important to take into account but are beyond the scope of this paper Therefore the analysis
will be restricted to solely relate the expected (and most basic) effects from changes in
employment and population to the respective catch-up performances Other things equal
increases in hours of labor per economically active participation rate and the share of the
population in working age will have positive effects on per capita GDP while an increase in
21
total population will affect per capita GDP negatively Accordingly these variables will be
the basis of the analysis in section 5
45 Integration through trade
Cross-border trade and specialization can also function as a mechanism of integration causing
convergence Based on a set of assumptions it can be showed that countries can converge
through the prices of traded goods (and services) without the need for mobility of capital and
labor A fundamental concept is Ricardian trade and comparative advantages which shows
how trade leads to complete specialization in the production of goods (Ricardo 1821) In the
case with only two goods and two countries each country would end up supplying only the
good it produces the most efficiently and trade with each other Heckscher and Ohlin (1933)
and Samuelson (1948) has taken the concept further and shown that international trade gives
rise to factor price equalization through the goods markets given equal levels of technology
Figure 8
Factor price equalization takes place within a restricted area in which incomplete
specialization prevails However the countries keep producing both goods although they tend
to export the one which is produced more efficiently Thus convergence in factor prices can
be brought about without cross-border mobility of capital and labor given that the goods and
services are traded on an international market and that further specialization is possible What
22
factor price equalization does demand is that the factors of production are mobile between
sectors and industries If eg laborers are unwilling to switch sector or accept lower wages the
resulting effect will be unemployment Thus given that convergence of factor prices gives
rise to convergence in per capita output (this will be elaborated in section 54) the degree of
openness to trade will influence the catch-up performances I will analyze this relationship by
comparing data on trade integration (ie the average of imports and exports to GDP)
46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
Based on the outline above a number of important variables affecting growth in per capita
GDP and thus the convergence (or divergence) of economies can be listed The productivity
of labor is a crucial factor affecting the growth rate and the convergence trend If the
productivity of labor increases faster in a poorer economy than in a richer counterpart
convergence will be fostered other things equal Labor productivity is determined by total
factor productivity and the capital intensity in the production process The capital intensity
can be enhanced by internal accumulation of capital and foreign investments
Since the per capita GDP for a given size of the population depends positively on hours of
work per economically active an increase in this variable will boost convergence Holding the
other variables constant positive changes in the participation rate and the share of total
population in working age will affect GDP per capita positively Because of the per capita
approach total population will be negatively correlated with the speed of convergence when
holding the amount of work constant Based on the fourth integration mechanism it is also to
expect that the degree of openness to trade affects the speed of convergence A proxy for the
degree of openness is the economyrsquos trade integration of goods and services as a share of
GDP In the following section these variables (which are summarized in table 3 on the
following page) will be compared with the convergence performances of the catch-up
countries
Table 3
Summary of key variables affecting speed of convergence
23
Variable of interest Expected effect on per capita GDP and convergence speed other things equal
Technology Positive
Internal accumulation of capital Positive
Foreign direct investment Positive
Hours of work per economically active Positive
Participation rate Positive
Working age population Positive
Total population Negative
Trade integration Positive
5 Explaining catch-up performances
In the preceding section basic theory on economic integration and possible mechanisms
fostering convergence was outlined These mechanisms will now be related to the
performances of the catch-up economies that were briefly presented in section 3 The analysis
is based on descriptive statistics on the key variables presented above and their relation to
economic theory The grouping of the catch-up economies introduced in section 3 is applied
The three groups are (1) the Baltic Member States (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS and (3) SE4 ie the Southern European MS It was showed in section 3 that
the Baltic group had the lowest initial per capita GDPs and grew faster than CEE4 SE4 had
initial per capita GDPs closest to the average of EU25 and grew slower than CEE4
51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
On the basis of the production function the factors contributing to growth are labor
productivity and employment Labor productivity in turn is a broad concept which depends
on both available capital per worker ie the capital intensity and the way in which the factors
of production are exogenously turned into output ie level of technology or TFP Further the
amount of capital depends on internal capital formation and inward foreign direct
investments as well as the consumption of fixed capital ie capital depreciation Evolutions
in capital formation as well as level of technology are expected to be highly decisive for
growth in per capita GDP Firstly the average annual change in labor productivity and per
capita GDP are graphed against each other
24
Figure 9
Labor productivity vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
SpainAv
erag
e an
nual
cha
nge
(in
)
Per capita GDPLabor productivity
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As expected labor productivity and per capita GDP co-varies strongly Although the data is
rather convincing in stressing the importance of the broad concept of labor productivity to
growth and thus catch-up speed there are a few remarks to be done before this concept is to
be further elaborated From the bars above one can distinguish a pattern in which labor
productivity increases by more than per capita GDP for poorer economies and vice versa (the
higher the initial level of per capita GDP the farther to the right the country is located on the
x-axis) The extreme case seems to be Spain for which labor productivity played a relatively
unimportant role in explaining increases in per capita GDP Other comparatively rich nations
such as Greece Portugal and Slovenia also had lower impacts from labor productivity in
contrast to eg Estonia Lithuania and Poland Nevertheless the figures are (with the
exception of Spain) considerably higher than for the non-catching up economies and thus help
to explain convergence In the Euro area as an example the corresponding average annual
labor productivity growth was just one percent (Kaitala 2004)
52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
As it nearly seems to be an explain-it-all correlation between catch-up and labor productivity
the concept has to be further investigated In section 4 it was showed how internal savings and
cross-border reallocation of capital can deepen economic integration and foster convergence
Besides capital formation an important factor in the integration process is the dispersion and
25
incorporation of technology ie changes in TFP The evolution in TFP can be derived by
estimating the so-called Solow residual However this either demands access to reliable and
comparable capital stock data or own estimations of the respective capital stocks eg under
the perpetual inventory method Since there is a scarcity of comparable capital stock data for
the CEECs the alternative is own estimations This in turn would require baseline
benchmarks of capital-to-output ratios stocks of human capital etc and is beyond the scope
of this paper For the time being the focus will be on formation of physical capital although
some recent findings on dynamics in TFP will be reported
Figure 10
Annual gross fixed capital formation
05
10152025303540
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Perc
ent o
f GDP Baltic
CEE4SE4NCU
Source data Eurostat (2006)
In the figure above the evolution in annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a share of
GDP for the three groups and the non-catching up economies of EU25 (NCU) is graphed The
statistical aggregate of GFCF is a measure of the net new investment in the domestic economy
in fixed capital assets although not accounting for capital depreciation Obviously GFCF is
not a measure of total investment because all kinds of financial assets are excluded but is a
good indicator of the level of investment activity relevant for real variables such as output
The levels have been consistently high for all three groups of catch-up economies over the
time period As a contrast the investment level for the NCUs has been consistently below 20
percent of GDP for the time period When comparing the groups the most striking trend is the
consistent intensification of investment activity in the Baltic economies Although the general
26
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
Less capital intensive production processes thus have a less productive labor force (the
marginal product of labor is lower) and lower wages other things equal If the assumptions
hold labor migration eg from Estonia to Finland lowers the wages in Finland (since the
capital intensity falls) and increases the wages in Estonia (because of increased capital
intensity) other things equal If overlooking externalities and changeover costs (and assuming
that the migrants are active laborers) the effect on GDP will be unambiguously positive in
Finland and negative in Estonia
Figure 7
In the figure above labor migrates from Estonia to Finland Capital intensity will increase in
Estonia given that to rapid capital depreciation not counteracts boosting convergence in
factor prices and labor productivity (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006 ch 8) Although this aspect
of economic integration unambiguously hampers convergence in GDP the effect on per
capita GDP is ambiguous The effect on convergence in per capita GDP depends on whether
the migrants were working in Estonia and if they find a job in Finland Other aspects eg
crowding out on the respective labor markets and the level of skills of the migrants are also
important to take into account but are beyond the scope of this paper Therefore the analysis
will be restricted to solely relate the expected (and most basic) effects from changes in
employment and population to the respective catch-up performances Other things equal
increases in hours of labor per economically active participation rate and the share of the
population in working age will have positive effects on per capita GDP while an increase in
21
total population will affect per capita GDP negatively Accordingly these variables will be
the basis of the analysis in section 5
45 Integration through trade
Cross-border trade and specialization can also function as a mechanism of integration causing
convergence Based on a set of assumptions it can be showed that countries can converge
through the prices of traded goods (and services) without the need for mobility of capital and
labor A fundamental concept is Ricardian trade and comparative advantages which shows
how trade leads to complete specialization in the production of goods (Ricardo 1821) In the
case with only two goods and two countries each country would end up supplying only the
good it produces the most efficiently and trade with each other Heckscher and Ohlin (1933)
and Samuelson (1948) has taken the concept further and shown that international trade gives
rise to factor price equalization through the goods markets given equal levels of technology
Figure 8
Factor price equalization takes place within a restricted area in which incomplete
specialization prevails However the countries keep producing both goods although they tend
to export the one which is produced more efficiently Thus convergence in factor prices can
be brought about without cross-border mobility of capital and labor given that the goods and
services are traded on an international market and that further specialization is possible What
22
factor price equalization does demand is that the factors of production are mobile between
sectors and industries If eg laborers are unwilling to switch sector or accept lower wages the
resulting effect will be unemployment Thus given that convergence of factor prices gives
rise to convergence in per capita output (this will be elaborated in section 54) the degree of
openness to trade will influence the catch-up performances I will analyze this relationship by
comparing data on trade integration (ie the average of imports and exports to GDP)
46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
Based on the outline above a number of important variables affecting growth in per capita
GDP and thus the convergence (or divergence) of economies can be listed The productivity
of labor is a crucial factor affecting the growth rate and the convergence trend If the
productivity of labor increases faster in a poorer economy than in a richer counterpart
convergence will be fostered other things equal Labor productivity is determined by total
factor productivity and the capital intensity in the production process The capital intensity
can be enhanced by internal accumulation of capital and foreign investments
Since the per capita GDP for a given size of the population depends positively on hours of
work per economically active an increase in this variable will boost convergence Holding the
other variables constant positive changes in the participation rate and the share of total
population in working age will affect GDP per capita positively Because of the per capita
approach total population will be negatively correlated with the speed of convergence when
holding the amount of work constant Based on the fourth integration mechanism it is also to
expect that the degree of openness to trade affects the speed of convergence A proxy for the
degree of openness is the economyrsquos trade integration of goods and services as a share of
GDP In the following section these variables (which are summarized in table 3 on the
following page) will be compared with the convergence performances of the catch-up
countries
Table 3
Summary of key variables affecting speed of convergence
23
Variable of interest Expected effect on per capita GDP and convergence speed other things equal
Technology Positive
Internal accumulation of capital Positive
Foreign direct investment Positive
Hours of work per economically active Positive
Participation rate Positive
Working age population Positive
Total population Negative
Trade integration Positive
5 Explaining catch-up performances
In the preceding section basic theory on economic integration and possible mechanisms
fostering convergence was outlined These mechanisms will now be related to the
performances of the catch-up economies that were briefly presented in section 3 The analysis
is based on descriptive statistics on the key variables presented above and their relation to
economic theory The grouping of the catch-up economies introduced in section 3 is applied
The three groups are (1) the Baltic Member States (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS and (3) SE4 ie the Southern European MS It was showed in section 3 that
the Baltic group had the lowest initial per capita GDPs and grew faster than CEE4 SE4 had
initial per capita GDPs closest to the average of EU25 and grew slower than CEE4
51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
On the basis of the production function the factors contributing to growth are labor
productivity and employment Labor productivity in turn is a broad concept which depends
on both available capital per worker ie the capital intensity and the way in which the factors
of production are exogenously turned into output ie level of technology or TFP Further the
amount of capital depends on internal capital formation and inward foreign direct
investments as well as the consumption of fixed capital ie capital depreciation Evolutions
in capital formation as well as level of technology are expected to be highly decisive for
growth in per capita GDP Firstly the average annual change in labor productivity and per
capita GDP are graphed against each other
24
Figure 9
Labor productivity vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
SpainAv
erag
e an
nual
cha
nge
(in
)
Per capita GDPLabor productivity
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As expected labor productivity and per capita GDP co-varies strongly Although the data is
rather convincing in stressing the importance of the broad concept of labor productivity to
growth and thus catch-up speed there are a few remarks to be done before this concept is to
be further elaborated From the bars above one can distinguish a pattern in which labor
productivity increases by more than per capita GDP for poorer economies and vice versa (the
higher the initial level of per capita GDP the farther to the right the country is located on the
x-axis) The extreme case seems to be Spain for which labor productivity played a relatively
unimportant role in explaining increases in per capita GDP Other comparatively rich nations
such as Greece Portugal and Slovenia also had lower impacts from labor productivity in
contrast to eg Estonia Lithuania and Poland Nevertheless the figures are (with the
exception of Spain) considerably higher than for the non-catching up economies and thus help
to explain convergence In the Euro area as an example the corresponding average annual
labor productivity growth was just one percent (Kaitala 2004)
52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
As it nearly seems to be an explain-it-all correlation between catch-up and labor productivity
the concept has to be further investigated In section 4 it was showed how internal savings and
cross-border reallocation of capital can deepen economic integration and foster convergence
Besides capital formation an important factor in the integration process is the dispersion and
25
incorporation of technology ie changes in TFP The evolution in TFP can be derived by
estimating the so-called Solow residual However this either demands access to reliable and
comparable capital stock data or own estimations of the respective capital stocks eg under
the perpetual inventory method Since there is a scarcity of comparable capital stock data for
the CEECs the alternative is own estimations This in turn would require baseline
benchmarks of capital-to-output ratios stocks of human capital etc and is beyond the scope
of this paper For the time being the focus will be on formation of physical capital although
some recent findings on dynamics in TFP will be reported
Figure 10
Annual gross fixed capital formation
05
10152025303540
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Perc
ent o
f GDP Baltic
CEE4SE4NCU
Source data Eurostat (2006)
In the figure above the evolution in annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a share of
GDP for the three groups and the non-catching up economies of EU25 (NCU) is graphed The
statistical aggregate of GFCF is a measure of the net new investment in the domestic economy
in fixed capital assets although not accounting for capital depreciation Obviously GFCF is
not a measure of total investment because all kinds of financial assets are excluded but is a
good indicator of the level of investment activity relevant for real variables such as output
The levels have been consistently high for all three groups of catch-up economies over the
time period As a contrast the investment level for the NCUs has been consistently below 20
percent of GDP for the time period When comparing the groups the most striking trend is the
consistent intensification of investment activity in the Baltic economies Although the general
26
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
total population will affect per capita GDP negatively Accordingly these variables will be
the basis of the analysis in section 5
45 Integration through trade
Cross-border trade and specialization can also function as a mechanism of integration causing
convergence Based on a set of assumptions it can be showed that countries can converge
through the prices of traded goods (and services) without the need for mobility of capital and
labor A fundamental concept is Ricardian trade and comparative advantages which shows
how trade leads to complete specialization in the production of goods (Ricardo 1821) In the
case with only two goods and two countries each country would end up supplying only the
good it produces the most efficiently and trade with each other Heckscher and Ohlin (1933)
and Samuelson (1948) has taken the concept further and shown that international trade gives
rise to factor price equalization through the goods markets given equal levels of technology
Figure 8
Factor price equalization takes place within a restricted area in which incomplete
specialization prevails However the countries keep producing both goods although they tend
to export the one which is produced more efficiently Thus convergence in factor prices can
be brought about without cross-border mobility of capital and labor given that the goods and
services are traded on an international market and that further specialization is possible What
22
factor price equalization does demand is that the factors of production are mobile between
sectors and industries If eg laborers are unwilling to switch sector or accept lower wages the
resulting effect will be unemployment Thus given that convergence of factor prices gives
rise to convergence in per capita output (this will be elaborated in section 54) the degree of
openness to trade will influence the catch-up performances I will analyze this relationship by
comparing data on trade integration (ie the average of imports and exports to GDP)
46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
Based on the outline above a number of important variables affecting growth in per capita
GDP and thus the convergence (or divergence) of economies can be listed The productivity
of labor is a crucial factor affecting the growth rate and the convergence trend If the
productivity of labor increases faster in a poorer economy than in a richer counterpart
convergence will be fostered other things equal Labor productivity is determined by total
factor productivity and the capital intensity in the production process The capital intensity
can be enhanced by internal accumulation of capital and foreign investments
Since the per capita GDP for a given size of the population depends positively on hours of
work per economically active an increase in this variable will boost convergence Holding the
other variables constant positive changes in the participation rate and the share of total
population in working age will affect GDP per capita positively Because of the per capita
approach total population will be negatively correlated with the speed of convergence when
holding the amount of work constant Based on the fourth integration mechanism it is also to
expect that the degree of openness to trade affects the speed of convergence A proxy for the
degree of openness is the economyrsquos trade integration of goods and services as a share of
GDP In the following section these variables (which are summarized in table 3 on the
following page) will be compared with the convergence performances of the catch-up
countries
Table 3
Summary of key variables affecting speed of convergence
23
Variable of interest Expected effect on per capita GDP and convergence speed other things equal
Technology Positive
Internal accumulation of capital Positive
Foreign direct investment Positive
Hours of work per economically active Positive
Participation rate Positive
Working age population Positive
Total population Negative
Trade integration Positive
5 Explaining catch-up performances
In the preceding section basic theory on economic integration and possible mechanisms
fostering convergence was outlined These mechanisms will now be related to the
performances of the catch-up economies that were briefly presented in section 3 The analysis
is based on descriptive statistics on the key variables presented above and their relation to
economic theory The grouping of the catch-up economies introduced in section 3 is applied
The three groups are (1) the Baltic Member States (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS and (3) SE4 ie the Southern European MS It was showed in section 3 that
the Baltic group had the lowest initial per capita GDPs and grew faster than CEE4 SE4 had
initial per capita GDPs closest to the average of EU25 and grew slower than CEE4
51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
On the basis of the production function the factors contributing to growth are labor
productivity and employment Labor productivity in turn is a broad concept which depends
on both available capital per worker ie the capital intensity and the way in which the factors
of production are exogenously turned into output ie level of technology or TFP Further the
amount of capital depends on internal capital formation and inward foreign direct
investments as well as the consumption of fixed capital ie capital depreciation Evolutions
in capital formation as well as level of technology are expected to be highly decisive for
growth in per capita GDP Firstly the average annual change in labor productivity and per
capita GDP are graphed against each other
24
Figure 9
Labor productivity vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
SpainAv
erag
e an
nual
cha
nge
(in
)
Per capita GDPLabor productivity
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As expected labor productivity and per capita GDP co-varies strongly Although the data is
rather convincing in stressing the importance of the broad concept of labor productivity to
growth and thus catch-up speed there are a few remarks to be done before this concept is to
be further elaborated From the bars above one can distinguish a pattern in which labor
productivity increases by more than per capita GDP for poorer economies and vice versa (the
higher the initial level of per capita GDP the farther to the right the country is located on the
x-axis) The extreme case seems to be Spain for which labor productivity played a relatively
unimportant role in explaining increases in per capita GDP Other comparatively rich nations
such as Greece Portugal and Slovenia also had lower impacts from labor productivity in
contrast to eg Estonia Lithuania and Poland Nevertheless the figures are (with the
exception of Spain) considerably higher than for the non-catching up economies and thus help
to explain convergence In the Euro area as an example the corresponding average annual
labor productivity growth was just one percent (Kaitala 2004)
52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
As it nearly seems to be an explain-it-all correlation between catch-up and labor productivity
the concept has to be further investigated In section 4 it was showed how internal savings and
cross-border reallocation of capital can deepen economic integration and foster convergence
Besides capital formation an important factor in the integration process is the dispersion and
25
incorporation of technology ie changes in TFP The evolution in TFP can be derived by
estimating the so-called Solow residual However this either demands access to reliable and
comparable capital stock data or own estimations of the respective capital stocks eg under
the perpetual inventory method Since there is a scarcity of comparable capital stock data for
the CEECs the alternative is own estimations This in turn would require baseline
benchmarks of capital-to-output ratios stocks of human capital etc and is beyond the scope
of this paper For the time being the focus will be on formation of physical capital although
some recent findings on dynamics in TFP will be reported
Figure 10
Annual gross fixed capital formation
05
10152025303540
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Perc
ent o
f GDP Baltic
CEE4SE4NCU
Source data Eurostat (2006)
In the figure above the evolution in annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a share of
GDP for the three groups and the non-catching up economies of EU25 (NCU) is graphed The
statistical aggregate of GFCF is a measure of the net new investment in the domestic economy
in fixed capital assets although not accounting for capital depreciation Obviously GFCF is
not a measure of total investment because all kinds of financial assets are excluded but is a
good indicator of the level of investment activity relevant for real variables such as output
The levels have been consistently high for all three groups of catch-up economies over the
time period As a contrast the investment level for the NCUs has been consistently below 20
percent of GDP for the time period When comparing the groups the most striking trend is the
consistent intensification of investment activity in the Baltic economies Although the general
26
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
factor price equalization does demand is that the factors of production are mobile between
sectors and industries If eg laborers are unwilling to switch sector or accept lower wages the
resulting effect will be unemployment Thus given that convergence of factor prices gives
rise to convergence in per capita output (this will be elaborated in section 54) the degree of
openness to trade will influence the catch-up performances I will analyze this relationship by
comparing data on trade integration (ie the average of imports and exports to GDP)
46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
Based on the outline above a number of important variables affecting growth in per capita
GDP and thus the convergence (or divergence) of economies can be listed The productivity
of labor is a crucial factor affecting the growth rate and the convergence trend If the
productivity of labor increases faster in a poorer economy than in a richer counterpart
convergence will be fostered other things equal Labor productivity is determined by total
factor productivity and the capital intensity in the production process The capital intensity
can be enhanced by internal accumulation of capital and foreign investments
Since the per capita GDP for a given size of the population depends positively on hours of
work per economically active an increase in this variable will boost convergence Holding the
other variables constant positive changes in the participation rate and the share of total
population in working age will affect GDP per capita positively Because of the per capita
approach total population will be negatively correlated with the speed of convergence when
holding the amount of work constant Based on the fourth integration mechanism it is also to
expect that the degree of openness to trade affects the speed of convergence A proxy for the
degree of openness is the economyrsquos trade integration of goods and services as a share of
GDP In the following section these variables (which are summarized in table 3 on the
following page) will be compared with the convergence performances of the catch-up
countries
Table 3
Summary of key variables affecting speed of convergence
23
Variable of interest Expected effect on per capita GDP and convergence speed other things equal
Technology Positive
Internal accumulation of capital Positive
Foreign direct investment Positive
Hours of work per economically active Positive
Participation rate Positive
Working age population Positive
Total population Negative
Trade integration Positive
5 Explaining catch-up performances
In the preceding section basic theory on economic integration and possible mechanisms
fostering convergence was outlined These mechanisms will now be related to the
performances of the catch-up economies that were briefly presented in section 3 The analysis
is based on descriptive statistics on the key variables presented above and their relation to
economic theory The grouping of the catch-up economies introduced in section 3 is applied
The three groups are (1) the Baltic Member States (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS and (3) SE4 ie the Southern European MS It was showed in section 3 that
the Baltic group had the lowest initial per capita GDPs and grew faster than CEE4 SE4 had
initial per capita GDPs closest to the average of EU25 and grew slower than CEE4
51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
On the basis of the production function the factors contributing to growth are labor
productivity and employment Labor productivity in turn is a broad concept which depends
on both available capital per worker ie the capital intensity and the way in which the factors
of production are exogenously turned into output ie level of technology or TFP Further the
amount of capital depends on internal capital formation and inward foreign direct
investments as well as the consumption of fixed capital ie capital depreciation Evolutions
in capital formation as well as level of technology are expected to be highly decisive for
growth in per capita GDP Firstly the average annual change in labor productivity and per
capita GDP are graphed against each other
24
Figure 9
Labor productivity vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
SpainAv
erag
e an
nual
cha
nge
(in
)
Per capita GDPLabor productivity
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As expected labor productivity and per capita GDP co-varies strongly Although the data is
rather convincing in stressing the importance of the broad concept of labor productivity to
growth and thus catch-up speed there are a few remarks to be done before this concept is to
be further elaborated From the bars above one can distinguish a pattern in which labor
productivity increases by more than per capita GDP for poorer economies and vice versa (the
higher the initial level of per capita GDP the farther to the right the country is located on the
x-axis) The extreme case seems to be Spain for which labor productivity played a relatively
unimportant role in explaining increases in per capita GDP Other comparatively rich nations
such as Greece Portugal and Slovenia also had lower impacts from labor productivity in
contrast to eg Estonia Lithuania and Poland Nevertheless the figures are (with the
exception of Spain) considerably higher than for the non-catching up economies and thus help
to explain convergence In the Euro area as an example the corresponding average annual
labor productivity growth was just one percent (Kaitala 2004)
52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
As it nearly seems to be an explain-it-all correlation between catch-up and labor productivity
the concept has to be further investigated In section 4 it was showed how internal savings and
cross-border reallocation of capital can deepen economic integration and foster convergence
Besides capital formation an important factor in the integration process is the dispersion and
25
incorporation of technology ie changes in TFP The evolution in TFP can be derived by
estimating the so-called Solow residual However this either demands access to reliable and
comparable capital stock data or own estimations of the respective capital stocks eg under
the perpetual inventory method Since there is a scarcity of comparable capital stock data for
the CEECs the alternative is own estimations This in turn would require baseline
benchmarks of capital-to-output ratios stocks of human capital etc and is beyond the scope
of this paper For the time being the focus will be on formation of physical capital although
some recent findings on dynamics in TFP will be reported
Figure 10
Annual gross fixed capital formation
05
10152025303540
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Perc
ent o
f GDP Baltic
CEE4SE4NCU
Source data Eurostat (2006)
In the figure above the evolution in annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a share of
GDP for the three groups and the non-catching up economies of EU25 (NCU) is graphed The
statistical aggregate of GFCF is a measure of the net new investment in the domestic economy
in fixed capital assets although not accounting for capital depreciation Obviously GFCF is
not a measure of total investment because all kinds of financial assets are excluded but is a
good indicator of the level of investment activity relevant for real variables such as output
The levels have been consistently high for all three groups of catch-up economies over the
time period As a contrast the investment level for the NCUs has been consistently below 20
percent of GDP for the time period When comparing the groups the most striking trend is the
consistent intensification of investment activity in the Baltic economies Although the general
26
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
Variable of interest Expected effect on per capita GDP and convergence speed other things equal
Technology Positive
Internal accumulation of capital Positive
Foreign direct investment Positive
Hours of work per economically active Positive
Participation rate Positive
Working age population Positive
Total population Negative
Trade integration Positive
5 Explaining catch-up performances
In the preceding section basic theory on economic integration and possible mechanisms
fostering convergence was outlined These mechanisms will now be related to the
performances of the catch-up economies that were briefly presented in section 3 The analysis
is based on descriptive statistics on the key variables presented above and their relation to
economic theory The grouping of the catch-up economies introduced in section 3 is applied
The three groups are (1) the Baltic Member States (2) CEE4 ie the Central and Eastern
European MS and (3) SE4 ie the Southern European MS It was showed in section 3 that
the Baltic group had the lowest initial per capita GDPs and grew faster than CEE4 SE4 had
initial per capita GDPs closest to the average of EU25 and grew slower than CEE4
51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
On the basis of the production function the factors contributing to growth are labor
productivity and employment Labor productivity in turn is a broad concept which depends
on both available capital per worker ie the capital intensity and the way in which the factors
of production are exogenously turned into output ie level of technology or TFP Further the
amount of capital depends on internal capital formation and inward foreign direct
investments as well as the consumption of fixed capital ie capital depreciation Evolutions
in capital formation as well as level of technology are expected to be highly decisive for
growth in per capita GDP Firstly the average annual change in labor productivity and per
capita GDP are graphed against each other
24
Figure 9
Labor productivity vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
SpainAv
erag
e an
nual
cha
nge
(in
)
Per capita GDPLabor productivity
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As expected labor productivity and per capita GDP co-varies strongly Although the data is
rather convincing in stressing the importance of the broad concept of labor productivity to
growth and thus catch-up speed there are a few remarks to be done before this concept is to
be further elaborated From the bars above one can distinguish a pattern in which labor
productivity increases by more than per capita GDP for poorer economies and vice versa (the
higher the initial level of per capita GDP the farther to the right the country is located on the
x-axis) The extreme case seems to be Spain for which labor productivity played a relatively
unimportant role in explaining increases in per capita GDP Other comparatively rich nations
such as Greece Portugal and Slovenia also had lower impacts from labor productivity in
contrast to eg Estonia Lithuania and Poland Nevertheless the figures are (with the
exception of Spain) considerably higher than for the non-catching up economies and thus help
to explain convergence In the Euro area as an example the corresponding average annual
labor productivity growth was just one percent (Kaitala 2004)
52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
As it nearly seems to be an explain-it-all correlation between catch-up and labor productivity
the concept has to be further investigated In section 4 it was showed how internal savings and
cross-border reallocation of capital can deepen economic integration and foster convergence
Besides capital formation an important factor in the integration process is the dispersion and
25
incorporation of technology ie changes in TFP The evolution in TFP can be derived by
estimating the so-called Solow residual However this either demands access to reliable and
comparable capital stock data or own estimations of the respective capital stocks eg under
the perpetual inventory method Since there is a scarcity of comparable capital stock data for
the CEECs the alternative is own estimations This in turn would require baseline
benchmarks of capital-to-output ratios stocks of human capital etc and is beyond the scope
of this paper For the time being the focus will be on formation of physical capital although
some recent findings on dynamics in TFP will be reported
Figure 10
Annual gross fixed capital formation
05
10152025303540
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Perc
ent o
f GDP Baltic
CEE4SE4NCU
Source data Eurostat (2006)
In the figure above the evolution in annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a share of
GDP for the three groups and the non-catching up economies of EU25 (NCU) is graphed The
statistical aggregate of GFCF is a measure of the net new investment in the domestic economy
in fixed capital assets although not accounting for capital depreciation Obviously GFCF is
not a measure of total investment because all kinds of financial assets are excluded but is a
good indicator of the level of investment activity relevant for real variables such as output
The levels have been consistently high for all three groups of catch-up economies over the
time period As a contrast the investment level for the NCUs has been consistently below 20
percent of GDP for the time period When comparing the groups the most striking trend is the
consistent intensification of investment activity in the Baltic economies Although the general
26
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
Figure 9
Labor productivity vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
SpainAv
erag
e an
nual
cha
nge
(in
)
Per capita GDPLabor productivity
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As expected labor productivity and per capita GDP co-varies strongly Although the data is
rather convincing in stressing the importance of the broad concept of labor productivity to
growth and thus catch-up speed there are a few remarks to be done before this concept is to
be further elaborated From the bars above one can distinguish a pattern in which labor
productivity increases by more than per capita GDP for poorer economies and vice versa (the
higher the initial level of per capita GDP the farther to the right the country is located on the
x-axis) The extreme case seems to be Spain for which labor productivity played a relatively
unimportant role in explaining increases in per capita GDP Other comparatively rich nations
such as Greece Portugal and Slovenia also had lower impacts from labor productivity in
contrast to eg Estonia Lithuania and Poland Nevertheless the figures are (with the
exception of Spain) considerably higher than for the non-catching up economies and thus help
to explain convergence In the Euro area as an example the corresponding average annual
labor productivity growth was just one percent (Kaitala 2004)
52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
As it nearly seems to be an explain-it-all correlation between catch-up and labor productivity
the concept has to be further investigated In section 4 it was showed how internal savings and
cross-border reallocation of capital can deepen economic integration and foster convergence
Besides capital formation an important factor in the integration process is the dispersion and
25
incorporation of technology ie changes in TFP The evolution in TFP can be derived by
estimating the so-called Solow residual However this either demands access to reliable and
comparable capital stock data or own estimations of the respective capital stocks eg under
the perpetual inventory method Since there is a scarcity of comparable capital stock data for
the CEECs the alternative is own estimations This in turn would require baseline
benchmarks of capital-to-output ratios stocks of human capital etc and is beyond the scope
of this paper For the time being the focus will be on formation of physical capital although
some recent findings on dynamics in TFP will be reported
Figure 10
Annual gross fixed capital formation
05
10152025303540
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Perc
ent o
f GDP Baltic
CEE4SE4NCU
Source data Eurostat (2006)
In the figure above the evolution in annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a share of
GDP for the three groups and the non-catching up economies of EU25 (NCU) is graphed The
statistical aggregate of GFCF is a measure of the net new investment in the domestic economy
in fixed capital assets although not accounting for capital depreciation Obviously GFCF is
not a measure of total investment because all kinds of financial assets are excluded but is a
good indicator of the level of investment activity relevant for real variables such as output
The levels have been consistently high for all three groups of catch-up economies over the
time period As a contrast the investment level for the NCUs has been consistently below 20
percent of GDP for the time period When comparing the groups the most striking trend is the
consistent intensification of investment activity in the Baltic economies Although the general
26
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
incorporation of technology ie changes in TFP The evolution in TFP can be derived by
estimating the so-called Solow residual However this either demands access to reliable and
comparable capital stock data or own estimations of the respective capital stocks eg under
the perpetual inventory method Since there is a scarcity of comparable capital stock data for
the CEECs the alternative is own estimations This in turn would require baseline
benchmarks of capital-to-output ratios stocks of human capital etc and is beyond the scope
of this paper For the time being the focus will be on formation of physical capital although
some recent findings on dynamics in TFP will be reported
Figure 10
Annual gross fixed capital formation
05
10152025303540
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Perc
ent o
f GDP Baltic
CEE4SE4NCU
Source data Eurostat (2006)
In the figure above the evolution in annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a share of
GDP for the three groups and the non-catching up economies of EU25 (NCU) is graphed The
statistical aggregate of GFCF is a measure of the net new investment in the domestic economy
in fixed capital assets although not accounting for capital depreciation Obviously GFCF is
not a measure of total investment because all kinds of financial assets are excluded but is a
good indicator of the level of investment activity relevant for real variables such as output
The levels have been consistently high for all three groups of catch-up economies over the
time period As a contrast the investment level for the NCUs has been consistently below 20
percent of GDP for the time period When comparing the groups the most striking trend is the
consistent intensification of investment activity in the Baltic economies Although the general
26
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
trend for catch-up economies seems to be upward sloping it is widely surpassed by the trend
for the Baltic group who even exceeded the 30 percent level in the last four years
The investment activity in the catch-up economies seems to follow the theoretical
expectations laid out in the preceding section It was explained how both internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital can function as mechanisms of
integration boosting labor productivity That the level of gross investments is higher the
poorer the economy is at an initial stage has according to our data certainly been the case for
EU25 However in section 4 integration through capital formation was divided into internal
accumulation (ie savings) and foreign investments By deducting FDIs from GFCF estimates
of internal accumulation can be made Below the annual average gross investments to GDP
and its two constituents are graphed FDIs as a share of GDP were well above 5 percent for
Latvia Estonia and Czech Republic For Lithuania Slovak Republic and Hungary they were
about 5 percent All of the economies except Greece had levels higher than the 14 percent of
the NCUs thus confirming the theoretical expectations
Figure 11
Investments in the catch-up economies 1994-2005
05
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Per
cent
of G
DP (p
erio
d av
erag
e)
GFCFFDIInternal
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As a consequence for economies with lower FDI inflows such as Greece and Slovenia
internal accumulation is more important Internal accumulation accounted for more than 90
percent of GFCF in these two economies To sum up capital formation in general as well as
investments from foreign sources seem to be at higher levels in poorer economies The
27
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
theoretical scenarios laid out in section 4 implying that catch-up can be boosted from internal
accumulation and reallocation of internationally mobile capital seem to be a part of the
explanation to recent convergence in EU25 Although formation of physical capital is
regarded as an important factor in convergence processes some notes on the possible role of
human capital and technology needs to be made
52 Human capital and technology
It is customary to take both physical and human capital into account when estimating capital
stocks and capital formation (see eg Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992) This can be done by
using levels of education for the labor force or measures of education expenditures as proxies
In empirical research on convergence human capital has shown to play a decisive role and be
regarded as a precondition for catch-up Evidence tends to confirm that convergence is
conditioned on a certain level of schooling in the economy However the CEECs have
traditionally had comparably high levels of education ndash most them actually have nearly full
enrolment to basic education and graduation rates close to that of the NCUs (Benacek and
Gacs 2002) The condition of human capital is probably more important when comparing
more dissimilar economies eg studies including Africa or Asia Although the quality of
education as well as the enrolment to higher schooling differs in Europe the basic human
capital condition for convergence is assumed to be fulfilled Nonetheless how education
patterns and expenditures affect convergence dynamics and catch-up speeds in the EU is an
idea for further research
Growth in technology or TFP is an important element in labor productivity growth especially
when it comes to catch-up economies Alvarez-Ayuso et al (2006) has studied convergence in
labor productivity and TFP levels in the 1990s by estimating β-coefficients Based on their
results they argue that capital formation (both physical and human) has a larger impact on
convergence than growth in TFP has However studies covering more recent years show
signficant increases in TFP levels across the CEECs and above all in the Baltic states
Growth in TFP has for these economies contributed to around 40-50 percent of per capita
GDP growth (Kaitila 2004) Hunya (2004) argues that the rapid growth in TFP for these
economiesrsquo could be explained by their close investment relations to the well-developed
Nordic neighbors 74 percent of the FDI stock in Estonia and around 50 percent of the stocks
in Latvia and Lithuania came from the Nordic countries in 2004 (Hunya 2004) Although
28
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
investments have been concentrated to labor intensive production substantial spillover effects
to the economies as a whole are highly probable
The determinants to TFP growth in the CEECs have been studied by Damijan and Rojec
(2001) They found that FDIs in general have a large impact on overall productivity growth in
the CEECs during the 1990s FDIs not only channel technology across national boundaries
but also between firms ndash in particular between foreign and domestic companies Summing
up both levels of FDI in general as well as the origin of the FDI ie the investment partners
can help explain growth in TFP and labor productivity Although estimates of growth in TFP
for our time period are not presented here one can regard it as an important contributor to
labor productivity growth On the one hand there is probably a general catch-up effect (the
Baltic states grew most rapidly) but on the other hand FDI partners investment structure and
knowledge formation could be plausible determinants to how fast TFP grows
53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
From the production function the importance of performed labor to level of output can be
directly derived Equation (44) was expanded into equation (45) and (46) in order to
elaborate the employment concept further Hours worked to total population (LN) depends on
hours worked per economically active (LLF) the size of the labor force to working age
population (LFWA) ie the participation rate and the working age population to the total
population (WAN) ie population structure Other things equal worked hours the size of the
labor force and working age population increase labor to total population and thus per capita
output A population increase when holding hours of work constant affects per capita output
negatively
Theory on economic integration proposes that people as a part of the integration process will
move from where the capital intensity and the wages are lower to where the capital intensity
and the wages are relatively higher The changes in labor illustrated in figure 12 below
indicate that there have been significant increases in the least poor member states with Spain
as the strongest example There have also been increases in labor in Portugal and Greece as
well as in the richest one of the accession states Slovenia The figures seems to point out that
catch-up for the group consisting of the more capital intensive economies of SE4 is driven by
increases in labor while labor plays a smaller and more ambiguous role for the other groups
29
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
Figure 12
Evolution of labor to total population (1994-2005)
-10-505
101520253035
Estonia
Latvi
a
Lithu
ania
Czech
Rep
ublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inNCU
Cha
nge
in p
erce
nt
Source data Eurostat (2006)
As mentioned above the amount of labor is dependent on both changes on the labor market
and demographic trends Since the incentive behind migration in the integration scenario is
higher return to labor ie wages one could primarily expect economically active residents to
migrate From an aggregated perspective this means that a reallocation process takes place in
which resources (in this case labor) are moved in order to be more efficiently used The net
effect in the relatively richer economies should not only be relative increases in hours of work
and size of the labor force but as an effect also in working age population and total
population Theory thus also suggests that these subgroups of the population as well as total
population as such in relative terms will decrease in the poorer economies
The changes in total population are presented in figure 13 below and follow the theoretical
proposal Major decreases in total population are recorded for the Baltic states in opposite to
considerable increases in SE4 In Lithuania the decrease was close to 10 percent while Spain
recorded an increase of more than 10 percent There was a small increase in the Slovak
Republic while the other three in this group had smaller decreases These results could
suggest that the contribution from labor to catch-up have been counteracted by changes in
total population (because of the per capita approach) Population changes might have reduced
the magnitude of the positive change in labor in eg Spain and Greece and on the other hand
counteracted otherwise larger decreases in the Baltic states
30
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
Figure 13
Population change 1994-2005 (in )
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak R
epub
lic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slovenia
Greece
Portug
al
Spain
Source data Eurostat (2006)
However since the available data does not reveal whether a population change largely
consists of a change in active labor or not it is not possible to be absolutely certain of how
population dynamics affect catch-up Nevertheless it is possible to say something about the
co-variation between the changes in population and labor For quite a few countries the
change in population is accompanied by a change in worked hours of significant size and in
the same direction The change in hours worked as a share of the change in total population
was actually more than 50 percent in all countries except Latvia Although this does not tell us
with certainty that the infusion to total population predominantly consists of active laborers it
suggests that the counteraction effect from changes in total population seems to be trivial The
average annual changes in LLF LFWA WAN and LN for the countries as well as group
averages are presented in detail in appendix 2 To summarize the changes in LLF LFWA
WAN and LN consistently follow the theoretical expectations in the sense that SE4 as a
group outperformed the CEC4 which in turn outperformed the Baltic states
54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
How openness to trade through factor price equalization can foster integration was briefly laid
out in section 45 If trade functions as a mechanism of integration one can expect the level of
trade to influence the speed of convergence positively However theory does not provide any
certainty of the relationship between level of trade and convergence in output Even though it
31
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
is clear that flows of goods and services between countries will lead to convergence in factor
prices at least under the assumptions of the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelsson
1948) empirical results have been rather diverging on whether this implies convergence in
output as well Further even if trade openness and convergence co-exist this does not
necessarily imply that there is a causal relationship between the two
Although the arguments supporting the convergence effect from openness to trade are not as
self-evident as when it comes to investments or employment it still has some important
logical arguments and empirical evidence as support It has for example been argued that a
high degree of openness to trade induces faster dispersion of available technology This
implies convergence in levels of technology which in turn would affect productivity and
growth positively in catch-up economies (see eg Slaughter 1997) A majority of empirical
studies of the connection between openness to trade and convergence in per capita GDP have
also reached a general conclusion stating a significantly positive relationship (see eg Ben-
David 1996 Henrekson et al 1997 and Giles 2001) On the negative side Bernard and Jones
(1996) conclude that freer trade causes divergence rather than convergence in income and
output In summary while the role of trade openness in the convergence process is not crystal
clear a great deal of recent evidence points to a positive association of some sort
When turning the focus to how the degree of openness to trade has changed in the catch-up
economies we find that all of them became more integrated in terms of trade with goods and
services Trade integration is here measured as the average of total exports and imports of
goods and services to GDP This measure is frequently used as indicator of the integration of
the markets for goods and services eg by Eurostat and other EU-institutions In figure 14
below the average annual growth in degree of trade integration and per capita GDP are
compared No noteworthy pattern distinguishing the three groups of countries from each other
seems to exist Thus one can not conclude that the fast growers also increased their openness
to trade faster than the others Although this partly leads to a rejection of the importance of
trade integration to catch-up performance an important note is that all of the studied countries
both grew significantly (Greece had the lowest average annual growth with around 25
percent) and increased their degree of openness
32
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
Figure 14
Trade integration vs GDP growth
0123456789
Lithu
ania
Latvi
a
Estonia
Poland
Slovak
Rep
ublic
Hunga
ry
Czech
Rep
ublic
Sloven
ia
Greece
Portug
alSpa
inAver
age
annu
al c
hang
e (in
)
Per capita GDPTrade integration
Source data Eurostat (2006)
55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
The results from the analysis of the catch-up performances are summarized in the table below
Four mechanisms of European integration was presented in section 3 and connected to
growths in per capita GDP The mechanisms were linked to the production function and
operationalized by following labor productivity ldquoemployment raterdquo (or worked hours to total
population) and trade integration of goods and services over time Change in labor
productivity seems to be the heaviest contributor to catch-up in EU25 Employment gets more
important the richer the economy is in relative terms which is in line with the theoretical
prospects Trade integration has played a more ambiguous part although it is interesting to
notice that all catch-up economies became more integrated in the international markets for
goods and services along with a general observation of significant absolute convergence for
the region
Table 4
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
YL LN Trade integration GDP per capita Lithuania 7372 -0421 0833 6524 Latvia 6721 0482 6787 6901
33
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
Estonia 8016 -0120 1529 7543 Baltic average 7370 -0020 3049 6989 Poland 4714 -0335 4279 4235 Slovak Republic 3874 0425 1119 4200 Hungary 3880 0546 8505 4325 Czech Republic 2938 -0252 3337 2618 CEC4 average 3852 0096 4310 3844 Slovenia 2904 1060 2885 3802 Greece 2558 0632 4594 3131 Portugal 1759 0785 0543 2478 Spain 0380 2487 2695 2822 SE4 average 1899 1241 2679 3058
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Irrespective of trade integration the two main mechanisms that foster integration of
production factors and convergence in per capita GDP followed the expectations Firstly the
sizes of the capital stocks in the poorer economies relative the richer grew through internal
accumulation and cross-border reallocation of capital By analyzing capital formation and
FDIs some of the important dynamics in labor productivity could be explained although a
more thorough analysis of changes in TFP and human capital was omitted Secondly people
in general and workers in particular were expected to migrate to where wages are higher when
economies are integrated to form a larger economic area Flows of workers as well as people
in general seem to be channeled as theory proposes although the impact of this mechanism is
rather small The relatively richer economies eg Spain and Slovenia gained more from
changes in employment than relatively poorer
A possible conclusion is that labor productivity (investments incorporation of technology)
highly important for catch-up but with diminishing impact as the economy closes the gap to
the average As the economy converges the importance of attracting workers grows To
understand why some catch-up economies although they are relatively richer witness
significant increases in employment and population one has to widen the perspective EU is
after all a relatively wealthy place especially if comparing with the neighbors of North
Africa the Balkans and the Middle East If a larger economic region is considered some
catch-up economies of EU25 could all of a sudden be regarded as wealthy non-catching up
economies with relatively high wages and low returns to capital
34
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
6 Conclusions
This study started off by carrying out a brief assessment of real absolute convergence patterns
in the area of the enlarged EU The estimates of β- and σ-convergence suggested that in the
course of the period 1994-2005 a process of convergence towards the same steady state has
taken place between the per capita GDP levels of the EU25 Member States The speed of
convergence is estimated to about 15 percent ie the gap to the average level of per capita
GDP in the EU25 is closed by 15 percent annually The half-life measure told us that it would
take an average economy about 48 years to close half the gap separating it from the average of
EU25 As regards the catch-up countries all grew faster than the average of EU25 although a
few of them more impressively than others The catch-up countries were grouped based on
initial per capita GDPs (conveniently coinciding with geographical location) but no
significant differences in convergence speeds among the groups where recorded
The analysis within the framework of integration theory left mainly two things of value
behind Firstly it helped to explain some of the dynamics behind the catch-up performances
which in turn could be a lesson to learn for poorer economies in general and coming entrants
into the EU ndash thus highly topical for Bulgaria and Romania ndash in particular Catch-up depends
on a number of factors but can mainly be derived from dynamics in labor productivity Both
total investments and FDIs were higher for the catch-up economies than the richer ones and
thus explain parts of the convergence through labor productivity Technological spillovers and
convergence in TFP which in turn could be boosted from FDI intensity and FDI relations are
also assumed to explain a great deal of increases in labor productivity The Baltic states grew
at the fastest rates and also had high levels of FDIs as a share of GDP Besides a general
catch-up effect close and intensive trade- and investment relations with the Nordic economies
together with early important political and economic reforms are according to Hunya (2004)
probable explanations to why the Baltic as group and Estonia as country top the growth
leagues
Secondly the findings are a clear verification of the neo-classical theories of growth and
economic integration although more detailed research including considerations of TFP and
human capital would deepen the understanding even more The relatively short time period
from which my source data is taken also leaves questions to the suitability of generalization
35
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
based upon the findings To reach more solid conclusions on catch-up speeds and
convergence patterns the study should cover a longer time frame including all phases of the
business cycle Nevertheless it is interesting to confirm the theory of convergence for an
enlarged European Union as well as to clarify through what mechanisms convergence comes
about More detailed clarifications can still be made mainly by including measures of capital
stocks in the analysis which in turn would enable estimations of Solow residuals and
evolutions in technology
References
Baldwin R 1989 The growth effects of 1992 Economic Policy 9 247-282
36
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
Baldwin and C Wyplosz 2006 The Economics of European Integration (New York
McGraw-Hill)
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1991 Convergence Across States and Regions Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 107ndash82
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1992 Convergence Journal of Political Economy 100 pp
223ndash251
Barro R and X Sala-i-Martin 1995 Economic Growth (New York McGraw-Hill)
Ben-David D 1996 Trade and convergence among countries Journal of International
Economics 40 279-298
Benacek V and J Gacs 2002 Catching Up and EU Accession - Conditions for Fast Real
Convergence in the Candidate Countries Interim Report IR-02-068 IIASA
Bernard A B and C I Jones 1996 Productivity and convergence across US states and
industries Empirical Economics 21 113-135
Dalgaard C-J and J Vastrup 2001 On the measurement of -convergence Economics
Letters Volume 70 Number 2 February 2001 pp 283-287(5)
Damijan J and M Rojec 2001 What role does FDI absorptive capacity and trade play in
transferring technology to Eastern Europe Evidence from panel data for Estonia and
Slovenia Paper prepared in the framework of the PHARE-ACE research project P97-8112-R
Eurostat 2006 Structural Indicators (Brussels available at laquohttpeceuropaeueurostatraquo)
Fagerberg J and B Verspagen 1996 Heading for Divergence Regional Growth in
Europe Reconsidered Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 431ndash48
Giles D E A 2001 Output convergence and international trade Time-series and fuzzy
clustering evidence for New Zealand and her trading partners 1950-1992 Econometrics
Working Paper EWP0102 Department of Economics University of Victoria
Henrekson M J Torstensson and R Torstensson 1997 Growth effects of European
economic integration European Economic Review 41 1537-1557
Hlouskova J and M Wagner 2002 The CEEC10`s Real Convergence Prospects Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion paper series No 3318
Hunya G 2004 FDI in small accession countries the Baltic states EIB Papers Vol 9 No 2
Kaitila V 2004 Convergence of real gdp per capita in the EU15 How do the accession
countries fit in Working paper No 252004 ENEPRI
McGranahan D 2003 Regional convergence and divergence in the US 1969-1998
Working Party on Territorial Indicators OECD
37
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
Mankiw G D Romer and DN Weil 1992 A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth Quarterly Journal of Economics vol107 no2 407-437
Islam N 1995 Growth Empirics A Panel Data Approach Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol CX No 4 pp 1127-1170
Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and International Trade
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 110 No 4 (Nov 1995) pp 1127-1170
Ricardo D 1821 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London John
Murray)
Alvarez-Ayuso I Delgado-Rodriquez J and M Salinas-Jimenez 2006 Capital
accumulation and TFP growth in the EU A production frontier approach Journal of Policy
Modeling Vol 28 No 2 195-205
Samuelson PA 1948 International trade and the equalization of factor prices Economic
Journal 58 163-184
Slaughter MJ 1997 Per capita income convergence and the role of international trade
American Economic Review 87 194-199
Solow RM 1956 A contribution to the theory of economic growth Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol 70 64-94
Tondl G 1999 The changing pattern of regional convergence in Europe Review of Regional
Research vol 19 1-33
Appendices
Appendix 1
Averages and measures of dispersion for per capita GDP in EU25
38
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-
Year EU25 average (population weighted)
EU25 average (unweighted)
SD of log GDP per capita
Coefficient of variance
1994 16597 12985 0994 0553 1995 15500 12536 0990 0553 1996 15747 12832 0981 0553 1997 16135 13282 0956 0553 1998 16593 13718 0950 0552 1999 17066 14205 0960 0555 2000 17663 14764 0948 0554 2001 17942 15018 0929 0549 2002 18067 15209 0912 0542 2003 18188 15414 0883 0542 2004 18493 15786 0866 0541 2005 18712 16118 0839 0522
Source data Eurostat (2006)
Appendix 2
Average annual changes in percent for 1994-2005
LLF LFWA WAN LN Lithuania -0382 -0196 0186 -0421
Latvia 0944 -0735 0270 0482 Estonia -0023 -0358 0187 -0120
Baltic average 0180 -0430 0214 -0020 Poland -0502 -0816 0939 -0335
Slovak Republic -0220 0255 0397 0425 Hungary 0349 -0342 0546 0546
Czech Republic -0327 -0624 0849 -0252 CEC4 average -0175 -0382 0682 0096
Slovenia -0207 -0783 1065 1060 Greece 0579 -0074 0526 0632 Portugal -0296 0240 0515 0785
Spain 1228 0541 0748 2487 SE4 average 0326 -0019 0713 1241
Source data Eurostat (2006)
39
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Are the countries of the enlarged EU converging
-
- 21 How to measure convergence
- 22 Evidence of convergence ndash estimation of β
- 23 Evidence of convergence ndash changes in σ
-
- 3 Are some catching up faster than others
-
- 31 An expanded β-model
- 32 The estimation results
- 33 A descriptive approach
-
- 4 What is economic integration and how can it be explained
-
- 41 The neo-classical concepts of growth and economic integration
- 42 Integration through internal accumulation of capital
- 43 Integration through capital mobility
- 44 Integration through migration
- 45 Integration through trade
- 46 Summing up integration mechanisms causing convergence
-
- 5 Explaining catch-up performances
-
- 51 Productivity and investments ndash decisive for convergence
- 52 Internal savings foreign investments or technology
- 52 Human capital and technology
- 53 Employment and demographic change ndash integration through migration
- 54 Degree of openness ndash integration through trade
- 55 Summing up what explains catch-up performances in Europe
-
- 6 Conclusions
- References
- Appendices
- Source data Eurostat (2006)
-