CONTROL PLANE ROUTING MISBEHAVIOR - MEWS: Mobile,...

CONTROL PLANE

ROUTING MISBEHAVIOR

The Vigilant

Giridhar PathakHuey Ling Chuan, Steven

Isaraporn KulkumjonPooja Gada

Agenda

• Introduction to control-plane routing

(AODV & DSR)

• Types of control-plane routing misbehaviors

• Paper 1 (ARAN)

• Paper 2 (ARIADNE and IARIADNE)• Paper 2 (ARIADNE and IARIADNE)

• Paper 3 (SEADOV)

• Conclusion

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INTRODUCTION TO

CONTROL PLANE ROUTING

Huey Ling Chuan, Steven

Control-plane routing misbehavior

• What is Control-plane?

• Populate information in the routing table

• BGP, RIP, OSPF in wired networks

• Theme: control-plane routing misbehavior techniques • Theme: control-plane routing misbehavior techniques

within wireless ad hoc networks and misbehavior

prevention by securing control routing messages.

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Summary of papers

• Paper 1: Kimaya Sanzgiri et al., “A secure routing protocol

for Ad Hoc networks (ARAN)”, IEEE ICNP, 2002

• Paper 2: Chu-Hsing et al., “Secure Routing with Malicious

Node Detection for Ad Hoc Networks (ARIADNE / I-Node Detection for Ad Hoc Networks (ARIADNE / I-

ARIADNE)”, 22nd Int. Conference on AINA, 2008

• Paper 3: Celia Li et al., “Secure Routing for Wireless Mesh

Network (SEADOV)”, Int. Journal of Network Security, 2011

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Routing protocols in Wireless ad hoc Networks

• Distance Vector Routing

• AODV (Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector)

• DSR (Dynamic Source Routing)

• DSDV (Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector)

On Demand

• Link State Routing

• OLSR (Optimized Link State Routing)

Proactive

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AODV & DSR Route Discovery

• Flooding of control packets to discover routes

• S is the Source and D is the Destination

S D

A B

C E

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• Source starts broadcasting a RREQ (Route Request) packet to its neighbors

RREQ

S D

A B

C E

RREQ

RREQ

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• If the neighbors has no relationship with the destination, it will further broadcast the packet

RREQRREQ

S D

A B

C E

RREQRREQ

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• Once the RREQ packet reaches the destination, or a node that knows the destination, the node will unicast a RREP packet to the source via the routed path

RREQRREQ

S D

A B

C E

RREQ

RREQ

RREQ

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• Once the RREQ packet reaches the destination, or a node that knows the destination, the node will unicast a RREP packet to the source via the routed path

RREPRREP

S D

A B

C E

RREPRREP

RREP

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AODV & DSR Route Maintenance

• Upstream node detects unreachable node

• Sends RERR (Route Error) packet to inform upstream

neighbors

• Route cache alternative (DSR) or rediscovery

S D

A B

C E

RERR

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AODV

• Sequence numbers and hop count

• Seq. no. indicates freshness, changes in route

RREQ

SS = 10

DS = 20

RREP

DS = 25

S D

A B

C E

DS = 20HC = 0

S D

A B

C E

DS = 25

HC = 3

RREP

DS = 25HC = 5

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DSR

• Source routing

• RREQ packet carries the source path

S D

A B

C E

RREQ:S

RREQ:S

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DSR

• Source routing


RREQ:S,A

S D

A B

C E

RREQ:S,A

RREQ:S,A

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DSR

• Source routing


RREQ:S,A,B

RREQ:S,A,B

S D

A B

C E

RREQ:S,A,B

RREQ:S,A,B

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DSR

• Source routing

• RREP: Destination and intermediate nodes add its address to source route

RREP:DRREP:D,B

S D

A B

C E

RREP:DRREP:D,B,A

RREP:D,B

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AODV & DSR Differences

AODV DSR

Routing tables

• one route per destination

Routing caches

• multiple routes per destination

Always chooses fresher routes

• Sequence numbers

Does not have explicit mechanism to

expire stale routes

More frequent discovery flood to ensure

freshness

Source Routing

• Intermediate nodes learn routes in 1

discovery cycle

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CONTROL PLANE

ROUTING MISBEHAVIORS

Huey Ling Chuan, Steven

Types of CP Routing Attacks

• Modification

• Flooding

• Impersonation

• Fabrication

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Attacks using modification

• Modify sequence numbers (AODV)

• Sequence number used as timestamps.

• Higher sequence number = freshness

• Mallory modifies RREP with higher sequence number than the destination

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• Modify hop count (AODV)

• AODV selects routes based on the lowest hop count in the RREP packets

• Mallory can modify the hop count to

• 0 (preferred route)

• Infinity (zombie route)

• Tunneling

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• Modify Source Routes (DSR)

• Non-existent route (DoS)

• Loops

• No control to prevent loops after route discovery

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• Modification

• Flooding

• Impersonation

• Fabrication

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Attacks using flooding

• Flood the network with an unreachable destination

address

D

A BRREQ

RREQ

RREQ

RREQ

S D

C E

RREQ

RREQ

RREQ

RREQ

Example : S continuously send RREQ packet to destination X

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• Modification

• Flooding

• Impersonation

• Fabrication

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Attacks using impersonation

• Spoofing attacks (AODV and DSR)

• Mallory listens to RREQ / RREP from neighboring nodes

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• Mallory spoofs as A and replies with a RREP packet with hop count less than C

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• Mallory spoofs as B and replies with a RREP packet with hop count less than E

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• Modification

• Flooding

• Impersonation

• Fabrication

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Attacks using fabrication

• Falsifying route errors (AODV and DSR)

• Denial of Service

S D

A M

C E

RERRRERR

Route Discovery

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Attacks using fabrication

• Route cache poisoning in DSR

MSR:S, M, B, D

Packet to SPacket to S

S D

A B

C E

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A SECURE ROUTING PROTOCOL

FOR AD HOC NETWORKS

Brian Neil Levine, Bridget Dahill, Clay Shields,

Elizabeth M. Belding-Royer, Kimaya Sanzgiri

Isaraporn Kulkumjon

Authenticated Routing for Ad-hoc Networks (ARAN)

• Make use of cryptographic certificates and asymmetric key to achieve authentication, message integrity and

nonrepudiation

• Need preliminary certification process before a route

instantiation processinstantiation process

• Routing messages are authenticated at each hop from

source to destination and vice versa

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Certification

• Assumptions

• Certificate server T is trusted

• T’s public key is known to all nodes

• Keys are a priori generated and exchanged through a secure channel

• Each node must request its certificate from T before entering the network

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Authenticated Route Discovery

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Broadcast Message

Unicast Message

36


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Broadcast Message

Unicast Message

37


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Broadcast Message

Unicast Message

Sign the whole

content with its

own private key

38


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Broadcast Message

Unicast Message

39

Authenticated Route Setup

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Broadcast Message

Unicast Message

Reply to the first RDP -- Delay Metric

40

Authenticated Route Setup

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Broadcast Message

Unicast Message

41

Route Maintenance• Send ERR message to deactivate route

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Broadcast Message

Unicast Message

42

Key Revocation

• Revocation notices need to be stored until the revoked

certificate expires.

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Security Analysis

Prevent Attacks from Using Modification

• Redirection by modified route sequence number or hop

count

• Denial-of-service with modified source routes

• Tunneling attacks• Tunneling attacks

.. also offers fastest path

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Security Analysis

Prevent Attacks from Using Impersonation

• Forming Loops by Spoofing

Prevent Attacks from Using Fabrication

Falsifying Route Errors• Falsifying Route Errors

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Network Performance Analysis

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SECURE ROUTING PROTOCOL WITH MALICIOUS NODES DETECTION FOR AD HOC NETWORKS

Chu-Hsing Lin, Wei-Shen Lai, Yen-Lin Huang, Mei-Chun Chou

Giridhar Pathak

ARIADNE

• Secure on demand ad hoc network routing protocol

• Runs a route discovery protocol

• One route between source and destination

• Intermediate nodes cannot use the same route to transmit data for themselvesthemselves

• Withstands compromised nodes

• Symmetric cryptography

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ARIADNE protocol

• Security against willful active attackers

• Cant alter uncompromised routes consisting of uncompromised nodes

• End to end authentication of routing message

• Shared key KSD and KDS and MAC• Shared key KSD and KDS and MAC

• TESLA for broadcast authentication for routing messages

• Pre hop hashing mechanism

• To verify that no hop is omitted

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ARIADNE protocol

• Dead link in route

• RErr message sent to initiator

• Intermediate nodes remove route that have dead links

• Strong defense against attacks that modify and fabricate

routing informationrouting information

• Immune to wormhole attacks when used with an

advanced version of TESLA

• Complicated key-exchange, infeasible in current ad hoc

environments

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ARIADNE protocol

S A DB

<α,h0,(),()><α,h1,(A),(MA)> <α,h2,(A,B),(MA,MB)>

Route list MAC list

<β,MD,()><β,MD,(KBti)><β,MD,(KBti, KAti)>

TESLA key list

• h0 is MAC(α)KSD only D can verify

• h1 is H(A,h0)

• MA is MAC(α,h1,(A),()) KAti this is the TESLA Key

• MD is MAC(β)KDS only S can verify

TESLA key list

Drawbacks of ARIADNE

• Only the sender and destination node can verify the node

list and correctness of the established route

• What if reply information is modified

• Only sender can detect the error

• Cant specify which nodes are bad

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I-ARIADNE

• Based on ARIADNE

• Reuse of a valid route for increasing packet delivery ratio

• Intermediate nodes verify route information

• Can detect the malicious node

• Can reuse the route information for another route discovery phase

• Decrease in broadcast packets

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I-ARIADNE protocol

• Sender signs h0

• Each participating node can verify h0

• Sender encrypts h0 with PKSD <α, h0, γ, (), ()>, destination

node can verifynode can verify

• Destination node signs the reply before unicast

• Each node can verify the authenticity of the reply

• Sender unicasts a validate message

• <S, D, h0, (A,B), (KAti, KBti)>

• MAC value is verified by all intermediate nodes

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Secure Route Maintenance

• Start node runs route discovery

• New route created based on trust relationship from previous

route discovery

RErr returned to start node if dead link • RErr returned to start node if dead link

• Node will try to find a new route, starts route discovery locally

• Local route repair decreases broadcast packets

• New node checks routing table for Destination

• If no route, rebroadcast of route request

• Else unicast route request to destination

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Summary

ARIADNE

• Symmetric crypto

• Secure route only for

sender and destination

• A lot of control packets for

I-ARIADNE

• Asymmetric crypto

• Reusability of secure

routes

• Lesser control packets for • A lot of control packets for

maintaining secure route

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• Lesser control packets for

setup and maintenance of

route

SECURE ROUTING FOR WIRELESS

MESH NETWORKS

Celia Li, Zuang Wang, Cungang Yang

Pooja Gada

Wireless Mesh Networks Introduction

• Superset of Ad hoc networks

• Infrastructure WMN - Mesh Routers

• Client WMN - Client mobile devices

• Hybrid network comprising mesh routers and mesh clients

Hybrid routing• Hybrid routing

• Proactive routing - Traffic flows to the mesh portal

• On-Demand Routing - Intra mesh traffic

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Blom's Key Pre-Distribuition Scheme

• With N as the network size, M as public information

• a(h+1)xN matrix G over finite field GF(q) is constructed

• Symmetric matrix D , (h+1)x(h+1) is created and kept

secret

• Matrix A= (D.M)T is created• Matrix A= (D.M)T is created

• Node K, only needs to store kth row and kth column of

matrix

• Nodes compute their pairwise keys from the matrix A

• For nodes i and j, the pairwise keys are Kij and Kji

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Keys in SEAODV

• Each node maintains two key hierarchies

• Broadcast key hierarchy

• Group Transient Key(GTK)

• Broadcast keys from one hop neighbors• Broadcast keys from one hop neighbors

• Authenticate incoming broadcast routing messages (e.g. RREQ)

• Unicast hierarchy

• Pair wise Transient Key(PTK)

• Secret pair wise keys shared with one hop neighbors

• Verify incoming unicast messages (e.g. RREP)

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Key Exchange Process

• Step 1: Exchange of Seed_G of public G matrix

• Every node broadcasts its public Seed_G to its one hop neighbors

• Upon the completion of this step, every node has public Seed_G of all its one hop neighbors

• Step 2: Derivation of pair-wise transient key

• Using a one hop neighbor node's Seed_G and private row of matrix A, compute PTK

• Upon completion of this step, every node has PTK of all its one hop neighbors

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Key Exchange Process (Contd..)

• Step 3: Exchange of Group Transient Key

• Node B encrypts GTK_B with its private PTK_B and unicasts the RREP message to A

• Encrypted GTK_B is attached in the unicast RREP message

• On receiving RREP message, A decrypts the GTK_B by using its private PTK_A

• Upon completion, every node has GTK keys from all its one hop neighbors

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Secure Route Discovery

Modified RREQ

Message Type

Flag & Reserved

Hop Count

RREQID

Dest.

AddressDSN

Originator Address

OSNMAC

(GTK,M)

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Secure Route Setup

Modified RREP

Message Type

Flag & Reserved Prefix Sz

Hop Count

RREQID

Dest.

Address

Originator Address

LifetimeMAC

(PTK,M)

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Security Analysis of SEAODV

• SEAODV can defend against the following attacks

• RREQ Flooding

• Route Re-direction

• Formation of routing loops

• RERR Fabrication• RERR Fabrication

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Performance Evaluation

• Low computation cost even if number of nodes on

increases

• Better immunity against DoS attacks

• Extends entire lifetime of the selected route under

condition that certain nodes are classified as mesh clientscondition that certain nodes are classified as mesh clients

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Conclusion

• Discussed different kind of misbehaviors in control-plane

routing of AODV and DSR.

• Examined the solutions proposed by the 3 papers

• Paper 1: Kimaya Sanzgiri et al., “A secure routing protocol for Ad Hoc • Paper 1: Kimaya Sanzgiri et al., “A secure routing protocol for Ad Hoc networks (ARAN)”, IEEE ICNP, 2002

• Paper 2: Celia Li et al., “Secure Routing with Malicious Node Detection for Ad Hoc Networks (ARIADNE / I-ARIADNE)”, 22nd Int. Conference on AINA, 2008

• Paper 3: Chu-Hsing et al., “Secure Routing in Wireless Mesh Network (SEADOV)”, Int. Journal of Network Security, 2011

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Other Approaches

• Trust based

• Francesco Oliviero, Simon Pietro Romano, “A Reputation-based Metric for Secure Routing in Wireless Mesh Networks”

• Reputation based

• Shilpa S G, Mrs. N.R. Sunitha, B.B. Amberker, “A Trust Model for • Shilpa S G, Mrs. N.R. Sunitha, B.B. Amberker, “A Trust Model for Secure and QoS Routing in MANETs”

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Q&A

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CONTROL PLANE ROUTING MISBEHAVIOR - MEWS: Mobile,...

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