Control of Weapon of Mass Destruction Lecture Notes for Student

8/16/2019 Control of Weapon of Mass Destruction Lecture Notes for Student

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THE CONTROL OF WEAPONS

OF MASS DESTRUCTIONBY

MIOR ROSLAN BIN MIOR MOHD JAAFAT KSD

MASTER IN DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES (UM) ADVANCE

DIPLOMA IN STRATEGIC AND SECURITIES STUDIES (UKM),

DIPLOMA IN STRATEGIC AND SECURITY STUDIES (UKM),DIPLOMA IN ACCOUNTING ADMINISTRATION (UM), DIPLOMA IN

HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (MIPM), CERT. IN COMPANY

ADMINISTRATION(IIUM)

DATED : 1 6T H FEBRUARY !11



COURSE OBJECTIVESHighlight the difference between disarmament and arms control

The role played by arms control during the Cold War

Criticism of arms control by the end of the Cold War

Usefulness of arms control in preserving peace and security in

the post cold war period



NO FIRST USE: THE NEXT STEP FOR U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY

Historically the Unite States has al!ays retaine

the o"tion o# $sin% n$clear !ea"ons #irst in

con#lict. In &''() ho!e*er) Presient +arac,

O-aa "roise a !orl #ree o# n$clear !ea"ons)

so e/"ectations ran hi%h #or a chan%e in U.S.

n$clear "olicy. The &'0' N$clear Post$re Re*ie!)

ho!e*er) i not ao"t the "olicy o# no #irst $se)

an "olicya,ers isse an i"ortant o""ort$nity

to re$ce the role o# n$clear !ea"ons in U.S.

strate%y.

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20439/no_first_use.html






IMPOR AN

CONCEP

The term arms race, in its original usage, describes a competition between two

or more parties for the best armed forces. Each party competes to produce

larger numbers of weapons, greater armies, or superior military technology in

a technological escalation. Nowadays the term is commonly used to describe

any competition where there is no absolute goal, only the relative goal of

staying ahead of the other competitors. To e!tend a country"s military powerfaster than another .

#rom $%&$ to $&$&, arms race between several Europeans countries, including 'ermany,

#rance, (ussia, and others too) place. *pecifically, 'ermany"s envy of +ritain"s superior

navy in the run up to world War $ resulted in a costly building competition of

dreadnoughtclass ships. This tense arms race lasted until -une $&$, when, after two

antagonic power blocs were formed because of the rivalry, the World War bro)e out. /fter

the war, a new arms race developed among the victorious /llies. The Washington navaltreaty was only partly able to put an end to the race.

/ nuclear arms race developed during the Cold war a period of high tensions between

the former soviet union and the United *tates of /merica. 0n both sides, perceived

advantages of the adversary 1such as the 22missile gap3 led to large spending on

armaments and the stoc)piling of vast nuclear arsenals

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missile_gap

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missile_gap

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I



ARMS CONTROL4efinitions 0f /rm Control

nvolves 2restraint internationally e!ercised upon armaments

policy, whether in respect of the level of armaments, their

character, deployment or use3 Hedly +ull “Control of the Arms

Race “

2/rms control deals with the restraints to be imposed upon the

use of nuclear weapons3 5Spanier and Nogee –” The Politics of

Disarmamenet”



WHAT ARE WEAPONS OF MASS

DESTRUCTION"

+u6an and Herring define W74 as“weapons of which small numbers can destro life and!or

inanimate " ma#e dead$ ob%ects on a &ast scale &er 'uic#l”

n $&% UN Commission for conventional /rmaments define W74

as

“Atomic e(plosi&e weapons) radioacti&e material weapons) lethal

chemical and biological weapons) and an weapons de&eloped in

the future which characteristics comparable in destructi&e effect

to those atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned abo&e”



0n /ugust 8, $&9, the United *tates used a massive, atomic

weapon against Hiroshima, -apan.

This atomic bomb, the e:uivalent of ;<,<<< tons of TNT,

flattened the city, )illing tens of thousands of civilians.

While -apan was still trying to comprehend this devastation

three days later, the United *tates struc) again, this time, on

Nagasa)i.



HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI

AF ER HE A OM BOMB

DES RUC ION IN AUGUS 1#$%



WEAPONS CONTROL

TREATY DEVELOPMENT

n -uly $&8%, N=T 1Non =roliferation Treaty> was signed by

nuclear countries.

China and #rance refused to sign and other states re?ected

the treaty pon the ground that it fro6e the nuclear status



KEY POINTSThe late $&<s and early $&9<s saw a growing disillusionmentwith disarmament in dealing with the problems posed by weapons

of mass destruction

The late $&9<s brought 2new thin)ing3 and the development of the

theory of arms control

The aim of arms control was to ma)e the prevailing system wor)more effectively



KEY POINTS&CONTD

The Cuban 7issile Crisis ushered in a new3 golden age3 of

arms control agreement

+y $&@<s, however, arms control as an approach to peace an

security faced increasing problems

There were continuing difficulties in the $&%<s, which meant

that despite the N# /greement in $&%@ there was growing

feeling that the disadvantage of arms control outweighed the

benefits



INTERNATIONAL

REGIMES ON WMD

A )ey categories of W74 1Nuclear, +iological, Chemical> plus

the missile delivery systems associated with them, each has

an international regime devoted to their control.

$. The Non=roliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1N=T>9th 7arch

$&@<. $%& members. 0nly ndia, srael, North Borea and=a)istan did not signed.



INTERNATIONAL REGIMES ON

WMD, CONTD

-; categories of signatories

$. Nuclear Weapons *tates 1+ritain, China, #rance, (ussia

and U*, are committed to 2pursue negotiations in good

faith3 on nuclear disarmament.

;. Non Nuclear Weapon states 1NNW*> agree to forgo

nuclear weapons entirely.



Chemical Weapons Convention 1CWC>

/ multilateral treaty banning the chemical weapons

*igned in ;&th /pril $&&@

Currently has $8 states partiesThe treaty bans development, ac:uisition or possession of

chemical weapon by signatories,

Their use or preparation for use, the transfer of CW or

encouragement of CW in other states,



and the destruction CW stoc) pile by signatories

CWC compels states parties possessing the banned

weapons to dismantle their stoc) and set out clear time table

to do it. 1 different from N=T>

f non compliance 0=CW 1organi6ation for the =rohibition of

Chemical weapons> can recommend members to ta)e

punitive action



+iological Weapons Convention 1+WC>

signed in ;8 7arch $&@9

-$9< states members

t bans development, stoc)piling, ac:uisition, retention, andproduction of biological agents and to!in and all weapons

designed to use them.

1CWC does not ban the use of such weapons.>



KEY POINTS

The post cold war period saw flurry 1sudden rush> of arms

control agreement

4espite the lessening of hostility between the united states

and russia, however, progress was slow and intermittent

ncreasingly the utility of arms control was perceived to have

declined in the changed international environment which

emerged especially after &D$$



HE END OF COLD

WAR

United states became dominant power in the world

Countries who feared U* hegemony or intervention in their internal

affairs had an interest in developing their own 2ultimate3 weapons

1north Borea and ran>

The emergence of terrorist groups li)e /leada, with nothing tolose attitude, to further their regional and global ambitions

The biggest fear is weapons of mass destruction proliferated to

wea) states and nonstates actor

This is the new 2geostrategic realities3 of the post cold war

Therefore, the attempts to control weapons of mass destruction faced new

challenges, difficult to bring traditional arms control techni:ues and

principles forward to address the new emerging threats



The end of cold war has brought about a new set of threats,

although smaller in size, but more numerous and potentially more

acute.

According to CIA Director James Woosley

! it was as if we were struggling with a large dragon for "# years,

$illed it, and then found oursel%es in a &ungle full of poisonous

sna$es'



THE EMERGENCE OF

COUNTER&PROLIFERATION

Counter=roliferation defined by +utcher as

2 The militar component of non*proliferation) in the same

wa that the militar is a component of foreign polic 3

4efinition +y 4avies

“the acti&ities of the department of Defense across full range

of +S efforts to combat proliferation) including diplomac)

arms control) e(port controls and intelligence collection and

analsis) with particular responsibilit for assuring +S forces

and interest can be protected should the confront and

ad&ersar armed with ,-D or missiles”



EMERGENCE OF COUNTER&

PROLIFERATION

n ;<< U* -oint Chief of *taff issue a statement on

countering W74 , define nonproliferation as

“ action to pre&ent the proliferation of ,-D b dissuading

or impeding access to) or distributing of sensiti&e

technologies”

"cited arms control and international treaties as rele&ant

acti&ities$

Counterproliferation defined as

2 7ilitary activities ta)en to defeat against the range of W74

ac:uisition, development and employment situation3



The +ush /dministration published a document in 4ecember

;<<; on W74 strategy. t gave the definition of counter

proliferation with A )ey elements

$. nterdiction of W74 transfers to 2hostile states and

terrorist organi6ations3;. 4eterrence of use,

A. 4efence

The document also states that

2 U* military forces and appropriate civilian agencies musthave the capacity to defend against W74armed adversaries,

including in ta)ing preemptive measures3



KEY POINTS

*trategic response against W74 proliferation are

those involving military means. /lso

means3counterproliferation3

2Counterproliferation3 is of interest during thepostcold war period because of the emergence of

smaller potentially more immediate threat and a

sense that arms control may be of limited use

Concern about proliferation of W74, especiallynuclear weapons, is significantly driven by a

concern that they may be used to deter U*led

intervention



HE DIPLOMA IC OP ION :

S RA EGIC RESPONSES WI HHELD

=reventive strategies are directed at the process

of proliferation, and aim to stop the development

or ac:uisition of W74

=reemptive strategies are directed at the deployedweapons and Dor facilities, the aim is to prevent

their use in war

The dilemma over North Borea and ran has been

whether to continue with diplomatic initiatives orwhether to pursue a preventive or preemptive

strategy



THE CHALLENGES OF COUNTER&

PROLIFERATION

There are several problems and dilemmas associated with

military response to proliferation

Concerning the definition of 2counterproliferation3

#inding a 2political3 logic into which preventive or

preemptive action can be fitted has not always been easy

=reemptive operations tend to find their rationale and

legitimacy in the conte!t of an ongoing war

*uch as the $&&$ 'ulf War

=reventive operations find their ?ustifying logic in theinternational norm surrounding W74, eg the =roliferation

*ecurity nitiative



VIEWS ON ARMS

CON ROL

#rom the cold war e!perience, arms control agreement had play

some role in contributing to international security

/rms control is rarely of decisive importance and it is not a solution

in its own right

/rms control has traditionally been a fundamentally conservativepolicy. ts aim is to introduce some measures of predictability into

an adversarial relationship

Therefore, arms control cannot by itself create stability or peace

/rms control in controlling weapons is only a means to an ends,

not an ends in itself

/rms control relies on the assumption that adversarial states see a

mutual interest in avoiding outright conflict



VIEWS ON ARMS

CON ROL

/rms control was wor)able during the cold

war because there was real confrontation

Now without confrontation, arms control is no

longer re:uire to in?ect stability orpredictability into a conflict

/rms control now comes to means about how

to eliminate surplus military capability i.e.

ageing cold war arsenal. Therefore no longer

re:uired formal verified treaties



MILI ARY DRIVEN RESPONSES

O PROLIFERA ION

+ecame prominence because of the growing concerns about

the declining effectiveness of deterrence and of non

proliferation efforts

Now is about counterproliferation option 5 preventive and

preemptive war The approach re:uires international political legitimacy if it

is to succeed i.e. to provide hard evidence that W74 are a

reality or an imminent threat

4ue to the difficulties of implementing forceful counter

proliferation, international community have renewed interest

in arms control



FROM COUN ER&PROLIFERA ION

BACK O ARMS CON ROL

4ue to the difficulties of implementing forceful counterproliferation,

international community have renewed interest in arms control

The arms control has broader strategy with the intention to

-Enhanced the nonproliferation regimes

-(enewed interest in traditional bilateral and multilateral arms control measures

-Counterproliferation arrangement through networ) of partnership activitiesuse as a 2tool)it3 against state or non stateactors intent to proliferate W74

1=roliferation *ecurity nitiatives, UN (esolution $9<, 'lobal initiative to

combat Nuclear Terrorism, The 'lobal Nuclear energy partnership, and the

cooperative Threat (eduction =rogram>

The emergence of 2 The New /bolitionist3 1'eorge *hult6, William =erry, Henry

Bissinger, *am Nunn> which called for urgent action to stop depending onnuclear weapons in order to prevent further proliferation in dangerous hands.

The necessity to bring in into force the comprehensive Test +an Treaty, #issile

7aterial Cutoff Treaty, and further cuts in offensive strategic capabilities of U*

and (ussia.



Whether traditional arms control can

reemerge to maintain international

security and control W74 remains

unclear although there some positive

signs especially from the 0bama

administration.

The 2 return to arms control 2 still

faces ma?or challenges



E'TRACT FROM PRESIDENT OBAMA SPEEACH

IN PRAUE CASTLE , %TH APRIL !!#

The cold war has disappeared but thousand of W74 have

not,

The threat of global nuclear war has gone but the ris) of

nuclear attac) has gone up

7ore nations has ac:uired these weapons.

We are destined to live in a world with more nations with the

tools of destruction

Having a deadly enemies

f the spread nuclear weapons is inevitable, than the use ofnuclear weapon is inevitable

Therefore, /merica is committed to see) the peace and

security of the world without nuclear weapons



CONCLUSION

There is no single approach to the problem of controlling

weapons of mass destruction1disarmament, arms control or

counterproliferation>

/rms control 1traditional treaties and new partnership

arrangement> are not panacea 1solution to social eveil>4espite the imperfection of arms control arrangement, if

more consistently applied, verified and policed , can provide

preventive barriers

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