CONTEST FOR POLITICAL SPACE: A CASE STUDY FROM COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

IN NEPAL'

Binod Pokharel

Inlroduction This paper presents the fi ndings of a research addressing the question of how the role of political parties affects the implementation of the Income Generation and Community Development Programme (ICCD) conducted under the Melamchi Water Supply Project (MWSP) in Nepal. It also shows how different political panies :md local government bodies manipulate the given model of community development in order to promote thei r own political space. llle ICC D is a component of mitigation measure of Mclamchi Water Supply Projc(.1. which aims to bring 170 MLD of water per day for the people of the Kathmandu Valley. In thi s art icle, I explore the ways in which poli tical spaces arc constmcled and negotiated by the project of community development under the competitive multiparty dClllocnllic regi me in Nepal.

Thi s paper will not discuss thc larger issue of the Melamchi Projcct. It will focus on componcnts of the mitigation measure. i.c. Income Generation and Community Development Programme conducted under the Mel.unchi Water Supply Project vis-a-vis the role o f political parties at the local leve l.

Th is case study is based on my observations and eX-I>eriences while I was working for the Social Upl ift Programme (SU P) under the Melamchi Water Supply Project (MWS P) frO I1l 1999-2004. [n order to update my data/information J carried out a short fi eldwork in May 2006.2

Po li tical part ies defi ned and fI1defi ned project policies and plans accord ing . to thei r poli tical interest and gain political benefi ts through the development projects. Project of community developmcnt is onc of thc sources for expanding " political space" at the rural setting of Nepal. It provides the room for poli tical parties so that their leaders interact and manifest the ir interest through differe nt mechanisms. Different political part ies use different vocabularies to ei ther support or contest the polic ies or modalities of community development to open up the spaces for themse lves. The space can be used for agitatio n, grievances and benefi ts because it is the

• voice and representation of their own political party. Mainstream political parties focus upon the electoral sustainability through the manipulation of the development strategies and policies. Support or opposition of a g iven development programme is an immediate interest of political parties. The inherent interest of behind is to expand the bases of party in all corners of the village society using the newly constructed space.

Contributions to Nepalese Studies, Vol. 34, No. 2 (July 2007), 251-275 Copyright © 2007 CNASlTU

,

252 CNAS Joumal. Vol. 34. No. 2 (July 2007)

Understanding Community De\'elopment Project and Political Space A project of community dcvelopment is a multifaceted phcnomenon which produccs intcndcd or unintendcd. cxpected or unexpected and visiblc o r invi sible impact upon the peoplc (scc Ferguson 1994: Pigg 1992 and Fujikura 2004). It works with differem players and perspectives and thcre are always tensions among the players and perspecti ves to establish own position in the community using dcvelopment project (see Mosse 2001). Development projcct unfolds the spaces for some stllkeholders :lIld it ahvilys intcrfacc with politics. The literatures show that somc dcgree of milnipulation and I>olitical motives seemed to ex ist in all types of community dcvclopment programmes in Nepill and elsewhere. When thc political players enter the ;Ircna of developmcnt project first of all mey maintain the panncrs and alliances to maintain politic;11 space and thcy rcducc the opponunities for ot hers (main ly oppositional panies) to panicipate in thc larger project. Thc pilnncrs and alliances may be 1>o1iticill or non-politicil!' governmental or non­governmental: NGOs or grass-roots level org<lll izOIIions. Thc po lit ical panics live in the same space with differcnt o r cven thc oppositc of others functions. David Mosse shows that project of dcvelopmcnt is not iI boundcd entity formcd around consensual goals and ideilS. but a politicill system in which diffcrcnt perspectives contcnd for influencc and authority (MosS(' 2001 : 159-160). It invo lves practices of coopcration and conflict among thc I>olitical p;lnies for thc production of cvcnts. As ;m event it is a space in which part icipants enter into practices. constituted and reinforced network s ;md process informlllion ;md knowledge.

I'olitical panics scek constant ly 10 innuence development programmc to sh;lpe their opinions to their adv:Ultages. "With respect to the contested nature of political space, the d iscussion ranges from the usc of coercivc forcc to contested me;mings rooted in different discourscs. In this wlIy poli ticlIl space emcrgcs as pan of constantly shifting landscape of contest that is primarily about social actors winning positions rather than achieving deci sive victories" (Anderson 1976 quolcd in Engberg-Pedersen ;lIld Webster 2002: 13). "Govcmment and donor agency interventions can shape thc context in which loc;11 development processes take place . they arc not in a position 10 direct the actions and responses of the local actors" (Websler 2002: 233).

Comw;tll (2004). Barker (1999), Lieten (2003). Gupta (1998), Shanna (2004) and H;ullmar (2002) show that the actors and sub-actors of developmenl projccts in the local levcl initiale Ihe use or double speak intrigues. power struggles, appropriation, rhetoric ;lIld manipulation while development projccts pl .. ce in the local level to cnlarge the pany I>oli tics in the village levcl. Pol itical space is not only something takc n up. assumed or fi lled, but somcth ing thm can be cre;lted. opened and reshaped (Comwall 2004 :77). Comw;lll demonstrates that "many of thc interventions that characterize the current landscape of devclopment seek to hybridize and

Contest lor Politica l Space 253

transfonn existing insti tutions, lending them new life and new purpose, as well as to create new ones" (2004:82),

Barker (1 999) clarifies distinctly the conceptual and theoretical issues of popular action held in poli tical setting. He views that "political space" or political setting count as part of civil society. He notes that the 'power exercised in the boundary zone emanates from several sources: local associations and institutions, certain local individual citizens, transnational NGOs, foreign governments and international agencies all vie for power and recognition. Centre of local power may aspire to control of activity seuing that in name come under state authority' (ibid: 239-240).

Unlike Baker defini tion of "political space," it is flu id and has complex boundary between state and civil society. However, unlike the rest of civil society thei r activity is oriented toward government or other matter of broad public concern. In the local level there are different types of political power centers and they depend on the same niche adopting d ifferen t str.l.Iegies. Community development and competitive electoral politics are tied each other in the case of South Asia. The political pan ies at local level maintain their local support through development intervention . Gupta (1998:124) shows that "the winners of village elections rewarded their supporters by making them the beneficiaries of development programme. Voters' decisions dependent on whether they had gained from development programmes or had been excl uded from them". He also points out that the hi story of factional polilics dctcnnined who thc beneficiaries of development progmmmes were: in turn, the pattern of distribution of benefits affected future support (ibid).

Gupta concludes that development projects are the fi eld of power with its own discourses and regime of truth (ibid: 104).To gct the powcr through developmcnt projccts they manipu late the modality in fa vour of own party and started populist programmes. "Populism was not just a project of ruling regime but also deployed by oppositional groups to construct alternative to ruling coalition" (ibid: 75). Introduction of populist progmmme is very common for the expansion of political support. Political leaders use Slate power for development and compete for power with claims of their ability 10 effect progress (ibid).

Rural or community dcvelopment project in south Asia part icularl y in India is charactcrized by intensc competition for the state resources on the bltsis of cllslc/rcligious identity such as Hindu vs Muslim, Thakur vs. Brah min. high caste vs. Dalit. etc. Lieten's (2003) study in Panchayat in Western Uttar Pradesh on comprehensive rural dcvelopment shows that how Pradhan (chicf of Panchayat) consolidates hi s power using the governm\'=nt mcchan ism. Pradhan is an elected posi tion. and he has power to nominate to other Panchayat mcmbers. He is protectcd by the officials and by the poHtici:lI1s. All thc power is cnjoyed by Pmdhan and nomi nated members hold the position only for the namesake. Pradhan d istributes loan to thc poor

2~ CNAS Journal, VoL 34, No. 2 (July 2007)

people, houses under government programme built for them, and hand pump installation, etc. Middlemen and goonda (hooligan) play the important role to keep the Pradhan in the position for a long time. Middlemen or mafia bosses and their hired thugs have occupied the space at the delivery point and that all-pervasive corruption prevents the benefits from reaching the people. The local Panchayats are seen as obstructing deve lopment and government plans rather helping them. All Pradhans existed in the position due to their patronization of national level political leaders (ibid: 73).

Water User Committee (WUC) and other types of community organizations in Nepal emerged as 'potent arenas for political contestation ' (Shaoua 2004), Shaoua observed that \VUC became new arenas for gauging one's political strength . Because of its assoc iation with bikas, the supposed ly neutral \VUC increasingly saw pol itical battles fought during its elections (ibid 2004: 107). He notes that \VUC developed as forum where local people saw the project as opening up new social spaces. " It provided opportunities to some who were opposed to the VDC chainnan to move into positions o f leadership themselves" (ibid). His study also demonstmtes that educated and articulate persons who had imbibed the ideology of bikas were coming into leadership positions in these forums. It is seen that in some cases community organizations or user groups in Nepal arc clearly being used to "legitimate the interest of some" (Shah 2006: 6).

Politicization and manipulation of development projects are not limited with small scale communit y development projects. The mai nstream political parties use the sp:lce created by mega project for the exp:lnsion of party politics in the different layers of the society. In this regard Khagmm (2004) c:lrried out det:lil ethnographic :lccount o f transnational struggles around the N:louada River Valley Dam Projects in Central India. a huge complex of thirty large and more than three thousand small dams. He mentions that in 1980s and 1990s anti-Narmada dam network of conservationists. environmentalis ts and other social groups led the campaign against the project. In 1978, the opposition Congress (I) Party in Madhya Pradesh ut il ized the backlash against the Nannada Project in Nirmar district o rders as a means to gamer popular support for themselves and thei r political party (Khagram 2(X)4:85). The leading Congress ( I ) pol iticians such as Dr. Shankar Oayal Sharma and V.c. Shukla with their over 1000 fo llowers were detained by the police in the course of movement. Yet, once Congress came to power, local expectations were disappointed. The elected leaders agreed to proceed with planned construction works, while stressing that they would stri ve to explore the possibility of reducing the distress of the displaced persons as much as possible (Khagaram 2004 cited in Pfaff-Czarnecka: 13». Khagaram's study shows the dynamic nature of political parties and how they simultaneously maintain the local and national politics through development project.

Contest for Political Space 255

There are mUltiple aspects of the political space of government policies and development programmes in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Hammar analyses how states in Zimbabwe have engaged in space-ordering practices that have been aimed simultaneously at territorial control and asserting political authority (2002: 129). She shows that land has been central to polit ics in Z imbabwe through its history and on all social and spatial scale'. She describes how President Mogabe and his party use the space constructed by Land Refoml Prog ..... mme in Zimbabwe. Her study shows that Mugabe' s government and other different aclOrs st ..... tegically used the new land policy to promote particular interests.

These reviewed C:lse studies confirm that government programmes. development activities and other policies open lhe room for political panies where different actors try to manipulate lhe given model and actors have no difficulty in picking a language to support the legitimacy of their claims and manipulation. In short, the poli tical parties of South Asia or Africa or elsewhere are constantly seeking the manipulation of development projects within the given conditions to generate for pol itical space to achieve the personal interesl.

Melamchi Water Supply Project : Contest rOT Political Gains Nepal has relatively a short history of mega project. Over the last fift y years many mega projects h:lve implemented in Nepal. Most of the mega projects related to water recourses are controversial and debatable. The Treaty of Koshi and Gandaki projects was held between Nepal and India in 1950s in order to generate electricity, irrigation and flood control in India and Nepal. From the very beginning the opposition communist parties of Nepal were against these projects as they argued that it was an unequal treaty with India, in which India has the upper hands in all cases. The same story was repealed in Mahakali treaty ill 1992 between India and Nepal where Nepal got namesake benefit fro m thi s project.

After 1990s non-govcrnmental ,Icti vism emerged against the high dam and mega project in Nepal. Arun IJ] was among the largest projects the Nepalese authorities and their international partners had ever designed for the country (Pfaff-Cz.amecka nd: 24). This project was withdrawn after the severe protests by NGO. human right activist and communist faction of the country. The main argument of the opponents was based on economic and mallllgerial aspects. It seems that there is severer protest and debate on mega projects of wll ter resources in Nepal than other type of mega projects. The leftist parties with some NGOs and human right organizmions are against the mega projects and directly opposed the involvement of multinational and transnational company in water resource development of the country.

Melamchi Water Supply Project is the first project in Nepal. which includes the multinational and transnational companies in w,lter enterprises

256 CNAS Journal, VoL 34 , No. 2 (July 2007)

and accepts to ut ilize the global technology and global thinking in water industries in Nepal.

The national debate on the problem of water scarcity in Kathmandu has been attracting the attention of government. political parties and international communities over the last twenty years. In order to supply plent ifu l water for the Kathmandu valley, Melamchi Water Suppl y Project was designed nearly ID years ago. Politically this project was framed when Nepal i Congress Leader Krishna Prasad Bhattar.ti. in course of his e lect ion campaign in 1991 , said. " I would bring so much of water from the Melamchi Ri ver not only for drinking purpose but al so for washing the street of Kathmandu: ' Th is high sounding slogan of Bhaltarai was meant to gai n support from the people of Kathmandu . However. he lost the election but Nepali Congress Government gave a top priority to this project to fulfill the scarcity of water in the Kathmandu valley.

Melamchi Water Supply Project (MWS P), a multi-million project (approximately 400 mill ion USD in 2000), located in centml Nepal. ;lI1d is designated to solve a major water supply shortage in the Kathmandu valley. The objective of the Melamchi Water Supply Project is to tmnsfer 170 MLD untreated water per day from the Melalllchi Ri ver to the water trC:l tlllent faci li ty :It Sundarijal in the Kathmandu valley through a 27 km long tunnel. The ovemll objective of the project is to provide safe potable water supply, improvement in health conditions and economic development in the Kilthmandu valley (MWSDB 1999).

The socio-economic impacts of the project on local communities were high. The land and other property t:lken up by the project was pilid better compensation thtlll in the P<lst. Total 14 Vill age Development Committees (VDCs) of Sindhupalchok district with 60,000 popuiations were directly/indircctly affected by this project. Another major impact of the project was decreased agricultur.tl production due to reduced waler fl ow in the river during the dry season. Several mitigation measures were adopted to minimize the negative impact of the project. Among them Soci al Uplift Progr.tmme (SU P) was the fore most one. The ai m of SUP was to ensure that Ihe project arrected I>cople of the Melamchi vlllley. Si ndhupalchok district benefil from the project and that suswinable developmellt in the natural resource management. heal th. education, income generation and community development and rural eleclrification could create significant improvements in Ihe qual ity of life of people in the Melamchi valley,

It is one of the complex projects where eight donors with number of international consultants and government staff arc involved. Asian Development Bank is the main donor of the project which shares approximately 50 percent of the lotal cost. In course of project designing of Melamehi Water Supply Project (MWSP), global, nalionaL regional and local

.. agendas were played in a variety of ways, Therefore, the implementation of

Contest for Political Space 257

MWSP was strongly associated with a wider political and economic interest of the Nepali government, donors and multinational companies. Unlike the other proposed mega projects (Pancheshawer Multipurpose Project l

,

Saptllkoshi High Ollm Project and recently completed Kaligandaki Hydro­power), the tTansnationall y allied non-government organizations could not strongly go against Melamchi Project due to severe scarcity of drinking water in Kathmandu valley.

Nepali Congress government agreed all terms and conditions of the donors by considering the severe problem of drinking water in Kathmandu Valley. Though Nepal Communist Party-United Marxist Leninist (CPN­UML) with other human right organizations was not in fa vour of this project in the beginn ing, later UML agreed to construct this project due to its political interest. Un like Amn Ill. UML did not strongly oppose this project due to political reasons. Firstly, the beneficiaries of this project were the people of the Kathmandu valley where UML had strong hold and almost all the seats of Kathmandu constituencies were won by them. Secondly, there was no beller option than Melamchi Project for supplying drinking w:l ter in Kathmandu. However, UML has some sort of reservation about dOllars' conditions. Before investing in the project the donors sought :Ill pany consensuses which made UML and other political part ies to reach consensus. The donors had proposed several terms and conditions for the implementation of the Melamchi Project including privlItization of the Water Supply Corpormion. increase wmer {;Iriff by six times and handover of the management to Water Corporation to foreign company, In spite of the UM L's reserv .. tion, the Nep .. li Congress government promises to fulfi ll conditions of the donors.

There were some sorts of consensus among the politica l pilnies about the Mel:ullchi Project at the nat ional level. However, :It the local level the political panies have contesting di scourse of Me!amchi Project. In the local level they did not directl y oppose the need of Mel:lffichi Project but had :.ome reserv:ltion. UML opposition pany in the central level and rul ing p:.rty in Sindhupalchok d i:.trict ( 1997-2002) viewed that "water should be di verted to Kathmnlldu by establishing the lac .. l right over the water" Nepali Congress hoped to make political c:lpital by completing this project on time. They concentrated on the improved road. electricity and the job opportunity at Ihe local level and Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) concurred with the Nepali congress.

This project actually sinned in 2000 and supposed to be completed by 2005 but due to political tunnoil of the country, lack of sufficient fund for project and the king' s takeover of the power on February I. 2005 made uncertainty of this project. Thi s project has also slowed down due to other various reasons. The first and foremost reason was tennination of contract of road project due to poor perfonnance in 2004. After 2004 the project was

258 CNAS Journal , Vol. 34, No. 2 (July 2007)

d isturbed by local level agitations. griev.mces. greed and Mao ist People' s War. This projecl suffered another hurdle in May 2007 when the newly appoinled minister frOIll the Maoist den ied 10 handover the contract o f water management to Severn Trent Comp.my. Handover of waler management 10

foreign company was one of the major conditio ns of Asian Development Sank (ADS ) to sanelion the loan for MW$ P.

I'oliticall'arlics at N:ltiona l and Loc.ll t c"cI NlIliolllll un' l: Aft er the political c hange of 1990s Nepali Congress (NC) and COlllmunist Party of Nep:ll-U nited Marx ist and Leninist (CPN-U ML) emerged as two major political par1ie.~ of the country . There were al so some nation:ll 1>oIitical pat1 ies such Rastriya Pr<lj'lIantr..l Party (RPP). Nepal Sadbhawana Party (NSP) .• md other small leftist parties. Unli ke NC and UML. they were confined in cer1ain areas and districts. These parties could Ilot innucnce the national politics witho ut the <llliance with e ither UML or Ne. Ne" .. l Communist Party (Mao ist) has just come 10 the main stream poli tics of the country giving up the 10-year armed stJ1lggle. Here I will confine myself to the role of NC and UML in the national level as well as di strict levc1]>olitics.

In the parl iamentary election of 1991 and 1999. Nepali Congress won the election with simple majority. UML bcc:rllle a strong opposition p:u1y of the country in both times. In 1994 election no onc got majority in the parliament but UML became the largest party of Ihe country :md it formed a minority go vemment for nine monlhs. The UML go vernment was voted out of office in September 1995. Since then the practice of coalition govern ment continue up 10 the third parliamentary election of the country. If wc look at the parliamentary history o f Nepal since 1990 to 2004 it is cv ident Ihat both o f these parties enjoyed thc power :md pri vileges through state mechanism in

• vanous ways. Two local eleclions were held after 1990s in Nepa\. In the first e lection,

Ne won more than 50 perce nt of the seats at local level. In the second local electio n. UML victory was more than 60 percent. Nepali Congress and CPN­UM L were major parties representing two different ideologies. There was a competition in every sphere of li fe among the major parties of the country. The former adopled the westen.l forlll of democracy that is neo-liberal economic policies favoured by the aid donors (Whelpton 2005: 189) and later followed the so-called communist ideology. In addition, NC was alleged by leftist p'lrties taking Indian stance in sharing insufficient electric power supply and water in T.makpur Treaty (ibid). In the beginning UML had the n'll ionalisl stand against the mu lt i-nat ional compllny. privatization and neo­liberal policy. The ideological polarizalion of these two parties was not limited in the national level but exp:mded in the all layers o f public and professional org:mizations such as bureaucracy. teachers associations.

Conlest for Political Space 259

uni versi ty. bar :lSSOCl:ltlon and so on. Nep:lli Congress and CPN-UM L contested on all level of affairs. In the beginning. the b;lsis o f polarizmion was clear. For example, UML was supported by the lower middle class people and lower or middle levcl bureaucrats while NC base was high level burcaucrats and feudal of o ld regime. Howcver. class-based polari zation graduall y bec:llne weak. Now the polarization did not reflect in the class difference. Therefore. conflict between NC and UML was based on I>ower sharing such :IS politic;11 appointments. jobs at school amd university, etc.

They exercise power through the str.lIegic maneuvering of the options of the other. Whcn the Congress came in power in 199 1. there W:lS no hilrmonious relation between Congress and UML. Several street prolests and agitiltions were held by the left opposition parties for power. There is a general tendency in Nep:11 to bypass the local govemment by the central govcmment if there is the majority of opposition party at the local level (Whelpton 2005). In principle. all parties welcome the policics of the govemment regarding rural development or poverty reduction scheme but in practice they manipulate according 10 thcir own political interest. For example. NCJXIli Congress int roduced a progl",Jmme 'Bisheshw:IT with Poor' in 1999 and UML establi shed ' Build Vour Village Yourse lf Sehemc' in 1995. [n principlc, these programmes were not antithetical. However, they charged each other mi sappropriating the fund and alleged for politiciz'ltion of the progmmme. Whclpton (2005: 193) writes:

The UML's major innovation wns its Build Your Village Yourse lf Scheme, under which village development committee receiveo the gr.mts of 300,000 mpces for local development projects. The scheme in itself was not controversial, but other parties wcrc strongly opposed to the UML's setting up a special monitoring mechanism involving members of different political parties at local level. To congress in particular.lhis see med:1 de liberate attempt to bypass the now congress- dominated local authorities. The UML levied similar charges :Igainst the Bishcshwar with poor scheme introduced by the 1999 govem ment.4

Local Level: There are four mainstream political parties in SindhupaJchok district, i.e. NC, UML, Maoist and RPP. All of them have strong bases in Sindhupalchok district. Therc is no clear picture of Maoist. They once contested for the parl iamentary election in 1991 since then they boycotl all Iype of elections. However, they showed their strength by attacking the district headquarters, torching all VD buildings and vandalizing the offices of NGOs in the time of insurgency. Mainstream leaders have their constituencies in SindhupaJchok district, for example RPP chainnan Pashupati Shamser Rana in constituency No 3, UML leader Amrit Bohora in constituency No. 2 and Mohan Basnet of Ne from constituency No I ,

260 CNAS Joumal. Vo!. 34, No. 2 (July 2007)

Pashupati Shamser is the single leader of Si ndhupalchok who was never defeated in the elect ion. Amrit Bohora was defeated in the last parliamentary election and NC candidate Mohan Basnet for the fi rst time was elected for par1i:!mem in the last election.

After the restor.Jtion of democracy many ex-p:!nchas joined Nepali Congress and UML. Both UML and NC need the he lp of RPP to establish own position in the district. Political all iances between the parties frequently changed. In the first loc:!l election no one got majority in the district. NC­UML co:!l ition govemment was formed. RPP was the opposition party at the district level. In the second local election UML absolutely won the election at district level. Out of thirteen members of District Development Commillee (DDC), twel ve members with president and vice-president were from UML one member from NC. There was no me mber from RPP at the DDC.

Financi:!lIy. Sindhupalchok ODe was strong as it had pennanent sources of income from the levy of Indrawati and Bhotekoshi hydro-power and Langtang National Park. Loclll Governance Programme-UN DP supported the community project started in 1996. The DDC chairman oversaw all progrdmmes. Therefore, those who won the e lection at the district level enjoyed more power and could explmd party through out the district either through the development projects or misapproprillting the resources. There were some more advantages for the OOC chai rman he could employ his cadres as paid staff of the DOe. District is the centre for power politics at local level. Power is expanded through development works. issuing license, giving jobs to party cadres and recruiting the local NOOs for community development works. The development workers who recrui ted through the DDC did not on ly involve their assigned works but worked as bridge linking the people with the ruling party of the DOe.

The Melamchi valley compri ses 14 VDCs. which includes one lIaka and majo r part of constituency No 3, Sindhupalchok district. In the both loc:!1 elections. UM L won the majority of seats o f VDCs. In 1997 loc:!l election. UM L won in 8 VDCs out of fourteen . NC :!nd RPP won 3 VOCs ellch. VDC level politics is more polarized than district :!nd national level. Polarization is seen in everyday social life. Reciprocal labour exchange. panic ip;ltiol1 in the wedding and funeral procession of rellltives and neighbours were the some of the old age tradition of vill age Nepal. With the introduction of multi-party system in 1990s sueh practices also politic:!lIy pol;lrized and people did not participate in the ritual func tion of the followe rs of opposition party. Some of the locill elites came into pllrty politics of mainstream pilrty after 1990s to take the re venge on the opponents. Such polarization could be seen in the community and co-operative organizations as well. For example, there were separate milk collection centres for NC. UML and RPP in Mahankal VOC of Melamchi valley. Forming community organizations. co-operatives or cluh .. at p<lrty line helped to incre;lSC the

Conlest for Political Space 261

solidarity among the party supporters. Disputes between two households became political issues. Political parties took the stand of one's own follower irrespective of whether he was right or wrong. Some times the followers of two panies fought in the village regarding the political speech made by their leaders in Kalhmandu.

Politicization of people is reflected when a development project starts at the local level. Political parties are in the process of party building. Therefore. they would like to penetmte into various segment of society in order to expand the party's bases of power through development activities (Hachhethu 2002: 21). The relations between mainstream political parties in Nepal are complicated, and lhe relation is based on distrust and asymmetrical power. All of lhem present lhemselves as devoted seriously to development projects. But in practice lhey support development conditionally. It was observed lhat village poli tics in Melamchi valley (between NC and UML) ostensibly related to grasping power. Power is gained at local level from development projects and other state interventions. Below I will discuss the inter-party politics between Ne and UML at the micro level where they manipulate the programme goal and objectives of lOCO.

Income Generation and Community Development Project (lGCD): An Overview Income Generation and Community Development (here after lOCO) is lhe sub-component of mitigation measure of MWSP. This programme had incorporated different activi ties such as social mobiliz.ation. credit capital scheme. infrastruClUre development. tmining, etc. Social mobilization was the cenmd part of lhe programme where hundreds of people could be organized under the Community Based Organizations (CBOs). It was designed to achieve sustainability by working with established local government structures (ODC/VDC) and strengthening these structures by using the participatory and capac ity building approaches of the Local Governance Programme. However. in course of implementation several di sagreements. constraints and debates emerged among the political parties and local government officials for manipulation and so on in accordance with vested political interests.

The lOCO was designed in a pre-construction phase of Melamchi Water Supply Project (MWSP) to minimize the negative att itude of people towards the MWSP as a whole and to prepare the people for the upcoming challenge in the construction phase of the tunnel by increasing ti)eir ngricultural products. However. the inherent objecti ve of this programme was to avoid and minimize the grievances induced through MWSP. The modality of programme implementation followed the principles and processes of social mobilization . Mclamchi Water Supply Project was responsible for providi ng the financia l suppon 10 implement Income Oenemtion and Community

262 CNAS Journal, VoL 34, No. 2 (July 2007)

Development component of SU P in Melamchi Valley and District Dcvelopmem CommiueclLocal Governance Programme (DDC/LGP) was Ihe executing agency of the programme.

Context of Intervention of IGCD Towards the end of 2000. Melamchi Water Supply Development Board (MWSDB) organized ;\ big gatheri ng in the Melamchi valley invi ting government authorit ies, major donors, local political parties and NOOs working in the Melamchi valley to legitimize the project design of MWSP. During thal time negoli<llions were underway with various donors for the financial suppon 10 implement MWSP. In this gathering the then Norwegian ambassador Ingrid Ofstad announced that her govemment would provide NOK 3,000.000 as a grant for one year 10 stan the IGCD in the Melamchi valley. She said, ' If the Mel;unc hi Project does not come her government would continue this progr::lmme fo r next three years'. Since March 2001 the loc .. 1 Governance Progr::unme (LOP) under DOC hOld been implementing the Income Gener<lt ion and Community Development component of Social Uplifl Progr .. mllle as agreed in third-pm1y cost sharing arr.mgcme nt between the Norwegi .. n Agency for Development Co,opemtion (NORAD) and the United Nations Deve lopment Programme (UNDP) on 12 December 2000.

It was designed by donors and approved by Nepali counterpan. Consensus was built among the stakeho lders prio r to project est .. bJishment. As I noticed from the beginning there were no debates reg<lrding lOCO implementation. however. there were more issues on olher component" of the project such <IS water ~haring. compcnsmion and tariff.

All of the stakeholders including political panies agreed to implement this progmmme through LOP, a UNOP project. for the sust<linabil ity of the project. An 'Igreement imd becn signed between DDC :md LGP for one year lOCO. The funding for this onc year progmmme had been aV;lil:.ble .. s gr.lnt assistance of Norwegian government and channelcd through UNDP to implement this progr.1Ill1ne in 14 MWSP affected VDCs of SindhupaJchok district. LOP under the DOC had played a centrJI role in this componem through social mobilization of villagers. Local Trust Fund and capacity building at the district level,

The advantage of utilizing the DDC/LG P was Ihat it was alrc:ldy opemting in the SindhupaJchok d istrict with an established struclure and methodology. and allowed for the various stakeholdcrs to pull resources and know-how together within the fnunework that was bcncficialto the project.

The major thrust of the lOCO was to promote self governing community organizations that would be capable of enhancing their access to resources and thereby promoting cottage industries, strengthening agriculture extension and veterinary services to supplement household income during the construction phase of the Melamchi Diversion Scheme.

Contest for Political Space 263

Politics of Partnership Approach This project was designed considering the mutual benefits for both panies i.e. Melamchi Water Supply Development Board (MWSDB) and DDC. MWSDB had seveml interests working with DDC. The foremost reason was that of the diversion structures and a good pan of the tunnel of MWSP was situated in the Si ndhupalchok d istrict. Secondly. Local Self-Governance Act 1998 provided more autonomy to Districts Development Committee which has given the right to DDC to stop the development projects which might consider environmentally unsound. Finally and imponantly. MWSDB would like 10 settle grievances relating compensation. forestry and water sharing issues working together with DDC. MWSDB thought that if IGCD successfull y implements the project it gained the trust from the local community for the construction of larger water supply project. Many human right organizations were lobbying against the project from the very beginning. By considering these issues project planned to work together with local insti tutions for the implementation of the IGCD. Board and other donors thought that if they worked together with local institutions grievances cou ld be lIvoided and minimized.

M;my approaches and gonl s were similar to or complement issues emerged in the IOCD and the DDClLGP management had given indications that co-operation is highly desirable within the framework of the Melamchi Project. These things inspired the Board to work together with DDCILOP. LGP did not handle everyday activities of IGCD but provided technical expertise to the programme through DDC and linked thi s programme with Ministry of Local Development and UNDP. They had the role to co-ordinate the programme with Mel;unchi Water Supply Board (MWSB). It moni tored the prosnullme whether it was implemented in the line of social mobilization or not. TIle authority of programme was deployed to ODe and Local Trust Fund Board.

For the DOC it was an opportunity working with high status project in terms of budget and coverage and funding for further project was alre:ldy est:lblished. The success of the project could make the credibility of UML headed DDC. Therefore. DOC took this project to achieve the political gain in the district.

There W;IS good relation between MWSDB and DOC when the project was framed. Once the project was started several disputes rose between the Board ;lIld DDC. DOC is ;1 politic:ll body which has more different concerns for the project than the Board. DDC commenced this project as a regular projcct and did not di sseminate the message of the agreed r.ttionale of the project among the communities. The main problem was that they would like to maintain the neutrality towards Melamchi Water Supply Project (MWSP) due to its complexity and some local activist NGOs were :lgainst the project. Therefore. DDC took middle w:lys regarding the Melamchi Project.

264 CNAS Journal, Vol. 34, No. 2 (July 2007)

In course of implementation of IGCD several. disagreements and debates emerged among the political part ies, MWSDB, LGP and DDC at Ihe local level which was not anticipated at the time of project design. MWSDB had some sort of expectation from the IGCD such as dissemination the messages of the MWSP at grass-roots level and minimize the local level grievances through dialogue with local community. Unlike the project expectation this programme increased further grievances instead of nonnalizing the local issues. When the IGCD set up then thc major pol it ical parties started to manipulation of the modality of IGCD on the line of their pol itical interest.

With regard to Melamchi Project. UML thought that if the whole project would succeed, credit would go 10 NC government and not to UML. Nepali Congress wanted publicity of this programme in the name of Melamchi Water Supply Project but UML had hesitation to link with lGCD with MWSP. Both of them wanted 10 use this programme for sustaini ng and expanding their support among the d ifferent layers of community. In the si tuation the MWSDB represented the line of Nepali Congress and UM L ideas were shared through the DDC. The strength of Nepali Congress was central government while UML was based on local government.

Melamchi Water Supply Board was an autonomous body of government establ ished to complete the Melamchi Water Supply Project. In spite of its autonomous nature, it worked on the line of ruling party Le. Ne. All of the technocrats and bureaucrats were deputed from the Ministry of Physical Planning and Construction or department. They were deputed in the project due to their political inclination :md closeness to the minister or the ruling party. Working in Board was very profilable than ministry due to handsome salary, 0Pl>ortunity to visit abroad and unseen other income. They attempted to please the ruling party recruiti ng the followers of the minister and party high command. The Board was. therefore. sensitive 10 the political results (benefits and loss) that the lGCD could bri ng. IGCD activities could win political friends and elections those were as means among many. Because of this, this is constant struggle for power :md influence between the political parties.

One of the most strained relations was between the Board (Congress) and the DDC (UML) and the relat ions between VDCs and the central players. The Board' s contact with the situation on the ground came from the political players who were the VDC leaders and key supporters of Nepal i Congress. Such power network of the Nepali Congress was able to challenge the local government. They thought that this project was designed by Ne. and therefore the fruit s of the project should go to their cadres first.

UML would like to showdown its power in the di strict and raised local issues through NGOs. UML wanted to make the central Congress government realize that without the UML support MWSP could not become successful. UML also expanded its popularity through IGCD programme

Contest lor Political Space 265

invol ving their supporters in training and exposure visit programme. UML also took Community Organizations (COs) as forum for the dissemination of party policies and programmes among the communities. Both of these parties used the space crellted by the ICCD to spread out the party politics in the village. lOCO was not only limited to community development of the Melamchi valley but al so linked with water politics of the country.

Emergence of Disputes All the stakeholders includi ng polilical parties of the project area accepted the goal and modality of the ICCD. However. the interpretation of such project goal and modality and their implicalions were strongly contested. There was clearly a lack of trust between the political parties as they fight for available resources and positions in the project. All the political part ies knew the objectives and scope of the ICCD programme but UML maneuvered the goals and objectives of the programme showing unwillingness 10 tie up with the programme of the larger MWSP. They claimed that this project was a regular programme of DOCILOP. Technically, UML was right because there were no direct negot iations between MWSDB and DDC. The NORAD fund came through the third party contract between UNDP and NORAD. However, in practice, thi s project was designed 10 mitigate the indirect impact of the Melamchi Diversion Scheme which was clearly spelled out in the agreementS The conflict emerged due to own sland of political parties regarding th is project The Board fe lt that the DOC/LOP h .. d not been giving a clear message to the people of Melamchi valley about the ICCD and the LOP funding source. In geneml , the political parties had no negative att itude towards the lOCO but they had competing meaning on its linkage with MWSP, claiming the ownership on lOCO. resource mobili zation and recruitment process of social mobil izers ..

Contest for Ownership: The disputes emerged taking the ownership of the IGCD. Both DDC and MWSP claimed the ownership of the programme. Progmmme was implemented due to MWSP. DDC was a partner institution of MWSP to implement this component. When the programme started the DDC took this programme as a regular programme of DOC. In many cases they also bypassed the Board from the decision making process of lOCO. At that time Board did not have control mechanism for DOC because this agreement was not directly held between DOC and Board. When the agreement was held between UNOP and LGPI DOC then DDC headed by UML said that lOCO was a regular programme of DDC and denied to accept this programme as a mitigation measure of MWSP. They also extended the message of this progmmme as DOC's own regular programme and did not mention the relation between DDC and MWSP.

266 CNAS Journal, Vo!. 34, No. 2 (July 2007)

The programme could provide different opportumtles to the local community and a large number of people could be mobilized for the local Icvcl development. This programme could givc better outputs in a very short period of timc through loan. infrastructurc development. tmining and tcchnology transfer <lctivi ties. All of the stakeholders namc ly DDC. MW$ P and political panics would like to use the achievement of the progmmmc for their political guin .

L;lck o f linbgcs betwcen IGCD and MWSP in the ground level put the MWSDB in a difficu lt situation. Villagers perceived this as VDCtDDC progmmme sUPIXl rted by the LG P/DOC. When J asked a question relating to linkage of this programme a rcspondent . said. ~ J don' t know where this programme comes fro m. I heard that it comes thro ugh thc DDC~ . In general. pcople had positive att iwde tow;lrds this progmmme. However. the credit of project implementation was not given to the MWS P. TIle SU P and MWSP were seen mostly as something complete ly d ifferent. the Mel;unchi projcct W:lS not related to this IGCD. according to the avcrage villagers of this ;Irea.

This mlllleric:ll strength of UML at the d istrict helped to redefine the pUTjXlSC. goal and scope of the IGCD. When the project W<l S establi shed they started to detach fro m the Me1:ullchi Project. Detachment from thc larger project was the ~t rategy of UML whereas involvement with Melamchi Project W;IS the stra tegy o f Nepali Congress.

UML stand made mistrust among the pol it ical parties. Nep;lli COllgress was vcry opti mistic towards th is project. Thcy Ihoughtth:l t this project wo uld make peoplc's positive att illLdc IOwards thei r pan)' bcl,;<lU SC it was frillned by thci r government which would ga in populari ty of the p:lrty among thc commulIities. RPP had not that much hold in the district but it was conccrned on the Mclilmchi v:!lIey from where its chain ll:lll h;ld been electcd in National Panchay;1I :lnd Member of Parliament since the last 25 yC;l rs.

Contesting Argument on VDCs and DDC Agreement: An <lgreement betwcen DDC and concerned VDC was thc condition for the implementation of the programme. To implementthc programme at the VDC level there was a provision of signing the agreement between DOC and concerned VDC. Thc opposition p<lrties at the district level denied signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between ODC/LTF :lnd programme VDCs to imple ment thc IGeD at their VDCs. DDC cou ld not implement the programme indepc ndently. VDC would provide the matching fund for the programmc. There W:lS clearly a lack of trust between thc d ifferent political p'lrties such as that six VDCs o ut of fourt een that had not signed memor;mdulll of understanding those who wa.s no UML. TIlere were threc VDCs headed by the Nepali Congress (Hchun bu, Kiul and Mahankal) and thrce by the RPP (lc ho k. Thak;mi ;lnd Talamarang). The OPIX)s it ion partics dis<lgreed on thc contents of Illemor.mdulll . The lettcr of memorandum did

Contest for Political Space 267

not tell anything about the Melamchi Project. funding source and link:lge between IGCD and MWSP. They rcpe:ltcdly asked DDC to include lhe mentioned issucs in MoU but DDC dcnied it. DDC took IGCD as a regu lar programmc of DOC. A VDC chairperson from Nep..1.li Congress. sllid '"To sign the MoU is to approve the UML manipulation over thc IGCD programmc".

It became apparent in the discussions that the opposition p:lrties preferred to have the fund channeled directly to the VDCs and not through :I DDC/LGP since they believed that these funds would be used to promote the UML in the next elections, eithcr through the success of programmc or by misappropriating funds for elcctions and favouring UML arcas. The LGP e:lrmarked fu nds to various VDCs directly without any cxperience. knowledge and mechanism for doing this. The VDC leaders of opposition panies claimed that they were the primary stockholders of the Melamchi Project. Thcrefore. whatevcr development programme wou ld come in the v:llley should have comc directly at the VDCs and not through the DDC. They were not ready to work under DDC. If thcre is no provision to change the working modal ity of IGCD. they said. it wou ld be bettcr to terminate the whole progrumme of IGCD from the Melamchi Valley. But the UML viewed that DOC was a reprc'lCllIative of local body and it had excl usive right to mobilize Ihe resources coming from different sources.

Ncpali Congress had also becn manipulating Ihc project adopting diffcrelll strategics. The first programme of the project the IGCD could not give direct benefit 10 Congress cadres thal were fully txlsed on people mobili7.ation. Thcy had only one representative out of thirteen members in thc District Development Council. Thcre was no member from NC at Local Trust Fund Board. Therefore. they could not influence thc dccision making process of the DDC. Having not gctting thc direct benefit to thc NC thcy askcd thc Board and consultants to Change the modality of cash flow for IGCD. Thcy also asked MWSD B to bypass the DDC to implement IGCD and crcate the scpamte new structure for the IGCD. Thcy thought that if thc modality would changc thcy shou ld not depend on DDC for budget. They also askcd to drop thc idea of lOCO if the modality could nOI be changed.

All the political parties intendcd to influence lhe progr.unme but they had different m«hani sms. UML inclined to give pressure to the project through their numerical slrength and popular suppon at the local levcl. Congress manipulated the si tuation through its government at the central level and good network with Melnmchi Board . Local leaders of Nepali Congress attempted to change the modality of the IGCD lhrough central government. They handed several petitions to MWSDB. NORAD, UNDP and DDC through the line ministry to change Ihe modality of the lOCO. There was a gcneral tendcncy of Ncpali Congress local leaders to see the centre 10 solve the local problem. I noticed that when the disagreement occurred regarding

268 CNAS Journal , Vot 34, No. 2 (July 2007)

the IGCO in the distric t level they wou ld not like to settle the problems by d iscussing with project staff. OOC and consultants at field level. rathe r they moved from the meeting and came to Kathmandu to give the pressure in the favour of Nepali Congress.

I.n Nepal . the political parties attract the voters through their popu list programme and slogan rather than the ir ideolog ies. Po lic ies and modalities as such we re not the points of debate amo ng the political parties for IGCO. But they were concemed on how to control the o verall mechanism of the programme. UML would like to strengthen their position in ODC through this progmmme. Nepali Congress wo uld like to change its oppositional role into ruling role in the district through IGCO. NC was worried that UML wou ld take the c redit o f the programme e njoying all resources alone without sharing other political parties. NepaJi Congress and RPP viewed thOl t if the OOC/ UML would say that this is the programme of MWSP they wou ld sign MoU . Nepali Congress thought that if the rC OI I messOIge of programme would have been disseminated, UML could not claim the ownership of programme alon~.

UML reservation WOlS thOlI most of the local cOldres of the party and NGGs people were not in fOl vour of this MWSP at local level. If UML directly supported this project its follo wers might be di verted from the party line. As mentioned before, there was a meeting with OOC and UML headed VOCs regarding the implementation of the IGCO. Majority of UML VDC chairmen denied implementing this programmc in thc name of MWSP. Some of the UML cadres thought thOlI if they would implement this progmmme as a component o f MWSP they had to agree wi th whole architecture of Mehullchi Project. For the m implementation of the IGCO is to exchange water with bikas (development). Some o f the activist repeatedly said in public hearing and workshop that " Pani s(mga bikas sa/na paid(lina" meOlns water should not be exchanged with bikas. ' IGCO could not substitute water resources of the Melamchi Valley' . they thought . If they did not handle this programme the OPl>osit ion part ies might accuse them as bikas birodhi or anti+ development'llisl. Therefore, they decided to implement IGCO without linking it to MWSP and manipulating the larger goal of the IGCO. At the same time they al so adopted the policy o f fi ghting for establishing the local right of water use work ing together wilh MWSOB. Hence, UML had adopted dual policy and tried to keep its politics in+tact both in Kathmand u and Melamchi Valley.

When I d iscussed with the OOC personnel about th is matter they j ustified their stand telling that ' If we wou ld say this program me is a Melamchi [Wiltcr Supply Project! Project, then a high leve l of expectations is created. When the project would run smoothly then we would disseminate the actual message of the project'. 'llley s.lid that MWSP is the largest project in the are'l. People perceive thm it has budget o f million dollars. If we link this

Contest for Political Space 269

progmmme with larger Melamchi Project they would not involve themselves in the mobil ization process and they would ask more money. In this programme people paid al least forty percent labour contributions and they would stop to contribute if we tell the reality'.

The UML role towards Melamchi project was ambiguous from the very beginning. They also redefined the meaning and objective of the progmmme. Detachment from MWSP could give them several credits for next election. In Nepal the preference of political party is generally measured on the basis of what development acti vities were held under the tenure of a particular party. Beyond this. IOCD was unique one where large number of people could be mobilized and organized for development.

Nepali Congress leaders had attachment with MWSP and calculated the material benefits from project such as good roads, electricity, job and handsome compensation. Local cadres of Nepali congress told me "I fee l happy that people who need water to drink in Kathmandu will get it from us. Melamchi water is used mainly for irrigation but in return we will get a black top road and other developments to compensate for the loss of this water." Nepali congress believed that Melamchi Project would bri ng bikas both for people of Kalhmandu and Melamchi Valley. They said that Melamchi Ko Pani Lyaucllha Smwulo Bihani means "Water of Melamchi would bring the golden morning". They had good relation with Board and made lobbying on the Board to recruit the ir cadres in job, contract and other facilities which were available in the project. UML saw these things as lollipop for children. They anticipated that after the project completion the people would be displaced due to reduction of water flow in the river. These two prominent discourses of MWSP helped to manipulate the modality of the IOCD programme. Both of them were seeking people support for next election. strategies were different i.e. attaching vs. detaching from the project.

Contest for the Recruitment of Social Mobilizers: One of the main reasons of disputes between NC and UML was recruitment process of Social Mobilizers (SMs). DDC recruited 14 social mobilizers and two senior social mobil izers through open compelition. The main thrust of the programme was dependent on the role of social mobilizers. There were fourteen social mobilizers appointed each onc in each VDC. They attained all the meetings of Community Organizations (COs). forwarded the local needs to Local Trust Fund Board (LTF) meeting, recom mended for credit capital and seed gr.lIlts. They ~eived monthly salary in the range of Rs.5000·6000 and project covered thei r travel expenses and daily allowances while they went to district headquarters. Their position was in center of the programme. They had everyday contact with the community people.

The opposition part ies questioned the selection criteria of the social mobilizers and senior social mobilizcrs of the lGCD progmmme. They also

270 CNAS Journal , Vot 34, No. 2 (July 2007)

accused to DDC that social mobilizers were recruited in non-transparent manner and UML cadres were recruited for their own political purpose. This dispute continued up to eight months after the project commencement. Some accused the DDCILGP of not infonning the VDCs in time and fa vouring people outside the areas. From the project side il was requested 10 all eligible candidates to apply for the position of social mobil izers in the Melamchi Water Suppl y Project. Many Nepali Congress and RPP supporters did not apply for that position assuming that the selection process would not be fair. There were reports that various people acquired positions through family and political connections. Although there were various cases of nepotism, it seems that the DDClLGP followed their nonnal recruitment procedures and the DDC notified all VDCs of the progmmme. It appears that there was little ground for criticizing the recruitment process in gener..l.l. This issue stemmed from the fi rst item and also revealed a lack of trust and fight for available resources and positions.

Having recruited through DDC social mobilii'.ers were close to DDC than MWSDB. MWSDB clai med that they were the staff of Melamchi Project and hoped that their role shou ld be in the line of MWSDB-SUP. There was no doubt in the performance and capacity of social mobilizers to handle this programme. However, they would like to li ve far away from the Melamchi Project from the very beginning. They said that they did not have enough knowledge to deal with issues about the MWSP, especially compensation and technic'll issues. The project staff gave them a week long orientation about the IGCD and it links with MWSP. All social mobilizers knew the link of the LGP/DDC with the Melamchi project. through the IGCD of the SU P, but none had el(pl ained the link in the commun ity. Given the complexity of the project and the relative shon time they had for orientation. it was perhaps nai've to think that they would be 'Ible to el(plain all issues and allswer all problems. If they would involve in the main domain of the Melamchi Project they could not perfonn own job properl y. When they came in the place there were many grievances and expectmion from the MWSP. Many land acquisition and compensation issues were not settled. If they were presented on behalf of the M WSP. people would ask many questions regarding to compensalion and other issues. Thi s context compelled them to live far from the MWSP.

MWSDB hoped that the social mobilizers would work like the ambassadors of MWSP. Board argued that the mobi lizCN were on the front line of the project and must be fully oriented and committed to the project. Unlike to Board expectation social mobil izers were loyal towards LTFIDDC because they were appointed by DDC and they fel t uncomfortable representing the MWSP. The social mobilizers. as suggested by ODC/VDC. they did not give the message IGCD is the one of the components of Melamchi Project. They said that it was the regular programme of LGP

Contest fo r Political Space 271

conducted by DDC. This made the opposition parties more suspicious to the role of SMs in gener.d and DDCIL TF in particular. Given the mistrust. misinformation and high e:\pecwtion the position of SMs became more challenging and controversial.

The Board felt that the DDCILGP had nOl been giving a clear message 10 the people of Melamchi Valley aboul the funding source of SUP and IGCD. In facl. the Board had a negati ve altitude towards DDC/LGP for a number of reasons when the project started. Firstly. they did not control IGCD directly. Control in this case means influencing how acti vities were calTied OUl and their impacts on the ground. including who benefited and how. Secondly. the MWSDB was a political organization de lu:\e and was mostly concerned with the politics of the Melamchi Valley and Kathmandu, not how the project would benefit the local inhabitants.

Rcncgotiations ror the Political Spa« Larger aim of the Board was to supply water in Kathmandu Valley by managing the local leve l grievances. The aim of DDCILGP was poverty alleviation and it had linle concern on the larger aim of the Melamchi Project. The substantial differences in grievances and priorities of political parties made Board. donors and consultants in difficult situations. As this was the fi rst acti vity of MWSP. it was expected that a number of problems or issues related to the MWSP of different nature would facilitate to minimize other grIevances.

Eight month long conflicts between two major political parties came to ,Ill end due to internal and e:\ternal pressures. The modality of IG~D was renegotiated. When the contradictory opinions emerged in the impleme ntation process of IGCD the Board sought the help of DDCILGP to settle these issues but they could not succeed. There were a lot of problems with the IGCD when it started. DDC d id not full y internalize the fact that this is not a regular DDClLGP activity.

Who represents whose interests in the struggle was not clear. Contradictory point of view between political parties made the serious misundefSlanding bet ween Board authority and donors. UN DP :llso gave the pressure to DDC Ihrough LGP to settle these issues. Within the period of eight months several negotiation meetings were held between political p:lrties, DDC. VDCs and LGP but Melamchi Board could not function well. In the end of year of the 200 1 MWSDB with donors organi zed all p:lrty meeting in Melamchi to resolve this issue through dialogues.

Due 10 severe pressure to the chairman of DDC, he agreed to redesign the MoU according to the demand of opposition parties. And the opposition parties left other griev:lnces regarding IGCD implementalion. This meeting also agreed th11t :Ill the soci:ll Illobilizers shou ld be given intensive orientalion to the project on a priori ty basis. It was agreed that any mobilizer who. after

272 CNAS Joumal, Vol. 34, No. 2 (July 2007)

full orientation, cannot make a commitment to the project, should be removed from the programme. Several reasons compelled to DDC and VDCs to reach to this negotiation. Firstly, their tenure of VDCs and DDC representatives was going to be terminated within the fou r months. Therefore, they would like to give positive impressions to the community as they are the supporter of development activities. Secondly, the NORAD grant was goi ng to be replaced by the ADB loan and there would be direct agreement between DDC and MWSDB. In the ADB loan, Board had the right to evaluate the performance of the mobilizers before the renewal of their tenure. Finally, opposition parties were pressured by the people of their respect ive VOC to sign MoU with DDe to implement this programme.

Conclus ions The project of development is not a politically neutr<11 phenomenon. It interfaces with political parties. local government. central government. donors and others in different level and sp.lce. Every political party of Nepal favours 11 development project. but they want to use the project for their own political gain, resources and position. They do not evaluate a development programme on the basis of advantages and disadvantages to the larger society. Every party wou ld li ke to use the development project to win the election for next time. Principally. they do not oppose the development projects but they are really concerned on who and how is handling various processes of the project. This is not simply an issue of c];liming ownership of the programme but it renects the inherent interest of Nepali Congress and UML towards the Melamchi Project. This is a strategy of pol itical parties gaining and maintaining electoral support from the Melamchi valley. My central argument is that the local political part ies lack tnlst among themselves and fight for available resources and positions at the expense of the local population. They al so influence the central government. donor agencies. consultants and civil society to legitimize their manipulation in a larger context of development in the name of grievances. This study concludes that all party consensuses about the larger projects do not work at the local level due to personal interests of members of political party. As elsewhere political parties of Nepal also do not only see the development project in terms of larger benefit s to the community, they focus on whether the projectS make their position strong or weak in the community. In short, 'Nepali politicians are too embroiled in infight ing among partied and groups for perks and privileges to worry about long-term interest' (Gyawali and Di",it 2002: 7). The ruling part ies both at local and national levels tend to monopolize the "political space" within the territory so much so that other poli tical parties can barely survive. The opposition part ies at both levels play strategic games by which the political authorities compel to realize the existence of other power structure within the society.

Contest for Political Space 273

Notes I . This anicle is a revised version of my seminar paper presented in the 19'"

conference on Modern South Asian Studies, Leiden. The Netherlands in June. 2006. I am gratefully acknowledged to my PhD supervisor. Dr. DiIli Ram Dahal. and expen Or. Ram Bahadur Chhetri for their useful comments and ideas on the draft version or this anicle.

2. My role as the insidcr of the project was to help intl! rnat ional consultant for designing the social uplift programme in a better way. In course of my work I had regular meetings with Board authorities. donors, poli tical panies and local communi ties. I got the opponunit ies to observe the front stage and hackstage behaviour of slakeholders which help me to understand the dynamics of power poli tics between the political pan ics and organizations. As a development worker I had a good rappon wi th local polit ical panies and organizations. This relation helps me to understand the inherent interests of the political panics towards the projcct as a wholc. 1 had involved in public consultation. public hearing organized by Mclamchi Board. This project comprises various actors and stakeholden; with their distinc t interest. concem and priorities. Sometimes NGOs and political panics presented their competing development agenda. Our duty was to design the modality of the project by considering the Environmental Impact Asses~menl. When the IGCD component established my role changed and I just obscf\',--d Ihe imple mcntation process of SUP activities. In this whole process I got the opponunitic~ to observe the behaviour of thc st'Lkeholders and noticed how and why political panics influence the modality for their intcrest.

3. In June 2007 the local JlCQplc of an ti-dam move me nt (Mahakali Bachau Andolan) and transnationally alliNI NGOs did not allow carrying Ollt EIA study in Pumagiri of Dadeldhur:, district ,md the locals derivcd away to the EIA study team (rorn the proj l.'Ct ~ilc .

. 1. It is notable Ihal while U~I L introduced Build Your Village Yourse lf Scheme in 1995 the majorily of the local bodies were dominated hy Nep:Ll i Congrcss while UML y,as in majority in all local lc\·el whereas Bishcshwar with poor scheme wa~ inlroducc<l.

5. Third-Pany cost sharing agreement between the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation and UNDP on DcccmOcrl2. 2000 says that "'the goal of IGCD is 10 impro'·c the socio-ecomomic condition of the people living in the 14 VDCs of Sindhupalchok district Ihat fa ll wi thin the affec ted areas of Melamchi Waler Supply Project in order to improve the living conditions o f the people in the area (Annex- I).

Rderences Barker, Jonatban. 1999. "Local Action and Global Power: Shifting the Balance". In

Jonathan Barker et.al. eds .. Streel Level Democracy: Polilical Sellings (j/ lire Margills o/Global Pown Hartford: Kumarian Press. pp. 239-5 1.

Cornwall. Andrca. 2004. "Spaces for transfonnation '! Reflections on issues of powcr and difference in Participation in Development". In Samuel Hickey and Gills Mohan eds .. Panicipafion: From Tyranny 10 Trans/ormaliQIL? Exploring new llPpro(lches 10 P(lr/icip(llion ill Developmem. LondonlNew

-- York: Zed Books. pp. 75-9 1.

274 CNAS Joumal. Vol. 34, No. 2 (July 2007)

Engbcrg-Pcderson, Lar. and Neil Webster. 2002. " Imroollction 10 Political Space". [n Neil Wcbster and Lar. Engbcrg-Pederson eds .. 11, 1111' ,vtlllll' of 1111' Poor: COnfefring Poliriml S,N/Cl' /or /'0\'1'''')" rell ll(·f ;lm. London/New York: Zed Books. pp. 1-29.

Ferguson, James. 1994. rite AllIi· /'oliliC':l· M IIChilll': '" DI'I'l'loPIIIl'III." /)l'PQlilid:tltioll. (//1(1 8/1rewwrlllic P(III'I'r ill Le.wl/lw. London: Uni\'ersi ty o f Minnesota Press. MinneOl polis.

F OUC:IUIt. M. 1984. "Space. Know[edge and Power". In P. Rabino ed .. nu' FQlICllI/lt Rf'lI(ler. New York: Pantheon Books. pp. 239-56.

Fujikura. Tatsuro. 2()(H. "Di~ourses of Awareness: Development. Social Movements and Ihe Practices of Freedom in Nepal'· . Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation. Uni\'ersi ty of Chicago.

Oupta. Akhil . 1998. POSICOIOlli(l1 Dt-I·t'/O/JII/f'nf ill IIIt/itl: Agricllllllrl' ill lite M akillg of M ool'm Imli(l . London: Duke Uni"crs ity Press.

Oyawal!. Dipak and Ajaya Dixi t. 200 1. "How not to do a South AsianTreaty". hllp:llwww.hirnalrnag.cnrn/al.r200 l /e~.lay l .htm l .

Hachhethu. Kril>hna 2002. /'art)" Bllildillg ill Ne/xII: Orgalli<.tllivlI. L{'(uirrsltip will Proplr. Kathmandll: MandalOl Book Point.

Hammer. Am:mda J. 2002. '"Speaking with SpOlce: Displaccments and Claims in the Politics of Land in Zimb:tbwc". In NeH Webster lmd Lars Engbcrg­Pederson eds .. III Ihe Nil/lie (1/ Iltt' POllr: CVnft'~'lillg Polilim/ SWlce fvr Pm'l'rt)" RI'dIlClivlI . London/New York: Zed Books pp. 129- 156.

Khagram. S. 2()(H). /)(lms (llId DCI'e/opmell l: Tr(llISIlt/limwl Slntsxle for Wt/tu Will POlI"er. New Delhi: Oxford Uni,'ersi lY Press.

Lieten. G,K. 2003. Power IXllilit's wul RI/rll/ Del'e!0plllelll: £SJtIYS (Ill /1Il1;l'. New Delhi: Manohar PfCS~.

Lieten. a.K. and Ravi Sriva!>tav'l. 1999. U/lrl/lI11f f'(/flllus: PtJI\"('r Rt'imiolls. f)el"tJ/ll/ioll wul f)1'1'elv/I /l/ell/ ill UlIllf Prtuit'sll. New Delhi: S:tge Publications.

Mosse. David. 2001 . "Social rese,lfc h in Rur,,1 Developmenl Projects'". In D<lvid N. Gcllner .\IId Eric Hin.ch eds .. Inside Org<lnizations: Anthropologbt at Work. Oxford:tnd New York : Berg. Pp 157- 182.

Mosse. David. 2005. Cllll imt;/lg Dt'I'e/olllllelll: EllllIoXrtlplly of Aid Policy lllld Pracl ice. London: Pluto Press.

MWSDB. 1999. "Environmental Impact Assessment of Mel:tmchi Water Supply Project"' . Unpublished Project Report . Kathmandu.

NORADIUNDP. 2000. "Third.Pany Cost-Sharing Agreement Between The Norweigian Agency for De"elopment Cooperation and The Uni ted N:ttions Development Progrnmme". Agreement Letter.

Norplan. 2003. "Review of the Income Oeneration and Community Development Component of the SU P. as Implemented by Lot<ll Oovcnlllllce Programme". Unpublished Project Report . MWSDB : Kathrnandu.

Norplan. 2()(H. "Qualitat ive Monitoring Report : Social Uplift Programme (SUP) Melamchi Di\'crsion Scheme". Unpublished Project. Kathmandu: MWSDB.

Pf"ff-CzOImecka, (nd) "Challenging Golialh: People. Dams .• md the Paradoxes of Transnational Crit ical Mo\'ement"'. Forthcoming in H. Ishii. D.N. Gellner and K. Nawa eds .. Polilico/lllld Socillllr(lIIsfomUllhJ/l ;/1 North /lIdia and NeINII.

Contest for Political Space 275

Pigg. Staey L. 1992. " Inventing Social Categories th rough Placc: Social Representations :md Developmcnt in Nel){ll . .. ill Cmll/){Imtil'f! Studies ill Sodt'/)' (/1/(/ Ni.flory. Vo1.34. No.3 pp 49 1-5 13.

Ricci. Oavid. 197 1. Cl)mllwllity Pm,·u (lI1d Democratic Theory: The lo!;ic of Political AII(/lysis. New York: Random House.

Shah. $aubhagya. 2006. " [nit ial Comments on MES I Ethnographic Data" (unpublished project report ) submit ted to World Bank. Kathmandu.

Sharma. Sudhindm. 2004. "Aid Policics. Practices and Impact" . In Sudhindm Sharm:l. luhani Koponcn and Oipak Gyawali eds .• Aid Under Stress: Watcr. Forest and Finnish Support in Nepal. Kathmandu: Himal Books. Pp 80- 114.

ViIlarrcal. Magdalcna. 2002. '1'he Voices and Represcntalion o f the Poor: Stri\'ing for Govenlmenl Aid in Western Mexico". In Neil Webster and Lars Engberg­Pcderson eds., III the Nmlle of the Poor: Comeslill!,; Polilic"l S,X/Cl' for POl'en), Reductioll. London/New York: Zed Books. Pp. 78- IOl

Webster, Neil. 2002. "Local Organizat ion and Political sp~cc in the Forests of West Beng~I". In Neil Webster ~Ild L~rs Engbcrg- Pedcrson OOs .• I II the Num/! of lilt' Po{}r: COllltfMillS f'olitical S,mce fl)1' Pm'erl), Redllclion. London/New York: Zed Books. Pp. 223-54.

Whclpton. John. 2005. A History l)f Nepal. United Kingdom: Cambridge Univcrsity Press.