Contending Masculinity

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Contending masculinities: the gendered (re) negotiation

of colonial hierarchy in the United Nations debateson decolonization

Vrushali Patil

Published online: 11 November 2008

# Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2008

Abstract The emergence of legal decolonization in the mid-twentieth century, as

evidenced by the 1960 United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence

to Colonial Countries and Peoples, is often understood through the lens of race and

the disruption of racial hierarchy. If we take seriously the transnational feminist

contention that the colonial racial order was also gendered, however, how might this

perspective shift our understanding of decolonization? In this article, I explore the

debates on decolonization that take place in the UN General Assembly from 1946

1960 that lead to the 1960 Declaration from a transnational feminist perspective to

answer this question. Specifically, I use comparative historical and discourse

methods of analysis to explore how colonialists and anti-colonialists negotiate the

onset of legal decolonization, focusing especially on how colonialist hierarchies of

race, culture, and gender are addressed in these debates. I argue that, on the one hand,

colonialists rely on a paternalist masculinity to legitimate their rule (i.e., our dependencies

require our rule the way a child requires a father). In response, anti-colonialists reply with

a resistance masculinity (i.e., colonialism is emasculating; decolonization is necessary

for a return of masculine dignity). I argue that decolonization in the United Nations

transpires via contentions among differentially racialized masculinities. Ultimately, atransnational feminist perspective that centers the intersection of race and gender

offers a richer analysis than a perspective that examines race alone.

Although the edifice of Europes colonial empires had already started to crumble

some time before, the passage of the 1960 United Nations Declaration on the

Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Declaration) can be

seen as a crucial moment in the discursive delegitimation of colonialism on a global

scale (Crawford 2002; Strang 1990: 851; Ziring et al. 1999:312). Indeed when the

Charter for the United Nations was being drawn up after World War II, the all-powerful United States and its allies were keen to protect states rights, and anti-

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DOI 10.1007/s11186-008-9076-y

V. Patil (*)

Department of Sociology & Anthropology, Florida International University,

University Park, DM 212, 11200 S.W. 8th St., Miami, FL 33199, USA

e-mail: [email protected]


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colonialistsgoals of decolonization were thwarted (Lauren1998). Anti-colonialists

attempts to bring decolonization onto the United Nations agenda continued to be met

by this prioritization of states rights for years to come. Nevertheless, when the

Declaration finally came to a vote in 1960, no country voted against it; and the mere

handful of opponents only abstained from voting.How are we to interpret this shift? Many scholars have rightly recognized

decolonization as a decided if incomplete rupture with the white supremacist past

(Winant 2001:134), and a number of scholars have also examined the Declaration

itself from the perspective of race (Churchill 2003; Grovogui1996; Obadele1996).

Nevertheless, this work is curiously silent on an important transnational feminist

insight: that the multiply inflected hierarchies of the colonial era were not merely

racialized but also gendered/sexualized and that indeed, race and gender/sexuality

were thoroughly imbricated (see, for example, Burton 1994; McClintock1995). By

transnational feminism, I mean feminist literature on the relationship of particulargender ordersin their multiple configurations with various racial, sexual, class,

national, and cultural ordersto historical processes of globalization (for a nice

introduction, see Kim-Puri 2005; McClintock 1995). Whether the topic is imperial

and colonial formations (Hall2002; Stoler1997) or neo-liberal restructuring (Grewal

2005; Salzinger2004) or contemporary cultural movements (Gerami2005; Kimmel

2003), transnational feminist work explores both how multiple gender orders inform

particular transnational processes and how these orders are affected in turn. It makes

connections among seemingly disparate gender orders, and it also demonstrates how

arenas that seem to have little to do with gender may in fact benefit from genderanalysis. If we take the transnational feminist argument on colonialism seriously,

how might such a perspective shift our questions regarding the Declaration in

particular and the discursive delegitimation of colonialism more generally? What

might we learn from such an approach regarding gender relations in a transnational

frame in the post-1960s period?

Moreover the Declaration, beyond its location within the racialized and

gendered/sexualized context of European colonialism, is a document almost

entirely negotiated between (variously politically situated) men. That is, the great

bulk of the representatives of the member states of the United Nations General

Assembly, those who participated in the negotiation of and passage of the

document, were men. I am particularly interested in the implications of this

dimension of the discursive delegitimation of colonialism. In this article I

employ a transnational feminist perspective, particularly recent work on

masculinities in a transnational frame, to examine the debates on decolonization

that took place in the United Nations General Assembly from 19461960 that

lead to the passage of the Declaration. Furthermore, although the documents

significance lies primarily in its discursive interventions, most scholars have

focused either on institutional structure and politics (El-Ayouty 1971; Hovet

1960; Singh 1993) or international law (Araim 1976; Grovogui 1996; Obadele

1996). There has been some focus on discourse, particularly on ethical argument

(Crawford 2002), moral claims-making (Reus-Smit 2001), and the discursive

construction of subjectivity (Grovogui 1996). However, none of this work

examines the interrelationships between race and gender/sexuality. In this study, I

use narrative and rhetorical methods of analysis to explore the role of race and

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gender/sexuality in these debates. I particularly explore how the largely male

speakers, situated in various ways in relation to the colonial question,renegotiate

notions of racial and cultural hierarchy, gender, and democracy and political

independence in this key moment of transition to the postcolonial world.

Thinking masculinities in a transnational frame

Recent work on masculinities in a transnational frame has emerged from a number of

(inter)disciplinary locations, including postcolonial feminism, feminist International

Relations, and sociological work on globalization and masculinities. Key contrib-

utors in this area are Connell and Messerschmidt (2005), who offer the concept of

global hegemonic masculinity. They write that we may understand hegemonic

masculinity as a normative masculinity defined in relation to femininity and a varietyof subordinated masculinities, and one level on which we can observe such

masculinity is the global arena (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005:842849).

Considering such global hegemonic masculinity historically, a world-historical

moment cited repeatedly as significant in both creating and relying on a certain kind

of global hegemonic masculinity is European imperialism and colonialism

(henceforth, colonialism) (Banerjee 2005:810; Connell 2000). Not only did

colonialism rely on a series of gendered practices (Connell 2000; McClintock

1995; Stoler 1997), masculinity was a key dimension of this gendering. Scholars

Banerjee, Connell, and Doty point to a set of overwhelmingly (racialized,sexualized, and classed) masculinist discourses, which constructed a certain global

hegemonic masculinity through tropes such as the exploration, discovery, penetra-

tion, and conquest of distant, feminized lands (McClintock 1995). This global

hegemonic masculinity understood itself in relation to othered peoples, particularly

groups of othered men, as insufficiently masculine (Nandy 1988; Sinha 1995), as

hypermasculine (Fanon 1967; West 1993), and sometimes, as both (Hassan 2003;

Hooper 2001:72). Such feminization and/or hypermasculinization could intersect

with infantilization, as subordinated men were often understood as children that

(progressive) colonial enthusiasts spoke of training and parenting (Colwill 1998;

Nandy1987; Nandy1988). Moreover the United States, though distinct in a number

of ways from European colonial empires, is nevertheless the inheritor of some of

these masculinist discourses, including the hypermasculinization, feminization, and

infantilization of subordinated peoples/men and the association of imperialism and

colonialism with virility (Bederman1995; Doty1996; Gilmore1996). Ultimately the

racial and cultural hierarchies of colonialism were enabled in large part through the

creation of a hierarchy of masculinities, the legacies of which are still with us today

(for a recent discussion, see Banerjee 2005).

Beyond European imperialism and colonialism, work on masculinities in a

transnational frame has also explored how contemporary processes of globalization

implicate gender in general and masculinity in particular. While akin to the

aforementioned global hegemonic masculinity, a transnational business masculinity

has been identified, scholars argue that contemporary transnational phenomena such

as neo-liberal restructuring and womens movements present a challenge to long

standing hegemonic masculinities (Connell 2005; Derne 2002; Kimmel 2003).

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According to Charlotte Hooper (2000), indeed, we may now understand globaliza-

tion itself as a site for

gendered interpretative struggles as the meaning of globalization is contested.

In the process, differentelementsor ingredients of masculinity and femininity

are coopted in new or old configurations to serve particular interests, and

particular gendered (and other) identities are consolidated and legitimated or

downgraded and devalued. This involves power struggles between men and

women, but also between different groups of men as they jostle for position and

control; articulating and re-articulating the relationship between masculinity

and power as they go. (Hooper2000:60)

In this vein, foregrounding especially experiences of contemporary economic

globalization, Michael Kimmel argues that what connects numerous extremist groups

todayfrom white supremacists in the United States to Al Qaedais the experience ofmassive male displacement and downward mobility in the global economy. He argues

thatall deploy masculinity as a form of symbolic capital, an ideological resource to

understand and explicate their plight[and thus all attempt to] re-establish and reassert

domestic and public patriarchies(Kimmel2003:605).

While there does appear to be a predominant focus on the economy in this work on

contemporary globalization, a smaller literature also focuses on the ongoing legacies of

histories of racialization. For example, in contrast to Kimmels economist approach

above, others point out that when it comes to groups like Al Qaeda, we cannot forget that

Islamic fundamentalism is

essentially a form of resistance to western imperialism andthe repressive postcolonial governments that implemented failed projects of Eurocentric

modernization (Hassan2003:321). In fact, this fundamentalism is a solution to the

problem of Muslim nations in the late 20th century (Gerami 2005). Indeed,

scholars that focus on the masculinity politics of historically racialized men in the

contemporary global arena underscore the necessity of exploring the ongoing legacies

of historical racialization. For example, regarding the aforementioned transnational

business arena, Dorrine Kondo (1999) examines an ad campaign for a Japanese suit for

men. She argues that the campaign constructs a notion of superior Japanese

masculinity in the world economy that necessarily must grapple with histories of

orientalization and emasculation. Interestingly, she argues that even as it attempts to

combat such racialization, the campaign inadvertently reinscribes it instead.

Indeed, the most compelling line of work here explores how the resistance politics of

historically racialized men inevitably embody such contradictions. For example,

Hodgson argues that during the colonial period, colonial interventions in Tanzania

marginalized Maasai men by defining them as traditional. Over time, Maasai men

themselves embraced such reifications and went on to critique other modern men

(Hodgson1999). Similarly, during the colonial period, British colonialists argued that

Singapore lacked masculinized discipline, in order to legitimate its conquest. In the

period after independence, the new nation used this same colonialist notion of

masculinized discipline to produce the new nation (Holden 1998). Banerjee (2005)

adds how even militant Hindu masculinity, which explicitly defines itself in opposition

to a putative westernization, adapts colonialist notions of militarism. Again, these

tensions are especially striking in the case of Japan. According to Low, in the late

nineteenth century, the Japanese embarked on a programme of Westernisation that

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can be interpreted as the Caucasianisation of the Japanese and the appropriation of

Western ideas of masculinity (Low 2003:8182). Such self-conscious whitening-

masculinizing was to serve to distinguish Japan from its Asian neighbors and show

Europe that Japan was a world power worthy of respect (Low2003).

Consequently, studies of historically racialized men in contemporary globalizationemphasize the ongoing significance of older histories of globalization, particularly

European imperialism and colonialism. They point out that the negotiation of

contemporary globalization processes is but the latest in a series of such negotiations

that have taken place for centuries. As such, contemporary negotiations are

potentially shaped by older negotiations, as the latter provide a repertoire of

discursive frameworks and strategies within which to make sense of newer

experiences. Collectively, the literature on masculinities in a transnational frame

offers three central insights. First, masculinities in particular and gender in general

must be explored within a transnational frame that takes account of historictransnational power relations such as colonialism and imperialism as well as more

recent processes such as neo-liberal restructuring. Second, there are multiple

masculinities that exist at multiple levels in shifting, intersecting hierarchies. Finally,

power-laden transnational economic, political, and cultural processesto the extent

that they are dominated by groups of menare better understood via a transnational

feminist approach that centers masculinities.

What might a focus on the General Assembly debates and on the declaration add to this

literature? Firstly, they are particularly relevant to the discursive delegitimation of

colonialism

on a global scale. They occur within an international forum in the context ofnot just the delegates of other countries but also countless news media, and thus their

audience goes beyond the immediate gathering and can be assumed to be universal (See

Donahue and Prosser1997). And yet, though the declaration is a major moment in the

transnational resistance of historically subordinated peoples and men to colonialisma

major moment when subordinate masculinities confront and contend with colonial

masculinitiesthere is very little work that looks at the declaration from the perspective

of contending masculinities. Moreover, given the two main foci in the literature

delineated above, historical colonialism and contemporary globalization, an examination

of the declaration provides a focus on a central point of transition and connection

between them. Finally, though colonialism was certainly enacted differently in different

times and places, transnational feminist scholars point out that it was a key moment in

the transnational story of gender and race. And yet, though scholars have examined

different instances of resistance to colonialism, including masculinist resistance, there

seems to be very little that also frames these multiple resistances as part of that one

transnational story. The declaration debates draw together different groups of

subordinated menas well as the apologists of this subordinationinto one

conversation. While the debates of course cannot give us unmediated knowledge on

any of these questions, they are one window onto these negotiations.

Data and method

The main source of materials for analysis is the General Assembly Official Records

for the years 19461960. These records are public documents and are available at

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then takes a stance on the issue under consideration (Donahue and Prosser1997).

The strategy of inquiry here consists of a discourse analysis of these statements.

Following Tischer, Meyer, Wodak, and Vetter (2000: 149), I first explore the

debates as constitutive discourse. That is, they are simultaneously constitutive of

different categories of identity(or identity distinctions), the relations among thesecategories of identity, and systems of knowledge and beliefs about these identities.

To explore how the different arguments might constitute such alternative identity

distinctions, relationships, and knowledges regarding colonialism and decoloniza-

tion, I begin with the technique of analysis known as cluster-agon analysis.

Cluster-agon analysis was initially formulated by Kenneth Burke (1973; 1984) in

order to compare the worldviews and meaning systems of different speakers. Burke

argues that every work produced by a rhetor contains a set of implicit equations, or

associational clusters. The meanings that key symbols or terms (also known as

god terms) have for the rhetor can be discovered by charting the symbols thatcluster around those key symbols in the rhetorical artifact. In cluster-agon analysis,

key symbols or terms are first identified by their frequency or intensity within a

text. After the key terms/symbols have been identified, the words that cluster (i.e.,

appear in close proximity to the key term, or are joined by a conjunction to the key

term, or are connected by a cause-and-effect relationship to the key term, and so

on) around those key terms are charted. Next, any patterns that might appear within

the clusters are charted. For example, is a particular word or symbol always

associated with a key term? Next, one may perform an agon analysis, where

opposing terms (also known as devil terms) are examined. Here, the goal is todiscover what terms/symbols oppose or contradict the key terms/symbols. The final

step is to use the pattern that emerges in the analysis to identify the speakers

motive (Burke1973; Burke1984; Foss1989). Cluster-agon analysis is particularly

useful for comparing the rhetoric of several speakers (Berthold1976). Through the

comparison of different speakerskey term clusters and opposing term clusters, one

may compare structures of binary logic that undergrid and constitute varying

meaning systems. In the case of this study, I use cluster-agon analysis to compare

the meaning systems of not only different speakers but also different groups of

speakers.

Beyond this notion of constitutive discourse, the statements offered by different

diplomats in the United Nations General Assembly may also be seen as persuasive

discourse, aimed at justifying a speakers own stance on a draft resolution and also

of convincing others to take on a similar stance. I follow Walter Fishers approach to

persuasive communication that human beings are above all story-telling creatures,

and that human communication is composed of competing stories/accounts on the

world. From this perspective, a story/account is acceptable to an audience when

constituted by good reasonsand when it satisfies certain requirements of narrative

probability and fidelity. Its central goal is identification with the audience, and it

inevitably functions as a moral inducement. I am also interested in these debates as

competing stories/accounts of the world. Ultimately, I am interested in the United

Nations General Assembly debates as simultaneously constitutive and persuasive, as

alternative visions of the meaning of colonialism and decolonization, which

themselves presume and imply alternative stories regarding colonialism and

decolonization.

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Analysis

Although one might expect certain patterns of discourse based on political

perspective, particular groups were not identified a priori. Rather, groupings of

speakers (and the countries that they represented) that tended to make similar kindsof arguments, to base their arguments on similar kinds of appeals, and to support one

another against others, were allowed to emerge from the data. In this fashion, two

overarching groupings emerged: first, former and contemporary European colonialist

powers, and second, former dependent, newly independent territories. The United

States and a number of former dependent territories in the Americas (such as

Argentina, Peru, and Columbia) tended to side with the first group. The Soviet

Union, and its associated bloc of countries, along with a number of different former

dependent territories in the Americas (such as Mexico and Guatemala), tended to

side with the second. As the first group tended to prioritize the perspective of thecolonialist powers, I term this group the colonialistview. As the second group did

the same for former and contemporary dependent territories, I term this group the

anti-colonialist view. I do not intend to imply unproblematically with these terms

that the United States was somehow a colonialist power or that the Soviet Union was

not a colonialist power. In what follows, I argue that while both perpetuated

hierarchical constructions of space and identity, as did the European colonialist

powers, the particular discourse of colonialism produced within the United Nations

did not allow for a ready recognition of these practices as colonialist practices.

Hence, although on occasion Soviet bloc countries especially targeted what theytermed the colonialist practices of the United States and vice versa, both the United

States and the Soviet Union were allowed to position themselves as outside the

history of colonialism. While at times, it was recognized that the United States was

indeed a colonialist power, it was nevertheless positioned as a good power

compared to other bad powers.

In what follows, I first perform cluster analyses of key terms within arguments

offered by colonialists and anti-colonialists, exploring how these arguments offer

different understandings of the meaning of colonialism and decolonization. I

describe how particular key terms were identified, what associational clusters were

found, and consider the competing stories/accounts of the world that are implied

within these worldviews. I also offer representative quotations from different

speakers to illustrate key differences among different groups.

The colonialist narrative: paternalist masculinity as wise beneficence

For colonialist argument, an initial examination of statements made indicates a

series of interrelated key terms: political independence, freedom, autonomy and

sovereignty, and so I began with a cluster analysis of these four terms. As

language is inexact, I examined any discussions of these terms without

requiring this precise language (as examples will demonstrate). The terms

found to cluster around these key terms were: progress, advancement,

development, evolution, higher civilization, and modernity. In the following

statement on colonialism, for example, developmentand independence are placed

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in a cause-and-effect relationship where (political) development is seen as a

precondition for independence:

We recognize that the colonial system is the best way of slowly guiding, by

gentle but ever-lengthening steps, peoples of little political education so that

they can develop their political sense and become independent nations able to

take their places with us here and thus constitute a truly universal assembly of

nations. (Mr. Sourdis, Colombia, Sess 2, 1947: 689)

Likewise, in the following statement made by a colonialist speaker on the

exclusive rights of administering authorities to determine the status of their

territories, the terms self-government and development are positioned within a

cause-and-effect relationship where development is seen as a precondition for

obtaining self-government:

Only the administering Power is left in the position to decide when aparticular Territory under its administration has reached a stage of political

development when it can be deemed to be self-governing. (Sir P. Spender,

Australia, Sess 9, 1954: 301)

For my purposes, I interpreted this discussion ofself-governmentas a discussion

of political independence in the sense I am interested in, and I included this

discussion within the cluster analysis.

Moreover, all six terms that clustered around the key terms seemed to define each

other, as they repeatedly appeared in close proximity to each other, appeared inconjunction with each other, appeared in cause-and-effect relationship with each

other, and functioned interchangeably within statements. In the following statement

on the Danish administration of the dependent territory of Greenland, for example,

the terms developmentand advancementare joined together by the conjunctionand:

United we will work for the further advancement and development of the

Greenland community ... the new order will be a blessing and a benefit to the

people of Greenland. (Mr. Lannung, Denmark, Sess 9, 1954: 307)

Similarly, in this next statement, the terms advancementand progress seem to be

defined in terms of each other:

On principle, we sympathize with the advancement of the [dependent territories

called] NSGTs and consider that their political, social, and economic progress

should lead them to assume full responsibility for their own destinies, in

accordance with the spirit and the letter of the Charter. (Mr. P. Perez, Venezuela,

Sess 10, 1955: 461)

After exploring this first cluster, I next performed a second cluster analysis

concerning the key terms political dependence and lack of sovereignty. The terms

that repeatedly clustered around these key terms were: native, primitive,

backward, underdeveloped, incompetent, uneducated, lack of civilization, and

simplistic civilization. The logic of this cluster seems inherent in the logic of the

first cluster. That is, if development, advancement, progress, modernity, and so

forth are prerequisites for political independence, it follows that the lack of these

qualifying conditions is a justification for political dependence. Indeed, the most

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common argument made by colonialist powers and administering authorities to

legitimate their rule over a dependent territory was the notion that they were in fact

preparing and training their dependent territories, by virtue of imparting

modernity, progress and so forth, for independence at some future date. In the

following statement, for example, lack of education and preparation (which Iinterpret here as a synonym for competence) are associated with political

dependence and so offered as the justification for political dependence by Brazil:

We must encourage the political education of the peoples that were not yet

ready for independence, and prepare the ground for them so that they might

shape their own future and direct their own affairs. (Mr. De Oliveira, Brazil,

Sess 12, 1957: 518)

Ultimately, both clusters relied on each other for their meaning and significance

within the debates. Considering the two in conjunction, colonialist discourse in theGeneral Assembly debates conjoined the abstractions of progress, advancement,

development, evolution, higher civilization, and modernity into a singular narrative

of linear progression. Separately and together, these abstractions were quantified

and placed on a linear scale. Countries that were higheror more advanced,with

a quantitatively greater amount of the qualities listed therein, were associated with

political independence. Countries situated as lower on the scale, or less

advanced, and possessing quantitatively less of the qualities listed therein, were

associated with political dependence.

While differential placement of territories on this scale of linear progressionhelped to construct central identity distinctions such as independent territories versus

dependent territories, an additional set of images and symbols helped to construct

appropriate kinds of relationships between these categories of identity. Thus, a

second set of terms clustered around the key terms political independence, freedom,

autonomy and sovereignty and its associated imagery of linear progression: growth,

maturity, responsibility (including responsibility for self ), autonomy, and the ability

to make decisions for self . How did this imagery facilitate certain kinds of

relationships between those higher and those lower on the scale of linear

progression? For starters, consider how the following speaker associates level of

advancement on the scale of linear progression and responsibility:

The struggle over backwards populations has passed from London to

Washington, from Lisbon to Rio, Rome to Addis Ababa; but the situation

always remains the same: a population of higher civilization, responsible for the

well-being and advancement of peoples of another race. (Mr. Ryckmans,

Belgium, Sess 2, 1947: 672)

Hence, a higher level of advancement on the scale of linear progression meant not

just the ability to be responsible for self, but also responsible for others. Meanwhile,a lower level on the scale implied an inability to be responsible for self. Through

such imagery, political independence for dependent territories was envisioned as the

end product of a naturalized, evolutionary process of tutelage under a more

responsible state until one was determined capable of taking responsibility for

self. This argument could of course also be used to justify the denial of political

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independence, as in the following case where the United Kingdom explained its

views on political independence in a general sense:

Democracy is a growth. In the case of all the territories coming under our

jurisdiction, we have been attempting, will continue to attempt, to provide all

the assistance we can towards this growthand, as I have said, it is essentially

a growth. With all our cooperation and all the help we can offer, time is needed

to build tradition and, to create political and public responsibility and to create

the social services which are the only sound foundation for political freedom.

(Mr. McNeil, United Kingdom, Sess 2, 1947: 666)

As in the two opposing clusters for linear progression, if this second set of terms of

maturity, responsibility, and so forth clustered around the key terms of political

independence, autonomy, freedom, and sovereignty, its binary opposites again clustered

around the key terms political dependence and lack of sovereignty. Particularly evidentwere the terms/symbolsimmaturity, lack of responsibility (including responsibility for

the self), dependency, wards, and children. In the following statement, for example,

the speaker makes clear the connection between political dependence and child-like

status: Those under the Trusteeship System are wards of the international

community (Mr. Soward, Canada, Sess 11, 1956: 667).

Hence, dependent territories were imaged here, above all, as children. The easy

slippage between the naturalized condition of childhood and the status of political

dependence is evident in their characterization throughout the 15 years examined as

minors,

wards,

not yet able to stand alone in the modern world,

unable to

govern themselves,and not developed enough to have an opinion that counts.Lack

of sovereignty was especially figured as a state of irresponsibility. Against this, the

state of independence was characterized as the ability to have full responsibility for

the self. In contrast, administering authorities were parents given the duty, the

sacred duty, and the sacred trust of guiding dependent people, providing wise

guidance, tutelage, political education, and teaching responsibility for self.

Thus, in these debates, the overwhelmingly male colonialist speakers constructed

distinct identities, relations between these identities, and knowledge about them with

two primary sets of images. First, the image oflinear progressionprovided an entire

lexicon of quantified and linearized abstractions, including progress, advancement,

development, modernity, evolution,and higher civilizationall terminology that has

been identified as constituting a post-Enlightenment metanarrative (Harding 2000;

Lyotard 1984). This metanarrative produced particular kinds of identities based on

where territories were deemed to be located along the scale of linear progression,

including backwards, primitive, and less evolved dependent territories versus

advanced, modern, and civilized countries. Beyond this, hierarchical sets of

relationships betweenthese identities was constructed through a racialized, gendered

paternalism that distinguished more childlike and incompetent dependent

territories from wiser and more competent administering authorities. Such

distinctions produced and indeed naturalized the paternalistic relationship of tutelage

and guidance between them:

We in the United Kingdom are proud of what we are doing in the colonial field.

It is with great pride that we have been able to bring various members of the

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prepared for independence, and so must be developed, advanced, and helped to

evolve. This colonialist, anti-colonialist narrative also appealed to both sets of

images that the colonialist narrative deployed, those of linear progression and

paternalism. For example, one speaker in the anti-colonialist camp proclaimed:

The [United Nations] Charter, with the object of leading the backward peoples

step by step towards the light and towards an evolution which will enable them

to take their responsibility for their social and political destinies upon their

shoulders [and] the Trusteeship System [are] more in keeping with our

modern ideas, which require that the peoples of the world should rise from one

stage of civilization to the next. (Mr. Vieux, Haiti, Sess 2, 1947: 611)

This colonialist anti-colonial narrative was the most common anti-colonialist

narrative throughout the 15 years examined.

In contrast, while the second anti-colonialist narrative agreed that backwardnesswas indeed about lack of development, which was also connected to a lack of

political independence, it made the critical distinction that this lack of advancement

was actually not an inherent condition but caused by the exogenous factor of

European colonialism:

[The Colonial] Powers alleged among other things that the colonial peoples still

lacked the necessary maturity to administer themselves. Those arguments show

the complete hypocrisy and bad faith of these Powers. On the one hand the

Colonial States actually keep the countries under their domination at an extremely

low standard of living, exploit them ruthlessly and withhold from them, even the

most elementary means of education. On the other hand, whenever it suits their

convenience, they use as an argument a state of affairs which is merely the result of

their own policy, in order to demonstrate that the conquered peoples would not be

capable of self-government. (Mr. Winiewicz, Poland, Sess 10, 1955, p. 370371)

Articulated in the early years to a limited extent by the Soviet bloc and its associated

countries, towards the close of the fifties newly independent countries started joining in

as well, making this the second most common anti-colonialist narrative. Together, these

countries argued thatcolonialism is not civilization, thatbefore colonialism, Africanswere highly developed, that colonialism [itself] is bad for development, is indeed

emasculating, and that there is a new kind of backwardness [that of] those who

continue colonialism.From this perspective, the civilizing missionorwhite mans

burden was seen as a guise and an excuse. One speaker argued: youve been

claiming to train us for 350 years, and havent done so. Furthermore, because this

discourse dissociated colonialism fromdevelopment,this approach could deconstruct

the notion of advancement or progress on a linear scale as the precondition for

independence. This discourse thus inverted the relationship between progress on a

linear scale and independence, arguing that progress did not so much lead toindependence, but rather, that independence would lead to progress or develop-

ment.With regard to the image of paternalist guidance, it argued that independence

would lead to maturity,and thatindependence is the best way to mature the people.

Overall, while this narrative accepted the identity distinctions of backwards versus

advanced in the colonialist narrative, it rejected the purported relationship between

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these identities as well as the colonialist knowledge about them. In the process, it

redefined the significance of those identity distinctions themselves.

Against both of these perspectives, the third anti-colonialist narrative problem-

atized the notion of backwardness as defined by the colonialist powers:

Former colonial peoples and those who are still not independent have their own

cultures, their own civilizations, their own traditions, their own languages and

their own customs. They are not only proud of their heritage but they want to

maintain it. They are determined to preserve it and to develop it in their own

way [italics added] these activities can be carried out just as well, if not

better, if the colonialists make an exit, and a quick exit now. (Mr. Asha, United

Arab Republic, Sess 15, 1960: 1048)

It necessarily, then, also rejected colonialist knowledge about these entities and

ultimately, this discourse rejected each element of the colonialist discourse. Whileappearing throughout the fifteen-year time span and intensifying especially toward

the end, relative to the other two, this argument was less common in the debates.

Despite these variable understandings of the notion of backwardness, therefore, it

is evident that most speakers actually accepted their colonialist designations as

backward, underdeveloped, and so on. How, then, was the argument for changefor

decolonizationarticulated? The debates reveal that this challenge was posed

primarily on the gendered/sexualized terrain of nature, violation, and mascu-

linity. Firstly, colonialism was challenged as against the rules of creation:

[At the eve of World War II, colonialism was so extensive that] contrary to therules of creation, the child was manifoldly bigger than its parents, indeed all the

parents put together. (Mr. Shukairy, Saudi Arabia, Sess 15, 1960:101314)

As an unnatural circumstance, it was understood as a violation, or a moral

prostitution and a rape (Mr. Perera, Ceylon, Sess 15, 1960:1001)one that

served, moreover, to emasculate already grown men:

[Colonialism] is a system that takes the manhood out of those exposed to it.

(Mr. Dosumu-Johnson, Liberia, Sess 15, 1960:1069)

[The colonized] man, in whom all dignity has been blunted, is thus morally

diminished. (Mr. Kaka, Niger, Sess 15, 1960:1125)

Decolonization, from this perspective, was necessary for redressing this emascula-

tion. One speaker described having freedom returned after being colonized, for instance,

as once again being masterin ones own house(Mr. Thors, Iceland, Sess 15, 1960:

1147). Speaking of the decolonization process already underway, another argued that

nearly a thousand million men have recovered their outraged dignity and freedom

(Mr. Champassak, Laos, Sess 15, 1960:1108).

Moreover, as the paternalistic relations of colonialism violated the rules of nature,anti-colonialists now sought to replace them with the more natural masculinist

relations of brotherhood:

[This moment is the] universal moment of truth. It is a moment between a past

of inequality and a glorious future, in which all peoples of the world seem

208 Theor Soc (2009) 38:195215


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resolved to re-establish human brotherhood, now won back at last, and to work

together for their common happiness, on a footing of equality and the solidarity

of free men. (Mr. Vakil, Iran, Sess 15, 1960:990)

Our age is one of co-operation among free and equal peoples and men. More

still, it is an age of human brotherhood, association and mutual assistance. (Mr.

Ammoun, Lebanon, Sess 15, 1960:1162)

[With this new Declaration, a new chapter is opened] one based on equality and

the brotherhood of man. (Mr. Rossides, Cyprus, Sess 15, 1960:1281)

Thus in anti-colonialist discourse, a transnational resistance masculinity defined

both the experience of being colonized and the freedom being fought for,

transforming the struggles of still-dependent peoples into the adult, masculine

battles of our brethren in Africa, our Algerian brothers, our Congolese

brothers, and our brothers in courage.

And yet, the ambiguous positioning in relation to the notion of backwardness

introduced certain tensions and contradictions into this politics of adult masculinity.

While for some anti-colonialists, every territory was always already of age, for

others, the once young territories had only now come of age and so only now

deserved freedom. Describing his own country of India, one speaker transformed

one of the oldest civilizations in existence into a young country, and the

representative from Ghana described his country as at once ancient and reborn.

This ambiguous relationship of many anti-colonialists to the imagery of birth, youth,

growth, and adulthood, clearly emergent from the history of colonialist paternalism,is especially evident in the following speech:

Every child, in his youth, inexperience and lack of initiative, lives under the wing of

his parents. When he grows up, he leaves his parents home, goes out into the world

and makes a home for himself far from those who reared him, because he feels free

in his person and personality. Then should the colonized, ever submissive, have his

freedom rationed by his colonizer?Not long ago we were being poisoned with

the sugared venom of colonialism but we have outgrown the stage of servitude,

we are no longer credulous children who can be made to believe in Santa Claus

forever. Those days are over, and colonialism has been outstripped at every point.

(Mr. Lheyet-Gaboka, Congo (Brazzaville), Sess 15, 1960: 1178)

Here, the speaker moves between the image of a (male) child who grows up and

obtains his freedom to the notion of a fleeting credulity or gullibility that is now

decidedly gone. Such ambiguity made itself felt in an uneven critique that embraced

and sought economic and technical development assistance even as it decon-

structed political tutelage:

Assistance and co-operation are indispensable for the progress of under-

developed countries, [as] the gap separating them from the technically

advanced countries can only be bridged if loyal cooperation is established

within the framework of national independence for all countries, for the task of

transforming and industrializing the economic structures of backward countries.

(Mr. Ismal, Guinea, Sess 15, 1960: 1083)

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Thus, while paternalist tutelage in the political arena had been thoroughly

critiqued, economic and technical assistance between brothers was deemed

acceptable and even necessary:

Real brotherhood [means that] the strong supports the weak; the wealthy helps

the needy; the developed assists the under-developed; and when all such aids

are made without conditions or strings attached. (Mr. RifaI, Jordan, Sess 15,

1960: 1057)

Finally, such assistance was especially appropriate if provided by the machinery

of the United Nations:

Newly liberated countries will need such aid, whether economic or technical.

None of these States will be able to do without it if it wants to develop

economically and socially. In general, this urgent need of new States provides a

good opportunity for competition between the different forces in the world, and

particularly between the two [Cold War] blocks, each seeking to impose its

influence therefore, the value of this aid would be enormously advanced if it

were given through the United Nations. (Mr. Slim, Tunisia, Sess 15, 1960: 1045)

Discussion

What do these conversations tell us? At the simplest level, to the racialized,sexualized paternalist masculinity (re)produced by colonialists, anti-colonialists in

the post-1945 United Nations General Assembly debates responded with a certain

kind ofresistance masculinity. The counter-politics of historically racialized men,

this masculinity negotiated an in-between space premised on simultaneously

accepting and rejecting key elements of the logic of its subordination. While, on

the one hand, it overwhelmingly accepted its location as backward, underdevel-

oped and so forth within the colonial narrative and sought assistance to rectify this

situation, it also demanded the return of a masculinity denied.

How did the shifting post-war global power structure condition this discourse?

Both colonialist and anti-colonialist categories, as mentioned earlier, were blocks

made up of discrete groups of countries, each with differing goals in the post-1945

world. The block that I termed colonialist was composed of former and

contemporary European colonial powers, the United States, and a number of Latin

American countries such as Argentina, Colombia, and Peru. Each of these had

distinct reasons for their similar rhetorical and voting patterns. For example, this was

a moment characterized by a decline in the hegemony of European colonial powers.

Thus in these conversations, colonial powers like Britain and France were engaged

in defending a world order quickly losing its legitimacy, and so they stressed

especially a gentle, well-intentioned fatherhood (while at the same time,

attempting to maintain power through new politico-economic structures such as

the Commonwealth and French Union). This order, moreover, was being eclipsed by

a new global-scale conflict and the rising power of especially the United States. On

one level, the United States is harder to pin down than European colonial powers,

with its professions of support for democracy and the anti-colonialist cause. Scholars

210 Theor Soc (2009) 38:195215


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point out, however, that in the Cold War climate, an American cold warrior

masculinity either sought to contain the threat of communism (Clark 2003) or

worried that it was not masculine enough to do so (Cuordileone 2005; Dean2001).

U.S. professions of support for democracy and development for underdeveloped

nations were made with such concerns in mind (Dean 2001; Grosfoguel 2003).Others add that any support anti-colonialists did get was also about reducing the

power of European rivals (Kelly and Kaplan2004). Regardless of such complexities,

however, in rhetorical and voting patterns, the United States perpetuated the colonial

narrative. Finally, many Latin American countries also aligned themselves with

colonialist Europe and the United States, which should perhaps come as little

surprise. The legacies of Spanish colonialism left a privileged elite, mainly white

descendants of the European conquerors, later joined by immigrants from Europe,

which preserved their power over mestizos, native Indians and descendants of

African slaves (McWilliams and Piotrowski 2001:311312). There is no reason toassume the elites that represented these states felt any association with newly

independent Asian and African countries. Indeed, countries like Argentina and

Colombia contributed some of the most racist arguments to the colonialist narrative

in the United Nations General Assembly debates. Additionally, despite growing

resentment toward US power, the United States also dangled military and economic

aid (McWilliams and Piotrowski 2001:313); and in international organizations the

Latin American states were usually found supporting U.S. positions (Robertson

1997:37).

Constituents of the anti-colonialist block, too, came together for varying reasons.The core of this block was newly independent Asian and African countries, which

coalesced especially after the Bandung Conference (Hovet1960:8788), and which

continued to develop a sense of collective identity and purpose throughout the 1950s

(Berger 2004; Legum 1958; Mortimer 1984). While the analysis above identifies

two key anti-colonial narratives, with one emphasizing that underdevelopment leads

to dependency and the other arguing that dependency leads to underdevelopment, I

do not want to make too much of this distinction. Not only did individual speakers

often vacillate between the two, both narratives agree on the fundamental condition

of underdevelopment. The central element to focus on here is the acceptance of this

dimension of the colonialist narrative.

Additionally in the shadow of the aforementioned growing resentment to US

power, Latin American states were split in the United Nations General Assembly,

and so countries like Guatemala and Mexico also contributed to anti-colonialist

rhetorical and voting patterns. In the 1960s, these states also started to produce

whats been called dependency theory (Robertson 1997:175), which echoed

especially the second anti-colonial narrative discussed above. Finally, these anti-

colonialists were joined by the Soviet Union, which despite its own racialized

identity (see especially chapters 2 and 3, Patil 2007), in its new contest with the

United States sought to connectwesterncolonialism with capitalism. In this, it was

uniformly joined by the Soviet-bloc.

In the context of the shifting political climate, and with a general orientation to

development and any development assistance offered by their new superpower

suitors on the part of newly independent countries (see also Gelvin 2002; Mason

1997), these countries especially targeted European powers. The problematic

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practices of both the United States and the Soviet Union were largely ignored. While

there may have been some connection to the emerging position of non-alignment,

newly independent Asian and African countries were acutely aware of the imperialist

practices of the Soviet Union regarding its satellites and republics, as well as

problematic relationships between the Unites States and its own dependencies likePuerto Rico. Indeed, both issues were debatedboth within the United Nations

General Assembly meetings and without. Nevertheless, on all counts, newly

independent Asian and African countries chose to focus on and target Europe (see

especially chapters 2 and 3, Patil 2007).

Ultimately, this shifting global power structure was central in shaping anti-

colonialist discourse. While most anti-colonialist speakers critiqued the political

dependence imposed by European colonialism, they failed to engage sufficiently the

potentially problematic relationships with those that might now offer economic

development and other kinds of assistance. In the case of the second anti-colonialistnarrative, which argued that dependency leads to underdevelopment, perhaps the

notion that development aid would come largely through the auspices of the United

Nations mitigated this contradiction. Nevertheless, scholars continue to comment on

this moment and its consequent complexities to this day. In the case of the third anti-

colonialist narrative as expounded by the United Arab Republic, which in the United

Nations General Assembly rejected the very notion of development itself in 1960,

such nationalist radicalism (Mason 1997) was short-lived. The United Arab

Republic came into existence in the late 1950s when, in the wake of the Suez War

and Syrian fears of a US plot to compromise its sovereignty, the government in Syriadecided to merge with a stronger Egypt (Mason 1997:169170). Both Syria and

Egypt, however, had long had orientations to development (Gelvin 2002:8485).

Their union fell apart only a few years later in 1961.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the negotiation of the 1960 Declaration sheds light on some important

transnational feminist concerns. If in this moment of resistance to racial and cultural

hierarchy, freedom is articulated as the reclaiming of a masculinity hitherto denied,

what might be the implications for women, as well as for other masculinities? That

this resistance emerges in the UN debates, moreover, points to its transnational

dimension. Although I do not wish to argue that this resistance masculinity manifests

in the same way in every postcolonialcountry, or that it manifests in the same way

in 2008 as it did in 1960, this sort of resistance masculinity is also clearly still

relevant today. It is evident from the insistence on an authentic masculinity that

actually adapts colonialist notions of masculinity to definitions of the modern nation

or culture that do the same (Banerjee 2005; Hodgson 1999; Holden 1998; Low

2003). Moreover, even more local studies point to the prevalence of this sort of

resistance masculinity in the politics of racially marginalized men (see, for example,

Archer and Yamashita2003; Chen1999; Messner2000; Weis et al. 2002). Thus if

we connect these instances of resistance masculinity as exhibiting a key transnational

pattern of resistance today, we may see the United Nations debates as one

significant, constitutive moment in the formation of this transnational pattern of

212 Theor Soc (2009) 38:195215


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resistance. Moreover, it is a moment that provides a discursive framework that

historically racialized men (and perhaps others) continue to draw from to make sense

of their experiences today.

Finally, although my analysis does not tackle this question directly, the debates

also point to the complexity of this masculinity politics as it becomes intertwinedwith multiple negotiations of development and by implication, multiple approaches

to state and nation-building. Thus, we need to pay better attention to how different

negotiations of development implicate different definitions of masculinity (and

femininity). Indeed, as development continues to be articulated and rearticulated

by subjects previously excluded from the sites of its negotiation (womens

movements, indigenous movements), we need more work exploring the interrela-

tionships between these different negotiations of development and the formation of

masculinities and femininities.

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Vrushali Patil is a sociologist. She holds a joint appointment with the Department of Global and

Sociocultural Studies and the Womens Studies Center at Florida International University. Patil is the

author ofNegotiating Decolonization in the United Nations: Politics of Space, Identity and International

Community (2008). She is currently working on an examination contemporary tourism promotion

strategies within India from a postcolonial and feminist perspective.

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