HPAIR SECURITY WORKSHOP

The Track Two Diplomacy Process In The Asia-Pacific Region1

John ParkJohn Stephenson

INTRODUCTION

The fundamental changes in global and regional strategic circumstances following the end of the Cold War have generally been welcomed throughout the Asia-Pacific region. However, they have also generated new and sometimes potentially very disturbing security issues. The regional security environment is now much more complex and uncertain than during the Cold War. There are more major actors on the stage — in particular, Japan, China and, over the longer term, India. There are numerous issues of disputation, involving competing territorial claims and challenges to governmental legitimacy, some of which could potentially escalate to major regional conflict. Most countries in the region are determined to enhance their defense self-reliance to enable them to deal better with regional contingencies on the basis of their own resources. Many countries are engaged in substantial defense buildups, (a trend that has momentarily abated due to the region-wide financial crisis) involving the acquisition of advanced maritime and air defense capabilities. Several are acquiring some particular new technologies, such as ballistic missiles, or weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear or chemical weapons, which are extremely troubling (Ball 1994, 157).

A significant new element of the emerging security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, complementing the new and generally more demanding regional security issues, is the widespread appreciation that new modalities and arrangements for multilateral dialogue, for confidence-building and cooperation should be an essential and integral feature of the regional security architecture (Ball 1994, 158; Evans 1994, 125-128).

Participants in the HPAIR Security Workshop will assess the evolution of these institutional and organizational structures and agenda-setting activities of some of the nascent policy networks in the Asia-Pacific region. Drawing upon this, a close examination will be made of Richard Higgott’s contention that “an explicit assumption of the exercise is that such formal, semi-formal and non-governmental regional contacts have become more important over recent years and represent increasingly important vehicles for regional communication. An implicit assumption… is that the growing networks of Asia-Pacific organizations represent an important laboratory for enhancing our conceptual and theoretical understanding of the importance of ideas in… policy learning in international relations.” (Higgot 1994, 367). 1 This briefing is designed to serve as a guide and compendium to the suggested reading list for the HPAIR Security Workshop. As such, it is a compilation of the key articles that highlight the main themes which will be discussed in the Workshop. The principal pieces are: (1) Desmond Ball, “A New Era in Confidence Building: The Second Track Process in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1994. (2) Kim Beng Phar, “Constructive Dialogue? An Examination of the Track Two Diplomacy Process in ASEAN and East Asia,” Asian Defense and Diplomacy, Vol. 4, No. 1, February 1998. (3) Kim Beng Phar, “Conflict Management Dimension of Track Two Diplomacy,” Asian Defense and Diplomacy, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 1998. Accompanying the citations in the briefing are references to further readings on the specific topic outlined.

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REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS

Overview

The security concerns that have emerged since the end of the Cold War are not difficult to identify. Many arise from the uncertainty accompanying the extraordinary rate and extent of change which now permeates the region. Much of this change derives from the economic dynamism of East and, to a lesser extent, Southeast Asia: this offers the prospect of longer-term stability but is also somewhat fragile, being dependent upon long and vulnerable sea lanes of communication for vital energy resources and raw materials from outside the region. Further, it generates considerable domestic instabilities as traditional modes of production and social relationships are disturbed and transformed. This uncertainty is compounded by the decline of the presence and influence of the former superpowers and the transition from bipolarity to some as yet undefined form of multipolarity. In particular, there is a general apprehension throughout the region concerning the pace, scope and extent of the U.S. draw-down and the future of the U.S. economic and strategic commitment to the region. For regional planners, it has become critical to establish some mechanism or variety of mechanisms for managing this increasing regional uncertainty (Ball 1994, 159).

Regional Conflict

One of the more unfortunate consequences of the end of the Cold War is the likely increase in regional conflict. Not only has the salience of regional conflict been enhanced in relative terms by the disappearance of the East-West conflict, but the end of that conflict has ‘removed the tempering mechanism’ that often served to keep regional tensions under control. In East and Southeast Asia, there remains much fertile ground for regional conflict. There are numerous issues of simmering and potential conflict involving competing sovereignty claims, challenges to government legitimacy, and territorial disputes (Ball 1994, 160; see Table 1).

The gamut of contentious issues is much more vast in the Asia-Pacific region than elsewhere. This is partly due to different impacts of the Cold War and its ending across different regions. In Europe, where the security architecture was for some four decades essentially defined by the Cold War, the removal of Soviet clutches and the wholesale collapse of governmental structures has wracked central Europe with intra-state conflict as ethnic and economic factors are unleashed to head the processes of political adjustment (Ball 1994, 162; Mak 1997, 38-48).

In Asia, where the Cold War and its ending were extremely important but only one of several determinants of security matters, the types of possible conflict are quite comprehensive. There is internal conflict, involving

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insurgency and secession movements in several countries in Southeast Asia, but these were generally not products of the Cold War. Further, the ending of the Cold War did not produce the collapse of Communist rule in Asia, at least not to date nor in the precipitate form that occurred in Europe; China, Vietnam, and North Korea remain in ideological competition with their neighbors, and while this is unlikely to lead to inter-state conflict involving China (depending on the definition of Taiwan in terms of statehood) or Vietnam, there is a real possibility of conflict on the Korean Peninsula, involving not just North and South Korea but also other states, specifically the U.S. (Ball 1994, 161-162). The unique feature of security environment of the Asia-Pacific region is that it is essentially maritime — most of the inter-state conflict issues (listed in Table 1) involve disputes over maritime boundaries and offshore territorial claims. These include the dispute between Russia and Japan over the southern Kurile Islands or ‘Northern Territories’; between Japan and China over Senkaku Island in the East China Sea; between Malaysia and Indonesia over the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan in the Celebes Sea; and — perhaps the most important potential maritime flashpoint — competing claims to the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, which are contested by China, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and the Philippines (Ball 1994, 162; Mak 1995, 303-325).

Significantly, most of the issues listed in the Table are unlikely to lead to inter-state conflict. Some could well be resolved through negotiation, possibly involving the institution of joint surveillance and development zones encompassing the areas of disputation. Others are inactive, such as the Philippines’ claim to Sabah; and others will remain essentially internal matters, such as the insurgency movements in Indonesia and the Philippines. Nevertheless, the high proportion of inter-state issues suggests that inter-state conflict is more likely in the Asia-Pacific region than elsewhere. In any event, all of the issues listed remain sources of tension, suspicion, and misunderstanding which could be alleviated by the institution of mechanisms for dialogue, consultation and cooperation. (Emphasis added) (Ball 1994, 163; Evans 1994, 126-132).

Defense Modernization Programs

Throughout the region, there is a significant degree of consistency in the acquisition programs. The more particular enhancements include national command, control, and communications (C3) systems; national strategic and tactical intelligence systems; multi-role fighter aircraft, with maritime attack capabilities as well as air-superiority capabilities (e.g., F-16s and F-18s); maritime surveillance aircraft (e.g. P-3s); anti-ship missiles; modern surface combatants — destroyers, frigates, ocean patrol vessels;

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submarines; electronic warfare systems; and rapid deployment forces (Ball 1994, 163-164; Mak 1995, 311-321).

Several aspects of the current acquisition programs are disturbing. To begin with, these programs are proceeding in an atmosphere of uncertainty and some lack of trust. Uncertainty and suspicion is fueled by a relative lack of transparency in the region with respect to the long-range objectives and motivations behind the current acquisition programs, as well as the particular force element of these programs. Tensions are already being induced in the region by attempts by some countries to discern the purposes and intentions of their neighbors. In addition to the absence of transparency, misunderstanding is also caused by the lack of any common threat perceptions throughout the region. Some countries are more concerned than others about India’s power projection capabilities, some are more concerned about the increasing Chinese capabilities, and some are more worried about the plans and intentions of their nearer neighbors. Justifications for particular acquisitions, no matter how well articulated, might simply not ring true in these circumstances — leading to misunderstandings and unanticipated and unfortunate reactions (Ball 1994, 164; Mack and Kerr 1995, 123-140).

The ‘offensive’ character of some of the new weapons systems being acquired is also cause of concern. Many of the new acquisitions (such as the maritime attack aircraft, modern surface combatants, and submarines, all equipped with anti-ship missiles) involve strike capabilities with offensive connotations. Unfortunately, for many countries, they provide the most cost-effective basis for self-reliance; in some cases, such as that of Australia, a viable posture of self-reliance would not be possible without some minimal strike capabilities. Yet these capabilities are the most likely to generate counter-acquisitions. In these circumstances, it is imperative that regional mechanisms be established to reduce the prospects of the various defense modernization programs degenerating into a regional arms race (Ball 1994, 163-164; Bessho 1999, 39-47).

Weapons of Mass Destruction

A highly disturbing development is that several countries have now acquired — whether by indigenous production or by importation — new technologies, such as ballistic missiles or weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear or chemical weapons.

However, it is generally accepted that the problem of proliferation of these weapons and technologies is best addressed through international regimes such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Chemical Weapons Convention, rather than new regional

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structures. Regional initiatives designed to promote and strengthen these global regimes would be useful, but there is little point in duplicating the global mechanisms, and care should be taken not to divert attention, effort and resources from other regional security issues which have to be dealt with within the region itself. More fruitful would be institutionalized dialogue mechanisms which would allow the discussion of particular problem areas and which could focus regional and global attention on especially recalcitrant states (Ball 1994, 164-165; Reese 1998, 42-58).

Confidence Building and Security Cooperation

In the few years from the late 1980s through the early 1990s, as the nature of post-Cold War security concerns in the region became apparent, both government officials and non-governmental analysts proffered more than two dozen proposals for confidence and security building measures for the region (see Table 2). As Paul Evans observed, “effective multilateralism in security matters (was) coming to Eastern Asia and the Pacific born of new realities and a distinctive regional process rather than by imposition by an external power or by imitation of instruments more maturely developed elsewhere” (Evans 1994, 125).

It soon became apparent that the most fundamental building block for regional security cooperation and confidence building centered around the institutionalization of regional security dialogue. The rationale was that such dialogue would lead to better appreciation of the concerns, interests and perceptions of the participating countries, enhancing mutual understanding and trust, and preventing misunderstandings and suspicions which were likely to cause tensions and even conflict. More generally, it would serve as a mechanism for managing some of the uncertainty which presently confounds regional security planners and analysts. (Emphasis added) (Ball 1994, 165; Evans 1994, 127-129). A closer examination of this mechanism is presented below.

CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE? AN EXAMINATION OF THE TRACK TWO DIPLOMACY PROCESS IN ASEAN AND EAST ASIA

This section attempts to show that ASEAN/East Asian track two diplomacy (herein T 2, as it is commonly referred to in ASEAN and East Asia) has and will continue to play a predominant role in East and Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War order irrespective of the geopolitical or economic circumstances that lay ahead. The influence of this phenomenon on conflict resolution in ASEAN and East Asia has too often been ignored by the realist perspective of international relations. T 2 will remain important in the region because of practical necessity as well as significant ideational

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contributions that have emerged from this realm. By T 2, one also refers to a range of activities that are undertaken under the “polite fiction” of benign government neglect.

The issue of “benign neglect” is important because just as most governments purport not to be interested and involved in the talks — T 2 activities are after all initiatives carried out under the banner of private and non-governmental efforts — most governments, nevertheless, used the frequency and sustainability of these talks to gauge the possibility of a real track one opening.

Invariably, to understand the future order of East Asian security, one requires an appreciation of the initiatives and ideas that are frequently proposed at this track two level. One also needs to contemplate the larger role of the second track movement in ASEAN and East Asia as a form ofconfidence building process itself. This section therefore serves to make plain the roles and dimensions of T 2. T 2 comes in various guises and capacities. They easily range from humanitarian work across borders to church-based activities. This diverse element is seen clearly in Margaret Keck’s and Kathryn Sikkink’s work on trans-border activities across the Latin American borders. T 2, as it ispracticed and understood in East Asia, however, refers to a brand of diplomacy where dialogue and exchange are held, not among non-government organizations (NGOs), but rather between semi-governmental think tanks. Over the years, these numerous think tanks have formed into two separate, but nonetheless mutually reinforcing networks: (1) ASEAN-ISIS and (2) Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP).

Since 1994, the year when ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was first set up, there now exists a working link between ARF and ASEAN-ISIS, and indeed also CSCAP; the latter being a T 2 network comprising eleven influential think tanks across the Asia Pacific, with its current participants composed of broad-based member committees.

Taken together, CSCAP and ASEAN-ISIS have formed what can be known as T 2. In ASEAN and Asia at large, T 2 plays a crucial role in assisting government cooperation. In this context, T 2 has facilitated a wide range of dialogue on various topics; not least, confidence-building, rescue and relief operations, and even peacekeeping.

More than just being a second track movement, ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP are in fact developing into a policy network with immense ideational and political influence. For, beyond the formal working relationship with ARF alone, groups comprising the second track movement have also gradually

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embedded themselves with research institutions in China, Japan, Korea, and even Europe as well.

Presently, T 2 can be characteristically said to be a growing force. Although difficult economic circumstances in the region have somewhat slowed its momentum, its direction remains clear: To generate viable security ideas and proposals for the benefit of the respective ASEAN members or Asian Pacific states. The aim not least, is to enhance post-Cold War regional cooperation.

What has been left unexplored in the academic literature on T 2, however, is whether or not the holding of numerous T 2 ‘dialogues’ can in and of themselves produce salutary benefits beyond the mere exchange of ideas and information. The general focus on this section is therefore on T 2 capacity for conflict resolution and confidence-building; two areas that have been generally ignored in T 2 research.

Restating T 2 and Defining It

Much has been written about T 2. They range from describing T 2 as a form of non-governmental organization (NGO) movement to characterizing it as an emergent ‘civil society’; the latter being an approach favored by Yamamoto Tadashi of the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE). It should, however, be noted that T 2 is not an NGO movement in the conventional sense of the word. This is because while members of T 2 are all autonomous andprivate individuals, it is not an NGO movement in the form of people’s coalition or even a nascent peace movement, as the term NGO commonly implies.

In fact, not only do members of T 2 attempt to work rigorously within the policy-orbit of the government, their enunciated views also run parallel to those of the government. From human rights issues to technical matters, such as creating a joint naval patrol to combating the steep increase of piracy in Asian waters for example, the emphasis of T 2 is more in offeringsolutions, rather than confronting or exposing the ineptitude of respective governments.

As such, while members of T 2 do have independent opinions and ideas of their own, their conceptions normally fall within the expectations and intellectual grid of their respective governments; another factor which also explains why members of T 2 could mingle comfortably with members of the first track, such as foreign policy officials, ambassadors, and even army personnel. In this regard, it would not be entirely inappropriate to refer to

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members of T 2 as ‘unofficial diplomats.’ (Berman and Joseph 1977, chap. 1).

From the above description, it is obvious that the buffer between the T 2 movement and their governments are somewhat compromised — although not necessarily undermined — on the basis of their more deferential approach and attitude towards the government. Clear evidence of this is the close degree of policy-coordination between track one (official diplomacy) and track two movements. It is partly due to this close relationship that Norleen Meyer has described the T 2 movement and network now existing across East Asia as akin to a “service delivery system.” (Meyer 1995, 1).

Hence, while civil society is wont to struggle for matters relating to civil rights, or even state incursion into private lives and properties, the T 2 movement has no such agendas or motives.

Perhaps the best definition of T 2 so far, is that it exists as what Peter Haas refers to as an ‘epistemic community.’ According to Peter Haas: “An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain of issue.” This community can extend to various facets of civil and political life: from academics and policy analysts to the media, business interests, grassroots organizations and even government officials working in an unofficial capacity (Haas 1992, 3-7).

When asked in an interview if T 2 is a unique ‘epistemic community’ in the above context, Jusuf Wannandi, a leading T 2 member of ASEAN, answered to the effect that: “It is not unique, only pragmatic, due to limits of governments.” This seems to confirm a major criterion set out by Peter Hass himself, that it is the high degree of uncertainty arising from the operating environment of governments — in this particular instance the transition of Cold War to post-Cold War order in Asia — that “gives rise to demands for particular sorts of information.” (Haas 1992, 4). Such ‘information’ is needed to effectively handle several issues:

1. The perceived decline and diminution of America’s strategic commitment in East Asia;

2. ASEAN’s mixed feelings over the emergence of China; and 3. An enlarged ASEAN that has grown in members (now 9) and size, but has

since lost its diplomatic clout.*

*The third was due to the recent admission of Myammar — the so-called ‘pariah state’ — into the fold of ASEAN in July 1997, thus complicating ASEAN’s dialogue relations with Europe.

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The benefits emerging from this ‘epistemic community’ are three fold. First, they provide an avenue for establishing transparency in terms of sensitive military issues, while at the same time improving perceptions concerning a rival’s motives and intentions. Misperceptions, often harbingers of imminent clashes of conflict, can be greatly reduced. Secondly, the epistemic community itself is a positive development in a region known for lack of proper communication. All the benefits of interpersonal and inter-organizational linkages result from this extended, truly regional community. An informal infrastructure of dialogue is brought about by T 2 efforts. Finally, it is hoped, these unofficial talks will influence and ascend to higher levels of ‘official’ interaction between states. As such, perceptible coordination of official policy and conflict resolution may spring from T 2 diplomacy. These three stages of T 2 benefits will be further elaborated below.

Increasing Transparency and Improving Perceptions

When addressing issues of military security, proper communication and perception can help avert conflict and catastrophe. The T 2 process allows for this communication to take place, resulting in increasing transparency of each actor’s movements and improving perceptions of each actor’s ability and intentions. Misperceptions, which can result in clashes and war, are dispelled.

T 2 meetings, not unlike the UN General Assembly, function as a useful forum for various national representatives to vent their grievances. In the case of China for instance, its high-ranking T 2 members have used these second track meetings, both to reach out to its ASEAN neighbors, as well as to debunk the theory of a ‘Chinese threat.’ (Cunlai 1996, 9). Whether these attempts have been successful can be rigorously debate, but Chinese efforts show at least a desire, even if strategically-minded, to diminish the antagonistic atmosphere which has pervaded the region. More generally, T 2 processes help participants develop more “differentiated images of the enemy and discover potential negotiating partners on the other side, learning that there is someone to talk to on the other side and someone to talk about.” (Kelman 1992, 91).

In fact, this is similar to what is deemed as a ‘healing function’ in political conflict resolution since actors that participate in T 2 processes no longer feel as psychologically besieged as before. This process is especially useful for Northeast Asian countries, given the history of mistrust that has pervaded the sub-region. Accordingly, it is stressed that T 2 meets the crucial requirement of a psychologically sensitive conflict resolution strategy to effect some form of acknowledgment, contrition, and forgiveness transaction between parties. Dialogue invariably produces the risk of reinforcing stereotypes, but if it is well managed such risks appear low. Dialogue between the West and the East Asian region generally has a reinforcing effect on stereotypes whereas intra-regional dialogue tends towards breaking down such stereotypes. As such, some would argue that T 2 diplomacy is a uniquely Asian means of diplomatic negotiation (Higgot 1994, 367-373).

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T 2 diplomacy is all about joint-thinking, mutual assistance, relationship building and creating a working trust that can then transcend any limitations posed by the track one process. It is essentially an attempt to reduce and manage risk. In fact, its non-adversarial approach is aimed at gaining a better understanding of the other’s concerns, expectations and intentions without being confrontational. More accurately, T 2 is meant to “encourage a shift in the political discourse between the parties from power politics to mutual accommodation.” (Kelman 1996, 115).

Closer to William Davidson’s and Joseph Montville’s original conception of second track diplomacy as a distinctively psychological process — verging almost on emotional catharsis — one can find that this element is also not totally absent in ASEAN, especially in its attempt to engage or moderate the behavior of China (Davidson and Montville 1981, 145-157). By inviting China into T 2 dialogue, ASEAN is able to build stronger bonds with Beijing as well as provide a useful avenue for China to engage in what Ronald Fisher refers to as the process of ‘self-disclosure.’ This is a process whereby all parties are able to share perceptions and ideas about a certain conflict, thus making it more malleable (Fisher 1989, 214).

Accordingly, as the line of communication becomes more open and accurate, the ability to see each other’s intentions more clearly and fully follows. This allows a more thorough and careful evaluation of policy. Invariably, this leads to a higher degree of congruence in the policy coordination process as compared to the barriers and breakdowns characteristic of severe and protracted conflicts. Thus a commitment to a mutual, cooperative exchange develops which helps to move the participants towards the ultimate objective of solving the problems.

In addition, second track dialogue allows ideas and opinions to be freely floated in order to determine their feasibility and general acceptability. In fact, Nordin Sopiee, head of the Malaysian ISIS think-tank, has metaphorically alluded that ASEAN’s approach to conflict resolution is akin to a ‘meat grinder’ in which all ideas and proposals are first subject to a process of continuous discussions and deliberations before they are unanimously adopted in consensus. It is the view of leading thinkers that T 2 can therefore play a supplementary role to the ASEAN Secretariat as well. Indeed, five years after the formal establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994, the second track process has become entrenched in the system.

‘Epistemic Community’ — Building Networks and Bridges

In a historically discordant region, T 2 interactions are constructing personal networks and bridges which will aid in confidence building and future conflict resolution. These dialogues have served as the foundation on which more official interaction may take place. The new regional community emerging from T 2 diplomacy is quickly replacing the former system of walls and boundaries built on suspicion and insecurity.

First and foremost, T 2 has tried to harness confidence by way of building more viable channels for non-official security dialogue. This trend has caught on like no other, as according to one account there are now more than one track two meetings per week, restricted not just to ASEAN,

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but spanning the entire Asia Pacific region. Prior to 1990 less than five channels for non-official security dialogue were in existence; by June 1998, there were about forty (Camileri 1997, 158).

Essentially there are several reasons why dialogues have been chosen as the preferred mechanism to build confidence and resolve conflict. For one, there is the general awareness that Asian Pacific countries have not had much contact with one another, let alone engage in any form of multilateral cooperation at the governmental level. There have been, however, numerous conferences on a range of topics in the post-Vietnam war period. These have effectively built strong networks of academics and practitioners throughout the region, most notably ASEAN, but within a distinctly non-governmental atmosphere. Therefore, it is more logical to begin a region-wide security dialogue at this T 2 diplomatic level.

Further, for a region that is still steeped in the norms and cultures of doing things informally and privately, dialogue is proving to be an expedient way of building confidence and managing conflict. It provides “the affected parties with a way of avoiding disputes by creating opportunities for adjustment and accommodation.” (Askandar 1994, 54).

Beyond promoting the non-official security dialogue, T 2 is in itself a larger process aimed at threat transformation. This is achieved through its status as an ‘epistemic community’ coupled with its vast array of networks in government, business and private sectors. As the ‘epistemic community’ enlarges and its influence extends, the second track movement initiates and facilitates a positive transformation in the security relations of the enduringly suspicious states.

Hence, while “epistemic community may not be vital in every area, nevertheless it is still the most effective way to ensure that the confidence building idea is understood and actively endorsed as worthwhile within influential parts of each participating state.” (McIntosh 1995, 168).

Previous encounters in the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), Pacific Asia Free Trade And Development (PAFTAD), and Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), all of which are non-governmental associations meant to improve economic cooperation in the Asia Pacific region, have continued to strengthen the links forged between T 2 members.

Robert O’Neill of Oxford University has even described such links as “a network of officials and non-official experts who (can) pool information and discuss their apprehensions and estimates of dangers, before beginning to evolve policy recommendations to their governments on an agreed basis.” (O’Neill 1992, 11).

Aside from replenishing old social networks, almost all T 2 meetings, especially of the variety that exist in ASEAN countries, are not just informal to say the least, but exceedingly convivial. T 2 meetings in ASEAN, especially noted for their open and frank exchange, differ immensely from T 2 meetings held in Japan, where discussions and deliberations take place in more austere and hierarchical settings. In fact, it is worth mentioning that T 2 members carry almost a distinctive sense of comraderie. To the extent that these personal networks and friendships,

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which have been developed for at least 10 years or more, matter in terms of helping to allay tensions and misperceptions, they can be said to build confidence. Sound and warm personal ties between members of the T 2 community also open a window toward augmenting the relationships between the ‘track two idea-brokers’ and policy-making elites.

Leading T 2 members of Singapore, such as Lee Tai To, have repeatedly called for more ‘institutional links’ with China’s strategic research establishment in order to broaden the ‘epistemic constituency’ further. This is an attempt to gain a foothold in the decision-making circles of China since these institutes are closely allied to the state. It is hoped that such connections will gradually help to transform the level of threat perception still existing in official circles. The reasoning is that if members of the Chinese T 2 efforts can understand the position of other countries better, they would be able to afford an interpretation of ASEAN, the US or Japan, that is less sinister. Indeed, an enduring promotion of confidence-building by a group of qualified policy-makers is an important element of overall success. This is especially evident if the ‘epistemic community’ has reasonable access to senior government decision-makers.

T 2 channels like ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP therefore serve as a useful forum to raise and debate ideas. These, in turn, allow governments of ASEAN to adopt ideas safely and with legitimacy. When these ideas are passed on to the ASEAN Secretariat, there already exists unquestionable commitment at the level of principle if not in terms of technical feasibility. Hence, T 2, in the context of ASEAN, also serves as a form of shield or ‘Ozone layer.’ It is through T 2 members’ constant “meetings with scholars, scientists, opinion leaders, dialogue partners and other external powers, [that] ASEAN-ISIS helps to filter, screen and modulate potentially harmful rays or ideas.” (Hernandez 1993, 2).

Conflict Resolution — T 2’s Influence on Official Policymaking

Without some form of non-official security dialogue, any attempt at building confidence at the offical level would be difficult, if not futile. In contrast, through open, exploratory communication in a T 2 process, governments find that they can gain a better understanding of the causes of their conflict and of the processes that contribute to its escalation and perpetuation. Indeed, like the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) and the Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD), T 2 in the form of CSCAP and ASEAN-ISIS, are aimed at “accommodating the pursuit of risk aversion approach to diplomacy in which interstate relations are developed and conducted cautiously and patiently through non-governmental channels and networks which are relatively inexpensive to support and require minimum political involvement.” (Woods 1991, 318).

Beyond providing, what Ralph Cossa, a leading American T 2 participant called ‘benign cover’ for governments to vet new policies, T 2 as initiated in ASEAN and, in fact, across the Pacific, also has a conflict management utility (Cossa 1996, 12). Some scholars have affirmed that it is a mistake to believe that T 2 diplomacy is a mere ‘dialogue for dialogue’ sake. At the very least, it creates a positive atmosphere conducive to movement through the negotiation process. Perhaps the most essential feature of T 2 diplomacy is that it is basically a joint-process of analysis and reflection: Participants are free to think aloud, to creatively foster solutions and to

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anticipate difficulties. For, aside from being a confidence-building process, T 2 can also work as ‘problem-solving diplomacy.’ (Kelman 1996, 108).

One of the hidden dimensions of T 2 lies in its utility as a risk-management technique. When government officials attend T 2 meetings in the polite fiction of being there in their private capacity, not only are they allowed to speak off the record, but more importantly, a unique forum is open to them to take exploratory and non-committal policy positions.

Delaying conflict issues from emerging in the agendas, or putting them on a back burner, until they are ‘ripe’ for resolution is in itself a process of de-escalation. This involves, first and foremost, the suppression of the conflict and deterring it from spiraling out of control. Thus far, T 2 has credibly prevented the Spratlys issues from being militarized any further. Most attention is presently focused on making feasibility studies for joint research and development. In the event that conflict between two or more nations results from the pursuit of incompatible goals, de-escalation through T 2 makes a concerted effort to prevent the militarization of the conflict. By doing so, it is hoped that manifested, open conflict will not necessarily mean open, armed conflict. This sort of conflict prevention encompasses two types of processes: those which prevent disruptive or undesirable behavior; and those which confine conflict behavior to activities acceptable to the parties (Askandar 1994, 61)..

Hence, while the US attempts to engage China in strictly structural terms, such as by inviting China to be a member of a triangular arrangement of power involving US, China, and Japan, ASEAN has moved one step further by engaging China through economic interdependence and track two dialogue. On both fronts, the long term aim is to moderate the behavior of China by way of allowing it to become a responsible partner in the region of Southeast Asia.

Indeed, T 2 has a utility beyond mere policy-coordination and networking alone. To a large extent, T 2 is also aimed at producing what John Burton has called “problem-solving conflict resolution.” (Burton 1993, 59). A crucial element of this approach is to help conflicting parties redefine their relationships as to facilitate the eventual meeting of their mutual needs. This is because conflict is caused and escalated to a considerable degree by unfulfilled needs that are “not only material needs, but also such psychological needs as security, identity, recognition, autonomy, and a sense of justice.” (The Star 1996, 6). To resolve the conflict and begin to build a new relationship, an agreement is required that satisfies the fundamental needs of both parties and reassures them that their fears are no longer warranted.

More significantly, T 2 could also be seen as a form of pre-negotiation since both de-escalation and a redefinition of relationships are ultimately a search for cooperative agreement. According to William Zartman, who is an authority on conflict resolution: “Prenegotiation is a purposive period of transition that enables parties to move from conflicting perceptions and behaviors (unilateral attempt at solution) to cooperative perceptions and behaviors.” (Zartman 1989, 7).

To the extent that T 2 is aimed at turning a problem into a manageable issue susceptible to a negotiated outcome, one can say that it also operates as a form of prenegotiation. Indeed, the principal function of prenegotiation is to build bridges from conflict to conciliation, and also to

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create a viable working trust, which is the underlying motive of T 2 in ASEAN. All these have combined to pave the way towards managing the conflict and eventually resolving it.

Invariably, one of the central assumptions of T 2 is that no conflict in the Asia Pacific region is impervious to resolution, given time and investment in building confidence and relationships. As the level of mutual reassurance increases, the parties become able to communicate at correspondingly higher levels of commitment and, ultimately, at the official level. The Oslo process that led to the Israeli-Palestinian agreement “though it took place from the beginning with some official backing” represents the potential of such a process of successive approximations: It started with relatively non-committal exploration in a confidential setting, which gradually led to the development of working trust to increasing higher levels of commitment (Phar 1998 [January], 6).

In its present pace and development, T 2 is geared not towards ‘high-risk’ structural negotiations where the stakes are high, but towards sustained yet simple exchange of information. It is this exchange of information that reduces the unknown while enlarging possible areas of cooperation. All cooperative endeavors will then become the building blocks of more substantial confidence building.

Generally, most of the efforts and energies of T 2 have been expended towards exchanging ideas and generating confidence-building measures that are suitable to the needs of ASEAN and East Asia at large. Although not much has been achieved by way of formal acceptance of confidence-building measures across the region, it must be noted that substantial gains have been made in terms of transforming the attitude of many governments towards confidence-building measures.

The most notable achievement so far is the agreement of China to accede to the Asia Pacific Military “Confidence-Building Agreement,” that could lead to advance notification of war games and an exchange of observers at such maneuvers. More significantly, through its participation in T 2 dialogues, both in ASEAN and across the Asia Pacific, China has also agreed to publish defense information for the first time. Although a document issued in November 1995 contained only very limited information about Chinese defense spending and force structure, the move away from secrecy is an encouraging one. As Jusuf Wanandi is quoted: “On the two issues considered critical by Southeast Asia, China’s claims in the South China Sea and the lack of transparency in its military affairs, Beijing has started to move positively.” (Phar 1998 [January], 7).

Assessment

These three elements of T 2 interaction — improving transparency and perception, community building, and conflict resolution — are highly integrated. The key to understanding confidence-building and how it works is not the role played by increased information or enhanced transparency per se. This is only part of the larger picture. Instead, successful confidence-building is associated with a basic shift in security thinking in influential circles in key states that make genuinely cooperative arrangements first possible, then acceptable, and even attractive

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when earlier they simply would not have been feasible. The goal is for T 2 diplomacy, and all its benefits, to have direct impact on official, track one policy. As J.N. Mak, a prominent T 2 personality from Malaysia further affirmed: “The language of second track is almost similar to the first track.” (McIntosh 1995, 168). If this is read to imply that the T 2 process runs parallel to government motive and is sensitive to official concerns, the security environment can hope to benefit from T 2 diplomacy.

CASE STUDY

South China Sea Conflict: Impervious To T 2 Dialogue?

Perhaps one of the most difficult issues confronting T 2 is the conflict in the South China Sea. It is here where there exists numerous claims and counter claims on the Spratlys and Paracel islets among six contenders; namely Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.

To know in what manners or forms China has been engaged by its ASEAN neighbors in the T 2 processes, one therefore needs to look at the South China Sea Informal (Track Two) Workshops that have been put in place. A series of workshops on “Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea” have been held in Indonesia since 1990. The series received funding support from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) with the Asia-Pacific Ocean Cooperation Program of the University of British Columbia as the executing agency. Although non-governmental in nature, this approach was initiated with the active support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia. According to Indonesian Ambassador Hasjim Djalal the initiative is “intended as a platform for policy-oriented discussion, not merely for academic exchange of views.”

Although there are currently five technical working groups (TWG) , the guideline for each is nevertheless based on the United Nations Conventions on Laws of the Seas (UNCLOS). While certain developments have been achieved, such as the joint marine research project promulgated, both by the Philippines and Vietnam , advances in these workshops in terms of helping various claimants with their respective sovereignty claims — which is the ultimate goal of the workshops — have moved only glacially, if at all.

Accordingly, Ambassador Hashim Djalal, an active track two facilitator of the workshops, explains that although various minor gains have been made on several fronts, at the insistence of China, the process towards an overarching solution still remains painstakingly slow.

To be sure, the reluctance of China to commit to any “overarching solution” is partly due to the nature of its historical claim on the whole Spratly and Paracel seaboard. But more importantly, as the Chinese economy continues

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to grow, demand for energy and resources have been growing rapidly too. China, a net exporter until 1993, now imports 600,000 barrels a day. By 2010, thisamount will grow to 2.7 million barrels a day (Keyuan 1998, 24).

To forestall the possibility of falling into near and almost total dependence on Middle Eastern oil, and thereby be held hostage by the volatile events there, China for one has been making strong maritime and territorial claims on South China Sea, followed by such members as Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei. The one area that has been especially contentious, with occasional military skirmishes on the high-sea between the various claimants, has been the Spratly and Paracel atolls. To be sure, the collective push towards the South China Sea is propelled by the belief that under its seabed lies oil and natural deposit that amount to about 17.7 billion tons. This compares with 13 billion tons for Kuwait and ranks fourth in the whole world (Keyuan 1998, 27).

Although the South China Sea conflict is essentially one occurring at the power-politics level —in that it involves the nation-states directly — the efforts towards resolving the conflict has, however, been entirely focused on T 2 diplomacy in the form of the aforementioned workshops and working groups. This is because almost all claimants to the Spratlys and Paracel atolls are of the belief that a protected and less pressurized environment, such as those provided by the South China Sea informal workshops in Indonesia for example, would serve to allow conflicting parties to adopt more exploratory and non-committing attitude to pave way for constructive dialogue and engagement (Antolik 1994, 117). In fact, it would not be amiss to see these workshops as a form of “proto-negotiation” as the whole purpose is actually aimed at finding creative solutions at the non-governmental level than transferring them to official track for adoption.

China: Stalling for Time?

Nevertheless, China’s constant insistence for the T 2 processes to slow down has prompted some suspicion that China is not actually negotiating in good faith, but employing a stalling tactic. The aim, some have speculated, is to buy more time as China expands its naval and air forces to counter other Southeast Asian claimants’ more sophisticated military (Valencia 1995, 54).

As Jun Zhan notes: “Neither the Chinese Naval Air Force nor the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force is capable of providing the fleets with the air cover which is crucial for modern sea combat.” In contrast, all of China’s rivals, due to their favorable geographic location, enjoy a clear superiority over China in that their air forces can reach the Spratly Islands easily. Invariably, according to John Lewis and Xue LiTai, China’s military thinking

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on naval warfare have undergone a qualitative transformation lately, moving from mere “coastal defense strategy” to one verging on “off-shore patrol by the year 2000 and a blue water navy by 2050.” (Lewis and Litai 1994, 229-230).

Driven variously by economic problems at home, which put a premium on some ASEAN claimants to hedge their bet on finding oil or gas deposits in the South China Sea, the conflicting parties’ geopolitical needs have slowly overtaken the imperative to genuinely negotiate towards a solution. To the extent that this is valid, T 2, in the form of “regularized workshops and dialogues,” has thus enjoyed only very piecemeal and limited success. Especially noteworthy is the fact that China has taken to using “inch-by-inch” military approach to dominate South China Seas, such as stationing armed vessels at and building structures on the China-Philippines contested Mischief Reef (Valencia 1995, 44).

Essentially because such incursions are so small, other claimant nations of ASEAN, such as Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam, have been reluctant to explicitly define China’s moves as direct threats, if only for the fear of unnecessarily antagonizing China.

Although China has repeatedly claimed that it wants to resolve this conflict peacefully — starting with Prime Minister Li Peng’s August 13th 1990 statement made during his visit to Singapore —such a move has not adduced to much. In fact, some ASEAN countries have ascribed this motive to China’s post-Tiananmen peace diplomacy to counter the Western barrage of criticism on its human rights records. Further, China has also given a 25,155 square km oil concession to Crestone Energy Corporation of US and has consequently promised them naval protection as well (Valencia 1992, 58).

ASEAN’s Reaction

To counter the situation, the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea was produced in 1992’s ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Manila. This has been signed between the various littoral states. It urged all claimants to settle disputes peacefully and called for regional cooperation in furthering the safety of navigation and communication, preventing pollution, search and rescue operation, and combating piracy and drug smuggling. China’s initial reaction to the Declaration was lukewarm, according to Lee Lai To, who is one of Singapore’s leading track two figure in ASEAN, in that China only appreciated some of the basic principles (Lee Lai To’s emphasis) (To 1994, 198).

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Invariably, subsequent developments have shown China to be impervious to the Declaration as it has disregarded all restraints by deploying three Romeo-class conventional submarines from its North Sea Fleet to the South China Sea to patrol the contested areas. Such Chinese actions have persuaded more hawkish ASEAN members who had participated in the workshops to believethat China is alas engaged in the deceitful process of what is known as “talk and take.”

T 2 Diplomacy and Realism

Seen from the realist standpoint, the T 2 approach towards engaging a huge regional actor such as China, is according to Robert Manning inherently flawed. As he explains: “Obviously, talking is better than not talking. But it can be dangerous if one believes, for example, that the mere fact that China shows up for a meeting signifies that it is therefore being integrated into the region.” (Phar 1998 [January], 13).

To be sure, this is a very valid point, and ought to be given proper attention. However, at a time when the Southeast Asian region is already embroiled in economic and political crisis, a regional “tread-thy-softly” approach towards China, manifested in the form of T 2 can only be a logical,if not an intentionally non confrontational way, of engaging China. As Singapore Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew pointedly said: “We can’t afford to confront China. America will come and go. China has been here for thousands of years, and will remain so in Asia. We have to live with it.” (Phar 1998 [January], 13).

Impediment of the Informal Workshops

Another impediment blocking progress in the informal South China Sea workshops is the lack of consensus on whether discussions should be moved to the official or formal level at all. While there are definite advantages to be gained in doing so at some stage, the problem is that some states may not be ready to change their positions with regard to their sovereignty claims over the islets in the South China Sea (To 1993, 253).

More significantly yet, just as many Asian leaders continue to believe in the exigency of an informal and low-profile diplomacy as having a restraining influence on China, the Chinese leadership in Beijing has become more audacious in taking calculated risks against ASEAN. China’s seizure of the Mischief Reef in early 1995, and then again in late 1998, can be seen inthis context.

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According to Gerald Segal: “In choosing the weakest ASEAN member, the Philippines, China chose the softest target. In choosing the state that had ejected American forces from their bases, it also tested American intentions in the most cautious manner. Thus sometime in the three months before the end of January 1995, China sent at least nine naval vessels to MischiefReef. This was not the most southerly territory taken by China, but it was the first time it had seized territory claimed by an ASEAN state.” (Segal 1996, 121).

CONCLUSION

Although T 2 still has a long way to go before it is able to institutionalize more confidence- building measures, what it achieved so far, especially within the sub-regional context of Southeast Asia, has nonetheless been noteworthy, to say the least. Its ability to convincepolicy-makers to create ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and then consolidate its presence thereof, through such institutional vehicles as ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP, is exceptional. That said, the road ahead for T 2 is definitely not an easy one; especially as indicated by the problems it faces in the South China Sea informal workshops. Not only is T 2 obliged to do what it doesbest — that is to build confidence and foster more relationships — but it also has to make sure that its efforts are not toppled or superseded by the fast changing geo-strategic reality of Asia Pacific at large.

Be that as it may, despite the South China Sea problems, T 2 look set to continue. This is because ASEAN and East Asia’s preference for multilateral security cooperation still remain rooted in a “sociological, inter-subjective and process-oriented dynamic, rather than a legalistic,formalistic and goal-oriented one.” As a matter of fact, it is the conventional belief of many T 2 participants, especially those from within the ranks of ASEAN-ISIS, that legalism can never be substituted for the level of understanding that emerges through such simple “forms of osmosis as trade and contact.” (Walsh 1992, 17).

For Nordin Sopiee, who is Malaysia’s leading strategic thinker, the choice for track two confidence-building approach is almost inevitable. As he asserted: “Supposed there is a South China Sea legal agreement that all of us have signed in blood and then there is a gusher, and it is worth US$10 billion? Is the legal document more effective than a system of understanding?” This question is indeed not posed in vain. The power configuration of East Asia has always favored China, Japan, and Korea, over those in the southern half of the region. If, indeed, there is a military conflict between ASEAN and China for example, it is questionable what an agreement can achieve beyond identifying the aggressed from the aggressor. Predictably, it is this

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lack of an indigenous balance of power situation that portends more troubling times ahead. Hence the only sensible way to stabilize these relationships is to foster and implement more confidence-building measures; a task T 2 is in fact more adept with (Phar 1998 [January], 15).

As it is, no one can yet ignore the utility of T 2. Its focus on interactive problem-solving, joint-thinking, reciprocity and non-committal discussions have all served to compensate for the rigidity and more constrained form of official diplomacy. This also explains why track twodiplomacy is the preferred modus operandi. It affords little policy risk and promotes gradualism as a region-wide virtue.

The benefits and inherent limitations of T 2 diplomacy have only been narrowly explored through one case study in this briefing. It is the purpose of the conference and objective of the delegates as a whole to analyze the applicability of T 2 diplomacy to conflicts beyond the Spratlys. To what degree has T 2 diplomacy been put into effect in the tense atmosphere of cross-Strait relations between Taiwan and mainland China? Can the semi-officious interactions between the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS, mainland China’s non-governmental organization for negotiations) and the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF, Taiwan’s counterpart) accurately be depicted as a T 2 process? If so, to what extent have these interactions been useful in abating tensions between the two actors? Similarly, what is the applicability of T 2 diplomacy to the current tensions on the Korean peninsula? Could fostering a T 2 process directly aid relations and succeed where track one efforts have broken down? These questions will be addressed directly and delegates are encouraged to investigate these issues far beyond the resources suggested in this briefing document’s bibliography.

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Bibliography and Suggested Reading List

Michael Antolik, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: The Spirit of Constructive Engagement,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 16, No. 2, September 1994.

Kamaruzalman Askandar, “ASEAN and Conflict Management: The Formative Years of 1967- 1976,” Pacifica Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1994.

Desmond Ball, “A New Era in Confidence Building: The Second Track Process in The Asia-Pacific Region,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 25, No.2, 1994.

Maureen R. Berman and Joseph E. Johnson, eds. Unofficial Diplomats (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

Koro Bessho, Adelphi Paper #325: Identities and Security in East Asia, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999).

John Burton, “Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy,” in Dennis J.D. Sandole and Hugo Van Der Merwe, (eds.), Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993).

Joseph Camileri, “ASEAN and the Emerging Architecture for Regional Security,” in The Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade, Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee, (ASEAN Inquiry) Submissions, Vol.1, No. 9, Canberra, March 1997.

Victor D. Cha, “Engaging China: Seoul-Beijing Détente and Korean Security,” Survival, Vol. 41, No. 1, Spring 1999.

“China’s Assurance Sought Over Territorial Disputes,” The Star, 20 July 1996.

Ralph Cossa, House Committee on International Relations Testimony, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, released by Pacific Forum/CSIS, 20 May 1996.

Ambassador Shi Cunlai, “Some Questions Concerning Asian-Pacific Security Situations and Policies,” unpublished paper presented at the 10th Asian Pacific Roundtable in June 1996, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, p. 9.

William Davidson and Joseph Montville, “Foreign Policy According to Freud,” Foreign Policy, No. 45 (Winter 1981-1982, pp. 145-157).

Alan Dupont, Adelphi Paper #319: The Environment and Security in Pacific Asia (London:

International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998).

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Paul Evans, “Building Security: The Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP),” The Pacific Review 7/2 (1994), pp 125-40.

Ronald J. Fisher, “Prenegotiation Problem Solving Discussions: Enhancing the Potential for Successful Negotiation,” in The Process of International Prenegotiation: Gettting to the Table, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

Bates Gill, “Northeast Asia and Multilateral Security Institutions,” SIPRI Yearbook 1994, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

Peter Haas, ed., “Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination,” International Organization, Volume 46, No.1 (Winter 1992).

Carolina Hernandez, “The Role of ASEAN-ISIS,” ASEAN-ISIS Monitor, (Kuala Lumpur: Institute for Strategic and International Studies, 1993).

Richard Higgot, “Ideas, Identity and Policy Coordination in the Asia Pacific,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 7, No.4.

Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).

Herbert Kelman, “Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner,” in J. Berkovitch and J. Rubin (eds.), Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992).

_____________, “Negotiation as Interactive Problem Solving,” International Negotiation, I: 1996.

Zou Keyuan, “The South China Sea: The China Claim,” Asian Defense and Diplomacy, Vol. 4, No. 4, September 1998.

Michael Leifer, Adelphi Paper #302: The ASEAN Regional Forum (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996).

John Lewis and Xue Litai, (eds.), China’s Strategic Seapower, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).

Lin Chong-Pin, “The Military Balance in the Taiwan Straits,” The China Quarterly, No.

146, June 1996.

Andrew Mack and Pauline Kerr, “The Evolving Security Discourse in the Asia-Pacific,” The Washington Quarterly, (Winter1995).

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J.N. Mak, “The ASEAN Naval Build-Up: Implications for the Regional Order,” The Pacific Review. Vol. 8, No. 2 (1995, pp. 303-325).

_______, “The ‘ASEAN Way’ and Transparency in South-East Asia” in Gill, Bates and J.N. Mak, eds. Arms, Transparency and Security in South-East Asia. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

Norleen Meyer, “Toward New Government-NGO Relations For Sustainable and People Centered Development,” Government and NGO Relations in Asia: Prospects and Challenges for People Centered Development (New York: MacMillan, 1995).

James McIntosh, “A Confidence-Building Framework for the Korean Peninsula,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 7, No.2, Winter 1995.

Andrew McIntyre, “Ideas and Experts: Indonesian Approaches to Economic Security Cooperation in The Asia-Pacific Region,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 8, No.1, 1995.

Joseph Montville, “The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case For Track Two Diplomacy,” Vamik D. Volkan, Joseph Montville and Demetrios A. Julius, eds., The Psychodynamics of International Relationships: Volume II, Unofficial Diplomacy At Work (Lexington Books, 1990).

Robert O’Neill, Security Challenges For Southeast Asia After the Cold War, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992).

Kim Beng Phar, “Conflict Management Dimension of Track Two Diplomacy,” Asian Defense and Diplomacy, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 1998

____________, “Constructive Dialogue? An Examination of the Track Two Diplomacy Process in ASEAN and East Asia,” Asian Defense and Diplomacy, Vol. 4, No. 1, February 1998.

David Reese, Adelphi Paper #323: The Prospects for North Korea’s Survival (London:

International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998).

Gerald Segal, “East Asia and the Constrainment of China,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4, Spring 1996.

Mark J. Valencia, Adelphi Paper #298: China and the South China Sea Disputes (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995).

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_____________, “The South China Sea: Potential Conflict and Cooperation,” Confidence Building and Conflict Reduction in the Pacific, (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1992).

James Walsh, “Home Alone: A New Era?” Time, 27 January 1992.

Lawrence Woods, “Non-governmental organizations and Pacific cooperation: Back to the future?” The Pacific Review, Vol.4., No.4, (1991, p. 318).

Hsin-hsing Wu, “Taiwan-Mainland China Relations Under the Leadership of Lee Teng-hui,” American Asian Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 1996.

Tadashi Yamamoto, ed., Emerging Civil Society in the Asia Pacific Community (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1995).

I. William Zartman, “Prenegotiation: Phases and Functions,” in The Process of International Prenegotiation: Gettting to the Table, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

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