Constructing Political Logic the Democratic Peace Puzzle

Constructing Political Logic: The Democratic Peace PuzzleAuthor(s): Dina A. ZinnesSource: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Jun., 2004), pp. 430-454Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3176216 .

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Constructing Political Logic THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PUZZLE

DINA A. ZINNES Department of Political Science

University of Illinois

The statistical observation that war between democratic states is exceptionally rare and the seemingly contradictory finding that democracies nevertheless do go to war have posed an intriguing puzzle for the field of international politics. The two explanations that have gained the greatest currency, the normative and structural, have commanded center stage for nearly a decade. Recently, however, these explanations have come under attack. Using the propositional calculus, this study provides a logical construction of both arguments that (1) explains the empirical results of why two democracies do not go to war whereas all other dyads do go to war, (2) compares the normative and structural theories, and (3) facilitates an assessment of the critiques leveled at both theories.

Keywords: logic; propositional calculus; democratic peace

The statistical observation that war between democratic states is exceptionally rare and the seemingly contradictory finding that democracies nevertheless do go to war have posed an intriguing puzzle for the field of international politics (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997; Bremer 1992; Dixon 1994; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Maoz 1998; Mousseau 1998; Oneal and Russett 1997; Ray 1995; Raymond 1994; Russett 1995). The field's initial reaction was to challenge the empirical evidence (Farber and Gowa 1995; Layne 1994; Schwartz and Skinner 1997; Spiro 1994). But the preponderance of evidence has led to the conclusion that the results are indeed robust. So the next phase in the evolving paradigm was to provide explanations. What is the mechanism that inhibits violence between two democracies, and why is this same mechanism inoperative when a democracy faces a nondemocracy? The two explanations that received the greatest early attention are the normative and structural (Maoz and Russett 1993; Morgan and Schwebach 1992; Russett 1995). The normative argument postulates that democracies possess a facilitative mechanism that allows two democra-

AUTHOR'S NOTE: The algorithm of the computer program used here (PropCalc, written by Robert Muncaster) is available at www.yale.edu/unsy/jcr/jcrdata.htm with the proof and output of the application here.

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 48 No. 3, June 2004 430-454 DOI: 10.1177/0022002704264213 ? 2004 Sage Publications

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Zinnes / THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PUZZLE 431

cies to resolve conflicts through the shared norm of nonviolence and bargaining. The structural explanation is based on the inhibitory effect of democratic institutions, namely, the checks and balances that make costly decisions such as war unlikely.

Other explanations stress the transparency of democracies and their ability to signal reliably and commit credibly (e.g., Fearon 1994; Schultz 2001; Lipson 2003). The earlier structural and normative explanations continue to command attention, however, and recently the logic behind them has come under attack (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2003; Rosato 2003). Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) point to defects in the two

arguments but are principally concerned that neither argument is adequate to explain related pieces of evidence about the relationship between regime type and violence.

They propose a new theory based on the size of winning coalitions in democracies that forces democracies to work harder at winning wars and thus makes a democracy a more formidable opponent. They then demonstrate how this explanation accounts for the original statistical results and more recent related empirical findings. Less concerned with providing an alternative explanation, Rosato (2003) challenges the logic that underlies both explanations. In the normative case, he attempts to show that there is no evidence that democracies (1) externalize their internal forms of conflict resolution or (2) treat one another with trust and respect, whereas in the structural case, he

provides evidence that suggests that (1) pacific publics do not constrain policy maker decisions for war and (2) democracies are not slow to mobilize.

Although the normative and structural arguments have never been totally free from criticism, the questions raised by these recent authors suggest that the time has come to

carefully reexamine these explanations. Before we toss these explanations aside and/ or propose modifications, revisions, or totally new theories, we need to be sure that we fully understand the assumptions behind each theory and whether either or both do or do not account for the empirical results. The arguments are complex and not always parsimonious. Thus, before we can conclude that the theories are logically fatally flawed, we need to identify carefully the logical structure of each theory.

The goal of this article is to illustrate a system of logical analysis that enables the construction of a sound representation of the normative and structural explanations. This will permit an assessment of whether either argument predicts why two democracies do not go to war, but why other possible dyads-democracy-nondemocracy and two nondemocracies-do go to war. These objectives will be pursued using formal logic, namely the propositional calculus. This will require identifying the key ideas in each argument, the atomic propositions, and the construction of the central premises of each theory by linking atomic propositions using the operations of not, and, or, and implies. Using the rules of the propositional calculus, we will then be able to ascertain whether these arguments are sufficient to predict peace between democracies and war between other pairs of regimes.

Moreover, the logical construction of the democratic peace arguments will addi- tionally help settle the literature's ambivalence about them. Some scholars believe the two explanations are in competition with one another. These researchers have sought ways to determine whether one argument is better than the other (Maoz and Russett 1993; Morgan and Schwebach 1992). Others believe that each explanation plays a role but under different conditions (Starr 1992), that is, that the two arguments are not com-



432 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

petitive but complementary. More recently, Eyerman and Hart (1996) have suggested that the two arguments are not independent of one another, and may indeed be one. Thus, a second goal of this analysis is to compare the two arguments to determine whether they are different and, if different, whether they are competitive or complementary. If we are successful in achieving these goals, we can then turn to the question of flaws and reexamine the critiques provided by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) and Rosato (2003).

CONSTRUCTING THE NORMATIVE ARGUMENT

Both the normative and structural theories concern two types of states: democratic and nondemocratic, and the interactions between possible pairs. Thus, we begin our construction by defining two atomic propositions, where an atomic proposition is defined as a statement that can be either true or false:

Al = state X is a democratic state.

A2 = state Y is a nondemocratic state.

If state X is democratic, the first statement is true; if it is nondemocratic, it is false. Given these two atomic propositions, we can construct combinations of interacting pairs; for example,

(A ^ A2)

is a democratic-nondemocratic pair, where the symbol A stands for the operator "and,"

(AI A-A2)

is a pair of two democratic states, where the symbol - stands for "not," and

(--A AA2)

is a pair of nondemocratic states. We note that the first type of dyad, democratic-

nondemocratic, can also be represented by

(-A l A- A2),

where X is now the nondemocratic state and Y is the democratic state.

Next, we need to specify the differences between democracies and nondemocracies. Morgan and Schwebach (1992, 306) state that

liberal democracies are ... peaceloving ... because of the norms regarding appropriate methods of conflict resolution that develop within the society. Adjudication and bargaining are viewed as proper methods of resolving disputes.




Maoz and Russett (1993, 625) write,

Democratic regimes are based on political norms that emphasize regulated political competition through peaceful means.... Political conflicts in democracies are resolved through compromise [in] an atmosphere of "live and let live,"

whereas in nondemocracies, conflicts are more likely to be seen as zero sum

so conflicts in nondemocratic regimes are more likely to be conducted and resolved through violence and coercion [creating] an atmosphere of mistrust and fear.

Later, Maoz and Russett (1993, 628) provide fuller operational definitions based on Polity II data (Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore 1989), in which regime type is determined as a function of

(1) competitiveness of political participation, (2) regulation of participation, (3) competitiveness of executive recruitment, (4) openness of executive recruitment and (5) constraints on the chief executive.

Although these are useful initial characterizations of democratic structure, we need to go further. We need to ask what it is about a democracy that makes it willing to bargain and compromise, and what aspect of a nondemocracy makes it prone to use force.

Why do democracies solve conflicts through adjudication and bargaining? In On the Social Contract, Rousseau ([1762] 1987, 18) builds an explanation by first noting that "liberty is one consequence of the nature of man ... all are born equal and free." This basic premise allows him to argue that "since no man has a natural authority over his fellow man . . . conventions remain the basis of all legitimate authority among men." The convention is "a form of association, which defends and protects with all common forces the person and goods of each." The significance of this convention, otherwise known as the social contract, is that it functions in accord with a set of agreed upon rules, that is, laws. As Rousseau argues,

This passage from the state of nature to the civil state... substitutes justice for instinct.... What a man loses through the social contract is his natural liberty.... What he gains is civil liberty.... For to be driven by appetite alone is slavery, [but] obedience to the law one has prescribed for oneself is liberty [italics added]. (p. 18)

Amplifying this in Book II, he notes that "laws are... the conditions of civil association [and] the populace that is subjected to the laws ... their author" (p. 18).

Men are born free. They relinquish freedom to be part of a civil society. By joining the civil society, an individual becomes an equal participant in making its laws, that is, an individual becomes a part of the decision process. Because everyone is a party to the decision process, it is necessarily the case that unless everyone agrees on everything, there must be bargaining and compromise to arrive at laws that all can accept. As one writer on democracy puts it, the




democratic process should provide the means for everyone's ideas ... to be expressed [and] given a fair chance of acceptance.... The policy which emerges will be the result of many compromises and concessions on all sides. (Goble 1946, 52)

Thus, bargaining and compromise arise naturally within a democracy. We therefore define the following:

A3 = all decisions made by the state involve the participation of the population and the institutions that represent the population,

and propose,

(NI)AI - A3.

If state X is a democracy, then all decisions involve the participation of the population and the institutions that represent the population.

Or, alternatively,

(N2) -A2 -> A3.

If state Y is a democracy, then all decisions involved the participation of the population and the institutions that represent the population.

Why are conflict situations in nondemocracies resolved through the use of force?

According to Goble (1946, 64),

In authoritarian states... a decision is reached by one or a few persons... [the people] are in no sense participants... decisions [are made] with little use of the implements of compromise and conciliation ... a dictatorship resolves differences and reaches decisions through suppressing and liquidating the opposition.

There are those empowered to make the decisions, and if others disagree they are

"liquidated." Similarly, Maoz and Russett (1993,625) argue, "The winner may take all, denying

the loser the power or opportunity to rise again." We define the following:

A4 = all decisions made by the state are made by a small group of elite leaders,

and propose,

(N3) A2 -> A4.

If state Y is a nondemocracy, then all decisions are made by a small group of elite leaders.

Or, alternatively,




(N4) -A1 -> A4.

If state X is a nondemocracy, then all decisions are made by a small group of elite leaders.

We are now in a position to capture the internal conflict resolution processes of both

types of regimes. By defining

A5 = a conflict over societal policies is resolved through bargaining and

A6 = a conflict over societal policies is resolved using force,

we state two further assumptions of the argument:

(N5) A3 -> A5.

If all decisions involve the participation of the population and the institutions that represent the population, then conflicts over societal policies are resolved through bargaining.

(N6) A4 -> A6.

If all decisions are made by a small group of elite leaders, then conflicts over societal policies (because they are zero sum) are resolved using force.

But how do we move from the internal conflict resolution mechanism to an international conflict resolution mechanism? According to Maoz and Russett (1993, 625), states use the conflict resolution mechanism with which they are familiar:

Normative assumption 1: States, to the extent possible, externalize the norms of behavior that are developed within and characterize their domestic political processes and institutions.

This suggests the following atomic propositions:

A7 = a state uses force to settle interation conflicts and

A8 = a state uses a bargaining strategy to settle internation conflicts,

and the premise that

(N7) A6 -> A7.

If a state uses force to settle conflicts over societal policies, then it uses force to settle internation conflicts.

A possible additional premise might be the following:

A5 - A8.




If a state uses a bargaining strategy to settle conflicts over societal polices, then it uses bargaining to settle internation conflicts.

However, Maoz and Russett (1993, 625) are not satisfied with such a premise. Not- ing the qualification in normative assumption 1, "to the extent possible," they proceed to state normative assumption 2:

The anarchic nature of international politics implies that a clash between democratic and nondemocratic norms is dominated by the latter rather than by the former.... In such a system states put their survival above any other value.... If states come to believe that their application of domestically developed democratic norms would endanger their survival they will act in accordance with the norms established by their rival. Democratic norms could be more easily exploited than could nondemocratic ones. Hence democracies ... shift norms when confronted by a nondemocratic rival.

In short, survival is the sine qua non for any state, democracy or nondemocracy. Hence, if a democracy's survival is threatened, it must do everything to preserve itself. If a democracy becomes engaged in a conflict with a nondemocracy, that the nondemocracy uses force necessarily poses a threat for the democracy. The nondemocracy's use of force is a challenge to the democracy's survival, requiring that the democracy abandon its predisposition to use a bargaining strategy and adopt instead a policy of force: the norm of force overwhelms the norm of bargaining. We therefore define the following:

A9 = a state's security is threatened,

and note that states that use bargaining to solve societal problems can only afford to use bargaining to settle internation conflicts if they are not threatened:

(N8) (A5 A -A9) -> A8.

If a state uses bargaining to settle internal societal conflicts and its security is not threatened, then it will use bargaining to settle internation conflicts.

Or, alternately,

(N9) (A5 A A9) -> A7.

If a state uses bargaining to settle internal societal conflicts and its security is threatened, then it will use force to settle internation conflicts.

We flesh out the argument by indicating the conditions under which a state's security is threatened. We define the following:

A 10 = states X and Y are in conflict,

and propose,




(N10) (A10 ^ A7) -> A9.

If states X and Y are in conflict and one state uses force to settle internation conflicts, then the other state's security is threatened.

(N 1) A9 - A7.

If a state's security is threatened, then it will use force to settle internation conflicts.

The argument is completed by defining the additional atomic propositions:

Al 1 = states X and Y both use force to settle their conflict,

A 12 = states X and Y go to war,

and postulating,

(N12) (A10 A A9) -> Al1.

If states X and Y are in conflict and one state's security is threatened, then states X and Y use force to settle the conflict.

(N13) All -- A12.

If states X and Y use force to settle intemation conflict, then states X and Y go to war.

We consider next why nations do not opt for force when engaged in an international conflict. If X and Y are in conflict and X and Y are both democracies, then the argument proposes that force is not used:

(N14) (A10 A A1 -A2) -> -A7.

If states X and Y are in conflict and state X is a democracy and state Y is a democracy, then force is not used to settle internation conflicts.

Or alternately,

(N14) (A10 ^ -A9) -> -A7.

If states X and Y are in conflict and a state's security is not threatened, then force is not used to settle interation conflicts.

Finally, given that X and Y are in conflict and that bargaining is used to settle interation conflicts, then states X and Y do not go to war:

(N16) (A10 A A8) -> -Al1.

If states X and Y are in conflict and bargaining is used to settle internation conflicts, then states X and Y do not use force to settle internation conflict.




(N17) -All -> -A12.

If states X and Y do not use force to settle internation conflict, then states X and Y do not go to war.

We now have a plausible representation of the normative theory ready for analysis. The analysis of the theory brings into play the rules, that is, theorems, of the propositional calculus. By applying a given rule (e.g., modus ponens, modus tollens, or hypo- thetical syllogism) to the premises, we obtain new propositions, that is, deductions. These new propositions can then be combined with the initial premises, and the rule can be reapplied to produce further propositions (new deductions). Clearly, this can be done with each rule. Applying a set of rules to the initial premises generates a new set of propositions/deductions. The rules can now be applied to the original premises plus the new output, generating yet further deductions. Eventually, of course, the continual

application of the rules to the previously generated output produces no new information. The computer program known as PropCalc, developed by Robert Muncaster, uses this algorithm, greatly simplifying what would be a tedious and time-consuming task.

Before we assess this theory's capacity to produce the desired conclusions regarding war and peace, we need to consider the possibility of redundancy or, in the termi- nology of the philosophy of science, the theory's parsimony. Parsimony in this context is assessed by determining whether all the premises are required: if any one premise is eliminated, will it be produced by the remaining premises? This assessment is accom-

plished by eliminating one premise at a time and determining whether that premise appears in the deductions. If a given premise is generated by the remaining premises, then that premise can be eliminated. The next step in the redundancy analysis is to see whether any combination of two of the redundant premises is redundant, and so forth. This tedious and time-consuming task is greatly simplified by PropCalc's built-in redundancy subprogram. Using the algorithm outlined above, it can be shown that the

following combinations of premises are redundant:

Combination 1

(N9) (A5 A A9) -> A7.

If a state uses bargaining to settle internal societal conflicts and its security is threatened, then it will use force to settle interation conflicts.

(N10) (A10 A A7)- A9.

If states X and Y are in conflict and one state uses force to settle interation conflicts, then the other state's security is threatened.

Combination 2

(N10) (A10 " A7) - A9.




If states X and Y are in conflict and one state uses force to settle internmation conflicts, then the other state's security is threatened.

(N1l)A9 -> A7.

If a state's security is threatened, then it will use force to settle interation conflicts.

Combination 3

(N9) (A5 A A9) -> A7.

If a state uses bargaining to settle internal societal conflicts and its security is threatened, then it will use force to settle internation conflicts.

(N15) (AO1 ^AA9) -> -A7.

If states X and Y are in conflict and a state's security is not threatened, then force is not used to settle interation conflict.

In other words, elimination of any of the three combinations of premises will produce exactly the same conclusions. Moreover, it can be shown that combinations 1 and 3 are equivalent, that is, that premises (N9) and (N10) together imply premises (N9) and (N15), and vice versa. We will therefore streamline the argument for the remain-

ing analyses by eliminating combination 1, premises (N9) and (N10), and producing the following basic normative theory:

(N1)A1 - A3.

If state X is a democracy, then all decisions involve the participation of the population and the institutions that represent the population.

(N2) -A2 -> A3.

If state Y is a democracy, then all decisions involved the participation of the population and the institutions that represent the population.

(N3) A2 -> A4.


(N4) -A1 -- A4.


(N5) A3 -> A5.

If all decisions involve the participation of the population and the institutions that represent the population, then conflicts over societal policies are resolved through bargaining.

(N6) A4 -> A6.




If all decisions are made by a small group of elite leaders, then conflicts over societal policies (because they are zero sum) are resolved using force.

(N7) A6 - A7.

If a state uses force to settle conflicts over societal policies, then it uses force to settle internation conflicts.

(N8) (A5 A -A9) -> A8.

If a state uses bargaining to settle internal societal conflicts and its security is not threatened, then it will use bargaining to settle internation conflicts.

(NI 1)A9 -> A7.

If a state's security is threatened, then it will use force to settle internation conflicts.

(N12) (AI0 ^A9) - A 1.

If states X and Y are in conflict and one state's security is threatened, then states X and Y use force to settle the conflict.

(N13) A1 - A12.

If states X and Y use force to settle internation conflict, then states X and Y go to war.

(N14) (A 10 A A A -A2) -> -A7.

If states X and Y are in conflict and state X is a democracy and state Y is a democracy, then force is not used to settle internation conflicts.

(N15) (A10 A -A9) - -A7.

If states X and Y are in conflict and a state's security is not threatened, then force is not used to settle internation conflict.

(N16) (AI0 A A8) -- -All.

If states X and Y are in conflict and bargaining is used to settle internation conflicts, then states X and Y do not use force to settle internation conflict.

(N17) -All -> -A12.

If states X and Y do not use force to settle internation conflict, then states X and Y do not go to war.

For clarity, we will retain the original numbering of the premises. We can now turn to the main questions driving our analysis of this argument: does

the normative argument predict that two democracies will not go to war and predict that a democracy and nondemocracy or two nondemocracies will go to war? Using the




rules/theorems of the propositional calculus through the medium of the PropCalc soft- ware, we consider three sets of conditions. In each of these settings, it is assumed that we have two states in conflict, that is, we postulate A10 by adding it to the argument. Then we consider the situation in which the two states are democracies, that is, the first analysis requires further postulating Al and -A2. If the argument is correct, then by adding the three assumptions, A10, Al, and -A2, we should discover that the two states in question do not go to war, that is, that one of the conclusions (deductions) is the following:

-A 12 = states X and Y do not go to war.

Furthermore, if we assume that one state is a democracy and the other is a

nondemocracy, or that both states are not democracies, that is, if, in addition to A1 0, we add Al and A2, or -Al and -A2, or -A1 and A2, we should obtain A12.

Running the premises through PropCalc under these four conditions, we do indeed obtain the desired results. The proof and output of the PropCalc analyses can be found in the Web site appendix. Thus, the normative theory, as sketched above, explains the empirical results for the four sets of dyads. But we need to look at the theory more closely. Are all the premises used to generate the desired conclusion in each of the four cases? If not, are the same premises used to predict that two democracies will not go to war also used to find that the other pairs will go to war? PropCalc has a routine that can be used to answer this question: simplification. For any given conclusion, PropCalc will determine which of the original premises were required to obtain that result.

Table 1 presents the results of the simplification analysis. The 15 original premises are listed in the first column. Each of the remaining four columns indicates which premises were required to obtain the desired result under the condition listed at the top of the column. Thus, the second column shows that when two democracies are in conflict, war does not occur as a consequence of premise (N 1), (N5), (N8), (N 11), (N 14), (N16), and (N17). Similarly, columns 3, 4, and 5 show that war is obtained in these three cases as a consequence of premise (N3) or (N4), (N6), (N7), (N 10), (N 12), and (N 13). Four significant features stand out in Table 1. First, not all premises come into play in the four cases. The second premise, -A2 -> A3, is not needed in any of the arguments, suggesting that the normative argument can be streamlined even further to only 14 premises.

Second, there is a marked contrast in the premises used when two democracies are in conflict as opposed to a pair of states in which there is at least one nondemocracy. The premises used when two democracies are considered are completely distinct from the premises used when at least one state is a nondemocracy. Third, exactly the same premises are involved when one state is a nondemocracy as when both states are nondemocracies. Finally, if one state in the dyad is a nondemocracy, then the argument uses no information about the democratic state.



TABLE I

Use of Normative Premises

Two Democracy and Nondemocracy Two Premise Democracies Nondemocracy and Democracy Nondemocracies

(N1) Al -> A3: If state X is a democracy, then decisions involve the population. X (N2) -A2 -> A3: If state Y is a democracy, then decisions involve the population. (N3) A2 -> A4: If state Y is a nondemocracy, then decisions are made by an elite. X (N4) -A 1 -- A4: If state X is a nondemocracy, then decisions are made by an elite. X X (N5) A3 -> A5: If decisions involve the population, then conflicts over societal policies X

are resolved through bargaining. (N6) A4 -- A6: If decisions are made by an elite, then conflicts over societal policies are X X X

resolved using force. (N7) A6 -> A7: If a state uses force to settle societal conflicts, then it uses force to X X X

settle internation conflicts. (N8) (A5 A -A9) -> A8: If a state uses bargaining in societal conflicts and its security is X

not threatened, then it will bargain internation conflicts. (N 10) (A10 A A7) -> A9: If states X and Y are in conflict and one state uses force to X X X

settle internation conflicts, then a state's security is threatened. (NI ) A9 -- A7: If a state's security is threatened, then it will use force to settle X

internation conflicts. (N 12) (A10 A A9) -> A 11: If states X and Y are in conflict and one state's security X X X

is threatened, then states X and Y use force to settle the conflict. (N 13) A 11 - A 12: If states X and Y use force to settle internation conflict, then X X X

states X and Y go to war. (N 14) (A10 ̂ Al A AAl A A2) -> -A7: If states X and Y are in conflict and state X is X

a democracy and state Y is a democracy, then force is not used to settle internation conflicts. (N16) (A 10 A8) - -A A 1: If states X and Y are in conflict and bargaining is used, then X

states X and Y do not use force to settle internation conflict. (N 17) A 1 - -> A 12: If states X and Y do not use force to settle internation conflict, X

then states X and Y do not go to war.




CONSTRUCTING THE STRUCTURAL ARGUMENT

The structural theory, like the normative theory, rests on the institutional differences between democracies and nondemocracies. Thus, Maoz and Russett (1993, 626) begin the construction of this argument by noting the following in their structural

assumption 1:

International challenges require political leaders to mobilize domestic support to their policies. Such support must be mobilized from those groups that provide the leadership the kind of legitimacy that is required for international action. [Consequently], a democratic political system requires the mobilization of both general public opinion and of a variety of institutions that make up the system of government, such as the legislature, the political bureaucracies and key interest groups. This implies that very few goals could be presented to justify fighting wars in democracies. It also implies that the process of national mobilization for war in democracies is both difficult and cumbersome... therefore ... due to the complexity of the democratic process and the requirement of securing a broad base of support for risky policies, democratic leaders are reluctant to wage wars.... The time required for a democratic state to prepare for war is far longer than for nondemocracies.

Because legitimacy in a democracy comes from the general public, that is, a large number of individuals have decision-making authority, agreement on difficult and po- tentially costly issues is cumbersome and slow. Our propositional calculus construction thus begins with several of the already defined atomic propositions and premises used in the normative argument:

(S1)Al -> A3.

If state X is a democracy, then all decisions made by the state involve the participation of the population and the institutions that represent the population.

(S2) -A2 - A3.

If state Y is a democracy, then all decisions made by the state involve the participation of the population and the institutions that represent the population,

to which we add two new atomic propositions:

Al 3 = the policy decision is costly and risky, and

A 14 = the policy-making decision process is cumbersome and slow,

and the new premise:

(S3) (A3 A A13) - A14.

If the decisions made by the state involve the participation of the population and the institutions that represent the population and the policy decision is costly and risky, then the policy-

making decision process is cumbersome and slow.




On the other hand, the authors note, "in nondemocratic societies, once the support of the key legitimizing groups is secured the government can launch its policy with little

regard to public opinion" (Maoz and Russett, 1993, 626). In other words, because the

legitimizing group is small and cohesive, the decision process, even on difficult and

costly decisions, such as war, is quick and straightforward. Thus, we can reuse additional atomic propositions and premises from the normative argument:

(S4) A2 -- A4.


(S5) -AI -> A4.


We further define the following:

A 15 = the policy-making decision process is rapid,

and add

(S6) A4 -> A15.

If decisions are made by a small group of elite leaders, then the policy-making decision

process is rapid.

Moreover, argue Maoz and Russett (1993, 626), in nondemocracies, "Because, in

many cases, the legitimizing groups may benefit from the use of force in foreign af-

fairs, the leadership may feel little restraint in its dealing with other states." Although it is not entirely clear why or how the legitimizing groups "benefit from the use of force," we define

A16 = the use of force in foreign affairs may be beneficial,

and, using the above quote, postulate the following:

(S7) A4 -> A16.

If decisions are made by a small group of elite leaders, then the use of force in foreign affairs

may be beneficial.

(S8) A16 - A7.

If the use of force in foreign affairs could be beneficial, then force will be used to settle international conflicts.

The other important pieces of the structural argument include the following:




The time required for a democratic state to prepare for war is far longer than for nondemocracies. Thus, in a conflict between democracies, by the time the two states are militarily ready for war, diplomats have the opportunity to find a nonmiltary solution to the conflict (Maoz and Russett, 1993, 626).

Using previously defined atomic propositions, we capture these points with the premises:

(S9) (A10 A Al ^ -A2) -> A14.

If states X and Y are in conflict and state X is a democracy and state Y is a democracy, then the policy decision process is cumbersome and slow.

(S10) A14 -> A8.

If the policy decision process is cumbersome and slow, then bargaining is used to settle internation conflicts.

(S11) A8 -> -AI 1.

If bargaining is used to settle international conflicts, then states X and Y do not use force to settle their conflict.

(S12) -A11 - -A12.

If states X and Y do not use force to settle their conflict, then X and Y do not go to war.

Moreover, Maoz and Russett (1993, 626) argue that

conflicts between a democracy and a nondemocracy ... are driven by the lack of structural constraints on the mobilization and escalation processs of the latter. The democratic state finds itself in a no-choice situation. Leaders are forced to find ways to circumvent the due political process. Thus, in such a conflict, the nondemocracy imposes on the democratic political system emergency conditions enabling the [democratic] government to rally support rather rapidly.

This leads the authors to their second structural assumption:

Shortcuts to political mobilization of relevant political support can be accomplished only in situations that can be appropriately described as emergencies.

This last point is sufficiently similar to a premise in the normative argument that we will reuse that premise here:

(S13) (A10 A A7) - A9.

If states X and Y are in conflict and force is used to settle internation conflicts, then a state's security is threatened,

adding the clarification:




(S14) A9 -> A15.

If a state's security is threatened, then the policy-making decision process is rapid,

and completing the argument with:

(S15) (A9 A A15) -> Al .

If a state's security is threatened and the policy-making decision process is rapid, then states X and Y use force to settle their conflict.

(S16) All ->A12.

If states X and Y use force to settle their conflict, then states X and Y go to war.

Given this propositional calculus construction of the structural argument, the analysis proceeds in a manner parallel to the analysis of the normative argument. First, we discover that these 16 premises contain no redundancies, that is, no single premise can be logically inferred from the remaining 15 premises. Second, we input the cases of two democracies, one democracy and one nondemocracy, and two nondemocracies and find that we obtain the desired conclusion in each case, namely two democracies do not go to war, whereas the other combinations of regime types do go to war. The structural theory, like the normative theory, produces the necessary outcomes in all cases.

The third issue for consideration is the set of premises used to obtain the desired conclusion in each of the three cases. Table 2 provides these results. Note that there are four premises in the structural theory that are never used: (S1), (S2), (S3), and (S6). Thus, the structural theory can be made more parsimonious with respect to these conclusions by deleting these premises. Note that this is a different concept of parsimony from that discussed above. Earlier we examined the parsimony of the entire theory by determining whether any one or more premises, if deleted, would be found in the conclusions generated by the remaining premises. Here, we have found that certain premises have no function with respect to a particular conclusion being sought.

Table 2 illustrates another similarity between the normative and structural theories: there is no overlap in the premises used to draw the no-war/war conclusion in the two democracies versus one or more nondemocracies. As before, the structural theory con- sists of two distinct subtheories, one for two democracies and another for one or more nondemocracies. Finally, as in the normative theory, the democracy-nondemocracy case uses exactly the same premises as the two nondemocracies.

WHAT DOES IT MEAN? PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER

Surprises are only surprises once; when you see it, you realize it was obvious all along. For me, the "obvious" surprise was discovering that regardless of theory, normative or structural, the explanation for peace between democracies has no overlap



t TABLE 2

uN^~~~~~~~ 1~~~Use of Structural Premises

Premise Two Democracy and Nondemocracy Two Democracies Nondemocracy and Democracy Nondemocracies

(S ) Al -- A3: If state X is a democracy, then decisions involve the population. (S2) -A2 -> A3: If state Y is a democracy, then decisions involve the population. (S3) (A3 A A13) -> A14: If decisions involve the population and the policy decision is

costly and risky, then the decision process is slow. (S4) A2 -> A4: If state Y is a nondemocracy, then decisions are made by an elite. X (S5) -A1 -> A4: If state Y is a nondemocracy, then decisions are made by an elite. X X

(S6) A4 -> A 15: If decisions are made by a small group of elite leaders, then the policy- making decision process is rapid.

(S7) A4 -> A16: If decisions are made by a small group of elite leaders, then the use of X X X force in foreign affairs is beneficial.

(S8) A16 -> A7: If the use of force in foreign affairs is beneficial, then force will be used X X X to settle international conflicts.

(S9) (A 10 A1 a ~A2) -> A14: If states X and Y are in conflict and state X is a democracy X and state Y is a democracy, then the decision process is slow.

(S10) A14 -> A8: If the decision process is slow, then bargaining is used to settle X internation conflicts.

(S 11) A8 -> -A 11: If bargaining is used to settle international conflicts, then states X and Y X do not use force to settle their conflict.

(S 12) -A 1l - - A 12: If states X and Y do not use force to settle their conflict, then X and Y do X not go to war.

(S 13) (A 10 A A7) -> A9: If states X and Y are in conflict and force is used to settle international X X X conflicts, then a state's security is threatened.

(S14) A9 -> A15: If a state's security is threatened then the policy-making decision process X X X is rapid.

(S15) (A9 ^ A15) -> A 11: If a state's security is threatened and the decision process is rapid, X X X then states X and Y use force to settle their conflict.

(S 16) A 11 -> A 12: If states X and Y use force to settle their conflict, then states X and Y go X X X to war.




with the argument for why other dyadic combinations can lead to war. These two explanations do not share any common premises. Moreover, as soon as there is one nondemocracy, you need no further information about the other state in the dyad. It is the existence of the nondemocracy that produces the war outcome. This is because the existence of the nondemocracy leads to a threat to the security of the other state, and any threat to a state's security brings into play, for whatever reason, a response of force.

The literature on the democratic peace has frequently alluded to the contrast between the monadic and dyadic arguments: if two democracies do not fight, then how does one explain that democracies are no more peaceful than nondemocracies? The answer lies in that a monad, like a democracy, is in a dyadic environment in the context of a conflict. If a democratic state is involved in a conflict with another democratic state, there is no threat and democratic norms can function. But if you put a democratic state into a conflict with a nondemocratic state, the environment is completely different. Indeed, the analyses suggest that there is no difference between a democratic- nondemocratic dyad and a dyad composed of two nondemocracies. Threat exists in both cases; hence, the prospects for war are the same.

This seems to suggest that we have been paying too much attention to the democratic side of the argument. Or perhaps the better way to put it is that we have not paid enough attention to the nondemocratic part of the argument. According to the argument, democracies do use their bargaining norm to solve international crises if they are permitted to do so by an absence of threat to their survival. The issue then is not just whether more democracies in the international system make war less likely. The other side of the coin is that the greater the number of nondemocracies in the system, the greater the amount of threat in the system and consequently the higher the likelihood of war. Assuming that the number of states in the system is more or less fixed, it is obvious that as more states become democracies, fewer states will be nondemocracies. But it is not sufficient to consider only the number of democratic states in the system. The other part of the picture is that as the number of nondemocracies in the system increases, the number of dyads involving at least one nondemocracy increases. From this perspective, for each additional nondemocracy in the system, the number of dyads that experience threat increases, thereby increasing the prospects for war.

More formally, if we define

N = number of states in the international system and

M = number of nondemocracies in the international system,

then the number of dyads involving at least one nondemocracy is given by

(M[N - M] + M[M - 1])/2 = threat level in the international system.

When M = 0, that is, all the states in the system are democracies, the threat level is 0, and the probability of war is 0. Plotting this function against M produces Figure 1, a

parabola that increases at a decreasing rate. Thus, as the number of nondemocracies in




N = Number of Nations M = Number of Nondemocracies D = Systemic Threat

D

D=F(M)= M(M-1) + M(N-M) -N(N-I ) -------------------------

M N

Figure 1: Systemic Propensity for War

the system increases, holding the system size constant, the threat level and consequently the probability of war increase at a decreasing rate. This result is consistent with the analyses of Gleditsch and Hegre (1997), although their model allows for changes in the size of the system (N) and only examines democratic-nondemocratic dyads as a function of increasing the number of democracies. It is also consistent with a comparable analysis by Cederman (2001) that shows a decaying trend in the conflict propensities of democratic and nondemocratic dyads since the 19th century.

But what is the relationship between the normative and structural theories? Are these two independent, complementary, or competing theories? There are several ways these questions might be answered. First, as already noted, the normative and structural theories produce very similar results. In both theories, there is a disconnect between the set of premises that predict no war between two democracies and the premises that lead to the conclusion of war between a dyad in which at least one state is a nondemocracy. Moreover, in both theories, the prediction of war when there is at least one democracy in the dyad uses only the information that one state is a nondemocracy.

However, we can examine this question further in Figures 2 and 3, which provide diagrammatic comparisons of the normative (solid arrows) and structural arguments (dashed arrows). Figure 2 considers two democracies, whereas Figure 3 examines dyads involving at least one nondemocracy. Each arrow represents a premise used in obtaining the no-war or war deduction. The partially dashed arrow at the top of Figure 3 indicates that you only need one of those two premises, but not both, in the normative argument involving at least one nondemocracy. Thus, Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the linkages between the atomic propositions, that is, the premises, required to obtain either the no-war or war conclusion for each theory. When more than a single arrow points to (or from) an atomic proposition, the interpretation is that it is the combined set of atomic propositions that produces the conclusion. However, the figures do not discriminate between "and" and "or." For example, in Figure 2, all three atomic propositions, Al, -A2, and A10, are connected to -A7, but it is not clear whether each link is an "and" or "or."




Al -A2 AIO State X is a democracy State Y is a democracy States X and Y are in conflict

A3 / Decisions are made^ by the population

/ 14 Decision process is slow

-A7 International conflicts are not resolved with force

A5 -A9 Bargaining is used to

A state's security settle societal conflicts a is not threatened

A8 A state uses bargaining to settle international conflicts

-All States X and Y do not use force to settle their conflict ? Normative Theory

I,n I.iE Structural Theory

-A12 States X and Y do not go to war

Figure 2: Two Democracies

Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate the differences and similarities between the normative and structural arguments by highlighting the different atomic propositions used. In Figure 2, the structural argument takes one from the two democratic states in conflict, to A14 ("the decision process is slow"), and from there directly into A8 ("bargaining is used to solve international conflicts"), whereas the more complex normative theory uses four atomic premises to arrive at A8. Thus, the two theories differ in that different premises are used to arrive at A8, "a state uses bargaining to settle international conflict." On the other hand, whether in the structural argument one goes from A 14 to A8 or, in the normative argument, from A3, A5, A7, and A9 to A8, the destination remains the same. In this sense, the two arguments appear very similar. Moreover, it could be argued that A3, A5, A7, and A9 imply A 14-when the population is involved, there is a societal norm of nonviolence and no threat, and then the decision process is very likely to be slow. To determine whether the two theories are indeed distinct would require an analysis of all conflicts between democracies. If there are two theories, not one, it should be the case that A3, A5, A7, and A9 are present, but A 14 is not. Are there conflicts between democracies that were resolved with speed, where speed might be defined as being shorter than the time between the onset of conflict and the declaration of war in dyads that did go to war? Similarly, in Figure 3, it could be argued that A6 ("societal conflicts are resolved by force") and A16 ("use of force in foreign affairs may be beneficial") are different manifestations of the same phenomenon of belief in




A2 -A1 A10 State Y is nondemocratic State X is nondemocratic States X and Y are in conflict

A4~ Decisions are made by an eliete

A6 Use ofc6 // / Societal conflicts foreign affairs i resolved by force beneficial

A7 / International conflicts / resolved by force f

ACAb a

A state's secut is threatened

A15 The decision process is rapid All

States X and Y use force to settle their conflict

! Y > Normative Theory

X 12aY go to ,a..r Structural Theory States X and Y go to war

-...... Normative Alternate

Figure 3: At Least One Nondemocracy

force. Here, however, it would be far more difficult to construct an empirical test to determine whether the theories are indeed different.

We turn, finally, to the recent critiques of the normative and structural theories. To what extent do recent critiques undermine either or both theories as they have been constructed here? Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999, 792) make the following chal-

lenges, with my comments after each one in italics:

1. Providing democratic leaders can escape public scrutiny, they often undertake violent acts against other democracies. But both theories are designed to explain war, not all violent acts.

2. It may be correct to argue that democratic states resort to realist strategies in the face of a powerful nondemocratic opponent who threatens their existence, but too many democratic wars have been against significantly weaker states to be sustained as an explanation for the democratic peace. This interesting observation should be the basisforfurther refinement of the theories to incorporate power Butfor the critique to be damaging, it must be shown that relative power is the only factor that makes one state a threat to another.

3. The institutional-constraints argument holds that democracies are more deliberate [which raises] the costs of violence... This suggests ... that democracies should be unlikely to wage war generally, not just against other democracies. The empirical record does not support such a conclusion. The link between "deliberation" and the costs of violence is not clear, but even if ac- cepted, high costs do not necessarily negate war decisions. Both the normative and




structural theories suggest that when the threat is high, costs become a lesser consideration.

4. Most important from a theoretical position, none of the institutional-constraints arguments has a sufficiently well-developed theory... that produces the [other] eight [empirical] regularities observed (p. 793). This may indeed suggest that these authors' theory is superior. But before rejecting the normative and/or structural theories, we need to explore the extent to which the normative and structural theories are indeed distinctfrom and at variance with the one being proposed.

Thus, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) show ways in which the normative and structural theories might profitably be further developed, but their critique does not provide grounds, at this stage, to reject either theory.

Rosato's (2003) arguments are as follows, with my comments again in italics:

1. The historical record indicates that democracies have often failed to adopt their internal norms of conflict resolution in an international context (p. 588). There are several exam- ples of liberal states violating liberal norms in their conduct of foreign policy (p. 589). The normative argument does not say that democratic states will always use their internal nonviolent conflict resolution norm, only that they do so vis-a-vis each other.

2. Proponents of the democratic peace [claim] that democracies remain at peace because they trust and respect one another (p. 589). The available evidence suggests that democracies do not have a powerful inclination to treat each other with trust and respect (p. 590). Neither trust nor respect are necessary to the constructions presented here.

3. Democratic peace theorists have tried to repair the logic by introducing ... perceptions ... available evidence suggests, however, that policymakers' personal beliefs ... preclude coherent ... assessments of regime type (p. 592). Neither construction here incorporates perceptions. However, Rosato's observation does suggest that the theories could use additional work to explain how two conflicting states identify their respective regime types.

4. Each variant of the institutional logic rests on the claim that democratic institutions make leaders accountable to various groups that may... oppose the use of force. I do not

dispute this claim but, instead, question whether democratic leaders are more accountable than their autocratic counterparts. Since we know that democracies do not fight one another and autocracies do fight one another, democrats must be more accountable than autocrats if accountability is a key mechanism in explaining the separate peace between democracies. On the other hand, if autocrats ... are more accountable than democrats, then there are good reasons to believe that accountability does exert the effect. ... [A]ccountability is determined by the consequences ... for adopting an unpopular policy.... Losing autocrats are more likely to suffer severe punishment..." (pp. 593-94) This critique asserts that if accountability is the mechanism that prevents leaders from making the decision to go to war, and if accountability is defined in terms of the consequences for choosing an unpopular policy and it can be shown that autocrats sufferfar more serious consequences from making unpopular decisions than do democratic leaders, then autocratic leaders should be even more hesitant to go to war While consequences are surely a component of "accountability" the more significant aspects of accountability are (I) the groups to whom the leaders are accountable and (2) the wishes and desires of those groups. A critical characteristic of a democracy is that the leaders are accountable to the greater population and the desires of the population oppose war The above critique is valid only if Rosato can show that the groups to whom autocratic leaders are accountable oppose war.




Thus, Rosato's (2003) critique of the normative and structural theories, like that of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999), contains suggestions for how the arguments might be

improved and extended, but the criticisms do not yet provide a basis for rejecting the

logics that have been constructed here.

CONCLUSION

Propositional calculus provides a medium for obtaining a better understanding of the normative and structural theories, making it possible to evaluate criticisms. How- ever, untangling the democratic peace puzzle remains a work in progress. As Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) noted 5 years ago, and is even more true now, many new findings related to the democratic peace need better explanation. Can they be incorporated into the currently constructed normative/structural arguments, or must we move to explanations such as the winning coalition theory of Bueno de Mesquita et al. or the audience costs argument presented by Fearon (1994)? Indeed, what, if any, is the relationship between the winning coalition argument and the audience costs explanation? Are they competitive or complementary explanations? Just as we moved from initial democratic-peace statistical results to explanations for them and then to critiques of those explanations, we now need to take the next step and expand and revise the logics to better incorporate such observations as the war initiation behavior and war victory rate by democracies (Reiter and Stam 2002).

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Constructing Political Logic the Democratic Peace Puzzle

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