Constructing Pacific States in the Settlement of Border Disputes and Territorial Claims

JAY A. COOMBS

Abstract

This paper investigates the identity of states as expressed in the context of a

territorial claim. Conventional theories of International Relations(IR), realism and

liberalism, treat the identity of states like their borders, as given and fixed.

Accordingly, territorial claims and border disputes remain the most likely cause for

states to go to war, since their settlement is zero-sum. What remains overlooked in

these accounts, however, is that the states involved in border disputes and territorial

claims are increasingly seeking non-violent means to settle their disputes. This may

be indicative of an international pacific turn for the settlement of border disputes

and territorial claims despite the predominantly realist inclinations in which they

are located in IR theories. Using a constructivist approach, I explore how

representations and state identity formation enable the ongoing search for pacific

mechanisms to settle contested territory. I present the case of the persistent Belize-

Guatemala dispute to explicate that the pacific state is central to the identity of

these states as they engage in ongoing interactions to settle this protracted territorial

claim. The implication for research is that a persistent claim does not necessarily

equate to an intractable one but new ideas need to be developed to track settlement

as a progressive process of change.

Introduction

This paper examines the changing identities of states in the context of a persistent and

adaptive territorial claim. It seeks to advance an understanding of territorial claim settlement

from the conceptual viewpoints of traditional constructivism to explain how social structures

influence the formation of state identities and interests. These social structures are also

analyzed to explain how the new identities and interests that they produce, can in turn, shape

how states choose to develop and pursue options for the settlement of territorial claims. The

theoretical aims of this paper are two-fold: first, it is to discuss the social representations that

have historically defined how the Guatemalan territorial claim to Belize has been anchored;

and second, to situate state identity formation as an analytical framework through which to

examine how these two states have formed new identities and interests in their search for a

peaceful settlement of this dispute. In addition, this paper holds that interest formation

emanates from the identities that these states form in the social structures of settlement

processes. This position deviates from traditional International Relations where both the

identity and interest of states are viewed as fixed and unchanging despite the context in which

the same states find themselves.

Traditional approaches tend to view territorial dispute settlement as zero-sum. They also

assume that the actions of states in these disputes are based solely on their power positions in

the international system. However, this paper moves away from the traditional view that

territorial claims, especially along contiguous borders, are a major source for war (Vasquez

1993) and, instead, it interrogates the influence of context in a persistent but non-militarized

territorial dispute. It asks instead, how it is that states which have been engaged in a

protracted territorial claim use representations to inform the discourse surrounding their

territorial claim and to subsequently structure their interactions. Contextually, this paper

explores the influence of representations and discourse on the mutability of state identities in

the social structure of a territorial claim. By exploring these four key aspects, I aim to offer

fresh insights into the social elements that come to bear on the identities of states as they

determine and pursue actions for a peaceful settlement of territorial disputes.

I begin with a brief review of the theoretical literature on border disputes and territorial claim.

I do so primarily to situate the assumptions of traditional IR theories of realism and neoliberal

institutionalism which both suggest that states settle these claims through the instrumental

pursuit of exogenous interest. This assumption also relies on states having fixed identities

when they interact in the international system. I offer the case for a constructivist approach to

territorial claim settlement and submit that these claims are constructed in context, and that

the identities and interests of states involved are neither fixed nor exogenous to the social

structure in which they interact. Critically, I argue that representations are key matters in

these structures because they help states to know what they are dealing with and to

discursively formulate and agree on a course of action. Subsequently, I describe my

methodological approach and list the data collection techniques used to generate the

empirical data in my case study. I then engage in a brief discussion of my main findings. I

conclude that the new identities and interests of Belize and Guatemala are unlikely to

expedite the settlement of their territorial dispute, but that they are critical to ensure an

eventual, pacific settlement of this persistent claim.

1. What traditional theories tell us about territorial claims

Territorial claims occur because states disagree about whose sovereignty reigns over a given

territory; that is, they dispute the exercise of state authority in a territorial space. Where states

agree about the location of boundary lines, borders do not pose political or security concerns.

As Vasquez (1993) asserts ‘if the territorial divisions among neighbours are not challenged

but [are] accepted as legitimate, peaceful relations can govern’ (p. 146). Where disputing

states share contiguous borders, territorial claims invariably question the location of the lines

that separate these states. The location of these lines for any contested border is critical since

the underlying reason states want their boundary lines precisely demarcated is because they

want sovereignty over territory – the exercise of sovereignty is material power and the

resultant attribute of a direct link between territorial borders and statehood (McCorquodale

2001). Huth (2000) also points out that the reason two countries might be engaged in a

border dispute is related to determining who has legitimate governing rights over a territory.

This suggests that in territorial disputes, the verities of statehood are questioned: including

the unit’s classification as a state; its ownership over territory; who its citizens are, and the

possibilities for as well as the extent of its international relations. Thus, territorial disputes are

not mere inconveniences between neighbouring states; ultimately, they challenge the

unproblematic nature of ‘fixed-state territoriality’ and mutual respect for sovereignty on

which international relations is premised (Agnew 1994, p. 57). This view of territorial

disputes - as a contestation of the constitutive elements of statehood - additionally indicates

that such claims may not only prevail on terms driven by military capabilities. Notably, Beth

Simmons explains that territorial claims ‘can be expected to instill uncertainty regarding

jurisdictional authority or future policy, even in the absence of the overt use of military force’

(2005, p. 832).

Scholars also contribute that once a territorial dispute emerges it gains an institutional

dimension. Hassner (20062007) argues that institutionalization occurs as territorial disputes

assume an established presence and function owing to the presence of social elements that are

ontologically two-dimensional having both rule-like (formal) and norm-like (inter-subjective)

characteristics. Territorial disputes emerge because norms for this type of state interaction are

ambiguous and can be challenged by a state. Furthermore, Vasquez (1993) argues that the

manner by which a state entered the international system can determine how it will treat its

borders. For Vasquez, states that enter the international system through violent, revolutionary

struggle are viewed as more threatening than those whose independence and state formation

were non-violent, evolutionary processes; these are distinctly revolutionary and evolutionary

states. Wendt (1999) similarly refers to these states as revisionist and non-revisionist states.

Revisionist states, are ‘out to grab territory, conquer each other, or change the rules of the

system’ (p. 105). Status quo states are the opposite they promote stability and ‘generally

respect each other’s territorial property rights’(Ibid). This distinction about the types of states

that are likely to be involved in a territorial claim suggests that state identity elements are

present and have a direct influence on the settlement of territorial claims. However, an

institutional characterization of territorial disputes, tend to suggest that efforts to resolve these

types of disputes are normatively strong but weak on formalization or rule-like behavior (see

Duffield 2007, p. 11).

In addition, time plays a crucial role in territorial disputes. The longer they remain

unresolved, the more likely these disputes are likely to assume bureaucratic features and

become entrenched (see Hassner 2006/2007). However, traditional approaches to border

disputes and territorial claims are ‘structural and ahistorical’ (Agnew 1994, p. 57) because

they discount the intrinsically historical and temporal elements typical of territorial disputes,

and the social conditions of state identity and interest that bear on this issue. In realist and

liberal institutionalist approaches for example, state territory is a material conception located

within a priori national interests, and pursuits of power. The fixed state territoriality -

established by the bordered units in the international system – is also the theoretical basis for

the fixed identity and interests which traditional approaches assume states maintain and

pursue during a border dispute and territorial claim.

Realism: Exogenous Interests, Self-Interested Pursuits and Capabilities

Realism is conceptually territorial argues Agnew (1994); and territory, as well as strategic

geographic position, are constitutive of realist conceptions of power and capabilities when

states calculate how to maximize their status and position. In the context of territorial

disputes, a realist position suggests that these interactions manifest the anarchical structure of

the international system where states are fearful and distrusting of each other. They then

interact in a grim, defensive environment where the potential for war is ever-present. Realism

emphasizes state survival where the object of the threat is national security; the source of

threat is other states; and the likely overcoming of that threat is inter-state warfare (see

Vaughn-Williams 2009, p. 3). A realist tradition also assumes that states pursue their interests

– territorial or otherwise – because they have significant power and material capabilities to

exert inordinate influence on the international system to secure what they want. In realism,

territorial claims and border disputes arise in conjunction with ‘power-political interests and

favourable power relations’ (Forsberg 1996, p. 435). And territorial disputes are seen as the

means to strengthen the capabilities of states, particularly through strategic increases in and

access to resource rich territory. (Mandel 1980, p. 429).

The overriding logic of the realist approach in a territorial dispute, rests on the influence of

capabilities that a state imposes on the international system. Forsberg (2003) suggests that

‘territory is primarily a strategic asset and territorial disputes are mostly resulting from power

struggles’ (p. 10). This view predicates the resolution of territorial claims and border disputes

as zero-sum. Here, realist perspectives tend to exemplify that ‘if one of the parties is to

achieve its objectives, the other one must lose’ (Stefanova 2006, p. 83). In this approach,

states are expected to view borders and territory as material interests where territorial

expansion is accommodated within realist conceptions to secure state exogenous interests of

wealth, security and power.

Two issues are worth considering. Firstly, while realism privileges capabilities in securing

interests, it discounts that states are constrained by international norms especially since

‘international law prohibits the settlement of territorial disputes between states by the threat

or use of force,’ (Crawford 2007, p. 49). Though states in realism exist in anarchy, they are

not excluded from the forces of ‘macro-level social structures [that] impinge on individual

actors’ and restrain certain actions by them (Fearon and Wendt, 2002, p. 56). Second, despite

their capabilities, states in realism value how they are perceived in international relations.

Hence, any deliberate or unilateral disregard for a norm including during territorial disputes,

can negatively influence a state’s identity (see Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Wendt 1999;

Simmons 2002). States are status maximizers and they worry about their international image.

Still, use of military capability is just one account by which traditional IR premise settlement

of territorial claims by states. In addition to military capabilities, states can also pursue

settlement of territorial claim through institutions.

Liberal Institutionalism: Self-Interested Pursuits, Institutions, and Cooperation

Neoliberal institutionalism is similarly committed to the instrumental rationality of states, an

international structure of anarchy and exogenous self-interests. This tradition differs from

realism because of its reliance on institutions as the medium through which states pursue their

pre-given interests. Where realism is wary of cooperation and sees this as naïve in a structure

of anarchy, neoliberal institutionalism counters that cooperation, through institutions can

reinvigorate economic dynamics between states and help them to jointly solve problems and

achieve economic gains (see Hay 2002). In the context of a territorial dispute, institutions

have a causal role because through them, states can pursue and secure their interests.

Institutions enable states to structure incentives and constraints that are consistent with the

strategic environment in which ‘instrumentally motivated, utility maximizing actors operate’

(Duffield 2007, p. 5). This causal role suggests that although procedures, rules and

regulations constrain states, they do not ultimately remove their pre-existing interests and

states are presumed to have created institutions anticipating their effects on patterns of

behaviour during interactions (Keohane and Martin, 1995). Stein (2008) similarly alludes that

in the creation of institutions, powerful states ‘structure the choices’ of other states and

institutions are epiphenomenal, reflecting the power and interests that already exist in the

international system (p. 6). A neoliberal institutionalist approach suggests that in a territorial

claim, institutions make a significant difference to settlement in conjunction with power

realities (Keohane and Martin 1995, p. 5).

However, neoliberal institutionalism does not fully accommodate that in a deep manner

‘cooperation begins to re-shape intersubjective meaning and hence re-constitutes state or elite

identities and interests according to cooperative norms’ (Sterling-Folker 2000, p. 113). In

holding self-interests as exogenous to interaction, neoliberal institutionalism ignores in the

long-term the ‘preconditioning relevance of social institutions to agents’ (Adler 1997, p. 337).

Indeed, social practice within institutions have the ‘capacity to transform identities and

interests’ (Sterling-Folker 2000, p. 113; Checkel 1997) and in long-standing territorial claims,

dense interactions tend to occur between states which increase their knowledge and

expectations of each other. This learning can influence interests and actions though liberal

institutionalism does not consider its impact to be causative; it maintains the premise that

state behaviour is rooted in power and pre-given interest (Hurd 2008). In these interactions,

neoliberal institutionalism considers states to be instrumental and utilitarian and interests in a

territorial claim are purely economic. What this suggests is that issues such as border disputes

tend to be embedded in existing institutions even though they have purposes other than

promoting an existing norm, such as sovereignty (see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p. 899).

Furthermore, these institutions can shape the content of a territorial claim that deflects

attention away from dispute resolution.

Traditional IR approaches view territorial disputes as consisting of exogenous interests

bolstered by the power potential of states. Here the settlement of these claims is treated as

zero-sum and their resolution is indicative of the capabilities of the powerful states.

Neoliberal institutionalism views territorial disputes as denying opportunities for cooperation

between states which institutions can overcome. Together, realism and neoliberal

institutionalism view territorial claims as a distributional issue that only the most powerful

and capable states can determine. These approaches are thus likely to view settlement of a

territorial claim as preserving the territorial status quo and maintaining the existing power of

states. Underlying this fixedness in identity and interests is viewed as a commitment to

territorial claims as unchanged by context and time. I argue that the social structure of

dispute settlement - more than the condition of anarchy, power and capabilities - impose

greater restrictions on how states pursue the resolution of territorial claims. The identities of

states in a persistent territorial claim for instance are changed by space and time ‘to

accommodate changing power relations . . . as they are constituted and reconstituted over

time’ and in social context (Somers 1994, p. 610). This is the domain of a constructivist

approach and the main thread of analysis with which I examine the persistent Guatemalan

claim to territory in Belize.

2. A Constructivist Approach to the Guatemalan claim to territory in Belize

A constructivist approach to the Guatemalan claim to territory in Belize is to present a social

structure in which state identity and interest formulation are accounted for as endogenous and

not pre-determined. This social structure is the bilateral process to seek settlement options for

the peaceful resolution of a long-standing, unresolved territorial claim and border dispute

between Belize and Guatemala. This approach challenges a priori conceptions of state

interests and identity that both realism and neoliberal institutionalism hold. Importantly,

traditional constructivism goes against traditional IR assumptions that states do not undergo

identity change and interest reformulation in territorial disputes (see Wendt 1994). However,

constructivist conceptions of state identities and interests are contingent on a discursive,

social structure and formed in context, and for a persistent territorial claim, this approach can

plausibly accommodate that ‘interests are expressed, acted upon and revised’ (see Hay 2002,

p. 21) even as the same dispute is being constructed and reconstructed. The turn to

constructivism therefore, is to examine how changes in identity along with interest

formulation and reformulation are prominent in a persistent but non-militarized territorial

claim and border dispute. Furthermore, I account for state action in a persistent territorial

dispute and show that states act upon reformulated interests by evoking representations that

are compatible with their newly formed identities and the dispute settlement context.

A contextual overview

The Guatemalan territorial claim to Belize began during British and Spanish colonial rule in

Central America. As early as 1783, under the Treaty of Versailles, Spain granted Britain

authority to harvest logwood in the Bay of Honduras, specifically, between the Hondo and

Belize Rivers (Grant 1976; Bolland 1977; Shoman 1994; Murphy 2004). A later convention

between the two countries, the Convention of 1786, extended logwood cutting rights as far as

the Sibun River but not beyond this area (Ibid.). The British settlers did not adhere to the

limits specified in the British treaty with Spain and they expanded their use and settlement of

the area (Grant 1976, p. 31; Bolland 1977, p. 10). The extended settlement area almost

doubled the original territory granted by Spain and it now reflects the expanse of present-day

Belize. This settlement eventually gained an administrative and political form despite the

British operations remaining beyond the grant of permission by Spain. The British were

administratively and politically in charge of the territory of Belize but sovereignty over the

area remained with Spain.

At the end of Spanish colonial rule in 1820, Britain continued to administer the territory in

Belize but Guatemala contested British rule in the same territory and any semblance of

borders between these two neighbouring states. After Guatemala gained independence from

Spain, its relationship with Britain over the territory in Belize became one of ‘epistemic

isolation’ (see Elcherote et al. 2011, p. 737). This required that interactions over Belize

needed to be grounded in a shared understanding of what this area now signified to these

states after the departure of Spain. As the challenger to Britain’s continued use of the

settlement, Guatemala needed to firstly, typify the situation of the territory in Belize to

determine what this settlement was; and secondly, this typification needed to be anchored to

enable subsequent interactions between the two states over the territory. This dual process1 is

to develop a representation as transference – where normally linked concepts are moved to a

context so that ‘the unusual becomes usual’ thereby gaining space in pre-existing knowledge

structures (Moscovici 2000, p. 39; Elcherote et. al 2011, p. 736). Here, the anomaly of the

territory of Belize was eventually represented as territory usurped by the British from

Guatemala. In this process, territorial usurpation became the discursively dominant category

over which Guatemala anchored its interaction with Britain over Belize. At this same time,

the territory in Belize had been typified and introduced in the emergent social structure

between Britain and Guatemala

In this paper, the Guatemalan territorial claim to Belize is not treated as a one-time event of

fact; instead, it is considered as a process constructed over a long period of discursive

interaction, even bargaining attempts between Britain Guatemala. Though these countries

eventually signed the 1859 Treaty of Boundaries where the borders of Belize with Guatemala

were officially specified, the non-implementation of its Article 7, led Guatemala to issue a

‘positive and definitive statement . . . to serve notice that [it] considered the treaty of 1859 to

be lapsed, inoperative or void’ (Bianci1959, p. 129). This formal statement of claim in 1940

occurred well over 80 years of interaction about the territory in Belize and who had

sovereignty over it. Once made, this claim framed the interactions between the two countries

to pursue settlement of a persistent territorial claim.

1 Vathakou, 2007 refers to this as part of observation systems. She notes that that ‘an observation is the unity of a distinction and a denotation.’ She explains that in an observation system an object is firstly . . . ‘distinguished from everything else . . . [ then denoted] . . . by calling or naming or identifying it’ (p. 64).

Representations: deriving meaning to anchor a claim to territory

A territorial dispute requires that material objects or ideas of focus must be classified and

then named so that they fit into a known paradigm or category. Once classified, actors or

states can then determine a course of action (Moscovici 2000, p. 42). This categorization is

aimed at confining an object, situation, event or behaviour to a set of rules for which it is

denoted. In the case of the Belize-Guatemala territorial disputes, these representations were

subject to change depending on the context and in which the states were interacting. Thus,

even as constructivism accommodates changing identities and interests, states do not act

arbitrarily in a territorial dispute; their course of action emerges because of the social

formation of representations in the discursive settlement structures. Representations emerge

because they are discursively shared in state interactions, and the identities of the state’s

structure the actions that are then deemed possible.

Socially derived representations bear on how states interpret and act upon an object. Here,

political elements (the experience, reasons and actions of the actors) combined with their

discursive actions (what they say and come to view the dispute as) have influenced how this

territorial dispute has been understood and interpreted by the disputing states. Social

representation in the ‘larger political framework makes understanding possible’ (Elcherote et.

al 2011, p. 733) and it involves the processes of naming and anchoring an unfamiliar object

or process so that it becomes known to the actors. Since this paper posits that the territorial

dispute was not a distinct occurrence but occurred through a long process of interaction, it

similarly points out that Guatemala needed to establish familiarity with the nature of British

actions in the territory to make a territorial claim over Belize. This led to early discursive

interactions with Britain over its presence in Belize represented as territory usurpation.

The territorial claim and the resultant dispute is not considered to have started over the

existence or exact location of the borders of Belize with Guatemala. It emerged, firstly, over

which state - Britain or Guatemala - had sovereign rule over this settlement after Spain’s

departure from the region. Britain’s position was that it had sovereign rule over the territory

of Belize since it benefitted from usufruct rights previously granted by Spain and it had also

maintained a steady presence in the area. Guatemala, meanwhile, argued that it had inherited

sovereignty over this territory as it was Spain’s successor in Central America. Guatemala thus

considered Belize as an inheritance. Even so, the context in which Guatemala’s declared

Belize as her legacy is important because this framing is subject to interpretation. Thus, the

discourse in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Belize-Guatemala territorial dispute

had at least three dominant representations, specifically: Guatemala’s sovereignty over the

territory; compensation for Guatemala to accept the full extent of British settlement; and

mutual acceptance of the boundary agreement between the two countries as defined by the

Treaty of 1859. These three representations are situated across periods and explain the early

identities and interests of Guatemala and Britain in relation to the settlement of the territorial

disputes in Belize. The most recent representation of the dispute puts it on legal footing for

settlement at the ICJ.

3. Methodology

The methodological plan of this paper is to explain the construction of pacific state identities

in the intractable Guatemalan territorial dispute with Belize. This explanation shows how the

social elements of state identity, interests and representations have played a role in

construction and offers that in the social structure of settlement processes these states

generate representations of the territorial dispute that promote a pacific settlement. Thus, this

paper adopts constructivist conceptions of state identities and interests to show that it is in the

social structures of settlement negotiations, not prior, that the states form options that support

a pacific resolution of their dispute. The methodological underpinning is that states do not

engage in the settlement of a territorial dispute with a package of pre-given interests; rather,

Guatemala, Britain and then Belize developed these interests because their identities have

been formed in these social contexts.

The empirical material is drawn from data collected from discursive spaces - spoken and

written text – in which representations of the dispute and the actions of the states are

articulated. This data, includes official utterances, public presentations and written

documentation about the ideas and beliefs of those closest to the social structures of this

dispute settlement. These were used to aid in an explanation of the “how possible” aspects of

the territorial dispute, specifically its long-standing existence. Semi-structured interviews

were also conducted with former and current diplomats, senior government officials and lead

negotiators who are considered as ‘targets of socialization policies and practices’ (Checkel

and Moravcsik, 2001 p. 221), and who too have engaged with others to channel ideas,

develop identities and formulate interests in this dispute. A documentary review sourced

monument resources (see Nuemann 2010) which specified courses of action by the States that

were compatible with the representation of the dispute at historical junctures. In addition, the

monument documents provided insights into the prevailing identities and interests that have

been attendant in the territorial dispute settlement efforts. I subsequently used the

combination of claim representations, state identities and interests, at specific junctures to

offer a plausible explanation of what the disputant states wanted and how they arrived at and

proposed numerous, pacific settlement options.

4. Settlement Structures, Discursive Spaces and State Identities in the unfolding of

settlement options

Guatemala and Belize have been engaged in a long process to settle their persistent territorial

dispute. Together, they have created prominent social structures in which peaceful settlement

of the dispute has been the primary focus of their interactions. These settlement structures are

distinctly interspersed in the history of the dispute and started with interactions between

Britain and Guatemala in the early colonial period; then later, in a measured manner, with

Britain, Guatemala and the colony of Belize; and finally, as interactions between Guatemala

and independent Belize. There are expectations for settlement in all these structures and these

are firmly captured in monument documents. A critical review of these documents however,

show that only three (3) of these structures produced proposals that were exclusively for the

settlement of the territorial dispute – Dallas Clarendon Treaty (1856);2 Anglo-Guatemalan

Treaty (1859); and in Belize’s post-independence era, the Special Agreement to settle the

claim at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (2008). The Special Agreement of 2008 is the

only settlement option that exclusively focused on the resolution of the territorial dispute.

2 The Dallas-Clarendon Treaty was never ratified but this treaty is monumental because it is the first public articulation of the acceptance of the new boundaries of the British settlement in Belize that reflects the currentboundary today; this is the southern boundary with Guatemala being at the Sarstoon River established as of 1850.

Table 1. Proposals to exclusively settle territorial boundaries of Belize

Date State Identities Interests Representation of Dispute

Monument Documents

1856

Britain Colonial Power Boundary delimitation ofTerritory in Belize

Usurpation of territory in Belize

Dallas Clarendon Treaty

Guatemala Colonial Successor to Spain

1859

Britain Party to 1859 Treaty Boundary delineation of Belize

Cession of Territory Anglo-GuatemalanConvention - 1859Convention3Guatemala Party to 1859 Treaty

2008

Belize

Target State

Settle boundary dispute and territorial claim at ICJ or ICA

Juridical Claim 2008 Special Agreement by Belize and Guatemala to submit Territorial Claim to the ICJ4

Guatemala Challenger State

Ambiguous Identities

It is worth noting, that whilst the Treaty of 1859 was a monument agreement, that delineated the

agreed boundaries of Belize with Guatemala, this treaty also served as the genesis of a two-tiered

approach to the settlement of this territorial dispute. This two-treaty approach became ubiquitous in

all the other settlement options, and an additional five (5) prominent, structures (see table 1.2

3 The 1859 Treaty is treated as a boundary agreement between Guatemala and Britain but this treaty also included the ubiquitous two-tiered approach settlement formula inclusive of a pronounced boundary delineation AND the creation of spaces for bilateral cooperation. This is reflected in Article 7 of the same treaty.If all three agreements were to be substantially scrutinized as being exclusive attempts to settle the claim, then SA 2008 fits this definition. The Dallas Clarendon Treaty was never ratified. Still, these are all presented as substantively focused on the settlement of the claim.4 This agreement was amended in 2010 after Belize and Guatemala failed to implement the joint national referendums on October 6, 2013. They now have the option to implement their respective referendums individually.

below) produced proposals that incorporated bilateral agreements and cooperation to resolve the

dispute. The dispute was strictly territorial, yet in all political settlement structures, Guatemala and

Britain or Belize included economic cooperation agreements to conclude it. The possibilities for

cooperation emerged in the context of discursive actions to settle the territorial claim and these

were formed in process after deep and long interactions between the two countries.

The inclusion of these “soft” mechanisms has been endogenous to the settlement structures, though

they are not compulsory to settle the hard elements of a territorial dispute such as territorial border

location and the maritime designation of each state, for example. However, they have been afforded

more than an ancillary role in all settlement options.5 In the case of the Webster Proposals (1968),

neither boundary delimitations nor borders for Belize were included, and the primary focus of these

proposals was to create and institutionalize commercial trade routes for Guatemala through Belize.

They also included protocols for the defence of Belize which Guatemala would lead. Later, the

Heads of Agreement (1981) pushed settlement of the dispute as a post-independence aspiration for

Belize and Guatemala to jointly seek a political solution to the territorial dispute while sharing

maritime and natural resources. These settlement proposals enabled Belize and Guatemala to

aspire for and develop cooperative identities even as they were target and challenger states

respectively, in the territorial dispute.6

5 See James Murphy (2004, p. 47) where explains that the two-treaty package was particularly common to the period 1969- 1972 during ministerial meetings between Britain and Guatemala. This package included state recognition and cooperation. The two-treaty approach however, has been ubiquitous throughout all settlementstructures since the 1859 Boundary Treaty. 6 See this approach to settlement in the following agreements: prior to Belize’s independence, see 1968 Webster Proposals; after decolonization and toward independence see, 1980 Heads of Agreement; in post-independence era, see 2002 Facilitation Proposals, and 2005 Agreement. These proposals, have all included a two-tiered system to claim settlement that articulate distinct programs of cooperation and bilateral partnerships. In the case of Webster’s proposals, this agreement did not address any matter related to border delineation and settlement of claim.

Table 1.2: Proposals to settle Guatemalan territorial dispute with Belize

Date State Identities Interests Representation of Dispute

Monument Documents

1968

Britain Aspirant Partner State Security of territory in Belize

Harmed relations of the United Kingdom and Guatemala

Webster Proposals

Guatemala Aspirant Partner State

1980-1981

Belize Former Colonial Ruler/Emergent State

Rights and claims of each State to territory

Denial of the Rights of Guatemala over territory in Belize

Heads of Agreement

UN Resolution 35/20

Guatemala Aggrieved State

2002

Belize Target State Mutually agreed Treaties for Settlement

Politically Intractable

Agreement for Facilitation Process Between Belize and Guatemala

Guatemala Challenger State

2005-2007

Belize Cooperative State Bilateral Cooperation and Good neighborliness

Politically Intractable Agreement on a Framework for Negotiations and Confidence Building Measures

Guatemala Cooperative State

2014

Belize Partner State Bilateral Cooperation

Inimical to cooperation between the two states

13 Bilateral Agreements of Cooperation

Guatemala Partner State

Another critical factor in this territorial dispute is that the identities of the states have also

been internally produced. Both states have simultaneously assumed target and cooperative

state (Belize) and challenger and cooperative state (Guatemala) identities respectively. They

have acted on these subject positions having ‘discursively articulated and produced’

settlement options that reflect their newly formed identities (see Dunn 2003, p. 11). Over

time, these identities have enabled these states to construct a territorial dispute that has

generated multiple representations that removed any rigidities and stasis in the actions and

interactions of these states. Moreover, these representations and the narratives around them

shifted state relations over time and space (see Somers 1994). Furthermore, it is through these

same narratives that representations of the dispute have been produced. In this manner,

settlement of the territorial dispute remains a discursive space in which Belize and Guatemala

produce subject positions that enable ‘actions and practices that enact [ideas]’ that are

compatible with the identities that they have formed in process (see Dunn 2003, p. 10). Even

more, in these discursive spaces, the same representations constitute the states so that they

can only act to settle the territorial dispute in a specific way.

5. Mediating role of Discourse and Inclinations for a Peaceful Settlement

The multiple representations of this territorial dispute have allowed only certain actions to be

deemed possible for settlement. What these representations show, however, is that settlement

of the territorial dispute has not depended entirely on the location of power in any one state.

Critically, ongoing discourse and use of discursive spaces have shaped the power location and

duration in this dispute, emphasizing power is never totally centralized (see Dunn 2003, p.

11). Shifts in discursive dominance also suggest a move away from power concentration in

any one of these states such that subject positioning is replaced by subject production (Ibid.).

Indeed, the protracted nature of the unsettled dispute also explains that it is not always the

most powerful state that determines how a territorial dispute comes to an end. Rather,

Guatemala and Belize have formed state identities that have produced interests compatible

with the actions they can exercise, thus granting subject dominance at various points in the

history of this dispute. These positions are evident in the following discursive points: the

declaration by Guatemala that the Treaty of 1859 is null and void and then stating that Britain

was unaccountable for the non-implementation of Article 7 of the same treaty; the stated

rejection of the 1968 proposals by Belize (still then a colony); the acceptance of the Heads of

Agreement by Guatemala, even as Belize articulated that it was an inexecutable proposal

(1981); the rejection by Guatemala of the Facilitators proposals of 2002; the joint declaration

by both to seek settlement of the dispute at the ICJ; and the continued interests by Belize and

Guatemala to pursue cooperation and partnership agreements (2005 Agreement; 2014 - 13

Bilateral Agreements) in spite of an unsettled claim.

The territorial dispute has also produced discursive spaces in which the states have learned to

identify and seek specific options that promote a pacific settlement of the dispute. This

suggests that Belize and Guatemala have also engaged in deep learning to actively seek

settlement options that are not just expedient but reflective of the pacific identities they have

come to form. One significant point of such learning occurred during the 2002 facilitation

process when the Belize team of presenters became increasingly confident about their own

legal position and voiced then that Guatemala’s presentation was legally insufficient by

comparison.7 In the same facilitation process, Guatemala expressed that Belize, who had

always refused ‘to submit the controversy to a legal instance, now accepts that the

controversy is eminently legal and accepts, tacitly, that it be settled legally’.8 Notably, such

learning is supportive of the position by Hensel (2008, p. 127) who points out that states

which have been engaged in long but unsuccessful periods of negotiations are more likely to

seek peaceful settlements. Hensel’s argument aptly supports the maintenance of a discursive

space that both Belize and Guatemala recognize as key to settlement of their dispute in this

modern period.

Finally, the settlement structures, have resulted in the formulation of ample treaties,

agreements and proposals for the settlement of the territorial dispute. These mechanisms all

indicate that Belize and Guatemala were tacitly committed to a settlement formula that jointly

embraced ‘soft’ elements of cooperation and “hard” elements of boundary delineation,

territorial integrity and sovereignty. Such a formula also indicates that rejection by Belize or

Guatemala, of any of these soft elements renders the dispute protracted and persistent. This

brings to the fore that the Special Agreement of 2008 to settle the dispute at the ICJ is the

only proposal that can exclusively for the settlement of this claim. Yet, the juridical path to

settlement has lost its salience as the two countries are increasingly engaged in the

development and implementation of bilateral programs of cooperation.9

An expedient settlement has not been at the forefront of this territorial dispute. Instead, this

process has produced states whose identities are increasingly compatible with a long view of

7 Interview conducted with senior official and former member of the Belize negotiation team for the settlement of the Guatemalan territorial claim.8 See Guatemala’s Rejoinder at the facilitation process, May 15, 2001.9 In 2014, Belize and Guatemala signed 13 new bilateral agreements. These were considered as critical efforts to promote an environment that is conducive for the eventual settlement of the claim.

dispute settlement even though previous political attempts have proven unsuccessful. Note

that Guatemalan President, Perez-Molina suggested that there are “two axes” that now shape

and drive the bilateral relationship between Belize and Guatemala. He acknowledges that the

first axis is premised on the juridical framing of the dispute which should enable its eventual

settlement at the ICJ. But he also contends that the second axis is for the two countries to

‘strengthen and ensure a normal and solid bilateral relationship [to benefit] the development

of the people of both countries, which generates a positive political and social environment

for the process of the definitive solution of the territorial [claim].’10 Note also that, this

acknowledgement is not made to abandon the claim, since doing so can cause significant

domestic pressures in both Belize and Guatemala. At the same time, however, Perez-Molina’s

position reinforces that specific state identities can promote cooperative efforts that support a

peaceful settlement of the Guatemalan territorial dispute with Belize. And in this context, the

territorial claim loses its salience as the central ordering structure that positions how these

states interact with each other; rather, the claim has been repositioned by the states because of

the identities and interests that they have come to form in the structures for its settlement.

Conclusion

As of 2008, both Belize and Guatemala agreed that the territorial claim should be placed on a

legal footing. Having accepted this position, their respective populations will indicate through

referendums whether the claim should be settled at the International Court of Justice(ICJ). In

the meantime, the legal representation of the dispute has removed the possibility that other

extraneous matters could now be attributed to the claim; instead, it is now firmly established

on a procedural path, that could lend for its juridical settlement. To this end, the adaptability

of the dispute has been sealed. Despite the existence of the Special Agreement of 2008,

however, this agreement has not expedited the efforts of the two countries for a juridical

settlement of the claim. Yet, the social structure of dispute negotiations has enabled Belize

and Guatemala to form new identities and interests beyond the settlement of the claim.

Most recently, the two states signed agreements to develop and implement 13 programs of

cooperation. They have referred to these projects as efforts to create a pacific and conducive

environment for the eventual settlement of the claim. It is in this social structure that they can

10 See President Perez-Molina statement during the signing of the 13 Bilateral Agreements between Belize and Guatemala, 2014.

best pursue cooperative and peaceful identities, rather than through a juridical settlement of

the territorial dispute. A juridical approach is likely to distract from the nascent opportunities

that their cooperative identities can pursue and it can prove fragile for their target and

challenger state identities to sustain. Maintaining the claim still leaves room for the countries

to explore cooperation and bilateral programs.

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