Constructing a Political System from Within the Iron Cage: Explaining Civil War in Palestine

Michael Sheflin

This paper attempts to apply the Selectorate Theory models from The

Logic of Political Survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al.) to the recent history

of the Palestinian National Authority (PA). By analyzing selectorate

hypotheses about institutional preference, corruption, war, and civil war,

we create a cogent model for examining Palestinian domestic politics and

the prolonged effects of the Occupation. The Selectorate Model has

important implications for the analysis of Palestinian politics.

Nevertheless, the immeasurable effects of persistent Occupation, strong

international monetary and military interference, and the lack of

transparency in regular official data, overshadow the normal ability to

measure Selectorate predictions in Palestine. We conclude with proposals

for improving PA transparency, improving government efficacy through

regular elections, and reducing conflict through more balanced US policy.

I. Introduction

II. A Selectorate Model of Political Competition (in brief)

III. Building a Political System from Within the Iron Cage

IV. Political Participation: 1996 and 2006 Elections

V. Corruption

VI. From Occupation to Intifada

VII. A House Divided

VIII. Conclusions

I. Introduction

In 2006, militias controlled by Fatah and Hamas began fighting primarily in the Gaza

Strip, beginning what some observers have termed the Palestinian civil war. Though

Hamas and Fatah, the main two Palestinian factions, have similar goals, their tactics have

become increasingly divergent. The Israeli Occupation of Palestine has taken thousands

of casualties and prevented freedom of movement. Conditions of the occupation, and

American and Israeli military and fiscal policies, have aided the conditions for

Palestinian violence. Nevertheless, the Palestinian civil war reflects a fundamental

redirection of Palestinian resources toward Palestinian violence against Palestinians on a

scale not previously seen. Explaining why violence has occurred has significant

implications for the conflict and the Palestinian political system. This essay examines the

assumptions of The Logic of Political Survival and Selectorate Theory to explain the

violence in Palestine and how to create conditions to prevent its recurrence.

Selectorate Theory, forwarded by in The Logic of Political Survival by Bruce Bueno de

Mesquita, James Morrow and others, explain some significant factors of government

action based on the size of a polity and its governing coalition. By examining how

government policies provide goods to the public and key political supporters, Selectorate

Theory predicts certain outcomes. Public goods, such as security, civil order, and

transparency are distributed from the government across the entire population without

regard to political affiliation. Selectorate Theory assumes that members of the winning

coalition will also receive private benefits from their participation in the winning

coalition, such as money or access to key resources. Factional interaction in most

institutionalized democratic political systems, at most times, leads to peaceful

reallocation of public and private goods. At other times, members of the winning

coalition may seek to oppress rivals to maintain the benefits derived from controlling the

government. Oppression requires the confluence of certain factors that provide

incentives to a winning coalition to prevent the loss of public and private benefits. It may

also degrade the normative functioning of society and contribute to civil conflict.

Increasingly after the PA�s creation in 1994, Hamas and the Palestinian public perceived

a widespread loss of the legitimacy of the Palestinian National Authority�s provision of

public goods. The Palestinian National Authority (PA) provides the institutional

structure described by Selectorate Theory, because it determines how Palestine selects its

government. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO/Fatah) emerged initially as the

dominant factional force by virtue of having negotiated the Oslo Accords with Israel,

which created the PA. Hamas quickly emerged as a main opposition political faction, but

its militant roots as a resistance organization created questions about the breadth of its

full political commitment. Hamas�s participation in local Palestinian politics had

increased its grassroots support throughout the 1990s. Fatah also had lost a significant

amount of public support because of increasing public perception of Fatah corruption as

the governing faction within the PA. The change in the domestic balance of public

support provided incentives for Hamas to participate more directly in the 2006 elections

for the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), the legislative organ of the PA. The

resulting victory for Hamas, as the Change and Reform List in 2006 legislative elections,

provided incentives for Fatah to engage in institutional oppression, according to the

Selectorate Model.

It is important to note that the Selectorate Model, which will shortly be examined in

greater detail, has shortcomings in measuring the effects of Israeli policies on domestic

Palestinian political behavior. The Israeli Occupation is an external force impeding or

preventing Palestinian freedom of movement, economic growth, and security. Thus the

political survival of Palestinian actors to some degree is decoupled from domestic policy-

performance. The Occupation allows Israeli control over violence against Palestinians,

which is generally perceived by Palestinians as arbitrary, collective, and unwarranted.

Israel controls some of the resources that would be controlled by a Palestinian

government in normal political circumstances. Public goods, like peace and civil order,

and the distribution of private goods, to supporters of the Palestinian government, are

externally influenced without regard to the performance of domestic Palestinian policies.

Thus Palestinian policy has at times reflected the coordination of violence toward Israelis

to reflect widespread political support for attacks. At times, resistance to the Occupation,

a private good, may have been seen as a public good to encourage Palestinian control

over Palestine. Thus during both Intifadas, Palestinian factions coordinated attacks

against Israel. Before 1996 elections, there was widespread public support for the hudna,

or truce, between Hamas and Israel, and Hamas mostly committed itself to that policy.

The effect of the Occupation cannot be understated, and American and Israeli collusion

will help contextualize the results of studying the Palestinian and Israeli conflicts through

Selectorate Theory.

This paper is arranged in eight parts, tracing Selectorate Theory predictions about various

aspects of Palestinian politics during the period of the Palestinian National Authority

(PA). The next section presents certain basic assumptions and hypotheses of the

Selectorate Theory�s model, and explanations about the use of data and appendices.

Section III presents a brief background on conflict and Palestinian political developments

until the negotiation of the Oslo Accords in 1993. The following four sections reflect a

progressively complex analysis of the Palestinian pseudo-state through political

participation, corruption, the Occupation and the Intifadas, and the Palestinian civil war.

The final section presents conclusions about the application of the Selectorate Theory to

the domestic Palestinian situation and suggestions for improving future government

efficacy and performance.

Israeli violence against Palestinians and Palestinian prisoners of the Occupation

numerically far outstrip the violence and oppression of the Fatah-dominated PA or civil

war. Still, the redirection of resources toward coordinated violence within a society is

extremely significant. For the first time, both Fatah and Hamas exhibited willingness to

engage in systematic, violent oppression of �the other.� Many attribute a major cause of

this violence to American pressure and support for a Fatah crackdown on Hamas,

resulting in Hamas�s seizure of the Gaza strip. These concerns will help explain some of

the findings of the Selectorate Model. This paper suggests that external events helped

influence internal conditions, reducing the size of the governing coalition and degrading

the condition of civil liberties in the Territories, such that systematic oppression was

more likely. The separation of Palestinian territory by Israeli Occupational control

helped prevent the allocation of the necessary resources required by Fatah to militarily

repress Hamas with sufficient force. Similarly, the Negev�s separation of Gaza and the

West Bank may have prevented Hamas from seizing power in the West Bank despite its

claims it could do so. The Selectorate Model predicts that in a democratic system,1 a

small governing coalition aids the degradation of civil liberties. Both these elements

encourage a government affinity for oppression, helping spur the Palestinian civil war.

II. Background: Conflict, Occupation, and Factionalism

The Occupation was not the only external force affecting politics in the Territories,

though it was the most significant. Jordan and the PLO, an organization forced outside

Palestine until Oslo, also externally influenced West Bank politics, and Palestinians were

"subject to fluctuations in the political influence and political fortunes of the outside

players they follow" (Sahliyeh, 1988 7). Israel had attempted to create and buttress local

rural elites in Palestine, in reality undermining "the political power of the West Bank

nationalist elite" (ibid 164). There was also no hegemonic Palestinian voice, and

alignments of pro-PLO pragmatists and pro-Jordanian factions differed in their support

and approach for resolving problems. Some Palestinians, like Sari Nusseibeh, even

argued that demanding equal rights for Palestinians within the Israeli political system

would be most likely to ensure Palestinian rights (ibid 173). Israeli opposition to

territorial concessions, particularly by the Likud Party, hurt Palestinian attempts at 1 What The Logic of Political Survival calls a large-coalition large-selectorate system.

negotiated settlement. Although �pragmatic PLO politicians� had initiated talks with

Israel after the 1982 Lebanon War, the PLO gained support at the expense of local

politicians, Jordan, and Israel by creating �its own mass-based institutions and structures�

(ibid 7).

In 1993, the Declaration of Principles on Palestinian Self-Government (Oslo I) was

signed by the PLO and Israel in Oslo. This agreement created the Palestinian National

Authority (PA) as an agreement between Israel and the PLO, whose political party would

be known by its Arabic acronym Fatah. The first Oslo Accords paved the way for the

Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza (Oslo II) in 1995, which outlined the

nature of PA governance and the 1996 elections. This progress has occurred only over

the last decade and a half, and complexity of the conflict between Palestinians and

Israelis is not primarily concerning Palestinian autonomy. In Palestinian Sovereignty and

Israeli Security, Naomi Weinberger explores the breadth of issues on the negotiating

table during Oslo like Israeli-Palestinian power asymmetries, Israeli settlements, security,

water rights, and control of Jerusalem. The more leaders ignore final-status issues such

as these, the �more likely previous accomplishments are to unravel� (Weinberger, 2000

216). There have been several international peace initiatives with uncertain results.

President Bush�s Road Map to Peace created a timetable for progress contingent on

progressive trust-building between Palestinians and Israelis. It is relatively clear that

momentum on this initiative is not seen as likely to produce results. It is also unclear

whether the peace initiative by the Quartet can produce effective progress. Israeli and

Western opinion has become less sympathetic since the victory of Hamas in elections for

the Palestinian Legislative Council in January 2006. Hamas has long been seen as a

deleterious militant force by Israel and the international community.2

Despite occasional low-intensity violent disagreements between Hamas and Fatah in the

1990s, they generally preferred to avoid violent conflict. The PA was created as an

agreement between Israel and the PA, so it was clear Fatah would dominate the

organization. It was the largest faction in the territories and also the sole Palestinian

negotiating force, having won international and Arab support, then finally Israeli

recognition (Tamimi, 2007 187). Hamas was skeptical of the PA, and refused to

recognize either the PLO or the PA as representative bodies. Arafat had actually invited

Hamas to join the PLO and the Palestinian National Council (PNC) in 1990, which was

initially received well by Hamas but did not ultimately result in its integration into either

(ibid 189). It would also have been impossible for any domestic Palestinian faction to

ignore the importance of the PA economically. By January 1995, the PA had become the

largest single employer in the Palestinian Territories (Mishal and Sela, 2000 139). The

initial optimism following the negotiation of the Oslo and Taba� Accords have not

yielded purely positive or effective results. The persistence of Occupation, and

stalemates in Palestinian-Israeli and domestic Palestinian dialogue, illustrate a

�discouraging view about how much has actually changed in the status quo�

(Weinberger, 2000 197).

2 With the notable exception of efforts by Vladimir Putin to engage Hamas diplomatically.

III. The Selectorate Model

Israel casts a long shadow as both an "internal" player in Palestinian politics, due to its ongoing occupation, and an external actor. (Weinberger, 2006 5)

The problem of how to consider Israel in models of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

slightly complicates Selectorate predictions. To some extent, it might be useful to

measure some Israeli data against Palestinian coalition and selectorate data. The theory

in The Logic of Political Survival does cross over into dyadic state interaction, but not in

a manner analogous to the Israel-Palestine conflict. The model employed for most of this

paper holds Hamas as the leader of a challenging coalition and Fatah as the incumbent

coalition until January 2006. Israeli data is included as it helps explain why Palestinian

data alone may not fully explaining conditions. The scope of our data is late 1993 to

early 2008, concentrating on particular dates depending on the availability of data or the

scope of a particular model for a regression. We have briefly summarized the elements

prior to the scope of this paper, which continue to play a large role in framing social and

political discourses. Before examining the particular methodology employed in our

adaptation of the Selectorate models, we must first summarize some of the key aspects of

the theory.

A Theory of Political Survival:

Selectorate Theory assumes that there is a leader and challenger who each form coalitions

of support derived from the population that participates in the political system (Bueno de

Mesquita, 2003 39). A polity has a total population of residents (N) from which a

selectorate (S) is drawn (ibid 40). The selectorate is defined as �the set of people whose

endowments include the qualities or characteristics instiutionally required to choose the

government's leadership and necessary for gaining access to private benefits doled out by

the government's leadership� (ibid 42), regulated by institutions, norms, and laws.

Selectorate members have generally been defined by qualities and characteristics

categorized as origin or birthplace, personal affinities or special skills, gender and age,

and wealth (ibid 43). A selection institution, or the actual machinery and structure of the

political system, can define both the selectorate and winning coalitions (W), by

controlling who can govern and participate.

The winning coalition is the proportion of the selectorate that supports the governing

party and �endows the leadership with political power over the remainder of the

selectorate as well as over the disenfranchised members of the society� (Bueno de

Mesquita, 2003 51). Thus W is a unitary actor controlled by the leader in theory, though

the reality is almost always more nuanced. We will additionally examine the effects of

challenging leaders from within the coalition, like Marwan Barghouti�s challenge to

Fatah�s leadership and the divisions in Hamas leadership. Challengers usually arise from

those outside W who do not receive private benefits, and from the disenfranchised who

receive fewer public goods by remaining outside of S. As public goods provision

increases and private goods provision decreases, members of the coalition are less likely

to see the benefit of remaining within W. Thus as the provision of private benefits to

members of the winning coalition approaches zero there is a greater probability of

members of W defecting to challenging coalitions (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003 382).

Over their terms, incumbent coalitions develop greater ability to distribute benefits to

their supporters, often at the expense of the public good.

The incumbent leader does not face this problem of credibility as severely because her current supporters understand that they will continue to receive private benefits as long as they remain loyal. (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003 60)

It is often difficult for members of the selectorate to know convincingly that bringing a

challenger to power will continue providing the previously enjoyed private benefits, after

that challenger has attained power.

Drawing from economic models of utility and models of rational choice, Selectorate

Theory assumes that coalitions offer the promise of bundles of goods that influence

individuals� preferences to support them. It is assumed that leaders want to ensure and

prolong their political careers and thus offer an acceptable allocation of public and

private goods to key segments of society. As with the economic definition of normal

goods, more public and private goods provide a greater utility and are preferred by

individuals. The candidates that can offer the optimal bundle of goods tends to be

favored in political survival. Theoretically,

Leaders use the combination of public and private goods they produce to hold the loyalty of their winning coalition. (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003 59).

Private goods benefit only supporters of the governing coalition. Public goods benefit

society as a whole, but may not be constant through all polities. Core public goods tend

to be universal across polities:

Civil liberties, political rights, transparency, peace, and prosperity are among the most important public welfare enhancements that any government can provide. (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003 179)

Some goods are not universal, and the diversity of individuals and polities no doubt

makes generalizing less precise. General public goods can include things like education,

health care, or foreign policy (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003 195).

A determining factor in why actors allocate either private or public goods is the loyalty

norm (W/S), which measures the �risk to coalition members of exclusion from future

winning coalitions� (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003 66). Most of the hypotheses and

deductions in The Logic of Political Survival relate to the effect of the loyalty norm. It is

assumed that the probability of inclusion in a winning coalition is greater as W is greater

and S is smaller (ibid 67). Governments commonly termed democracies, autocracies, and

monarchies are, in theoretical terms, more accurately described by the characteristics of

W and S, the means for choosing each � selection institutions. In the case of each

government type, selection institutions help structure who can be a part of the selectorate

and the winning coalition. In democracies, the selectorate is generally high because

�citizenship automatically holds out the prospect of benefits, both in terms of public

policies and in terms of private benefits� (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003 69-70). In contrast

to democracies, or large-coalition systems, authoritarian states have smaller winning

coalitions and selectorates and thus stronger loyalty norms:

When the selectorate is small, this means that the policy preferences of the vast majority of residents (N-S) can be ignored as a part of daily, routine politics. (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003 70)

The key assumptions of the allocation of private and public goods relate to the relative

and absolute sizes of W and S, thusly affecting the loyalty norm (W/S). As W increases,

private goods are distributed over a larger group of people, and the benefits of good to

individuals is diluted (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003 92). A strong loyalty norm (low W/S)

also allows a leader to skim more off the top for protecting personal incumbency (ibid

93). A weak loyalty norm (high W/S), characterized by a large coalition size, encourages

group to favor public goods at the expense of private goods (ibid 105).

Limitations of the Model:

The authors identify four key shortcomings to their model. It assumes a unitary nature of

actors, policy implementation is possible, more public and private goods are better, and

individuals are identical (74). The second and third elements are particularly

problematic. Implementation of PA policy is not always possible because of restrictions

placed by the Occupation and international dependency. Though we attempt to account

for some Israeli policies that might skew the data, it is often difficult to do so. Palestinian

politics is also highly defined by personal, and to a lesser extent ideological, affinities.

Hamas and Fatah have core popular bases that consist of such loyal members.

For purposes of our basic model the nature of the affinity does not matter. Affinity is simply a preference for one individual over another, independent of the policies of the individuals. (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003 61)

Throughout this paper we believe we have accounted for the effect of Palestinian

domestic conditions, the Occupation, and international intervention in a balanced manner.

We now discuss specific aspects of the modeling employed in this paper.

Modeling Palestine:

We believe it is better to test a theory with crude data than not to test it at all. (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003 133)

As with many tests in The Logic of Political Survival, we employ multiple-variable linear

regressions to determine the effect of certain independent variables on a dependent

variable. The data is primarily drawn from polling by the Palestinian Center for Policy

Survey Research (PCPSR) Survey Research Unit.3 Data on fatalities are taken from

B�Tzelem, an Israeli human rights monitor. Some data, such as GDP per capita income

for the territories, and election results and voter lists, are drawn from the websites for the

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and the Central Elections Commission,

respectively. Appendix B goes into more detail regarding the sources of data for

particular graphs and regressions.

The regressions have several important components. Results are in table form, listing the

coefficient, standard deviation, and 2-tail probability for each independent variable. The 3 The name was changed after April 2000 to the Center for Palestine Research and Studies.

coefficient measures the strength and direction of the effect of independent variables on

the dependent variable. As the coefficient for an independent variable has a greater

positive or negative value, it causes a greater positive or negative effect on the dependent

variable. Standard deviation measures the deviation of the quadratic means of all data

values from their arithmetic means. The 2-tail probability (or p-value), is the measure of

statistical significance for each independent variable. As this value approaches zero the

probability that an independent variable has a statistically significant effect on the

dependent variable increases. The maximum p-value for statistical significance is

determined before a regression, and measured against the p-values in the results of the

regression. Some regressions use p<0.05 as the condition for significance. Because of

the lack of transparency and consistency in data reporting, and the short period of time

from which our data originate (1993-2008) compared to the regressions employed in The

Logic of Political Survival, which uses Correlates of War and Polity data, we use the

condition p<0.10.

Even if independent variables have significant effects on the dependent variable, their

cumulative effect may not explain much of the dependent variable. The amount of

variance explained by each regression is related to standard deviation, and listed as r2 for

each regression. A high r2 value shows that independent variables explain a large

proportion of the dependent variable. The probability that all the independent variables

have a cumulative effect is listed as p for each regression. The results of these

regressions have striking implications for the Selectorate Theory�s ability to explain and

predict certain aspects of Palestinian politics.

IV. Political Participation

Clearly Fatah�s reputation had been increasingly staked on diplomatic negotiations with

Israel since at least the Madrid Conference in 1991. Thus there was little uncertainty

over whether Fatah (the PLO) would participate in a system it had created jointly with

Israel, especially since it saw itself as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.

This progressive moderation was challenged by the rise of the tenzim (organization),

within the PLO (Weinberger, 2006 6). A prominently tenzim leader, Marwan Barghouti,

fell out of favor with Arafat�s leadership and has been imprisoned by Israel since 2002.

As a result, Arafat�s support increasingly became associated with that of an �old guard,�

the elites which had previously been in the diaspora. His options for political survival

were constrained by the tenzim, and increasingly by Hamas and Israel. The purpose of

this section is to examine both what preferences actors have for institutional selection,

and also whether Hamas is a legitimate political player.

The Logic of Political Survival does not expressly say anything about the latter issue

(when actors participate in externally imposed selection institutions). It does, however,

outline various actor-preferences for and within selection institutions. In particular, the

demands of an increasing winning coalition or selectorate put pressure on leaders to

distribute goods over a greater number of people. Therefore, if given free reign, leaders

would prefer a low W and large S, to maximize private goods over the fewest number of

people. Theoretically, therefore, rational leaders most prefer �autocratic regimes with

universal suffrage� (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003 336). Those inside a coalition may or may

not prefer a similar trend. On the one hand, reducing W would provide more private

goods per person, by strengthening the loyalty norm. However, reducing W also

increases the probability of any individual coalition member�s exclusion from a future

coalition. Those outside the coalition generally prefer a large coalition for the same

reason, to increase their chances of future inclusion (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003 333). We

now examine long-term trends before turning to the 1996 and 2006 Palestinian

Legislative Council elections themselves.

Long-Term Trends in Palestine:

Because of leaders� autocracy preferences, we should expect Fatah to prefer a

strengthening loyalty norm over time. We should thus expect a greater provision of

private goods to supporters of Fatah�s winning coalition (WF) and fewer public goods.

The decision of participation within a selection institution can be seen as having costs or

benefits to a leader and coalition. In other words, an increase in private goods to a

coalition and to key leaders can provide incentives to an organization to work within a

selection institution to provide goods to supporters.

Graph 1

Fatah's Loyalty Norm (1993-2006)

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The regression employed assumes that Fatah and Hamas are the only major competing

political actors across the PA system. The reason we examine the probability of

defecting from Hamas to the selectorate and Fatah is rooted in the loyalty norm�s

function as a probability of defection and inclusion. This regression essentially measures

two probabilities and Hamas�s loyalty norm as independent variables against the

dependent variable PLCPart, a measure of expected participation in elections for the

PLC. For this regression, PLCPart data was available only for certain dates before

March 1996 and January 2006, because it resulted from a question of whether individuals

would participate in upcoming elections. We thus do a linear interpolation of PLCPart

(S) in order to calculate each loyalty norm and participation over time. Hamas�s

participation decisions are very tricky to measure and we include an available measure,

from PCPSR polls from 1993 � 1996, of the percentage of the selectorate that supported

Hamas�s participation in 1996 PLC elections in the following regression (HSupPart).

These data were not collected after 1996, and simple linear regressions are inaccurate, so

it is not included after 1996. Nevertheless, there needs to be a bridge between Hamas�s

identity as a movement and its development into a political party. The intuition behind

the creation of these new variables will now be explained.

Participation, Hamas Loyalty Norm, Probabilities of Defection from Hamas

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Graph 2: Palestinian participation in the PLC, Hamas�s loyalty norm, the probability of defection from Hamas to Fatah within the selectorate, and the probability of defecting from Hamas to the remainder of the selectorate.

The first independent variable (ProbH-S) is a comparison of the likelihood that members

of the selectorate will defect from Hamas�s coalition to Fatah�s coalition, controlling for

the level of disenfranchisement. If this measure is negative, it implies that members of

Fatah�s coalition will join Hamas. The effect on participation would be assumed to be

positive because as Hamas members defect to Fatah, they would have a more positive

effect on participation being attached to a key force behind the creation of the selection

institution (the PA). Therefore a rise in the probability that Hamas members defect to

Fatah�s coalition should also cause a rise in political participation. It is unlikely that this

correlation would change from positive to negative over time because of Fatah�s strong

continuing association with the PA, especially through the institution of the Presidency.

Even were Hamas to become a full political participant, it is still more likely that Fatah

has had a greater positive effect on participation over time. This trend may also fluctuate

over time because of external Israeli and international conditions over which Fatah does

not have direct control.

The second independent variable represents the probability that members of Hamas�s

coalition will defect to the selectorate in general, excluding the level of disenfranchised

people.4 This variable thus measures what effect defections from Hamas�s coalition to

the selectorate have on political participation. Though it may be less predictable than the

effect of defections to Fatah, several expectations should be defined. First, if Hamas has

transitioned from a political pariah to a full-fledged member of Palestinian politics, then

there should be an inflection point after which the effect of ProbH-S on PLCPart changes

� some time after 1996. Prior to 1996, defection from Hamas to other coalitions should

have a positive effect on participation, not because Islamic Jihad and the Democratic

Front for the Liberation of Palestine were positive forces, but because this measure

includes the effect of defection to Fatah. At some point in the decade that followed,

defection from Hamas to independent factions should switch from having a potentially

insignificant effect on participation to a clearly negative effect. Throughout the 1990s,

the probability of defection from Hamas to Fatah was positive, whereas the trend-line on

Graph 1 (a polynomial trend) makes it appear as this probability was lower than it likely

was in reality. Tessler and Nachtwey�s suggestion that fluctuations in support for peace

did not prevent Fatah from maintaining a consistent base, did not translate into segments

of the population and key factions endorsing �none of the above� faction lists (Tessler 4 The first term (1) is a simplification of S/S.

and Nachtwey, 1999 25). Thus in the 1996 elections we should expect Hamas�s non-

participation to result in a positive effect of ProbH-S.

We also include Hamas�s loyalty norm (W/S) to determine whether this may have an

effect on participation. In particular, a stronger loyalty norm would have encouraged

members to participate in the boycott and thus reduce participation. Fatah�s loyalty norm

is not a useful measure for a few reasons. Because Fatah is assumed to be the perpetual

incumbent, and Hamas the perpetual challenger, one would expect a strengthening

loyalty norm over time because of leaders� tendencies to prefer autocracy (Bueno de

Mesquita, 2003 336). The same may be true for Hamas but its lack of incumbency

should actually have the opposite effect over time. Beginning with a small support base

and limited resources, Hamas would need to expand its provision of public goods to

become a viable political challenger, and to expand its base of resources for prosecuting

military operations. The external conditions of the Occupation, and the general optimism

that fades after a precipitous event like the creation of the Palestinian National Authority,

would be likely to encourage a negative long-term trend in political participation. In fact,

the data we do have on participation suggests that participation increased slightly over

time, or grew to a peak and then fell slightly.

Graph 3

Participation, Disenfranchisement, Hamas Loyalty Norm

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Fatah�s leaders� inherent desires to seek a smaller winning coalition could thus cause a

negative effect. This would imply that as Fatah�s loyalty norm weakens political

participation falls as well, which is unlikely to provide an accurate depiction of

Palestinian policy realities. A positive effect would reveal only the normal trend that

greater provision of public goods tends to increase participation and decrease

disenfranchisement. Thus Fatah�s loyalty norm is not integrally related to the dependent

variable, in examining Hamas�s effect on participation. Hamas�s loyalty norm is the

probability that members of the selectorate overall will defect to Hamas. One would

expect weakening of Hamas�s loyalty norm (an increase in WH/S) to decrease

participation if Hamas were a political detractor. Similarly, one would expect a positive

effect were Hamas a full political player.

Results:

Table 1 (1993 � 2006)

PLCPart (coef., std, 2-tail p)

Probability of Defection from Hamas to Fatah

ShiseDisenfranc

SWh

SWf −−

(-0.32, 0.11, 0.0076)

Probability of Defection from Hamas to Selectorate

ShiseDisenfranc

SWh −−1

(0.24, 0.1, 0.027)

Hamas Loyalty Norm (WH/S) (-0.26, 0.14, 0.0003) p=0.0431 r2=0.35662

The outcome of this regression is surprising. PLCPart, ProbH-S

(S

hiseDisenfrancS

Wh −−1 ) and ProbH-F (S

hiseDisenfrancS

WhS

Wf −− ) are all

individually statistically significant (p<0.1), but these independent variables collectively

accounts only for 36% of the variance in LegPart. However, the independent variables

collective effect (p=0.0431) is also statistically significant. Regardless, the results are

worth examining.

The size of the selectorate increased over time both with participation and voter

registration initiatives by the Central Elections Commission.5 Thus with a relatively

small winning coalition (WH) until 2002, an increasing selectorate size would dilute

Hamas�s allocation of both private and public goods. The probability of defection from

5 Elections com website for more info, see the website for Palestinian Central Elections Commission voter lists: http://www.elections.ps/template.aspx?id=53.

Hamas to Fatah in fact has a small negative effect on voter participation. The period

from 1993 to 2002 reveals a decreasing probability of Hamas defection to Fatah until it

became negative � Fatah defection to Hamas after the late 1990s.

Additionally, the probability of Palestinians becoming disenfranchised exceeded the

probability of defecting to Hamas until 1995. The negative effect of defection from

Hamas to Fatah would decrease as disenfranchisement rose in the early period. Where

selectorate size is large and the coalition is small, those outside the coalition within the

selectorate tend to reject institutions less readily than the disenfranchised outside the

selectorate (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003 333). Thus Hamas, as a more mainstream party

than Islamic Jihad and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, should be

expected to have a less negative effect on an institution of the political system like W. An

examination of Hamas�s decision-making process with regard to 1996 PLC elections

reveals a broader flexibility than realized by many observers at the time.

Altering the Case: Accounting for Hamas�s Internal Selectorate: To look at what effect Hamas�s internal support for democratic participation had on its

pariah nature, we add the variable HSupPart. This is the support level among self-

identified Hamas supporters from PCPSR polls from 1993 to 1996 in proportion to the

total share of Hamas�s support in the selectorate (WH/S). Hamas�s internal selectorate is

fractured between external and internal leadership, and security and political interests.

Though Hamas pays keen attention to the demands of the people, internal support for

participation increased steadily prior to elections. This independent variable can

essentially be seen as a way of quantifying participation as the provision of a good to

Hamas�s popular support base. Hamas�s acuteness to public desires was primarily

realized in the distribution of private goods through grass-roots charitable organizations.

Still, the question of a Hamas boycott was floated in a December 1994 PCPSR poll, in

which 30.5% of those polled said they would or might boycott elections if Hamas called

for a boycott (CPSR Poll #19).6 So there will probably be a positive effect of Hamas

support for elections on legislative participation. Hamas�s thinking was strategic and we

will now briefly examine why Hamas chose to boycott elections, but why its concurrent

de facto participation may also have been inevitable.

As with Fatah through the 1980s, Hamas had primarily been a resistance organization

with a political leadership to steward the group toward that end. The creation of the PA

raised a greater number of issues for Hamas because they had not participated in the Oslo

peace process, which created the Interim Authority, and they were avowedly opposed to

it. After Oslo negotiations between the PLO and Israel had begun, Hamas �gradually

mounted an unprecedented challenge to the PLO�s exclusive claim to the leadership of

the Palestinian people� (Kristianasen, 1999 20). The debate within Hamas over the

benefits and costs of participation was not monolithic but neither did it produce strong

rifts within Hamas. As early as 1992, Hamas had outlined its view of the potential

decisions facing the Movement, and the outcomes it believed were likely to result.

Hamas�s leadership decided to boycott elections and discourage citizens from voting as

well as tacitly supporting and fielding candidates, without actually employing the name

Hamas. This decision partly reflected general uncertainty over the developing nature of 6 Appendix B contains a full list of references to PCPSR/CPSR polls employed, from 1993-2008.

the recently created PA and resulting elections. It also reflected the belief that the new

selection institution would be monopolized by Fatah. No strong incentive structure

existed to compel Hamas to participate in the PA, and the costs of associating with a

policy Hamas termed collusion (with Israel) would affect its strong credentials in

resisting the Occupation. However, Hamas may also have recognized the growing

importance of the PA as an employer of Palestinians, seeking to avoid a confrontation

either with either the PA or Fatah. Saul Mishal and Avraham Sela note that the PA had

become the largest single employer in the Palestinian Territories in January 1995 (Mishal

and Sela, 2000 139), and after the PA released Hamas prisoners in late-October 1995,

Hamas spokesmen began referring only to �refraining� from elections rather than

boycotting them (ibid 134).

The creation of the PA was indeed dominated by Fatah, who had negotiated the accords

with Israel. Nevertheless, Hamas encouraged its members to build connections with the

PA and recognized the inevitability that many of its members would join. Its rhetoric

called the PA an administrative rather than representative body, so that its involvement

(in the PLC) would be seen less as a legitimization of the body as a representative

legislature. The allegations by Hamas, of Fatah�s corruption and collaboration with

Israel, helped foster popular dissatisfaction with Fatah, but were increasingly directed at

Arafat�s leadership. Hamas and Fatah both recognized the threat the other could pose.

Hamas was wary of beginning or being involved in Palestinian infighting, believing it

would be blamed in the media and public regardless of the realities of the provocation.

Each group also had relatively reliable information about the other�s decision-making and

intentions. Nevertheless, Hamas and Fatah both displayed restraint in provoking

Palestinian infighting, despite worsening relations. Threat perception would have been

reduced by the more fluid identity structure of Palestinian politics at the time, in which an

in-group/out-group relationship would not have existed. Hamas had no need for highly-

centralized organization given its ground-up support strategies. In 1995, Hamas

officially created a distinction between the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, its military

wing, and its political activities (Mishal and Sela, 2000 143). When the PA security chief

(at the time) Mohammed Dahlan reached an agreement with Izz al-Din in Gaza, it was

without the knowledge Hamas�s political leadership in Gaza (Kristianasen, 1999 29).

Hamas�s internal discourse and preference-ranking were also not hegemonic. A

conference of wealthy Hamas businessmen in Khartoum, the Sudanese capital, in

November 1995 supported participation in elections against the majority view within

Hamas (ibid 134). After the PA released Hamas prisoners in October 1995, Fatah also

managed to secure a ceasefire of Hamas forces within PA-administered territory. If

Hamas imposed a ceasefire in PA administered territory, the PA would no longer be

obligated to police areas essentially controlled by Hamas. Therefore, Hamas would not

be as likely to face violent conflicts with Fatah or its members in the PA. Due to the less

developed and centralized nature of political institutions, Hamas and Fatah did not see

each other as directly threatening groups in the short-term. Past cooperation increased

hopes of future factional cooperation, and personal connections and reliable information

further reduced the perception of threat.

Mishal and Sela�s The Palestinian Hamas presents a document prepared by Hamas for its

high-level political-leadership in August 1992, which was captured and translated by the

IDF. This document outlines clear priorities and beliefs in a pragmatic manner:

"There are four possible alternatives:

1. Hamas participates in the elections. 2. Hamas boycotts the elections and is contented with calling the people also to boycott the elections... [sic] against the elections. 3. Hamas boycotts the elections and also attempts to disrupt them by force in order to delegitimize them as well as the whole peace process. 4. Hamas participates under another name, the essence of which would be determined in accordance with the circumstances of the next phase and the results of the negotiations." (Document, August 1992 Table 5.1 in Sela and Mishal 124-130).7

An analysis of this internal Hamas document reveals the pliability of the developing

Palestinian political opposition, even in early years, and its potential for political

moderation and integration. Hamas expected any militant actions it took against Fatah or

the PA

would necessarily mean a civil war in which we would lose more [than Fatah would] because our real power is our popularity, whereas Fatah's power derives from a combination of both financial [resources] and control of the important institutions. (Document 3)

Because resistance was a priority, it saw an �attempt to diminish the legitimacy of the

elections and in effect the negotiations and the concessions that it entails� as potentially

7 Hereafter the internal Hamas document in Sela and Mishal will be referred to as �Document� including the section number, or table number if specified. This document is reproduced in part as Appendix A.

beneficial but unlikely to succeed (Document Table 5.1). Hamas was keenly aware that

the peace negotiations could produce meaningful and noticeable gains in public goods,

such as freezing the expansion of Jewish settlements, and thus galvanize support in favor

of the peace talks (Document 5). Hamas has seen Oslo, entailing recognition of Israel

and cessation of hostilities, as partly contradictory to its mission. Hamas has consistently

condemned Oslo in its rhetoric (with decreasing intensity) since before the 1996 elections

campaign. In its internal document, Hamas maintained three preferences it considered

central to any decision taken with regard to elections: the maintenance of its popular base

and growth of popularity; the continuation of jihad for the liberation of Palestine; and

continued resistance to the loss of Palestinian rights (Document 1). Hamas�s

commitment to private goods served it well in the mid-1990s, and incentives to allocate

public goods were not high.8 They also could serve to alienate the base of its winning

coalition by appearing to endorse Oslo and thus appearing to compromise on Palestinian

rights. Hamas did, however, urge its supporters to take positions in the PA to distribute

services to Palestinians, but emphasized that these positions were administrative and not

representative (Mishal and Sela, 2000 139).

Its relatively small support base in the 1990s made it ill equipped to compete with Fatah

militarily or politically on the national level. Still, it ruled out disrupting elections

because of the potential ramifications. It feared that even a passive boycott could

facilitate �the opportunity to Fatah to contain Hamas� (Document Table 5.1).

Nevertheless the personal connections between Fatah and Hamas members would have

8 Allocating public goods through private organizations, like charities and Izz al-Din, would not be considered private goods.

reduced Hamas leaders� beliefs that Fatah would crack down on its activities. The tenzim

leader Marwan Barghouti, now in an Israeli prison, was �adamant about preserving

independence from the PA� (Weinberger, 2006 6). While believing non-participation

would somewhat isolate Hamas, personal political connections no doubt reduced the

perception of threat from the outside.9

Beliefs in the credible possibility of a future PA or Fatah crackdown led Hamas to reject

violent disruption of elections to deny Fatah the pretext of �containing [the] movement,

dismantling its institutions, and ending its activities� (Document 1). A boycott would

deny it a potential boon to its popularity and the means through which to both increase

the resource base and distribution of services. Hamas rightly predicted and feared,

however, that participation within a political structure would require altering its discourse

in a way that might conflict with its overarching goals, such as armed resistance to the

Occupation (Document 2). Its political leaders were keenly aware of Hamas�s limitations

on campaigning and achieving seats, and they did not expect to win a majority, by any

calculation. When this secret document was prepared, in August 1992, they expected

they might win a third of legislative seats (Document 4), though CPSR data suggests no

more than 13.3% support nationally (Poll #3, CPSR October 5-10, 1993). Khaled Hroub

explains Hamas�s political objections to elections on the basis of the Oslo Accords.

From its establishment, Hamas had steadfastly refused to run in any national elections, either for PC or for the presidency of the Palestinian Authority (PA). As both these structures grew out of the Oslo accords,

9 Arafat and others may have perceived a greater threat, after Oslo, of Barghouti and others, to derail the investments they had put into diplomacy and negotiation.

which Hamas opposed and considered illegitimate, it had never recognized the legitimacy of either. (Hroub, 2006 6)

One of Hamas�s founding members, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin had made reference to

Hamas�s participation as the lesser of two-evils. Hamas knew that a boycott was unlikely

to be successful enough to deny the PA political legitimacy. Encouraging a future Fatah

crackdown would have been as likely to have effects as adverse on the prosecution of

attacks, as would moderation. Hamas had also signaled its intention not to derail

elections by supporting candidates and imposing a ceasefire in PA administered territory.

Even a superficial boycott would allow it to both achieve some presence in the new

Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and save face with its more hard-line coalition

members � its political base. Hamas attempted to de-emphasize the connection between

elections and self-rule, though �the coincidence [of the elections and self-rule] leaves a

vague impression [that such a connection indeed exists]� (Document 6).

Results: Table 2 (October 1993 - July 1995) LegPart

(coef., std, p) LegPart

(coef., std, p) Probability of Defection from Hamas to

Fatah

ShiseDisenfranc

SWh

SWf −−

(-0.51, 0.36, 0.2239)

(-0.25, 0.13, 0.1623)

Probability of Defection from Hamas to Selectorate

ShiseDisenfranc

SWh −−1

(0.38, 0.29, 0.2565)

(0.23, 0.10, 0.1195)

Hamas Loyalty Norm (WH/S) (0.38, 0.29, 0.2565) (-0.97, 0.20, 0.0157) HSupPart (HamasSupport*WH/S) (1.48, 0.27, 0.0122)

r2= 0.41084 0.9457 p= 0.50395 0.03064

As expected, Hamas�s support for elections within its own coalition (HSupPart) has a

statistically-significant positive effect on political participation. This accounts for the

ineffectiveness of Hamas�s boycott and the fact that Hamas members did participate in

elections. During this period, the first regression explains just over 40% of the variance

in the dependent variable. The second regression explains just under 95% of the variance.

The limited availability of statistics on internal Hamas support for elections constrains

our data set to between October 1993 and July 1995. The first regression is not as

statistically significant as it is for the same regression from 1993 to 2002, thus HSupPart

is worth analyzing.

Graph 4

Internal Hamas Selectorate

-0.6000

-0.4000

-0.2000

0.0000

0.2000

0.4000

0.6000

0.8000

Oct-93

Dec-93

Feb-94

Apr-94

Jun-9

4

Aug-94

Oct-94

Dec-94

Feb-95

Apr-95

Jun-9

5Prob

abili

ty HamasW/SProbH-FProbH-SHSupPA

In this time, Hamas internal support for elections rose steadily until the decision not to

participate in elections, which would indicate a weakening internal loyalty norm

(increasing HSupPart*WH). Participation through support for independent candidates,

the cease fire in PA territory, and encouragement of its members participating in the PA,

might indicate an early Hamas shift away from merely resistance and charity as goods to

its supporters.

Despite discouragement of its members from voting, its members still showed up at the

ballot boxes, and Hamas had expected this. This also reveals a point about the affinity of

Hamas supporters for the control of Hamas � the Movement of the Islamic Resistance.

Hamas also means zeal, and its members zealously advocate certain ideals that, while

vilified in the West, in many cases �do not essentially differ from those held in the West�

(Hamad, 2006 4).10 Nevertheless, the distinction between the leadership in Palestine, the

Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, and the expatriate leadership reduces the effect of popular

Palestinian support for a policy option incompatible with more militant rhetoric. In

Israel, Jordan, and the Masha�al Affair, P. R. Kumaraswamy describes a tale of intrigue

that seems fit for a John le Carré novel. In 1997, Khaled Mesha�al, at the time Hamas�s

Jordan Bureau Chief, was poisoned by ten agents of the Israeli security organization

Mossad. International pressure from President Clinton and King Hussein eventually led

to Netanyahu giving Mesha�al the antidote to the poison. The result was Jordan�s

deportation of Mesha�al. Much like the PLO throughout its history, Hamas�s actions

have presented a threat to both Israeli and Jordanian designs for Palestinian sovereignty

and governance (Kumaraswamy, 2003 125). Hamas at various times also presented

threats to the PLO�s dominance and the authority of Palestinian President Yasir Arafat.

The Second Intifada began in 2000, and witnessed a brief sidelining of Palestinian

factionalism to the common misery brought about by the escalated military operations

10 This is a statement on Hamas�s view of transparency and accountability by Ghazi Hamad, the editor of al-Risala, Hamas�s weekly publication.

and the Occupation. Arafat�s death in 2004 created new political conditions that raised

questions of whether Hamas could or would participate fully in national politics.

Hamas in Politics?

In November 2004, after the death of Palestinian President Yasir Arafat, Palestinians

chose Mahmoud Abbas as their leader. Khaled Hroub explains that Hamas�s abstention

from presenting a candidate for the Presidential elections was not fundamentally rooted in

opposition to Oslo or the process of elections.

Hamas chose to remain entirely on the sidelines of the November 2004 elections for president of the PA following the death of Yasir Arafat. Hamas believed that it would be illogical to present a candidate for the presidency of a body and indeed an entire system completely dominated by its traditional rival, Fatah. (Hroub, 2006 7)

As a pragmatic and strategically-oriented movement, its participation in 2006 PLC

elections were all but inevitable after its strong showing in municipal elections in 2004

and 2005 (Special Poll, PCPSR December 2005). After its surprising electoral gains in

the municipal elections, largely due to widespread perception of its rival�s corruption,

Hamas decided to contest 2006 PLC elections under the Change and Reform List �to

become a strong opposition force in the new PLC� (Hamad, 2006 3).

The al-Aqsa intifada has created new realities on the ground. It has made the Oslo program a thing of the past. All parties, including the Zionist occupiers, now refer to the demise of Oslo. Our people today are more united, more aware, and stronger than before. Hamas is entering these elections after having succeeded, with God�s help, in affirming its line of resistance and in ingraining it deep in the hearts of our people.

Brothers and sisters: this is our program, which we put before you, sharing with you, hand in hand, our ambition. We do not claim to be able to work miracles, or to have a magic wand. But together we will keep trying to realize our national project with its great aims . . . one free and capable nation. (The Change and Reform Electoral Platform in Hroub, 2006 8-9)

Hamas maintained a continuing rejection of the idea of the Oslo peace in its

connection with the PA and PLC. The unjustifiable nature of such a distinction

helped weaken Hamas�s resistance to participation. In the PLC elections, Naomi

Weinberger explains that �the decision to participate in elections within the

framework of the Palestinian Authority was a reversal of its earlier political

stand� (Weinberger, 2006 13). The decision also reflects significant growth in

Hamas public support since 1996.

The victory was in part a mandate for Hamas to tackle key issues like corruption and

reform. There were also certain structural elements of Palestinian politics that

contributed to Hamas�s victory in receiving PLC mandates (seats), which may not have

reflected a corresponding popular mandate. Naomi Weinberger explains that Hamas

support was partly contingent on Fatah�s failures in fully exploiting the complex

proportional and individual representation aspects of the Palestinian electoral system.

Despite Fatah's efforts to put forward appealing new candidates who were known locally for professional competence rather than factional loyalty, Fatah in the West Bank was considered a movement of social conservatism, with its base primarily in small localities. (Weinberger, 2006 13)

In The Hamas Victory: Implications and Future Challenges, Ziad Abu Zayyad, a PLC

member and former minister, claims that Hamas�s victory �does not necessarily

constitute an endorsement either of its agenda or its modus operandi and military option�

(Abu Zayyad, 2006 107). While he acknowledges that some of the shift in politics is due

to the perception of the corruption, he also claims that Palestinians see the Occupation as

the chief source of problems. A Hamas spokesman, Ghazi Hamad, saw the elections as a

mandate for Hamas to pursue law enforcement, political reform, and job creation

(Hamad, 2006 6).

Results: Table 3 (October 2003 � December 2005):

LegPart (coef., std, p)

Probability of Defection from Hamas to Fatah

ShiseDisenfranc

SWh

SWf −−

(0.3, 0.03, 0.0521)

Probability of Defection from Hamas to Selectorate

ShiseDisenfranc

SWh −−1

(-0.34, 0.028, 0.0522)

Hamas Loyalty Norm (WH/S) (0.29, 0.009, 0.0201) r2= 0.99786 p= 0.029

Between 1996 and 2003, several major changes occurred regarding the effect of defection

probabilities and Hamas�s loyalty norm on political participation. Unlike in the period of

the first PLC elections, the probability of defecting to Fatah causes a positive effect on

participation. No doubt despite its shortcomings, Fatah managed to maintain a popular

base and was still associated with progress made through negotiations. Despite its

position as an �incorruptible� party, Hamas still had trouble establishing credibility

internationally. This regression clearly also shows that the probability of defecting from

Hamas to the rest of the selectorate has a negative effect on participation. This means

that unlike until 2003, Hamas has had a positive effect on the selectorate in the recent

period. Additionally, as Hamas�s loyalty norm weakens, participation also increases.

Khaled Hroub�s contention that Hamas has undertaken a political moderation appears to

be validated by data. Hamas has always been strategic in its thinking, and Weinberger, in

analyzing Hroub�s contention, asserts that there is �considerable nuance in [Hamas�s]

positions with regard to resistance and a two-state solution, as well as a progressive de-

emphasis on religion in favor of a programmatic, state-building approach� (Weinberger,

2006 15).

Hamas�s loyalty norm has weakened consistently since its victory in the PLC in January

2006. This trend is an indication of the effects of Fatah�s incumbency, which will be

discussed at greater length in the following section as components of Fatah�s drive to

preserve its incumbency � and thus political survival. Hamas�s inexperience at national

governance encouraged it to default back to private goods to its traditional support-base

shortly after the election, and as its loyalty norm progressively weakened. Thus as more

resources are allocated toward private goods after the election, these goods are being

distributed over a far smaller number of people as well. Those who had defected to

Hamas�s coalition in hopes of �punishing Fatah� for corruption may also not have

appreciated the international blockade, which will be discussed in Section VII. These

would have lost their access to public goods as a result, and would not be ensured access

to the increased quantity of private goods, distributed in increasing quantity to Hamas�s

traditional base.

Graph 5: (2004-2006)

Participation, Defection, and Loyalty Norm

-1.2

-0.7

-0.2

0.3

0.8

1.3

Sep

-04

Oct

-04

Nov

-04

Dec

-04

Jan-

05

Feb-

05

Mar

-05

Apr

-05

May

-05

Jun-

05

Jul-0

5

Aug

-05

Sep

-05

Oct

-05

Nov

-05

Dec

-05

Jan-

06Prob

abili

ty PLCPartHamasW/SProbH-FProbH-S

Conclusions: There are clear indications of positive developments in the integration and full

participation of the Palestinian opposition into the political system. Nevertheless, Fatah,

Israeli, and international inflexibility have isolated Hamas and helped reduce its loyalty

norm. The domestic and international political, economic and social changes in the years

between 1996 and 2006 will be examined more closely in the following sections.

Nevertheless, the effects of the international and Israeli blockades of the Hamas-run PA,

and Gaza in particular, have served to reduce Hamas�s loyalty norm and increase the

probability of Hamas coalition members defecting to the selectorate. These conditions

make it more likely that Hamas will continue to default back on the provision of private

goods, like those to its security services as it has done in the last few years. Even during

the 2006 PLC election campaigns, the Carter Center announced �credible reports of use

of Palestinian Authority resources for the benefit of Fateh candidates and numerous

reports of campaigning in many mosques on behalf of Islamic Resistance Movement

(Hamas) candidates� (The Carter Center, 2006). Strengthening loyalty norms and

increased production of private goods also means that the probability of Hamas returning

to its tenuous position outside the political system is more likely. The final section will

look more closely at the effects of these conditions on domestic Palestinian relations and

violence. First, it is necessary to examine an important trend in all polities, and a major

component of the shift in the 2006 legislative elections: corruption.

IV. Corruption

Incumbent Tendencies:

Incumbent leaders tend to favor strong loyalty norms, meaning a low winning coalition

and also generally a reduced selectorate. The strengthening loyalty norm encourages the

production of private goods distributed over a smaller group of people. Corruption tends

to benefit incumbent leaders by allowing them to steal resources from state funds to

allocate as private goods. These resources are then kept by the leader personally to

protect her personal incumbency and distribute to members of W.

In addition to failing to root out corruption, leaders with small winning

coalitions might endorse corruption as a way of rewarding supporters.

(Bueno de Mesquita, 2003 103)

A small winning coalition and selectorate increases leaders� affinities for corruption by

reducing the amount of resources needed for political survival (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003

162). The Logic of Political Survival refers to this trend as kleptocracy, constructed state-

networks of corruption. As the loyalty norm weakens, and W increases and S decrease,

kleptocracy approaches zero (ibid 164). By discouraging public goods and encouraging

private goods, corruption adversely affects not just money but civil liberties,

transparency, foreign policy and the peace as well. We now trace the growth of

corruption under the Palestinian National Authority (PA). This corruption, as has been

previously mentioned, was strongly associated with Fatah�s domination of the PA, and

was a key source of its municipal and legislative defeats (2004-2005 & 2006).

Tracing the Growth of Corruption since Oslo:

An early test of the PA police, in November 1994, resulted in 14 Hamas supporters shot

dead at a peaceful rally in Gaza (Tamimi 191). A Lancet article concisely summarized

the 1997 Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group (PHRMG) �The State of Human

Rights in Palestine� Report as simply �worse.� The group�s director, Bassem Eid,

attributed declining human rights conditions partly to officially sanctioned abuse and

corruption (Fisherman, 1998). Though elections had been held less than a year prior to

the report�s publication, Eid claimed that �criticisms of the Authority are effectively

illegal � political opponents are jailed as an expedient means of blocking opposition�

(ibid). The dismissal of two senior judges, for the criticism of a minister and ruling

against the PA respectively (ibid), indicates attempts by the leadership of Fatah to

strengthen its loyalty norm by withholding private goods from members on the fringe of

its winning coaliton. Over time this means that, as its loyalty norm strengthened, Fatah

would increase private goods over a fewer number of people at the expense of public

goods. It would also isolate those on the edge of its coalition, whose private benefits

were marginal compared to those in the core of the coalition.

Foreign policy is another public good, and Fatah had staked its popularity and reputation

on the provision of tangible results from the peace process. According to Shikaki in

Peace Now or Hamas Later, in 1998:

Most students see the peace process as an American tool to stabilize

Arafat�s corrupt regime and maintain the domestic status quo. The more

disillusioned the students are with the PA about issues like corruption,

mismanagement, and lack of democratization, the more opposed to the

peace process they become. (Shikaki, 1998, 32)

Tessler and Nachtwey observed, in Palestinian Political Attitudes: An Analysis of

Survey Data from The West Bank and Gaza, that despite fluctuating Palestinian

support for peace between January 1994 and the PLC Elections, Fatah managed to

maintain a consistent base of support (Tessler and Nachtwey, 1999 25).

Conspiratorial views on the impact of aid also play a part in defining particularly

Arab discourse on the issues. Corruption has no doubt injured investment in

foreign policy, if just in monetary terms alone, impeding progress toward

Palestinian reform or the implementation of international agreements. Shikaki

mentions that had the nation-building project in Palestine failed, Oslo could have

collapsed (Shikaki, 1998 38). We have already mentioned why the PA favored

Fatah.11 The system was also originally negotiated to be an interim authority

toward the end of creating an internationally-recognized Palestinian state. The

initially transient nature of the PA did not provide the requisite steps toward

institutionalizing consistent elections. This subsequently encouraged the

autocratic trends that strengthened Fatah�s loyalty norm over time. Though

Palestinians consistently ranked their political system more free than Egypt but

less so than Israel in the 1990s, �only about a quarter of the population [said] that

the Palestinian political system is moving toward democracy� (Shikaki, 1998, 39).

Municipal elections, held between 2004 and 2005 in Gaza and the West Bank,

showed a clear public dissatisfaction with the type of private good allocation

associated with corruption.12 Michael Denoeux examined 11 polls by the PCPSR

and Bir Zeit University in the West Bank from January 2004 to June 2005 in The

Politics Of Corruption In Palestine: Evidence From Recent Public-Opinion Polls.

Over this time, 86.5% of poll respondents believed corruption existed and 57.3%

believed officials were not generally charged with graft allegations (Denoeux,

2005 120). About 18% believed corruption was the most significant factor

impeding Abbas, which included responses like the practices of Israel, the PLO, 11 Fath is actually just a reversed Arabic acronym for the Palestine Liberation Organization (harakat tahrir filistiin), and its members personally negotiated Oslo (I) and the Taba� Accords (Oslo II). 12 The First Round was held on December 23, 2004 in �36 population centers� in the West Bank and January 27, 2005. The Second Round was held on May 5, 2005 in �76 [population centers] in the West Bank and 6 in Gaza Strip.� The Third Round was held on September 29, 2005 in �104 population centers in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.� All �seats were distributed according to the Proportional Representation System (lists) according to the new Local Councils� Elections Law No. (10) of 2005.� (Palestinian Central Elections Commission, http://www.elections.ps/template.aspx?id=351)

armed groups, and PA coordination (ibid). Though corruption was not

necessarily seen as the most important policy priority, about half of those polled

in municipal election exit polls believed that fighting corruption should be the

PA�s first or second priority (ibid 122). The expectation that Hamas would fight

corruption, and provide the people greater public goods, was a strong deciding

factor in municipal election exit polls.

Extrapolating from this and Denouex's analysis, it is clear that Fatah was the

faction most closely associated with corruption in the PA (Denouex, 2005 124).

In June 2005, Palestinians polled were split on whether they thought corruption

would increase or decrease (38% each) (ibid 123), and over the period 56.6%

believed the PA did not properly approach tackling corruption (ibid 121). Such

high beliefs in the mismanagement of funds would suggest that a credible

challenger would arise that promises greater public goods. Hamas�s

incorruptibility was a major reason for their electoral success. However, low-

turnout in large cities also hurt Fatah�s support, and local voters were more

focused on corruption than issues like the peace process (CPSR Special Poll,

December 21, 2005). Hamas�s perceived strength nevertheless aided its

credibility as a challenger in the 2006 PLC elections. Widespread pessimism that

the government�s fight against corruption was not progressing led voters to select

Hamas in part on the belief it would encourage the distribution of public goods.

Modeling Corruption:

Expectations:

Corruption, according to the Selectorate Theory, is strongly correlated to the size of the

winning coalition and the loyalty norm. The more public goods are funneled instead to

private goods, fewer people receive benefits from government policies. After 1996, as

the incumbent, Fatah began to foster the growth of private good distribution networks

through the PA. These occurred either as political favors from politicians to members of

the selectorate, or from higher up the political ladder to individual politicians. Fatah�s

support had been contingent on the peace process and negotiations beginning with the

Madrid Conference in 1991 and Oslo I in 1992. After 1996, Hamas�s support had been

contingent upon a tenuous balance between limited participation in the PA and

condemnation of negotiations. The effect of support for these competing foreign policies

correlates to support for each group, as will be examined shortly. Between Fatah�s initial

electoral dominance and its decline in 2006, it began to be seen as an increasingly

autocratic and corrupt force.

Graph 6: (1996-2006)

Corruption and PA W/S and W

0.000.100.200.300.400.500.600.700.800.901.00

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

% (0

-1) Corruption

WW/S

The regressions for corruption in The Logic of Political Survival measure the effect of

residual democracy rating (WS:DemRes), W, and W/S against corruption perception and

construction (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003 204). We do a regression for annual averages of

W and W/S from 1996 to 2006, drawing these figures from support for Hamas rather than

Fatah beginning in 2006. We do not have a measure of democracy for the PA and cannot

include the effects of Democratic Peace hypotheses, which are not integrally relevant.

Nevertheless, we should expect a negative effect of both W and W/S since 1996 (ibid).

One expects an autocratic tendency for Fatah as the incumbent, so there should be an

increasing trend in corruption and a decreasing trend for W/S from from 1996 until the

2006 elections. The data for corruption are annual averages from PCPSR for those

respondents who believed that corruption did, or definitely did, exist. This measure is

very similar to that employed in regressions in The Logic of Political Survival, which

measures perception of corruption internationally over a greater period of time. All of

these variables are computed as averages for the figures available each year from 1996

until January 2006. We should find negative effects of both independent variables on the

dependent variable.

Results:

Table 4: Corruption, W, W/S (1996-2006): Corruption

Coefficient Corruption STD

Corruption 2-Tail p-value

W 6.76 2.02 0.0101 W/S -5.76 1.38 0.0031 p=0.00066 r2=0.83988

The regression explains 84% of the variances in corruption from 1996 to 2006, and is

very statistically significant. Each independent variable has a strong, statistically

significant effect as well. However, W actually causes a rise in Corruption, the opposite

of predicted by Selectorate Theory (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003 204). In part this is

attributable to the eight year gap in elections. Internal incentives for Fatah to reduce

corruption were weak between the first legislative elections in 1996 and the first

municipal elections round in 2004. As expected, W/S has a negative effect on

Corruption, which suggests that as the loyalty norm strengthens, more private goods are

indeed produced. These are distributed by means of political patronage and personal

loyalty by Fatah from moneys like those received through international aid. The rising

threat of Hamas and fractured state of the security services recently have also provided

incentives for Fatah to strengthen its loyalty norm and skim more money off of foreign

aid for political and actual survival. The diversion of funds from public to private goods

corresponds to a higher probability that members will defect from a winning coalition

(smaller W/S). The change in loyalty norm means those outside the coalition benefit less,

because they are not receiving private goods. Thus from 1996 to 2004, Fatah would have

had strong incentives to promote private goods. No doubt some like the tenzim and

Barghouti criticized this corruption, but as Fatah�s loyalty norm strengthened, dissident

members were more likely to be pushed to the fringe or to defect.

Thus Fatah�s regime from 1996 to 2006 appears to reflect the normal trend of régime

kleptocracy. Were Fatah�s loyalty norm to weaken, perception of corruption would fall

as more money is diverted to public goods like housing, economic activity, peace, and

perhaps foreign policy. However, it is possible that Fatah�s loyalty was not the most

important factor in delivering on the peace initiative, especially in the early and mid-

1990s. Israel�s resources far outstrip those of the PA and Fatah in negotiating or

implementing any peace accords. Therefore, the effect of Fatah�s provision of this public

good would be less significant on corruption than Israeli effects.13 As Fatah�s loyalty

norm strengthens, it diverts money to other uses like private rewards for members of its

coalition. Corruption had a significantly negative effect on Fatah�s popularity throughout

the 1990s and until the 2006 PLC Elections. This factor will be examined further, but

clearly the key factor for corruption in the territories, as predicted by the Selectorate

Model, is Fatah�s loyalty norm.

Fatah�s reliance on international assistance in diplomacy and foreign funding to

implement its domestic and foreign policy initiatives encourages private goods to Fatah

members, while general economic well-being may be devalued in policy priorities. The

US and Israel need Fatah support in their respective wars against terror, and have

provided Fatah external incentives to encourage corruption within the PA. There still

seems to be a relatively high level of PA private good provision to Fatah, which is not

surprising given that Fatah has institutionalized its presence within the PA over its decade

in power. A lack of transparency and the irregularity of elections have generally

encouraged greater Fatah corruption, and have isolated Fatah policies from popular

desires. Hamas�s provision of private goods through its grass-roots charity organizations,

as a challenger not in power, was not seen as encouraging corruption because of the

13 Selectorate Theory sees foreign policy as a dyadic game in which greater allocation of resources toward foreign policy by one actor helps it beat the other.

Islamic norms of giving charity (al-zakaa). Municipal elections were the first indication

of Palestinian discontent with a kleptocratic government, and its belief that Hamas would

rigorously tackle the endemic graft problem.

Conclusions:

Selectorate Theory would expect a lack of regular elections, like election rigging, to be

indicative of tendencies that lead to kleptocracy. It would also expect foreign interests to

seek to keep Palestinian political participation low and support for the government low.

This encourages the production of private goods at the expense of public goods like

foreign policy. It also aids in the US and Israeli wars on terrorist organizations �like

Hamas.�14 This serves Israel and the US by providing them public goods, like foreign

policy assurance and reduced risk of terrorism, as well as private goods, like serving

private policy interests.15 These external elements have a destabilizing force on relations

between Israel and Palestine, and the Palestinians. Selectorate Theory also has

predictions about when states initiate conflict, and how they behave. The following

section will examine these predictions and examine the Second Intifada, a wave of

violence conflict between Israel and Palestinians that began in 2000.

14 Hamas, as an umbrella organization, does fund and support terrorist activities, but calling Hamas a terrorist organization like al-Qaeda, devalues the important cause of analyzing Hamas�s political behavior. 15 See Mearsheimer, J. and Walt, S. (2007), The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

V. From Occupation to Uprising ( اإلحتالل إلى اإلنتفاضةمن فلسطين (

Since June 1967, Israel has occupied all of the territory commonly

referred to as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. With occupation has

come Israeli responsibility for ruling approximately 1.3 million

Palestinian Arabs...16

Since its occupation of the West Bank in 1967 the Israeli government has

avoided any substantial investment in the occupied territories' economic

infrastructure.

(Emile Sahliyeh, In Search of Leadership: West Bank Politics Since 1967)

The First Intifada and the Peace Process: 1967-1991

The creation of Israel in 1948 produced hundreds of thousands of refugees in camps

throughout the neighboring Arab countries. The primary focus on the issue of Palestinian

refugees shifted to the Occupation after 1987, when Palestinians began a coordinated

campaign of civil disobedience and calculated violence called the First Intifada.17 The

aims of the Intifada, portrayed in some Western media as disorganized �Arab rage� or

violence, was not actually intended toward the aim of violently destroying the

Occupation. Rather, in contrast to growing pressure on the PLO to compromise with

Israel, the Intifada was intended �to draw world attention to their grievances and political

aspirations� (Sahliyeh, 1988 177). In essence, it was both a campaign for media

16 The number of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza has risen to just under 4 million as of 2007. 17 al-intifada means �the shaking off.�

coverage and for bolstering the morale of a people who had lost rights and dignity. The

Occupation had led to harsh interrogation practices, administrative detentions and the

demolition of homes of �suspected militants� within Palestine (Dowty, 2005 132).

The Occupation was not the only external force affecting politics in the Territories,

though it was the most significant. Jordan and the PLO, an organization forced outside

Palestine until Oslo, also exerted influence within the West Bank and Palestinians were

�subject to fluctuations in the political influence and political fortunes of the outside

players they follow� (Sahliyeh, 1988 7). Israel had attempted to create and buttress local

rural elites in Palestine, and this served to undermine "the political power of the West

Bank nationalist elite" (ibid 164). There was also no hegemonic Palestinian voice, and

alignments of pro-PLO pragmatists and pro-Jordanian factions differed in their

approaches to resolving problems, particularly in whether UN Resolution 242 should be

accepted (ibid 167). Some Palestinians, like Sari Nusseibeh, even argued that demanding

equal rights for Palestinians within the Israeli political system would be most likely to

ensure Palestinian rights (ibid 173). Israeli opposition to territorial concessions,

particularly by the Likud Party, hurt Palestinian attempts at negotiated settlement,

although �pragmatic PLO� politicians had initiated talks with Israel after the 1982

Lebanon War (ibid 171). Other PLO members, like some security personnel �crossed

over and joined in acts of violence, reflecting internal Palestinian political struggles"

(Weinberger, 2006 6).

The effects of the Intifada were mixed and Israelis and Palestinians may both have lost

out as a result of the violence that followed acts of civil disobedience. On the one hand,

the First Intifada helped break the normative deterrence created by Palestinian fear of the

Israeli Occupation. Many Palestinians who were directly affected by the Intifada �were

no longer fearful of confronting the Israeli army� (Sahliyeh, 1988 3). Nevertheless, it

may also have made Israelis more hawkish on short-term practices like detention and

more dovish on long-term concessions on territory (Dowty, 2005 135). Emile Sahliyeh

claims the Intifada was �particularly detrimental to Jordan's interests� in political control

of the West Bank (Sahliyeh, 1988 184). To this point, as discussed in the Political

Participation section, local politics was divided over support for the PLO and for

Jordanian initiatives. After the 1982 Lebanon War, there was a joint PLO-Jordanian

initiative "culminating in the signing of an agreement between King Hussein and PLO

Chairman Yasir Arafat in February 1985... a year later the agreement was suspended and

Jordanian-PLO relations were ruptured" (ibid 2). The PLO�s refusal to recognize UN

Resolution 242 significantly injured its ability to portray itself as a legitimate negotiating

body to Israel and the US (Dowty, 2005 130). The PLO also coordinated violent activity

with Islamist movements under the National Unified Leadership of the Uprising (NULU),

which �operated in a clandestine manner, away from foreign media exposure and

political visibility� (Sahliyeh, 183). Nevertheless, the PLO eventually agreed to

recognize Israel, renounce violence, and accept Resolution 242, after which negotiations

between the PLO and United States commenced (Dowty, 2005 136).

The al-Aqsa Intifada, the Second Intifada:

The Second Intifada began after a brief period of optimism that the government of Ehud

Barak would commit itself to a just, peaceful settlement with the Palestinians. The

failure of the Camp David Summit in 2000 was attributed by the Israelis to Palestinian

inflexibility. It was attributed by the Palestinians to Israeli inflexibility, and Arafat�s

popularity increased with his image as uncompromising on Palestinian rights (Tamimi,

2007 199). Israeli external security had improved since the first Intifada, having signed a

peace agreement with Jordan in 1994 (Egypt in 1979). Little tangible progress toward

Palestinian statehood, rights, or final settlement issues had been achieved, however, and

when Ariel Sharon visited al-haram al-sharif with IDF protection, he enraged the Islamic

World and triggered the Second Intifada (Tamimi, 2007 199). The Israeli response to

another movement of calculated violence and civil disobedience was to systematically

destroy �the PA's security capabilities-headquarters, accomodations, and prisons�

(Weinberger, 2006 7). The PA in fact began freeing prisoners, claiming they could not

guarantee protection against Israeli attacks, and Barak threatened to hold the PA

accountable for attacks against Israel (Tamimi, 2007 200). The election of Sharon and

the Likud Party in 2001 dramatically changed the character of Israeli-US relations and

has had a pronounced effect on Palestinian politics that will be examined in the next

section.

The Intifada was advocated by tenzim like Marwan Barghouti, whereas it was condemned

by prominent figures like Mahmoud Abbas. Abbas (Abu Mazen), who was appointed the

first Palestinian Prime Minister in March 2003, resigned in October with the feeling that

he had little power to affect change. Despite being an old comrade of Arafat�s, he and

the President quickly �became rivals,� and Abbas�s condemnations of the al-Aqsa

Intifada lost him favor and popularity until his resignation (Tamimi, 2007 204). The

tenzim advocated greater cooperation with Hamas and greater militancy. This placed

strong pressure on Arafat�s political survival while he was under military siege by Israel

and cut-off by the United States. In Hamas: A History from Within, Azzam Tamimi

claims that Arafat learned too late �that what Israel was looking for in him was not so

much a partner as a collaborator� [who] preferred to die under siege rather than go

down in history as a traitor� (Tamimi, 2007 204-205).

Model for the Second Intifada:

The Logic of Political Survival forwards seven hypotheses of state motivation in and after

warfare. The authors acknowledge the model�s shortcomings in accounting for

particularities of issues in disputes that lead to war (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003 423).

They also explain that their hypotheses� are based on the assumption that after the

cessation of conflict, foreign policy interests of the vanquished and victor will continue to

be opposed. In seeking to model the Second Intifada, the limitations of generalizing a

conflict that has been ongoing and unresolved should not be understated. Still, these

hypotheses have important implications for explaining state action, which will primarily

concentrate on Israeli action in this section.

The political, security, and economic costs of �declaring war� for Palestinians are muted

by the continuation of an Occupation that renders these effects on Palestinians anyway.

Nevertheless, the costs of supporting policies like uprising have become greater, and the

potential benefits slimmer, for Palestinians over time. Hamas�s response to renewed PLO

vigor in Oslo negotiations with Israel was a call for the intensification of the Intifada

(Sela and Mishal, 2000 120). In addition to detention, imprisonment, and movement and

economic restrictions on Palestinians, Israel also targets certain people for assassination.

Territory:

Many Israelis consider Gaza and the West Bank to be necessary for total Israeli security.

Settlements have progressed steadily in the West Bank over the last several decades

despite the withdrawal of settlers and the IDF from Gaza in 2005. The Golan Heights

were unilaterally annexed in the early 1980s, and the Israeli Separation Barrier has

shaved more and more precious land from what the Palestinians control of the West

Bank. Many Israelis refer to the West Bank by its biblical names: Judea or Samaria

(Sahliyeh, 1988 1). Selectorate Theory offers two caveats before explaining when states

take territory in war. First, taking territory shifts resources from the vanquished to the

victor, but requires the victor to fight �beyond the point when it could end the war with a

favorable settlement� (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003 417). There are precious few

instances of states agreeing to cede all or some territory without the credible threat of

annihilation. Secondly, institutions can also have an effect, but if costs of taking territory

are small institutions may not have a significant effect in reducing a state�s desire for land

(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003 418).

1. The larger the winning coalition of a warring state, the less likely

it is to seek to take territory from the opposing side.

(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003 419)

The model assumes that leaders seek greater resources to increase the provision of private

goods to their coalition and to skim goods off for themselves. We have already seen that

as the loyalty norm weakens, the provision of such private goods becomes less likely.

Therefore, all things remaining equal, the smaller the winning coalition, the more likely

an increase in resources will improve a leader�s chances of political survival by

increasing the resources available for allocating private goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al.,

2003 418). If institutional arrangements also allow leaders to skim resources for

themselves, they have a further incentive to seek those resources (ibid). Because Israel�s

government functions as a coalition democracy, the winning coalition may be lower than

support figures would suggest. Many Israeli governments are made up of disparate

elements that have strongly differing policy preferences. Thus strong support for the

government may not have the same effects shown by The Logic of Political Survival,

because it is not an accurate measure of WIsrael. Israeli settlements are a private good to

Israeli constituencies, which help fuel conflict by allowing the de facto seizure of

territory. Land and money are then distributed to those who support settlement policies

and choose to become settlers.

2. The larger the size of the selectorate in a warring state, the more

likely it is to seek territory as a war aim. The impact of selectorate

size (SA) should be most pronounced when WA is small.

(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003 419)

As selectorate size rises, a winning coalition�s loyalty norm is strengthened (W/S is

reduced). As a result, there should be a shift in provision of public to private goods. As

already mentioned, taking territory increases the resources available to a victor state.

These newly acquired resources can be distributed as private goods, but more resources

can also be taken by the leader without fear of injuring political survival (Bueno de

Mesquita et al., 2003 418). Yisrael Beitenu, an Israeli political party that has in the past

supported transporting all Arabs to the Sea of Galilee area, resigned from the government

in early 2008 on the basis of refusing to negotiate with the PA on final status issues.18

The party�s founder, Avigdor Lieberman, recently explained to Jimmy Carter his belief

that land for peace will �provide neither peace nor security.�19 In March 2006 Israeli

elections, Yisrael Beitenu received 11 spots in the Knesset compared to 12 for the former

governing Likud, 19 for Labor-Meimad, and 29 for the new governing Kadima.20 Thus

private goods to Israeli parties that do not advocate peace or settlement on the basis of

international peace initiatives or UN resolutions have generally encouraged the illegal

seizure of Palestinian land. Because the Palestinian democracy, despite autocratic

18 Lieberman blasts Arab MKs, pulls party out of government. Mazal Mualem: Haaretz Correspondent, and Haaretz Online Service. January 16, 2008. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/945299.html. (May 2008) 19 Liberman to Carter: "Land for peace will bring neither peace or security. The Strategic Threats: Israel Beytenu Domain. http://beytenu.org./121/1641/article.html. (May 2008) 20 Results. Elections for the 17th Knesset � 2006. English Domain to the Israeli Knesset. http://www.knesset.gov.il/elections17/eng/index_eng.asp. (May 2008)

tendencies present in any government, is a large-coalition system, Israel would also have

an incentive in taking resources to forestall future Palestinian foreign policy efforts. The

effect of vanquished selection institutions may be marginal compared to those of the

victor; but if the vanquished leader heads a large-coalition system, resources are more

likely to be sought by the victor to forestall future foreign policy efforts by the

vanquished (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003 419).

Puppets:

3. Puppets are not installed in large-coalition systems.

(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003 421)

The prerequisite military control of the victor must be extensive to allow the installation

of a puppet in a vanquished state, and the puppet must be able to hold power domestically

(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003 419). Thus installing a puppet in a large-coalition

system would be unlikely to succeed because of domestic competition. A victor state

would have to pay a very high cost to ensure the survival of a puppet in a large-coalition

system. Because puppets are constrained in their provision of goods, they survive best in

systems with strong loyalty norms (large selectorate and small coalition) (Bueno de

Mesquita et al., 2003 420). The Palestinian system is not kind to those seen as

collaborators. Even those seen as genuinely decent have difficulty brokering popular

reforms favorable to Israel and the West. In contrast to Arafat during the Second

Intifada, Mahmoud Abbas was forced to resign his post as Prime Minister believing the

Intifada to be a mistake. His inability to deliver on promises to increase public goods as

President is also severely constrained by his reliance on Israel and US support, and his

conflict with Hamas within the PA. Nevertheless, Israel has been unsuccessful in

exerting direct political control of the Territories through Palestinian actors.

4. The larger the coalition in the victorious state (WA), the more

likely the victorious leader is to replace the defeated leader with a

puppet.

(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003 421).

The course of Israeli negotiations with the PA has created an institutional link that

prevents more radical action espoused by radical Israeli political parties. Nevertheless,

Israel was willing to attempt to depose Hamas, after its election in 2006, both through

Abbas and Mohammed Dahlan. This reveals an Israeli willingness to favor Palestinian

political actors that do not provide public goods like foreign policy that is contrary to

Israeli interests. This concerns the aforementioned caveat that foreign policy aims may

not always be contradictory, especially after the election of Abbas. However, it will be

discussed at greater length in the next section. The commitment of greater resources to

foreign policy is more likely when the loyalty norm is high (Bueno de Mesquita et al.,

2003 420).

5. Subject to puppets not being installed in the largest-coalition

systems, the greater B�s coalition, the greater the prospects that a

puppet will be imposed on B. (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003 421)

Installing a puppet in very large-coalition systems may be counterproductive because

the puppet is unlikely to survive domestic competition. Nevertheless a large-coalition

system of the vanquished tends to favor the allocation of public goods. To constrain

the foreign policy capacity of the vanquished, the victor has an interest in

constraining the foreign policy capacity of the victor. Thus, if a vanquished political

system has a weak loyalty norm (as in large-coalition systems), the victor has an

interest in installing a puppet to prevent the greater provision of goods to foreign

policy in the future (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003 421). Israeli constraints on

negotiating with the PA have placed many disproportionate preconditions, and the PA

likewise on Israel, that have generally injured cooperation and aided Palestinian

unrest. Because of its progressively increasing reliance on Israel for tax revenue and

maintaining few constraints on the Occupation, Fatah�s public good provision was

externally constrained in a situation fundamentally dissimilar to that of Hamas.

Before 2006, Hamas was unlikely to be seen as responsible for these external

constraints.

Institutional Change and Control:

The last two hypotheses are concerned with when a victor state is likely to seek to

change the selection institution of the vanquished.

6. The larger the winning coalition in the victorious state, the more likely it is to

alter institutions by reducing coalition size and increasing selectorate size in the

defeated state.

(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003 423)

This discussion is similar to the previous hypotheses, namely constraining a vanquished

state�s future investment in public goods like foreign policy. When a victor can

strengthen the loyalty norm of a vanquished state, it reduces the vanquished state�s

investment in foreign policy and increases its own chances at foreign policy success

(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003 423). Israeli constraints at the negotiating table and in

impeding PA implementation of international agreements adversely affected the

performance development of the PA and its policies. In particular, Israel has conflicted

with the PA in its provision of security by imprisoning Palestinians and controlling

violence (imposing its military sovereignty) in PA administered territories.

7. The larger the winning coalition in the losing state, the more likely

a large-coalition victor is to seek institutional changes.

(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003 423)

Strengthening the vanquished state�s loyalty norm weakens its provision of public goods

like foreign policy in the future (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003 422). US and Israeli

funding of Fatah and the PA President Mahmoud Abbas after Hamas�s election in 2006

have helped strengthen Fatah�s loyalty norm. Israeli Occupation constraints have also

encouraged Fatah�s corruption, and controlled its provision of public and private goods.

Expectations:

We examine data collected from PCPSR polls, and fatality statistics from the Israeli

human rights monitor B�Tzelem. We apply a similar model to that which will be applied

to Palestinian domestic violence. The dependent variable is a measure of deaths of Israeli

civilians and security personnel in the Occupied Territories, taken from B�Tzelem�s

website, over the period of January 2001 to December 2006. A multiple-variable linear

regression is then done first for WF, WF/S, CivLibs, and CivLibs*W. CivLibs is a measure

of those respondents not positively evaluating PA civil rights. In other words it measures

all respondents less those who evaluate the PA as �positive� or �very positive.� We then

successively add IntDeaths, to examine the effect of Palestinians killed from 2001 to

2006, and SupportPeace, to measure the effect of fluctuations in Palestinian support for

peace. If support for peace is low, violence would be a more highly-preferred good.

Results:

Table 5: Palestinian Violence Toward Israelis (May 2002 � December 2006) IsraelisKilled

(coef.,std,2-tail p) IsraelisKilled (coef.,std,2-tail p)

IsraelisKilled (coef.,std,2-tail p)

W (-890, 338, 0.0299) (-806, 371, 0.066) (-777, 337, 0.06) W/S (642, 234, 0.025) (607, 256, 0.049) (605, 230, 0.039) CivLibs (-49, 101, 0.64) (-22, 104, 0.84) (0.71, 101, 0.995) CivLibs*W (84, 287, 0.78) (7.1, 299, 0.98) (-47, 284, 0.87) IntDeaths (0.023, 0.026, 0.4) (0.03, 0.02, 0.33) SupportPeace (9.9, 6.9, 0.2) r2= 0.50272 0.5467 0.61713 p= 0.18412 0.25498 0.21709

Graph 7

Violence Against Israelis, W, W/S, SupportPeace

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

May-02

Apr/Ju

ne 03

June

/Dec 0

3

14-M

ar-04

23-S

ep-0

4

1-Dec

-04

10-M

ar-05

9-Ju

n-05

6-Dec

-05

16-M

ar-06

5-Ju

n-06

14-S

ep-0

6

Dec-06

%

-15

5

25

45

65

85

105

125

145

Num

ber o

f Dea

ths

W/SWCivLibsCivLibs*WIsraelisKilledSupportPeaceIntDeaths

It should be noted that the variance explained by these regressions is only between 50%

and 62%, implying that other factors like the Occupation have a significant effect. None

of the variables have a cumulative statistically significant effect, but some of the

individual independent variables warrant more explanation. As we expected, an increase

in the loyalty norm of the winning coalition, that of Fatah, has a positive effect on

violence. As the security situation in the territories deteriorated through unadulterated

Israeli violence, elements of the PA including Arafat became increasingly militant in

foreign policy toward Israel. As W/S rose over this time, greater foreign policy goods,

like attacks, were provided as public goods and increasing the number of Israelis killed.

WF has a negative effect on violence. This is not surprising given that Fatah also

depended on Israel for much of its financial support and Western recognition. As support

for Fatah rose, it probably would increases resources toward attacks, but would also

encourage public good production in other areas like negotiations and peace talks. It

would also discourage the allocation of resources to personal and private interests that

supported violence, like al-tenzim. The loss of private goods would not cause the

disenfranchised to seriously threaten Fatah�s political survival Fatah was �already

providing the disenfranchised with ample public goods� (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003 365).

The effects of civil liberties and Intifada deaths (the number of Palestinians killed in the

Occupied Territories by Israelis), are not statistically significant. This may lead to the

deduction of two important conclusions. Firstly, because the confluence of PA and

Israeli desires to deescalate violence was inconsistent, civil liberty measures in the PA are

not a consistent measure of restrictions on militant action. Secondly, civil liberties as a

public good were less likely to be distributed evenly amongst Fatah�s coalition

(CivLibs*W) because of fluctuations in PA policy and because of Israeli restrictions.

Personal loyalties also restricted the development of even comprehensive Fatah control

over all its security forces, discussed in greater detail in the next section. The effect of

international aid and initiative, and Israeli Occupation, has helped fluctuating PA policy

as goes civil liberties, and has decoupled civil liberties simply from PA policy. Civil

liberties should have a positive effect on violence in a democratic society and a negative

effect in an autocratic society (Bueno de Mesquita et. al, 2003 366). Civil liberties

should decline as the government imposes high civil liberty costs (an increase in

CivLibs). The result is expected to decrease individuals� utility at engaging in actions

against the government (ibid). CivLibs*W has a positive effect in theory because as civil

liberties decline when W is low, a population is more willing to tolerate oppression. In

large-coalition systems, people feel freer to object to specific policies rather than

oppression in general, and thus a decline in civil liberties is likely to spur anti-

government action (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003 366). Clearly these effects are not as

significant as other factors like the Occupation and international pressure.

Intifada deaths represent another public good cost, because as more Palestinians were

killed by the Occupation, the cost of violence against Israelis should also increase.

Though violence in this manner was intended to serve as a deterrent to Palestinian

violence, it is unclear whether this is necessarily true in the context of the history of the

conflict. Palestinian deaths are not significant in this regression, but given better data

might be proven to have a significant deterrent effect. We included the variable

SupportPeace, from PCPSR polls, measuring whether said �yes� or �definitely yes� to

supporting peace and reconciliation with Israel. This variable does not measure either a

public or private good, but rather measures a budget-constraint for the ideal level of

provision of peace, and foreign policy as public goods. Neither Israeli nor Palestinian

actions appeared to reflect an attempt to produce a goods bundle that met this constraint.

In other words, violence in the Intifada did not rest in a society allocating resources

toward public goods, but rather representing private benefits to key Palestinians, and key

constituencies in Israel. The positive effect of SupportPeace reinforces this notion by

showing that violence increased as public support for peace increased. There was also a

clear disconnect between Israeli escalations and policies of destroying Palestinian

infrastructure and the level of Palestinian support for peace with Israel. However,

SupportPeace was not statistically significant, however, and so the effect of public

support for peace is unclear. We now attempt to account for Israeli measures in three

further regressions.

Accounting for Israeli Measures:

Table 6: Including Palestinian detainees and prisoners in Israeli custody.

We have already shown that civil liberties do not have a statistically significant effect on

violence against Israelis. The next four regressions examine whether Israeli measures

like imprisonment or �administrative detention� have an effect on violence. We take the

same model above but exclude civil liberties and instead include the new independent

variables IDFPrisoners, representing those imprisoned by the IDF, and Detainees,

representing the number of people detained by the IDF. The first regression is a control,

the same model as above, excluding both IDFPrisoners and Detainees. The first

regression is statistically significant and explains 62% of the variance. The following

two regressions explain about 67% of the variance in IsraelisKilled each, but are not

clearly statistically significant.

IsraelisKilled (coef.,std,2-tail p)

IsraelisKilled (coef.,std,2-tail p)

IsraelisKilled (coef.,std,2-tail p)

W (588, 208, 0.022) (-924, 323, 0.024) (-567, 339, 0.14) W/S (-764, 271, 0.023) (715, 250, 0.024) (437, 261, 0.14) IntDeaths (0.02, 0.02, 0.29) (0.03, 0.02, 0.23) (10.9, 6.1, 0.12) SupportPeace (10, 6, 0.13) (16, 8, 0.11) (10.9, 6.1, 0.12) IDFPrisoners (-0.001, 0.001, 0.38) Detainees (0.01, 0.01, 0.36) r2 0.61713 0.66656 0.66979 p= 0.06897 0.10615 0.10311

IDFPrisoners is not statistically significant, although the slight negative correlation may

show that from 2002 to 2006, Israeli imprisonment tactics had a negative effect on

violence, or indeed were an Israeli public good. The opposite is true for Detainees,

which is statistically significant, and the positive trend appears to show that as short-term

arbitrary detention rates rose, violence increased. The likely correlation suggests that

increased systematic Israeli oppression of the Occupied Territories served the short-term

cause of spurring violence in the Intifada. Over the long-term, however, Israeli

imprisonment may have acted as a credible deterrent to violence. It is unclear that

Palestinian action had any effect on Israeli policy as PA performance at quelling violence

was not acceptable to the Israelis at any point (Tamimi, 2007 202).

It is unclear whether this correlation (of detainees to violence) suggests that a rising

number of detainees had a negative trend on violence against Israelis. Systematic

Occupation has also institutionalized these practices in a manner that makes them

ineffective as deterrents. They therefore have very small effects on overall violence

toward Israelis. The lack of statistical significance for both W and W/S in the final

regression is interesting. The inconsistency of both Israeli and PA policy may explain

why coalition size may not have the most significant effect on Israeli violence when

compared to the Occupation. The succession of Abu Mazen after the death of Arafat

created a leader far more favorable to Israeli policy, signaling a potential change in Israeli

policy direction in 2004, however unfulfilled. SupportPeace may be statistically

significant in these regressions. If we had better data we could be more certain, but its p-

value is slightly higher than the 0.1 cut-off. This might suggest that Palestinian support

for a foreign policy that would be more confluent with Israeli foreign policy increases

violence, because it is not taken into account in Israeli efforts for peace. Selectorate

Theory would suggest that for Israel to �beat� Palestine at a foreign policy game, it

should seek to reduce provision of the peace process.

Selectorate Theory explains that the larger a winning coalition in the vanquished state,

the more likely a victor will seek to install a puppet (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 421) and

institutional changes (ibid 423). The Palestinian political system is a large-coalition

democracy, despite problems with political control and human rights. Thus it would be

impossible for Israel to install a puppet which it directly controls. Nevertheless, it does

appear that Israel�s buttressing of Abbas recently, and its marginalization of Arafat,

represent Israeli attempts to promote certain leadership tendencies and institutional

changes. In 2003, Fatah�s support hit a 2 or 3 year peak, but has consistently remained

above 25%. As Fatah�s support began to increase, and its loyalty norm weakened, Israel

should be more likely to employ means like forcing institutional change and installing a

puppet. Clearly, shifts in Israeli policy after the death of Arafat (that have strongly

favored Fatah) are indications of Selectorate Theory�s value in explaining victor-state

behavior.

Conclusions:

Though Detainees and IDFPrisoners are not statistically significant independent

variables in either of the above regressions, if their effects are to be believed they reveal

something interesting about the high cost of Israeli oppression. The effect of the prisoner

data suggests that if Israel holds 10,000 Palestinians monthly, they might save two Israeli

lives per month. From 2001 to 2006, there have been an average of more than 2,000

prisoners held and an average of 5 Israeli deaths per month. Clearly the effect of

continued oppression reduces oppression�s value as a deterrent �because there is no

connection between opposing the government and suffering the punishment� (Bueno de

Mesquita, 2003 346). Detention would appear to have a positive effect on violence,

helping to spur the First Intifada, and inflaming Palestinian public opinion and militancy

in the short term. Fueling the cycle of hate cannot be a desired or beneficial outcome for

Israel. The theory behind oppression will be examined in the next section, as well as the

shift in direction of Palestinian violence from Israel toward fellow Palestinians.

VI. A House Divided

Until Arafat's death, diplomacy was frozen, and the Sharon government

increasingly embraced unilateral measures, including the construction of

a security barrier in the West Bank and plans to withdraw unilaterally

from Gaza. (Weinberger, 2006 8)

The Presidency of Mahmoud Abbas:

Arafat had lost the support of some within Fatah, Israel, and the United States. The

election of Mahmoud Abbas in 2005 took some of the pressure off of the PA by creating

the opportunity for Abbas to improve the PA�s image in Israel and the West. His task

was arduous and has been met with limited success. Proceeding particularly slowly is the

pace of security sector reform, which is vitally needed if the PA hopes to restore law and

order to the Occupied Teritories. Despite a legacy of corrupt governance and an

infrastructure devastated by the Second Intifada, Abbas managed to negotiate a partial

West Bank withdrawal with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (Weinberger, 2006 16).

Increasingly, Sharon�s Likud government embodied unilateral tactics. The most

important unilateral action taken by the Sharon government was its withdrawal of

settlements and IDF forces (from settlements) in the Gaza Strip in September 2005.

After the Gaza Withdrawal, the US remained relatively hands-off until Secretary of State

Condoleeza Rice "reassured [the PA] about arrangements for free passage into and out of

Gaza for people and goods" and EU monitors took up positions with a very limited

mandate at the Rafah crossing in Gaza (ibid 20).

After the Israeli Disengagement from Gaza, civil order quickly degenerated � especially

in the Gaza Strip. Spats of violence in the Territories can partly be explained by the

fractured nature of the security services. Militias are controlled by various individuals

and institutions, including the presidency and factions and their members. In her

examination of security sector reform, Weinberger explains that:

Arafat deliberately fostered competing security organizations with overlapping responsibilities, seeking personal loyalty from their commanders and undermining the rule of law in the transitional political system. (Weinberger, 2006 4)

Attempts to reform the fragmented nature of the security sector have been impeded by a

legacy of PA corruption and mismanagement. Clashes between Hamas supporters and

Palestinian police have resulted from Abbas's decision to incorporate militias directly into

the PA security services without proper training (Weinberger, 2006 9). The balance of

control is extremely tenuous, and according to the forward written by Sela and Mishal for

the reprint of their book after 2006 PLC elections,

�despite the subordination of the security organizations to the PA president, any attempt by the Hamas-led government to conduct major purges or reshuffle the existing command of these security agencies might result in violent confrontation with Fatah. (Sela and Mishal in Weinberger, 2006 p.xxiii)

An early indication of the disruption of this delicate balance came just after the Israeli

withdrawal from Gaza. Hamas began firing Qassam rockets into Israel. When Hamas

supporters were confronted by PA police, they attacked a police station (Weinberger,

2006 17).

In The Peace Process and the Israeli Elections, Rynhold and Steinberger explain that

security constituted the key issue in the 2001 Israeli elections, resulting in an Israeli vote

of no-confidence in the PA (Rynhold and Steinberger, 2004 182). Shortly after Sharon�s

election, he formed a unity government, which increased the size of the governing

coalition. He also managed to foster a very close relationship to President George W.

Bush. Bush has been ostensibly unwilling to place the diplomatic, financial or military

constraints on the Israeli state, applied by previous presidents, creating a situation where,

for the first time in five decades the policy of the US president was closer to that of the Israeli right than to the Israeli left. (Rynhold and Steinberger, 2004 192).

President Bush has extended loans without conditions that Israel freeze settlement

construction, unlike his father, and had delayed the announcement of the Roadmap to

Peace until after Israeli elections at Sharon�s personal request (ibid 192). During

Sharon�s first term, very little actual progress occurred with regard to the peace process.

Arafat�s hand was increasingly tied by Israel, rival Palestinian factions, and the

international community. Sharon, whose visitation of al-haram al-sharif had triggered

the Second Intifada, moved to reoccupy the West Bank and intensify incursions into

Gaza. This prompted just under half of Palestinians to believe the only goal of Israel�s

use of force was destruction (ibid 182). Hamas�s already poor reputation in the West was

hurt further by the confluence of the War on Terror, Israeli unilateralism, and a close

Israeli-US relationship. Sharon�s relationship with President Bush helped the former

convince the latter that Yasir Arafat did not want peace, (Tamimi, 2007 200). The

optimism behind Abbas�s selection abated with the fear that Hamas would undertake

terrorist actions and policies of aggression and destabilization with a freer-hand after its

election. The experiences of the US Iraq War of 2003 and the Israeli Lebanon War of

2006 did not appear to constrain the US�s belief that Hamas, a popular mass-movement,

could be deposed through unilateral military action. The United States feared the

expansion of Hamas power and in early 2006 began implementing policies and applying

pressure with regard to Fatah�s handling of Hamas�s governance. This analysis goes

beyond the scope of the basic Selectorate Theory model, but helps to explain the

importance of external coercion and deterrence.

Examining the Gaza Takeover and the Palestinian civil war:

Ziad Abu Zayyad, the former minister and PLC member, was reluctant to call the Hamas

victory a clear mandate. Its strengthening loyalty norm, after 2006 PLC elections, is

related to two factors. Firstly, the US and Israel quickly moved to isolate Hamas and to

buttress Fatah militarily and financially. Secondly, incumbency provides leaders an

advantage in providing private goods because they have established the reliable

allocation of private goods to supporters throughout their terms (Bueno de Mesquita et

al., 2003 59). Fatah had been given an essentially free mandate for eight years, and many

clearly voted for Hamas as a protest to Fatah and its association with PA corruption

rather than an endorsement of Hamas. These people would have wagered that Hamas

could more reliably reduce corruption, increasing the flow of public goods and producing

a better outcome for the Palestinian condition. After its election, Abu Zayyad, like others

in Fatah, believed Hamas�s ability to successfully govern was contingent on moderation:

To stay in power means that Hamas will have to change its position for one that espouses the same notions and language of the intemational community and which Fateh has embraced since the 19th PLO National Council that was held in Algiers in November 1988, and the historic decisions taken then to recognize UN resolutions 242 and 338 and to accept the principle of a two state solution. If this occurs, the result will be a new Hamas which will be much more akin to Fateh but calls itself �Hamas.� (Abu Zayyad, 2006 110).

The support that Hamas received for its Change and Reform List in the 2006 PLC

elections quickly fell. But as Hamas�s loyalty norm weakened through the election, its

provision of foreign policy would have increased. Observers have contended that despite

Graph 8

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Hamas�s inability to fully fulfill international expectations, it has altered its discourse on

Israel dramatically. The increasing similarity in the foreign policies of Hamas and Fatah,

coupled with Hamas�s increase in provision of public goods, had a strong potential to

fundamentally threaten Fatah�s political survival. The threat to a core public good like

diplomacy would, according to Selectorate Theory make it more likely that Fatah would

seek institutional change in conflict (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003 423). The same

prediction is true with regard to Hamas�s winning coalition. As WH rises and WH/S rise,

the theoretical �Fatah polity� would be more likely to seek institutional change against the

theoretical �Hamas polity� (ibid).21

21 This model is dyadic for states, and so the modeling of the regression assumes an inevitable polarization between two sub-state states � this assumption is explained below.

There are two periods in which Hamas�s loyalty norm weakened dramatically: first after

the municipal elections in 2005, and then the PLC elections in 2006. In the period

between the municipal and legislative elections, Fatah had a relatively weak loyalty norm

in the West Bank, indicating that goods were being distributed to a large portion of the

selectorate. The result of the 2006 PLC elections appears to have been a strengthening of

Fatah�s loyalty norm in the West Bank and a weakening of Hamas�s loyalty norm in the

West Bank. This would lead to an increase in the provision of private goods by Fatah

and likewise for public goods by Hamas. We speculate that the resulting public goods

production was channeled into efforts like Hamas�s attempts to foster a unity government

with an uncooperative Fatah. This shift in Hamas policy, from a Selectorate perspective,

would injure the chances of Fatah�s survival and lead to any number of potential

outcomes. A consistent weakening of Fatah�s loyalty norm throughout 2006 corresponds

to a significant increase in US military aid to President Abbas, and a blockade on the

transfer of money to Hamas. This effective embargo by the US and EU on the Hamas

government meant �as many as 160,000 employees of the PA did not receive full salaries

in the aftermath of the Hamas electoral victory� (Weinberger, 2006 14). Israel also

prevented �the transfer to the PNA of collected tax and customs revenues, which are the

legal property of the PNA� (Hamad, 2006 8). The United States quickly moved to

prevent funding to Hamas, and to buttress Abbas. Executive Order Number 13338,

signed on May 11, 2006 by President George W. Bush, states:

are blocked under United States law for terrorism-related reasons, including, but not limited to, Hamas.

This created a greater asymmetry between the two factions. Additionally, stronger

Hamas support and capabilities in Gaza, despite the monetary constraints of the

embargo,22 posed a significant threat to Fatah especially in Gaza.

Nevertheless, the mandate that Hamas received led it to seek to form a

government. Rather than attempt to do so alone, Hamas�s MPs extended offers

for a coalition government to Fatah, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of

Palestine (DFLP), and Islamic Jihad. Though the latter two elements expressed

interest in sharing power, Fatah �never had any real intention of joining a

coalition, preferring to �wait it out� in the hopes that Hamas�s days in power

would be numbered� (Hroub, 2006 16). Fatah�s political dominance had been

threatened and its political survival was perhaps in question. As WF decreased,

and Fatah�s loyalty norm strengthened, it �put party affiliates in key positions in

the PLC and PNA Departments for Administrative and Financial Control and

Personnel and Salaries� (Hamad, 2006 7). Acts like this served to solidify Fatah�s

residual control over certain institutions of governance as well as to strengthen

Fatah�s network for distributing private goods.

Hamas�s decision to seek a unity government reflects these realities, as Hroub

explains:

As already indicated, one of the major problems confronting Hamas following its victory was external pressure to recognize international conventions and agreements on Palestine. A number of articles reflect Hamas�s attempt to grapple with these issues. Article 5 calls for

22 Note that Hamas�s loyalty norm has strengthened consistently since the election.

�Cooperating with the international community for the purpose of ending the occupation and settlements and achieving a complete withdrawal from the lands occupied [by Israel] in 1967, including Jerusalem, so that the region enjoys calm and stability during this phase.� Two articles attempt to provide assurances that the Hamas-led government will function within the international conventions and agreements on Palestine: Article 9 confirms that �The government will deal with the signed agreements [between the PLO/PA and Israel] with high responsibility and in accordance with preserving the ultimate interests of our people and maintaining its rights without compromising its immutable prerogatives,� while article 10 states that �The government will deal with the international resolutions [on the Palestine issue] with national responsibility and in accordance with protecting the immutable rights of our people.�

Clearly, articles 9 and 10 did not go far enough to satisfy either the international community or Fatah. They did, however, represent a major shift on Hamas�s part, showing an obvious attempt to maintain a delicate balance between appeasing international observers and Hamas�s own constituency. (Hroub, 2006 16-17).

Though Fatah consistently refused to take part in a Hamas-led government, Abbas invited

Hamas�s Ismail Haniya to form a government. The Cabinet Platform submitted by

Hamas, for the formation of a government, in March 2006:

Sought to signal to Israel its nonbelligerency and expectation of smooth interaction in �necessary contacts in all mundane affairs,� even while emphasizing Palestinian suffering from Israeli policies and the Palestinians� legitimate right to resist the occupation (Hroub, 2006 20).

Continuing belief in the importance of retaining the right of resistance to the

Occupation did not meet international or Israeli standards for Hamas�s inclusion

in international politics. Foreign pressure strained ties between Abbas�s

administration and the new Hamas government. By the summer, Abbas had

threatened to host a referendum on Palestinian statehood so as to bind Hamas to

the recognition of Israel and past PLO treaties.23 Abbas�s dissolution of the

Hamas government shortly thereafter, declaration of a state of emergency, and

appointment of Salam Fayyad as acting Prime Minister helped polarize conditions

in the Territories. The same day, June 14, 2006, Hamas seized control of much of

the Gaza Strip.

Oppression and Stalemate:

The Israeli Occupation had a deleterious long-term effect on the Palestinian Security

services, especially since Israel�s Operation Defensive Shield under Sharon in 2002 Rose,

2008 7). US pressure also had a pronounced impact on Fatah�s behavior toward Hamas,

accounting for the low variance explained by the regressions below.

In April 2008, David Rose published an article in Vanity Fair detailing

a covert initiative, approved by Bush and implemented by Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and Deputy National Secuirty Advisor Elliott Abrams, to provoke a Palestinian civil war. The plan was for forces led by [Mohammed] Dahlan, and armed with new weapons supplied at America�s behest, to give Fatah the muscle it needed to remove the democratically elected Hamas-led government from power.� (Rose, 2008 3)

US interference in Palestine began innocently enough with the encouragement of

elections by President George W. Bush. The US had a large role in promoting the idea of

elections in the Territories. Despite the necessity of Fatah to US policy in the Israeli- 23 As of May 2008, still accessible from BBCNews Online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5068460.stm

Palestinian peace process, the administration did not appear to care that many close

observers and Fatah members warned that Fatah was not adequately prepared to contest a

national election (Rose, 2008 5). Particular pressure was placed on Abbas who, like

Arafat, found himself trapped between US, Israeli, and domestic pressures.

Graph 9: Palestinian Violence

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The previously described attempts at forming a unity government by Hamas, with which

Fatah appeared wholly disinterested, were also de-incentivized by US policy.

Washington reacted with dismay when Abbas began holding talks with Hamas in the hope of establishing a �unity government.� (ibid)

The US appeared to instead favor dissolving the result of the elections completely and

imposing a government of emergency rule through the agency of President Abbas.

Secretary of State Rice traveled to Ramallah to secure a promise by Abbas to attempt to

depose Hamas, and after eating with Abbas at an iftar during Ramadan attempted to

ascertain a specific time at which Abbas would dissolve Hamas�s government (Rose,

2008 6). A US State Department memo to the consul general in Ramallah explained:

Hamas should be given a clear choice, with a clear deadline: �they either accept a new government that meets the Quartet principles, or they reject it. The consequences of Hamas� decision should also be clear: If Hamas does not agree within the prescribed time, you should make clear your intention to declare a state of emergency and form an emergency government explicitly committed to that platform. (ibid 6)

The dramatic weakening of Hamas�s loyalty norm also meant that conflicting powers, in

this case the United States would be more likely to seek both institutional changes and to

install a puppet (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003 421). By reducing the loyalty norm of

the governing Palestinian power, they would reduce the likelihood that public goods like

economic growth or foreign policy activity would be able to compete with the goals of

the Quartet and the US particularly.

The US also encouraged the strengthening of Fatah�s loyalty norm, although policy was

not articulated in exactly this manner. Fatah had no doubt appointed certain key

members prior to elections, fearing an electoral loss. The US also shifted power away

from Abbas�s security reform initiatives, like the integration of security services, and

toward clandestine, foreign-trained militias. In particular, the United States sought to

enlist the help of Mohammed Dahlan, chief of a Fatah militia, who �helped found Fatah�s

youth movement� a leading role in the first intifada� [and] spent five years in Israeli

jails� (Rose, 2008 3).

Abbas was also encouraged to �strengthen [his] team� to include �credible figures of strong standing in the international community.� Among those the US wanted brought in, says an official who knew of the policy, was Muhammad Dahlan. (ibid 7)

By empowering Dahlan and pressuring Abbas, the US ensured that the situation in Gaza

would escalate without the requisite understanding of how that assistance would be used

or recognizing the possibility of the plan�s failure. Rather than serving security, or

deterring Hamas from action, US policy served to empower a man with a history of harsh

violence and irregular tactics. As early as January 26, 2006, armed clandestine Fatah

gunmen began attacking bases of Hamas�s support like students of the Islamic University

of Gaza (Rose, 2008 1).

Modeling Civil War:

Expectations:

The conflict between Palestinian factions has been heavily influenced by external forces

like the US. Since January 2006, the US plan was to injure Hamas�s traditional power

base in Gaza. Though there is no statistical model or test for war in The Logic of

Political Survival, we examine some similar assumptions and hypotheses from the

previous section. In modeling this conflict we believe the effect of territorial polarization

between Fatah support in the West Bank and Hamas support in Gaza had a large effect on

power in addition to US machinations. We thus include the independent variables Hamas

support in Gaza (WHGaza) and Hamas�s loyalty norm in Gaza (WH/SGaza), and Fatah

support in the West Bank (WFWestBank) and Fatah�s loyalty norm in the West Bank

(WF/SWestBank). The dependent variable is Violence, measuring Palestinian violence

against other Palestinians. We also assume that Fatah oppression would increase the

likelihood that Hamas would respond to Fatah attacks after taking power in the 2006 PLC

elections. As the incentives for either Fatah or Hamas to oppress the other increase,

oppression is likely to escalate � with the potential of escalating to serious violence. It is

therefore necessary to outline under what conditions governing coalitions decide to

oppress political opponents. Oppression by some definitions is likely to occur in most

political systems. It is difficult to find individuals willing to punish challengers and to

actually �carry out� oppression, but

Systems with a small winning coalition and a large selectorate tend to encourage oppression, both in intensity and magnitude. Such systems present a greater incentive to challenge the leader, a greater incentive for the leader to hang onto power by all possible means, a greater ability to recruit those who will cary out the threats, and greater credibility because of the longer tenure of leaders. (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003 344)

However, when a faction decides to oppress rivals by violent means, it is more likely to

mobilize the type of support and resources to fight. It is also more likely to allocate

private resources in order to win. We thus examine the most applicable of the seven

hypotheses presented by The Logic of Political Survival and in the previous section.

5. Subject to puppets not being installed in the largest-coalition systems,

the greater B�s coalition, the greater the prospects that a puppet will

be imposed on B. (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003 421).

Graph 10

Polarizing Support and Loyalty Norms

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z

The three trend-lines, in order of distance from the top of the page, refer to WHGaza/S (Hgaza/S), WFWestBank/S (FWB/S), and Violence.

Fatah security initiatives against Hamas had the intention of institutional change, and

removing the democratically elected government.24 Abbas�s attempts to hold new

elections for the Presidency and PLC, were no manner of coup d�êtat compared to the

international conspiracy to depose Fatah heralded a �U.S.-backed Fatah coup� (Rose,

2008 5). Hamas�s loyalty norm in Gaza weakened by almost 30% between January and

March 2006, around the same time Fatah�s loyalty norm strengthened by a little over

26%. As Fatah�s loyalty norm strengthens, we should expect a greater number of private

goods to be allocated to members of Fatah and fewer public goods to be allocated

generally by the PA. This coincides with US funding for Fatah militias and the activities

24 Though Fatah was unsuccessful, egime change raises similar installing a puppet of the PA executive by any other name)

of Mohammed Dahlan. As Hamas�s loyalty norm weakened, Fatah would be more likely

to seek to depose it on the grounds that provision of public goods would severely hurt

Fatah�s chances of political survival.

Results:

Table 7 (Jan 2001 � Dec 2007)

Violence (coef.,std,2-tail p)

Violence (coef.,std,2-tail p)

WHGaza (7819,2854,0.0076) (6989,3178,0.0308) WH/SGaza (-6000,2178,0.0073) (-5365,2427,0.03)

WFWestBank (-3849,2300,0.0982) (-4376,2469,0.0803) WF/SWestBank (2878,1756,0.1053) (3274,1882,0.0858)

Income (-0.073,0.121,0.5479) r2= 0.20317 0.20688 p= 0.001146 0.00247

The variance explained by both regressions does not exceed 20.7%, although it is likely

that all the independent variables except per capita income have a statistically significant

effect on Palestinian violence. In addition, in each regression the cumulative effect of the

independent variables on Violence was statistically significant. The embargo of the PA

after Hamas�s election had created a resilient but progressively demoralized public

suffering from inflation and the withholding of wages. As Hamas�s loyalty norm in Gaza

strengthened, violence increased, whereas as Fatah�s loyalty norm in the West Bank

strengthens, violence decreases. In fact, we find the opposite of what is expected in this

case, that as Hamas�s loyalty norm strengthens, violence in fact increases. A large

portion of this may be explained by the fact that Hamas relies largely on militias, is not a

state actor, and at the time was paralyzed by the Quartet, US, and Israeli embargos on

Gaza. Fatah�s loyalty norm may not be statistically significant (the coefficient switches

signs in the second regression), largely because US and Israeli funding and support for

presidential militias cannot be accurately measured. This also means that international

factors have buttressed Fatah�s policies from the effects Selectorate Theory would

predict. By providing external monetary and diplomatic incentives to the PLO to engage

in attacks against Hamas in Gaza, international actors have spurred violence. Because of

this, WHGaza and WFWestBank have strong and significant effects. As WHGaza

increases, external incentives from the US and Israel couple with Fatah fears for its own

political survival and encourage it to attempt to oppress and depose Hamas. The same

fears escalate as Fatah�s support level in the West Bank falls, thus WHGaza has a positive

effect on violence, and WFWestBank has a negative effect. The pronounced effects of

international interference are immeasurable, as is the damage this interference has done

to Palestinian relations.

Graph 11

Gaza (2001-2007)

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HgazaHgaza/SFWBFWB/SViolence

VIII. Conclusions:

Alleviations of the Occupation will not be enough to promote full

Palestinian peace just as it will not promote Israeli-Palestinian peace.

There are questions of Israeli intentions in withdrawing from the Gaza

Strip, and even when disengaging from the Palestinian territory it "retains

the option of retaliation or even reoccupation in response to Palestinian

armed attacks. (Weinberger, 2006 17)

The effects of the Occupation cannot be understated. International involvement has

contributed to the stagnation of real progress on Palestinian statehood and peace. It has

created a complex system of interests for those actors thousands of miles away and those

just beyond the fence. Despite international constraints, particularly in the last half

decade, Fatah�s long-time domination of the institutional structure of the PA has further

hurt Palestinian interests. Fatah has displayed far greater inflexibility in compromising

with Hamas over Hamas�s attempt to join the PLO and form a unity government. This

inflexibility was largely driven by Fatah�s reliance on American aid and Israeli approval.

The necessity of basic things like providing wages to government employees places the

Palestinians in no position to control their own path.

Fatah�s strengthening loyalty norm, over time, has caused its decisions to rely heavily on

personal and political loyalties. Arafat purposely created multiple redundant security

services to foster this trend. Fatah is not all to blame, and Hamas�s various clandestine

security groups have contributed to violence, and DFLP and Islamic Jihad as well. There

has been less attentiveness to public goods like civil liberties, law and order, and anti-

graft measures as a result of the loyalty norm trend. This trend is reversed for Hamas

until very recently, and has helped strengthen both Hamas�s provision of goods through

charities and mosques, and their concentration on public policy issues. Fatah�s

deficiency in providing both public goods and private goods to a suitable winning

coalition was demonstrated by the municipal and 2006 PLC elections. The electoral loss

Fatah suffered was in large part due to the corruption they have fostered from within the

PA as a result of the strengthening Fatah loyalty norm. The United States, in aiding

Mohammed Dahlan and also Force 17 (a clandestine security service of the President of

the PA) has encouraged the strengthening of Fatah�s loyalty norm at the expense of its

electoral success. The Occupation has complicated all of this by decoupling some of the

factors for corruption and ineffectiveness from the PA�s control.

President Bush was a large part of the impetus for the PLC elections in Palestine.

Compared to the Palestinian civil war, deliberately provoked by the United States, the

foundation of pushing elections appears chaste. Truthfully, transparency, civil liberties,

and corruption have all suffered enormously due to the lack of regular elections. Regular

elections tie political survival to candidate performance, and encourage them to perform

better than otherwise. Fatah complained it was unready to contest elections in 2006,

unable to field popular candidates. In reality, Fatah had a decade to prepare for elections,

but instead sought the private benefits associated with corruption and skimming off the

top of international assistance. Abbas, having imposed on himself a one-term limit, may

yet attempt to seriously tackle graft as he has less incentive to skim for political survival.

He also appears genuinely committed to reforming PA institutions and the security

services. Successes have been mixed and his challenges are great. Abbas believes in the

value of assistance from the international community and dialogue with Israel, as

conditions of Palestinian independence. His attempts to cease negotiations with Israel

during the latest wave of Israeli attacks signal his true commitment to bettering the

Palestinian condition, rather than merely echoing the policies and chasing the purse

strings of the US.

Inflexibility, therefore, has been largely induced by US interference. This inflexibility

results from duel US pressures to appear to promote democracy and appear to fight

terrorism. By encouraging Abbas to call elections, Bush was certain to allow Hamas

electoral gains in the PLC. But the US can not promote democracy through elections

without the intention of recognizing the results. Policies such as this help degrade the

normative value of elections in promoting legitimacy. They help induce an external

strengthening of loyalty norms, as groups are constrained from providing certain public

goods and encouraged to provide private goods beneficial to the external force.

Elections, to be meaningful in aiding Palestinians and Palestinian society, must be

regular, free and fair, and binding. Moreover, the security services require reform to

prevent factional warfare that has plagued Fatah and Hamas particularly in the last few

years. These types of socially damaging action have been condemned but unfortunately

extant throughout Islamic history. My interpretation of Chapter 2, Verses 190 � 195 of

the Qur�an offers some account of this:

And fight, in the cause of God, those who slay you but do not

transgress because God does not love the transgressors.

Slay them when you catch them and expel them, for [civil]

disorder [al-fitna] is from murder. Do not fight them at the protected

Mosque until they fight you in it. Thus, if they fought you then fight

them, for that is a component of the blasphemers.

If they stop, God is compassionate in forgiveness [most-forgiving,

most-compassionate].

Fight them until no longer is there discord, but instead they which

are of God. And if they cease, then be there no hostility but over the

oppressors.

The prohibited month [Ramadan] is for the prohibited month and

the sanctity of retribution [refers to the tribal right to respond to violence

of other tribes]. Thus who transgresses against you, transgress against him

in the way he transgressed against you. Fear God and know that God is

with the restrained.

Spend in the cause of God, and do not allow your hands to

contribute to destruction. Be kind, that God loves those who do good.

(2:190-195)25

25 surah al-baqarah: صرة البقرة

واقتلوهم حيث ثقفتموهم وأخرجوآم والفتنة من القتل > 191<وقاتلوا في سبيل اهللا الذين يقتلونكم وال تعتدوا إن اهللا ال يحب المعتدين > 190<> 193<يم فإن انتهوا فإن اهللا غفور رح> 192<وال تقاتلوهم عند المسجد الحرام حتى يقاتلوآم فيه فإن قاتلواآم فاقتلوهم آذلك جزاء الكفرين

الشهر الحرام بالشهر الحرام والحرمات قصاص > 194<وقاتلوهم حتى ال تكون فتنة ويكون الذين اهللا فإن انتهوا فال عدوان إال علي الظالين تلقوا بايديكوم وأنفقوا في سبيل اهللا وال > 195<فمن اعتدى عليكم فاعتدوا عليه بمثل ما اعتدى عليكم واتقوا اهللا واعلموا أن اهللا مع المتقين

.(195-2:190)إلى التهلكة وأحنوا إن اهللا يحب المحسنين

Palestinian factions, particularly Fatah, must display greater flexibility in dealing with

domestic issues. International aid and legitimacy are crucial to the governance of the PA,

but long-term benefits must not be sold out for the benefits of the short-term. Ironically,

an unintended effect of Fatah�s electoral losses in 2006 may provide cause for regular

future elections. Fatah�s losses are indicative of a lack of attentiveness but do not reflect

political collapse or realignment. Abbas, and Fatah�s members and allies in the PA may

yet be able to lobby for electoral reform or regular elections. Though driven by the hope

of returning Fatah�s electoral advantage, such elections would have to be perceived by

consensus as legitimate, unlike Abbas�s dismissal of the Hamas government. Whether

this would encourage republican and democratic norms is still unclear. Still, there must

be stronger internal incentives for elections and normative institutional rule. President

Abbas has a difficult path ahead and must delicately seek a balance between external and

internal forces. He and other Palestinian leaders must tread carefully, or risk ensuring a

cycle of Palestinian violence alongside that of the Occupation.

Bibliography:

Works Cited:

Abu Zayyad, Z. (2005). The Hamas Victory: Implications and Future Challenges. Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics & Culture, 12/13(4/1), 107-114.

Bush, G. (2006) Executive Order 13338, May 11, 2006; electronic copy: http://uscode.house.gov/uscode-cgi/fastweb.exe?getdoc+uscview+t49t50+1861+1++%28hamas%29%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20

Denoeux, G. (2005). The Politics of Corruption in Palestine: Evidence from Recent Public-Opinion Polls. Middle East Policy, Fall2005, Vol. 12 Issue 3, p119-135

Dowty, A. (2005). Israel/Palestine. Cambridge, UK: Polity.

Fishman, R. (1998) Palestinian human rights suffer from official corruption. Lancet: February 2, 1998.

Gray, M. (2005). Arafat's Legacy, Abbas's Challenges. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 59(2), 127-132.

Hamad, G. (2006). The Challenge for Hamas: Establishing Transparency and Accountability. Geneva: Center for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF).

Hroub, K. (2006). A "New Hamas" Through Its New Documents. Journal of Palestine Studies, 35(4), 6-27.

Kristianasen, W. (28). Challenge and Counterchallenge: Hamas's Response to Oslo. 1999, 3(19), 36.

Kumaraswamy, P. R. (2003). Israel, Jordan and the Masha'al Affair. Israel Affairs, 9(3), 111-128.

Nachtwey, J. & Tessler, M. (2002). The Political Economy of Attitudes Toward Peace Among Palestinians and Israelis. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Apr2002, Vol. 46 Issue 2, p260-286.

Rynhold, J., & Steinberg, G. (2004). The Peace Process and the Israeli Elections. Israel Affairs, 10(4), 181-2004.

Sahliyeh, E. (1988). In Search of Leadership : West Bank Politics Since 1967. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.

Sela, A., & Mishal, S. (2000). The Palestinian Hamas. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Sela, A., & Mishal, S. (2006). The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Shikaki, K. (1998). Peace now or hamas later. Foreign Affairs, 77(4), 29-43.

Tamimi, A. (2007). Hamas: A history from within. Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press.

Weinberger, N. (2006). The Absence of Human Security in Palestine: International Responses to the Failure of Security Sector Reform. Unpublished Paper.

(January 26, 2006.) Prelminary Statement of the NDI/Carter Center International Observer Delegation to the Palestinian Legislative Council Elections. The Carter Center. http://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/doc2283.html

Data Sources:

For a greater discussion about the source of various data, please see Appendix B, which contains the source of information from PCPSR, CPSR, B�Tzelem, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, and the Palestinian Central Elections Commission.

Appendix A: Internal Hamas Document August 10, 1992. Partial Reproduction (Mishal and Sela, 2000 124-130):

Appendix B: Sources of Data: This appendix provides the source of all data for regressions, tables, and graphs. CPRS

(the previous name for PCPRS) raw data tends to be at the end of the initial page.

PCPRS raw data tend to begin on the page after the last page of analysis.

(See: http://www.pcprs.org). Data for the selectorate for 1996/January 1996 and

2006/January 2006 are taken from the Central Elections Commission � Palestine (See:

http://www.elections.gov.ps/english.aspx).

The Model We used a model from Web-Enabled Scientific Services and Applications (http://www.wessa.net) that employs an r module method for multiple-variable regression (http://www.wessa.net/rwasp_multipleregression.wasp).

Graph 1 (pg. 18)

Fatah�s supporters from all the below listed CPRS and PCPSR polls.

Graph 2 (pg. 20) PLCPart taken from the percentage of people who said they would participate in Legislative Council elections (1-PLCPart = Disenfranchise). This value is taken as S, against the level of support for Hamas to measure Hamas�s loyalty norm (Hamas W/S). Probability values are calculated from these previously mentioned variables and from Fatah�s support as well. CPRS Polls: Poll # 2 : Palestinian Elections (October 5-10, 1993) http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/94/poll2a.html Poll # 3 : Palestinian Elections (November 11, 1993) http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/94/poll3a.html Poll # 6 : Palestinian Elections and the Cairo-Agreement (February 19, 1994) http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/94/poll6.html

Poll # 10 : Elections, Economic Conditions, Palestinian Prisoners, Palestinian Police, and Jerusalem (June 30, 1994) http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/94/poll10a.html Poll # 12 : The West Bank and Gaza Strip (September 29-30, 1994) http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/94/poll12a.html Poll # 13 : Unemployment, Jordanian-Israeli Treaty, Armed Operations, Elections and Other Issues (November 17-19, 1994) http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/94/poll13a.html Poll # 14 : Negotiations, Palestinian National Authority and Opposition, Jordanian-Palestinian Relations, Elections and the Presidency of the PNA (December 29-31, 1994) http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/94/poll14a.html Poll # 16 : Armed Attacks, Negotiations, Jenin Proposal, Elections, Economic Situation, and the Palestinian-Jordanian Relations (March 16-18, 1995) http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/95/poll16a.html Poll # 17 : Elections, Negotiations, Strike, Refugee Camps, Criticism of the PNA (May 18-20, 1995) http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/95/poll17a.html Poll # 18 : Redeployment Agreement, PNA Performance, Prisoners Release, Electoral System and Other topics (July 6-9, 1995) http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/95/poll18a.html Poll # 22 : Armed Operations, Peace Process, Elections, Unemployment (March 1996) http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/96/poll22a.html Poll # 23 : The Peace Process After Netanyahu's Elections, Freedom of Expression, Democratization Under the PNA, The Recent Arab Summit, The Performance of the Legislative Council (June 28-30,1996) http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/96/poll23a.html Poll # 33: Evaluation of the Performance of PLC and PA, Corruption, Attitudes Regarding new Legislative Elections, Local Elections, and Oslo Peace Agreement (June 3-6, 1998) http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/98/poll33a.html PCPSR: Poll #4 :Palestinians Give Less Support For Bombings Inside Israel While Two Thirds Support The Saudi Plan And 91% Support Reforming The Pa, But A Majority Opposes Arrests And Opposes The Agreements That Led To Ending The Siege On Arafat's Headquarter, Nativity Church, And Preventive Security Headquarter 15-18 May 2002

http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2002/p4a.html Poll #5 : While Sharply Divided Over The Ceasefire And Bombing Attacks Against Civilians, An Overwhelming Majority Supports Political Reform But Have Doubts About The Pa's Intentions To Implement It. 18-21 August 2002 http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2002/p5a.html Poll #6 : While Indicating Important Shifts In Palestinian Public Attitudes Toward The Intifada And The Peace Process, Psr Poll Shows Significant Support For The Appointment Of A Prime Minister And Refusal To Give Confidence In The New Palestinian Government. 14-22 November 2002 http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2002/p6a.html Poll #9 : With Arafat's Populairty Reaching Its Highest Level In Five Years, Three Quarters Of The Palestinians Support The Maxim Resturant Suicide Bombing And Two Thirds Believe The Roadmap Is Dead. Nonetheless, An Overwhelming Majority Of 85% Supports Mutual Cessation Of Violence, Two Thirds Support Return To Hudna, And 59% Support Taking Measures Against Those Who Would Violate A Ceasefire. 07-14 October 2003 http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/p9a.html Poll #13 : After Four Years Of Intifada, An Overwhelming Sense Of Insecurity Prevails Among Palestinians Leading To High Level Of Support For Bombing And Rocket Attacks On One Hand And To High Levles Of Demand For Mutual Cessation Of Violence And Questioning Of The Effectivness Of Armed Attacks On The Other 23-26 September 2004 http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2004/p13a.html Poll #14 : In an environment of increased realism and hope, in which the popularity of Fateh greatly increases while that of Hamas decreases, a close presidential race between Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazin) and Marwan Barghouti 01-05 December 2004 http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2004/p14a.html Poll #16 : Despite Negative Evaluation Of Palestinian Conditions Since The Election Of Abu Mazin, And Despite The Continued Rise In The Popularity Of Hamas, Expected Elections' Outcome Gives Fateh 44% And Hamas 33% Of The Seats Of The Next Plc 09-11 June 2005 http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2005/p16a.html Poll #17 : On The Eve Of The Israeli Withdrawal From The Gaza Strip, 84% See It As Victory For Armed Resistance And 40% Give Hamas Most Of The Credit For It; But 62% Are Opposed To Continued Attacks Against Israelis From The Gaza Strip, 60% Support Collection Of Arms From Armed Groups In Gaza, Fateh's Electoral Standing

Improved At Hamas' Expense (47% To 30%), Optimism Prevails Over Pessimism, And 73% Support The Establishment Of A Palestinian State In The Gaza Strip That Would Gradually Extend To The West Bank 07-09 September 2005 http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2005/p17a.html Special Poll - Results of PSR Exit Poll For Palestinian Local Elections: Amid Widespread Belief that Corruption Exits in Existing Local Councils, and in Parallel with the Split Within Fateh, PSR's Local Elections' Exit Poll in the cities of Nablus, Ramallah, al-Bireh, and Jenin Shows First Signs of Crack in Fateh's Standing in the Legislative Elections 15 December 2005 http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2005/exitlocaledec05.html Special Poll Before the Start of the Election Campaign, and About One Month Before the Elections, a PSR Pre Election Poll Shows Fateh List Winning at the National Level While Showing a Tie Between Candidates of Fateh and Change and Reform in the Electoral Districts 01 January 2006 http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2005/preelectionsdec05.html Table 1 (pg. 24) The variables measured are explained in the discussion for Graph 1. CPRS Poll # 2 Poll # 3 Poll # 6 Poll # 10 Poll # 12 Poll # 13 Poll # 14 Poll # 16 Poll # 17 Poll # 18 Poll # 22 Poll # 23 Poll # 33 PCPSR: Poll #4 Poll #5 Poll #6 Graph 3 (pg. 23)

The same source of data for Graph 1, also including the following additional polls: PCPSR Poll #19 : On The Eve of the Formation of the New Palestinian Government, Hamas' Popularity Increases and Fateh's Decreases, but a Majority of the Palestinians Wants the Continuation of the Peace Process and the Implementation of the Road Map and Supports a New Negotiated, rather than a Unilateral, Israeli Disengagement in the West Bank - 16-18 March 2006. http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2006/p19e.html Poll #20 : In An Environment of Increased Pessimism, Greater Support for Violence and Decreased Support For a Permanent Status Agreement Similar to the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Document, Three Quarters Agree with the Prisoners' Document, but only 47% would Actually Vote for it if a Referendum is to Take Place Today - 15-18 June 2006. http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2006/p20e1.html Poll #21 : Despite Dissatisfaction with the Performance of the Hamas Government, Especially Regarding Salaries, and Despite Public Preference for a National Unity Government in which Fateh and Hamas are Equal, Hamas' Popularity Remains Largely Unchanged and the Majority does not Think it Should Recognize Israel - 14-16 September 2006. http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2006/p21e1.html Poll #22 : With Increased Public Dissatisfaction with the Performance of the President and the Hamas Government and with a Widening of the Gap Between the Popularity of Fateh and Hamas in Favor of the Former, a Majority Supports the Holding of Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, and is in Favor of the Arab (Saudi) Initiative, and Prefers a Comprehensive Settlement over an Interim Political Track - 14-16 December 2006. http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2006/p22e1.html Poll #23 : An Overwhelming Majority is Satisfied with the Make-Up of the National Unity Government but the Public is Split into Two Equal Halves with Regard to its Acceptance of the Quartet Conditions and Almost Three Quarters are in Favor of the Saudi Initiative - 22-24 March 2007. http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2007/p23e1.html Poll #24 : Anger and lack of confidence prevails in the Palestinian Street: While Popularity of Hamas Decreases, and Status of Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmud Abbas Declines, and While the Public Loses Confidence in its Leadership, in Most of the Security Services, and in the Various Armed "Brigades," Three Quarters Demand Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections and 63% support the American Security Plan - 14-20 June 2007. http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2007/p24e1.html

Poll #25 : While Three Quarters of the Palestinians Reject Hamas's Military Action in the Gaza Strip and While Fateh and President Mahmud Abbas Gain Popular Support as a Result of Hamas's Step, and While a Majority Supports the Presidential Decree Regarding Election Law and Supports Early Elections, 40% Want the Government of Ismail Haniyeh to Stay in Power and Half of Gazans Feel They and Their Families are Secure and Safe in Their Homes - 06-08 September 2007. http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2007/p25e1.html Poll #26 : A Total Lack of Confidence in the Annapolis Process Keeps Hamas's Popularity Stable despite Worsening Conditions in the Gaza Strip - 11-16 December 2007. http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2007/p26e1.html Poll #27: With Increased Dissatisfaction with the Performance of Mahmud Abbas and with the Government of Ismail Haniyeh Seen as Having Greater Legitimacy and Better Performance than the Government of Salam Fayyad, and with Confidence in the Negotiations with Israel Collapsing, Hamas's and Haniyeh's Popularity Increase and Fateh's and Abbas's Decrease While Support for Rocket Launching and Suicide Attacks Increase - 13-15 March 2008. http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2008/p27e1.html Table 2 (pg. 32) & Graph 4 (pg. 33): These values were calculated above, with the addition of HSupPart, which was taken from CPRS polls of Hamas members� intentions of participating in 1996 PLC elections multiplied by WH. CPRS Poll # 2 Poll # 3 Poll # 6 Poll #10 Poll # 12 Poll # 13 Poll # 16 Poll # 18 Table 3 (pg. 37): PCPSR: Poll #9 Poll #13 Poll #16 Poll #17

Special Poll - 15 December 2005 Graph 5 (pg. 39): PCPSR: Poll #9 Poll #13 Poll #16 Poll #17 Special Poll - 15 December 2005 Special Poll - 01 January 2006 Table 4 (pg. 46) & Graph 6 (pg. 45): Data averaged from CPRS then PCPSR data annually from 1996-2006. Table 5 (pg. 62) & Graph 7 (pg. 63): Fatality figures were taken from B�Tzelem: www.btzelem.org � Statistics: Palestinians Killed by Palestinians Data about perception of civil liberties is only available in PCPSR polls from March and June 2004; January, March, June, and December 2005; and March, June, September, and December 2006. PCPSR: Poll #4 Poll #7 :Appointment of Prime Minister, Political Reform, Roadmap, War in Iraq, Arafat's Popularity, and Political Affiliation. 03-07 April 2003 http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/p7a.html Poll #8 : While Support For Abu Mazin Drops, Support For A Ceasefire Increases With A Majority Supporting Ending The Armed Intifada And Agreeing To A Mutual Recognition Of Israel As The State Of The Jewish People And Palestine As The State Of The Palestinian People. 19-22 June 2003 http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/p8a.html Poll #10 : While A Majority Opposes The Geneva Document, Palestinian Attitudes Vary Regarding Its Core Components: A Large Majority Opposes The Refugee Solution And The Restrictions On Palestinian Sovereignty, But A Majority Endorses Equal Territorial Swaps And The Deployment Of A Multinational Force 04-09 December 03 http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/p10a.html

Poll #11 : While Three Quarters Of The Palestinians Welcome Sharon's Plan Of Withdrawal From Gaza And While Two Thirds See It As Victory For Armed Struggle Against Occupation, 58% Of The Palestinians Prefer To See The Palestinian Atuhority And Israel Negotiate The Withdrawal Plan And 61% Believe Sharon Is Not Serious And Will Not Withdraw 14-17 March 2004 http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2004/p11a.html Poll #13 Poll #14 Poll #15 : SHARP DECREASE IN SUPPORT FOR SUICIDE BOMBINGS INSIDE ISRAEL AND SATISFACTION WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF ABU MAZIN, BUT HAMAS' POPULARITY INCREASES WHILE FATEH'S DECREASES 10-12 March 2005 http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2005/p15a.html Poll #16 Special Poll - 15 December 2005 Special Poll - 01 January 2006 Poll #19 : On The Eve of the Formation of the New Palestinian Government, Hamas' Popularity Increases and Fateh's Decreases, but a Majority of the Palestinians Wants the Continuation of the Peace Process and the Implementation of the Road Map and Supports a New Negotiated, rather than a Unilateral, Israeli Disengagement in the West Bank - 16-18 March 2006 http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2006/p19e.html Poll #20 : In An Environment of Increased Pessimism, Greater Support for Violence and Decreased Support For a Permanent Status Agreement Similar to the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Document, Three Quarters Agree with the Prisoners' Document, but only 47% would Actually Vote for it if a Referendum is to Take Place Today - 15-18 June 2006 http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2006/p20e1.html Poll #21 : Despite Dissatisfaction with the Performance of the Hamas Government, Especially Regarding Salaries, and Despite Public Preference for a National Unity Government in which Fateh and Hamas are Equal, Hamas' Popularity Remains Largely Unchanged and the Majority does not Think it Should Recognize Israel - 14-16 September 2006 http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2006/p21e1.html Poll #22 : With Increased Public Dissatisfaction with the Performance of the President and the Hamas Government and with a Widening of the Gap Between the Popularity of Fateh and Hamas in Favor of the Former, a Majority Supports the Holding of Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, and is in Favor of the Arab (Saudi) Initiative,

and Prefers a Comprehensive Settlement over an Interim Political Track - 14-16 December 2006 http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2006/p22e1.html Table 6 (pg. 66) Imprisonment and detainment figures were taken from B�Tzelem: www.btzelem.org � Statistics: Administrative Detention PCPSR: Poll #4 Poll #5 Poll #6 Poll #9 Poll #13 Poll #16 Poll #17 Special Poll - 15 December 2005 Graph 8 (pg. 74) All CPRS and PCPSR polls between 1993 and 2008. Table 7 (pg. 84) & Graphs 9 (pg. 79) and 10 (pg. 83) and 11 (pg. 86) Using data points where available for all previously listed PCPSR polls between June 2001 and December 2007, we carried the value of the previous data point until a new value from polling. Ex. A poll offering data on Hamas support in Gaza would exist for June 2001 and May 2002, we would use the June 2001 data until May 2002. However, gaps in data-reporting do not generally exceed 2 or 3 months. GDP per capita figures were taken from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. (http://www.pcbs.gov.ps)