Constitutional Law 3

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The Executive

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Transcript of Constitutional Law 3

Page 1: Constitutional Law 3

The Executive

Page 2: Constitutional Law 3

The Executive Branch in Singapore

1. The Executive Branch – Cabinet & the President

2. Cabinet composition & functions

3. The Head of State

4. Discretionary Powers of the Head of State

5. The Elected President & his roles

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The Cabinet

1. Parliamentary form of government – power lies mainly in the Cabinet

2. Cabinets developed in reigns of George I and George II in first half of 18th century

3. English kings from Hanover, Germany, depended on small group of advisors to decide state policy

4. First British Prime Minister – Sir Robert Walpole (1676–1745)

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The Cabinet

1. Singapore – Cabinet emerged out of the old Executive Councils

2. 1877 – First Executive Council formed to advise Governor of the Straits Settlements, Sir William Robinson

3. 1877–1954: Executive Council of the Straits Settlements

4. 1954 – Rendel Constitution – First Council of Ministers

5. 1958 – State of Singapore – Cabinet

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The Cabinet

1. Article 24(1) – there shall be ‘a Cabinet which shall consist of the Prime Minister and such other ministers as may be appointed in accordance with Article 25’

2. No specification as to size of cabinet

3. No specification as to where members are to be drawn from

4. Prime Minister – Appointed by President – the person who ‘in his judgment is likely to command the confidence of the majority of the Members of Parliament’

5. Quaere: How does the President determine ‘confidence’?

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The Cabinet

1. Prime Minister – First among equals – most powerful member of the cabinet

2. Typically holds most powerful post within his/her party – Secretary-General

3. Current Cabinet – 20 members.

4. Non-traditional posts – Minister Mentor (2004); Senior Minister (1988); Minister without Portfolio (1980)

5. Drawn from the ranks of MPs

6. Ministers charged with various departments or ministries by PM under Article 30.

7. PM may retain any portfolio for himself – eg Lee Hsien Loong was PM & Minister for Finance.

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The Cabinet

1. Cabinet Ministers run ministries assisted by permanent secretaries and possibly junior ministers (Ministers of State).

2. Walter Bagehot (author of The English Constitution) observed that the efficiency of the British government lay in the ‘close union and nearly complete fusion of the executive and legislative powers’

3. Article 24 – Cabinet has ‘general direction and control of the Government’

4. Cabinet can only by summoned by the Prime Minister – Article 28(1)

5. Collective responsibility of the cabinet – Article 24(2).

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The Cabinet

1. Ministers hold office as long as they remain MPs

2. Term of office runs for duration of each Parliament

3. President may declare office of PM vacant if (a) PM resigns; or (b) ‘acting in his discretion’, the President ‘is satisfied’ that the PM has lost the confidence of the House.

4. Quaere: Can the President dismiss the PM? Perak Crisis 2009

5. Quaere 2: Is the Executive in Singapore an elected dictatorship?

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The Head of State

1. President – Head of State

2. Initially a ceremonial role based on British Westminster practice.

3. Unlike British Governor who had real powers, President had very limited personal discretion:

a) Appointment of Prime Minister

b) Withholding assent to dissolve Parliament

c) Proclamation of Emergency

4. Changed dramatically with Elected Presidency amendments in 1991.

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Presidential Discretion (pre-EP)

1. Appointment of Prime Minister

a) Meaning of ‘is satisfied’ – based on objective criteria or purely subjective.

b) Justiciability of President’s discretion?

2. Proclamation of Emergency

3. Presidential Pardon

4. Assent to Bills unaffected by EP provisions

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Presidential Discretion – Appointment of PM

1. Appointment of Prime Minister

a) Adegbenro v Akintola (Privy Council, on appeal from Western Nigeria, 1963)

b) Stephen Kalong Ningkan v Tun abang Haji Openg & Tawi Sli (Sarawak, 1966)

c) Tun Haji Mustapha v Tun Datuk Haji Mohamed Adnan Robert & Datuk Pairin Kitigan (Sabah, 1986)

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Presidential Discretion – Emergency

1. Is Proclamation of Emergency reviewable?

a) Lee Mau Seng v Minister for Home Affairs (1971) – the words ‘is satisfied’ does not mean that he is personally satisfied

b) Head of State’s exercise of discretion cannot be challenged in court

150(1): If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security or economic life of Singapore is threatened, he may issue a Proclamation of Emergency.

150(1): If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security or economic life of Singapore is threatened, he may issue a Proclamation of Emergency.

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Presidential Discretion – Emergency

1. Is Proclamation of Emergency reviewable?

a) Lee Mau Seng v Minister for Home Affairs (1971) – the words ‘is satisfied’ does not mean that he is personally satisfied

b) Head of State’s exercise of discretion cannot be challenged in court

150(1): If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security or economic life of Singapore is threatened, he may issue a Proclamation of Emergency.

150(1): If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security or economic life of Singapore is threatened, he may issue a Proclamation of Emergency.

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The Elected Presidency

1. Arose out of concern that a ‘freak election result’ could bring in a profligate and populist government (1984)

2. First White Paper 1988 – outline of main scheme

3. Second White Paper 1990 – inclusion of additional functions

Key Considerations

1. Preservation of parliamentary system of government

2. New mechanism must act quickly

3. New Institution must have high moral authority

4. President must have ministerial, high executive or administrative experience to ‘balance the demands of political expediency and the public interest

5. Entrenchment in the Constitution

Key Considerations

1. Preservation of parliamentary system of government

2. New mechanism must act quickly

3. New Institution must have high moral authority

4. President must have ministerial, high executive or administrative experience to ‘balance the demands of political expediency and the public interest

5. Entrenchment in the Constitution

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The Elected Presidency

1. President to be elected by citizens of Singapore under Presidential Elections Act

2. Term of office is 6 years

3. Discretion now includes:

a) withholding assent to any Bill under Articles 22E, 22H, 144(2) & 148A

b) Withholding concurrence under Art 144 to any guarantee or loan to be given or raised by Govt

c) Disapproving transactions referred to in Arts 22B(7), 22D(6) or 148G

d) Withholding concurrence for preventive detention cases

e) Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act

Qualifications

1. Singapore citizen

2. Aged 45 or above

3. Resident in Singapore for not less than 10 years

4. Satisfy Presidential Elections Committee that he is person ‘of integrity, good character and reputation’.

5. Held high office for not less than 3 years in prescribed list under Art 19(2)(g) – cf Andrew Kuan (CFO, JTC)

Qualifications

1. Singapore citizen

2. Aged 45 or above

3. Resident in Singapore for not less than 10 years

4. Satisfy Presidential Elections Committee that he is person ‘of integrity, good character and reputation’.

5. Held high office for not less than 3 years in prescribed list under Art 19(2)(g) – cf Andrew Kuan (CFO, JTC)

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The Elected Presidency

1. Entrenchment under Article 5(2A) still in abeyance

2. President Ong Teng Cheong’s attempt to test the system:

a) Constitutional Reference No 1 of 1995

b) Press interview 1999

3. President Nathan’s concurrence to draw down of $4.5 billion for Government’s $20.5 billion Resilience Package under Article 148A(1)

4. Quaere: Process deployed in making decision on the draw-down? Was this an adequate safeguard and second key?