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1. Hurtado vs. People of State of California [110 U.S. 516, 3 March 1884]

Facts: The constitution of the state of California adopted in 1879, in article 1, 8, provides as follows: "Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information, after examination and commitment by a magistrate, or by indictment, with or without such examination and commitment, as may be prescribed by law. A grand jury shall be drawn and summoned at least once a year in each county." In pursuance of the foregoing provision of the constitution, and of the several sections of the penal Code of California, the district attorney of Sacramento county, on 20 February 1882, filed an information against Joseph Hurtado, charging him with the crime of murder in the killing of one Jose Antonio Stuardo. Upon this information, and without any previous investigation of the cause by any grand jury, Hurtado was arraigned on 22 March 1882, and pleaded not guilty. A trial of the issue was thereafter had, and on 7 May 1882, the jury rendered its verdict, in which it found Hurtado guilty of murder in the first degree. On 5 June 1882, the superior court of Sacramento county rendered its judgment upon said verdict, that Hurtado be punished by the infliction of death, and the day of his execution was fixed for 20 July 1882. From this judgment an appeal was taken, and the supreme court of the State of California affirmed the judgment. On 6 July 1883, the superior court of said county of Sacramento ordered that Hurtado be in court on 11 July 1883, in order that a day for the execution of the judgment in said cause should be fixed. In pursuance of said order, Hurtado, with his counsel, appeared in court, and upon the court's inquiry, objected to the execution of said judgment and to any order which the court might make fixing a day for the execution of the same, upon the grounds (1) that it appeared upon the face of the judgment that Hurtado had never been legally, or otherwise, indicted or presented by any grand jury, and that he was proceeded against by information made and filed by the district attorney of the county of Sacramento, after examination and commitment by a magistrate of the said county; (2) that the said proceedings, as well as the laws and constitution of California, attempting to authorize them, and the alleged verdict of the jury, and judgment of the said superior court of said county of Sacramento, were in conflict with and prohibited by Amendments 5 and 14 of the constitution of the United States, and that they were therefore void; (3) that Hurtado had been held to answer for the said crime of murder by the district attorney of the said county of Sacramento, upon an information filed by him, and had been tried and illegally found guilty of the said crime, without any presentment or indictment of any grand or other jury, and that the judgment rendered upon the alleged verdict of the jury in such case was and is void, and if executed would deprive Hurtado of his life or liberty without due process of law. Thereupon the court overruled the said objections, and fixed 13 August 1883, as the time for the execution of the sentence. From this latter judgment, Hurtado appealed to the supreme court of the state. On 18 September 1883, the supreme court of the state affirmed the said judgment. A review of which, by a writ of error, by the US Supreme Court was allowed. Issue: Whether Hurtado was denied due process by being tried and found guilty without being presented or indicted by a grand jury. Held: The clause of the 14th article of amendment to the constitution of the United States, provides that "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." The phrase is to be construed by the usus loquendi of the constitution itself. The same words are contained in the 5th amendment. That article makes specific and express provision for perpetuating the institution of the grand jury, so far as relates to prosecutions for the more aggravated crimes under the laws of the United States. It declares that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." It then immediately adds: "nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." The natural and obvious inference is that, in the sense of the constitution, "due process of law" was not meant or intended to include, ex vi termini, the institution and procedure of a grand jury in any case. The conclusion is equally irresistible, that when the same phrase was employed in the 14th amendment to restrain the action of the states, it was used in the same sense and with no greater extent; and that if in the adoption of that amendment it had been part of its purpose to perpetuate the institution of the grand jury in all the states, it would have embodied, as did the 5th amendment, express declarations to that effect. Due process of law in the latter refers to that law of the land which derives its authority from the legislative powers conferred upon congress by the constitution of the United States, exercised within the limits therein prescribed, and interpreted according to the principles of the common law. In the fourteenth amendment, by parity of reason, it refers to that law of the land in each state which derives its authority from the inherent and reserved powers of the state, exerted within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions, and the greatest security for which resides in the right of the people to make their own laws, and alter them at their pleasure. The 14th amendment does not profess to secure to all persons in the United States the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies. Great diversities in these respects may exist in two states separated only by an imaginary line. On one side of this line there may be a right of trial by jury, and on the other side no such right. Each state prescribes its own modes of judicial proceeding. Further, any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law. Herein, the Court is unable to say that the substitution for a presentment or indictment by a grand jury of the proceeding by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, certifying to the probable guilt of the defendant, with the right on his part to the aid of counsel, and to the cross-examination of the witnesses produced for the prosecution, is not due process of law. The Court found no error and thus affirmed the judgment of the supreme court of California.

2. Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho [GR L-29646, 10 Nov 1978] Facts: On 22 February 1968, Ordinance 6537 (An ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade, business or occupation within the City of Manila without first securing an employment permit from the mayor of Manila; and for other purposes) was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila and signed by Manila Mayor Antonio J. Villegas on 27 March 1968. The Ordinance prohibits aliens from employment and trade in the City of Manila without the requisite mayors permit; but excepting persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind. The permit fee is P50, and the penalty is imprisonment of 3 to 6 months or fine of P100-200, or both. On 4 May 1968, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila, filed a petition, with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila (Civil Case 72797), praying for (1) the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the implementation of the ordinance, and (2) judgment to declare the ordinance null and void. On 24 May 1968, Judge Francisco Arca (CFI Manila, Branch I) issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on 17 September 1968, the Judge rendered a decision declaring the ordinance null and void, and the preliminary injunction is made permanent. Mayor Villegas filed a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CFI.

Issue: Whether the Ordinance, requiring aliens - however economically situated - to secure working permits from the City of Manila at a uniform fee of P50, is reasonable.

Held: The ordinance is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Requiring a person, before he can be employed, to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila, who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. The ordinance does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted powers. The ordinances purpose is clearly to raise money under the guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. The amount is unreasonable and excessive because it fails to consider differences in situation among aliens required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, full-time, part-time, rank-an-file or executive.

3. Rubi, et. al. vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [GR 14078, 7 March 1919]

Facts: On 1 February 1917, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted Resolution 25 creating a reservation / permanent settlement for Mangyans (Mangyanes) in an 800-hectare public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake, and resolving that Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on the reservation provided that said homestead applications be previously recommended by the provincial governor. On 21 February 1917, the Secretary of Interior approved Resolution 25. On 4 December 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued Executive Order 2 which directed all Mangyans in the vicinities of the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than 31 December 1917, and penalizing any Mangyan who refused to comply with the order with imprisonment of not exceeding 60 days, in accordance with section 2759 of the Revised Administrative Code. Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwellings within the reservation of Tigbao and are prosecuted in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711. On the other hand, Doroteo Dabalos, was detained by the sheriff of Mindoro by virtue of the provisions of Articles 2145 and 2759 of Act 2711, for having run away from the reservation. Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro applied for writs of habeas corpus, alleging that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province.

Issue: Whether due process was followed in the restraint of the Manguianes liberty, either on their confinement in reservations and/or imprisonment due to violation of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code .

Held: None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. The meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite, a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law. Due process of law" means simply that "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." What is due process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation. The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature. Herein, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws. There exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class. Action pursuant to Section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that Section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Rubi and the other Manguianes are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro

39 Phil. 660 Political Law Delegation of Powers Liberty and due processRubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of very low culture.

One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later caught and wasplaced in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf byRubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, which provides:

With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.

was challenged.

ISSUE:Whether or notSection 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes undue delegation. Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.

HELD:I.No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better position to determine whether or not to execute the law but the provincial governor. It is optional for the provincial governor to execute the law as circumstances may arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the provincial governor.The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.

II.No. Among other things, the term non-Christian should not be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term non-Christian it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this case, the Manguianes were being reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace and to arrest their seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down where they can adapt to the changing times.

The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: . . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro

FACTS:

The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor.

In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.

Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.

It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.

It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives a person of his liberty?

2. Thus, whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional?

HELD:

The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.

One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines.

Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.4. Ople v. Torres [ GR 127685, 23 July 1998 ] Facts: On 12 December 1996, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order 308, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System." It was published in 4 newspapers of general circulation on 22 and 23 January 1997. On 24 January 1997, Senator Blas F. Ople, as a Senator, taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), filed instant petition against then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee are charged with the implementation of Administrative Order 308.

Issue: Whether the Philippine President can issue an Administrative Order for the adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System, independent of a legislative act.

Held: Administrative Order 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy. Such a system requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies: the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law. The Order is a law, negating claims that it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under it, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Administrative Order 308 does not merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987, but establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. The authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws. AO 308 was beyond the power of the President to issue.

292 SCRA 141 (1998)

Blas Ople vs Ruben Torres FACTS: On December 12, 1996 President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order 308 entitled Adoption of National and Computerized Identification Reference System. The purposes of the said order are: (a) it will provide the Filipino and foreign residents with the convenience to transact businesses with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities (b) it will reduce if not totally eradicate fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations because it will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently identify person seeking basic services on social security.

Petitioner Senator Blas Ople prays to invalidate A.O. 308 for two vital constitutional grounds: (a) it is a usurpation of power of Congress to legislate (b) it intrudes the citizenrys protected zone of privacy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Administrative Order 308 is unconstitutional for being overbreadth?

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that it is inarguable that the broadness, vagueness and overbreadth of A.O. 308 will put the peoples right to privacy in clear and present danger.

Administrative Order 308 does not state: (a) what specific biological characteristics will be gathered (b) what particular biometrics technology will be employed (c) whether data is limited to use for identification purposes only (d) how data will be handled (e)who shall control and access the data.

Thus A.O 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy because, as technology advances, the level of reasonable expected privacy decreases.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order (A.O.) 308 on

December 12, 1996 entiltled Adoption of NationalComputerized

Identification Reference System or commonly known as Natioanal

ID System.

Senator Blas F. Ople filed a petition before the Supreme Court

questioning the constitutionality of the said executive issuance on

two important grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of

Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our

citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the

rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger

barriers against further erosion.

ISSUE: DOES A.0 308 VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY? SUPREME COURT:

Yes. Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of

a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative

legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. A.O. 308 is so

vague. The vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if

implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present

danger. There are no vital safeguards.

A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show

that it does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological

information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor

General claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference

System will contribute to the "generation of population data for

development planning." 54 This is an admission that the Population

Reference Number (PRN) will not be used solely for identification but

for the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed

purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308

can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve

information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual

through his PRN .

The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308

cannot be underplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said

administrative order, an individual must present his PRN everytime he

deals with a government agency to avail of basic services and

security. His transactions with the government agency will necessarily

be recorded -- whether it be in the computer or in the documentary

file of the agency. The individual's file may include his transactions for

loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities,

reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent

the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge and

formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files.

The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government

purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information

constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too

great for some of our authorities to resist.

We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be

limited to the name, address and other basic personal information

about the individual. Even that hospitable assumption will not save

A.O. No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for again said order does not

tell us in clear and categorical terms how these information gathered

shall be handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the

data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors

are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the

information. Well to note, the computer linkage gives other

government agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no

controls to guard against leakage of information. When the access

code of the control programs of the particular computer system is

broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use

of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data

stored within the system. It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that

personal information which will be gathered about our people will only

be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of proper

safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the

individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track

down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to

access confidential information and circumvent the right against selfincrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by

government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable

searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN,

biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we

consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or

placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data

encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to

prevent.

Excerpts from the concurring opinion of the Supreme Court justices:

Justice ROMERO, concur

So terrifying are the possibilities of a law such as Administrative Order

No. 308 in making inroads into the private lives of the citizens, a virtual

Big Brother looking over our shoulders, that it must, without delay, be

"slain upon sight" before our society turns totalitarian with each of us, a

mindless robot.

Justice Vitug, concur

Administrative Order No. 308 appears to be so extensively drawn that

could, indeed, allow unbridled options to become available to it

implementors beyond the reasonable comfort of the citizens and of

residents alike.

RIGHT TO PRIVACY RECOGNIZED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

Hereunder are the provisions in the 1987 Constitution which recognize our

Right to Privacy :

Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights:

"Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be

inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or

order requires otherwise as prescribed by law."

Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of

the Bill of Rights, viz: 34

"Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the

laws. Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of

whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search

warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be

determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or

affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and

particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things

to be seized.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits

prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the

court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of

national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by

law.

xxx xxx xxx.

Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public

and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes

not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Personal Analysis:

A.O. 308 was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court en banc for

reasons above stated. It bears stressing that the bulk of discussion in the

case focused more on the issue of infringement of the right to privacy. As

can be gleaned from A.O. 308, the provisions were so general that there

were no clear and vital guidelines to safeguard the information stored in

the Identification Card. Had President Fidel V. Ramos issued a more

complete and detailed guidelines providing for the metes and bounds of

the ID System, the decision could have been otherwise.

Even the argument of the respondents that rules and regulations would

be issued by the committee later, the court still reject the same. The court

said.: The rules and regulations to be drawn by the IACC cannot remedy

this fatal defect. Rules and regulations merely implement the policy of the

law or order. On its face, A.O. No. 308 gives the Inter-Agency

Coordinating Committee (IACC) virtually unfettered discretion to

determine the metes and bounds of the ID System.

In one press conference last month, Presidential Spokesperson Ignacio

Bunye said that there is really no need to pass a law to push through with

the plan of the National ID System. An executive issuance by the

President would suffice provided this time the said order will now be

detailed, comprehensive and contains all the vital safeguards. From his

statement, it can be deduced therefrom that the reservation and

backlash by the supreme court on the on the Ople case (A.O 308) have

been taken into consideration by Malacanang.

5. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan [GR 148560, 19 November 2001]

Facts: On 4 April 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Criminal Case 26558, for violation of Republic Act (RA) 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Criminal Cases 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Sections 3, paragraph (a), 3, paragraph (a), 3, paragraph (e), and 3, paragraph (e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Criminal Case 26563, for violation of Section 7, paragraph (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Criminal Case 26564, for Perjury (Article. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Criminal Case 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (Commonwealth Act 142, as amended by RA 6085). On 11 April 2001, Joseph Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 5 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Criminal Case 26558; and, for reconsideration / reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. The grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration / reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law. On 25 April 2001, the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan. On 14 June 2001, Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 9 July 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.

Issue: Whether the Plunder law, and the information, are clear to inform Estrada of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.

Held: As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Section 1, paragraph (d), of the Plunder Law. Herein, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which Estrada is alleged to have committed. There was nothing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse Estrada in his defense. Factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, Estrada is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense. There is no basis for Estrada's claim that the Supreme Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 6 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) cases. "On its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored.

ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYANG.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001Facts:Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder,wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that itcrosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. Hiscontentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice ofvagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and itabolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Codesaying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.Thefocalpointof thecaseisthealleged vaguenessofthelaw inthe termsituses.Particularly, thisterms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, thepetitioneruses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.Issue:Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law usingthe facial challenge.Ruling:On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. Thepetitioners contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the lawseekstopenalizecannotbeplausiblyargued.Void-for-vaguenessdoctrineismanifestlymisplacedunderthepetitionersreliancesinceordinaryintelligencecanunderstandwhatconduct is prohibited by the statute. It canonly be invoked against that specie of legislation thatis utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot beinvoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free fromambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires areasonable degree ofcertainty for thestatuteto be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.Onthe otherhand,overbreadth doctrinedecrees thatgovernmentalpurpose maynot beachievedbymeanswhichsweepunnecessarilybroadlyandtherebyinvadetheareaofprotected freedoms.Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statuteand to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech.Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of freespeech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount successfullysince the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists.Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in freespeech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application ofa statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly itmight also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its applicationmightbeunconstitutional.Onits faceinvalidation ofstatues results instriking themdownentirely on the ground that theymight be applied to parties notbefore the Court whose activitiesare constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law ismore imagined than real.The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congressdecision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit.G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001Joseph Ejercito Estrada vs. SandiganbayanFACTS:

The Office of the Ombudsman accuses President Joseph Ejercito Estrada together with Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro Eleuterio Tan, and Delia Rajsas of the crime of plunder defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080 as amended by Sec. 12 R.A. No. 7659.

During the term of President Estrada, he together with the individuals mentioned above wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire by himself, directly or indirectly ill-gotten wealth amounting to four billion ninety seven million eight hundred four thousand one hundred seventy three pesos and seventeen centavos (4,097,804,173.17), thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

Under RA 7080 An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder as amended by RA 7659 Section 2, the crime of plunder is defined as an act of any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (50,000,000) and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death.

Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned;(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. Petitioner Estrada questions the validity of the law for it is void for vagueness. He bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms and combination and series in the key phrase a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts found in Section 1 par. d, and the word pattern in Section 4.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for it suffers from the vice of vagueness?

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.

Randolf David vs President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

Professor Randolf S. David, et. al. vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, et. al.

G.R. No. 171396 03 May 2006

OVERVIEW:

This is a case of seven consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition alleging that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion.

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a State of National Emergency invoking Section 18, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. On the same day, she also issued GO no. 5 AFP and PNP to immediately carry out appropriate actions to suppress and prevent the lawless violence by invoking Section 4, Article 2 of the same. She did so citing the following bases:

The elements of the elements of the Extreme Left (NDF-CPP-NPA) and Extreme Right are now in alliance threatening to bring down the President;

Being magnified by the media, said acts are adversely affecting the economy thus representing clear and present danger to the safety and integrity of the State

A week later, the President lifted PP1017 via PP1021. It must be noted that before the said proclamations, the following course of events ensued:

February 17, 2006 : authorities got hold of a document entitled Oplan Hackle I detailing the plans for bombing more particularly that which was to occur in the PMA Homecoming in Baguio City which the President was to attend.

February 21, 2006 : Lt. San Juan recaptured a communist safehouse where 2 flash disks containing information that Magdalos D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I.

February 23, 2006 : PNP Chief Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP-SAF were planning to defect. Also, it was discovered that B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Col. Ariel Querubin were plotting to break the AFP chain of command for a movement against the Arroyo administration. The two were later taken into custody by Gen. Senga. However, statements were being released from the CPP-NPA and NDF on the increasing number of anti-Arroyo groups within the police and military.

The bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan.

The effects of PP1017 and GO No. 5 are as follows:

Protest by the KMU, NAFLU-KMU despite the cancellation of programs and activities for the 20th celebration of Edsa I as well as revocation of rally permits resulting in the violent disposal of the said groups and warrantless arrest of petitioner Randolf David and Ronald Llamas.

Raid of the Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante offices and confiscation of news stories and various documents

Arrest of Congressman Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis Party) by the police showing a 1985 warrant from the Marcos regime and attempts on the arrest of Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, et. al.

The petitioners assail that various rights stated in Article III of the 1987 Constitution have been violated, thus the case at hand.

ISSUES:

Whether PP 1021 in lifting PP 1017 renders the petitions moot and academic;

Whether the Court may review the factual bases of PP1017 on the petitioners contention that the said proclamation has none of it;

Whether PP 1017 and GO no. 5 are unconstitutional for their insofar as it allegedly violates the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures, the right against warrantless arrest, the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and to peaceably assemble.

HELD:

The court held that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers committed illegal acts implementing it. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the publics interest involving as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. An otherwise moot case may still be decided provided that the party raising it continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance (Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary) which is applicable in the present case.

Yes, the Court may do so. As to how the Court may inquire into the Presidents exercise of power, it must be proven that the President did not act arbitrarily. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis as the Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. This, however, was something that the petitioners failed to prove.

Since there is no law defining acts of terrorism, it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5 who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism, without restrictions. Certainly, the effects which may be implicated by such violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus, the acts of terrorism portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional. The plain import of the language of the Constitution provides that searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable without a search warrant or warrant of arrest. A warrantless arrest shall only be done if the offense is committed in ones presence or it has just been committed based on personal knowledge both of which are not present in Davids warrantless arrest. This being done during the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU, et. al. is also violative of the right of the people to peaceably assemble. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. Revocation of such permits may only be done after due notice and hearing. In the Daily Tribune case, the search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media are plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more. When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which violate the citizens rights under the Constitution, the Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal.

GR No. 126858, September 16, 2005

Ong vs. sandiganbayan

FACTS:

Congressman Bonifacio Gallego executed a complaint against petitioner Ong, a former Commissioner of the BIR claiming that petitioner has amassed properties worth disproportionately more than his lawful income. The Director of the Fact Finding Committee of the office of the Ombudsman ordered the conduct of investigation on the matter; of which petitioner was required to submit counter affidavit and controverting evidence. Petitioner filed a counter-affidavit submitting his Statements of Assets and Liabilities, income tax return, bank certificates showing that he obtained a loan from Allied Banking Corporation, certificate from SGV and company and other documents explaining the sources of funds with which he acquired the questioned assets. Ombudsman finds and recommend for recovery of ill-gotten wealth under Ra 1379, in relation to RAs 3019 and 6770 against Ong and all other persons concerned.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON, the right to preliminary investigation is withheld by RA 1379 from a co-respondent Nelly Ong, who is not herself a public officer or employee.

2. WON, petitioner is correct in his contention that the office of the Ombudsman is disqualified to file a petition for forfeiture considering of the duality of function, as investigator and prosecutor of the case.

3. WON, petitioner is correct in the contention that RA1379 is unconstitutional since it violates the presumption of innocence and the right against self incrimination.

HELD:

1. No, even if RA 1379 appears to be directed only against the public officer or employee who has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, the reality thst the application of the law is such that the conjugal share of Nelly Ong stands to be subjective to the penalty of forfeiture grants her the right, in line with the due process clause of the constitution, to a preliminary investigation.

2. No, Supreme Court declared that the office of the Ombudsman has the correlative powers to investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth.3. No, the court ruled that petitioner cannot invoked constitutional assurance against self incrimination because such right is a prohibition against the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications to the accused. In this case, petitioners are not compelled to present themselves as witnesses in rebutting the presumption established by law. They may present documents evidencing the purported bank loans, money market placements and other fund sources in their defense.Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Algue [GR L-28896, 17 February 1988]

Facts: The Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company (PSEDC) appointed Algue Inc. as its agent, authorizing it to sell its land, factories, and oil manufacturing process. The Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation (VOICP) purchased PSEDC properties. For the sale, Algue received a commission of P125,000 and it was from this commission that it paid Guevara, et. al. organizers of the VOICP, P75,000 in promotional fees. In 1965, Algue received an assessment from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the amount of P83,183.85 as delinquency income tax for years 1958 amd 1959. Algue filed a protest or request for reconsideration which was not acted upon by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). The counsel for Algue had to accept the warrant of distraint and levy. Algue, however, filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals.

Issue: Whether the assessment from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was reasonable.

Held: No. Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance. Every person who is able to pay must contribute his share in the running of the government. The Government, for his part, is expected to respond in the form of tangible and intangible benefits intended to improve the lives of the people and enhance their moral and material values. This symbiotic relationship is the rationale of taxation and should dispel the erroneous notion that is an arbitrary method of exaction by those in the seat of power. Tax collection, however, should be made in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for government itself. For all the awesome power of the tax collector, he may still be stopped in his tracks if the taxpayer can demonstrate that the law has not been observed. Herein, the claimed deduction (pursuant to Section 30 [a] [1] of the Tax Code and Section 70 [1] of Revenue Regulation 2: as to compensation for personal services) had been legitimately by Algue Inc. It has further proven that the payment of fees was reasonable and necessary in light of the efforts exerted by the payees in inducing investors (in VOICP) to involve themselves in an experimental enterprise or a business requiring millions of pesos. The assessment was not reasonable. 53 Commissioner of Customs v. Makasiar [GR 79307, 29 August 1989] Third division, Cortes (J): 3 concur, 1 took no part Facts: On 7 December 1978, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila issued Search and Seizure Warrants in Criminal Cases 8602 and 8603 (People v. Sosis) for violation of Section 11 (a) and/or 11(e) of Republic Act 3720, and violation of Article 188 of the Revised Penal Code (Substituting and altering trademarks, tradenames, or service marks; in this case, Johnnie Walker Scotch Whisky), respectively. On 8 December 1978, a composite team from the Ministry of Finance Bureau of Investigation and Intelligence (BII), the Bureau of Customs and the Integrated National Police (INP) enforced the search and seizure warrants, and seized and confiscated 6 tanks of scotch whisky, 417 cartons of 1doz. Johnny Walker black, 109 empty bottles, among others, found in the premises of the Hercules Bottling at Paco, Manila. The articles seized remained in the premises of Hercules guarded and secured by BII personnel. On 2 January 1979, the Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila issued a warrant of seizure and detention and ordered the immediate seizure and turnover of the seized items to its Auction and Cargo Disposal Division at the Port of Manila. Seizure and forfeiture proceedings were then initiated against the articles for alleged violation of Section 2530 (f) of the Tariff and Customs Code, in relation to RA 3720. On 29 January 1979, the CFI issued an order authorizing the transfer and delivery of the seized articles to the customs warehouse located at South Harbor, Port of Manila. The City Fiscal of Manila proceeded with the preliminary investigation of the criminal cases and the Bureau of Customs also resumed hearing the seizure and forfeiture proceedings over the said articles. On 11 June 1982, the Distiller Co. Ltd. of England objected to the continuation by the Collector of Customs of the seizure proceedings claiming that these proceedings would hamper or even jeopardize the preliminary investigation being conducted by the fiscal. The Collector of Customs ignored the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) objections. On 24 September 1982, the company filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or TRO (Civil Case 82-12721) to enjoin the Hearing Officer of the Bureau of Customs from taking further action in the seizure proceedings of the subject goods. The petition was heard not before the CFIMANILA which originally issued the search warrants, but before another sala, that of Judge Ramon P. Makasiar of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Manila. The judge issued a TRO on 29 September 1982. Subsequently, a writ for preliminary injunction was issued as well. On 20 July 1987, the judge rendered a decision holding that the Collector of Customs acted in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the warrant of seizure and detention considering that the subject goods had already come under the legal custody of the CFI. Hence, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, represented by the Solicitor General, filed the instant petition on 11 August 1987. In the meantime, Howard Sosis and company were charged for violation of Chapter VI, Sec. 11(a) & (e) of RA 3720 (Criminal Case 88-63157) and for violation of Article 188 of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case 88-63156) before the RTC and the MTC Manila. Issue: Whether the Regional Trial Court has the power to review the acts of the Collector of Custom. Held: Tariff and customs duties are taxes constituting a significant portion of the public revenue which are the lifeblood that enables the government to carry out functions it has been instituted to perform. The Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted in the Bureau of Customs, and to enjoin, or otherwise interfere with, these proceedings. The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The RTCs are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. The provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code and that of RA 1125 specify the proper fora for the ventilation of any legal objections or issues raised concerning these proceedings. Actions of the Collector of Customs are appealable to the Commissioner of Customs, whose decisions, in turn, are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA. Thereafter, an appeal lies to the Supreme Court through the appropriate petition for review by writ of certiorari. Undeniably, RTCs do not share these review powers. The rule is anchored upon the policy of placing no unnecessary hindrance on the government's drive not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon customs, but also, and more importantly, to render effective and efficient the collection of import and export duties due the state.

CIR vs. Algue Inc.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Algue Inc.GR No. L-28896 | Feb. 17, 1988Facts:Algue Inc. is a domestic corp engaged in engineering, construction and other allied activities

On Jan. 14, 1965, the corp received a letter from the CIR regarding its delinquency income taxes from 1958-1959, amtg to P83,183.85

A letter of protest or reconsideration was filed by Algue Inc on Jan 18

On March 12,a warrant of distraint and levy was presented to Algue Inc. thru its counsel, Atty. Guevara, who refused to receive it on the ground of the pending protest

Since the protest was not found on the records, a file copy from the corp was produced and given to BIR Agent Reyes,who deferred service of the warrant

On April 7,Atty. Guevara was informed that the BIR was not taking any action on the protest and it was only then that he accepted the warrant of distraint and levy earlier sought to be served

On April 23,Algue filed a petition for review of the decision of the CIR with the Court of Tax Appeals

CIR contentions:

-the claimed deduction of P75,000.00 was properly disallowed because it was not an ordinary reasonable or necessary business expense-payments are fictitious because most of the payees are members of the same family in control of Algue and that there is not enough substantiation of such paymentsCTA: 75Khad been legitimately paid by Algue Inc. for actual services rendered in the form of promotional fees. These were collected by the Payees for their work in the creation of the Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation of the Philippines and its subsequent purchase of the properties of the Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company.Issue:W/Nthe Collector of Internal Revenue correctly disallowed the P75,000.00 deduction claimed by Algue as legitimate business expenses in its income tax returnsRuling:Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance, made in accordance with law.RA 1125:the appeal may be made within thirty days after receipt of the decision or ruling challenged

During the intervening period, the warrant was premature and could therefore not be served.Originally, CIR claimed that the 75K promotional feesto be personal holding company income, but later on conformed to the decision of CTA

There is no dispute that the payees duly reported their respective shares of the fees in their income tax returns and paid the corresponding taxes thereon. CTA also found, after examining the evidence, that no distribution of dividends was involved

CIRsuggests a tax dodge, an attempt to evade a legitimate assessment by involving an imaginary deductionAlgue Inc.was a family corporation where strict business procedures were not applied and immediate issuance of receipts was not required. at the end of the year, when the books were to be closed, each payee made an accounting of all of the fees received by him or her, to make up the total of P75,000.00. This arrangement was understandable in view of the close relationship among the persons in the family corporation

The amount of the promotional fees was not excessive. The total commission paid by the Philippine Sugar Estate Development Co. to Algue Inc. was P125K. After deducting the said fees, Algue still had a balance of P50,000.00 as clear profit from the transaction. The amount of P75,000.00 was 60% of the total commission. This was a reasonable proportion, considering that it was the payees who did practically everything, from the formation of the Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation to the actual purchase by it of the Sugar Estate properties.

Sec. 30 of the Tax Code: allowed deductions in the net income Expenses -All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered xxxthe burden is on the taxpayer to prove the validity of the claimed deductionIn this case, Algue Inc.has proved that the payment of the fees was necessary and reasonable in the light of the efforts exerted by the payees in inducing investors and prominent businessmen to venture in an experimental enterprise and involve themselves in a new business requiring millions of pesos.Taxes are what we pay for civilization society. Without taxes, the government would be paralyzed for lack of the motive power to activate and operate it. Hence, despite the natural reluctance to surrender part of one's hard earned income to the taxing authorities, every person who is able to must contribute his share in the running of the government. The government for its part, is expected to respond in the form of tangible and intangible benefits intended to improve the lives of the people and enhance their moral and material valuesTaxation must be exercised reasonably and in accordance with the prescribed procedure. If it is not, then the taxpayer has a right to complain and the courts will then come to his succorAlgue Inc.s appealfrom the decision of the CIR was filed on time with the CTA in accordance with Rep. Act No. 1125. And we also find that the claimed deduction by Algue Inc. was permitted under the Internal Revenue Code and should therefore not have been disallowed by the CIRCommissioner vs. Algue, Inc.COMMISSIONER v. ALGUE, INC.GR No. L-28896, February 17, 1988

158 SCRA 9

FACTS: Private respondent corporation Algue Inc. filed its income tax returns for 1958 and 1959showing deductions, for promotional fees paid, from their gross income, thus lowering their taxable income. The BIR assessed Algue based on such deductions contending that the claimed deduction is disallowed because it was not an ordinary, reasonable and necessary expense.

ISSUE: Should an uncommon business expense be disallowed as a proper deduction in computation of income taxes, corollary to the doctrine that taxes are the lifeblood of the government?

HELD: No. Private respondent has proved that the payment of the fees was necessary and reasonable in the light of the efforts exerted by the payees in inducing investors and prominent businessmen to venture in an xperimental enterprise and involve themselves in a new business requiring millions of pesos. This was no mean feat and should be, as it was, sufficiently recompensed. It is well-settled that taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance On the other hand, such collection should be made in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for government itself. It is therefore necessary to reconcile the apparently conflicting interests of the authorities and the taxpayers so that the real purpose of taxation, which is the promotion of the common good, may be achieved. But even as we concede the inevitability and indispensability of taxation, it is a requirement in all democratic regimes that it be exercised reasonably and in accordance with the prescribed procedure. If it is not, then the taxpayer has a right to complain and the courts will then come to his succor. For all the awesome power of the tax collector, he may still be stopped in his tracks if the taxpayer can demonstrate, as it has here, that the law has not been observed.

G.R. No. 79307 August 29, 1989COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner, vs. THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, RTC Judge, Branch 35, Manila and THE DISTILLERS CO. LTD. OF ENGLAND, respondents.Petitioner Commissioner of Customs seeks the reversal of respondent judge's decision dated 20 July 1987 in Civil Case No. 82-12821 entitled "The Distillers Co. Ltd., of England v. Victorio Francisco, et al.," the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:WHEREFORE, having been issued by the Collector of Customs in excess of his jurisdiction the disputed Warrant of Seizure and Detention dated January 2, 1979, in Seizure Identification No. 2-79 of the Bureau of Customs, as well as all the proceedings taken thereon are declared NULL and VOID, and the writ of prohibition prayed for is GRANTED. The public respondent is ordered to REFRAIN and DESIST from conducting any proceedings for the seizure and forfeiture of the articles in question until after the Court having taken cognizance and legal custody thereof has rendered its final judgment in the criminal cases which involve the same articles. Without costs.SO ORDERED. [RTC Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 26].The undisputed acts are as follows: On 7 December 1978, the then Court of First Instance of Manila (herein referred to as CFI-MANILA) issued Search and Seizure Warrants in Criminal Case Nos. 8602 and 8603 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Howard J. Sosis,, et al.," for violation of Section 11 (a) and/or 11(e) of Republic Act No. 3720, * and violation of Article 188 of the Revised Penal Code (captioned as "Substituting and altering trademarks, tradenames, or service marks"), respectively, and ordering the seizure of the following:a) Materials:All whisky, bottles, labels, caps, cartons, boxes, machinery equipment or other materials used or intended to be used, or suitable for use, in connection with counter-feiting or imitation of Johnnie Walker Scotch Whisky b) Documents:x x x under the control and possession of: 1. Howard J. Sosis 2. George Morrison Lonie 3. Hercules Bottling Co. 4. Lauro Villanueva 5. Vicente Velasco 6. Manuel Esteban 7. Eugenio Mauricio[Rollo, pp. 106-107].On 8 December 1978, a composite team from the Ministry of Finance Bureau of Investigation and Intelligence (herein referred to as BII), the Bureau of Customs and the Integrated National Police enforced the search and seizure warrants, and seized and confiscated the following articles, among others, found in the premises of the Hercules Bottling Co., Inc. (herein referred to as HERCULES) at Isla de Provisor, Paco, Manila:Six (6) Tanks of Scotch Whisky; 417 cartons each containing I doz. bottles of "Johnnie Walker Black Label Whisky"; 109 empty bottles; Empty Cartons of "Johnnie Walker Black Label Scotch Whisky" number 900-2044 empty cartons. [Rollo, p. 21].The articles seized remained in the premises of HERCULES guarded and secured by BII personnel. On 2 January 1979, the Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, after being informed of the seizure of the subject goods and upon verification that the same were imported contrary to law, issued a warrant of seizure and detention, in Seizure Identification No. 2-79, and ordered the immediate seizure and turnover of the seized items to its Auction and Cargo Disposal Division at the Port of Manila. Seizure and forfeiture proceedings were then initiated against the above-enumerated articles for alleged violation of Section 2530 (f) of the Tariff and Customs Code, in relation to Republic Act 3720, to wit:Sec. 2530. Property subject to forfeiture under Tariff and Customs law: x x x (f) Any article the importation or exportation of which is effected or attempted contrary to law, or any article of prohibited importation or exportation, and all other articles which, in the opinion of the collector have been used, are or were entered to be used as instruments in the importation or exportation of the former. x x xOn 29 January 1979, the CFI-MANILA issued an order authorizing the transfer and delivery of the seized articles to the customs warehouse located at South Harbor, Port of Manila, subject to the following conditions:1. The Commissioner of Customs is willing to have custody of the same and guarantees their safekeeping at all times in the same quantity, quality, manner and condition when the articles shall be turned over to and received by the Bureau of Customs in custodia legis, subject to the further orders from the Court; 2. No article shall be transferred without the presence of a representative of the applicant, the defendants, the Commissioner of Customs and the Court; these representatives to secure the necessary escort as guarantee that nothing will happen during the transfer of the articles. 3. The Commissioner of Customs to issue the proper and necessary receipt for each and every article transferred to and received by the Bureau of Customs pursuant to this order [Rollo, p. 22].Meanwhile, the validity and constitutionality of the issuance and service of the search and seizure warrants issued by the CFI- MANILA were contested in and upheld by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-09153-R entitled "Hercules Bottling Co. Inc., et al., v. Victoriano Savellano, et al." HERCULES filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court but in a resolution dated 26 November 1986 in G.R. No. 55061 captioned as Hercules Bottling Co., Inc. v. The Court of Appeals, the Court dismissed the petition. Consequently, the City Fiscal of Manila proceeded with the preliminary investigation of the criminal cases, where private respondent, The Distillers Co. Ltd. of England, claiming to be the owner and exclusive manufacturer of Johnnie Walker Scotch Whiskey was the private complainant [Rollo, p. 61], With the dismissal of HERCULES' petition, the Bureau of Customs also resumed hearing the seizure and forfeiture proceedings over the said articles. The present controversy arose when private respondent, on 11 June 1982, objected to the continuation by the Collector of Customs of the seizure proceedings claiming, among others, that these proceedings would hamper or even jeopardize the preliminary investigation being conducted by the fiscal. The Collector of Customs ignored the objections. In order to stop and enjoin the Hearing Officer of the Bureau of Customs from taking further action in the seizure proceedings of the subject goods, private respondent on 24 September 1982 filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, docketed as Civil Case No. 82-12721. It must be noted at this juncture that the petition was heard not before the CFI-MANILA which originally issued the search warrants, but before another sala, that of respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Manila. Respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order on 29 September 1982. Subsequently, a writ for preliminary injunction was issued as well. Petitioner filed an answer on 12 November 1982. On 20 July 1987, respondent judge rendered a decision holding that the Collector of Customs acted in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the warrant of seizure and detention considering that the subject goods had already come under the legal custody of the CFI-MANILA. Hence, petitioner represented by the Solicitor General, filed the instant petition on 11 August 1987. In the meantime, Howard Sosis and company were charged for violation of Chapter VI, Sec. 11(a) & (e) of Republic Act 3720 in Criminal Case No. 88-63157 and for violation of Article 188 of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. 88-63156 before the Regional Trial Court and the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, respectively [Rollo, p. 83]. In his petition, the Commissioner of Customs assigns as errors the following:I. RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ISSUING A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND SUBSEQUENTLY A WRIT OF INJUNCTION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 82-12721 NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT, THE DISTILLERS CO., LTD., OF ENGLAND HAS NO VALID CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER;II. RESPONDENT RTC JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION AND IN PROCEEDING TO HEAR AND RENDER A DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 82-12721 NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE [Rollo, pp. 10-11].Petitioner contends that the authority of the Bureau of Customs over seizure and forfeiture cases is beyond the judicial interference of the Regional Trial Court, even in the form of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus which are really attempts to review the Commissioner's actions [Rollo, p. 98]. Petitioner argues that judicial recourse from the decision of the Bureau of Customs on seizure and forfeiture cases can only be sought in the Court of Tax Appeals and eventually in this Court. Private respondent however contends that while the law may have vested exclusive jurisdiction in the Bureau of Customs over forfeiture and seizure cases, in this case respondent judge had jurisdiction to enjoin the Bureau of Customs from continuing with its seizure and forfeiture proceedings since the articles here were already in custodia legis, by virtue of the search warrants issued by the CFI-MANILA. Private respondent contends that respondent judge may properly take cognizance of the instant case since unlike the cases cited by petitioner, the action for prohibition was brought not to claim ownership or possession over the goods but only to preserve the same and to prevent the Bureau of Customs from doing anything prejudicial to the successful prosecution of the criminal cases [Rollo, p. 123]. The issue thus presented is whether or not respondent judge may enjoin the Collector of Customs from continuing with its seizure and forfeiture proceedings over goods earlier seized by virtue of search warrants issued by the CFI-MANILA. The instant petition is impressed with merit. This Court finds that respondent-judge has failed to adhere to the prevailing rule which denies him jurisdiction to enjoin the Bureau of Customs from taking further action in the seizure and forfeiture proceedings over the subject goods. Jurisprudence is replete with cases which have held that regional trial courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted in the Bureau of Customs, and to enjoin, or otherwise interfere with, these proceedings. The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The regional trial courts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus [See General Travel Service v. David, G.R. No. L-19259, September 23, 1966, 18 SCRA 59; Pacis v. Averia, G.R. No. L-22526, November 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 907; De Joya v. Lantin, G.R. No. L-24037, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 893; Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya G.R. No. L-29043, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 381; Collector of Customs v. Torres, G.R. No. L-22977, May 31, 1972, 45 SCRA 272; Pacis v. Geronimo, G.R. No. L-24068, April 23, 1974,56 SCRA 583; Commissioner of Customs v. Navarro, G.R. No. L-33146, May 31, 1977, 77 SCRA 264; Republic v. Bocar, G.R. No. L-35260, September 4, 1979,93 SCRA 78; De la Fuente v. De Veyra, G.R. No. L-35385, January 31, 1983, 120 SCRA 451]. It is likewise well-settled that the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code and that of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended ** specify the proper fora for the ventilation of any legal objections or issues raised concerning these proceedings. Actions of the Collector of Customs are appealable to the Commissioner of Customs, whose decisions, in turn, are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals. Thereafter, an appeal lies to this Court through the appropriate petition for review by writ of certiorari. Undeniably, regional trial courts do not share these review powers. The above rule is anchored upon the policy of placing no unnecessary hindrance on the government's drive not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon customs, but also, and more importantly, to render effective and efficient the collection of import and export duties due the state. For tariff and customs duties are taxes constituting a significant portion of the public revenue which are the lifeblood that enables the government to carry out functions it has been instituted to perform. Notwithstanding these considerations, respondent judge entertained private respondent's petition for prohibition holding that the seizure and forfeiture proceedings instituted in the Bureau of Customs was null and void because the subject goods were earlier seized by virtue of the warrants issued by the CFI-MANILA in Criminal Cases Nos. 8602 and 8603. This holding is erroneous. Even if it be assumed that a taint of irregularity may be imputed to the exercise by the Collector of Customs of his jurisdiction to institute seizure and forfeiture proceedings over the subject goods because he had accepted custody of the same under conditions specified in the CFI-Manila order dated January 29, 1979, it would not mean that respondent judge was correspondingly vested with the jurisdiction to interfere with such proceedings (See Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya supra]. It bears repeating that law and settled jurisprudence clearly deprive the regional trial courts of jurisdiction to enjoin the Collector of Customs from exercising his exclusive authority to order seizure and forfeiture proceedings over imported goods. Moreover, there is no legal basis for respondent judge's conclusion that the Collector of Customs is deprived of his jurisdiction to issue the assailed warrant of seizure and detention, and to institute seizure and forfeiture proceedings for