CONSTITUTION

Was the Constitution an economicdocument intended as acountermeasure to the ideals expressedin the Declaration of Independence?Viewpoint: Yes. The Constitution was an economic document framed bywealthy planters, merchants, and creditors who sought to protect the privi-leges of the propertied classes and reverse the leveling principles inspired bythe Declaration of Independence.

Viewpoint: No. The Founding Fathers, who represented a cross section ofgeographical areas and political interest groups, created a democratic frame-work of government.

From the time the Continental Congress sent the Articles of Confedera-tion to the states for ratification in late 1777, local officials suggested manyrevisions to the first U.S. national charter. William Henry Drayton, Chief Jus-tice of South Carolina, was so disturbed by inadequacies in the Articles thathe felt compelled to create an alternate constitution in early 1778 that signifi-cantly strengthened the powers of the central government. However, Dray-ton's prescient suggestions were premature, and Congress refused to adopthis, and all other, proposed revisions to the Articles. Not until the emergenceof fiscal, commercial, political, and diplomatic troubles in the mid 1780s didpolitical leaders seriously consider altering the federal charter. In late 1786nationalist politicians, led by Alexander Hamilton, asked Congress to call aconvention for the following year in Philadelphia to discuss all matters neces-sary to "render the constitution of the federal government adequate to the exi-gencies of the Union." In February 1787 Congress agreed to the conventionproposal but emphasized that the meeting in Philadelphia was "for the solepurpose of revising the Articles of Confederation."

Despite this stipulation some delegates came to the Convention ready topropose a new constitution that provided for a strong central government withthe power to tax and enforce its laws. The fifty-five wealthy and well-educateddelegates who took part in drafting the Constitution in Philadelphia during thesummer of 1787 quickly agreed to keep its sessions closed to the press andthe public and to scrap the Articles and begin debate on an entirely newframework of national government. During the subsequent three months ofsecretive, extralegal, and unconstitutional proceedings the Framers ham-mered out a new federal charter that significantly shifted the balance of poweraway from the states and to the central government. Congress would nowhave the authority, among other things, to levy and collect taxes, regulateinterstate and foreign commerce, make war, establish inferior courts, use mil-itary force against any state, and enact any law it deemed "necessary andproper" to execute the aforementioned powers. Conspicuously and curiouslymissing from the Constitution were a bill of rights and a clause reserving tothe states all powers not explicitly conferred on the central government.Equally peculiar was the provision requiring ratification of the Constitution byspecial state conventions rather than directly by the people.

Until the twentieth century both scholars and the public revered theFramers as demigods and canonized the Constitution as the crowning sym-68

bol of a democratic revolution against tyranny. However, the many publicized political and corporatescandals of the Progressive Era in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries influenced histo-rians to begin viewing the Constitutional Convention with a more jaundiced eye. Convinced that menwere motivated primarily by economic self-interest and that class conflict pervaded human events,these scholars argued that the Founding Fathers carried out a counterrevolution by creating a reac-tionary document to protect their interests against popularly controlled state governments thatpassed cheap paper money legislation, debtor laws, and other measures that favored small farmersand artisans at the expense of wealthy creditors. To prove their case they pointed to the many provi-sions in the Constitution that checked popular sovereignty: the difficult procedure for adoptingamendments, the judicial veto, the election of senators by state legislators, the election of the presi-dent by an electoral college, the appointment of Supreme Court justices by the president (confirmedby the Senate), and the awesome power conferred to the central government to suppress populardissent. Thus, the Constitution was equipped with a system of minority checks and vetoes designedto prevent majority rule.

However, Cold War historians, who sought to show Communists that the United States hadalways been a united country, presented the Constitutional Convention as a consensus amongAmericans rather than as an illustration of class division and the charter it created as a political doc-ument rather than an economic one. Although not as piously patriotic in their interpretation as earlynational historians, these scholars presented the Framers as liberal-minded and virtuous men whosought practical solutions to the nation's many problems in a document that further protected thedemocratic rights and privileges already enjoyed by Americans.

This debate over the Framers' motives is of particular interest to Americans, who are currentlyexperiencing both a revival in reverence for the Founding Fathers and increasing doubts about thedemocratic nature of national politics. How does one resolve this seeming contradiction? If theFramers truly created a democratic document that advanced the republican principals espousedin the Declaration of Independence (1776), then what explains the current widespread disgustamong Americans concerning the lack of popular influence on national politics? Are the Framerspartly to blame?

Viewpoint:Yes. The Constitution was aneconomic document framed bywealthy planters, merchants, andcreditors who sought to protect theprivileges of the propertied classesand reverse the leveling principlesinspired by the Declaration ofIndependence.

American history is replete with myths. Oneof the most enduring myths is the idea that theFounding Fathers were "superb democratic poli-ticians" who rose above faction and self-interestto create a national charter that advanced popu-lar and democratic government. Generations ofAmericans have been taught to revere the Fram-ers as demigods and to worship the Constitutionas "the greatest single document struck off bythe hand and mind of man." However, both theFramers and the Constitution they created havea much darker side. In reality, the PhiladelphiaConvention of 1787 was a counterrevolutionaryconspiracy by the fifty-five delegates—all mem-bers of the planter-merchant-creditor elite—whosought to curb democratic trends that threat-ened their political and economic dominance.The Founding Fathers created a framework of

national government to serve the interests oftheir class at the expense of the masses. Using acombination of threats, bribery, and chicanery,they managed to have this elitist document rati-fied over the objection of a majority of Ameri-cans who opposed it. In the end the Framersdeliberately designed an undemocratic docu-ment that has contributed to many current polit-ical problems—lack of confidence in, andwidespread frustration with, the federal govern-ment; institutional deadlock and indecisiveness;widespread political apathy; and low voter turn-out. If Americans are to have a more accurateunderstanding of the genesis of the UnitedStates and be able to resolve many current politi-cal troubles, they must dispense with the heroworship surrounding the Constitutional Con-vention and, instead, come to a more candidassessment of the Framers and of the Constitu-tion they created.

The Founding Fathers were hardfisted,wealthy conservatives who openly voiced theiropposition to democracy, which they equatedwith "mobocracy," and their dedication to thepropertied and monied interests of their class.Writing during the "crisis" of the mid 1780s,Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts asserted that"the evils we experience flow from the excess ofdemocracy." He urged his colleagues to be"taught by the experience the danger of the level-

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ing spirit." Edmund Randolph, spokesman forthe Virginia Plan (a scheme of representation inCongress that favored the states with larger pop-ulations), echoed Gerry and urged the adoptionof his resolutions as a counter to the "turbulenceand follies of democracy" in which every "evil"of government under the Articles of Confedera-tion found its "origin." Perhaps the most elitistof all the delegates was New Yorker AlexanderHamilton, who believed that "the people are tur-bulent and changing; they seldom judge or deter-mine right." He therefore emphasized the needto check "the amazing violence and turbulenceof the democratic spirit." Likewise, CharlesCotesworth Pinckney of South Carolinabelieved in the need for "stiff measures torestrain the urges of arrant democracy," whileJohn Dickinson of Delaware constantly worriedabout the "dangerous influence of those multi-tudes without property & without principle."For these reasons Roger Sherman of Connecti-cut believed that "the people immediatelyshould have as little to do as may be about thegovernment." John Jay of New York unasham-edly wrote that the upper classes were "the betterkind of people" and that "the people who ownthe country ought to govern it." Even VirginianJames Madison, the "Father of the Constitu-tion," greatly feared that the majority of peoplewith little or no property would take away theproperty of the few who held most of it. Hetherefore framed a Constitution in a way that hehoped would prevent the majority from "discov-ering their own strength" and passing "wickedmeasures" harmful to the creditor class.

From these elitist statements, obviously theFounding Fathers felt contempt for the commonpeople and feared their political participation.The Constitution reflects this supercilious atti-tude among the Framers, whose primary goal wasto preserve their privileges and build a strongpolitical economy insulated from popular control.One should not be surprised that the Framerspossessed such selfish motives. After all, thesemen risked their lives and fortunes to lead a rebel-lion against a mother country that threatenedtheir political dominance. If America had failed towin its independence, the British certainly wouldhave targeted their vengeance against Whig lead-ers, not the common folk. Thus, it defies bothcommon sense and human nature to believe thatsuch a group of leaders would willingly write aconstitution that transferred power from theirhands into the hands of the people.

One needs to remember that Patriot leadersdid not intend to use their colonial rebellion todestroy the tradition of upper-class leadership inAmerica and to usher in a social, political, andeconomic transformation of American society.They simply sought independence from Great

Britain: nothing more and nothing less. To thatend they created a national charter, the Articlesof Confederation, which put significant restric-tions on the federal government while grantingmost power to the states. Here, with British offi-cials no longer interfering with "home rule,"American leaders intended to govern with evengreater authority than they had under royal rule.

However, the Revolution had social andpolitical consequences that Patriot leaders didnot foresee because the common people under-stood independence to mean freedom from tyr-anny by the American aristocracy, not just bythe British ruling elite. Patriot leaders hadunwittingly contributed to the declining defer-ence and increasing sense of egalitarianismamong commoners by reluctantly granting themgreater political power in exchange for their crit-ical support of the independence movement.Adding to the people's political authority dur-ing this time were the new state constitutions,which granted most power to, and placed lim-ited checks on, the legislature (the traditionalvoice of the common folk). By the mid 1780sthe "lesser sorts" gained control of several statelegislatures. In Rhode Island, for example, the"country" party issued paper money and tried toforce merchants and creditors to accept thedepreciated currency. In North Carolina, NewYork, and Georgia the legislatures, controlled by"paper money parties," passed tender laws orissued paper money schemes and various devicessuspending the ordinary means for recovery ofdebts. In states such as Massachusetts, Connecti-cut, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Virginia,Maryland, and New Jersey—where "papermoney parties" failed to persuade legislaturescontrolled by the creditor class to provide tem-porary relief to debtors during the postwardepression—debtors organized to resist foreclo-sures on their farms (sometimes with force ofarms as in Shays's Rebellion, 1786-1787).

With the political pendulum swingingtoward the "lesser sorts," who were demanding amore equal distribution of power and wealth, thetraditional elite now began to believe that Ameri-can politics had become "too democratic."Although the Founding Fathers did not believein a governing nobility, they did not want directparticipation by the people in decision making.Instead, they expected the masses to consent togovernment by men of principle, property, andeducation. Yet, the growing political power inthe hands of common men, according to the rul-ing elite, was leading to "democratic despotism."They attributed the social and economic turmoilof the period to the "democratic spirit" of thepeople, whom they believed had too much polit-ical power. This fear by the traditional elite of thelesser sorts' increasing power was the most

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important motivating desire among the formerto create a stronger national government to pro-tect property from threats by the latter.

Although the Constitution begins with thewords We the People, the creation and adoption ofthe national charter was not done with theapproval of "the people." Instead, the actions ofthe Framers were tantamount to a bloodlesscoup d'etat. First, the series of meetings that ledto the Convention were engineered by an eliteconsensus who grew increasingly concernedwith the federal government's inability to dealadequately with the many popular rebellionsand democratic tendencies. To ensure that thoseserving at the Convention belonged to the eliteclass, delegates were selected by the state legisla-tures, not by ordinary voters. As a result, theConstitution was framed by financially success-ful planters, merchants, lawyers, bankers, andcreditors. Indeed, the personal wealth repre-sented at the Convention was enormous. Atleast forty of the fifty-five delegates held govern-ment bonds, fourteen were land speculators,twenty-four were moneylenders and investors,eleven were engaged in commerce or manufac-turing, and fifteen owned large plantationsworked by hundreds of slaves. No dirt farmersor poor artisans attended the Convention topropose an alternate viewpoint.

Second, the state legislatures instructedtheir delegates only to amend the Articles andagreed that any proposed changes had to beapproved by all the states before being adopted.However, the Framers, who arrogantly believedthat they knew what was best for all Americans,defied these legal stipulations, abandoned theirauthorization only to amend the Articles,designed an entirely new centralized nationalgovernment, and inserted into the Constitutiona measure that stated it should go into effectwhen ratified by only nine states. This conspir-acy explains why the delegates' first order ofbusiness was to hold its sessions behind closeddoors and to keep all proceedings a closelyguarded secret. They knew that there was wideagreement, particularly among the middle andlower classes, that the Convention should onlyalter the Articles and maintain a decentralizedgovernment that kept political power as close tothe local level as possible. If the people learnedthat the Framers were intent on ignoring theirinstructions, abolishing the Articles, and creat-ing a strong, distant central government with thepower to suppress internal dissident movementsand to coerce the states to comply with nationallegislation, they would have stormed the Con-vention and attacked the delegates. To preventsuch an unwelcome event, the Founders wiselykept the contents of their illegal proceedingsfrom the people.

With the public kept in the dark about theirproceedings, the Framers were free to create anelitist document designed to promote and pro-tect the interests of merchants, investors, plant-ers, real-estate developers, and owners of publicbonds and securities. Indeed, the FoundingFathers would not have developed and sup-ported a Constitution if they (and their fellowelite) had not stood to gain substantially from it.To that end they framed a new constitution thatprohibited states from making treaties, coiningmoney, emitting bills of credit, and impairing theobligation of contracts. The Framers alsogranted the national government control overthe state militias and the power to tax directly, toraise a national army and navy, to regulate com-merce, and to establish a national currency. TheConstitution also gave the national governmentthe power to dispose of Western territories andstipulated that national laws, treaties, and judi-cial power were superior to those of the states.

With these new powers, the national gov-ernment was no longer dependent on the statesand was now in a position to protect and developmarkets, protect home manufacturers, and raiserevenue directly to pay off its debts to wealthycreditors. The Constitution placed most of thetax burden on consumers in the form of customduties and excise taxes rather than direct taxes onindividual income or property. The federal gov-ernment could not levy taxes in proportion towealth, thus further protecting the upper class.The Constitution also specifically benefitedSouthern planters, whose livelihood dependedon the export of rice, tobacco, and cotton, byprohibiting both state and national governmentsfrom passing export duties. However, Congresswas given the power to tax imports so thatNorthern manufacturers could erect a tariff toprotect American industries from cheap foreigngoods. The Constitution also benefited slave-holders in the protection of their valuablehuman property by requiring states to returnfugitive slaves to their owners.

The Constitution furthermore prohibitedthe states from assisting the debtor or disadvan-taged by emitting bills of credit and paper money(detrimental to the interests of wealthy creditors)or by modifying contracts. The Constitution, bycreating a strong central government with thepower to control state militias, actually helped toprotect creditors against social upheavals by thelarge debtor class in America (as witnessed inShays's Rebellion). In fact, the principle found inthe Declaration of Independence (1776) that revo-lution is a right of the people is eliminated alto-gether in the Constitution, a telling example ofthe counterrevolutionary intentions of the Found-ing Fathers. Likewise, the Framers wanted a fed-eral government with the power to raise a

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EMBARKING ON A NEW SHIPIn art essay written in 1787, Virginian Richard Henry Leecomments on the motives of the Federalists:

The Confederation was formed when greatconfidence was placed in the voluntary exer-tions of individuals, and of the respective states;and the framers of it, to guard against usurpa-tion, so limited and checked the powers that, inmany respects they are inadequate to the exi-gencies of the union. We find, therefore, mem-bers of Congress urging alterations in thefederal system almost as soon as it wasadopted It was early proposed to vest Con-gress with powers to levy an impost, to regulatetrade, &c,» but such was that known to be thecaution of the states in parting with power, thevestment even of these was proposed to beunder several checks and limitations, During thewar the general confusion and the introductionof paper money infused in the minds of peoplevague ideas respecting government and credit.We expected too much from the return ofpeace, and of course we have been disap-pointed. Our governments have been new andunsettled; and several legislatures, by makingtender, suspension, and paper money laws,have given just cause of uneasiness to credi-tors. By these and other causes, several ordersof men In the community have been prepared,by degrees, for a change of government; andthis very abuse of power in the legislatures,which in some cases has been charged uponthe democratic part of the community, has fur-nished aristocratical men with those very weap-ons, and those very means, with which in greatmeasure they are rapidly effecting their favoriteobject And should an oppressive governmentbe the consequence of the proposed change,[posterity] may reproach not only a few over-bearing, unprincipled men, but those parties inthe states which have misused their powers.

The conduct of several legislatures, touch-ing paper money and tender laws, has preparedmany honest men for changes in governmentwhich otherwise they would not have thoughtof-~»when by the evils, on the one hand, and bythe secret Instigations of artful men, on the other,th& minds of men were become sufficientlyuneasy, a bold step was taken which is usuallyfollowed by a revolution or a civil war. A generalconvention for mere commercial purposes wasmoved for—the authors of this measure saw thatthe people's attention was turned solely to theamendment of the federal system; and that, hadthe idea of a total change been started, probablyno state would have appointed members to theconvention. The idea of destroying ultimately thestate government and forming one consolidatedsystem could not have been admitted, A con-vention, therefore, merely for vesting in Con-gress the power to regulate trade was proposed.TWt was pleasing to the commercial towns, andtie landed people had little or no concern aboutft September, 1786, a few men from the middlestates met at Annapolis and hastily proposed aconvention to be held in May, 1787, for the pur-pose, generally, of amending the Confederation.This was done before the delegates of Massa-chusetts and of the other states arrived. Still not

a word was said about destroying the old consti-tution and making a new one. The states stillunsuspecting and not aware that they werepassing the Rubicon, appointed members to thenew convention, for the sole and express pur-pose of revising and amending the Confedera-tion—and, probably one man in ten thousand inthe United States till within these ten or twelvedays, had an idea that the old ship was to bedestroyed, and he put to the alternative ofembarking in the new ship presented, or of beingleft in danger of sinking. The States, I believe,universally supposed the convention wouldreport alterations in the Confederation whichwould pass an examination in Congress, andafter being agreed to there, would be confirmedby all the legislatures, or be rejected.

Virginia made a very respectable appoint-ment and placed at the head of it the first man inAmerica. In this appointment there was a mix-ture of political characters; but Pennsylvaniaappointed principally those men who areesteemed aristocratical. Here the favoritemoment for changing the government was evi-dently discerned by a few men, who seized itwith address. Ten other states appointed, andtho' chose men principally concerned with com-merce and the judicial department, yet theyappointed many good republican characters-had they ail attended we should now see, I ampersuaded, a better system presented. Thenonattendance of eight or nine men who wereappointed members of the convention, I shallever consider as a very unfortunate event to theUnited States. Had they attended, I am prettyclear that the result of the convention would nothave had that strong tendency to aristocracynow discemable in every part of the plan. Therewould not have been so great an accumulationof powers, especially as to the internal police ofthis country, in a few hands as the constitutionreported purposes to vest in them—the youngvisionary men and the consolidating aristocracywould have been more restrained than theyhave been. Eleven states met in the conventionand after four months close attention presentedthe new constitution, to be adopted or rejectedby the people. The uneasy and fickle part of thecommunity may be prepared to receive anyform of government; but I presume the enlight-ened and substantial part will give any constitu-tion presented for their adoption a candid andthorough examination; and silence thosedesigning or empty men who weakly and rashlyattempt to precipitate the adoption of a systemof so much importance. We shall view the con-vention with due respect—and, at the sametime that we reflect there were men of abilitiesand integrity in it, we must recollect how dispro-portionately the democratic and aristocraticparts of the community were represented. Per-haps the judicious friends and opposers of thenew constitution will agree that it is best to let itrely solely on its own merits, or be condemnedfor its own defects.

Source: Richard Henry Lee, Letters of the FederalFarmer to a Republican, October 8,1787 (New York:Thomas Greenleaf, 1787), pp, 6-8,

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large standing army to, among other things, assistthe men of wealth who were speculating in West-ern lands. A strong central government with thepower to oust the British and Native Americansfrom the Northwest would open the way forunfettered settlement, thereby causing land valuesto skyrocket. Similarly, a strong navy was essentialto the protection of American commerce on theseas. As things turned out, the first significantnaval action under the new government wasagainst the piracy of the Barbary states (1801-1805). Thus, the Framers allowed for the creationof a national army and navy not so much to pro-tect the United States against invasion as to pro-tect and promote the governing elite's commercialand territorial ambition. Indeed, obviously theFramers were more concerned with property andcommercial interests than personal liberties.When one delegate suggested that they create acommittee to draft a national bill of rights, his col-leagues voted unanimously against it.

The Founding Fathers deliberately designedthe new American government to make it difficultfor any mass political movement to challenge thepolitical dominance by the traditional ruling elite.The undemocratic and elitist nature of the Constitu-tion is reflected in the concept of checks and bal-ances within the national charter. The Framersdiscarded the unicameral system under the Articlesof Confederation, where the important powers ofgovernment were vested in a single legislature, andreplaced it with a bicameral system to ensure thatthe poor could never get a law passed that was detri-mental to the interests of the rich. The elaborate sys-tem of checks and balances would "check" theHouse of Representatives (which was closest to thepeople) by giving the wealthy a greater voice in thePresidency and the Senate, both of which wereelected directly by wealthy property owners in theelectoral college and state legislatures, respectively.Moreover, the masses had a limited voice in theselection of decision makers. Of the four major deci-sion-making bodies established under the Constitu-tion—the House of Representatives, the Senate, thePresidency, and the Supreme Court—the peoplecould directly elect only one. The other bodies wereto be at least twice removed from popular control.The people elected only Representatives who servedfor short terms of two years before facing reelection.In contrast, state legislatures elected Senators forsix-year terms. Likewise, state legislatures nominatedpresidential electors, always prominent men ofwealth. The president appointed federal judges forlife (from among the wealthy and educated elite),thus removing those powerful decision makers asfar as possible from popular control. Indeed, withthe awesome power of judicial review, a dubiousconstitutional power granted to the SupremeCourt, a mere five high court justices could ignorethe popular will and make policy decisions thataffect the lives and welfare of all Americans.

The Framers further hamstrung popular influ-ence on public policy by making each of the fourmajor decision-making bodies of the national gov-ernment elected by different constituencies.Because the terms of service are of varying length, acomplete renewal of government in one election isimpossible. Thus, the people cannot facilitate quickchange through direct elections. To make their willfelt in all the federal decision-making bodies, theymust wait several years. Finally, the Framers inten-tionally made amending the Constitution difficult,requiring passage by two-thirds of both houses ofCongress and ratification by three-quarters of thestates. In short, the Founding Fathers created aframe of government with layer upon layer of obsta-cles to simple majority rule that allowed the privi-leged elite to dominate and overcome popular willwhen necessary.

Knowing that most Americans would rejectsuch an elitist document, the Founding Fathersused political maneuvering, deceit, and even vio-lence to ensure ratification of the Constitution.They first cleverly wrote into the Constitution aprovision that for it to become law only nine stateshad to ratify it, rather than all the states as stipulatedin the Articles. After pushing the Constitution pasta pusillanimous Congress, the Framers called forspecial ratifying conventions in the states. Thisextraordinary procedure gave clear advantage to theFederalists, those who supported the Constitution,since submitting the plan to the state legislatureswould weaken its chances for success. Thus, theFramers established ground rules for ratificationthat gave them an advantage over their opponents.

Establishing the rules for ratification, however,was not enough for the Framers in their attempt toensure the adoption of the Constitution. In Penn-sylvania, for example, the Federalists usedstrong-arm tactics, literally dragging dissentingmembers into the state assembly so it would reach aquorum necessary to call a convention. In NewHampshire, where a majority of delegates opposedthe Constitution, the Federalists simply adjournedthe convention and, over the next several months,used propaganda, deceit, and bribery to converttheir opponents. When it appeared that the Anti-federalists would reject the Constitution in Massa-chusetts, Federalists concocted a proposal that thestate ratify but suggest the adoption of severalamendments. Massachusetts Federalists made thisappealing suggestion, knowing that the Framershad decided that the conventions were simply to rat-ify or to reject the Constitution with no changes. Tobreak the last vestiges of resistance, leading Federal-ists in the state also promised their opponents highfederal offices under the new Constitution. Federal-ists used similarly deceitful and disingenuous tacticsin Virginia and Maryland to overcome majorityoppositions. The strength of the opposition in NewYork motivated Madison, Hamilton, and Jay to

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write the famous Federalist Papers (1787-1788)explaining, defending, and praising the Constitu-tion and urging its ratification. This self-serving pro-paganda, coupled with the Federalists' promise tocall a second constitutional convention to revise thenational charter, swayed enough opponents to givethe Federalists a victory in that decisive state. Onlyin Rhode Island was the question of ratificationsubmitted directly to voters. Here opponents to theConstitution won by an eleven-to-one margin, a tell-ing illustration of what might have happened if theFramers had presented the national charter to apopular vote in all of the states.

Most Americans believe that the U.S. Consti-tution is superior to all other frames of governmentand that it has been a model for the rest of the dem-ocratic world. Yet, among the countries most com-parable to the United States and where democraticinstitutions have long existed without breakdown(there are twenty-six such nations), not one hasadopted the American constitutional system. Thesenations have all rejected it because they recognizethe undemocratic and unwieldy nature of the U.S.federal charter. The Framers deliberately rigged thepolitical system to make it nearly impossible forpopular majorities to change the distribution ofwealth and power. Americans must abandon theunhealthy reverence for the Framers as an assem-blage of demigods and the inaccurate understand-ing of the Constitution as a democratic documentbrought down from the heavens.

-KEITH KRAWCZYNSKI,AUBURN UNIVERSITY AT MONTGOMERY

Viewpoint:No. The Founding Fathers, whorepresented a cross section ofgeographical areas andpolitical interest groups, createda democratic frameworkof government.

In 1913 Charles A. Beard, then a professor ofhistory at Columbia University, provoked a majorfervor with the publication of An Economic Interpre-tation of the Constitution of the United States. By hisown account, scholars, a president of the UnitedStates, jurists, and many others condemned hiswork for its characterization of the Framers of theConstitution as being driven by their own eco-nomic interests and the resulting Constitution as aneconomic document. Today one could be some-what perplexed to understand the firestorm Beard'swork set off As he stated, perhaps somewhat disin-genuously, in the preface to the 1935 edition, it isonly "an" economic interpretation, not "the" eco-

nomic interpretation. Beard also conceded, in thatintroduction at least, that other noneconomic inter-pretations of the Constitution are also possible.

Nonetheless, Beard's interpretation provedenormously influential. An Economic Interpretationof the Constitution of the United States is still in print,and the idea that the Constitution is an economicdocument that disproportionately serves the inter-ests of the class from which its Framers were drawnremains a widespread view. Yet, at minimum, thecharacterization of the Constitution as an economicdocument is flawed. Beard, and those who followhis interpretation, err in two ways. First, evidenceBeard cites to prove the economic character of theConstitution actually shows that the Framers weremore than merely economic actors and that theConstitution was far more than simply an economicdocument. Second, Beard and his followers empha-size the economic character of the Constitution tothe exclusion of all other considerations.

For instance, Beard quotes a satirical essayfrom The New Hampshire Spy (Portsmouth) to "indi-cate the class bias" of the Antifederalists—presum-ably because it mentions "well born" and"aristocracy." Yet, the article also mentions "libertyof the press," "liberty of conscience," "slavery," and"trial by jury" as well as "Great Men" and "Mr.[James] Wilson." While Beard may see evidence ofclass bias and an economic division between Feder-alists and Antifederalists, certainly other compellingissues are both explicit and implied. Liberty of thepress and conscience are civil-liberties issues, whilereferences to the well born and aristocracy reflectAntifederalist concerns about the nature of repre-sentation in the Constitution. Furthermore, Wilsonhad been a long-time opponent of the Pennsylvaniastate constitution that was supported by most Anti-federalists. Their attack on him reflected long-stand-ing political differences rather than economic issuesper se.

Beard also acknowledges that several states rati-fied the Constitution with little or no opposition.Delaware, for example, although it had a long his-tory of conflict between the "interests" of agricul-ture and capital, ratified the Constitutionunanimously. Beard's economic interpretation can-not explain the absence of a division within the statethat apparently hinged on other noneconomicissues. Likewise, Georgia ratified with little or noopposition and largely for reasons related to secu-rity and defense. Thus, economic issues do notexplain Georgia's rapid ratification of the Constitu-tion.

Likewise, Beard's evidence from the key statesof New York and Pennsylvania contradicts his ownthesis. For New York, citing The Federalist, Beardnotes that the opponents of the Constitution con-sisted of "some inconsiderable men in office understate governments, the influence of some consider-able men playing the part of the demagogue for

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their own aggrandizement and the democraticaljealousy of the people." None of these reasons seemovertly economic in character.

Similarly, in Pennsylvania, Beard insists thatthe conflict between "personalty" and "realty" was"patent to all." He cites Virginian James Madison asproof of this conflict, although his interpretationmisconstrues Madison's statement. Madison didnot portray the division in Pennsylvania as onebetween agrarians and capitalists, but as a conflictbetween constitutionalists who defended the demo-cratic constitution of 1776 and state republicanswho supported the proposed federal Constitutionas well as a new, less democratic state one.

Finally, one should note that the men whoframed and adopted the constitution of 1787 actedin a manner contradictory to their own economicinterest. South Carolina delegates to the Constitu-tional Convention, for example, drafted a Constitu-tion that threatened through Article I, Section 10(no state shall impair the obligation of contract)their own class's economic interest. Thus, after thedelegates secured the adoption of the new Constitu-tion in South Carolina, they acted as state legislatorsto adopt legislation—notably a stay law—that their

own handiwork precluded once the new govern-ment was set in motion. In sum, Beard's analysis ofthe Constitution as an economic document is mate-rially flawed in terms of the evidence cited.

The economic interpretation is also flawedconceptually. The Constitution of the United Statesis a statement of purpose and a set of fundamentalprocedures. It identifies how the broad ends of gov-ernment should and should not be achieved. Dur-ing the campaign for ratification of theConstitution, few argued against the preamble'sarticulation of the ideals of justice, defense, and gen-eral welfare. Rather, the debate focused on how toachieve those ends without sacrificing other funda-mental principles. In essence, the debate centeredon three questions: how should power be dividedbetween the central and state governments; howshould the accountability of the governors to thegoverned be ensured; and how should the civilrights and liberties of the people be guaranteed?These concerns are not economic issues.

The Antifederalists recognized at the outset ofthe ratification campaign that the distribution ofpowers between the states and the proposed federalgovernment radically altered the nature of the cen-

An early-nineteenth-centuryengraving of delegatesat the ConstitutionalConvention inPhiladelphia, 1787

(Library of Congress,

Washington, D.C.)

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 75

tral government. The Constitution, Antifederalistsinsisted, created not a "federal" government but aconsolidated national government of enormouspowers. Samuel Bryan, a Pennsylvania Constitu-tionalist and one of the most prolific Antifederalists(writing as "Centinel" in the Philadelphia Indepen-dent Gazetteer), asserted that the most compelling ofgovernmental powers—those of the purse and thesword—were to be wielded by the central govern-ment. In addition, the central government seem-ingly would possess under this new Constitutionthe authority to decide which powers belonged tothe central government and which powers remainedwith the states. Centinel asserted that the proposedConstitution "would issue in a despotism."

The authority of the new central governmentwas doubly alarming because of the absence of suffi-cient checks upon federal officeholders. The ratio ofrepresentation in the House of Representatives, themost "democratic" branch of the new government,was too large, according to Antifederalist PatrickHenry of Virginia. Furthermore, representativescould be neither instructed nor recalled. Membersof the Senate were even further removed from thereach of ordinary citizens, complained Luther Mar-tin of Maryland, since they were elected to six-yearterms and were accountable to neither the citizenrynor their state legislatures in the interim. The presi-dent and members of the federal judiciary alsoremained largely autonomous, as well as were wield-ers of enormous power.

The third issue proved the most powerful forAntifederalists. Although Federalists such as Wilsoninsisted that the Constitution posed no threat to therights and liberties of the citizenry, Antifederalistsargued otherwise. Richard Henry Lee of Virginia,"Brutus" in New York, and Antifederalist membersof the majority of state conventions that ratified theConstitution agreed with an anonymous Pennsylva-nia essayist: "We may yet form a federal constitution. . . bu t . . . it will not be done without carejul atten-tion to the framing of a bill of rights."

Opponents of the ratification of the Constitu-tion ultimately failed. The noneconomic argumentsthey made nonetheless compelled Federalists topledge revisions to the Constitution. The content ofthe resulting first ten amendments (Bill of Rights),like the text of the Constitution itself, provideample evidence to emphasize that the Constitutionis not solely or principally an economic document.

-STEVEN R. BOYD, UNIVERSITYOF TEXAS AT SAN ANTONIO

References

Thornton Anderson, Creating the Constitution: TheConvention of 1787 and the First Congress (Uni-

versity Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State Univer-sity Press, 1993).

Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of theConstitution of the United States (New York:Macmillan, 1913).

Robert A. Dahl, How Democratic is the AmericanConstitution? (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 2001).

Martin Diamond, "The American Idea of Equality:The View from the Founding," Review of Poli-tics, 38 (July 1976): 313-331.

Thomas R Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler, The Ironyof Democracy: An Uncommon Introduction toAmerican Politics (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth,1970).

Jerry Fresia, Toward an American Revolution: Expos-ing the Constitution and Other Illusions (Bos-ton: South End Press, 1988).

Robert A. Goldwin and William A. Schambra, eds.,How Democratic is the Constitution? (Washing-ton, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute forPublic Policy Research, 1980).

James H. Hutson, "The Constitution: An Eco-nomic Document?," in The Framing and Rati-jying of the Constitution, edited by LeonardLevy and Dennis Mahoney (New York: Mac-millan, 1987), pp. 259-270.

Merrill Jensen and others, eds., The DocumentaryHistory of the Ratification of the Constitution, 18volumes (Madison: State Historical Society ofWisconsin, 1975- ).

Calvin Jillson and Cecil Eubanks, "The PoliticalStructure of Constitution Making: The Fed-eral Convention of 1787," American Journal ofPolitical Science, 28 (August 1984): 435-458.

Michael Lienesch, New Order of the Ages: Time, theConstitution, and the Making of Modern PoliticalThought (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1988).

John F. Manley and Kenneth M. Dolbeare, eds.,The Case against the Constitution: From theAntifederalists to the Present (Armonk, N.Y.:Sharpe, 1987).

Forrest McDonald, We the People: The Economic Ori-gins of the Constitution (Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1958).

Michael Parenti, Democracy for the Few (New York:St. Martin's Press, 1974).

John P. Roche, "The Founding Fathers: A ReformCaucus in Action," American Political ScienceReview, 55 (December 1961): 799-816.

Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the AmericanRepublic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: Universityof North Carolina Press, 1969).

76 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION