Eminent Domain (GENERIC DISCUSSION)

Eminent Domain is the right of the state to ACQUIRE PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE with JUST COMPENSATION. It is enshrined in Article 3, Section 9 of the Constitution that: “Private property shall not be taken for public use withour just compensation.ED is an inherent power of the State and its pervasive nature towards the private property is deemed as for the betterment of the general populace, thus the word “public use”. The power of ED is inseparable in sovereignty being essential to the existence of the State and inherent in the Government, Its essence is prescribed by two constitutional requirements: 1) that there be just compensation, and 2) that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law (Art 3, Sec 1). The power to expropiate is primarily lodged in the Legislature. However, Congress may delegate the exercise of power to government agencies, public officers and quasi-public entities. A LGU may exercise the power to expropiate private property only when authorized by the Congress and subject to latters control and restraints. In Yusay vs CA (penned by J. BERSAMIN), the SC laid down the following requirements that must concur, upon payment of JC, pursuant to the laws of the Constitution and the pertinent laws.

- ORDINANCE enacted by Local legislative council authorizing Local Chief Executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise power of ED or pursue Expropiation proceedings

- Power of ED must be executed for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of LGU, to exercise power of ED or pursue Expropiation proceedings

- There is A PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION- Valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be

expropiated, but was not accepted.

In the case of Republic vs Castellvi, (penned by J. Zaldivar) the SC declared that the following circumstances must be present in the "taking" of property for purposes of eminent domain.

- First, the expropriator must enter a private property.

- Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period. The word "momentary" when applied to possession or occupancy of (real) property should be construed to mean "a limited period" — not indefinite or permanent.

- Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority.- Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously

affected- Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and

deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Addt’l notes: Mere notice of the intention to expropiate a particular property doesn’t bind its owner and inhibit him from disposing of it or otherwise dealing w/ it. Such notice will not justify immediate taking. The expropiator can enter the said property only after expropriation proceedings are actually commenced and the deposit required by law is duly made.

- Public use- ANY use directly available to gen public as matter of right and not merely of forebearance or accommodation.== Subject to direct enjoyment

- Just compensation- full and fair equivalent of the property taken from the private owner by the expropiator. TO ASCERTAIN JC: 1 Court to determine the ACTUAL/BASIC VALUE, CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES

- Petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use.  It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes.  Here, as elsewhere, the idea that “public use” is strictly limited to clear cases of “use by the public” has been abandoned.  The term “public use” has now been held to

be synonymous with “public interest,” “public benefit,” “public welfare,” and “public convenience.”[8]  The rationale for this new approach is well explained in the case of Heirs of Juancho Ardona, et al. vs. Reyes, et al.(J. GUTIERREZ JR,) ,[9] to wit:

- “The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes the scope of government activities and public concerns and which possesses big and correctly located public lands that obviate the need to take private property for public purposes.  Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines.  We have never been a laissez faire State.  And the necessities which impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce public land or limited government resources.

- x x x                                      x x x                              x x x- The taking to be valid must be for public use.  There was a time when it was felt that a literal

meaning should be attached to such a requirement.  Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks.  Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable.  It is not anymore.  As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play.  As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use.  One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals.  The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government.  It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.” (emphasis supplied)

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When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.

Fery vs. Municipality of Cabanatuan,[12] is still good and sound doctrine, viz.: “x x x  If, for example, land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated.  x x x  If, upon the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator x x x. When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.”

“The revolutionary case of Ardona va Reyes, penned by Justice Puno”

The issues raised by the petitioners revolve around the proposition that the actions to expropriate their properties are constitutionally infirm because nowhere in the Constitution can a provision be found which allows the taking of private property for the promotion of tourism.

Do the purposes of the taking in this case constitute "public use"?

The petitioners ask us to adopt a strict construction and declare that "public use" means literally use by the public and that "public use" is not synonymous with "public interest", "public benefit", or "public welfare" and much less "public convenience. "

The petitioners face two major obstacles. First, their contention which is rather sweeping in its call for a retreat from the public welfare orientation is unduly restrictive and outmoded. Second, no less than the lawmaker has made a policy determination that the power of eminent domain may be exercised in the promotion and development of Philippine tourism.

The records show that the area being developed into a tourism complex consists of more than 808 hectares, almost all of which is not affected by the land reform program. The public respondents have stressed that the development of the 808 hectares includes plans that would give the petitioners and other displaced persons productive employment, higher incomes, decent housing, water and electric facilities, and better living standards. Our dismissing this petition is, in part, predicated on those assurances. The right of the PTA to proceed with the expropriation of the 282 hectares already Identified as fit for the establishment of a resort complex to promote tourism is, therefore, sustained.

MACTAN VS FERY VS OUANO

FERY: Petitioners cite, in support of this position, Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan,[7] which declared that the

Government acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over

the properties—

 If x x x land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated.  If x x x land is expropriated for a public street and the expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only use it for a public street, then, of course, when the city abandons its use as a public street, it returns to the former owner, unless there is some statutory provision to the contrary.  x x x.  If, upon the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or municipality, and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings.  x x x.  

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no right in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner. x x x.

MACTAN VS LOZADA j. nachura

It bears stressing that both the RTC, Branch 57, Cebu and the CA have passed upon this factual issue and have

declared, in no uncertain terms, that a compromise agreement was, in fact, entered into between the Government and

respondents, with the former undertaking to resell Lot No. 88 to the latter if the improvement and expansion of the Lahug

Airport would not be pursued.  

More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to

the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose.  If

not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter   desires to

reacquire the same.  Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable

element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the

property will be devoted.  Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law, and the  judgment

would violate the property owner’s right to justice, fairness, and equity.Recall State’s power of eminent domain: Expropriation of property always subject tocondition that it be used for specific public purpose for which it was taken. Abandonment or fulfilment of public purpose = must return property to original owner

 OUANO v. RP (J. Velasco)

More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the property owners right to justice, fairness, and equity.

In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent to the Governments exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification.39

Eminent Domain – Just Compensation

These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No.

6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).

Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by

the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the

right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case

of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was

promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and

to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full

land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the

decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform

program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also

enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while

considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are

not inconsistent with its provisions.

[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]

G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)

The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution scheme provided

for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not

exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to

distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In

short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a different class.

G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)

Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that these

laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the specific amount must be determined by the

Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides

that only courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under the constitution,

no property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in bonds and not

necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the form of money and not in bonds.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.

2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.

3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.

HELD:

1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the agrarian reform

program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in

certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following

requirements:

(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;

(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights

conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to

a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share

the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of

owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event,

the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and

respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the

contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.

2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However, there is no law

which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be

that amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government – even without judicial intervention so long as both

parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial

intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that, the just compensation determined by an

administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an

administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This is even

so provided by RA 6657:

Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.

3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of eminent domain. The

agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos in funds

if all compensation have to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money

hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

The Freedom of Religion traces its historical lineage to the “Right to Worship” performed by ancient civilizations and manages to expound its influence through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which basically states that Every one has the right to freedom of thought, and this includes the right to change his belief and religion, and to manifest such in worship, practice and observance. The ambit of Religion would include wmbracing ones matters of faith as well as doubt, agnosticism and atheism. Our Constitution gives primordial value to the Freedom of Religion. According to Art. 3, Section 5: No law shall be made respecting to an establishment of Religion or prohibit the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination and preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required in the exercise of civil or political rights. The Constitution also provided the inviolable separation of the Church and State, (Art 3, Sec 5 and Art 6, Sec 29 (2)). The State cannot interfere in purely ecclesiastical affairs and the Church is also barred from meddling in purely secular matters. The Religious Profession and Worship has a twofold aspect: Freedom to believe and Freedom to Act on ones belief

first, whether the respondent Board has the power to review petitioner’s TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) second, assuming it has the power, whether it gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program, series Nos. 115, 119 and 121, for the reason that they constitute an attack against other religions and that they are indecent, contrary to law and good customs.

(1) Petitioner contends that the term “television program” should not include religious programs like its program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.” A contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene Section 5, Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that “no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.  The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.”

(2) We reject petitioner’s submission which need not set us adrift in a constitutional voyage towards an uncharted sea.  Freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present.   it is “designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good.”[16] We have also laboriously defined in our jurisprudence the intersecting umbras and penumbras of the right to religious profession and worship.

(3) But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State.  As great as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all the other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of others.  It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society.  And this is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law.

(4) Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: ‘The constitutional provision on religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges.  It gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma.

For sure, we shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man.  For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.

The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be.  Under our constitutional scheme, it is not

the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion.  Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion.  Vis-a-vis religious differences, the State enjoys no banquet of options.  Neutrality alone is its fixed and immovable stance.  In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country.  In a State where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology.  The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas.  When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.

ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR

 To be held on balance are the state’s interest and the respondent’s religious freedom. In this highly sensitive area of law, the task of balancing between authority and liberty is most delicate because to the person invoking religious freedom, the consequences of the case are not only temporal.

1. Respondent is the Court interpreter of RTC Branch 253 in Las Pinas City. The complainant Estrada requested for an investigation  of respondent for living with a man not her husband while she was still legally married and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Estrada believed that Escritor is committing a grossly immoral act which tarnishes the image of the judiciary, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed  therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.

2. Respondent admitted she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. more than 20 years ago when her husband was still alive but living with another woman. She likewise admitted having a son with Quilapio but denies any liability for alleged grossly immoral conduct because, 1) She is a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower Society, 2) That the conjugal arrangement was in  conformity  with their religious beliefs, and 3)  That the conjugal arrangement with Quilapio has the approval of her congregation.

3. Escritor likewise claimed that she had executed a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness' in accordance with her religion which allows members of the Jehovah’s witnesses who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all over the world except in countries where divorce is allowed.

To make an individual’s obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs except where the State’s interest is “compelling” - permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, “to become a law unto himself,” . . . - contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.

as legal scholars observe, this area of jurisprudence has demonstrated two main standards used by the Court in deciding religion clause cases: separation (in the form of strict separation or the tamer version of strict neutrality or separation) and benevolent neutrality or accommodation.   separation - strict or tame - protects the principle of church-state separation with a rigid reading of the principle while benevolent neutrality protects religious realities, tradition and established practice with a flexible reading of the principle

HELD: A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests

The state’s interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency.  “There is nothing in the OCA’s (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override respondent’s plea of religious freedom.  Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General”.

In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent’s position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise protection.  The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom.  Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom but must also apply the “compelling state interest” test.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.   

MANOSCA case J VITUG

the late Felix Y. Manalo, who, admittedly, had made contributions to Philippine history and culture has been declared as a national landmark. It has been held that places invested with unusual historical interest is a public use for which the power of eminent domain may be authorized

It has been explained as early as Seña v. Manila Railroad Co.,[19] that:

“x x x A historical research discloses the meaning of the term ‘public use’ to be one of constant growth.  As society advances, its demands upon the individual increase and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted. x x x for ‘whatever is beneficially employed for the community is a public use.’”

Islamic da wah

ISSUE: Whether the EO is violates the constitutional provision as to freedom of religion

RULING: The Court grants the petition. OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the Muslim community as a "national cultural community" and not as a religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and State, the latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment clause and the "free exercise of religion" provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. 

UNREASONABLE SEARCHES

In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Right (ULAP) vs. Integrated National Police, 3 it was held that individual petitioners who do not allege that any of their rights were violated are not qualified to bring the action, as real parties in interest.

The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, 4 or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. 

A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. 6Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, 7 or simply looks into a vehicle, 8 or flashes a light therein, 9 these do not constitute unreasonable search.

Read my digest of People vs Calantiao

Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and some cases decided by the Supreme Court provide the instances when search is lawful without search warrant:1. In times of war within the area of military operation.(People v. de Gracia, 233 SCRA 716, Guanzon v. de Villa, 181 SCRA 623)2. As an incident of a lawful arrest.

Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states that “a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant”.

Requisites:  a) arrest must be lawful; b) search and seizure must be contemporaneous with arrest; c) search must be within permissible area (People v. Estella, G.R. Nos. 138539 – 40, January 21, 2003)3. When there are prohibited articles open to the eye and hand of an officer (Plain View Doctrine).

The “plain view doctrine” is usually applied where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes upon an incriminationatory object (People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597).

Requisites: a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; 2) the evidence was accidentally discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; c) the evidence must be immediately visible; and d) “plain view” justified the seizure of the evidence without any further search (People v. Sarap, G.R. No. 132165, March 26, 2003).4. When there is consent which is voluntary (consented search)Requisites: a) there is a right; b) there must be knowledge of the existence of such right; and c) there must be intention to waive (De Gracia v. Locsin, 65 Phil 689).5. When it is incident to a lawful inspection.Example of this kind of search is the searches of passengers at airports, ports or bus terminals. Republic Act 6235 provides that luggage and baggage of airline passengers shall be subject to search6. Under the Tariff and Customs Code for purposes of enforcing the customs and tariff laws;The purpose is to prevent violations of smuggling or immigration laws.7. Searches and seizures of vessels and aircraft; this extends to the warrantless search of motor vehicle for contraband.

Examples of this is the seizure without warrant of a fishing vessel found to be violating fishery laws and the “stop and search” without a warrant at military or police checkpoints which are legal. Warrantless search and seizure in these instances are justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicles, vessels, or aircrafts can be moved quickly out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought.8. When there is a valid reason to “stop – and – frisk”.

“Stop – and – frisk is defined as the particular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him and pat him for weapons whenever he observes unusual conduct which leads him to conclude that criminal activity may be afoot (Terry v. Ohio).

Requisites:  a) that there is a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct; b) that the police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries; c) that the police officer approached and restrained the person in order to check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed weapon; and d) that the apprehending officer must have a genuine reason to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapon or contraband concealed about him People v. Sy Chua, G.R. Nos. 136066 – 67, February 4, 2003)

NOTE: SEARCH AND SEIZURE SHOULD PRECEDE THE ARREST.

Under the Rules of Court, Rule 113, Section 5, a warrantless arrest, also known as "citizen’s arrest," is lawful under three circumstances:

1. When, in the presence of the policeman, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. This is the "in flagrante delicto" rule.

2. When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe, based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has committed it. This is the "hot pursuit" arrest rule.

3. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment.

In flagrante delicto warrantless arrest should comply with the element of immediacy between the time of the offense and the time of the arrest. For example, in one case the Supreme Court held that when the warrantless arrest was made three months after the crime was committed, the arrest was unconstitutional and illegal.

If an accused is caught in flagrante delicto, the warrantless arrest is lawful and the evidence obtained in a search incidental to the arrest is admissible as evidence. One common example of a warrantless arrest is a buybust operation.

An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance; or hears the disturbance that it creates and proceeds at once to the scene.

If the warrantless arrest turns out to be unlawful, still the court is capable of assuming jurisdiction over the accused. Any objection to the court’s jurisdiction is waived, when the person arrested submits to arraignment without any objection.

The test of in flagrante delicto arrest is that the suspect was acting under circumstances reasonably tending to show that he has committed or is about to commit a crime. Evidence of guilt is not necessary. It is enough if there is probable cause. For example, if there was a prior arrangement to deliver shabu inside a hotel, the immediate warrantless arrest of the accused upon his entry in the hotel room is valid. By contrast, the discovery of marked money on the accused does not justify a warrantless arrest.

Under the rule on "hot pursuit" arrest, the policeman should have personal knowledge that the suspect committed the crime. The test is probable cause, which the Supreme Court has defined as "an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion."

Under this rule, the policeman does not need to actually witness the execution or acts constituting the offense. But he must have direct knowledge, or view of the crime, right after its commission.

* Mentally disabled persons on emergency grounds.

* Arrest based on unreasonable suspicion.

The Constitution does not forbid warrantless search; it only forbids unreasonable search. The Rules of Court, Rule 126, Section 13, allows a warrantless search, provided it is incident to a lawful arrest. The law provides: "A person lawfully arrested maybe searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant."

To be valid, the search must have been conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter, and only at the place where the suspect was arrested, or the premises or surroundings under his immediate control.

Any evidence obtained during an illegal search (even if it confirms initial suspicion of felonious activity) is considered absolutely inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, since it is considered to be the fruit of a poisonous tree. Since the Anti-Wiretapping Law provides that an illegal wiretap is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, being the fruit of a poisonous tree, do you wonder how the alleged Garci tape could be possibly considered admissible? I wonder too.

A valid arrest must precede the search, not vice versa. One exception to the rule on search is waiver by the suspect. For example, where the shabu was discovered by virtue of a valid warrantless search, and the accused himself freely gave his consent to the search, the prohibited drugs found as a result were inadmissible as evidence.

Another example, is the stop-and-frisk rule. A warrantless search is allowed if the officers had reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist is a law offender, or that they did find the evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched. The rule for checkpoints is that the inspection of the vehicle should be limited to a visual search. The vehicle itself should not be searched, and its occupants should not be subjected to a body search.

* Seizure of prohibited articles in plain view. The seizure should comply with the following requirements:

(1) A prior valid intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest, in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties.

(2) The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are.

(3) The evidence must be immediately apparent.

(4) Plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

As a lawyer and a former RTC judge, I am a very strong law and-order person. The people upholding law in society are policemen and therefore, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the police. After all, the Rules of Court provides for the disputable presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

I submit that it is not fair to demand that the police should risk their very lives to uphold the rule of law, and yet should be held in low esteem by people whose mission in life is to change or disregard the law, outside of constitutional processes. Accordingly, as vice chair of the Senate Finance Committee, I will file at the end of the Senate budget hearings, a motion to appropriate the sum of R37 billion for the Philippine National Police.

* More firearms, both short and long; more radios, whether base, mobile, or handheld.

It is not the guns or armament or the money they can pay. It is the close cooperation that makes them win the day. It is not the individual or the police as a whole but the everlasting teamwork.

The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid warrant is not only ancient. It is also zealously safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.[1] Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Indeed, while the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.[2]

A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. The following searches and seizures are deemed permissible by jurisprudence: (1) search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs searches (4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante

delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and, (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.[30]

WHAT  ARE  THE  THREE  SITUATIONS  WHEREIN  THERE  MUST  BE FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE?

1.    Probable cause in filing of an information >     Facts   and   circumstances   that   would   engender   a   well-grounded  belief  that  a  crime  has  been  committed  and  the person to be charged is probably guilty thereof 2.    Probable cause in the issuance of a search warrant >     Facts   and   circumstances   that   would   lead   a   reasonable discreet  and  prudent  man  to  believe  that  there  has  been  a crime committed and the things and objects connected to the crime committed are in the place to be searched 3.    Probable cause in the issuance of a warrant of arrest >     Facts   and   circumstances   that   would   engender   a   well-grounded  belief  that  a  crime  has  been  committed  and  the person to be arrested committed it 

RIGHT TO BAIL (Short info)

      The right to bail is a manifestation that the state allows an accused, no matter how evil his appearance may be, to enjoy his liberty and the right against restraint from movement, although provisional in character.  Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of law, furnished by him or by a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court.[7] The purpose of bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial.[8] The right to bail is recognized under Section 13 Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, promulgated by the Supreme Court by virtue of their rule-making power under Section 5 (5) Article VIII of the Constitution.

            As provided for by the fundamental law of the land, all persons charged with an offense shall, before conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right.[9] It admits an exception, when a person is charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua and when evidence of guilt is strong, the right to bail shall be denied. The grant or denial of an application for bail is dependent on whether the evidence of guilt is strong which the lower court should determine in a hearing called for the purpose.[10]

EQUAL PROTECTION

Himagan vs people J kapunan

The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a member of the PNP charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six years of imprisonment and which suspension continues until the case against him is terminated.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.

If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. 

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection

clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness.

The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the

purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of

the same class. The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both

as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

BIRAOGO VS PTC

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth

commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the

previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Arroyo

administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to

include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction.

Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and

selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification. The PTC must not exclude the other

past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations. The Constitution is

the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all

private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be

stricken down for being unconstitutional. WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby

declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

GARCIA VS DRILLON

A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials. Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child abuse, which could very well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law. R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union69 is instructive:

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences

justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality."70

Yrasegui J. REYES

Held: Petition denied. To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection clause guaranty of the Constitution. However, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked. Put differently,the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. Indeed, the US Supreme Court, in interpreting the 14th Amendment, which is the source of our equal protection guarantee, is consistent in saying that the equal protection erects no shield against private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful. Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection guarantee.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Ayer Prod vs Capulong (J Feliciano)

The counter-balancing of private respondent is to a right of privacy. It was demonstrated sometime ago by the then Dean Irene R. Cortes that our law, constitutional and statutory, does include a right of privacy. 5 It is left to case law, however, to mark out the precise scope and content of this right in differing types of particular situations. The right of privacy or "the right to be let alone," 6 like the right of free expression, is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute of apublic character. 7 Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be invoked resist publication and dissemination of matters of public interest.

A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a 'public personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously to be included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainment. Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their tight to privacy. Three reasons were given, more or less indiscrimately, in the decisions" that they had sought publicity and consented to it, and so could not complaint when they received it; that their personalities and their affairs has already public, and could no longer be regarded as their own private business; and that the press had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public about those who have become legitimate matters of public interest. 

RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL., x J CARPIO -MORALES

 Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage of court proceedings.  They principally urge the Court to revisit the 1991 ruling in Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquino’s Libel Case[14] [12] and the 2001 ruling in Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former President Joseph E. Estrada (J MENDOZA) [15] [13] which rulings, they contend, violate the doctrine that proposed restrictions on constitutional rights are to be narrowly construed and outright prohibition cannot stand when regulation is a viable alternative. 

          Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre cases has attracted intense media coverage due to the gruesomeness of the crime, prominence of the accused, and the number of media personnel killed.  They inform that reporters are being frisked and searched for cameras, recorders, and cellular devices upon entry, and that under strict orders of the trial court against live broadcast coverage, the number of media practitioners allowed inside the courtroom has been limited to one reporter for each media institution.

  The Court had another unique opportunity in Estrada to revisit the question of live radio and television coverage of court proceedings in a criminal case.   It held that “[t]he propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve[s] the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial.”  The Court disposed:

            The Court is not all that unmindful of recent technological and scientific advances but to chance forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.

            WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.[20] [18]

          In resolving the motion for reconsideration, the Court in Estrada, by Resolution of September 13, 2001, provided a glimmer of hope when it ordered the audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary purposes, under the following conditions:

          x x x (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public under Rule 119, §21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be

installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only and shall be made without comment except such annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the cases against the former President shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.[21] [19]

 One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre cases apart from the earlier cases is the impossibility of accommodating even the parties to the cases – the private complainants/families of the victims and other witnesses – inside the courtroom.  On public trial,Estrada basically discusses:

            An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance.  A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago.  A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process.  In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings.[28] [26] (underscoring supplied)

In so allowing pro hac vice the live broadcasting by radio and television of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, the Court lays down the following guidelines toward addressing the concerns mentioned in Aquino and Estrada:  

(a) An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao massacre cases may be made both for documentary purposes and for transmittal to live radio and television broadcasting.

(b) Media entities must file with the trial court a letter of application, manifesting that they intend to broadcast the audio-visual recording of the proceedings and that they have the necessary technological equipment and technical plan to  carry out the same, with an undertaking that they will faithfully comply with the guidelines and regulations and cover the entire remaining proceedings until promulgation of judgment. 

No selective or partial coverage shall be allowed.  No media entity shall be allowed to broadcast the proceedings without an application duly approved by the trial court.      

(c) A single fixed compact camera shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom to provide a single wide-angle full-view of the sala of the trial court.  No panning and zooming shall be allowed to avoid unduly highlighting or downplaying incidents in the proceedings.  The camera and the necessary equipment shall be operated and controlled only by a duly designated official or employee of the Supreme Court.  The camera equipment should not produce or beam any distracting sound or light rays.  Signal lights or signs showing the equipment is operating should not be visible.  A limited number of microphones and the least installation of wiring, if not wireless technology, must be unobtrusively located in places indicated by the trial court.

Estrada VS DESTIERO J. PUNO Political questions-  "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:EDSA I EDSA II

exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government.

exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assemblyto petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President.

extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review

intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review.

presented a political question; involves legal questions.The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace.Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing material relevant issues—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive resignation.SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacañan Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the country;5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before, during and after January 20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed  HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat.  In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a

President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with prosecution.

LIBRERTY OF ADOBE

MANOTOC VS CA:: According to the petitioner, having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts that granted him bail nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

ISSUE: WON petitioner’s constitutional right to travel was violated.

HELD: NO.

The court has power to prohibit person admitted to bail from leaving the country because this is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his constitutional right to travel. In case he will be allowed to leave the country without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of courts.

Furthermore, petitioner failed to satisfy trial court and CA of the urgency of his travel, duration thereof, as well as consent of his surety to the proposed travel. He was not able to show the necessity of his travel abroad. He never indicated that no other person in his behalf could undertake such business transaction.

Article 3 Sec6: “The liberty of abode and of changing the same… shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court….” According to SC, the order of trial court in releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the provision on right to travel.

Marcos “We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions.”

CORTES, J:

Primarily, the issue raised in this petition is whether or not the Regional Trial Court can enjoin the Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and order the striking employees to return to work. Collaterally, it is whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.

It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands,

By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and employees, including those in the public sector, to strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this impression, for in the Sub-Article on the Civil Service Commission, it provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as "all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters," that "[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(l) and (50)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that "[tlhe right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike.

But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against strikes?

The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3 cases:a. When there is an urgent need for immediate action (preventive suspension in administrative charges, padlocking filthy restaurants, cancellation of passport).b. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, & the respondent isn’t prevented from enjoying the right to notice & hearing at a later time (summary distraint & levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, replacement of an appointee)c. Twin rights have been offered, but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.

As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.42 Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.43 What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senate’s membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.