Consti Remaining Cases

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-52364. March 25, 1983.]

RICARDO VALLADOLID, petitioner, vs. HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, Deputy Minister of Labor, and COPACABANA APARTMENT-HOTEL, respondents.

SYLLABUS3.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS; NOT VIOLATED IN SUMMARY RESOLUTION OF APPLICATIONS FOR CLEARANCE. — J.R.M. cannot claim that it was deprived due process considering that applications for clearance have to be summarily investigated and a decision required to be rendered within ten (10) days from the filing of the opposition (Section 8, Rule XIV, Book V, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code). As this Court had occasion to hold there is no violation of due process here the Regional Director merely required the submission of position papers and resolved the case summarily thereafter (Cebu Institute of Technology vs. Minister of Labor, 113 SCRA 237 [1982]).4.LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT; ILLEGAL DISMISSAL; RIGHT TO REINSTATEMENT; BACKWAGES NOT RECOVERABLE WHERE EMPLOYEE INCURRED UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCES. — J.R.M. admits that Valladolid requested for leave for 3 days from December 30, 1978, and thereafter for 15 days, but denies that he notified the company of his absences subsequent to this. The Regional Director ruled that the absences of Valladolid were unauthorized but did not amount to gross neglect of duty or abandonment of work which requires deliberate refusal to resume employment or a clear showing in terms of specific circumstances that the worker does not intend to report for work. We agree. But as Valladolid had been AWOL, no error was committed by respondent Regional Director in ordering his reinstatement without backwages (Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corp. vs. Minister of Labor and Employment, 112 SCRA 280 [1982]).D E C I S I O NMELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:

The Order dated December 26, 1979 of the Order of May 2, 1979 for reinstatement without backwages issued by Regional Director Francisco L.

Estrella in Case No. R4-STF-2-1316-79 entitled, "Ricardo C. Valladolid, Jr. vs. Copacabana Apartment-Hotel," is being assailed by the parties in these petitions. Cdpr

J. R. M. & Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as JRM), as petitioner in G.R. No. 53349, is also the respondent in G.R. No. 52364 named therein as Copacabana Apartment-Hotel. JRM originally owned and operated not only Copacabana but also Tropicana Apartment-Hotel. The principal stockholders of JRM were the brothers Joseph, Manuel, Vicente and Roman, all surnamed Yu. Upon the death of Joseph on October 12, 1975, although both Copacabana and Tropicana continued technically as owned by JRM, the controlling (70%) interest in Copacabana was lodged in the surviving heirs of Joseph, with brothers Manuel and Roman having a 15% interest each. JRM was placed under the management of the heirs of Joseph. The brothers Manuel, Roman and Vicente were allowed 100% equity interest in Tropicana, which was operated separately from JRM. Eventually, Tropicana and Copacabana became competing businesses.Ricardo Valladolid, petitioner in G.R. No. 52364 and respondent in G.R. No. 53349, after the death of Joseph, was employed by JRM in 1977 as a telephone switchboard operator. He was subsequently transferred to the position of clerk-collector by Mrs. Lourdes T. Yu, President of JRM. llcdAccording to the affidavit of Daniel T. Yu, Executive Vice-President, attached to the position paper submitted by JRM before the Regional Director, the transfer was motivated by the fact:

xxx xxx xxx"That as such switchboard operator numerous telephone conversations and communications relating to business and confidential matters were intercepted and relayed to Tropicana Apartment-Hotel, a competitor;

"That to confirm suspicion on Ricardo Valladolid as the person responsible for said interception and relay, Mrs. Lourdes T. Yu, President of JRM & Co., Inc. sent him on an errand to Manila Hotel to bring flowers on the occasion of Wedding Anniversary of Mr. & Mrs. Yu Hong Ty. Matters which Mrs. Lourdes Yu told him in confidence and admonitions not to tell anyone, reached Tropicana people:

xxx xxx xxx 1

The affidavit further disclosed:

xxx xxx xxx

"That while serving in his capacity as clerk collector, copies of Accounts Receivables, reach Tropicana Management although said copies were not referred to them;

"That conferred (sic) on numerous confidential matters taken in the office of Copacabana Apartment-Hotel reached Tropicana Apartment-Hotel;

"That to finally and fully confirmed suspicions that Ricardo Valladolid was the person responsible for the aforementioned disclosures, a plan for the entrapment was conceived by the management of Copacabana Apartment-Hotel;

"That on November 9, 1979, pursuance of said plan, a cash voucher for P500,000.00 supposedly in payment for representation expenses to myself with the corresponding check were prepared and issued respectively by Juan V. Bermudo, Apartment-Hotel Manager, who thereafter called Ricardo Valladolid and asked the latter to bring the said cash voucher and check to my room which he did; few minutes later I came down to the office and asked Mr. Ricardo Valladolid to prepare the corresponding deposit slip to Pacific Banking Corporation for said check;

"That thereafter, the aforementioned cash voucher, corresponding check and deposit slip were kept in the hotel vault with no other person other than myself, Juan Bermudo and Ricardo Valladolid having any knowledge of preparation and existence thereof;

"That unknown to Ricardo Valladolid, the aforementioned check, cash voucher and deposit slip were cancelled;

"That on December 4, 1978, Mr. Manuel Yu Chua, came to Copacabana Apartment-Hotel as minority stockholder of the latter, vehemently demanding for an accounting of Copacabana books;

'That he strongly charged that information reached him that I received a disbursement of P500,000.00 from Copacabana Apartment-Hotel as

representation expenses in my capacity as Executive Vice-President thereof;

"That at this juncture, I brought out the cancelled cash voucher, check and deposit slip; with mouth agape, Manuel Yu Chua, could do nothing else but admit that in fact, his informer within Copacabana Apartment-Hotel was no other than Mr. Ricardo C. Valladolid;

'That I then informed Manuel Yu Chua, that under the circumstances, I could no longer repose any trust whatsoever on Ricardo Valladolid and requested him to take the latter to Tropicana Apartment-Hotel and just swap him with someone else; Mr. Manuel Yu Chua directed me to tell Valladolid to see him;

"That after few days, Ricardo Valladolid came back and told me that Manuel Yu Chua has no place for him at Tropicana Apartment-Hotel; in this conversation, RicardoValladolid apologized for having betrayed the trust that we had reposed on him, especially after Mrs. Lourdes T. Yu had told him to stay impartial; that he then having done this for Manuel Yu Chua, the latter could not even accept him in Tropicana Apartment-Hotel;

xxx xxx xxx 2

The entrapment scheme was corroborated by the affidavits of Sofia Mo. Gianan, External Auditor of JRM & Co., Inc., and Juan V. Bermudo; Copacabana Apartment-Hotel Manager, which affidavits formed part of JRM's position paper filed before the agency below. 3 The cancelled Cash Voucher, the uncashed check, and the unused deposit slip, all in the respective amounts of P500,000.00 were also attached to the same position paper as Exhibits "4", "5" and "6".

On December 29, 1978, or after the entrapment scheme had been effected, Valladolid filed a written request for a five (5) day vacation leave starting December 30, 1978 with the Manager of Copacabana, stating therein that he would report for work on January 5, 1979. 4 He did not report for work on January 5 but sent a telegram from Bicol on January 8, 1979 requesting for 15 days sick leave as he was confined for flu at the Dr. Estrellado Clinic. 5 On January 23, 1979, Valladolid's wife allegedly called up JRM informing the company through its accountant, Eddie Escueta, that her husband was still sick and requested for 30 days sick leave, which was allegedly granted. This was denied by JRM.

Valladolid reported for work on February 16, 1979. The Executive Vice-President, Mr. Daniel Yu, allegedly refused to admit him and instead asked him to resign. JRM maintains that Valladolid left the office that same day and never returned, because he was reprimanded for his unauthorized absences.

On February 22, 1979, Valladolid filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with vacation and sick leave pay. 6

On February 24, 1979, JRM sent a letter to Valladolid signed by Daniel T. Yu, advising him of his preventive suspension effective February 26, 1979 preparatory to the termination of his services 10 days from receipt of a copy of the application for clearance to dismiss him. The grounds given were: (1) Willful Breach of Trust for having divulged, in various instances, confidential business matters to competitors of the company; and (2) Gross Neglect of Duty for having been absent without leave or notice for more than 25 days, to the detriment of the company. 7

On February 28, 1979, JRM filed said application for clearance with the Ministry of Labor 8 The application for clearance and Valladolid's complaint for Illegal Dismissal were consolidated and docketed as R4-STF-2-1316-79. The parties submitted their respective position papers and documentary evidence. On May 2, 1979, the Regional Director issued the following challenged Order: llcd

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the application for clearance with preventive suspension is hereby denied. Respondent is hereby ordered to reinstate complainant to his former position without backwages and without loss of seniority rights. Let the time this case was pending be considered as complainant's suspension for his absences.

The claims for vacation-sick leave pay is dismissed for failure to substantiate the same."

Valladolid appealed the foregoing order to the Minister of Labor seeking modification of the same, praying for the award of backwages from the time he was illegally dismissed on February 16, 1979 to the date of his actual reinstatement. JRM also appealed the said Order.

On December 26, 1979, the Deputy Minister of Labor, in a succinct Order, dismissed both appeals after finding "no sufficient justification or valid reason to alter, modify, much less reverse the Order appealed from."

On January 21, 1980, Valladolid filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 52364, praying for a modification of the Order of December 26, 1979 of the Deputy Minister of Labor so as to grant him backwages. This Court resolved, on February 4, 1980, to give due course to the petition, and required the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda.

On March 12, 1980, JRM also filed a petition for Certiorari with this Court assailing that same Order. This Court gave due course to the petition and consolidated the same with G.R. No. 52364. Thereafter, the parties filed their respective memoranda.

The non-award of backwages is the only issue being raised by Valladolid claiming that the Orders in question are contrary to law and evidence, and were issued arbitrarily and capriciously with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

JRM, on the other hand, assails the said Orders on the following grounds:

I

"That respondent Deputy Minister of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion when in his questioned order in effect sustained the finding of respondent Regional Director that there is no evidence to support the dismissal of private respondent.

II

That respondent Deputy Minister Amado Inciong and Regional Director Francisco Estrella committed grave abuse of discretion when they arbitrarily failed to consider in their respective orders under review, established jurisprudence.

III

That respondent Regional Director committed grave abuse of discretion when he held that preventive suspension is equivalent to dismissal.

IV

That the order of respondent Hon. Amado Inciong was a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment when it failed to state the facts and conclusion of law upon which it is based.

V

That respondent Regional Director Francisco Estrella acted in excess of his jurisdiction when, without any statutory authority or transcending beyond his jurisdiction, he absolutely disregarded procedural requirement in the hearing of the present controversy, thus depriving petitioner of its right to due process."

Valladolid, in his affidavit dated March 29, 1979, denied having committed any breach of trust 9 In corroboration, he presented the affidavits of Mr. Manuel Yu dated March 20, 1979 and March 29, 1979, wherein the latter stated that Valladolid was "one of Copacabana's most hard-working and efficient employees"; that Valladolid's work is "mere routinary collection and clerical in nature which do not involve trust (or) confidential business or trade secrets" which he may 'divulge' to other companies." 10

On this issue, the Regional Director ruled that "there is no evidence on record that Valladolid furnished copies of receivables or divulged confidential business matters to Mr. Manuel Yu and the 'Tropicana People' including the P500,000.00 'entrapment scheme'.

That finding is not supported by the records. The affidavits attached to petitioner's position paper adequately show that JRM did not act on mere suspicion but on the contrary, acted prudently when it first transferred Valladolid from switch board operator where he could eavesdrop on telephone conversations, to a less crucial position of clerk-collector. But even in the latter capacity, JRM's fears were confirmed as shown by the entrapment scheme. Manuel Yu's certification as to Valladolid's trustworthiness cannot be given much weight not only because it was disproved by the entrapment contrived but more so because even Manuel Yu himself refused to employ him at Tropicana when Daniel Yu had suggested that Tropicana absorb Valladolid because JRM had lost confidence in the latter. And although Manuel Yu, who owns 15% of the equity holding of Copacabana, and being a member of the Board of Directors of JRM, had a right to know the business standing of said establishment, there is basis to believe that he would not have been able to pinpoint the particular "disbursement" of P500,000.00, if the same had not been leaked out to him. LexLib

Loss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an employee. Proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee's misconduct is not required, it being sufficient that there is some basis for the same or that the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct and his participation therein renders him

unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of his position. 11 However, as this was Valladolid's first offense, as found by the Regional Director, dismissal from the service is too harsh a punishment, considering that he had not been previously admonished, warned or suspended for any misdemeanor. Besides as clerk-collector, he need not be given access to facts relative to the business of Copacabana, which, if divulged to Tropicana would be to the former's prejudice.

Moreover, we find basis for the finding of the Regional Director that Valladolid was terminated without prior clearance. JRM sent a memorandum to Valladolid on February 24, 1979 advising him of his preventive suspension effective February 26, 1979 pending approval of the application for clearance to dismiss him. The clearance application was filed on February 28, 1979. However, even prior to that date, or on February 22, 1979, Valladolid had already filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal. This shows that Valladolid was indeed refused admittance on February 16, 1979 when he reported back to work, so that he was practically dismissed before he was formally notified of his suspension leading to his dismissal, in violation of the requirement of Section 3, Rule XIV, Book V, Rules & Regulation Implementing the Labor Code. 12And as provided in Section 2 of the same Rule, any dismissal without prior clearance shall be "conclusively presumed to be termination of employment without a just cause."

JRM cannot claim that it was deprived of due process considering that applications for clearance have to be summarily investigated and a decision required to be rendered within ten (10) days from the filing of the opposition. 13 As this Court had occasion to hold there is no violation of due process where the Regional Director merely required the submission of position papers and resolved the case summarily thereafter. 14

Nor is the questioned Order of the Deputy Minister of Labor violative of Section 9, Article X of the Constitution, which requires a statement of the facts and the conclusions of law upon which it is based. That prescription applies to decisions of Courts of record. The Ministry of Labor is an administrative body with quasi-judicial functions. Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V, ibid., states that proceedings in the NLRC shall be non-litigious and summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities obtaining in courts of law. As the Deputy Minister was in full accord with the findings of fact and the conclusions of law drawn from those facts by the Regional Director, there was no necessity of discussing anew the issues raised therein. 15 cdphil

JRM admits that Valladolid requested for leave for 5 days from December 30, 1978, and thereafter for 15 days, but denies that he notified the company of his absences subsequent to this. The Regional Director ruled that the absences of Valladolid were unauthorized but did not amount to gross neglect of duty or abandonment of work which requires deliberate refusal to resume employment or a clear showing in terms of specific circumstances that the worker does not intend to report for work. We agree. But as Valladolid had been AWOL, no error was committed by respondent Regional Director in ordering his reinstatement without backwages. 16

WHEREFORE, both Petitions for Certiorari are hereby denied. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Plana, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., took no part.

SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 78648. January 24, 1989.]RAFAEL N. NUNAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND MUNICIPALITY OF ISABELA, BASILAN, respondents.SYLLABUS3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; SECTION 14, ARTICLE VIII, APPLICABLE ONLY IN CASES SUBMITTED FOR DECISION BUT NOT TO AN ORDER OR RESOLUTION REFUSING DUE COURSE TO A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI. — In the first place, our "Resolution" of 11 May 1988 was not a "Decision" within the meaning of the Constitutional requirement. This mandate is applicable only in cases "submitted for decision," i.e., given due course and after the filing of Briefs or Memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the case may be. It is not applicable to an Order or Resolution refusing due course to a Petition for Certiorari. In the second place, the assailed Resolution does state the legal basis for the dismissal of the Petition and thus complies with the Constitutional provision. (Tayamura, et al., vs. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 76355, May 21, 1987 [en banc]; see also Que vs. People, G.R. Nos. L-75217-18, 154 SCRA 160, September 21, 1987).

R E S O L U T I O N

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:For resolution is petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Minute Resolution of this Court of 11 May 1988 dismissing the Petition for Certiorari "for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the public respondent had committed grave abuse of discretion in holding, among others, that the compromise agreement of the parties is not enforceable against the Municipality of Isabela, the latter not having been impleaded as an indispensable party in the case."In the present Motion, petitioner contends:

"1. The decision does not clearly and distinctly express the facts and the law on which it is based;

"2. The Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, is bound by the compromise agreement; and

"3. Public respondent "Commission on Audit (COA for short) gravely abused its discretion in denying the lawful claim for separation pay by your petitioner." (Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p. 67)

The facts disclose that on 24 February 1986 petitioner was appointed as Municipal Administrator of Isabela, Basilan. On 1 February 1980 he was administratively charged and dismissed from the service for dishonesty, misconduct and for lack of

confidence. On appeal, the Merit Systems Board exonerated petitioner and reinstated him to his position as Municipal Administrator on 8 May 1980. LLphil

On 29 January 1981 petitioner was again dismissed for lack of confidence by then Municipal Mayor Alvin Dans under Administrative Order No. 54, Series of 1981. Upon denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner filed Case No. 43, a suit for Mandamus and Damages with Preliminary Injunction against the Municipal Mayor, the Municipal Treasurer, and the Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela, Basilan, before the then Court of First Instance in Basilan Province, Branch I, praying for reinstatement "with full backwages and other rights inherent in the position." He also filed Case No. 45 with the same Court seeking that he and his wife be paid their back salaries from 1 February 1980 to 31 May 1980 pursuant to the Decision of the Merit Systems Board on 16 February 1981.

On 20 February 1984, during the pendency of the said case, the Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela, Basilan, abolished the subject position in its Resolution No. 902, Series of 1984, and Ordinance No. 336, pursuant to the provisions of the Local Government Code. prcd

On 5 December 1984, petitioner and his wife, on the one hand, and on the other, Mayor Dans in his capacity both as Municipal Mayor and as Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela, Basilan, the Municipal Treasurer and the Provincial Fiscal (p. 4, Reply To Comment of COA), entered into a Compromise Agreement stipulating, among others, that:

"1. The respondents shall pay petitioner Rafael Nunal all back salaries and other emoluments due him by reason of his employment as Municipal Administrator of Isabela, Basilan, covering the period from January 1, 1980 to August 15, 1984, together with accumulated vacation/sick leaves, midyear and Christmas bonuses in 1982 and 1983, and separation pay under the Local Government Code, which are reflected in the computation hereto attached and made an integral part hereof . . ." (p. 13, Rollo)

Under the same Compromise Agreement, petitioner was also considered as "retired" upon receipt of the monetary considerations mentioned therein.

On 12 December 1984, the Court approved the Compromise Agreement.

On 1 April 1985, petitioner collected his retirement benefits although, concededly, no provision for the same had been

included in the Compromise Agreement (Petition, p. 6; Rollo, p. 9).

On 17 September 1985, petitioner filed his claim for separation pay in the amount of P54,092.50 to which he is allegedly entitled due to the abolition of the position of Municipal Administrator, which separation pay is provided for by the Local Government Code (B.P. 337, Section 76).

On 6 January 1986 the Municipal Treasurer forwarded petitioner's claim to the Provincial Auditor of Basilan. On 11 January, 1986, in a First Indorsement, the Provincial Auditor opined that the claim was legal and proper but payment thereof was made subject to availability of funds and the ruling of the Regional Office of the Commission on Audit, Region IX, Zamboanga City.

On 12 February 1986, in a 2nd Indorsement, the Regional Director of the Commission on Audit, Region IX, Zamboanga City, reversed the Provincial Auditor of Basilan and denied petitioner's claim for separation pay. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was forwarded to the Commission on Audit (COA), Central Office, Quezon City.

On 13 October 1986 the COA Central Office, in its Decision No. 388, not only denied petitioner's claim for separation pay but also disallowed the other payments made to petitioner. It held:

"Premises considered, and it appearing that Mr. Nunal has been paid back salaries and other emoluments in the total amount of P90,362.96 pursuant to the Compromise Agreement, supra, this Commission hereby directs that any and all payments made to Mr. Nunal corresponding to the period when he was no longer in the government service should be disallowed in audit without prejudice to his right of recourse against the officials personally liable for his unlawful dismissal." (pp. 15-16, Rollo)

Thus, this recourse by petitioner alleging grave abuse of discretion by COA, which Petition we had previously dismissed in our Resolution of 11 May 1988 as heretofore adverted to.

It appearing, however, that the Compromise Agreement was duly signed by Mayor Alvin Dans as Mayor and as Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, by the Municipal Treasurer, and by the Provincial Fiscal as their lawyer (Motion for Reconsideration, p. 3); that the case was one for reinstatement and backwages; and following the ruling of this

Court in Gementiza vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. Nos. L-41717-33, 113 SCRA 477, April 12, 1982), the Municipality of Isabela should be deemed as impleaded in this case, it being apparent that the officials concerned had been sued in their official capacity. LLpr

"It should be noted that before the Court below, respondents sued petitioner Mayor alone. However, respondents, too, prayed for a Writ of Mandamus to compel petitioner Mayor to reinstate them with back salaries and damages. Respondents, therefore, actually intended to sue petitioner in his official capacity. Failure to implead the Municipality and other municipal authorities should not deter this Court, in the interests of justice and equity, from including them herein as respondents." (at p. 488)

The Compromise Agreement, therefore, must be held binding on the Municipality of Isabela, which was not, in any way, deprived of its day in Court (Gabutas vs. Castellanes, L-17323, 14 SCRA 376, June 23, 1965). Thus, the payments to petitioner of the sums of P68,389.25 as back salaries, P21,387.71 as total accumulated vacation/sick leaves, P772.75 as Christmas bonus, and the back salaries of Mrs. Nanie B. Nunal in the sum of P3,096.00, have to be upheld. It likewise appears that retirement benefits had also been collected by petitioner on 1 April 1985.

In respect, however, of the separation pay claimed by petitioner, we uphold the ruling of the COA reading in part:

"Anent the second issue, this Commission believes and so holds that the instant claim for separation pay in addition to the retirement benefits earlier received by claimant is bereft of any legal basis. Culled from the records is the fact that Mr. Nunal was dismissed from the service on January 29, 1981 and has not been reinstated to the service until his position of Municipal Administrator of Isabela was abolished. In other words, he was no longer in, or had already been separated from, the service when the said position was abolished. Evidently then, his separation from the service was not attributable to the abolition of the position but was due to his dismissal and, therefore, Section 76 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 which provides —

'Section 76. Abolition of Position. — When the position of an official or employee under the civil service is abolished by law or ordinance, the official

or employee so affected shall be reinstated in another vacant position without diminution of salary. Should such position not be available, the official or employee affected shall be granted a separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service over and above the monetary privileges granted to officials and employees under existing law.'cannot be validly invoked as legal basis for the claim for separation pay. Moreover, the fact remains that as earlier seen Mr. Nunal has already been paid his retirement benefits under the existing retirement law. His entitlement, therefore, to separation pay under Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 is offensive to the general policy of the government prohibiting payment of double retirement benefits to an employee." (p. 4, COA Decision No. 388 p. 15, Rollo)

To grant double gratuity is unwarranted (See Cajiuat, et al. vs. Mathay, Sr., G.R. No. L-39743, 124 SCRA 710, September 24, 1983).

It may be that the matter of separation pay was included in the Compromise Agreement. Nonetheless, it could not be granted outright but still had to be claimed and passed in audit, and has been aptly denied by COA. And although petitioner did file suit against the Municipality for reinstatement, it does not follow that he was not effectively dismissed such that he could still be considered an incumbent whose position had been abolished. A dismissed employee can be considered as not having left his office only upon reinstatement and should be given a comparable position and compensation at the time of reinstatement (Cristobal vs. Melchor, No. L-43203, 101 SCRA 857, December 29, 1980). LLjur

Finally, a word on petitioner's contention that the Resolution of this Court under date of 11 May 1988 is not in accordance with Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

"Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any Court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

"No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the Court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor."

In the first place, our "Resolution" of 11 May 1988 was not a "Decision" within the meaning of the Constitutional requirement. This mandate is applicable only in cases "submitted for decision," i.e., given due course and after the filing of Briefs or Memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the case may be. It is not applicable to an Order or Resolution refusing due course to a Petition for Certiorari. In the second place, the assailed Resolution does state the legal basis for the dismissal of the Petition and thus complies with the Constitutional provision. (Tayamura, et al., vs. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 76355, May 21, 1987 [en banc]; see also Que vs. People, G.R. Nos. L-75217-18, 154 SCRA 160, September 21, 1987). llcd

It may be added that the Writ of Certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a prerogative Writ, never demandable as a matter of right, "never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 3d Rev. [8th ed.]; Francisco, The Revised Rules, 1972 ed., Vol. IV-B, pp. 45-46, citing 14 C.J.S., 121-122).

ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of this Court of 11 May 1988 is hereby PARTIALLY RECONSIDERED in that the disallowance by respondent Commission on Audit of the amounts ordered paid by the Court of First Instance of Basilan, Branch I, in its Decision dated 12 December 1984, is hereby SET ASIDE, but its disallowance of petitioner's claim for separation pay of P54,092.50, is hereby SUSTAINED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION[G.R. Nos. 110817-22. June 13, 1997.]THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARCELINO A. BUGARIN, accused-appellant.The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.SYLLABUS1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1987 Constitution; ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14; THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO EXPRESS THEREIN CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED; CASE AT BAR. — We take up first accused-appellant's charge that the decision of the trial court does not state the grounds therefor. Indeed, the Constitution provides in part in Art. VIII, Sec. 14 that "No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." This requirement is reiterated and implemented by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure as provided in Rule 120, Sec. 2. The decision of the trial court falls short of this requirement in at least three respects. First, it does not contain an evaluation of the evidence of the parties and a discussion of the legal questions involved. It does not explain why the trial court considered the complainant's testimony credible despite the fact that, as accused-appellant points out, complainant could not remember the time of the day when she was allegedly raped. It does not explain why accused-appellant's licking of complainant's genital constituted attempted rape and not another crime. Second, the complainant testified that she had been raped five times, to wit, in November 1989, on December 24, 1989, in June 1990, on March 14, 1991, and on December 23, 1991, and that once, on January 17, 1992, she was molested by her father who licked her private part, for which reason six informations were filed against him, but the decision found the accused-appellant guilty of only four counts of rape (which the trial court erroneously said three counts) and one count of attempted rape, without explaining whether accused-appellant was being acquitted of one charge of rape. Third, the decision is so carelessly prepared that it finds the accused-appellant guilty of three counts of consummated rape but sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua "for each of the four counts of . . . rape."

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FUNCTION THEREOF. — The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based serves many functions. It is intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to

the appellate court the findings of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding by ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision. The decision of the trial court in this case disrespects the judicial function. AIaDcH

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J p:

This is an appeal from the decision, 1 dated February 11, 1993, which the Regional Trial Court, Branch 97 of Quezon City rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-28785 to 86 and Q-92-31157 to 31160, finding accused-appellant Marcelino Bugarin guilty of four counts of consummated rape and one count of attempted rape and sentencing him as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged of multiple (3 Counts) rape and one count of attempted rape, and in accordance with Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code sentences him to prison terms as follows:

1) For each of the four counts of the above rape, reclusion perpetua.

2) For the attempted rape, two (2) years and four (4) months in the minimum penalty to four (4) years in the maximum period and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and exemplary damages of P50,000.00 to deter sexual crimes of the sort committed by accused.

SO ORDERED.

The complainant, Maryjane Bugarin, is the daughter of accused-appellant. On February 22, 1992, accompanied by her mother, Regina Bugarin, and her maternal aunt, Nena Padecio, she complained to the Central Police District Command that she had been repeatedly raped by accused-appellant. In her sworn statement she related how, on nine different occasions between November 1989 and January 17, 1992, her father

entered the common sleeping area of their house in Payatas, Quezon City and, after holding her knees and spreading her legs, succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina and kissed her breasts. She claimed that, on January 17, 1992, her father molested her by "kissing her vagina" and that only by repeatedly kicking him did he desist from molesting her any further. cdasia

Complainant was examined on the same date by Emmanuel I. Aranas, PNP Medico-Legal Officer, who found that she was "in non-virgin state physically." 2 On February 25, 1992, she returned to the police station to file formal charges against her father. The case was referred to the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor which found probable cause and accordingly filed charges for consummated rape and attempted rape by means of force and intimidation committed on December 23, 1991 and January 17, 1992 against accused-appellant Marcelino Bugarin. No bail was recommended "considering that the evidence of guilt of the respondent is strong." The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-28785 and Q-92-28786 and raffled to Branch 88 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court.

On May 7, 1992, four more charges for rape by means of force and intimidation committed on November 1989, May 1990, June 1990, and March 14, 1991 were filed against accused-appellant. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-31157 to 31160, the additional cases were raffled to Branch 97 of the same court. These cases were eventually consolidated and assigned to Branch 88.

The informations in the six cases alleged as follows:

Crim. Case No. 92-31157

That on or about the month of June 1990 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned MARY JANE BUGARIN y ASUNCION, a minor, 15 years of age, without her consent and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.

The crime was attended by the aggravating circumstance of relationship.

Crim.. Case No. 92-31158

That on or about the month of November, 1989 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the undersigned MARY JANE BUGARIN y ASUNCION without her consent and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.



That on or about the 14th day of March, 1991 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned MARYJANE BUGARIN y ASUNCION, a minor, 15 years of age, without her consent and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.



That on or about the month of May 1990 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned MARYJANE BUGARIN y ASUNCION, a minor, 15 years of age, without her consent and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.



That on or about the 17th day of January, 1992, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Rape directly by overt acts, by then and there kissing the nipples and the vagina of the undersigned MARYJANE BUGARIN Y ASUNCION, a minor, and about to lay on top of her,

all against her will, however, the said accused did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Rape by reason of some causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is, undersigned complainant push him away, to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the New Civil Code.


That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1991, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned MARYJANE BUGARIN Y ASUNCION, a minor, without her consent and against her will, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the New Civil Code

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty in each case, after which trial ensued. Under questioning by the prosecutor, Maryjane Bugarin narrated how her father sexually assaulted her in their family's common sleeping area while no one was at home and threatened her if she told anyone about what happened.

Accused-appellant denied the charges against him. He claimed to be God fearing and morally upright and that his wife, Regina Bugarin, must have induced their daughter to file the complaints against him because his wife blamed him for financially neglecting their family since 1989.

In rebuttal, the prosecution presented Regina Bugarin who testified that a good mother would not expose her child to humiliation just to get back at her husband. She further claimed that her daughter, who had been raised properly and taught to be honest, could not have fabricated the charges against the accused-appellant. aisadc

In a two-page decision, promulgated on February 11, 1993, the trial court, after giving a summary of the testimonies of the complainant and accused-appellant, laconically ruled:

The issue is simple. Is the private complainant credible in her story of how she was raped? The answer of this Court is an undoubtful and a definite yes.

Accused-appellant questions the trial court's decision on the ground that: (1) the testimony of Maryjane Bugarin is not credible; (2) the elements of force and intimidation had not been proved; and (3) the decision of the trial court does not state the facts and law upon which it was based.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General, representing the prosecution, contends that complainant, who was only 15 years old when she reported the crime, was not likely to concoct charges against her father and that the moral ascendancy of the father over her took the place of force and intimidation in rape.

We take up first accused-appellant's charge that the decision of the trial court does not state the grounds therefor. Indeed, the Constitution provides in part in Art. VIII, §14 that "No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." This requirement is reiterated and implemented by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides in Rule 120, §2:

Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgment. — The judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.

If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there are any; (b) the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has been reserved or waived.

In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended party.

The decision of the trial court falls short of this requirement in at least three respects. First, it does not contain an evaluation of the evidence of the parties and a discussion of the legal questions involved. It does not explain why the trial court considered the complainant's testimony credible despite the fact that, as accused-appellant points out, complainant could not remember the time of the day when she was allegedly raped. It does not explain why accused-appellant's licking of complainant's genital constituted attempted rape and not another crime. Second, the complainant testified that she had been raped five times, to wit, in November 1989, on December 24, 1989, in June 1990, on March 14, 1991, and on December 23, 1991, and that once, on January 17, 1992, she was molested by her father who licked her private part, for which reason six informations were filed against him, but the decision found the accused-appellant guilty of only four counts of rape (which the trial court erroneously said three counts) and one count of attempted rape, without explaining whether accused-appellant was being acquitted of one charge of rape. Third, the decision is so carelessly prepared that it finds the accused-appellant guilty of three counts of consummated rape but sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua "for each of the four counts of . . . rape."

Maryjane claimed she had been raped on December 24, 1989, but the information in Criminal Case No. Q-92-31160 is for rape allegedly committed in May 1990. It must be for this reason that the trial court convicted accused-appellant of only four counts of rape, instead of five. But the trial court should have explained so, if this was really the reason, and expressly acquitted the accused-appellant of the charge under this information.

The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based serves many functions. It is intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the findings of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding by ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public

confidence in the justness of his decision. The decision of the trial court in this case disrespects the judicial function.

We would normally remand this case to the trial court for compliance with the constitutional requirement for decisions. But this case has been pending for sometime and further delay can be avoided if the Court simply reviews the whole evidence. After all, the records of the trial court contain the transcript of stenographic notes, the complainant's sworn statement dated February 22, 1992, the resolution of the prosecutor, and the statement of the arresting officer, on the basis of which the Court may properly decide the case. 3 For this reason the Court has decided to review this case despite the failure of the trial court to make detailed findings of facts and a statement of the reasons underlying its decision. lexlib

Now it is settled that when the complainant in a rape case, more so if she is a minor, 4 testifies that she has been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to prove the commission of the crime. 5 Care must be taken, however, that her testimony is credible for a conviction to be justified based on her testimony alone. 6 In this case, Maryjane Bugarin testified on November 25, 1992 7 as follows:

Q On November 1989, was your father residing with you or was he living with you?A Yes, sir.Q Now, on November, 1989 do you remember any unusual incident that happened, if any?A Yes, sir, when he entered the room.Q When you say "he," are you referring to Marcelino Bugarin?A Yes, sir.Q If Marcelino Bugarin is present today, would you be able to identify him?A Yes, sir. (witness is pointing to a man wearing a green t-shirt who answers by the name Marcelino Bugarin when asked by the Court).Q On November 1989, you were mentioning that "he", referring to the accused, entered your room, what happened?A (witness crying) When he entered the room, he embraced me and touched the different parts of my body and he informed me that when I grow up, I would not become innocent.Q What do you mean by those words that he told you that when you grow up you would not be innocent?A So that when I grow up I will know what he will be doing.Q What did he do?A He touched my knees and spread them out and then holding my breast and he put his sex organ inside meQ When you say inside me, what do you mean?

A His sex organ entered my what, I am fertile.Q What do you mean by what?A My sex organ, sir.Q What did you do when your father tried to put his sex organ to your sex organ?A I was trying to push his body away from me, and I said to him, father, I don't like it, ayoko po.Q Despite your pleas, what happened next?A He still continued what he is doing, and when I fainted, he suddenly moved backQ After he moved back, what transpired afterwards?A He went out and I was left crying.Q After this first incident were there any other similar incident which happened, if any?A There are, sir, but I can't recall when.Q How many times more or less?A Around four (4) times.Q After November 1989?A Including November 1989.Q How about on December 24, 1989, do you remember where you were?A Yes, sir. I was in our house.Q Do you remember any unusual or extraordinary incident that happened on December 24, 1989?A Yes, sir. It is the same thing, that he did to me.Q Please explain what the same thing he do to you?A He embraced and kissed me on my cheek, my neck and also my breast.Q What happened next?A He was spreading my legs.Q Then after spreading your legs, what did the accused do?A He let his sex organ touched my sex organ.Q After that, what happened next?A I cried again.Q When you cried again, what did your father do, if any?A His face became scaring.Q Now, after December 24, 1989 incident, do you remember where you were sometime in June 1990?A I was in our house.Q Specifically, in June of 1990, do you remember any unusual incident that happened?A The same thing happened, over and over.Q What do you mean by the same thing happened, over and over?A He would embraced me and then kissed me and touched my breast and kissed my nipples.Q And, besides in embracing, kissing and kissing your nipples, what else did your father do on June 1990?A He kissed also my sex organ.

Q Beside kissing your sex organ, what else did he do, if any?A He placed inside my sex organ his sex organ.Q In March 14, 1991, where were you?A I was also in our house.Q Do you remember what happened, if any, On March 14, 1991?A That's it again, I was in the room and again he embraced me made me lie down then kiss my sex organ and then, he placed again his sex organ inside my sex organ.Q How about December 23, 1991, do you remember where you were?A I was also in the house.Q What happened?A I was lying down and he lied there beside me and told me to accede to his desire.Q What do you mean to accede to his desire?A He wanted to use me again.Q Then, he actually used you?A Yes, sir.Q Now, on January 17, 1992, do you remember where you were?A I was also in our house.Q Would you kindly tell what happened in your house on this day?A He licked my sex organ.Q After that, what did he do next?A He was threatening me.Q What did you do when he threatened you?A I was so afraid. (witness is crying)Q What did the accused do after threatening you?A He was doing nothing. He was just walking beside me.Q What happened after you saw him walking just beside you on that date?A None, sir. I was just crying

The accused-appellant claims that Maryjane's testimony contains inconsistencies which indicate that the charges against him were fabricated. He points to the failure of complainant on cross-examination to state in some instances the exact date and time she was allegedly raped, and to the fact that it took complainant two years before reporting the incidents and that the prosecution did not present the medico-legal officer who examined the complainant. Accused-appellant also claims that no evidence was adduced to prove that the rape was committed by force and intimidation.

The failure of the complainant to state in some cases the exact date and time of the commission of rape is a minor matter and can be expected when a witness is recounting the details of a

humiliating experience which are painful and difficult to recall in open court and in the presence of other people. 8 Indeed, this Court has ruled that complainant's failure to recall some details of the crime, instead of suggesting prevarication, precisely indicates spontaneity and is to be expected from a witness who is of tender age and unaccustomed to court proceedings.

Besides, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime. 9 The precise time of the crime has no substantial bearing on its commission, 10especially since in this case the date and time of the commission of the crime is not material to the accused-appellant's defense. Indeed, accused-appellant's contention is only that he could not have raped his daughter in the common bedroom at nighttime because the place where they sleep is shut off from the rest of their house by a curtain.

Suffice it to state that lust is no respecter of time and place. 11 Our cases record instances of rape committed inside family dwellings when other occupants are asleep. 12In the case at bar, Maryjane testified that the accused-appellant was able to rape her by sending out her siblings to play with their neighbors' children, and while her mother was at work from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. Complainant explained her apparent inability to recall the exact dates of the assaults upon her, thus:

Q Madam witness, you mentioned that you were raped sometime November 1989, June 1990, December 24, 1989, March 14, 1991, December 23, 1991, how come that you knew very well the date as December 24, March 14, December 23; or rather, how come that your complaint is only sometime in the early part of 1991?A I remember because that was closed to the birthday of my brother.Q How about March 14, how come you knew very well that you were molested by your father?A Because at that time, our class will almost end and we were given clearances.Q What day is your last school day?A I cannot remember. sir.Q Is it usual that you knew very well March 14, and you do not know very well your last day of your school day?A Because March 14 is our clearance

Neither does the delay in making a criminal accusation impair the credibility of a witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained. 13 In People v. Coloma, 14 where the complainant was also only 13 years old when first molested by her father, the Court adverted to the father's moral and physical control

over the young complainant in explaining the delay of eight years before the complaint against her father was made. In this case, Maryjane must have been overwhelmed by fear and confusion, and shocked that her own father had defiled her. After all, she had been very close to him. She also testified that she was afraid to tell her mother because the latter might be angered, so that she finally confided to her aunt. Indeed, a survey conducted by the University of the Philippines Center for Women's Studies showed that victims of rape committed by their fathers took much longer in reporting the incidents to the authorities than did other victims. Many factors account for this difference: the fact that the father lives with the victim and constantly exerts moral authority over her, the threat he might make against her, the victim's fear of her mother and other relatives.

Nor is it entirely true that no evidence of force and intimidation had been adduced during the trial. Maryjane testified that she tried to resist her father's advances but, on several occasions, she was overpowered by him. She was embraced and thus prevented from escaping. 15 At other times she was intimidated by menacing looks cast on her 16 and by threats of harm. 17 Indeed, even if there was no violence or force employed against her, the moral influence of accused-appellant over the complainant sufficed to make the crime rape. 18

Nor is a medical examination an indispensable element in prosecutions for rape. 19 That the prosecution did not present the medico-legal officer is, therefore, not an obstacle to a finding of guilt in this case.

We think the evidence in this case proves beyond all reasonable doubt that Maryjane had been raped on four occasions by accused-appellant: November 1989, June 1990, March 14, 1991, and December 23, 1991. Complainant has no motive to incriminate her father. To the contrary, she testified that she was close to him. The absence of a motive lends greater credence to her testimony. 20 Neither does her mother have any reason to falsely accuse Marcelino Bugarin. Regina Bugarin suspected her husband of having an affair with her sister in 1980 and confronted him, but she continued to live with him. This fact makes it unlikely that she would use her daughter to destroy her husband more than ten years later. A mother would not expose her child to public trial, if the charges she makes are not true. 21

We find no evidence, however, to find accused-appellant guilty of the charge in Criminal Case No. Q-92-31160 for alleged rape committed in May 1990. There is no evidence to prove that accused-appellant raped complainant on that date. Her testimony is to the effect that she was raped on another date, December 24, 1989. But accused-appellant cannot be convicted for this as no complaint was formally filed regarding it. Accused-appellant must accordingly be acquitted of the charge in Criminal Q-92-31160.

Nor do we think that accused-appellant is guilty of attempted rape committed on January 17, 1992 as the trial court held. Maryjane testified:

Q Now, on January 17, 1992, do you remember where you were?A I was also in our house.Q Would you kindly tell what happened in your house on this day?A He licked my sex organ.Q After that, what did he do next?A He was threatening me.Q What did you do when he threatened you?A I was so afraid. (witness is crying)Q What did the accused do after threatening you?A He was doing nothing. He was just walking beside me.Q What happened after you saw him walking just beside you on that date?A None, sir. I was just crying.

The intent to commit rape is not apparent from the act described. It cannot be inferred from this act (licking complainant's genital) alone that his intention was to have sexual intercourse with her because it has not been shown that he had at least placed himself on top of the complainant. 22 The act imputed to him cannot be considered a preparatory act to sexual intercourse. 23 Accused-appellant is instead guilty of acts of lasciviousness. It can at least be inferred from his act of kissing the genital of the complainant that he was moved by lewd designs. 24

Although relationship, as an aggravating circumstance, is alleged only in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-31157 to 31160, this circumstance was nonetheless proved during the trial in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28785 and, therefore, should also be appreciated in that case to justify the imposition of the penalty in its maximum period. cda

WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 11, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is SET ASIDE and another

one is RENDERED finding accused-appellant Marcelino Bugarin GUILTY of four counts of consummated rape in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-28786, Q-92-31157, Q-92-31158, and Q-92-31159 and SENTENCED toreclusion perpetua and ORDERED to INDEMNIFY the complainant Maryjane Bugarin in the amount of P30,000.00 in damages for each count of rape committed; and of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28785, for which he is SENTENCED to suffer imprisonment from 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six 6 years of prision correccional, as maximum.

In Criminal Case No. Q-92-31160, accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ ., concur.

||| (People v. Bugarin, G.R. Nos. 110817-22, June 13, 1997)

FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 104874. December 14, 1993.]DANILO HERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.Marcelo Y. Hernandez for petitioner.The Solicitor General for People of the Philippines.

SYLLABUS

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; DECISION SHOULD STATE FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED; NO PROSCRIPTION AGAINST COURT'S ADOPTION OF NARRATION OF FACTS MADE IN BRIEFS OR MEMORANDA OF PARTIES. — In its decision the Court of Appeals merely stated: "The facts of the case as summarized in the Appellee's Brief are as follows:" and then quoted in full the statement of facts of the Solicitor General. According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals did not make its own "independent judicial opinion" by such act of adopting the statement of facts made by the advance party. What the Court of Appeals, in effect, said was that it found the facts as presented by the Solicitor General as supported by the evidence. The constitutional mandate only requires that the decision should state the facts on which it is based. There is no proscription against the court's adoption of the narration of facts made in the briefs or memoranda of the parties, instead of rewriting the same in its own words. Precisely, briefs or memoranda are required in order to aid the courts in the writing of decisions.

D E C I S I O N

QUIASON, J p:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 05877, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, FINDING the decision appealed from to be in accordance with law and the evidence, the same is hereby AFFIRMED except as to Criminal Case No. 21-87 where, for reasons above discussed, the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED" (Rollo, p. 33).

CA-G.R. No. 05877 was an appeal by petitioner from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cavite City in Criminal Cases Nos. 21-87 to 29-87, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: cdll

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds Danilo Hernandez guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the following cases: Crim. Case No. 21-87, for Estafa and he is hereby ordered sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum to Twenty (20) years ofreclusion temporal, as maximum and to pay the offended party Remedios de Leon in the amount of P150,000.00 corresponding to the value of jewelries embezzled and unreturned and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 22-87, for Estafa, he is hereby ordered sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to pay the offended party Remedios de Leon in the amount of P100,000.00 for the value of the jewelries embezzled and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 23-87, Violation of BP 22, he is hereby sentenced to eight (8) months of prision correccional and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 24-87, for Viol. of BP 22, he is hereby sentenced to eight (8) months of prision correccional and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 25-87, for Estafa, he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to pay the offended party Remedios de Leon in the amount of P250,000.00 for the value of the jewelries embezzled and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 26-87, for Viol. of BP 22, he is hereby sentenced to eight (8) months of prision correccional and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 27-87, for Estafa, he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to pay the offended party Remedios de Leon in the amount of P280,000.00 for the value of the jewelries embezzled and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 28-87, for Estafa, he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to pay the offended party Remedios de Leon in the amount of P100,000.00 value of the jewelries embezzled and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 29-87, for Viol. of BP 22, he is hereby sentenced to eight (8) months

of prision correccional, and to pay the costs" (Rollo, pp. 49-50). cdrep

It appears that sometime in August 1986, petitioner was introduced to Remedios de Leon by his aunt, as one engaged in the business of buying and selling jewelry (TSN, March 17, 1987, pp. 18, 20).

In their first transaction, petitioner paid in cash the several pieces of jewelry which he bought from de Leon. In their subsequent dealings, petitioner either paid in cash or by way of postdated checks (TSN, March 17, 1987, pp. 22-23). On one occasion, petitioner issued post-dated checks with the aggregate amount of P275,000.00. These checks bounced. However, upon notice of dishonor by the drawee banks concerned, petitioner paid de Leon cash in exchange for the dishonored checks. Some checks were likewise exchanged with cash even prior to their due date (TSN, March 17, 1987, pp. 33, 37).

Several days before October 20, 1986, petitioner told de Leon that he was interested in buying some more pieces of jewelry (TSN, March 17, 1987, p. 60). On that date, at around 10:00 A.M., petitioner, together with his common-law wife, Rosemarie Rodriguez, and two other companions, went to the house of de Leon in Cavite City (TSN, March 17, 1987, p. 70). Petitioner selected a pair of 2-carat diamond earrings worth P150,000.00 for which he issued BPI Check No. 798246 payable to "cash" in the said amount and post-dated it to October 26, 1986. The amount of the check was filled in by Rosemarie Rodriguez and petitioner affixed his signature as drawer (TSN, March 17, 1987, p. 69).

Petitioner and Rodriguez returned to de Leon's house at about 7:00 P.M. and bought one choker with 20 diamond stones and one bracelet with 16 diamond stones, for which he issued BPI Check No. 798247 payable to "cash" in the amount of P250,000.00 and postdated it to October 27, 1986. Petitioner specifically instructed de Leon to give him one week to confer with his buyer before de Leon negotiates the check. The check was also prepared by Rodriguez and signed by petitioner (TSN, March 17, 1987, pp. 73-79). Cdpr

In the evening of October 22, 1986, petitioner again went to the house of de Leon and bought one heart-shaped diamond set. In payment thereof, he issued BPI Check No. 798248 payable to "cash" in the amount of P280,000.00 and post-dated it to November 9, 1986 (TSN, March 17, 1987, pp. 84-89).

On October 23, 1983, petitioner made a long-distance call to de Leon and inquired whether she still had jewelry for sale. When she said that she did, petitioner made an appointment with her. Petitioner arrived at de Leon's house at around 2:30 P.M. The two went to a restaurant, where petitioner selected a set of earrings and a ring, each piece with a 1-carat diamond (TSN, March 31, 1987, pp. 15-16). In payment for the set, petitioner issued to de Leon BPI Check No. 798250 payable to "cash" in the amount of P100,000.00 and dated that same day (October 23, 1992). Petitioner told de Leon that the check was funded and that she could even withdraw the amount on that day. De Leon did not encash the check for the bank was closed (TSN, March 31, 1987, pp. 16, 19).

In the evening of October 24, 1986, petitioner with Rodriguez went to de Leon's house and bought a 5-carat diamond piece. In payment thereof, petitioner indorsed to de Leon ASB Check No. 245964 in the amount of P150,000.00 post-dated to November 10, 1986 and issued by one Enrique Araneta (TSN, March 31, 1987, pp. 21-26).

BPI Checks Nos. 798246, 798247 and 798250 were drawn against insufficient funds, while BPI Check No. 798248 and ASB Check No. 245964 were drawn against a closed account. Cdpr

Petitioner was charged in nine informations with estafa and violation of B. P. Blg. 22.

At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges (Rollo, pp. 16-17).

After a joint trial, petitioner was convicted of the nine charges in a joint decision.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the conviction of petitioner was affirmed as to Criminal Cases Nos. 22-87, 23-87, 24-87, 25-87, 26-87, 27-87, 28-87, and 29-87, and reversed as to Criminal Case No. 21-87.

In this petition, petitioner claims that his conviction of nine distinct offenses subject of nine separate informations in a single judgment is reversible error. This contention is untenable.

The case of United States v. Tanjuatco, 1 Phil. 116, relied upon by petitioner, is distinguishable from the instant case. In Tanjuatco, we held that the trial court improperly rendered a single judgment for two offenses in one of the two criminal cases, in the absence of a consolidation of the two cases. In the case at bench, the trial court rendered a judgment for each of the nine separate informations, albeit in the same decision.

We further stated in Tanjuatco that the trial court violated "an essential right of the accused, inasmuch as he is entitled, although accused of two offenses, to a trial in each of the two cases upon the proofs adduced in each individual case, and upon the allegations set forth in each information. It is not permissible to take into account or consider in one case the facts proved in the other, and vice versa" (at pp. 117-118). Cdpr

The trial of the nine criminal cases was conducted jointly without any objection from petitioner. Even had he signified his opposition to the joint trial, such opposition would have been unavailing. A consolidation of trials, at the court's discretion, is allowed in "charges for offenses founded on the same facts, or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character" (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 119, Sec. 14).

Petitioner also complains that while he assigned eight errors, the Court of Appeals did not make a complete findings of fact as to the last two assigned errors (Rollo, pp. 11-12).

In the last two assigned errors, petitioner claims that the trial court erred:

VII

"IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 21-87 TO 29-87 NOTWITHSTANDING ABSENCE OF INCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND PRESENCE OF NUMEROUS PROOFS NEGATING THE SOUNDNESS OF SUCH VERDICT.

VIII

IN PRONOUNCING THE ACCUSED, THROUGH A SINGLE JUDGMENT, GUILTY OF ALL THE NINE DISTINCT OFFENSES COVERED BY THE NINE SEPARATE INFORMATIONS SUBJECT MATTER OF CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 21-87 TO 29-87, INCLUSIVE" (Rollo, p. 56).

Obviously, the Court of Appeals did not deem it necessary to make a separate findings of fact for said assigned errors, because they were just the necessary consequences of the previous, assigned errors. cdphil

Petitioner next questions: (i) as violative of the constitutional mandate that decisions shall contain the facts and the law on which they are based (1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par. 1), the decision of the Court of Appeals which merely adopted

the statement of facts of the Solicitor General in the appellee's brief, and (ii) as violative of the constitutional mandate requiring that any denial of a motion for reconsideration must state the legal basis thereof (1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par. 2), the denial of his motion for reconsideration on the basis of a comparison of said motion with the "comment thereon" (Rollo, pp. 10-12).

In its decision the Court of Appeals merely stated: "The facts of the case as summarized in the Appellee's Brief are as follows:" and then quoted in full the statement of facts of the Solicitor General (Rollo, p. 20). According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals did not make its own "independent judicial opinion" by such act of adopting the statement of facts made by the advance party (Rollo, p. 11).

What the Court of Appeals, in effect, said was that it found the facts as presented by the Solicitor General as supported by the evidence. The constitutional mandate only requires that the decision should state the facts on which it is based. There is no proscription against the court's adoption of the narration of facts made in the briefs or memoranda of the parties, instead of rewriting the same in its own words.

Precisely, briefs or memoranda are required in order to aid the courts in the writing of decisions.

We note that aside from adopting the statement of facts of the Solicitor General, the Court of Appeals also made findings of fact in the course of its discussion of the assignment of errors.

As to the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals stated in its Resolution dated March 30, 1992: LLjur

"Acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused-appellant of the decision dated December 13, 1991 and the comment thereon of the Solicitor General, the court finds no cogent reason that could justify a modification or reversal of the decision sought to be reconsidered.

Accordingly, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit" (Rollo, p. 35).

The denial, therefore, was based on the ground that the Court of Appeals did not find any "cogent reason that could justify a modification or reversal of the decision sought to be reconsidered.".

Petitioner claims that the decision of the trial court is not supported by the evidence, which is contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals that said decision is "in accordance with law and the evidence" (Rollo, p. 12). He points out that the appellate court should not have believed the trial court's conclusion that "the sole testimony of the offended party would have sufficed to sustain her assertions" (Rollo, p. 47). He claims that self-serving declarations of a party favorable to himself are not admissible and that none of the alleged witnesses to the transactions were presented.

The common objection known as "self-serving" is not correct because almost all testimonies are self-serving. The proper basis for objection is "hearsay" (Wenke, Making and Meeting Objections, 69).

Petitioner fails to take into account the distinction between self-serving statements and testimonies made in court. Self-serving statements are those made by a party out of court advocating his own interest; they do not include a party's testimony as a witness in court (National Development Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 19 SCRA 861 [1967]). LexLib

Self-serving statements are inadmissible because the adverse party is not given the opportunity for cross-examination, and their admission would encourage fabrication of testimony. This cannot be said of a party's testimony in court made under oath, with full opportunity on the part of the opposing party for cross-examination.

It is not true that none of the alleged witnesses to the transactions was presented in court (Rollo, p. 13). Yolanda Dela Rosa, an eye-witness to some of the transactions, testified for the prosecution. Assuming that Dela Rosa was not presented as a witness, the testimony of de Leon sufficed to sustain the conviction of petitioner. The conviction of an accused may be on the basis of the testimony of a single witness (People v. Rumeral, 200 SCRA 194 [1991]). In determining the value and credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not counted (People v. Villalobos, 209 SCRA 304 [1992]).

Petitioner also contends that while he was condemned by the trial court to pay civil indemnity, no evidence was actually presented in court to prove the existence, ownership and worth of the pieces of jewelry other than the checks (Rollo, p. 14).

The existence of the jewelry was established by de Leon herself, who testified that petitioner even selected the pieces of jewelry before buying them.

As to the ownership of the jewelry, we held in People v. Dy, 109 SCRA 400 (1981) that:

"Ownership is not a necessary element of the crime of estafa . . . In estafa, the person prejudiced or the immediate victim of the fraud need not be the owner of the goods. Thus, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides that 'Any person who shall defraud another (it does not say 'owner') by any means mentioned herein below shall be punished . . . .' All that is necessary is that the loss should have fallen on someone other than the perpetrators of the crime . . ." (at p. 408). llcd

The trial court based the civil indemnity on the actual price of the jewelry as agreed upon by petitioner and de Leon at the time of the transactions and this is reflected by the face value of the checks.

Petitioner further contends that the trial court erred in admitting the checks in evidence without the prosecution first proving that his signatures on the checks were authentic (Rollo, pp. 13-14). If petitioner claims that his signatures on the checks were forged, the burden is on him to prove such fact. He who alleges must prove his allegations.

In the trial court, petitioner presented a certification issued by the San Juan Police Station to the effect that he reported as lost several blank checks, to wit: BPI Checks Nos. 798246, 798247, 798248, 798249, and 798250, and AB Check No. 245964. We agree with the trial court when it gave little weight to the certification. Like the trial court, we wonder why petitioner never filed a criminal case against de Leon, if said checks were really stolen.

Lastly, petitioner contends that because "the amounts covered by the checks were deposited by the offended party in her savings account with the Prudential Bank, it becomes the liability of the bank by its acceptance to pay for the amounts of the checks" (Rollo, pp. 14-15). LexLib

The case of Banco de Oro v. Equitable Banking Corporation, 157 SCRA 188 (1988) cited by petitioner as authority, dealt with the negligence of a collecting bank which facilitated the payment by the drawee bank of the value of a check with a

forged endorsement and signature of the payee. No such issue is involved in the case at bench.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo, JJ ., concur.

||| (Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104874, December 14, 1993)

FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 132428. October 24, 2000.]GEORGE YAO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.Arturo S. Santos for petitioner.The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner was convicted with the crime of unfair competition in the MeTC. Later, he filed an appeal to the RTC where Judge Angeles affirmed the conviction quoting in his decision the dispositive portion of the MeTC decision and then stated, "after going over the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the MeTC." Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision but the same was denied. On the last day of the period allowed by law to perfect an appeal, petitioner filed a notice of appeal instead of the required petition for review with the Court of Appeals. This, appellate court dismissed; and when petitioner finally filed a petition for review on certiorari, the same was also dismissed.

Since petitioner never instituted the correct mode appeal on time, he lost his right to appeal. Nevertheless, the Court has noted that the decision of the RTC affirming the conviction of petitioner palpably transgressed Section 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution which requires that court decisions clearly and distinctly state the facts and law on which the decision was based. Hence, the resolution of the Court of Appeals was set aside and the decision of the RTC nullified. The records of the case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings and for the rendition of judgment in accordance with Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution.

SYLLABUS3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; COURT'S DECISION MUST CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY EXPRESS THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED. — [T]he decision of the RTC affirming the conviction of YAO palpably transgressed Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which states: Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. . . [The Court has] sustained decisions of lower courts as having substantially or sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction notwithstanding the laconic and terse manner in which they were written and even if "there (was left) much to be desired in terms of (their) clarity, coherence and comprehensibility" provided that they eventually set out the facts and the law on which they were based, as when they stated the legal qualifications of the

offense constituted by the facts proved, the modifying circumstances, the participation of the accused, the penalty imposed and the civil liability; or discussed the facts comprising the elements of the offense that was charged in the information, and accordingly rendered a verdict and imposed the corresponding penalty; or quoted the facts narrated in the prosecution's memorandum but made their own findings and assessment of evidence, before finally agreeing with the prosecution's evaluation of the case. [The Court has] also sanctioned the use of memorandum decisions, a specie of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in accordance with the provisions of Section 40, B.P. Blg. 129 on the grounds of expediency, practicality, convenience and docket status of our courts. [The Court has] also declared that memorandum decisions comply with the constitutional mandate. In Francisco v. Permskul, however, [the Court] laid down the conditions for the validity of memorandum decisions . . . Tested against these standards, [the Court] find[s] that the RTC decision at bar miserably failed to meet them and, therefore, fell short of the constitutional injunction. The RTC decision is brief indeed, but it is starkly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in its form. It achieved nothing and attempted at nothing, not even at a simple summation of facts which could easily be done. Its inadequacy speaks for itself. [The Court] cannot even consider or affirm said RTC decision as a memorandum decision because it failed to comply with the measures of validity laid down in Francisco v. Permskul. It merely affirmed in toto the MeTC decision without saying more. A decision or resolution, especially one resolving an appeal, should directly meet the issues for resolution; otherwise, the appeal would be pointless.

4. ID.; ID.; ADHERENCE TO CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF DECISIONS, RATIONALE. — [The Court] reiterates its our admonition in Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, in that while it conceded that brevity in the writing of decisions is an admirable trait, it should not and cannot be substituted for substance; and again in Francisco v. Permskul, where the Court cautioned that expediency alone, no matter how compelling, cannot excuse non-compliance with the constitutional requirements. This is not to discourage the lower courts to write abbreviated and concise decisions, but never at the expense of scholarly analysis, and more significantly, of justice and fair play, lest the fears expressed by Justice Feria as the ponente in Romero v. Court of Appeals come true, i.e., if an appellate court failed to provide the appeal the attention it rightfully deserved, said court deprived the appellant of due process since he was not accorded a fair opportunity to be heard by a fair and

responsible magistrate. This situation becomes more ominous in criminal cases, as in this case, where not only property rights are at stake but also the liberty if not the life of a human being. Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision. .D E C I S I O N

DAVIDE, JR., C.J p:In this petition for review on certiorari, George Yao (hereafter YAO) assails the 25 April 1995 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16893 which dismissed his appeal and ordered the remand of the records of the case to the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 52, Caloocan * City (hereafter MeTC) for execution. YAO was convicted by said MeTC for unfair competition.YAO's legal dilemma commenced in June 1990 when the Philippine Electrical Manufacturing Company (hereafter PEMCO) noticed the proliferation locally of General Electric (GE) lamp starters. As the only local subsidiary of GE-USA, PEMCO knew that it was a highly unlikely market situation considering that no GE starter was locally manufactured or imported since 1983. PEMCO commissioned Gardsmarks, Inc. to conduct a market survey. Gardsmarks, Inc., thru its trademark specialist, Martin Remandaman, discovered that thirty (30) commercial establishments sold GE starters. All

these establishments pointed to Tradeway Commercial Corporation (hereafter TCC) as their source. Remandaman was able to purchase from TCC fifty (50) pieces of fluorescent lamp starters with the GE logo and design. Assessing that these products were counterfeit, PEMCO applied for the issuance of a search warrant. This was issued by the MeTC, Branch 49, Caloocan City. Eight boxes, each containing 15,630 starters, were thereafter seized from the TCC warehouse in Caloocan City.Indicted before the MeTC, Branch 52, Caloocan City for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code were YAO, who was TCC's President and General Manager, and Alfredo Roxas, a member of TCC's Board of Directors. The indictment 1 charged YAO and Roxas of having mutually and in conspiracy sold fluorescent lamp starters which have the General Electric (GE) logo, design and containers, making them appear as genuine GE fluorescent lamp starters; and inducing the public to believe them as such, when they were in fact counterfeit. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-155713.Both accused pleaded not guilty. At the trial, the prosecution presented evidence tending to establish the foregoing narration of facts. Further, the State presented witnesses Atty. Hofilena of the Castillo Laman Tan and Pantaleon Law Offices who underwent a familiarization seminar from PEMCO in 1990 on how to distinguish a genuine GE starter from a counterfeit, and Allan de la Cruz, PEMCO's marketing manager. Both described a genuine GE starter as having "a stenciled silk-screen printing which includes the GE logo . . . back to back around the starter, a drumlike glowbulb and a condenser/capacitor shaped like an M&M candy with the numbers .006." They then compared and examined random samples of the seized starters with the genuine GE products. They concluded that the seized starters did not possess the full design complement of a GE original. They also observed that some of the seized starters did not have capacitors or if they possessed capacitors, these were not shaped like M&M. Still others merely had sticker jackets with prints of the GE logo. Mr. de la Cruz added that only Hankuk Stars of Korea manufactured GE starters and if these were imported by PEMCO, they would cost P7.00 each locally. As TCC's starters cost P1.60 each, the witnesses agreed that the glaring differences in the packaging, design and costs indisputably proved that TCC's GE starters were counterfeit.

The defense presented YAO as its lone witness. YAO admitted that as general manager, he has overall supervision of the daily operation of the company. As such, he has the final word on the particular brands of products that TCC would purchase

and in turn sold. He also admitted that TCC is not an accredited distributor of GE starters. However, he disclaimed liability for the crime charged since (1) he had no knowledge or information that the GE starters supplied to TCC were fake; (2) he had not attended any seminar that helped him determine which TCC products were counterfeit; (3) he had no participation in the manufacture, branding, stenciling of the GE names or logo in the starters; (4) TCC's suppliers of the starters delivered the same already branded and boxed; and (5) he only discussed with the suppliers matters regarding pricing and peak-volume items. EHScCA

In its 13-page 20 October 1993 decision, 2 the MeTC acquitted Roxas but convicted YAO. In acquitting Roxas, the trial court declared that the prosecution failed to prove that he was still one of the Board of Directors at the time the goods were seized. It anchored its conviction of YAO on the following: (1) YAO's admission that he knew that the starters were not part of GE's line products when he applied with PEMCO for TCC's accreditation as distributor; (2) the prosecution's evidence (Exhibit G-7), a delivery receipt dated 25 May 1989 issued by Country Supplier Center, on which a TCC personnel noted that the 2000 starters delivered were GE starters despite the statement therein that they were China starters; this fact gave rise to a presumption that the TCC personnel knew of the anomaly and that YAO as general manager and overall supervisor knew and perpetrated the deception of the public; (3) the fact that no genuine GE starter could be sold from 1986 whether locally manufactured or imported or at the very least in such large commercial quantity as those seized from TCC; and (4) presence of the elements of unfair competition.

The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

For the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused, Alfredo Roxas, of Unfair Competition under Article 189 (1) of the Revised Penal Code . . . i.e., to prove that he was Chairman of the Board of the Tradeway Commercial Corporation on October 10, 1990, as well as to have him identified in open court during the trial, he isacquitted of the same. IaESCH

But because the prosecution proved the guilt of the other accused, George Yao, beyond reasonable doubt as principal under the said Article 189 (1) for Unfair Competition, he is convicted of the same. In the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances alleged/proven, and considering the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is

sentenced to a minimum of four (4) months and twenty-one (21)days of arresto mayor to a maximum of one (1) year and five (5) months of prision correccional.

This case was prosecuted by the law offices of Castillo Laman Tan and Pantaleon for . . . PEMCO . . . Considering that no document was submitted by the private complainant to show how the claim of 300,000 for consequential damages was reached and/or computed, the court is not in a position to make a pronouncement on the whole amount. However, the offender, George Yao, is directed to pay PEMCO the amount of P20,000 by way of consequential damages under Article 2202 of the New Civil Code, and to pay the law offices of Castillo, Laman Tan and Pantaleon the amount of another P20,000.00 as PEMCO's attorney's fees under Article 2208 (11) of the same.

This decision should have been promulgated in open court on July 28, 1993 but the promulgation was reset for August 31, 1993 in view of the absence of parties; it was again re-set for today.

promulgated this 20th day of October, 1993 in Kalookan City, Philippines. 3

YAO filed a motion for reconsideration, which the MeTC denied in its order 4 of 7 March 1994.

YAO appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (RTC). The appeal was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-47255(94) and was assigned to Branch 121 of the court.

On 24 May 1994, Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of Branch 121 issued an order 5 directing the parties to file their respective memoranda.

On 4 July 1994 YAO filed his Appeal Memorandum. 6

Without waiting for the Memorandum on Appeal of the prosecution, which was filed only on 20 August 1994, 7 Judge Adoracion Angeles rendered on 27 July 1994 a one-page Decision 8 which affirmed in toto the MeTC decision. In so doing, she merely quoted the dispositive portion of the MeTC and stated that "[a]fter going over the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Metropolitan Trial Court."

YAO filed a motion for reconsideration 9 and assailed the decision as violative of Section 2, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court. 10 In its order 11 of 28 September 1994, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration as devoid of merit and reiterated that the findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed on appeal unless for strong and cogent reasons.

On 4 October 1994, YAO appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal. 12

The appealed case was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 16893. In its Resolution 13 of 28 February 1995, the Court of Appeals granted YAO an extension of twenty (20) days from 10 February or until 12 March 1995 within which to file the Appellant's Brief. However, on 25 April 1995 the Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution 14 declaring that "[t]he decision rendered on July 27, 1994 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121, has long become final and executory" and ordering the records of the case remanded to said court for the proper execution of judgment. The pertinent portion of the Resolution reads:

In Our resolution, dated February 28, 1995, accused-appellant was granted an extension of twenty (20) days from February 10, 1995, or until March 12, 1995 within which to file appellant's brief.

To date, no appellant's brief has been filed.

From the Manifestation, filed on March 24, 1995, by City Prosecutor Gabriel N. dela Cruz, Kalookan City, it would appear that:

xxx xxx xxx

2. George Yao received a copy of the RTC's decision on August 16, 1994, and filed a motion for reconsideration

on August 30, 1994. On October 3, 1994, George Yao received a copy of the RTC's order, dated September 28,

1994, denying his motion for reconsideration.

3. On October 4, 1994, George Yao filed a notice of appeal by registered mail.

We will assume from the said Manifestation that the decision of the RTC and the order denying YAO's motion for reconsideration were sent to and received by YAO's counsel.

Proceeding from said assumption, Yao had fifteen (15) days from August 16, 1994 to elevate his case to

this Court. On August 30, 1994, or fourteen (14) days thereafter, Yao filed a motion for reconsideration. When he received the Order denying his aforesaid motion on October 3, 1994, he had one more day left to elevate his case to this Court by the proper mode of appeal, which is by petition for review. Yao, however, on October 4, 1994, filed a notice of appeal by registered mail informing the RTC that he is appealing his conviction to the Court of Appeals. By then, the fifteen (15) day period had already elapsed.

That notwithstanding, the Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 121, transmitted to this Court the entire records of the case, thru a transmittal letter, dated October 13, 1994, and received by the Criminal Section of this Court on October 28, 1994. YAO's counsel, on February 20, 1995, filed with this Court, a motion for extension of period to file brief for accused-appellant which was granted in Our resolution mentioned in the opening paragraph of this resolution.

Petitions for review shall be filed within the period to appeal. This period has already elapsed even when Yao filed a notice of appeal by registered mail, with the RTC of Kalookan City. Worse, the notice of appeal is procedurally infirm.

YAO filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment contending that the 25 April 1995 resolution did not specifically dismiss the appeal, for which reason, there was no Judgment on which an entry of judgment could be issued. He also argued that the attendant procedural infirmities in the appeal, if any, were cured with the issuance of the 28 February 1995 resolution granting him twenty (20) days from 10 February 1995 or until 12 March 1995 within which to file an appellant's brief and in compliance thereto, consequently filed his appellant's brief on 2 March 1995. 15

In its Resolution 16 of 26 January 1998, the Court of Appeals denied the Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Entry of Judgment for lack of merit. It considered the 25 April 1995 resolution as having "in effect dismissed the appeal, [hence] the Entry of Judgment issued on May 26, 1995. . . was proper."

In this petition for review on certiorari, YAO reiterates the arguments he raised in his Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Entry of Judgment of the Court of Appeals, thus: (1) that the entry of judgment was improvidently issued in the absence of

a final resolution specifically dismissing the appeal; (2) the procedural infirmity in the appeal, if any, has been cured; and (3) the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying him (YAO) due process of law.

In support of his first argument, YAO cites Section 1, Rule 11 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, thus:

SEC. 1. Entry of Judgment — Unless a motion for reconsideration is filed or an appeal is taken to the Supreme Court, judgments and final resolutions of the Court of Appeals shall be entered upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days after notice to parties.

YAO claims that the 25 April 1995 resolution of the Court of Appeals was not a judgment on his appeal nor was it "a final resolution" contemplated in the Internal Rules since it did not specifically dismiss his appeal. A fortiori, the entry of judgment was improvidently issued for lack of legal basis.

YAO also repeats his argument that any procedural infirmity in the appeal was cured when the RTC gave due course to the appeal, elevated the records to the Court of Appeals which in turn issued on 13 December 1994 a notice to file his Appellant's Brief and granted him until 12 March 1995 within which to file the appellant's brief.

Finally, YAO asserts that he was denied due process considering that (1) none of the elements of unfair competition are present in this case; (2) he filed his appeal to the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period; and (3) notwithstanding his filing of a notice of appeal (instead of a petition for review), it was a mere procedural lapse, a technicality which should not bar the determination of the case based on intrinsic merits. YAO then invokes the plethora of jurisprudence wherein the Supreme Court "in the exercise of equity jurisdiction decided to disregard technicalities"; "decided [the case] on merits and not on technicalities"; "found manifest in the petition strong considerations of substantial justice necessitating the relaxing of the stringent application of technical rules," or "heeded petitioner's cry for justice because the basic merits of the case warrant so, as where the petition embodies justifying circumstances"; discerned "not to sacrifice justice to technicality"; discovered that the application of "res judicata" and estoppel by judgment amount to a denial of justice and/or a bar to a vindication of a legitimate grievance." 17

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that the petition should be dismissed for lack of merit. It maintains

that although the 25 April 1995 resolution did not specifically state that the appeal was being dismissed, the intent and import are clear and unequivocable. It asserts that the appeal was obviously dismissed because the RTC decision has long become final and executory. YAO failed to challenge the RTC decision, within the reglementary period, by filing a petition for review of the same with the Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Instead, he filed an ordinary appeal by way of a notice of appeal. Hence, the period to file the correct procedural remedy had lapsed.

There is no dispute that YAO availed of the wrong procedural remedy in assailing the RTC decision. It is clear from the records that YAO received a copy of the adverse RTC judgment on 16 August 1994. He has fifteen (15) days or until 31 August 1994 within which to file either a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Fourteen (14) days thereafter or on 30 August 1994, YAO opted to file a motion for reconsideration the pendency of which tolled the running of the period. He received a copy of the RTC's order denying the motion for reconsideration on 3 October 1994. He had therefore, only one day left, 4 October 1994 as the last day, within which to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. 18 However, on said date, YAO filed a notice of appeal. He palpably availed of the wrong mode of appeal. And since he never instituted the correct one, he lost it.

The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a statutory privilege of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute. 19 Since the right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process, it may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.20 Corollarily, its requirements must be strictly complied with.

That an appeal must be perfected in the manner and within the period fixed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. 21 Non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal, 22 for it renders the decision sought to be appealed final and executory, 23 with the end result that no court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the decision. 24

In the light of these procedural precepts, YAO's petition appears to be patently without merit and does not deserve a second look. Hence, the reasons he enumerated to persuade this Court to grant his petition and reinstate his appeal are obviously frivolous if not downright trivial. They need not even be discussed here.

In the normal and natural course of events, we should dismiss the petition outright, if not for an important detail which augurs well for YAO and would grant him a reprieve in his legal battle. The decision of the RTC affirming the conviction of YAO palpably transgressed Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which states:

Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

xxx xxx xxx

Let us quote in full the RTC judgment:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 52, Kalookan City, in Crim. Case No. C-155713, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxxBut because the prosecution proved the guilt of the other accused, George Yao, beyond reasonable doubt as principal under the said Article 189 (1) for Unfair Competition, he is convicted of the same. In the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances alleged/proven, and considering the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to a minimum of four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of arresto mayor to a maximum of one (1) year and five (5) months of prision correccional.xxx xxx xxx

After going over the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Metropolitan Trial Court.

WHEREFORE, this Court affirms in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court dated October 20, 1993.

SO ORDERED.

That is all there is to it.

We have sustained decisions of lower courts as having substantially or sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction notwithstanding the laconic and terse manner in which they were written and even if "there (was left) much to be desired in terms of (their) clarity, coherence and comprehensibility" provided that they eventually set out the

facts and the law on which they were based, 25 as when they stated the legal qualifications of the offense constituted by the facts proved, the modifying circumstances, the participation of the accused, the penalty imposed and the civil liability; 26 or discussed the facts comprising the elements of the offense that was charged in the information, and accordingly rendered a verdict and imposed the corresponding penalty; 27 or quoted the facts narrated in the prosecution's memorandum but made their own findings and assessment of evidence, before finally agreeing with the prosecution's evaluation of the case. 28

We have also sanctioned the use of memorandum decisions, 29 a specie of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in accordance with the provisions of Section 40, B.P. Blg. 129 30 on the grounds of expediency, practicality, convenience and docket status of our courts. We have also declared that memorandum decisions comply with the constitutional mandate. 31

In Francisco v. Permskul, 32 however, we laid down the conditions for the of validity of memorandum decisions, thus:

The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.

It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the decision of the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the law on which it is based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should suggest that such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.

The Court finds necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for the validity that this kind of decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties and easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it.xxx xxx xxxHenceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein set forth both as to the form prescribed and the occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation will summon the strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and strike down the flawed judgment as a lawless disobedience.Tested against these standards, we find that the RTC decision at bar miserably failed to meet them and, therefore, fell short of the constitutional injunction. The RTC decision is brief indeed, but it is starkly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in its form. It achieved nothing and attempted at nothing, not even at a simple summation of facts which could easily be done. Its inadequacy speaks for itself.

We cannot even consider or affirm said RTC decision as a memorandum decision because it failed to comply with the measures of validity laid down in Francisco vs. Permskul. It merely affirmed in toto the MeTC decision without saying more. A decision or resolution, especially one resolving an appeal, should directly meet the issues for resolution; otherwise, the appeal would be pointless. 33

We therefore reiterate our admonition in Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 34 in that while we conceded that brevity in the writing of decisions is an admirable trait, it should not and cannot be substituted for substance; and again in Francisco v. Permskul, 35 where we cautioned that expediency alone, no matter how compelling, cannot excuse non-compliance with the constitutional requirements.

This is not to discourage the lower courts to write abbreviated and concise decisions, but never at the expense of scholarly analysis, and more significantly, of justice and fair play, lest the fears expressed by Justice Feria as the ponente in Romero v.

Court of Appeals 36 come true, i.e., if an appellate court failed to provide the appeal the attention it rightfully deserved, said court deprived the appellant of due process since he was not accorded a fair opportunity to be heard by a fair and responsible magistrate. This situation becomes more ominous in criminal cases, as in this case, where not only property rights are at stake but also the liberty if not the life of a human being.

Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. 37 It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. 38 The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. 39 More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision. 40

Thus the Court has struck down as void, decisions of lower courts and even of the Court of Appeals whose careless disregard of the constitutional behest exposed their sometimes cavalier attitude not only to their magisterial responsibilities but likewise to their avowed fealty to the Constitution.

Thus, we nullified or deemed to have failed to comply with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, a decision, resolution or order which: contained no analysis of the evidence of the parties nor reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusions; contained nothing more than a summary of the testimonies of the witnesses of both

parties; 41 convicted the accused of libel but failed to cite any legal authority or principle to support conclusions that the letter in question was libelous; 42 consisted merely of one (1) paragraph with mostly sweeping generalizations and failed to support its conclusion of parricide; 43 consisted of five (5) pages, three (3) pages of which were quotations from the labor arbiter's decision including the dispositive portion and barely a page (two [2] short paragraphs of two [2] sentences each) of its own discussion or reasonings; 44 was merely based on the findings of another court sans transcript of stenographic notes; 45 or failed to explain the factual and legal bases for the award of moral damages. 46

In the same vein do we strike down as a nullity the RTC decision in question.

In sum, we agree with YAO that he was denied due process but not on the grounds he ardently invoked but on the reasons already extensively discussed above. While he indeed resorted to the wrong mode of appeal and his right to appeal is statutory, it is still an essential part of the judicial system that courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the prerogative, but instead afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his case, freed from the constraints of technicalities. 47

In the interest of substantial justice, procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of compliance, may be relaxed. 48 In other words, if strict adherence to the letter of the law would result in absurdity and manifest injustice 49 or where the merit of a party's cause is apparent and outweighs consideration of non-compliance with certain formal requirements, 50 procedural rules should definitely be liberally construed. A party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on mere technicalities. 51 We therefore withhold legal approbation on the RTC decision at bar for its palpable failure to comply with the constitutional and legal mandates thereby denying YAO of his day in court. We also remind all magistrates to heed the demand of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. It is their solemn and paramount duty to uphold the Constitution and the principles enshrined therein, lest they be lost in the nitty-gritty of their everyday judicial work. DHACES

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition in this case is GRANTED. The questioned 25 April 1995 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16893 is hereby SET ASIDE and the 27 July 1994 decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121 of Kalookan City rendered in its appellate jurisdiction is NULLIFIED. The records are hereby remanded to said Regional Trial Court for further proceedings and for the rendition of judgment in accordance with the mandate of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-96-1338 September 5, 1997

[Formerly OCA IPI-95-21-RTJ]

ENGINEER FERNANDO S. DIZON, complainant, vs.JUDGE LILIA C. LOPEZ, Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City, respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint charging Judge Lilia C. Lopez of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City, with violation of the Constitution, serious misconduct, inefficiency, and falsification in connection with her decision in Criminal Case No. 91-0716 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Engineer Fernando S. Dizon."

It appears that on April 22, 1993, judgment was rendered, convicting complainant of falsification of private document. The promulgation of the judgment consisted of reading the dispositive portion of the decision sentencing him to imprisonment, without serving a copy of the decision on him. The accused and his counsel were told to return in a few days for their copy of the decision, but although petitioner and his father by turns went to the court to obtain a copy of the decision they were not able to do so. To protect his right, complainant filed a partial motion for reconsideration on May 5, 1993, expressly reserving his light to submit a more elaborate one upon receipt of the decision. The hearing of the motion for reconsideration was scheduled on May 12, 1993, but the case was not called as complainant's counsel was told that the decision had not yet been finished. On November 29, 1994, complainant filed an "Omnibus Motion to Annul Promulgation of Sentence and to Dismiss" the case. On December 16, 1994, the date set for hearing the motion, complainant was served a copy of the decision, dated April 22, 1993, the dispositive portion of which states:

In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Fernando Dizon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Private Document as defined and penalized under Art. 172, par. 2 in relation to Art. 171 par. 2 and 4 thereof and hereby sentences him to imprisonment of two (2)

Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Six (6) Years and a fine of P5,000.00.

Complainant alleges that the failure of respondent judge to furnish him a copy of the decision until almost one year and eight months after the promulgation of its dispositive portion on April 22, 1993 constitutes a violation of Art. VIII, §14 of the Constitution which prohibits courts from rendering decisions without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which they are based and §15 of the same Art. VIII, which provides that in all cases lower courts must render their decisions within three months from the date of their submission. He alleges further that he was denied the right to a speedy trial in violation of Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution and that Judge Lopez falsified her decision by antedating it and including therein, as additional penalty, a fine of P5,000.00.

On December 26, 1994, complainant filed another motion for reconsideration after receiving a copy of the full decision of the court. On January 3, 1995, he moved to disqualify respondent from hearing the motions for reconsideration which he had filed. Respondent judge responded by voluntarily inhibiting herself from further consideration of the case and ordered it forwarded to the Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle. The case was eventually assigned to Judge Manuel F. Dumatol of Branch 113 of the Pasay City RTC.

Judge Lopez claims that on April 22, 1993, when the judgment was promulgated with the reading of the dispositive portion, her decision was already prepared, although to prevent leakage in the process of preparing it, she withheld its dispositive portion until the day of its promulgation. Respondent judge states that after the dispositive portion had been read to complainant, respondent gave it to Ma. Cleotilde Paulo (Social Worker II, presently OIC of Branch 109) for typing and incorporation into the text of the decision. The court found complainant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of private document under Art. 172, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent states that the delay in furnishing complainant with a copy of the decision was unintentional.

Respondent judge referred to difficulties she had in preparing her decision and to a series of personal problems which contributed to this delay in the release of her decision, to wit: she has only two (2) stenographers to attend to daily trials in her court, making it necessary for her to make use of the Social Worker assigned to her to type her decisions. During the

period January to December 1993 she had to dispose of 285 cases, apart from the fact that there was an unusually big number of criminal, civil, and land registration cases as well as special proceedings filed in her court which required the holding of hearings in the mornings and in the afternoons. During the same period, she went through some personal tragedies. She lost her niece, Gloria Lopez Roque, whom she had raised from childhood, due to a hospital accident. This was followed by the death on March 1, 1992 of her mother, Margarita Lopez, who had been under respondent's care for the past eight years after suffering a stroke. On September 17, 1993, respondent's father died of diabetes, renal failure, pneumonia, and cardiac arrest. Respondent was the one who single-handedly brought them in and out of the hospital because all her able-bodied relatives are abroad. Respondent herself was found to be suffering from diabetes and hypertension, necessitating her treatment and leave of absence from September 27, 1994 to December 12, 1994, in addition to her other leaves of absence. Aside from these, respondent's family suffered financial reverses because of estafa committed against them.

On February 19, 1996, Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis submitted a memorandum, finding the charge of violation of the Constitution to be without merit. He called attention to the written decision of respondent judge, which, albeit delivered to complainant late, nonetheless states the facts and law on which it is based. He likewise finds the charge of serious misconduct and falsification to be without basis in view of the absence of malice. However, he finds the charge of inefficiency to be well founded on the basis of respondent's failure to furnish complainant or his counsel a copy of the decision within a reasonable time after its promulgation. Hence, the Deputy Court Administration believes that Judge Lopez should be given admonition for her negligence, but recommends that the other charges against her for violation of the Constitution, serious misconduct, and falsification be dismissed for lack of merit.

The Court finds that respondent violated Art. VIII, §15(1) of the Constitution which provides:

All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts and three months for all other lower courts.

Although respondent judge promulgated her decision within three months of the submission of the case for decision, the fact is that only the dispositive portion was read at such promulgation. She claims that on April 22, 1993 the text of her decision, containing her findings and discussion of complainant's liability, had already been prepared although it had to be put in final form by incorporating the dispositive portion. However, the fact is that it took a year and eight months more before this was done and a copy of the complete decision furnished the complainant on December 16, 1994. Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

§1. Judgment defined. — The term judgment as used in this Rule means the adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or is not guilty of the offense charged, and the imposition of the proper penalty and civil liability provided for by law on the accused.

§2. Form and contents of judgment. — The judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.

§. Promulgation of judgment. — The judgment is promulgated by reading the same in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside of the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.

It is clear that merely reading the dispositive portion of the decision to the accused is not sufficient. It is the judgment that must be read to him, stating the facts and the law on which such judgment is based. Since this was done only on December 16, 1994 when a copy of the complete decision was served on complainant, it is obvious that the respondent failed to render her decision within three months as required by Art. VIII, §15 of the Constitution.

If indeed all that had to be done after the dispositive portion had been read in open court on April 22, 1993 was to incorporate it in the text of the decision allegedly then already prepared, it is difficult to see why it took respondent judge one year and eight more months before she was able to do so.

Respondent claims that she was prevented from putting out her decision by a series of personal and other problems which leads the Court to believe that when she promulgated her sentence she had not finished the preparation of the entire decision. At all events, she could have applied for extension of time to decide the case and put off the promulgation of judgment until she had finished it.

What respondent did in this case was to render what is known as a "sin perjuicio" judgment, which is a judgment without a statement of the facts in support of its conclusion to be later supplemented by the final judgment. 1 That is why, in answer to complainant's charge that the dispositive portion of the judgment read to him did not impose a fine, respondent contends that the addition of the fine of P5,000.00 was within her power to do even if no such fine had been included in the oral sentence given on April 22, 1993. As respondent judge states, because the decision was not complete it could be modified and cites in support of her contention the case of Abay, Sr. v. Garcia. 2 Respondent only succeeds in showing that the judgment promulgated on April 22, 1993 was a "sin perjuicio" judgment which was incomplete and needed a statement of the facts and law upon which the judgment was based. As early as 1923, this Court already expressed its disapproval of the practice of rendering "sin perjuicio" judgments, what with all the uncertainties entailed because of the implied reservation that it is subject to modification when the decision is finally rendered. 3 This Court has expressed approval of the practice of some judges of withholding the dispositive portion from their opinions until the very last moment of promulgation of their judgment in order to prevent leakage, 4 but that refers to the preparation of their decision, not itspromulgation. What must be promulgated must be the complete decision. There would be no more reason to keep the dispositive portion a secret at the stage of promulgation of judgment.

However, the Court finds the other charges against respondent to be without merit.

First, the claim that complainant was deprived of his right to a speedy trial by reason of respondent's failure to furnish him with a copy of the decision until after one year and eight months is without basis. It appears that despite the destruction of records by fire in the Pasay City Hall on January 18, 1992 the parties were required to submit simultaneously their memoranda on August 18, 1992. The delay, if any, was not such "vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay" 5 as to

justify finding a denial of the right to a speedy trial. The fact is that the reading of the sentence on April 22, 1993, albeit not in compliance with the requirement for promulgation of judgments, nonetheless put an end to trial.

Second, the delay in furnishing complainant a copy of the complete decision did not prejudice his right to appeal or file a motion for reconsideration. It is true that an accused must be given a copy of the decision in order to apprise him of the basis of such decision so that he can intelligently prepare his appeal or motion for reconsideration. However, in accordance with the ruling in Director of Lands v. Sanz, 6 complainant's period to appeal or file a motion for reconsideration did not begin to run until after he actually received a copy of the judgment on December 16, 1994. He therefore suffered no prejudice. If at all, complainant suffered from the anxiety to refute a conviction which he could not do for lack of a statement of the basis of the conviction.

Nonetheless, certain factors mitigate respondent judge's culpability. Except for this incident, respondent's record of public service as legal officer and agent of the National Bureau of Investigation, as State Prosecutor, and later Senior State Prosecutor, of the Department of Justice for 17 years and as Regional Trial Judge for more than 13 years now is unmarred by malfeasance, misfeasance or wrongdoing. This is the first time she is required to answer an administrative complaint against her. Her failure to decide the case of complainant was brought about by factors not within her control, to wit, lack of stenographers and unusually big number of cases; and her personal loss as a result of the death of her niece and both her parents, financial reverses of the family, and poor health as a result of diabetes and hypertension.

In Mangulabnan v. Tecson, 7 a joint decision in two criminal cases was rendered by respondent judge on February 24, 1978, six months and eight days from submission of the case, and a copy was delivered to complainant on September 28, 1979, over 19 months after rendition of the decision. Two complaints were filed for violation of the constitutional provision requiring submitted cases to be decided by lower courts within three months and for violation of complainant's right to a speedy trial. Respondent judge blamed the delay in deciding the cases on the fact that his clerks had misfiled the records. As to the delay in furnishing complainant with a copy of the decision, the judge attributed this to the mistake of his clerk who did not think complainant was entitled to receive the same. The judge was reprimanded. The reason for the

delay in that case was even less excusable than the difficulties experienced by respondent Judge Lopez, i.e., deaths in respondent's family, her own poor state of health, financial reverses suffered by her family, and the volume of work done within the period in question, which somewhat mitigate her liability. The Court believes that a similar penalty would be appropriate.

In view of the foregoing, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED with WARNING that repetition of the same acts complained of will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Regalado J., is on leave.

A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA March 27, 2001

IN RE: DEROGATORY NEWS ITEMS CHARGING COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DEMETRIO DEMETRIA WITH INTERFERENCE ON BEHALF OF A SUSPECTED DRUG QUEEN:COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Men and women of the courts must conduct themselves with honor, probity, fairness, prudence and discretion. Magistrates of justice must always be fair and impartial. They should avoid not only acts of impropriety, but all appearances of impropriety. Their influence in society must be consciously and conscientiously exercised with utmost prudence and discretion. For, theirs is the assigned role of preserving the independence, impartiality and integrity of the Judiciary.

The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates a judge to "refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency."1 The slightest form of interference cannot be countenanced. Once a judge uses his influence to derail or interfere in the regular course of a legal or judicial proceeding for the benefit of one or any of the parties therein, public confidence in the judicial system is diminished, if not totally eroded.

Such is this administrative charge triggered by newspaper accounts which appeared on the 21 July 2000 issues ofThe Manila Standard, The Manila Times, Malaya, The Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today. The national dailies collectively reported that Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria tried to intercede on behalf of suspected Chinese drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, alias Sze Yuk Lai, who went in and out of prison to play in a Manila casino.2

That same day, 21 July 2000, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., issued a Memorandum to Justice Demetria directing him to comment on the derogatory allegations in the news items.3 On 24 July 2000, Justice Demetria submitted his Compliance. Subsequently, Chief State Prosecutor (CSP) Jovencito R. Zuño, who disclosed to the media the name of Justice Demetria, and State Prosecutor (SP) Pablo C. Formaran III, a member of the Task Force on Anti-Narcotics Cases of the Department of

Justice (DOJ) prosecuting the case of the suspected Chinese drug queen, filed their respective Comments on the Compliance of Justice Demetria.4

On 8 August 2000, the Court En Banc ordered an investigation and designated Mme. Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino as Investigator and Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo as Prosecutor. An investigation then commenced on 22 August 2000 and continued until 16 November 2000.

The Prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely, CSP Zuño, SP Formaran III, Agnes P. Tuason, secretary of SP Formaran, III, and Jose H. Afalla, an employee from the Office of Asst. CSP (ACSP) Leonardo Guiyab, Jr. The defense on the other hand presented ten (10) witnesses: respondent Justice Demetria, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor (ACSP) Severino Gaña, Jr., Senior State Prosecutor (SSP) Romeo Dañosos, Go Teng Kok, Yu Yuk Lai, MTC Judge Orlando Siapno, Peter Young, Atty. Reinerio Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok, Danilo J. Mijares, bodyguard of Go Teng Kok, and Luisito Artiaga, official of the Philippine Amateur Track and Field Association (PATAFA).

The facts as borne out by the evidence presented by the prosecution are quite clear. In an Information dated 9 December 1998, SP Formaran III charged Yu Yuk Lai, together with her supposed nephew, a certain Kenneth Monceda y Sy alias William Sy, before the RTC of Manila, Br. 18,5 with violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, RA 6425, as amended, for "conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent and without authority of law . . . (to) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to a poseur-buyer three (3) kilograms, more or less, of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), which is a regulated drug."6 Accused of non-bailable offense, both Yu Yuk Lai and Kenneth Monceda were held at the detention cell of the PNP Narcotics Group in Camp Crame, Quezon City. On 25 June 1999, accused Yu Yuk Lai filed a Petition for Bail on the ground that the evidence of her guilt was not strong.

On 10 November 1999, upon receiving information that the accused, especially Yu Yuk Lai, had been seen regularly playing in the casinos of Heritage Hotel and the Holiday Inn Pavilion, SP Formaran III filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Transfer the Detention of the Accused to the City Jail.7 On the same day, Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio, Jr., granted the motion and

ordered the immediate transfer of the two (2) accused to the Manila City Jail.8

On 18 January 2000, Judge Laguio, Jr., concluded that "the evidence standing alone and unrebutted, is strong and sufficient to warrant conviction of the two accused for the crime charged" and denied the petition for bail of accused Yu Yuk Lai for lack of merit.9 Consequently, both accused filed a Joint Motion for Inhibition arguing that the trial court's actuation "do not inspire the belief that its decision would be just and impartial."10 On 28 January 2000, Judge Laguio, Jr., believing that the joint motion was utterly without merit but considering the gravity of the offense and for the peace of mind of the accused, inhibited himself.11

The case was re-raffled to Branch 53, presided by Judge Angel V. Colet. Accused Yu Yuk Lai then filed a Motion to Order the Confinement of the Accused in a Hospital. Before Judge Colet could resolve the motion, the case was handled by the Branch's Pairing Judge Manuel T. Muro.

On 15 May 2000 Judge Muro granted accused Yu Yuk Lai's motion and allowed her to be confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital for a period not exceeding seven (7) days,12 contrary to the recommendation of Dr. Jose Estrada Rosal, Chief of the Health Services of the Manila City Jail, that Yu Yuk Lai be confined at the Philippine General Hospital.13

On 5 June 2000 Judge Muro granted Yu Yuk Lai's Urgent Motion for Extension of Medical Confinement "for a period of one (1) month, or until such time that she is fit to be discharged from the said hospital."14 On 7 July 2000 Judge Muro also granted Yu Yuk Lai's Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence with Motion to Admit Demurrer to Evidence.15 Soon, rumors circulated in the Manila City Hall that Judge Muro was partial towards accused Yu Yuk Lai.

The rumors did not end there. On 6 July 2000 unidentified employees of the RTC Manila calling themselves "CONCERNED COURT EMPLOYEES" wrote the Secretary of Justice, copy furnished the Chief State Prosecutor, the Ombudsman, and Judge Muro. The letter alleged that Judge Muro ordered the hospitalization of Yu Yuk Lai "even if she (was) not sick and there (was) already a rumor circulating around the City Hall, that the notorious Judge had given the go signal to the counsel of the accused to file the Motion to Quash, which (would) be

granted for a consideration of millions of pesos and the contact person (was) allegedly the daughter of the Judge, who is an employee in the said branch."16

Accordingly on 14 July 2000, SP Formaran III filed a Motion for Inhibition praying that Judge Muro inhibit himself "from further handling this case and/or from resolving the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused Yu Yuk Lai as well as any other pending incidents therein."17

On 16 July 2000, at around 7:30 o'clock in the morning, while she was supposed to be confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital, accused Yu Yuk Lai was arrested inside the VIP room of the Casino Filipino at the Holiday Inn Pavilion, Manila, while playing baccarat. She was unescorted at the time of her arrest.

On 18 July 2000, at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, the Motion for Inhibition of Judge Muro was heard and submitted for resolution. Later, at around 11:30 o'clock, when SP Formaran III arrived in his office from the hearing, he was informed by his secretary, Agnes Tuason, that the staff of Court of Appeals Justice Demetrio Demetria had called earlier and said that the Justice wanted to speak with him. The caller requested for a return call. As requested, SP Formaran III immediately returned the call of Justice Demetria but the Justice had already gone out for lunch.

Later in the afternoon, between 1:30 and 2:00 o'clock, Justice Demetria, PATAFA President Go Teng Kok and Atty. Reinerio Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok and a close friend of Justice Demetria, went to the office of SP Formaran III in the DOJ which SP Formaran III shares with SP Albert Fonacier. Apparently, Justice Demetria was not familiar with SP Formaran III as he greeted SP Fonacier "Kamusta ka, Prosecutor Formaran?"18

Soon the visitors were seated. Go Teng Kok immediately pleaded with SP Formaran III to withdraw his motion to inhibit Judge Muro as this would purportedly delay the resolution of the case. Go Teng Kok also expressed his apprehension that if Judge Muro would inhibit, a new judge might convict his friend, accused Yu Yuk Lai, who was then already receiving bad publicity.

Justice Demetria then asked about the status of the case. SP Formaran III informed the Justice that a motion for inhibition has been submitted for resolution, one basis of which was the

unsigned letter of the concerned court employees. Justice Demetria opined that it was a bit dangerous to anchor the inhibition of a judge on an unsigned, anonymous letter. The Justice then advised Go Teng Kok who was becoming persistent to "keep his cool" and asked SP Formaran III if he could do something to help Go Teng Kok. Apparently, prior to 18 July 2000, Go Teng Kok had already been asking SP Formaran III to go slow in prosecuting accused Yu Yuk Lai.19 SP Formaran III at first politely declined the request. But later, "just to put an end to (the) conversation," 20 he told them that he would bring the matter to CSP Zuño. "Iyon pala," Justice Demetria replied. The Justice then stood up, bade good bye and left. Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok followed closely behind.21

Thereafter, SP Formaran III went to see CSP Zuño and informed the latter of what had transpired. CSP Zuño replied, "No way!" SP Formaran III also told ACSP Guiyab, Jr., who gave the same reply.22

At around 3:00 o'clock that same afternoon, CSP Zuño received a call from Justice Demetria who requested him to instruct SP Formaran III to withdraw the motion for inhibition of Judge Muro so that the Judge could already issue an order. "Pakisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na i-withdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa na ng Order si Judge Muro," Justice Demetria was quoted as saying.23 Politely, CSP Zuño said that he would see what he could do. "Tingnan ko po kung ano ang magagawa ko."24

On 20 July 2000, The Philippine Daily Inquirer reported that a "Supreme Court Justice . . . and an outspoken sports person and leader"25 had been exerting "undue pressure" on the DOJ to go slow in prosecuting re-arrested drug queen Yu Yuk Lai. That same afternoon, the names of Justice Demetria and Mr. Go Teng Kok were disclosed to the media to clear the name of the Supreme Court justices who might have been affected by the erroneous news report. The following day, 21 July 2000, several newspapers named Justice Demetria and Go Teng Kok as "drug lawyers."

Also on 20 July 2000 the DOJ received a copy of an Order dated 19 July 2000 of Judge Muro inhibiting himself from further hearing the case of Yu Yuk Lai and Kenneth Monceda.26

Respondent Justice Demetria, for his part, vehemently denied having interceded for Yu Yuk Lai. While he admitted that he indeed visited the DOJ on 18 July 2000, he went there to "visit old friends" and his meeting Go Teng Kok whom he did not know until that time was purely accidental. Expectedly, Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok corroborated the claim of respondent Justice.

Justice Demetria explained that he merely requested SP Formaran III "to do something to help Go Teng Kok about the case" without ever specifying the kind of "help" that he requested. He averred that it was purely on the basis of erroneous impression and conjecture on the part of SP Formaran III that he impliedly asked him to withdraw the motion "because that is what Mr. Go Teng Kok was appealing and requesting."27 Respondent claimed that the "help" he was requesting could well be "within legal bounds or line of duty."

Justice Demetria claimed that if ever he said anything else during the discussion between Go Teng Kok and SP Formaran III, such was not a form of intervention. He only admonished Go Teng Kok "to cool it" when the discussion between the prosecutor and Go Teng Kok became heated. While he asked about the status of the case this, he said, demonstrated his lack of knowledge about the case and bolstered his claim that he could not have possibly interceded for Yu Yuk Lai.

Respondent Justice likewise argued that the bases of his identification by CSP Zuño as the Justice exerting undue pressure on the DOJ were all hearsay. Respondent submitted that CSP Zuño based his identification from a newspaper account, from the statement of his secretary that it was he (Justice Demetria) who was on the other end of the telephone and from SP Formaran III when the latter consulted the Chief State Prosecutor about the visit of the Justice and Go Teng Kok impliedly asking him to withdraw the motion.

In defense of respondent Justice, Atty. Paas stated that it was actually he, not Justice Demetria, who later called up CSP Zuño to inquire about the latter's decision regarding the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit since SP Formaran III had earlier told Go Teng Kok that the matter would be taken up with his superiors.

In fine, respondent Justice Demetria maintains that it is inconceivable for him to ask SP Formaran III whom he just met for the first time to do something for Go Teng Kok whom he

claims he just likewise met for the first time. Neither did he know Yu Yuk Lai, a claim Yu Yuk Lai herself corroborated. It would be unthinkable for him to intercede in behalf of someone he did not know. Indeed respondent Justice asserted that his meeting Go Teng Kok on 18 July 2000 at the DOJ was purely coincidence, if not accidental.

So, did respondent Justice Demetria really intercede in behalf of suspected drug queen Yu Yuk Lai?

Investigating Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino believes so. In her Report dated 5 January 2001, she found respondent Justice Demetria "guilty of violating Rule 2.04, Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct" and recommended that "appropriate disciplinary action be taken against him by this Honorable Court."28

Only rightly so. The evidence is clear, if not overwhelming, and damning. Thus, even the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, after a hearing, found that "there was a conspiracy to commit the following offenses on the part of CA Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria and PATAFA President Go Teng Kok and Miss Yu Yuk Lai: obstruction of justice punishable under PD No. 1829 and Article 3(a) of RA 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."29

While Justice Demetria vehemently denied interfering with the criminal case, his denial cannot stand against the positive assertions of CSP Zuño and SP Formaran III,30 which are consistent with natural human experience. To accept the testimony of the defense witnesses that it was Atty. Paas who telephoned CSP Zuño, and not Justice Demetria, and that the "help" the respondent Justice was requesting SP Formaran III was something "within legal bounds or line of duty" other than the withdrawal of the motion is to strain too far one's imagination.

The testimony of CSP Zuño is plainly unambiguous and indubitably consistent with the other facts and circumstances surrounding the case —

CSP Zuño: As far as I could recall Justice Demetria said, "Pakisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa ng Order si Judge Muro."31

In his discussion with Go Teng Kok and Justice Demetria, SP Formaran III said that he would consult his superiors regarding the proposal to withdraw the motion. The timely telephone call to CSP Zuño was thus a logical follow-up. And no one could have made the call except respondent Justice since it is not uncommon for anyone to believe that CSP Zuño would recognize the voice of respondent Justice who was CSP Zuño's former superior in the DOJ. Thus, the confident utterance "[p]akisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa ng Order si Judge Muro" could not have come from anyone else but from respondent Justice who had moral ascendancy over CSP Zuño, he being a Justice of the Court of Appeals and a former Undersecretary and at one time Acting Secretary of the DOJ.

Even the requested "help" for Go Teng Kok, whom respondent Justice claims he did not know and met only that time, could not have meant any other assistance but the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit Judge Muro. True, Justice Demetria never categorically asked SP Formaran III to withdraw his Motion. But when respondent Justice Demetria asked the state prosecutor at that particular time "to do something . . . to help Mr. Go Teng Kok," the latter was pleading for the withdrawal of the motion, and nothing else. That was the only form of "help" that Go Teng Kok wanted. The subtle pressure exerted simply pointed to one particular act. Thus, subsequently respondent Justice called CSP Zuño to ask for just that — the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit Judge Muro.

Justice Demetria also claimed that he, together with Atty. Paas, went to the DOJ, first, to see Secretary Artemio Tuquero and seek assistance in the appointment of Atty. Paas to the Court of Appeals, and second, to "visit old friends,"32 and that the meeting with Go Teng Kok was purely accidental. But respondent Justice never mentioned in his earlier Compliance to the Memorandum of the Chief Justice that his primary purpose in going to the DOJ was to see Sec. Tuquero, and since Sec. Tuquero was not in, he instead decided to see some officials/prosecutors whom he had not visited for a long time.

We find this assertion difficult to accept. For, even his very own witnesses belied his alibi. ACSP Gaña, Jr. testified and confirmed that Justice Demetria only said "hi."33 SSP Dañosos, denied seeing him and claimed that it was only Atty. Paas who peeped into his room.34 Suspiciously, it was really in the office of SP Formaran III, whom respondent Justice Demetria did not

know, where Justice Demetria, Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok decided to "stay a while."35

Thus, as found by Mme. Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, the Investigating Justice, Justice Demetria and company could not have been there to exchange pleasantries with SPs Formaran III and Fonacier since they were not acquainted with each other. Prior to this incident, Justice Demetria did not personally know either SP Formaran III or SP Fonacier, a fact corroborated by respondent himself.36

All of these contradict and belie respondent Justice Demetria's earlier Compliance to the Memorandum of the Chief Justice that "[b]ecause Prosecutor Formaran is also a friend, we decided to drop by his office . . . (and) I stayed a while."37

As pointed out by the Investigating Justice, respondent Justice was there "to join forces with Go Teng Kok in arguing for the withdrawal of Formaran's Motion for Inhibition of Judge Muro, which was the real purpose of their visit to SP Formaran and to the DOJ. The uncanny coincidence in the timing of Justice Demetria's visit to SP Formaran's office, and that of Go Teng Kok, could not have been 'accidental' but pre-arranged."38 And, "visiting old friends" only came as an afterthought. The circumstances simply show that Justice Demetria and Atty. Paas, together with Go Teng Kok, did not go to the DOJ to see Sec. Tuquero, but to visit, if not "pressure," CSP Zuño and SP Formaran III.

Justice Demetria also claimed that it is inconceivable for him to help Yu Yuk Lai and Go Teng Kok, both of whom he did not personally know, and more unthinkable that he would be asking help from SP Formaran III whom he had just met for the first time.

The argument cannot be sustained. It is admitted that respondent is a very close friend of Atty. Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok. And, it is not necessary that respondent Justice Demetria be acquainted with Go Teng Kok, Yu Yuk Lai or SP Formaran III for him to intercede in behalf of the accused. It is enough that he is a close friend of the lawyer of Go Teng Kok, who has been helping the accused, and that he wields influence as a former DOJ Undersecretary and later, Acting Secretary, and now, a Justice of the Court of Appeals.

In sum, we find the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses convincing and trustworthy, as compared to those of the

defense which do not only defy natural human experience but are also riddled with major inconsistencies which create well-founded and overriding doubts.

The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with the heavy of responsibility. His at all times must be characterized with propriety and must be above suspicion.39 His must be free of even a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his judicial duties, but also his behavior outside the courtroom and as a private individual.

Unfortunately, respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria failed failed to live up to this expectation. Through his indiscretions, Justice Demetria did not only make a mockery of his high office, but also caused incalculable damage to the entire Judiciary. The mere mention of his name in the national newspapers, allegedly lawyering for a suspected drug queen and interfering with her prosecution seriously undermined the integrity of the entire Judiciary.

Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness tha a seat in the Judiciary.40 High ethical principles and a sense of propriety should be maintained, without which the faith of the people in the Judiciary so indispensable in orderly society cannot be preserved.41 There is simply no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity.42

WHEREFORE, we sustain the findings of the Investigating Justice and hold Justice Demetrio G. Demetria GUILTY of violating Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is ordered DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to his appointment or reappointment to any government office, agency or instrumentality, including any government owned or controlled corporation or institution.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA September 9, 2008

RE: LETTER OF PRESIDING JUSTICE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, JR. ON CA-G.R. SP NO. 103692 [Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al.]

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:

The Judiciary, which is acclaimed as the firmest pillar of our democratic institutions, is vested by the Constitution with the power to settle disputes between parties and to determine their rights and obligations under the law. For judicial decisions, which form part of the law of the land, to be credible instruments in the peaceful and democratic resolution of conflicts, our courts must be perceived to be and, in fact be, impartial, independent, competent and just. To accomplish this end, it is imperative that members of the Judiciary from its highest magistrates to its humblest employees adhere to the strictest code of ethics and the highest standards of propriety and decorum. Indeed, it is unfortunate that one of the country’s second highest courts, the Court of Appeals, should be presently embroiled in scandal and controversy. It is this Court’s bounden duty to determine the culpability or innocence of the members of the Judiciary involved in the said controversy and to discipline any one whose conduct has failed to conform to the canons of judicial ethics, which uphold integrity, independence, impartiality, competence and propriety in the performance of official functions.

The present administrative matter arose from the Letter dated August 1, 2008 of Court of Appeals Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (Presiding Justice Vasquez), referring to this Court for appropriate action the much publicized dispute and charges of impropriety among the justices of the Court of Appeals (CA) involved in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 entitled "Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al."

To assist in its investigation of this sensitive matter, the Court in its Resolution dated August 4, 2008 constituted a three-person panel (the "Panel of Investigators") composed of retired Justices of the Court; namely, Mme. Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino as Chairperson, Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero and Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. as Members. The

Panel of Investigators was tasked to investigate the (a) alleged improprieties of the actions of the Justices of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio V. Rosete, et al. v. SEC, et al.); and (b) alleged rejected offer or solicitation of bribe disclosed respectively by Mr. Justice Jose Sabio and Mr. Francis de Borja.

A narration of relevant events and facts, as found by the Investigating Panel, follows:

On April 15, 2008, Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes (Justice Reyes), then Chairperson of the Ninth Division of the CA, filed an application for leave from May 15, 2008 to June 5, 2008.1

In Office Order No. 149-08-CMV dated May 14, 2008 issued by Presiding Justice Vasquez, Justice Jose C. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) was designated by the Raffle Committee as Acting Chairman of the Ninth Division during the absence of Justice Reyes. Apart from his duties as regular senior member of the Fifth Division, Justice Mendoza was authorized "to act on all cases submitted to the Ninth Division for final resolution and/or appropriate action, except ponencia, from May 15, 2008 to June 5, 2008 or until Justice Reyes reports back for duty." The said office order likewise applied to the other Division(s) where Justice Reyes had "participated or took part as regular member or in an acting capacity."2

On May 29, 2008, Antonio V. Rosete, Manuel M. Lopez, Felipe B. Alfonso, Jesus P. Francisco, Christian S. Monsod, Elpidio L. Ibañez, and Francis Giles B. Puno, as officers, directors and/or representatives of the Manila Electric Company (hereinafter to be collectively referred to as "Meralco"), filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO) against the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Commissioner Jesus Enrique G. Martinez, Commissioner Hubert B. Guevarra, and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). 3 Aside from the application for immediate issuance of a TRO, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a preliminary injunction that should thereafter be declared permanent, as well as a declaration of nullity of the cease and desist and show cause orders issued by the SEC through Commissioner Martinez. The petition was received by the CA at 10:49 a.m. on May 29, 2008 and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.

On the same day, petitioners simultaneously filed at 10:48 a.m. an urgent motion for a special raffle. Presiding Justice Vasquez granted the motion in a handwritten note on the face of the urgent motion,4 and CA-G.R. No. 103692 was raffled to Justice Vicente Q. Roxas (Justice Roxas).5 At 3:10 p.m., the Office of Presiding Justice Vasquez received a letter from Atty. Estrella C. Elamparo (Atty. Elamparo), Chief Legal Counsel of the GSIS, requesting the re-raffling of the case "in the presence of the parties in the interest of transparency and fairness."6 At 4:10 p.m. on that day, the GSIS filed anex-parte motion to defer action on any incident in the petition pending the resolution of their motion for the re-raffle of the case.7

Atty. Elamparo, accompanied by Atty. Orlando P. Polinar, also of the GSIS Law Office, personally filed the urgent motion to defer action on the petition pending the resolution of their motion to re-raffle the case. Since the receiving clerk of the Court of Appeals could not assure them that the motion would be transmitted to the Court of Appeals Division, Attys. Elamparo and Polinar allegedly went to the office of Justice Roxas "for the sole purpose of personally furnishing him a copy" of the motion.8They initially talked to a male clerk who referred them to one of the lawyers, who, however, told them that it was not possible for them to personally hand a copy of the motion to Justice Roxas. Thus, Attys. Elamparo and Polinar left a copy of the motion to the staff but no one wanted to sign and acknowledge receipt of the copy.9

On May 30, 2008, Justice Reyes filed an application for the extension of his leave until June 6, 2008.10 In the meantime, Justice Mendoza, who had been designated to replace Justice Reyes during the latter’s absence, informed Justice Roxas through a letter that he (Justice Mendoza) was inhibiting from the case on the ground that he used to be a lawyer of the Meralco.11 Hence, in an "Emergency Request for Raffle," Justice Roxas informed the Raffle Committee about the inhibition.12

Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. (Justice Sabio) was assigned as Acting Chairman of the Ninth Division by raffle, "in lieu of Justice Mendoza."13 At 11:30 a.m., the office of Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal (Justice Dimaranan-Vidal) received a notice of emergency deliberation with the new Acting Chairman of the Special Ninth Division, apparently sent by Justice Roxas, stating that her presence and that of Justice Sabio, Jr. were "indispensable" on account of the "national interest" involved in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.14

Meanwhile, Atty. Elamparo "received a telephone call from somebody who did not identify herself but (who) said that she had important information regarding the Meralco case." The unidentified caller told Atty. Elamparo that "a TRO was already being prepared and that certain Meralco lawyers had in fact been talking to Justice Roxas." The caller warned Atty. Elamparo against Justice Roxas who had "administrative cases and was ‘very notorious,’" but when prodded, the caller would not disclose more details.15

At about 1:30 p.m. also on May 30, 2008, Justice Sabio received a telephone call in his chambers from his older brother, Chairman Camilo Sabio (Chairman Sabio) of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).16 Chairman Sabio informed his brother that he (Justice Sabio) had been named the "third member" of the division to which the MERALCO-GSIS case had been raffled. Justice Sabio was surprised as he had not yet been "officially informed" about the matter. Chairman Sabio likewise informed him that a TRO had been prepared. Chairman Sabio then tried to convince Justice Sabio "of the rightness of the stand of the GSIS and the SEC," and asked his brother to help the GSIS, which "represents the interest of the poor people." Justice Sabio told his brother that he would "vote according to [his] conscience" and that the most that he could do was "to have the issuance of the TRO and the injunctive relief scheduled for oral arguments," at which the respondents "must be able to convince" him that the TRO indeed had no legal basis.

In his signed testimony,17 which he read before the Panel of Investigators, Chairman Sabio narrated the circumstances of this call to his brother on May 30, 2008. It appears to have been prompted by a call from a member of the Board of Trustees of GSIS. To quote from Chairman Sabio’s testimony:

Last May 30, 2008 I was in Davao City Airport with my wife, Marlene, waiting for our 1:25 P.M. PAL flight to Manila. xxx xxx xxx.

As we were boarding, I received a call from Atty. Jesus I. Santos, a Member of the Board of Trustees of GSIS. We had known each other and had become friends since before Martial Law because as Chief Counsel of the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) we were opposing counsel in various cases in Bulacan.

Attorney Santos informed me that the dispute between the GSIS and MERALCO was now in the Court of Appeals; and, that as a matter of fact, my brother, Justice Sabio, was chair of the Division to which the case had been assigned. Being a Trustee, Attorney Santos requested me to help. I readily welcomed the request for help and thanked him. There was no mystery about his having known of the results of the raffle because the lawyers are notified thereof and are present thereat. As a Trustee, Attorney Santos should be concerned and involved. As such it is his duty to seek assistance for the GSIS where he could legitimately find it. He was right in seeking my assistance.

I was aware of the controversy between the GSIS and MERALCO. In essence this was in fact a controversy between the long suffering public and the mighty - financially and politically - controlling owners of MERALCO. MERALCO is not only a public utility but also a monopoly. Fortunately, GSIS had taken up the cudgels for the long suffering public, who are at the mercy of MERALCO.

x x x x x x x x x.

Immediately, I tried to contact Justice Sabio. But due to the noise I could not hear him. So I waited until we would arrive in Manila.

As we were leaving the Airport, I again got in touch with Justice Sabio. After, he confirmed that he was in fact in the Division to which the petition of MERALCO had been raffled. I impressed upon him the character and essence of the controversy. I asked him to help GSIS if the legal situation permitted. He said he would decide according to his conscience. I said: of course.

x x x x x x x x x.

On the same day, May 30, 2008, GSIS filed an urgent ex-parte motion to inhibit Justice Roxas from CA-G.R. No. SP 103692.18 The Special Cases Section of the Court of Appeals received a copy of the motion at 11:58 a.m.19

Claiming that the TRO was issued "to pre-empt the hearing" scheduled in the afternoon of that day before the SEC, the GSIS Law Office, through Atty. Marcial C. Pimentel, Jr., set forth its reason for the motion for inhibition as follows:

3. Unfortunately, reports have reached respondent GSIS that the Honorable ponente has been in contact with certain lawyers of MERALCO and has in fact already prepared a draft resolution granting the TRO without affording respondents even a summary hearing. The records of this case was (sic), per information, immediately transmitted to the Honorable ponente upon his instructions. The worries of the respondent were exacerbated when it learned that there are supposedly two administrative cases pending against the Honorable ponente, both of which involve allegations of bias and prejudice.

It turned out, however, that at that time, Justice Roxas had not yet been officially notified by the Raffle Committee that the case was raffled to him.20 Moreover, contrary to the allegation of Atty. Elamparo that the raffle was rigged, Justice Roxas had no hand in the raffle proceeding, which was handled by the Division chaired by Justice Mariano del Castillo with the use of a "fool-proof Las Vegas tambiolo, like the lotto machine."21

Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice Sabio, for the latter’s signature, the TRO which he had prepared, already signed by himself and Justice Dimaranan-Vidal. Convinced of the urgency of the TRO, Justice Sabio signed it on condition that the case will be set for oral arguments.

Thus, at 2:08 p.m. on May 30, 2008,22 the Special Ninth Division composed of Justices Sabio, Roxas, and Dimaranan-Vidal, issued the Resolution granting the TRO prayed for by the petitioners and directing the respondents to file their respective comments (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition within ten days from notice, with the petitioners given five days from receipt of that comment within which to file their reply. The Special Ninth Division also set the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction for 10:00 a.m. on June 23 and 24, 2008. In the same Resolution, parties were directed to file their respective memorandum of authorities in connection with the application for a writ of preliminary injunction together with their comments/reply. After the parties had filed their memorandum of authorities relative to the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the prayer for the said writ would be considered submitted for resolution "forty five (45) days from promulgation of this Resolution." The SEC received a copy of the Resolution at 4:03 p.m. on that day.23

For Justice Roxas, the issuance of the TRO was an implied denial of the motion for inhibition filed against him. There was

no need to put in writing the action on the motion for inhibition.24

At 3:00 p.m., the Special Cases Section of the Court of Appeals received the Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order and To Hold Its Enforcement in Abeyance filed by the GSIS.25 Justice Roxas did not act on the Urgent Motion because he did not consider it meritorious.26

On May 31, 2008, Justice Sabio received a cellular phone call from Mr. Francis De Borja (Mr. De Borja), a person he had lost contact with for almost a year already.27 Mr. De Borja greeted him with:"Mabuhay ka, Justice." When Justice Sabio, Jr. asked Mr. De Borja why he said that, Mr. De Borja told him that the Makati Business Club was happy with his having signed the TRO, to which Justice Sabio retorted, "I voted according to my conscience."

On June 5, 2008, the GSIS Law Office received a letter dated June 2, 2008 of Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. informing GSIS Chief Legal Counsel, Atty. Elamparo, that the Court of Appeals could not grant her request for the re-raffling of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 "in the presence of the parties in the interest of transparency and fairness," as the case had been raffled in accordance with the procedure under the IRCA.28

On June 10, 2008, Justice B. L. Reyes reported back to work.29

On June 11, 2008, at 3:50 p.m.,30 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appearing for the SEC, filed a manifestation and motion praying for the admission of the comment (to the petition) attached thereto, as well as the advance and additional copies of the memorandum of authorities.

On June 12, 2008, at 4:53 p.m., the GSIS filed its comment/opposition to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692,31 as well as its memorandum of authorities.

On June 16, 2008, the Division Clerk of Court, Atty. Teresita Custodio (Atty. Custodio), delivered to Justice Reyes the cartilla of the Meralco case, and informed him that a hearing on the prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction had been scheduled at 10:00 a.m. on June 23 and 24, 2008.32However, on the same day, the Division Clerk of Court came back to retrieve the cartilla upon instructions of Justice Sabio. Justice Reyes instructed his staff to return the cartilla and when he asked the Division Clerk of Court why

she was retrieving it, she said that Justice Sabio "demanded" that it be returned back to him. "Personally affronted" by the "domineering and superior stance" of Justice Sabio, Justice Reyes "read and re-read Secs. 1, 2(d) & 5, Rule VI (Process of Adjudication)" until he was satisfied that he should sit as Division Chairman in the Meralco case.33

On either June 17 or 18, 2008, Justice Sabio requested the rollo of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 from Justice Roxas so that he could study the case before the hearing.34 Justice Roxas asked him whether Justice Reyes would preside over the hearing. Justice Sabio explained the reason why he, not Justice Reyes, should preside. Justice Roxas promised to instruct the Division Clerk of Court to send the rollo over to Justice Sabio. The next day, the Division Clerk of Court told Justice Sabio that the rollo was with Justice Reyes. When the rollo was eventually transmitted to Justice Sabio, the Division Clerk of Court asked him whether the rollo should be with Justice Reyes. Justice Sabio explained why the rollo should be with him.

On June 18, 2008, petitioners filed a motion for an extension of five days or until June 23, 2008 within which to file their consolidated memoranda of authorities and reply to the comment of the SEC.35

On June 19, 2008, MERALCO filed an ex-parte manifestation together with their reply to the comment of the GSIS.36 Meanwhile, Justice B. L. Reyes asked Atty. Custodio to report on "what transpired between her and Justice Sabio" when she returned the cartilla. "Teary-eyed," Atty. Custodio begged off from making a report.37

Justice Reyes decided to consult the Presiding Justice "to avoid an ugly confrontation" with the Justices on the "highly politicized case involving giants of the Philippine society." He explained to the Presiding Justice his understanding of the relevant IRCA rules and "the actual practice in similar situations in the past." The Presiding Justice promised to talk with Justice Sabio and, "for the sake of transparency and future reference," Justice Reyes requested permission to write an inquiry on the matter.38

On the same day, Justice Reyes wrote Presiding Justice Vasquez a letter39 calling the attention of Justice Edgardo P. Cruz ("Justice Cruz"), Chairperson of the Committee on Rules, to the "dilemma" as to who between him and Justice Sabio

should "receive" CA-G.R. SP No. 103692. Justice Reyes posed these questions before the Presiding Justice:

Will the case remain with Justice Jose Sabio, Jr. as Acting Chairman of the Special 9th Division and who participated in the initial Resolution of the case?

Will the case revert to the regular 9th Division with the undersigned as Chairman?

For Justice Reyes, the "dilemma" was engendered by this provision of Section 2 of Rule VI of the IRCA:

(2) When, in an original action or petition for review, any of these actions or proceedings, namely: (1) giving due course; (2) granting writ of preliminary injunction; (3) granting new trial; and (4) granting execution pending appeal have been taken, the case shall remain with the Justice to whom the case is assigned for study and report and the Justices who participated therein, regardless of their transfer to other Divisions in the same station.

The hearing on the application for preliminary injunction having been scheduled for June 23 and 24, 2008, Justice Reyes considered it "necessary" that the issues be resolved before that date. Moreover, the referral of the controversy to the Presiding Justice would give him sufficient time to seriously study the case before the hearing.40

On June 20, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez referred the letter of Justice Reyes to Justice Cruz, Chairperson of the Committee on Rules, noting "some urgency involved as the hearing of the case is on Monday, June 23, 2008."41

On that same day, Justice Cruz wrote Justice Reyes a letter42 quoting Section 2 (d), Rule VI of the IRCA and stating that the "[i]ssuance of a TRO is not among the instances where ‘the Justices who participated’ in the case shall ‘remain’ therein." Hence, Justice Cruz opined that "[n]otwithstanding the issuance of the TRO (not writ of preliminary injunction), the case reverted to the regular Chairman (Justice Reyes) of the Ninth Division upon his return." Justice Reyes received a copy of the letter of Justice Cruz in the afternoon of that day.43

During the hearings of this case, Justice Cruz explained his opinion before the Panel. He opined that the motion to lift the TRO is not a motion for reconsideration because Rule 52 of the Rules of Court states that a motion for reconsideration may be filed with respect to a decision or a final resolution. A TRO is not a final resolution but an interlocutory order. Moreover, since the subject of the hearing on June 23, 2008 was on the application for preliminary injunction, Justice Sabio had no right to participate in the hearing because as an Acting Chairman, his authority was only to act on the motion to lift the TRO. Under the IRCA, the position of Justice Sabio invoked the exception to the general rule in the IRCA. However, the settled principle is to construe a rule strictly against the exception. The participation of Justice Sabio in the hearing on June 23, 2008 was a "passport" to participation in the decision-making process, in violation of the IRCA.44

Justice Reyes having consulted with him, the Presiding Justice referred the matter to Justice Sabio who in turn, opined that "a temporary restraining order is part of the injunctive relief or at least its initial action such that he should be the one to chair the Division." 45 In his office after that consultation with the Presiding Justice, Justice Reyes found that the Division Clerk of Court had given him a copy of the cartilla just in case he would preside over the hearing.In the evening, the Presiding Justice called up Justice Reyes to inform him that Justice Sabio "insisted that he would preside over the hearing of the case," and that the opinion of Justice Cruz, who was "junior" to Justice Sabio "was no better than his own opinion."46

It turned out that, upon receipt of a copy of the letter of Justice Cruz, Justice Sabio told the Presiding Justice by telephone that he disagreed with the opinion of Justice Cruz "because he did not sign in an official capacity as Chairman of the Rules Committee, but in his personal capacity" and hence, the opinion of Justice Sabio "was as good as his, as in fact I (Justice Sabio, Jr.) am even more senior than he."47 Justice Sabio told the Presiding Justice that he "smelled something fishy" about the move to transfer the case to the Ninth Division especially because Justice Reyes did not inform him about it despite the fact that they were seated together on three occasions.

Justice Sabio "smelled something fishy" because a couple or so weeks ago, he attended a Chairpersons’ meeting regarding the leakage of the ponencia of Justice Bato, with Justice Reyes as Chairperson and Justice Jose Mendoza as senior member. The meeting was called because prior to the promulgation of the

decision of Justice Bato, the losing party already filed a motion for the inhibition of the ponente. According to Justice Sabio information on the decision could not have been leaked by Justice Bato but by a member of the Division.48

The Presiding Justice "did not do anything anymore" to prevent an "unpalatable" situation at the scheduled June 23, 2008 hearing, notwithstanding the "conflicting opinions" of Justices Reyes and Sabio. The "personal view" of the Presiding Justice was at the time "with Justice Cruz" but Justice Sabio had a "different interpretation." Neither did the Presiding Justice suggest that the Rules Committee be convened because the Committee then had only two members. He felt that it would be "better" if Justices Reyes and Sabio "could settle it between themselves." The Presiding Justice was seeing the Justices "practically" everyday because he did not want "these things to blow up." However, neither did it enter the mind of the Presiding Justice that the hearing on June 23 could be reset. Had he known that there was a motion to inhibit Justice Roxas, he would have changed his position "that it should be the Sabio group."49

Also on June 20, 2008, the GSIS requested permission to conduct a power-point presentation during the hearing.50 Likewise the SEC, through the OSG prayed that it be allowed the use of Microsoft Powerpoint Application at the June 23 and 24, 2008 hearings.51 Justice Roxas did not act on the motions.

On June 21, 2008, Justice Sabio came to know that it was the Division chaired by Justice Reyes that would handle the case on account of the opinion of Justice Cruz.52

In the morning of June 23, 2008, Justice Sabio consulted with Justice Martin Villarama, Jr. ("Justice Villarama") who advised him, "in no uncertain terms," that his stand was "correct" and that he should remain in the case.53 Justice Villarama said that the case should remain with the Special Ninth Division "regardless of the transfer of the ponente to the Eighth Division because of the pending motion to lift TRO," which the Special Ninth Division should resolve "following the general rule that when a decision or resolution is rendered by a division, a motion for reconsideration thereof should be acted upon by all the Members of that division, whether regular or special, which participated in the rendition of the decision or resolution, except in case of death, retirement or resignation of such Member."54

That morning, Justice Roxas also consulted Justice Villarama. The latter told the former that since there was a motion to lift the TRO, Justice Roxas should first rule on the motion. He also advised Justice Roxas to inhibit himself from the case, as there might be a problem (mag-inhibit ka baka magka-problema). Justice Roxas told Justice Villarama that he would follow his "suggestion."55

Justice Reyes also went to the office of Justice Villarama to tell him of his "strong conviction that the issuance of a TRO is not among the instances provided in Sec. 2 (d), Rule VI when the case shall remain with those Justices who participated in the case regardless of their transfer to other division(s)." Justice Villarama told Justice Reyes that per his "understanding and interpretation of said provision, x x x the case should remain with the Special Ninth Division."56

At 9:50 a.m., the Office of the Division Clerk of Court called Justice Reyes to inform him that the parties and their counsels were already in the hearing room. Justice Reyes informed the caller that he could not preside as Justice Sabio had "apparently hardened his position" and he wanted to avoid an "ugly spectacle." His name plate was displayed in the hearing room but Justice Sabio moved to another hearing room.57 Allegedly, the removal of the nameplate of Justice Reyes was the talk of the Court of Appeals for weeks.58

Villaraza Cruz Marcelo and Angangco entered its appearance as counsel for Meralco.59 At the hearing, Justice Sabio presided with Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal in attendance. Justice Roxas, the ponente, did not ask a single question.60 Not one of the Justices in attendance brought up the motion for inhibition filed by the GSIS against Justice Roxas.61 In open court, the parties in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 agreed to submit, within 15 days, simultaneous memoranda on the injunctive relief prayed for by the petitioners, after which the application for preliminary injunction would be deemed submitted for resolution.62

On June 25, 2008, or about two days after the separate conversations of Justice Villaram with Justices Sabio and Reyes, the Presiding Justice also consulted Justice Villarama about the letter-queries of Justices Roxas and Reyes on which Division should resolve "the matter of injunctive relief or issue the decision" in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692. 63

The Presiding Justice issued Office Order No. 196-08-CMV reconstituting the Committee on Rules and designating Justice Cruz as the Chairperson, with Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, Reyes, Hakim Abdulwahid, and Noel G. Tijam, as members.64 The Committee on Rules was tasked to propose amendments to the IRCA on or before August 15, 2008 "for submission and adoption of the Court en banc." (The office order was later amended by Office Order No. 196-08-CMV on August 4, 2008 to include as members Justices Mario L. Guariña III, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores.65) The Rules Committee used to be composed of only three members, namely: Justices Cruz, Abdulwahid, and Roberto Barrios, now deceased, as members, with Justice Cruz as chairperson.66

It was also on June 25, 2008 that Presiding Justice Vasquez issued Office Order No. 200-08-CMV stating that, in view of the retirement of Justices Enrique Lanzanas, Lucenito N. Tagle, Agustin S. Dizon, and Rodrigo Cosico, and the appointments of Justices Ruben C. Ayson and Edgardo L. delos Santos, the Divisions would have a new composition effective July 4, 2008.67 Under that office order, Justice Sabio became the Chairman of the Sixth Division, with Justice Dimaranan-Vidal as a member. Justice Reyes became the Chairman of the Eighth Division, with Justices Roxas and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. ("Justice Bruselas") as members.

On June 29, 2008, Justice Reyes went on official leave of absence to use a business class airplane ticket to Sydney, Australia that he had won in an APT Golf Tournament in January 2008. He was still on official leave when the reorganization of the Court of Appeals took place on July 4, 2008.68

On July 1, 2008, Justice Roxas told Justice Sabio that he did not attend the Access to Courts (sic) summit on June 30 and July 1, 2008 at the Court of Appeals Auditorium because he was busy with the Meralco case. Justice Sabio was taken aback because at that time the parties had not yet submitted their memoranda.69

That same afternoon, Mr. De Borja again called up Justice Sabio, seeking to meet with him for an "important" matter. Because Justice Sabio had 6-8 p.m. classes at the Ateneo Law School, they agreed to meet after his classes but not for long because his wife and his daughter, Atty. Silvia Jo Sabio who is an Attorney VI in the Office of the Chief Justice,70 would be

waiting for him.71 According to Justice Sabio, the conversation at that meeting with Francis de Borja went as follows:

17. By the time my class was finished at 8 pm, Mr. De Borja was already waiting for me at the Lobby Lounge of the 3rd Floor of the Ateneo Law School. His first words to me were: Alam mo Justice kung sino ang kasama ko sa kotse? Si Manolo Lopez. Then he said: Noong tinatawagan kita at sinabi kong "Mabuhay ka Justice," si Manolo Lopez ang katabi ko noon. Nasa Amerika siya, kaya ako na lang ang pumunta dito para makiusap sa ‘yo. Alam mo, itong kaso na ito is a matter of life and death for the Lopezes. And alam mo naman what the Marcoses did to them, which is being done now by the Arroyos.

· At that point he mentioned the impasse between Justice Bienvenido Reyes and myself. He said: Alam naming may problema kayo ni Justice Reyes tungkol sa chairmanship.

· I was surprised how he came to know about it, as this was an internal matter of the Court of Appeals which only happened fairly recently and many associate justices of the CA were not even aware of this. Just the same, I explained my stand and why I could not relinquish the chairmanship to Justice Reyes.

· He then replied: Alam mo, Justice ang opinion dito ni Nonong Cruz ay i-challenge ang stand mo. Kaya lang, mayroon namang nagsabi na it might become messy.

· Then he bragged to me: Ako din ang responsible sa pag-recommend at pag-hire ng Villaraza Law Firm.

· Then he explained that he was there to offer me a win-win situation.

· He said: Justice, mayroon kaming P10 million. Ready. Just give way to Justic Reyes.

· Then I said: Bakit ganun. Nakasisiguro sila sa kanya, sa akin hindi?

· He said: Mas komportable lang sila sa kanya.

At that point, I was shocked that he had a very low regard for me. He was treating me like there was a price on my person. I could not describe my feelings. I was stunned. But at the same time, hindi ko rin magawang bastusin siya because I had

known him since 1993 and this was the first time that he had ever treated me like this, or shown that he believed I could be bought.

· So I just told him: Francis, I cannot in conscience agree to that.

· His answer was: Sabi ko nga sa kanila, mahirap ka talaga papayag. Kasi may anak iyang Opus Dei. Numerary pa.

· At this point, I just wanted to leave, so I told him I could not stay long. I told him my wife and lawyer daughter were waiting.

· Even then, he was already insistent. His parting words before I left were: Just think about it, Justice.72

At that time, Mr. De Borja was carrying a "sealed" brown paper bag, which he was handling "as if something important" was inside. However, Justice Sabio did not know if the bag contained P10million.73

In his car, Justice Sabio told his wife and his daughter, Silvia Jo, about the offer of Mr. De Borja for Meralco.74

In his affidavit submitted to the Panel of Investigators, Mr. De Borja describes himself as a businessman, a deal maker, and project packager. On July 1, 2008, he invited Justice Sabio for dinner "to touch base" and for chismis about the MERALCO-GSIS case. As the latter would have evening classes at the Ateneo Law School, and his wife and daughter would be waiting in their car after his classes, they just agreed to meet at the lobby-lounge of the School. What Mr. De Borja knew about the MERALCO case allegedly came from news reports but he was interested in the news because he is a "confirmed free-enterpriser." Moreover, De Borja thought that there was "[n]othing like hearing things directly from the horse’s mouth."75

When Mr. De Borja and Justice Sabio met, Mr. De Borja averred he was indeed carrying a bag, not an expensive looking luggage. After parking his car at the Rockwell basement, he took the escalator, intending to walk out of the mall. On his way, he passed by the Kenneth Cole shop and, since it was still early, he looked in and saw a T-shirt he liked. He bought the T-shirt, which he brought before the Panel of

Investigators in the grey "Kenneth Cole Reaction" bag. The photographs of the bag and the T-shirt costing P1,650.00 are marked Exhibits "A-De Borja" and "A-1-De Borja" and attached to therollo of A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA, while the photograph of the receipt issued by the Kenneth Cole Boutique, marked as Exhibit "A-2-De Borja," shows that the purchase was made on July 1, 2008 at 19:47. He stressed the bag did not contain P10 million.

Before the Panel, Justice Sabio claimed that the bag Mr. De Borja brought during the hearing was not the bag that Mr. De Borja was carrying when Justice Sabio saw him on July 1, 2008. What Mr. De Borja allegedly brought with him to the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School was a brown bag with paper handle "about 2/3 (of the Kenneth Cole bag) in size." Justice Sabio was told by the Panel that it could be the subject of rebuttal evidence but he did not present such evidence.

According to Mr. De Borja, Manolo Lopez (Mr. Lopez), the owner of MERALCO whose wife was a member of Martha’s Vineyard just like Mr. De Borja’s wife, was also an acquaintance of Mr. De Borja at the Ateneo grade school. Mr. Lopez did not ask him (Mr. De Borja) to contact Justice Sabio. At a party where Mr. De Borja met Mr. Lopez, Mr. De Borja informed him that he knew Justice Sabio but Mr. Lopez did not say anything.

Mr. De Borja denied having offered P10 million to Justice Sabio. Instead, he claimed that Justice Sabio informed him that the government has offered him (Justice Sabio) money and a promotion to the Supreme Court to favor GSIS. When Mr. De Borja asked what would it take for Justice Sabio to resist the government’s offer, Justice Sabio allegedly replied: "Fifty Million."76 He alleged that it was Justice Sabio who called up after that July 1, 2008 meeting to "feel" his reaction to the "P50 million solicitation." Justice Sabio asked him: "O, ano, kumusta, ano ang nangyayari."

Mr. De Borja admitted having given P300,000 to Justice Sabio, some 15 years ago, as a balatobecause he came to value the friendship of Justice Sabio that developed while the latter was helping the Roa family in a business transaction. Mr. De Borja earned "more than P25 million" although he received only P3 million as down payment out of the sale of 100 hectares of the Roa property. He gave the balato of 10% of the P3 million to Justice Sabio in cash at the Roa-owned bank in Cagayan de Oro. Since the Roas had a lot of "legal problems," Justice Sabio rendered advice and consultation at the time that he was an

RTC judge in Cagayan de Oro. After the promotion of Justice Sabio to the Court of Appeals, Mr. De Borja invited him for dinner. They would see each other at get-togethers of the Roas with whom Mr. De Borja is related, even at a gathering in the house of Mr. De Borja’s mother.77

On July 2, 2008, Justice Sabio that informed Presiding Justice Vasquez that he (Justice Sabio) was offered a bribe (which he rejected) to have him ousted from the Meralco case. The news allegedly shocked the Presiding Justice. Justice Sabio also went to Justice Villarama who was both "shocked and amused." Justice Sabio. did not tell them who the "offeror" was. However, a day or two later, Justice Sabio found out that Mr. De Borja had called their mutual friend, Mrs. Evelyn Clavano, who was also shocked that Mr. De Borja had "the gall to ask her" to convince Justice Sabio to accept the bribe.78

Although Justice Sabio told the Presiding Justice that the offer of P10 million to a Justice was, in the words of Justice Sabio, bastusan na ito, and he knew that bribing a Justice is a criminal act, the Presiding Justice did nothing because he could not "advise a fellow Justice on what to do" - the Justice would know what he should do. Neither did he think of consulting Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal on the chairmanship impasse.79

On July 3, 2008, to stop Mr. De Borja from pestering him with phone calls and text messages, Justice Sabio called up Mr. De Borja who told him: Mabuti naman Justice tumawag ka, kasi malapit na ang deadline ng submission ng memorandum. Pinag-isipan mo bang mabuti ang offer namin? Kasi sayang din kung di mo tatanggapin, Kasi kahit aabot itong kaso sa Supreme Court, matatalo ka din. Sayang lang ‘yung P10 million. Baka sisihin ka pa ng mga anak mo. Shocked by what he heard, Justice Sabio said "No." Since Mr. De Borja did not seem to understand why he kept saying "No," Justice Sabio explained to him: If I accept that, my conscience will bother me forever. How can I face my wife and two daughters? One a lawyer and the other a Numerary member of Opus Dei? And besides, how can I reconcile my being a member of PHILJA’s Ethics and Judicial Conduct Department; being a lecturer of the MCLE; and being a pre-bar reviewer of the Ateneo Law School on Legal and Judicial Ethics? Mr. De Borja retorted: Wala naman kaming pinapagawa sa iyo na illegal, eh. Then he added: You know Justice, after two or three weeks, makakalimutan na ito ng mga tao. Meron naman diyang mga Atenista na tumatanggap. Justice Sabio said: I don’t know about them, but I am different. Mr. De Borja then said: Well, if

you will not accept, we will be forced to look for other ways. To this, Justice Sabio said: But they will have to contend with me. In parting, Mr. De Borja said:Justice, no matter what, saludo talaga ako sa iyo.

Mr. De Borja admitted that Justice Sabio called him up, but denied the above conversation with Justice Sabio.

On July 4, 2008, the reorganization of the Court of Appeals became effective and brought Justices Reyes, Roxas and Bruselas to the Eighth Division. Justice Reyes went to see the Presiding Justice about the urgent motion for him to assume the chairmanship of the Division, which shows on its face that the Urgent Motion dated July 10, 2008 was received by the Court of Appeals at 2:08 p.m. on July 10, 2008 and by Atty. Teresita C. Custodio on July 9, 2008. Justice Reyes expressed to the Presiding Justice his apprehension that should he fail to assume the chairmanship, he would face administrative liability for nonfeasance or dereliction of duty. The Presiding Justice suggested that the respondents in the case be required to comment on the Urgent Motion "in a resolution to be issued by the former 9th Division of Justice J.L. Sabio, Jr. since to allow the new Division of Justice B.L. Reyes to issue the resolution x x x would render moot and academic" the same motion. Justice Reyes agreed and told the Presiding Justice that he would be sending over the records to him so that the Presiding Justice could place a note thereon as to what had been agreed upon. However, the records of the case did not reach the Presiding Justice.80

For Justice Roxas, the July 4, 2008 reorganization was mandatory and the Meralco case followed him as its ponente to the Eighth Division. By the reorganization, Justice Sabio was moved from the disbanded Special Ninth Division to the Sixth Division, as the reorganization did not spare any Justice.81 Moreover, the IRCA does not require that the Justices that issued a TRO be the same Justices that will render the decision.82 This is because the TRO does not appear in Section 2 (d), Rule VII of the IRCA. Accordingly, only the issuance of a preliminary injunction could be an exception to the July 4, 2008 reorganization of the CA.83 He believes the IRCA does not require that the Justices who heard the case should also decide it because the CA is a court of record and Justices may rely on the transcript of stenographic notes.84 And so, once the three Justices have signed the decision, the ponente has the "pressing duty" to promulgate the decision.85

Since July 4, 2008, Justice Bruselas alleged that he acted "on all the ponencias" of Justices Reyes and Roxas, "just as they had acted" on his ponencias.86

On July 7, 2008, the GSIS filed its memorandum.

On or about July 8, 2008, Atty. Silvia Sabio, to help her father, sought the advice of Atty. Jose Midas Marquez ("Atty. Marquez") regarding the bribery attempt. Atty. Marquez advised that Justice Sabio should write the Chief Justice about the incident, detailing not only the bribery attempt but all that has transpired relative to the chairmanship issue. Atty. Silvia Sabio immediately called her father and relayed Atty. Marquez’s advice. Later that date, Justice Sabio handed his daughter, Silvia, a handwritten letter for her to deliver to the Chief Justice.87 The handwritten letter, in essence, requested permission for Justice Sabio to "unburden" himself before the Chief Justice on the Meralco case.88

At around 2:30 p.m., Justice Reyes went to see Justice Sabio. The conversation between them, as recalled by Justice Sabio, was as follows:

· As soon as he came in, I said: "Why did you stab me behind my back?" He said, "Why, what did I do? I asked him Why is it that you have to resort to that strategy of seeking the opinion of Ed Cruz, in his personal capacity, when we could have discussed the matter with the PJ?

· I reminded him that we were seated three times near each other on different occasions only recently and he never mentioned to me about the plan to oust me.

· He said: Perhaps that was my fault. I should have talked to you.

· I told him, that all the while I thought we were friends. Why did you have to do these things behind my back and not discuss the matter with me face to face?

· Then he said it just came about due to the urgent motion; that he was afraid Meralco would take action against him for nonfeasance for not doing his job.

· It was then that I said: Are you aware that I was offered 10M for me to give way to you?

· I further asked him the following: In the first place, how was the Meralco emissary able to know that there was an impasse between you and me when that was supposed to be an internal matter?

→ If you will now insist on assuming the chairmanship after I told you of the 10Million offer, what will I think of you?

→ Are you a Trojan horse? Can you blame me if I think you are part of this whole scheme or shenanigan?

→ Does not the timing alone stink of corruption? After they failed to convince me of their offer, now they will use you to oust me? Is it because they are certain of your loyalty and they are uncertain with mine?

→ And why did they file this stupid urgent motion to assume? In my nine years in this court, I have never seen such an animal as this. This is a cowardly act, and whoever advised this stupid motion is also stupid. Why do you have to dignify such a foolish motion? They should file a motion for me to inhibit or recuse myself.

→ Why is it that Meralco actively participated in the hearing on the 23rd and never raised any question on the alleged irregularity of my having presided over the hearing?

→ Why do you insist on assuming the case? Are you not aware that several days after the issuance of the TRO, respondents filed a motion for inhibition of Justice Vicente Roxas and a motion to lift the TRO. Who then had the right to resolve such motion?

→ Under the circumstances, anong iisipin ko sa yo? Ano ang tingin ko ngayon sa iyo?

· His feeble answer was: you. He then said he did not know of those pending motions. (Incidentally, these motions were never resolved.) He also said, wala talaga akong interest dito kundi ayaw ko lang ma charge ng non-feasance for failing to do my duty.

· I answered him: Malayo yung non-feasance. Hindi ito nonfeasance. I taught the subject for many years and this is not one of them.

· So I told him, I have made my decision on the matter.Bahala ka na. Then I stood up to show him to the door. He was silent after that and before he left, he put his arm around me.

For his part, Justice Reyes kept on repeating: "Wala talaga ako dito, wala akong interest kung di yun lang hindi ako ma non-feasance. Justice Sabio thought otherwise.

Meanwhile, Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal "the final decision on the MERALCO case" bearing his signature, which he gave to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for "concurrence/dissent." According to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal, Justice Roxas explained to her the "rationale for his conclusion." Justice Roxas went out for a while and returned "with an expensive looking travelling bag" from where he pulled out the "purported final decision." Before the close of office hours, Justice Roxas returned to the chambers of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal to check if he (Justice Roxas) had signed his decision. When she replied that yes, he had signed it, Justice Roxas said he would pick it up the next day.89

Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed the decision notwithstanding that on July 8, 2008 the Court of Appeals had been reorganized because she believed that the Special Ninth Division was still existing on account of its having issued the TRO.90 She also concurred with the portion of the decision recommending administrative sanctions against the GSIS lawyers because she believed the OSG or the OGCC should have appeared for the GSIS.91

Also late that day, Justice Villarama told Justice Sabio that he had advised Justice Reyes to "lay off the case" and allow Justice Sabio "to continue" and to resolve the urgent motion for Justice Reyes to assume the chairmanship. Justice Villarama recalled that Justice Reyes repeatedly said: "Wala talaga ako dito Jun, Wala akong personal interest dito."

After "a careful and judicious study" of the more than 56-page decision of Justice Roxas, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed it. True to his word, Justice Roxas personally picked up the decision that day "purportedly for the action of the Acting Chairman, Justice Sabio," who was then on leave of absence until July 11, 200.92 Notwithstanding the fact that the parties had not submitted their respective memoranda, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed the "convincing" ponencia, including three copies of the signature page, because Justice Roxas was insistent of the urgency of the signing of the decision due to

the impending lapse of the TRO on July 29, 2008.93 Justice Sabio thought otherwise.94

However, Justice Roxas denied that the decision he gave to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was the final decision. He denied that he gave it to her for her signature. He said it was only for her to read because she asked to read it. He said it was a mere draft as "everything was unofficial" - there was no rollo or logbook with it, it was not placed in an envelope, and it did not have the "special seal" of Justice Roxas. It allegedly "was thrown in the garbage can."

On July 9, 2008, the OSG filed the memorandum for the SEC.

On July 10, 2008, Meralco filed an urgent motion praying that Justice Reyes assume the chairmanship of the Division,95 alleging the reasons for the urgent motion as follows:

5. At the scheduled oral arguments on 23 June 2008 in the instant case, the parties were first directed to one of the Hearing Rooms of the Court of Appeals. At the said room, the name plate of Justice Reyes was already placed on the table for the justices. Thus, petitioners were of the impression that the leave of absence of Justice Reyes was over and that he would be presiding over the oral arguments as Chairman of the Ninth Division of the Honorable Court.

6. However, when the parties were directed to transfer to another Room of the Court of Appeals for the oral arguments in the instant case, petitioners saw that the name plates on the table for the justices included that of Justice Sabio, Jr., together with that (sic) of Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal. Thereafter, Justice Sabio presided over the oral arguments as Chairman of the Special Ninth Division of the Honorable Court. Petitioners were, thus, of the impression that the regular Chairman of the Ninth Division, Justice Reyes, was still on temporary leave of absence.

7. Subsequently, it has come to the attention of the petitioners that Justice Reyes has already returned from his temporary leave of absence and has resumed his duties as Chairman of the Ninth Division of the Honorable Court.

8. Under the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, Justice Sabio, Jr. should now refrain from acting as the chairman of the Division hearing the instant case as he is already

disqualified from acting as such upon the return of Justice Reyes.

8.1. With due respect, Justice Reyes cannot shirk from his bounden judicial responsibility of performing his duties and functions as Chairman of the Ninth Division of the Honorable Court.

8.2. Specifically, under Section 3 (d), Rule IV of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, a case can remain with the justices who participated therein only when any of the following actions have been taken: (a) giving due course; (b) granting of a writ of preliminary injunction; (c) granting of a new trial; or (d) granting of execution pending appeal:

x x x x x x x x x.

9. None of the foregoing instances apply with respect to Justice Sabio, Jr.’s continuing hold on the case. Although Justice Sabio, Jr. was one of the Justices who issued the temporary restraining order in favour of the petitioners in the instant case, this circumstance is not among the grounds as above-quoted, when a justice of the Court of Appeals may remain in the Division.

10. As above-quoted, the rule is categorical that it is not the grant of a temporary restraining order but rather the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction that sanctions a justice’s remaining with the Division. Thus, the continued participation of Justice Sabio, Jr., in the instant case, considering the clear Rules of the Honorable Court, is not only irregular but may lead one to conclude that he is exhibiting undue interest in the instant case.

On this day, Justice Reyes reported back to work after his trip to Australia.96

On July 11, 2008, Justice Sabio was on leave when Justice Roxas called him up for a meeting to discuss the case. Justice Sabio told him that he needed ample time to read the memoranda of the parties. Justice Roxas promised to send to Justice Sabio the memoranda immediately.97

At 4:00 p.m., Justice Reyes received from the Eighth Division Clerk of Court a copy of Meralco’s Urgent Motion for him to assume the chairmanship of the Ninth Division.

On Monday, July 14, 2008 at the flag ceremony, Justice Sabio requested Justice Roxas to meet with him as he had by then read the memoranda of the parties. Justice Roxas initially agreed to the meeting but he later informed Justice Sabio that he had another matter to attend to; neither was he available in the afternoon. Justice Roxas had become scarce. Justice Sabio learned that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was also looking for Justice Roxas.98

Justice Sabio prepared a resolution on the motion for the reconsideration of the TRO and informed Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal that he wanted to discuss it with them. The resolution he prepared "never saw light."99

At 10 a.m., Justice Roxas, with his messenger, brought the rollo of CA G.R. SP No. 103692 to Justice Reyes, and told the latter that he and Justice Bruselas would be coming over to deliberate on the case. Ten minutes later, the Eighth Division deliberated on the case.100 After a cursory examination of the rollo, Justice Reyes found that the decision had been signed by Justices Roxas and Bruselas but Justice Reyes asked for more time to study the case.101

A transcript of the "Final Deliberation" on July 14, 2008 is attached to page 1926 of Volume III of therollo of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 and marked as Exh. 2- Roxas on page 279 of the rollo of A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA. According to Justice Roxas, it was he who prepared the transcript from memory to "lend credence" to the certification of Justice Reyes at the end of the decision pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution.102 Justice Reyes denied having seen it or having authorized its transcription. Justice Bruselas did not sign any transcript of the deliberation as he was not aware that a transcript was being taken. There was no stenographer present, as only the three of them, Justices Reyes, Roxas, and Bruselas were present at the deliberation. Neither was there a recording machine. Justice Roxas admittedly prepared the transcript "from memory."103

The statement attributed to Justice Reyes in the transcript that there were "previous deliberations" were "really meetings," which they had twice, in the office of Justice Reyes, according to Justice Roxas.104

On July 15, 2008, when she felt that the timing was right, Atty. Silvia Sabio testified that she handed her father’s letter to the Chief Justice through his private secretary, Ms. Jasmin

Mateo.105 A few days later, however, Presiding Justice Vasquez told Justice Sabio that the Chief Justice would no longer meet with him, as the Presiding Justice had apprised the Chief Justice about the matter.106

According to Justice Reyes, at 2:00 p.m. that day, the Office of the Presiding Justice informed him that Justice Sabio was waiting for him in his office. As soon as Justice Reyes was seated, Justice Sabio "berated" him and accused him of "orchestrating matters." Justice Sabio told him that an emissary of MERALCO had offered him P10 million to drop off the case, hence, he asked that if he was offered that much, how much could have been offered "to the principals?"107

On July 17, 2008, Justice Reyes went back to the office of the Presiding Justice and informed him of the episode in the office of Justice Sabio. He also went to ask Justice Villarama for his opinion as to who was "the rightful claimant" to the chairmanship of the Division that should decide the Meralco case. Justice Villarama allegedly replied that they "were both correct."

On July 18, 2008, at the pre-launching meeting for the CA-CMIS, Justice Villarama had a "brief chat" with Justice Bruselas. The former told the latter that "both Justices Sabio and Reyes are correct in the sense that one (1) [of] them can properly assume chairmanship either under the exception provided in Sec. 2 (d), Rule VI of the 2002 IRCA depending on the final disposition of the prayer for injunctive relief, or pursuant to the general rule enshrined in Sec. 7 (b), Rule VI."108

On July 21, 2008, Justice Roxas personally filed with the Presiding Justice109 an "Interpleader Petition"110 praying that Presiding Justice Vasquez "decide which division Chairman (Justice Sabio’s Former Special 9th Division or Justice B. L. Reyes’ 8th Division) should sign the Preliminary Injunction or Decision."111 Justice Roxas averred that "[t]he impasse between two Chairmen from two Divisions has to be resolved much earlier than July 30, 2008 because July 30, 2008 is the expiration date of the TRO issued by the Special 9th Division (signed by Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., Justice Vicente Q. Roxas [ponente] and Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal)." He opined that the two Chairpersons differed in the interpretation of Sections 1 and 2 (d) in relation to Section 5 of Rule VI on Process of Adjudication of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (IRCA).112 His stand was that the IRCA "should be strictly applied" because "[w]hen the provisions are clear, there is no room for interpretation."

Justice Roxas endorsed his "Interpleader Petition" to Justice Reyes for his "signature or dissent" to the "finalized MERALCO Decision," which had been in Justice Reyes’ possession since July 14, 2008.113 He also gave the rollo of the case to Justice Reyes.114

Presiding Justice Vasquez allegedly told Justice Roxas that as Presiding Justice, he had no authority to rule on the Interpleader Petition, which is not an administrative concern over which the Presiding Justice must intervene. Nevertheless, to avoid further discussion, the Presiding Justice told Justice Roxas that he would study the matter.115

On July 22, 2008, Justice Reyes wrote the Presiding Justice a letter on "what was discussed between us last 17 July 2008 at around 3:30 p.m."116 Apparently the Presiding Justice had suggested "to endorse the case and have the Special Ninth Division direct the respondents to file their simultaneous comments on the petitioners’ Urgent Motion (For Honorable BIENVENIDO L. REYES to Assume Chairmanship of the Division in the Instant Case) dated 10 July 2008."

Justice Reyes expressed "doubts" that the suggestion was "most prudent," as the dispute "revolves around the correct interpretation" of the IRCA. He believed that since the question was "purely internal," the CA should not seek "enlightenment" from the litigants for it would only be construed against its "competence." He shared Justice Cruz’s and Roxas’ interpretation of the IRCA. Hence, he urged the Presiding Justice to decide the matter; otherwise, he would interpret the rules according to his "best lights and act accordingly."

On July 23, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez asked for the rollo of CA G. R. No. SP No. 103692 so he could "properly submit the requested opinion." It was then that he came across the unresolved motion praying for the inhibition of Justice Roxas and the pending urgent motion to lift the TRO or to hold its enforcement in abeyance. The Presiding Justice considered the latter as a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution issuing the TRO.117

Meanwhile, at noon of that day, as Justice Reyes had not yet received "any reaction" from the Presiding Justice, he signed the decision as well as the Certification. It was promulgated on the same day.

The decision was promulgated without waiting for the Presiding Justice’s opinion on whether it was the Eighth or Special Ninth Division that should decide the case. Justice Roxas alleged that he did not expect the Presiding Justice to "answer" or resolve the matter anyway.

On July 24, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez issued his reply to Justice Reyes’ letter and Justice Roxas’ "Interpleader-Petition." The Presiding Justice claimed having doubts on whether he possessed "the authority to decide the subject conflict" simply because under the IRCA, the Presiding Justice has control and supervision only over administrative affairs of the Court. The controversy was certainly not an administrative matter but Section 11 of Rule VIII of the IRCA provides that the Presiding Justice "has the authority to act on any matter not covered" by the Rules although such action should be reported to the Court en banc.

The Presiding Justice expressed in his letter the view that "the (Special Ninth) Division that issued the temporary restraining order should continue resolving the injunctive prayer in the petition" because it was the Division that issued the Resolution granting the TRO and setting the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, aside from the fact that the parties did not contest the authority of Justice Sabio as Division Chairman at the time, although Justice Reyes had reported back to work. Moreover, the motion for inhibition and the urgent motion to lift the TRO "have a bearing" on the application of Section 2 of Rule VI of the IRCA, especially because Section 7 (b) of Rule VI118 points to the retention of the case by the Special Ninth Division. Furthermore, the new Division headed by Justice Reyes may not be allowed to resolve the pending incidents because two of its members, Justices Reyes and Bruselas did not participate in the hearing on June 23, 2008. He did not believe that Justice Reyes would be charged with dereliction of duty should he not assume the chairmanship. The Presiding Justice ended his letter with the hope that the matter would be "laid to rest" and that whoever would be dissatisfied "with its outcome may elevate the matter to the Supreme Court."

At 2:00 p.m. that day, Justice Sabio informed the Presiding Justice that a decision had been promulgated in the Meralco case the previous day. The Presiding Justice was surprised because Justices Roxas and Reyes had asked him to resolve the impasse on the Division chairmanship. Upon inquiry, the Presiding Justice found that the decision had indeed been promulgated at 4:10 p.m. on July 23, 2008.119

It was also on July 24, 2008 that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal received a call from Justice Sabio, informing her that Meralco had offered him a bribe of P10 million "in exchange for his voluntary stepping out from the Meralco case in order to give way to Justice B. L. Reyes," and that the decision in the Meralco case had been promulgated by the Eighth Division.120 Shocked that Justice Roxas did not inform her "as a matter of judicial courtesy" of the scrapping of the decision which she signed on July 8, 2008, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal wrote a letter to the Presiding Justice dated July 24, 2008,121bringing to his attention "the apparent and obvious irregularities in the handing of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692," and complaining about Justice Roxas’ "lack of judicial courtesy" in discarding for reasons she would not know, his "purported final Decision" that he had asked her to sign and which she signed "after a judicious study of the records and rollo thereof." Justice Roxas gave the lame excuse that he had "to incorporate therein some ten pages which he forgot to include in his Decision."

Justice Dimaranan-Vidal expressed "surprise and consternation" when she learned "on even date that a Decision" in the case had been promulgated on July 23, 2008 by the Eighth Division chaired by Justice Reyes, with Justices Roxas and Bruselas as members. She said:

My deepest regret is that the undersigned who already signed the supposed final draft of the Decision in the instant case which bears the signature of the ponente, was not even informed by the latter as a judicial courtesy at least, of the hurried easing out of the undersigned from the case. This inevitably posed even to an unprejudiced mind the following questions: under what basis was the case suddenly transferred to the 8th Division and why is it that neither the undersigned nor the Acting Chairman Justice SABIO, of the Special 9th Division not consulted thereof? and, foremost, what happened to the Decision which the undersigned signed after devoting her precious time and effort in carefully and laboriously examining the voluminous records and rollo of the case?

Sad to say the circumstance obtaining herein constitute a flagrant violation of the provision of Canon 5 particularly Sections 2 and 3 thereof of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC).

On July 25, 2008, Justice Bruselas wrote the Presiding Justice a letter,122 which was "prompted by a disturbing telephone call" he received from Justice Sabio in the morning of July 24, 2008.

Justice Sabio informed Justice Bruselas that, "after the injunction hearing" on June 23, 2008, Meralco offered him P10 Million "to either favor them or yield the chair" to Justice Reyes. Justice Sabio told Justice Bruselas that he had informed the Presiding Justice of the "bribery incident" and that he "was disgusted over the turn of events because he should have remained chair of the Special 9th Division that issued the TRO on the case." Justice Bruselas informed Justice Sabio that it was the first time that he heard of the matter and that he had "participated in the deliberation on the case and concurred with the ponencia" of Justice Roxas "without such information ever being taken up." Justice Sabio told Justice Bruselas that he would not leave the matter "as it is" because he would bring it up in the "open, to media, etc." Justice Sabio asked Justice Bruselas that if P10M was offered to him, how much would have been offered to the "others."

Troubled by the information, Justice Bruselas went to the Presiding Justice where Justice Dimaranan-Vidal, who had received the same call from Justice Sabio, joined them. After that meeting with the Presiding Justice, Justice Bruselas called up Justice Reyes who confirmed that he had heard about the "bribe offer" but that he did not reveal the same to Justice Bruselas as it "escaped" his mind. The effort of Justice Bruselas "to get in touch" with Justice Roxas proved futile.

Allegedly prompted by "the manner by which the decision x x x was arrived at, and how the decision was promulgated," and that unless an "immediate and thorough investigation thereon be undertaken" by the Court of Appeals, "both the individual and institutional integrity of the justices" and of the Court of Appeals would "undoubtedly be tarnished," Justice Sabio wrote on July 26, 2008 a letter123 to the Presiding Justice, which precipitated the present investigation.

On July 28, 2008, the Philippine Daily Inquirer "carried an account" of the letter of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal to the Presiding Justice, without her knowing how her confidential letter to the Presiding Justice leaked out.124

Before Justice Bruselas delivered his letter to the Presiding Justice, he received a copy of the letter of Justice Sabio and, through a telephone call, reiterated his "full agreement with his desired investigation."

The Presiding Justice called the Court of Appeals to an "emergency en banc session at 10:00 a.m. on July 31, 2008 at

the Session Hall to elicit the reaction of the Court and on the "possible effect" on the decision rendered. The session was also called in order that the "predicament experienced in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692" could be deliberated upon by the Committee on Rules with a view to amending the IRCA on the reorganization of the Court of Appeals. The Executive Justices of Cebu and Cagayan de Oro, Justices Antonio L. Villamor and Romulo V. Borja, respectively, were instructed to attend the en banc session to report to the other Justices in their stations what transpired at the session, and to "collect the personal reaction, comment or view" of the Justices on the matter.125

In its closed door en banc session on July 31, 2008, "after a torrid discussion of all the issues," the Court of Appeals decided, as follows:

(1) Refer the propriety of the actions of the Justices concerned to the Supreme Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator;

(2) Leave the matter regarding the validity of the decision rendered in the above-entitled case to the parties for them to take whatever legal steps they may deem appropriate in the usual course of procedure; and

(3) Refer the conflict in the interpretation of our Internal Rules to the Committee on Rules of the Court of Appeals in order to prevent the recurrence of a similar situation.126

After the en banc session, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal expressed in a letter for the Presiding Justice127her "strong reaction" to the paper of Justice Roxas "falsely" imputing to her "grandstanding before the media or resorting to media-recourse instead of just filing an administrative complaint before the Supreme Court," and taking exception to "the equally outrageous, revolting and baseless accusation that she is allegedly clinging" to the case. She asserted that she never leaked a copy of her letter to the Philippine Daily Inquirer, as her letter was only intended to bring to the attention of the Presiding Justice "the impropriety done by Justice Roxas in the MERALCO case" that resulted in her having been eased out of the case notwithstanding that she "carefully and judiciously" examined theponencia with more than 50 pages, after devoting her "precious time" to such study, and affixing her concurrence thereto. Justice Dimaranan-Vidal reiterated her prayer for an investigation of the matter.

Meanwhile, on that day, Mr. De Borja, executed an affidavit admitting that he was the businessman referred to by Justice Sabio, Jr. in his letter to Presiding Justice Vasquez. Mr. De Borja publicly claimed having learned "from the news" that Justice Sabio was "one of the justices" in the case arising from the order of the SEC to nullify the proxies issued in favor of the MERALCO management. He also alleged that Justice Sabio told him about the "blandishments coming from the government side," that he was being offered a promotion to the Supreme Court and money to favor the GSIS position. Mr. De Borja asked Justice Sabio, Jr., "What would it take for you to resist the government’s offer?" and that the response of Justice Sabio, Jr. was "Fifty Million."

Justice Sabio asked permission from the Presiding Justice to hold a press conference the next day on account of the publicized affidavit of Mr. De Borja. The Presiding Justice told Justice Sabio that "this is a matter of self-defense on his part," hence, the Presiding Justice cannot stop him from doing so.

Justice Sabio issued a signed statement as an "initial response" to the affidavit of Mr. De Borja, "vehemently" denying that Mr. De Borja asked him what it would take for him to inhibit from the case, and that he "never asked for money" from him.128

On August 1, 2008, Justice Sabio called the press conference to read a signed statement entitled "My Reaction to Mr. Francis De Borja’s Affidavit dated July 31, 2008 on the Meralco-SEC Case."

Expressing anger at the "filthy lie" of Mr. De Borja, Justice Sabio decided to narrate "almost word for word" his "conversations" with Mr. De Borja.

In an affidavit dated August 1, 2008, which Evelyn Clavano129 executed in Davao City, she stated that -

Francis de Borja requested me if I have the cell phone number of Justice Jose L. Sabio Jr. He related that because he was very close to the Lopezes of Meralco, he wanted to call him regarding his possible inhibition in a certain Meralco case, wherein he was designated as a substitute member of the division vice a justice who was temporarily on leave by reason of sickness. He further said that the Lopezes desire that the same Justice, with whom the Lopezes are more comfortable, to sit in the division.

So, I gave Francis de Borja the cell phone number of Justice Jose. L. Sabio, Jr. through business card.

x x x x x x x x x.

On August 4, 2008, the Supreme Court constituted the Panel of Investigators to investigate "(1) alleged improprieties of the actions of the Justices of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio V. Rosete, et al. v. SEC, et al.) and (2) the alleged rejected offer or solicitation of bribe disclosed respectively by Mr. Justice Jose Sabio and Mr. Francis de Borja."

The Panel of Investigators held hearings from August 8 to 23, 2008. Affidavits were submitted to the Panel to serve as the parties’ direct testimonies upon which they were cross-examined by the Panel and the other parties.

On September 4, 2008, the Panel of Investigators submitted its Report of even date to the Court en banc.

According to the Report, "the investigation has revealed irregularities and improprieties committed by the Court of Appeals Justices in connection with the MERALCO case, CA-G.R. SP No. 103692, which are detrimental to the proper administration of justice and damaging to the institutional integrity, independence and public respect for the Judiciary."130

Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas

Justice Roxas inexcusably failed to act on a number of motions of the parties prior to the promulgation of the Decision.

As found by the Panel of Investigators, several motions were not resolved or acted upon by Justice Roxas. These were enumerated in the Report as follows:

(a) The "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Defer Action on any Incident of the Petition Pending Resolution of Re-Raffle" filed by GSIS on May 29, 2008 soon after this case was filed on that date (Rollo, pp. 185-186).

b) GSIS’ "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Inhibit" Justice Roxas, which was filed on May 30, 2008.As the motion raised a

prejudicial question, Justice Roxas should have resolved it before issuing the TRO sought by Meralco, but he never did (Rollo, pp. 220-223).

(c) GSIS’ Motion to Lift TRO which was filed on May 30, 2008 (Rollo, pp. 187-210)

(d) GSIS’ Motion filed on June 18, 2008, praying that it be allowed to use Power point at the hearing on June 23, 2008 . On June 20, 2008, the SEC filed a similar motion. Both motions were not acted upon by Justice Roxas (Rollo, pp. 593-621,)

(e) Meralco’s "Motion for Extension of Time to file their Consolidated Memorandum of Authorities and Reply to Repondent SEC’s Comment" filed on June 25, 2008 (Rollo, pp. 981- 987).

(f) Meralco’s "Urgent Motion for Honorable Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes to Assume Chairmanship of the Division in the Instant Case," which was filed on July 10, 2008 (Rollo, pp. 1262-1274).131 (emphasis supplied)

We agree with the Panel of Investigators that "by ignoring or refusing to act on the motion for his inhibition, Justice Roxas violated Rule V, Section 3, third paragraph of the IRCA, which provides that he should resolve such motion in writing with copies furnished the other members of the Division, the Presiding Justice, the Raffle Committee, and the Division Clerk of Court." The pertinent portion of the said provision states:

Sec. 3. Motion to Inhibit a Division or a Justice. - x x x

x x x

A motion for voluntary inhibition of a Justice shall be acted upon by him alone in writing, copy furnished the other members of the Division, the Presiding Justice, the Raffle Committee and the Division Clerk of Court.

This Court cannot agree with Justice Roxas’ proposition that the issuance of the TRO constitutes an implied denial of the motion to inhibit since under IRCA the obligation of the Justice to act on such a motion is mandatory.

Furthermore, the Court finds well-taken the Panel’s finding that "Justice Roxas’ failure to act on the other motions of the

parties violated Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct (which applies in a suppletory manner to the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary) providing that:

"Rule 3.05. - A judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods."

Even Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that "[j]udges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness." Thus, it has become well-settled in jurisprudence that even just undue delay in the resolving pending motions or incidents within the reglamentary period fixed by law is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency.132 With more reason, this Court finds suspicious and reprehensible the failure of Justice Roxas to act at all on pending motions and incidents in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.

This is in fact not the first time that Justice Roxas has been cited administratively for failure to resolve pending incidents in cases assigned to him. In Orocio v. Roxas, A.M. Nos. 07-115-CA-J and CA-08-46-J, this Court imposed a P15,000 fine on Justice Roxas for unwarranted delay in resolving two motions for reconsideration in another case and sternly warned him that future commission any act of impropriety will be dealt with more severely.

Justice Roxas is guilty of gross dishonesty.

Apart from Justice Roxas’ inexcusable inaction on pending incidents in the Meralco case, the Panel of Investigators found that he had been dishonest and untruthful in relation to the said case. The Court adopts the following findings of the Panel:

2. Justice Roxas was dishonest and untruthful.

(a) Justice Roxas admitted that the "Transcript of Final Decision," which is supposed to be a transcript of the deliberation on July 14, 2008 of the Eighth Division on the final decision in the Meralco case was not a true "transcript" of the minutes of the meeting, but purely a "transcript from memory" because no notes were taken, no stenographer was present, and no tape recorder was used. It was in fact a drama which he composed "from my recollection" to comply with Sec. 9, Rule VI of the IRCA which requires that "minutes of the

meeting, i.e., deliberation, shall be kept." The so-called "transcript" is a fabrication designed to deceive that there had been compliance - when actually there was none -- with the prerequisite of the IRCA that consultation and/or deliberation among the members of the Division must precede the drafting of a decision.

(b) The statement in the "transcript" that it was a "recap from our previous deliberations" was another falsehood because there had been no previous deliberations.

(c) The reference in the "transcript" to a "Final Report of Justice Roxas" was also false for Justice Roxas admittedly did not submit a "report" as ponente , as required by Sec. 9, Rule VI of the IRCA, for deliberation by the Eighth Division on July 14, 2008. The "Final Report" which he submitted was admittedly the decision itself which he and Justice Bruselas, Jr. had already signed. The "Final Report" was merely the title of the page that served as the cover of the decision. Hence, Justice B.L. Reyes’ supposed closing statement in the "transcript" that -- "We have covered every angle of the Final Report of Justice Roxas extensively" is also false. Justice B.L. Reyes testified at the investigation that he had not seen the "transcript" until the copy in therollo was shown to him by Justice Callejo, Sr. during his cross-examination of Justice B. L. Reyes on August 26, 2008.

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Justice Roxas’ testimony that when he brought the Meralco decision to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal on July 8, 2008, it was only a draft for her to read, because she asked if she may read it, not for her to sign it, is completely false . This testimony was labelled by Justice Dimaranan-Vidal as a lie, and she called Justice Roxas a liar, because she did not ask to borrow the decision for her reading pleasure, but Justice Roxas personally brought it to her office for her to sign as a member of the Special Ninth Division. After poring over it the whole night, she signed it, as well as three (3) additional signature pages which were to be attached to three (3) other copies of the decision.133

xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, the fabrications and falsehoods that Justice Roxas blithely proferred to the Panel in explanation/justification of his questioned handling of the Meralco case demonstrated

that he lacks the qualification of integrity and honesty expected of a magistrate and a member of the appellate court.

Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, dishonesty is considered a serious offense that may warrant the penalty of dismissal from the service. Under the Rule IV, Section 52 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty is likewise considered a grave offense and warrants the penalty of dismissal even for the first offense. In the past, the Court has had the occasion to rule that:

…dishonesty and falsification are considered grave offenses warranting the penalty of dismissal from service upon the commission of the first offense. On numerous occasions, the Court did not hesitate to impose such extreme punishment on employees found guilty of these offenses.

Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service. Dishonesty has no place in the judiciary.134

Justice Roxas showed a lack of courtesy and respect for his colleagues in the Court of Appeals.

The Panel of Investigators reported on this matter in this wise:

xxx xxx xxx

(f) Justice Roxas was thoughtlessly disrespectful to a colleague and a lady at that, when he unceremoniously discarded, shredded, and burned the decision that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal had signed, because he allegedly forgot that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal and Justice Sabio, Jr. had already been "reorganized out" of the Special Ninth Division as of July 4, 2008, hence, out of the Meralco case. Out of courtesy, he should have explained to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal the reason why he was not promulgating the decision which she had signed.

The truth, it seems, is that Justice Roxas, who had consulted Justice Villarama, Jr. on which Division should decide the Meralco case, may have been

convinced that it should be the Special Ninth Division. That is why he brought his decision to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for her signature. However, somehow, somewhere, during the night, while Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was patiently poring over his decision, Justice Roxas was persuaded to bring his decision to the Eighth Division (to which he and Justice B.L. Reyes belong after the July 4, 2008 reorganization of the Court), it may have dawned on him that if the case remained in the Special Ninth Division, Justice Sabio, Jr. might dissent, requiring the Presiding Justice to constitute a special division of five. If he (Justice Roxas) should fail to obtain a majority of the Division on his side, he would lose his ponencia; someone else would become the ponente (perhaps Justice Sabio, Jr.). That may be the reason why he junked Justices Sabio, Jr. and Dimaranan-Vidal (even if the latter concurred with his decision) because he was unsure of Justice Sabio, Jr. He chose to cast his lot with his companions in the Eighth Division -- Justices B. L. Reyes and Bruselas, Jr. -- with whom he and Meralco were "comfortable".

(g) J. Roxas was disrespectful to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. whose ruling on his "Interpleader Petition" he sought on July 21, 2008, but he promulgated the Meralco decision two (2) days later, on July 23, 2008, without waiting for Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.’s ruling which came out on July 24, 2008, only three (3) days after the Interpleader Petition was filed by him, and two (2) days after Justice B.L. Reyes also reiterated in writing his request for Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. to resolve the same chairmanship issue raised in the Interpleader. Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. was embarrassed and humiliated by Justices B.L. Reyes’ and Roxas’ lack of courtesy and respect for his position as head of the Court.

xxx xxx xxx

There is an old adage which says to gain respect one must learn to give it. If judges and justices are expected to treat litigants, counsels and subordinates with respect and fairness, with more reason, that judges and justices should give their fellow magistrates the courtesy and professional regard due to them as their colleagues in the Judiciary. Thus, in Canon 5, Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are

expected to "carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties."

This Court cannot view lightly the discourteous manner that Justice Roxas, in his apparent haste to promulgate his decision in the Meralco case, treated his colleagues in the Court of Appeals. It behooves the Court to remind all magistrates that their high office demands compliance with the most exacting standards of propriety and decorum.

Justice Roxas’ questionable handling of the Meralco case demonstrates his undue interest therein.

In the Report, the Panel of Investigators observed that Justice Roxas in fact began drafting his decision even prior to the submission of the parties’ memoranda. As discussed in the Report:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) Although the parties were given 15 days after the hearing on June 23, 2008, or up to July 8, 2008, to simultaneously submit their memoranda and memoranda of authorities, and actually submitted:

On July 7, 2008 - GSIS’s 39 page- memorandum

On July 9, 2008 - SEC’s 62 page-memorandum

On July 10, 2008 - MERALCO’s 555 page- memorandum (by messenger) with memorandum of authorities

Justice Roxas prepared the decision before the parties had filed their memoranda in the case and submitted it to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for her signature on July 8, 2008. His "rush to judgment" was indicative of " undue interest and unseemly haste ," according to J.Romero.

He cheated the parties’ counsel of the time, effort, and energy that they invested in the preparation of their ponderous memoranda which, as it turned out, neither he nor the other members of the Eighth Division bothered to read before signing his decision. He made a mockery of his own order for

the parties to submit memoranda, and rendered their compliance a futile exercise.

xxx xxx xxx

(underscoring supplied)

We agree with Mme. Justice Romero’s observation that the "rush to judgment" (even before the filing of the parties’ memoranda) was indicative of Justice Roxas’ undue interest and unseemly haste, especially when taken together with other circumstances. This inexplicable haste in resolving the case on the merits is likewise apparent in Justice Roxas’ failure to resolve the several pending incidents and instead jumping ahead to deciding the case on the merits; his "rushing" of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal into signing his draft Decision on July 8, 2008 when the parties’ memoranda have not yet all been filed with the CA; his precipitate transfer of the case to the Eighth Division for promulgation of decision, without notice to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal of the Special Ninth Division who had already signed his draft Decision and despite the unresolved Chairmanship dispute between Justice Reyes and Justice Sabio which he (Justice Roxas) even submitted to the Presiding Justice for appropriate action, just a few days before the promulgation.

We reiterate here that as the visible representation of the law and justice, judges are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. This standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made.135 This Court will not hesitate to sanction with the highest penalty magistrates who exhibit manifest undue interest in their assigned cases.136

In sum, this Court finds that Justice Roxas’ multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct constitute grave misconduct, compounded by dishonesty, undue interest and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, which warrant his DISMISSAL from the service.

Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.

In the Report, the Panel found that Justice Sabio likewise committed improprieties in relation to the Meralco case.

The circumstances of the telephone call of Chairman Sabio to his brother Justice Sabio showed that Justice Sabio failed to uphold the standard of independence and propriety expected of him as a magistrate of the appellate court.

In his testimony before the Panel, Chairman Sabio admits that he called up Justice Sabio on May 30, 2008 from Davao City, in response to a resquest for help from a member of the Board of Trustees of Meralco. Notwithstanding the fact that Chairman Sabio called to relay to Justice Sabio the "rightness" of the GSIS’ cause and asked him "to help GSIS" and that Justice Sabio allegedly told his brother that he would act in accordance with his conscience, the same still constituted a violation of Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers, which provides that:

"A lawyer shall x x x refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the Court."

As they were both members of the Bar, it is incomprehensible to this Court how the brothers can justify their improper conversation regarding the Meralco case. As the Panel observed in its Report:

Ironically, both of them found nothing wrong with brother Camilo’s effort to influence his younger brother’s action in the Meralco case, because both believe that our Filipino culture allows brother-to-brother conversation, even if the purpose of one is to influence the other, provided the latter does not agree to do something illegal.137

For the Panel, Justice Sabio violated Sections 1, 4, and 5, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which provide that -

Sec. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently x x x free from extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.

Sec. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.

In the Investigators’ mind, although Justice Sabio signed the TRO in favour of Meralco contrary to his brother’s advice, Justice Sabio’s "unusual interest in holding on to the Meralco case," seemed to indicate that he may have been actually influenced by his brother "to help GSIS." In arriving at this conclusion, the Panel noted the following circumstances: (1) Justice Sabio adamantly refused to yield the chairmanship of the Special Ninth Division although the regular chairman, Justice Reyes had returned to duty on June 10, 2008; and, (2) Justice Sabio officiously prepared and signed a resolution (a chore for the ponente Justice V. Roxas to perform), requiring the GSIS and the SEC to comment on Meralco’s "Motion for Justice B. Reyes to Assume the Chairmanship of the 9th Division," which he probably intended to delay the decision on the preliminary injunction beyond the life of the TRO to the prejudice of Meralco and the advantage of the GSIS.

Based on the facts on record, the Court is wary of declaring that Justice Sabio had been influenced by his brother by speculating that he would have favored GSIS had he been a part of the division which rendered the decision in the Meralco case. However, we do find that it was improper for Justice Sabio to hold on to the chairmanship of the Ninth Division the despite the return of Justice Reyes, when Justice Sabio’s designation as acting chairman was clearly only for the duration of Justice Reyes’ leave of absence. We likewise note with disfavor his stubborn insistence on his own interpretation of the IRCA and hostile, dismissive attitude towards equally well-reasoned positions of his colleagues on the proper interpretation of their rules. Such conduct on the part of Justice Sabio did nothing to aid in the swift and amicable resolution of his dispute with Justice Reyes but rather fanned the flames of resentment between them. We deem this sort of behavior unbecoming for a magistrate of his stature.

Justice Sabio’s conversations with Mr. De Borja were improper and indiscreet.

On this matter, the Court accepts the following findings in the Report:

Knowing the nature of De Borja’s profession, Justice Sabio, Jr. should have been wary of the former. He should have foreseen that De Borja had the Meralco case on his mind when he called Justice Sabio, Jr. True enough, De Borja mentioned the Meralco case and congratulated Justice Sabio, Jr. for having signed the TRO in favour of Meralco.

But that was not the last time Justice Sabio, Jr. would hear from De Borja. A month later, after Justice Sabio, Jr. had presided at the hearing of Meralco’s prayer for preliminary injunction on June 23, 2008, and the case was ripening for decision or resolution, De Borja again called up Justice Sabio, Jr. and asked to meet him over dinner to "chit chat" about the Meralco case.

Instead of telling off De Borja that he could not, and would not, talk about the Meralco case, Justice Sabio, Jr. agreed to meet De Borja in the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School after his evening class in Legal Ethics in said school.

Justice Sabio Jr.’s action of discussing the Meralco case with De Borja was highly inappropriate and indiscreet . First, in talks with his brother; the second time in conversation with De Borja, Justice Sabio, Jr. broke the shield of confidentiality that covers the disposition of cases in the Court in order to preserve and protect the integrity and independence of the Court itself. He ignored the injunction in Canon 1, Section 8 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary that: "Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct (and discretion) in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence."

It was during that meeting with De Borja in the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School, that De Borja allegedly offered him P10 million, in behalf of Meralco, to step out of the case and allow Justice Bienvenido Reyes to assume the chairmanship of the Special Ninth Division because Meralco was "not comfortable" with him (Justice Sabio, Jr.). He rejected the bribe offer because he "could not in conscience accept it."

Justice Sabio, Jr. was allegedly shocked and insulted that De Borja would think that he (Justice Sabio, Jr.) could be bribed or bought. The Panel is, however, honestly perplexed why in spite of his outraged respectability, Justice Sabio, Jr. called up De Borja two (2) days later (on July 3, 2008), to tell De Borja to stop "pestering" him with his calls. The Panel is nonplussed because, normally, a person who has been insulted would never want to see, much less speak again, to the person who had disrespected him. He could have just shut off his cell phone to De Borja’s calls. De Borja denied that he reiterated his offer of P10 million to Justice Sabio, Jr. He denied saying that even if the case should go up to the Supreme Court, GSIS would still lose, hence, "saying lang yung P10 million; baka sisihin ka pa ng mga anak mo." He testified that his reply to Justice Sabio, Jr.’s call was "deadma" or indifference. Justice Sabio, Jr. blamed that call of his to a "lapse in judgment" on his part.

Be that as it may, the Investigating Panel finds more credible Justice Sabio, Jr.’s story about De Borja’s P10 million-bribe-offer on behalf of Meralco, than De Borja’s denial that he made such an offer. Why does the Panel believe him, and not De Borja?

First, because Justice Sabio, Jr. verbally reported the rejected bribe offer to CA Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. the next day - a fact admitted by Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.

Second, even though Justice Sabio, Jr. did not mention the bribe-offeror’s name in both his verbal and written reports to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr., De Borja identified himself to the media as the person alluded to.

Third, De Borja’s allegation, that Justice Sabio, Jr. wanted P50 million, not P10 million, is not believable, for, if Justice Sabio, Jr. quoted P50 million as his price, he would not have reported the P10 million bribe offer to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. He would have waited for Meralco’s reply to his counter-offer.138

xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, the Court agrees with the Panel that the allegation of solicitation on the part of Justice Sabio is not credible. Nevertheless, the continued communications between Justice Sabio and Mr. De Borja even after the latter’s rejected bribery attempt is highly inappropriate and shows poor judgment on the part of Justice Sabio who should have acted in

preservation of the dignity of his judicial office and the institution to which he belongs.

Premises considered, this Court is of the view that Justice Sabio’s indiscreet and imprudent conversations regarding the Meralco case with his brother and Mr. De Borja and his actuations in the chairmanship dispute with Justice Reyes constitute simple misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a justice of the Court of Appeals which warrant the penalty of two (2) months suspension without pay.

Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes.

As previously discussed, Justice Reyes appealed to Presiding Justice Vazquez in a letter dated July 22, 2008, reiterating his (Justice Reyes’) request that the Presiding Justice render an opinion which Division of the Court of Appeals - the Eighth Division with him as chairman, or the Special Ninth Division chaired by Justice Sabio should resolve the Meralco case. This was in conjunction with an Interpleader filed by Justice Roxas on the same issue with the Presiding Justice. Yet, despite the fact that the Presiding Justice informed Justices Reyes and Roxas that he would study the matter, Justices Reyes and Justice Roxas, together with Justice Bruselas, promulgated the decision in the Meralco case on July 23, 2008. Justice Reyes and Justice Roxas did not withdraw their request for a ruling nor did either of them advise the Presiding Justice beforehand of their intention to proceed with the resolution of the Meralco case. Thus, when the Presiding Justice issued his ruling on the chairmanship dispute on July 24, 2008, he was unaware of the promulgation of the Meralco decision on July 23, 2008, under the aegis of Justice Reyes’ Eighth Division. As found by the Panel, "Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. was completely taken aback when he learned about it on July 24, 2008, the same day that he issued his opinion on the chairmanship issue which by then had become functus oficio. He felt belittled and humiliated by the discourtesy of the two justices to him."

It bears repeating here that under Canon 5, Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are mandated to show the appropriate consideration and respect for their colleagues in the Judiciary.

Thus, we adopt the finding of the Panel on this point and find Justice Reyes guilty of simple misconduct, which is mitigated

by the fact that he repeatedly asked Presiding Justice Vasquez to act on his request to rule on the conflicting interpretation of the IRCA. However, Justice Reyes should be reprimanded for taking part in the decision of the subject case without awaiting the ruling of the Presiding Justice.

Findings regarding the conduct of Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal

The Court finds well-taken and adopts the findings of the Panel of Investigators, to wit:

Justice Dimaranan-Vidal deviated from the IRCA when she allowed herself to be rushed by Justice Roxas to sign the Meralco decision on July 8, 2008, without reading the parties’ memoranda and without the deliberation among members of the Division required by the IRCA. She knew that the TRO would not expire until July 30, 2008 - some three (3) weeks away from July 8, 2008 - yet she allowed herself to believe Justice Roxas’ misrepresentation that signing the decision was urgent. Her compliance with certain dissembling practices of other justices of the Court, in violation of the IRCA, showed weakness and lack of independence on her part.139

The following sections of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct are instructive in this regard:

SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.

SEC. 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent from judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently.

Allowing a fellow justice to induce her to deviate from established procedure constitutes conduct unbecoming a justice for which Justice Dimaranan-Vidal should be

ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of her judicial duties.

Findings regarding the conduct of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez

It is the view of the Panel of Investigators that Presiding Justice Vasquez failed to provide the leadership expected of him as head of the Court of Appeals. The following quote from the Report summarizes the perceived lapses on the part of the Presiding Justice:

Clearly, Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. had been indecisive in dealing with the turmoil arising from the Meralco case. He vacillated and temporized on resolving the impasse between Justice Sabio, Jr. and Justice B. L. Reyes over the chairmanship of the Division that should hear and decide the Meralco case. He failed to take action on the reported bribe-offer by Meralco to J. Sabio, Jr. He hesitated to assert his leadership of the Court even when the parties repeatedly urged him to lay down the rule for them to follow. Was he hampered by the fact that he has relatives - two daughters - employed in the GSIS, and a sister who is a consultant thereof? He pleaded lack of authority. Was he not aware then, or did he discover too late, that under Section 11, Rule VIII of the IRCA, he is in fact authorized to act "on any matter" involving the Court and its members? That Rule provides:

Sec. 11. x xx the Presiding Justice or any one acting in his place is authorized to act on any matter not covered by these Rules. Such action shall, however, be reported to the Court en banc.

He should have convened the Court en banc as soon asthe alleged bribery attempt on Justice Sabio, Jr. was reported to him, for it was an attempt to corrupt a member of the Court, calling for the "protection and preservation of the integrity of the judicial processes" of the Court, hence, an administrative matter cognizable by the Court en banc. Section 5 (c), Rule I of the IRCA, provides:

Sec. 5. Matters cognizable by the Court en banc.- The Court en banc

shall, inter alia:

(a) x x x(b) Adopt uniform administrative measures, procedures, and policies for the protection and preservation of the integrity of the judicial processes, x x x.Presiding Justice Vasquez admitted his "lapses in judgment."140

In the light of the foregoing observations of the Panel, this Court is of the view that much of the trouble now being faced by the Court of Appeals could have been averted by timely, judicious and decisive action on the part of the Presiding Justice. Certainly, this unpleasant and trying episode in failure to act in the early part of his tenure as Presiding Justice has indelibly impressed upon him what is required of him as leader of the second highest court in the land. Nevertheless, Presiding Justice Vasquez is hereby severely reprimanded for his failure to act promptly and decisively on the controversy as required of him by the IRCA.Findings regarding other personalities involved in the Meralco caseAlthough the Presiding Justice in his letter dated August 1, 2008 only referred to this Court "the propriety of the actions of the Justices concerned" in the Meralco case, we cannot simply turn a blind eye to the facts brought to light during the investigation that relate to potential liabilities of other personalities in the Meralco case.With respect to Chairman Sabio, this Court has the power to discipline members of the Bar and his attempt to influence a member of the Judiciary, his brother at that, should be referred to the Bar Confidant for appropriate action.With respect to Mr. De Borja, the present investigation has given this Court reason to believe that Mr. De Borja may be criminally liable for his attempt to bribe a magistrate of the Court of Appeals. This matter should be referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, this per curiam decision was reached after deliberation of the Court en banc. At the outset, the offer of three (3) members of the Court to recuse themselves was denied by the Court. Except for two members of the Court who were allowed to inhibit themselves from the case, the Justices voted as follows: Twelve Justices voted for the dismissal from service of Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas and one (1) voted for his suspension from the service for six (6) months. Ten (10) Justices voted for two (2) month suspension from service without pay of Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, one (1) voted for six-month suspension, one (1) for reprimand only as he should be credited for being a "whistle blower" and one (1) for his dismissal from the service. Eight (8) Justices voted to reprimand Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and five (5)

for his suspension from the service for one (1) month. As to the rest, the voting was unanimous.WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES as follows:(1) Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas is found guilty of multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, grave misconduct, dishonesty, undue interest and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and is DISMISSED from the service, with FORFEITURE of all benefits, except accrued leave credits if any, with prejudice to his re-employment in any branch or service of the government including government-owned and controlled corporations;(2) Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. is found guilty of simple misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a justice of the Court of Appeals and is SUSPENDED for two (2) months without pay, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;(3) Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. is SEVERELY REPRIMANDED for his failure to act promptly and decisively in order to avert the incidents that damaged the image of the Court of Appeals, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;

(4) Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes is found guilty of simple misconduct with mitigating circumstance and is REPRIMANDED, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;(5) Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal is found guilty of conduct unbecoming a Justice of the Court of Appeals and is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the discharge of her judicial duties.(6) PCGG Chairman Camilo L. Sabio’s act to influence the judgment of a member of the Judiciary in a pending case is hereby referred to the Bar Confidant for appropriate action;(7) Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.’s charge against Mr. Francis R. De Borja for attempted bribery of a member of the Judiciary is hereby referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.

This Decision shall take effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 175888. February 11, 2009.]

SUZETTE NICOLAS y SOMBILON, petitioner, vs. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; RAUL GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice; EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local Government; SERGIO APOSTOL, in his capacity as Presidential Legal Counsel; and L/CPL. DANIEL SMITH, respondents.

[G.R. No. 176051. February 11, 2009.]

JOVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, JOSE DE LA RAMA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., FLORIN HILBAY, and BENJAMIN POZON, petitioners, vs. DANIEL SMITH, SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL SERGIO APOSTOL, SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, The Special 16th Division of the COURT OF APPEALS, and all persons acting in their capacity, respondents.

[G.R. No. 176222. February 11, 2009.]

BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), represented by Dr. Carol Araullo; GABRIELA, represented by Emerenciana de Jesus; BAYAN MUNA, represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo; GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, represented by Rep. Liza Maza; KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU), represented by Elmer Labog; KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), represented by Willy Marbella; LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), represented by Vencer Crisostomo; and THE PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER, represented by Atty. Rachel Pastores, petitioners, vs. PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as concurrent Defense Secretary, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, AND INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, respondents.D E C I S I O NAZCUNA, J p:

These are petitions for certiorari, etc. as special civil actions and/or for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in

Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith v. Hon. Benjamin T. Pozon, et al., in CA-G.R. SP No. 97212, dated January 2, 2007. HSEcTC

The facts are not disputed.

Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the United States Armed Forces. He was charged with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, petitioner herein, sometime on November 1, 2005, as follows:

The undersigned accused LCpl. Daniel Smith, Ssgt. Chad Brian Carpentier, Dominic Duplantis, Keith Silkwood and Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr. of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353, upon a complaint under oath filed by Suzette S. Nicolas, which is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as Annex "A", committed as follows:

"That on or about the First (1st) day of November 2005, inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Olongapo City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused's (sic), being then members of the United States Marine Corps, except Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr., conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with lewd design and by means of force, threat and intimidation, with abuse of superior strength and taking advantage of the intoxication of the victim, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sexually abuse and have sexual intercourse with or carnal knowledge of one Suzette S. Nicolas, a 22-year old unmarried woman inside a Starex Van with Plate No. WKF-162, owned by Starways Travel and Tours, with Office address at 8900 P. Victor St., Guadalupe, Makati City, and driven by accused Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr., against the will and consent of the said Suzette S. Nicolas, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW." 1

Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, entered into on February 10, 1998, the United States, at its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith pending the proceedings.

During the trial, which was transferred from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zambales to the RTC of Makati for security reasons, the United States Government faithfully complied with its undertaking to bring defendant Smith to the trial court every time his presence was required.

On December 4, 2006, the RTC of Makati, following the end of the trial, rendered its Decision, finding defendant Smith guilty, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the prosecution to adduce sufficient evidence against accused S/SGT. CHAD BRIAN CARPENTER, L/CPL. KEITH SILKWOOD AND L/CPL. DOMINIC DUPLANTIS, all of the US Marine Corps assigned at the USS Essex, are hereby ACQUITTED to the crime charged. EcTIDA

The prosecution having presented sufficient evidence against accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH, also of the US Marine Corps at the USS Essex, this Court hereby finds him GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of RAPE defined under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, and, in accordance with Article 266-B, first paragraph thereof, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with the accessory penalties provided for under Article 41 of the same Code.

Pursuant to Article V, paragraph No. 10, of the Visiting Forces Agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States, accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH shall serve his sentence in the facilities that shall, thereafter, be agreed upon by appropriate Philippine and United States authorities. Pending agreement on such facilities, accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH is hereby temporarily committed to the Makati City Jail.

Accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH is further sentenced to indemnify complainant SUZETTE S. NICOLAS in the amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages plus P50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED. 2

As a result, the Makati court ordered Smith detained at the Makati jail until further orders.

On December 29, 2006, however, defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine law enforcement agents, purportedly acting under orders of the Department of the Interior and Local Government, and brought to a facility for detention under the control of the United States government, provided for under new agreements between the Philippines and the United States, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 19, 2006 which states: SEAHcT

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America agree that, in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed between our two nations, Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine Corps, be returned to U.S. military custody at the U.S. Embassy in Manila.

(SGD.) KRISTIE A. KENNEY (SGD.) ALBERTO G. ROMULORepresentative of the United Representative of the RepublicStates of America of the Philippines

DATE: 12-19-06 DATE: December 19, 2006

and the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 22, 2006 which states:

The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines and the Embassy of the United States of America agree that, in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed between the two nations, upon transfer of Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine Corps, from the Makati City Jail, he will be detained at the first floor, Rowe (JUSMAG) Building, U.S. Embassy Compound in a room of approximately 10 x 12 square feet. He will be guarded round the clock by U.S. military personnel. The Philippine police

and jail authorities, under the direct supervision of the Philippine Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) will have access to the place of detention to ensure the United States is in compliance with the terms of the VFA.

The matter was brought before the Court of Appeals which decided on January 2, 2007, as follows:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, we resolved to DISMISS the petition for having become moot. 3

Hence, the present actions.

The petitions were heard on oral arguments on September 19, 2008, after which the parties submitted their memoranda.

Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of defendant L/CPL Smith because, first of all, the VFA is void and unconstitutional. EHSAaD

This issue had been raised before, and this Court resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the VFA. This was in Bayan v. Zamora, 4 brought by Bayan, one of petitioners in the present cases.

Against the barriers of res judicata vis-à-vis Bayan, and stare decisis vis-à-vis all the parties, the reversal of the previous ruling is sought on the ground that the issue is of primordial importance, involving the sovereignty of the Republic, as well as a specific mandate of the Constitution.

The provision of the Constitution is Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 which states:

Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so

requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

The reason for this provision lies in history and the Philippine experience in regard to the United States military bases in the country.

It will be recalled that under the Philippine Bill of 1902, which laid the basis for the Philippine Commonwealth and, eventually, for the recognition of independence, the United States agreed to cede to the Philippines all the territory it acquired from Spain under the Treaty of Paris, plus a few islands later added to its realm, except certain naval ports and/or military bases and facilities, which the United States retained for itself.

This is noteworthy, because what this means is that Clark and Subic and the other places in the Philippines covered by the RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947 were not Philippine territory, as they were excluded from the cession and retained by the US.

Accordingly, the Philippines had no jurisdiction over these bases except to the extent allowed by the United States. Furthermore, the RP-US Military Bases Agreement was never advised for ratification by the United States Senate, a disparity in treatment, because the Philippines regarded it as a treaty and had it concurred in by our Senate. TSIDEa

Subsequently, the United States agreed to turn over these bases to the Philippines; and with the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the territory covered by these bases were finally ceded to the Philippines.

To prevent a recurrence of this experience, the provision in question was adopted in the 1987 Constitution.

The provision is thus designed to ensure that any agreement allowing the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in Philippine territory shall be equally binding on the Philippines and the foreign sovereign State involved. The idea is to prevent a recurrence of the situation in which the terms and conditions governing the presence of foreign armed forces

in our territory were binding upon us but not upon the foreign State.

Applying the provision to the situation involved in these cases, the question is whether or not the presence of US Armed Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to the VFA is allowed "under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State".

This Court finds that it is, for two reasons. aEIcHA

First, as held in Bayan v. Zamora, 5 the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States government.

The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate does not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal United States law. Notice can be taken of the internationally known practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate for advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in nature, whereas those that carry out or further implement these policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under the provisions of the so-called Case-Zablocki Act, within sixty days from ratification. 6

The second reason has to do with the relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed and duly ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the United States Senate.

The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty states: 7

MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Signed at Washington, August 30, 1951.

The Parties of this Treaty

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the

United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area.

Recalling with mutual pride the historic relationship which brought their two peoples together in a common bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side-by-side against imperialist aggression during the last war. CEHcSI

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area.

Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area.

Agreeing that nothing in this present instrument shall be considered or interpreted as in any way or sense altering or diminishing any existing agreements or understandings between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America.

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I. The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relation from the threat or use of force in any

manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. IDAESH

ARTICLE II. In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE III. The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty and whenever in the opinion of either of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific.

ARTICLE IV. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE V. For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean, its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

ARTICLE VI. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VII. This Treaty shall be ratified by the Republic of the Philippines and the United Nations of America in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Manila.

ARTICLE VIII. This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other party. HScDIC

IN WITHNESS * WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at Washington this thirtieth day of August, 1951.

For the Republic of the Philippines:

(Sgd.) CARLOS P.

ROMULO

(Sgd.) JOAQUIN M. ELIZALDE

(Sgd.) VICENT

E J. FRANCISCO

(Sgd.) DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL

For the United States of America:

(Sgd.

) DEAN ACHESON

(Sgd.) JOHN FOSTER DULLES

(Sgd.)

TOM CONNALLY

(Sgd.) ALEXANDER WILEY 8

Clearly, therefore, joint RP-US military exercises for the purpose of developing the capability to resist an armed attack fall squarely under the provisions of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. The VFA, which is the instrument agreed upon to provide for the joint RP-US military exercises, is simply an implementing agreement to the main RP-US Military Defense Treaty. The Preamble of the VFA states: EIDTAa

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to strengthen international and regional security in the Pacific area;

Reaffirming their obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951;

Noting that from time to time elements of the United States armed forces may visit the Republic of the Philippines;

Considering that cooperation between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines promotes their common security interests;

Recognizing the desirability of defining the treatment of United States personnel visiting the Republic of the Philippines;

Have agreed as follows: 9

Accordingly, as an implementing agreement of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, it was not necessary to submit the VFA to the US Senate for advice and consent, but merely to the US Congress under the Case — Zablocki Act within 60 days of its ratification. It is for this reason that the US has certified that it recognizes the VFA as a binding international agreement, i.e., a treaty, and this substantially complies with the requirements of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of our Constitution. 10

The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution, is complied with by virtue of the fact that the presence of the US Armed Forces through the VFA is a presence "allowed under" the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Since the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty itself has been ratified and concurred in by both the Philippine Senate and the US Senate, there is no

violation of the Constitutional provision resulting from such presence. IcDESA

The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions.

The VFA provides that in cases of offenses committed by the members of the US Armed Forces in the Philippines, the following rules apply:

Article VCriminal Jurisdiction

xxx xxx xxx

6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United States military authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial proceedings. United States military authorities shall, upon formal notification by the Philippine authorities and without delay, make such personnel available to those authorities in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the offense with which the person has been charged. In extraordinary cases, the Philippine Government shall present its position to the United States Government regarding custody, which the United States Government shall take into full account. In the event Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one year, the United States shall be relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The one year period will not include the time necessary to appeal. Also, the one year period will not include any time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed because United States authorities, after timely notification by Philippine authorities to

arrange for the presence of the accused, fail to do so.

Petitioners contend that these undertakings violate another provision of the Constitution, namely, that providing for the exclusive power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure for all courts in the Philippines (Art. VIII, Sec. 5[5]). They argue that to allow the transfer of custody of an accused to a foreign power is to provide for a different rule of procedure for that accused, which also violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution (Art. III, Sec. 1.).

Again, this Court finds no violation of the Constitution.

The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial basis for a different treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all other accused. 11 cda

The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter one's territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The Status of Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around the world vary in terms and conditions, according to the situation of the parties involved, and reflect their bargaining power. But the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties. 12

As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure is curtailed or violated, but rather one in which, as is normally encountered around the world, the laws (including rules of procedure) of one State do not extend or apply — except to the extent agreed upon — to subjects of another State due to the recognition of extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies as visiting foreign armed forces.

Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or some aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to long-recognized subjects of such immunity like Heads of State, diplomats and members of the armed forces contingents of a foreign State allowed to enter another State's territory. On the contrary, the Constitution states that the Philippines adopts the generally

accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. (Art. II, Sec. 2). HCEaDI

Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different treatment when it comes to detention as against custody. The moment the accused has to be detained, e.g., after conviction, the rule that governs is the following provision of the VFA:

Article VCriminal Jurisdiction

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippines and United States authorities. United States personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall have the right to visits and material assistance.

It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody during the trial and detention after conviction, because they provided for a specific arrangement to cover detention. And this specific arrangement clearly states not only that the detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, but also that the detention shall be "by Philippine authorities". Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the detention of the accused in the United States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not "by Philippine authorities".

Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and negotiate with representatives of the United States towards an agreement on detention facilities under Philippine authorities as mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA.

Next, the Court addresses the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Medellin v. Texas (552 US ____ No. 06-984, March 25, 2008), which held that treaties entered into by the United States are not automatically part of their domestic law unless these treaties are self-executing or there

is an implementing legislation to make them enforceable. TAESDH

On February 3, 2009, the Court issued a Resolution, thus:

"G.R. No. 175888 (Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon v. Alberto Romulo, et al.); G.R. No. 176051 (Jovito R. Salonga, et al. v. Daniel Smith, et al.); and G.R. No. 176222 (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan [BAYAN], et al. v. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.).

The parties, including the Solicitor General, are required to submit within three (3) days a Comment/Manifestation on the following points:

1. What is the implication on the RP-US Visiting Forces Agreement of the recent US Supreme Court decision in Jose Ernesto Medellin v. Texas, dated March 25, 2008, to the effect that treaty stipulations that are not self-executory can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect; and that, while treaties may comprise international commitments, they are not domestic law unless Congress has enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be "self-executory" and is ratified on these terms?

2. Whether the VFA is enforceable in the US as domestic law, either because it is self-executory or because there exists legislation to implement it.

3. Whether the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951 was

concurred in by the US Senate and, if so, is there proof of the US Senate advice and consent resolution? Peralta, J., no part."

After deliberation, the Court holds, on these points, as follows:

First, the VFA is a self-executing Agreement, as that term is defined in Medellin itself, because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely because the Agreement is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to produce L/CPL Smith before the court during the trial.

Secondly, the VFA is covered by implementing legislation, namely, the Case-Zablocki Act, USC Sec. 112 (b), inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be immediately implemented. The parties to these present cases do not question the fact that the VFA has been registered under the Case-Zablocki Act. DaCTcA

In sum, therefore, the VFA differs from the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the Avena decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), subject matter of the Medellin decision. The Convention and the ICJ decision are not self-executing and are not registrable under the Case-Zablocki Act, and thus lack legislative implementing authority.

Finally, the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was advised and consented to by the US Senate on March 20, 1952, as reflected in the US Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, Second Session, Vol. 98 — Part 2, pp. 2594-2595.

The framers of the Constitution were aware that the application of international law in domestic courts varies from country to country.

As Ward N. Ferdinandusse states in his Treatise, DIRECT APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS, some countries require legislation whereas others do not.

It was not the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting Article XVIII, Sec. 25, to require the other contracting State to convert their system to achieve alignment and parity with ours. It was simply required that the treaty be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. With that, it becomes for both parties a binding international obligation and the enforcement of that obligation is left to the normal recourse and processes under international law.

Furthermore, as held by the US Supreme Court in Weinberger v. Rossi, 13 an executive agreement is a "treaty" within the meaning of that word in international law and constitutes enforceable domestic law vis-à-vis the United States. Thus, the US Supreme Court in Weinberger enforced the provisions of the executive agreement granting preferential employment to Filipinos in the US Bases here.

Accordingly, there are three types of treaties in the American system:

1. Art. II, Sec. 2 treaties — These are advised and consented to by the US Senate in accordance with Art. II, Sec. 2 of the US Constitution. HScAEC

2. Executive-Congressional Agreements: These are joint agreements of the President and Congress and need not be submitted to the Senate.

3. Sole Executive Agreements. — These are agreements entered into by the President. They are to be submitted to Congress within sixty (60) days of ratification under the provisions of the Case-Zablocki Act, after which they are recognized by the Congress and may be implemented.

As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given under it and this can only be done through implementing legislation. The VFA itself is another form of implementation of its provisions.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED, and the Court of Appeals' Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97212 dated January 2, 2007 is MODIFIED. The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, entered into on February 10, 1998, is UPHELD as constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006 are DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA, and respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs is hereby ordered to forthwith negotiate with the United States representatives for the appropriate agreement on detention facilities under Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA, pending which the status quo shall be maintained until further orders by this Court.

The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve without delay the related matters pending therein, namely, the petition for contempt and the appeal of L/CPL Daniel Smith from the judgment of conviction.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Corona, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro and Brion, JJ., concur.

Puno, C.J., see dissenting opinion.

Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.

Austria-Martinez, J., I join the Chief Justice and Justice Carpio in their dissenting opinions.

Carpio-Morales, J., I join the dissents of Chief Justice Puno and Justice Carpio.

Nachura, J., took no part. Signed pleading as Solicitor General.

Peralta, J., took no part.

||| (Nicolas y Sombilon v. Romulo, G.R. No. 175888, 176051, 176222, February 11, 2009)

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 198-J. May 31, 1971.]

PAZ M. GARCIA, complainant, vs. HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., respondent.

SYLLABUS1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE; IN CASE AT BAR, RESPONDENT'S RECEIPT OF SALARIES WITHOUT ACTUALLY PERFORMING HIS DUTIES AS JUDGE NOT DISHONESTY. — Complainant's theory is that respondent collected or received salaries as judge when in fact he has never acted as such, since the date he took his oath up to the filing of the complaint. In the sense that respondent has not yet performed any judicial function, it may be admitted that respondent has not really performed the duties of judge. What is lost sight of, however, is that after taking his oath and formally assuming his position as judge, respondent had a perfect right to earn the salary of a judge even in the extreme supposition that he did not perform any judicial function for he could, while preparing himself for his new job or for any good reason, take a leave, as in fact, he had planned to do, were it not for the request of the Secretary of Justice for him to forego the idea and, instead, help the Department in whatever way possible which would not, it must be presumed impair his position as a judge. This is more so, when, as in this case, the government offices or officers in duty bound to furnish him the necessary place and facilities for his court and the performance of his functions have failed to provide him

therewith without any fault on his part. That respondent took it upon himself to personally work for early action on the part of the corresponding officials in this direction and, in his spare time made himself available to the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary, what with his vast experience, having worked therein for sixteen years, is, far from being dishonesty, to his credit. In the circumstances, it was certainly not improper that he rendered some kind of service to the government, since he was receiving salaries, while being unable to perform his regular duties as judge without any fault on his part.

2. ID.; ID.; SECTIONS 5, 55 AND 58 OF THE JUDICIARY ACT AND CIRCULAR NO. 10 DATED FEBRUARY 6, 1952 OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; APPLICABLE ONLY TO JUDGES ACTUALLY HOLDING TRIALS AND HEARINGS AND MAKING DECISIONS AND ORDERS. — Admittedly respondent has not prepared and submitted any of the reports of accomplishments and status of cases in his sala which are usually required of judges under existing laws as well as the corresponding circulars of the Department of Justice. The reason is simple. He has not yet started performing any judicial functions. None of those laws and circulars apply to him, for all of them contemplate judges who are actually holding trials and hearings and making decisions and orders. On the other hand, respondent could not be blamed for taking his oath as he did, for he had a valid confirmed appointment in his favor. In other words, he simply made himself available for the purposes for which he was appointed. That he could not actually hold office in the court to which he was appointed was not of his making. The other officials in charge of providing him therewith seem to have been caught unprepared and have not had enough time to have it ready. Conceivably, under the law, with the permission of this Court, respondent could have been assigned to another court pending all these preparations, but that is something within the initiative and control of the Secretary of Justice and not of the respondent.

3. POLITICAL LAW; DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS; LIMITS OF COLLABORATION OF JUDGE WITH OFFICERS OR OFFICES UNDER THE OTHER GREAT DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT. — Of course, none of these is to be taken as meaning that this Court looks with favor at the practice of long standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may

do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service. The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on check and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or this Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, this Court feels very strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued.

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS; PRINCIPLE EMBODIED IN DOCTRINE; REASON FOR DOCTRINE. — The doctrine of separation of powers, a basic concept under our Constitution, embodies the principle of a tripartite division of governmental authority entrusted to Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court as well as such inferior courts as may be created by law. Three departments of government are thus provided for, the legislative vested with the lawmaking function, the executive with the enforcement of what has been thus enacted, and the judiciary with the administration of justice, deciding cases according to law. The reason for such a doctrine is to assure liberty, no one branch being enabled to arrogate unto itself the whole power to govern and thus in a position to impose its unfettered will. If it were so, the rights of the individual could with impunity be disregarded; he could be placed at its mercy. The three departments are coordinate and coequal, each having exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and supreme in its own sphere. That is to guarantee independence, no interference being allowed on matters left to the exclusive concern of each. Much less is control by only

one of the three departments of any or both of the others permissible.

2. ID.; ID.; MEMBER OF JUDICIARY SHOULD NOT ASSUME A POSITION OR PERFORM A DUTY NON-JUDICIAL IN CHARACTER; RATIONALE THEREFOR. — While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less . . . Our holding today has been foreshadowed in Noblejas v. Teehankee, a 1968 decision. Justice J.B.L. Reyes who penned the opinion, first referred to the above Richardson decision as well as to Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co. It went on to state: "In this spirit, it has been held that the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions, and a law requiring the Supreme Court to arbitrate disputes between public utilities was pronounced void in Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co. (57 Phil. 600)." It is clear from the above Noblejas decision that even prior to the Constitution, there was a commitment to the principle that a member of the judiciary cannot be asked to discharge non-judicial functions. For in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co., mentioned therein, Justice Malcolm, speaking for this Court, was quite explicit. Thus: "The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions."

R E S O L U T I O NBARREDO, J p:Administrative complaint filed by one Paz M. Garcia against the Honorable Catalino Macaraig, Jr., formerly Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI, now Undersecretary of Justice, in his former capacity as judge, for

alleged "dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge . . . gross incompetence, violation of Republic Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, (particularly) Sections 5, 55 and 58 thereof, committed (allegedly) as follows:

"2. That from July 1, 1970 up to February 28, 1971 inclusive, as such incumbent Judge, respondent herein, has not submitted his monthly reports containing the number of cases filed, disposed of, decided and/or resolved, the number of cases pending decisions for one month, two months to over three months, together with the title, number, number of hours of court session held a day, etc., as evidenced by the certificate issued by Hon. Eulalio D. Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, Dept. of Justice, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex 'A', Item No. 1, in violation of Circular No. 10 of the Dept. of Justice dated February 6, 1952, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex 'B';

"3. That he has not submitted his certificate of service (New Judicial Form No. 86, Revised 1966) from July to December, 1970 and from January to February, 1971 inclusive as evidenced by the certificate issued by Judge Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, Dept. of Justice Annex 'A', Item No. 2 thereof;

"4. That as incumbent Judge of Branch VI, Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo and knowing fully well that he has never performed his official duties or discharged the duties appertaining to his office, he has collected and was paid his salaries from July to December, 1970 and from January to February 1971 as evidenced by the certificate issued by the cashier Mrs. Santos of the Department of Justice hereto attached as Annex 'C' and the certificate of Mr. Pichay Annex 'A', last paragraph thereof, aggravated by his repeated failure to submit the certificate of service in flagrant violation of section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended which provides as follows:

'. . . District judges, judges of City Courts, and municipal Judges shall certify on their application for leave, and upon salary vouchers presented by them for payment, or upon the payrolls upon which their salaries are paid, that all special proceedings,

applications, petitions, motions, and all civil and criminal cases which have been under submission for decision or determination for a period of ninety days or more have been determined and decided on or before the date of making the certificate and . . . x no salary shall be paid without such certificate' (Emphasis supplied).

"5. That his deliberate failure to submit the monthly reports from July to December, 1970 and from January, 1971 to February, 1971 stating therein the number of hours of session that the Court holds daily, the accomplishments of the Court constitutes a clear violation of Sections 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.

"6. That by his deliberate violation of his Oath of Office as a District Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo, Branch VI he has manifested such moral bankruptcy as to deny his fitness to perform or discharge official duties in the administration of justice.

"7. That on June 29, 1970, respondent Judge wrote to the Honorable Secretary of Justice informing him that he was entering upon the performance of his duties, which letter of his reads in full:

'I have the honor to inform you that I am entering upon the performance of the duties of the office of Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City (Branch VI) today, June 29, 1970.'

"That such actuation of deliberately telling a deliberate falsehood aggravates his moral bankruptcy incompatible to the requirements of the highest degree of honesty, integrity and good moral character appertaining to holding the position of Judge in the administration of justice."

Upon being so required, in due time, respondent filed an answer alleging pertinently that:

"THE FACTS

"Respondent took his oath as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City with station at Calamba on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch. After consultations with the officials of the province of Laguna, the municipality of Calamba and the Department of Justice, respondent decided to accept the offer of the Calamba Municipal Government to supply the space for the courtroom and offices of the court; to utilize the financial assistance promised by the Laguna provincial government for the purchase of the necessary supplies and materials; and to rely on the national government for the equipment needed by the court (Under Section 190 of the Revised Administrative Code, all these items must be furnished by the provincial government. The provincial officials of Laguna, however, informed the respondent that the province was not in a position to do so).

"As to the space requirements of the court, the Municipal Mayor of Calamba assured the respondent that the court could be accommodated in the west wing of the Calamba municipal building as soon as the office of the municipal treasurer and his personnel are transferred to another location. When the projected transfer of the municipal treasurer's office was about to be effected, the treasurer and several municipal councilors objected. The municipal mayor then requested the respondent to look over some of the office spaces for rent in Calamba, with the commitment that the municipal government will shoulder the payment of the rentals. Respondent's first choice was the second floor of the Republic Bank branch in Calamba, but the negotiations failed when the owner of the building refused to reduce the rent to P300 a month. The next suitable space selected by respondent was the second floor of the Laguna Development Bank. After a month's negotiations, the municipality finally signed a lease agreement with the owner on October 26, 1970. Another month passed before the municipal government could release the amount necessary for the improvements to convert the space that was rented, which was a big hall without partitions, into a courtroom and offices for the personnel of the court and for the assistant

provincial fiscal. Thereafter, upon respondent's representations, the provincial government appropriated the amount of P5,000 for the purchase of the supplies and materials needed by the court. Early in December, 1970 respondent also placed his order for the necessary equipment with the Property Officer of the Department of Justice but, unfortunately, the appropriation for the equipment of courts of first instance was released only on December 23, 1970 and the procurement of the equipment chargeable against this allotment is still under way (please see enclosed certification of the Financial Officer of the Department of Justice marked Annex 'A').

"When respondent realized that it would be sometime before he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the Department of Justice, respondent had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, prevailed upon respondent to forego his leave and instead to assist him, without being extended a formal detail, whenever respondent was not busy attending to the needs of his court.

"Charges Have No Basis —

"Complainant has charged respondent with dishonesty, violation of his oath of office, grave incompetence and violation of Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act.

"It is respectfully submitted that —

"A. Respondent's inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances mentioned above does not constitute incompetence. Respondent was, like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being 'a judge without a sala', but forces and circumstances beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties.

"B. Respondent's collection of salaries as judge does not constitute dishonesty because aside from the time, effort and money he spent in organizing the CFI at Calamba, he worked in the Department of Justice (please see enclosed certification of Undersecretary of Justice Guillermo S. Santos marked Annex 'B'). Indeed, even if respondent did no more than exert efforts to organize his court, he could, as other judges have done, have collected his salaries as judge without being guilty of dishonesty.

"Incidentally, when respondent took his oath as CFI judge which position then carried a salary of P19,000 per annum, he automatically ceased to be Chief of the Technical Staff of the Department of Justice and Member of the Board of Pardons and Parole, positions from which he was receiving P16,200 and P8,000 per annum, respectively. Also, in anticipation of the judicial duties which he was about to assume, respondent took a leave of absence from his professorial lecturer's duties in the U.P. College of Law where he was receiving approximately P600 a month.

"C. Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10 dated February 6, 1952 of the Department of Justice are not applicable to a Judge not actually discharging his judicial duties.

"The Department of Justice has never required judges who have not actually started to perform their judicial duties to comply with the abovementioned statutory provisions and circular (please see enclosed certification of Judge Eulalio D. Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, marked Annex 'C').

"Moreover, a reading of these sections and circular makes evident the folly of requiring a judge who has not entered into the performance of his judicial duties to comply with them. Taking Section 5, how could a judge who has not started to discharge his judicial duties certify that 'all special proceedings, applications, petitions, motions, and all civil and criminal cases, which have been under submission for decision or determination for a period of ninety days or more have been determined and decided on or before the date of making the certificate.' And how could such a judge hold court in his place of

permanent station as required by Section 55; observe the hours of daily sessions of the court as prescribed by Section 58: and render the reports required by Circular No. 10 when his court is not yet in physical existence. Clearly, therefore, Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10 cannot apply to such a judge."

In view of the nature of the allegations of complainant and respondent in their respective complaint and answer and considering, in the light thereof, that the material facts are more or less undisputed, the Court feels that this case can be disposed of without any further proceeding.

After mature study and deliberation, the Court is convinced that the complaint must be dismissed. To begin with, We cannot discern any tinge of dishonesty in the actuations of the respondent complained of. As We see it, the situation is not exactly as complainant has attempted to portray it. Complainant's theory is that respondent collected or received salaries as judge when in fact he has never acted as such, since the date he took his oath up to the filing of the complaint. In the sense that respondent has not yet performed any judicial function, it may be admitted that respondent has not really performed the duties of judge. What is lost sight of, however, is that after taking his oath and formally assuming this position as judge, respondent had a perfect right to earn the salary of a judge even in the extreme supposition that he did not perform any judicial function for he could, while preparing himself for his new job or for any good reason, take a leave, as in fact, he had planned to do, were it not for the request of the Secretary of Justice for him to forego the idea and, instead, help the Department in whatever way possible which would not, it must be presumed, impair his position as a judge. This is more so, when, as in this case, the government offices or officers in duty bound to furnish him the necessary place and facilities for his court and the performance of his functions have failed to provide him therewith without any fault on his part. That respondent took it upon himself to personally work for early action on the part of the corresponding officials in this direction and, in his spare time, made himself available to the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary, what with his vast experience, having worked therein for sixteen years, is, far from being dishonesty, to his credit. In the circumstances, it was certainly not improper that he rendered some kind of service to the government, since he was receiving salaries, while being unable to perform his regular duties as judge without any fault on his part. As to whether or not in doing so

he placed in jeopardy the independence of the judiciary and failed to act according to the correct norm of conduct which a judge should observe vis-a-vis service to the other departments of the government will be discussed anon. At this juncture, the only point We settle is that complainant's theory of dishonesty cannot hold water.

Admittedly respondent has not prepared and submitted any of the reports of accomplishments and status of cases in his sala which are usually required of judges under existing laws as well as the corresponding circulars of the Department of Justice. The reason is simple. He has not yet started performing any judicial functions. None of those laws and circulars apply to him, for all of them contemplate judges who are actually holding trials and hearings and making decisions and others. On the other hand, respondent could not be blamed for taking his oath as he did, for he had a valid confirmed appointment in his favor. In other words, he simply made himself available for the purpose for which he was appointed. That he could not actually hold office in the court to which he was appointed was not of his making. The other officials in charge of providing him there with seem to have been caught unprepared and have not had enough time to have it ready. Conceivably, under the law, with the permission of this Court, respondent could have been assigned to another court pending all these preparations, but that is something within the initiative and control of the Secretary of Justice and not of the respondent.

Of course, none of these is to be taken as meaning that this Court looks with favor at the practice of long standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service. The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on check and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more

paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or this Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, this Court feels very strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued.

WHEREFORE, the herein administrative complaint is hereby dismissed. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Secretary of Justice.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Castro and Teehankee, JJ., took no part

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. L-35377-78. July 31, 1975.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CAMILO PILOTIN, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, ISIDRO PUGAL and ERNING ABAÑO, defendants-appellants.

SYNOPSIS

Defendant-appellant Vincent Crisologo sought the transfer of Criminal Case No. 3949 of the municipal court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur to the New Bilibid Prisons or, alternatively, to Camps Crame, Aguinaldo or Olivas on the ground that if he were to be confined in the Vigan municipal jail during the trial, his life would be in jeopardy.

Finding the motion meritorious and applying Sec. 5(4), Article X of the Constitution, the Supreme Court directed the transfer of the record of the case to the City Court of Quezon City and the holding of the trial at Camp Crame.

SYLLABUS

1. SUPREME COURT; POWERS; POWER TO ORDER CHANGE OF VENUE. — Section 5(4) Article X of the Constitution expressly empowers the Supreme Court to "order a change of venue or place of trial to void a miscarriage of justice."

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Where what is involved is not merely a miscarriage of justice but the personal safety of the accused, it would be absurd to compel him to undergo trial in a place where his life would be imperilled. Present hostile sentiment against the accused at the place of trial is a justification for transfer of venue.

3. REMEDIAL LAW; VENUE; CHANGE INVOLVES TRANSFER OF EXPEDIENTE. — The change of venue involves not merely the change of the place of hearing but also the transfer of the expediente to another court. Thus where the alleged evidence against the accused is in the custody of the authorities at Camp Crame, Quezon City, the transfer of the case to the City Court of Quezon City and the holding of the trial at Camp Crame appear to be the most convenient.

R E S O L U T I O N

AQUINO, J p :

Vincent Crisologo through counsel filed a verified motion praying for the transfer to the New Bilibid Prisons or, alternatively, to Camps Crame, Aguinaldo or Olivas, of the place of trial of Criminal Case No. 3949 of the municipal court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, wherein he, as sole defendant, is charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions.

As justificatory ground, he alleged that his life would be in jeopardy if he were to be confined in the Vigan municipal jail during the trial because there are many political enemies of the Crisologo family in that vicinity; some of the adherents of the Crisologos had in fact been murdered in Ilocos Sur, and his father, Congressman Floro Crisologo, was shot to death while hearing mass at the Vigan cathedral.

Bluntly, he affirmed that inside that jail he would be a sitting duck for a gunwielder or grenade-thrower who wants to assassinate him. He could even be lynched or shot to death on the specious pretext that he was trying to escape.

Asked to comment on the motion, the Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Sur signified his conformity to the transfer of the venue of the trial to the New Bilibid Prisons.

Section 5(4), Article X of the Constitution expressly empowers this Court to "order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice". Here, what is involved is not merely a miscarriage of justice but the personal safety of movant Crisologo, the accused. It would be absurd to compel him to undergo trial in a place where his life would be imperilled.

Present hostile sentiment against the accused at the place of trial is a justification for transfer of venue (See State vs. Siers, 136 S. E. 503, 103, W. Va. 30; 22 C.J.S. 310).

We find Crisologo's motion to be meritorious. The change of venue involves not merely the charge of the place of hearing but also the transfer of the expediente of Criminal Case No. 3349 to another court. According to Crisologo's motion, the alleged evidence against him is in the custody of the authorities at Camp Crame, Quezon City. The transfer of Criminal Case N. 3949 to the City Court of Quezon City and the holding of the trial at Camp Crame appear to be the most convenient arrangement.

WHEREFORE, the municipal court of Vigan is directed to transfer the record of Criminal Case No. 3949 to the City Court of Quezon City where it should be re-docketed and raffled to any Judge thereof. The case may be tried at Camp Crame. The usual precautions and security measures should be adopted in bringing defendant Crisologo to Camp Crame on the occasion of the hearing.

SO ORDERED.

Makalintal, C . J ., Fernando, Barredo and Concepcion, Jr., JJ ., concur.

Antonio, J ., did not take part.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-41313. November 6, 1975.]

ALIPIO MONDIGUING and ANDRES DUNUAN, petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCISCO MEN ABAD, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ifugao; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; MARIANO PACTIW, alias Bugbug; DULMOG ABLUYEN and ANGELINA ABLUYEN, respondents.

Jose W . Diokno for petitioners.

Acting Solicitor General Santiago M . Kapunan and Solicitor Oscar C . Fernandez for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioners, two of the ten defendants accused of double murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder in the Ifugao Court of First Instance, sought a transfer of the venue of the case to Baguio City or Quezon City, on the ground that they could not expect a fair and impartial trial in said court, because respondent Judge is a protegee of the Ifugao Provincial Governor, one of the victims mentioned in the information. They further claimed that their witnesses are afraid to testify for fear of harassment and reprisals, and that their lives and those of their witnesses and lawyers are in grave danger in Ifugao because of the tensions and antagonisms spawned by the case and political rivalry between the Governor's faction and that to which petitioner

belong. In fact, in an election case involving the Governor, the Supreme Court disqualified respondent judge, who was found to be a political leader of, and was recommended to his present position by, the governor and his brother.

Upon these facts, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a transfer of venue, and ordered the case tried by the Circuit Criminal Court of Baguio.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: VENUE; GROUNDS FOR TRANSFER OF. — A change of the place of trial in criminal cases should not be granted for whimsical or flimsy reasons. The interests of the public require that, to secure the best results and effects in the punishment of crime, it is necessary to prosecute and punish the criminal in the very place as near as may be, where he committed his crime.

2. SUPREME COURT; VESTED WITH PREROGATIVE TO ORDER CHANGE OF VENUE. — The Supreme Court is invested with the prerogative of ordering a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. It possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a case pending in a Court of First Instance be transferred to another Court of First Instance with the same district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice.

3. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; VENUE; GROUNDS FOR. — A change of venue may be ordered by the Supreme Court where it is shown that the accused might be liquidated by his enemies in the place where the trial was originally scheduled to be held.

R E S O L U T I O N

AQUINO, J p:

Alipio Mondiguing and Andres Dunuan are two of the ten defendants accused of double murder,

frustrated murder and attempted murder in Criminal Case No. 140 of the Court of First Instance of Ifugao Province (People vs. George Bayucca et al.). That case was filed in connection with an ambuscade which was perpetuated on July 23, 1970 at Baag, Banaue, Ifugao. As a result of that incident, Governor Gualberto Lumauig of Ifugao was wounded and his executive assistant and his driver were killed. Up to this time the accused in that case have not been arraigned.

On September 4, 1975 Mondiguing and Dunuan filed in this Court a petition to transfer the venue of the case to Baguio City or Quezon City. They claimed that they could not expect a fair and impartial trial in Lagawe, Ifugao because Judge Francisco Men Abad of the Court of First Instance of that province is a proteg of Governor Lumauig and his brother, former Congressman Romulo Lumauig, and because their witnesses would be afraid to testify for fear of harassment and reprisals. The petitioners further claimed that, as may be inferred from previous incidents recounted in the petition, their lives and the lives of their witnesses and lawyers would be in grave danger in Ifugao because of the tensions and antagonisms spawned by the case and the political rivalry between the Lumauig and Mondiguing factions. (The accused, George Bayucca, was killed on October 28,1970 and Alipio Mondiguing resigned as mayor of Banaue and took refuge in Baguio City).

The Acting Solicitor General interposed no objection to the change of venue but he invited the Court's attention to the suggestion of Governor Lumauig that the case may be transferred to the proper court in Isabela in view of its proximity to Ifugao.

Respondent Judge Francisco Men Abad in his comment disputed the correctness or truth of the grounds relied upon for the change of venue and prayed that the petition be dismissed. He said that, if there would be bias on his part, he would be biased in favor of the People of the Philippines. He said that the crime charged was not "committed personally against" Governor Lumauig. That statement is not correct since the governor is one of the victims mentioned in the information.

Judge Abad revealed that petitioner Dunuan sent to the court a letter dated August 30, 1975 wherein he declined the services of Atty. Jose W. Diokno (who filed the instant petition for transfer of venue). In view of

that disclosure, the petition herein should be regarded as having been filed only by Alipio Mondiguing.

The fact is that this Court in Paredes vs. Abad, L-36927-28, April 15, 1974, 56 SCRA 522, 534, disqualified Judge Abad from trying the electoral protests filed by Crescencio Paredes and Venancio Uyan against Gualberto Lumauig and John Laugbayan. In that case it was alleged that Judge Abad was a political leader of Governor Lumauig and was recommended to his present position by the Lumauig brothers.

The issue is whether Mondiguing's plea for a change of venue is justified. A change of the place of trial in criminal cases should not be granted for whimsical or flimsy reasons. "The interests of the public require that, to secure the best results and effects in the punishment of crime, it is necessary to prosecute and punish the criminal in the very place, as near as may be, where he committed his crime" (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523, 562).

This Court is invested with the prerogative of ordering "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice" (Sec. 5[4], Art. X of the Constitution). It "possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a case pending in a Court of First Instance be transferred to another Court of First Instance within the same district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice" (People vs. Gutierrez, L-32282-83, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 172, 185.)

A change of venue was ordered by this Court in a case where it was shown that the accused might be liquidated by his enemies in the place where the trial was originally scheduled to be held (People vs. Pilotin; Vincent Crisologo, movant, L-3537778, July 31, 1975).

After a careful consideration of the circumstances recited in Mondiguing's petition to support his request for a change of the place of trial, we have reached the conclusion that his petition is meritorious.

In the interest of a fair and impartial trial and to avoid a miscarriage of justice and considering that his life would be in danger if he were to be tried in Lagawe, Ifugao, he should be tried by the Circuit Criminal Court in the City of Baguio.

The other relief sought by Mondiguing, which is that he be transferred from the Philippine Constabulary headquarters at Lagawe, Ifugao to Camp Crame should be submitted for the consideration of the Circuit Criminal Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Alipio Mondiguing for the transfer of the venue of Criminal Case No. 140 of the Court of First Instance of Ifugao is granted. The said case should be transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District so that it may be heard in Baguio City.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ ., concur.

Fernando, J ., is on leave.

Martin, J ., was designated to sit in the Second Division.

||| (Mondiguing v. Abad, G.R. No. L-41313, November 06, 1975)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 56158-64. March 17, 1981.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MAYOR PABLO SOLA, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBER FRANCISCO (ECOT) GARCIA, RICARDO (CADOY) GARCIA, JOSE BETHOVEN (ATSONG) CABRAL, CAPTAIN FLORENDO BALISCAO, JOHN, PETER, OSCAR, OMAR, JACK, RICHARD, JAMES, DONALD, WILLIAM, ROBERT, HOMER, JESSIE, ANDY, PAUL, all surnamed DOE's, respondents.

Renecio R. Espiritu, Juan Hagad and Francisco Cruz as private prosecutors for petitioner.Francisco Tagamolila for respondent P. Sola.Gregorio Andres for respondent F . Garcia.Vicente M . Tagac for respondent F . Baliscao.Cirilo Anigan for respondent R. Garcia.

SYNOPSISBy virtue of a warrant for the search and seizure of the deceased bodies of seven persons believed in the possession of accused Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, the 332nd PC/INP company made diggings in the area that yielded two common graves. Seven separated murder charges were filed against Pablo Sola

and his companions at the municipal court of Kabankalan. An order of their arrest was issued but without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail for their temporary release. Meanwhile, the witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of their fears that if trial is held at the Court of First Instance branch in Himamaylan, 10 km. from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. Hence, this petition to set aside the order granting bail to the accused and for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice.The Supreme Court, in a resolution issued the following day, transferred the venue of the aforesaid criminal cases to Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City and after respondents had submitted their comments, which were considered as Answer, ruled that there was failure to abide by the basic requirement that the prosecution be heard in a case where the accused is charged with a capital offense prior to bail being granted necessitating cancellation of the bail bonds and the remand of the case for such hearing.

The order granting bail was nullified and set aside. The executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental to whose sala the cases were transferred was directed to hear the petitions for bail of private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO CHANGE THE VENUE OF CRIMINAL ACTIONS TO AVOID A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE. — Article X, Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution is quite explicit. The Supreme Court could order "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice." In the landmark decision of People v. Gutierrez, L-32282-83, Nov. 26, 1970, the Supreme Court held: ". . . to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been established."

2. ID.; RIGHT TO LIBERTY; BAIL; GRANT THEREOF MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH DUE PROCESS. — Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be

resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground.

D E C I S I O NFERNANDO, C.J p:The power of this Tribunal, constitutionally mandated, 1 to order a change of venue to avoid any miscarriage of justice as well as the procedure ordained in the implementation of the right to bail 2 are involved in this petition which, even if not so denominated, partakes of the nature of a certiorari. It must have been the zeal of private prosecutors Francisco Cruz and Renecio Espiritu, 3 no doubt under the conviction that there was no time to lose, that must have led them to devote less than that full measure of attention to certain fundamentals. They ignored the principle that the responsibility for the conduct of the prosecution is with the public officials concerned. Nonetheless, the importance of the questions raised, the need for a change of venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds, necessitated that further action be taken. Accordingly, in a resolution dated February 12, 1981, one day after the filing of the petition, the Court required the comment of the Solicitor General as well as of the private respondents, 4 the accused in six pending criminal cases before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. cdphil

On March 4, 1981, the Comment was submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza. 5 It opened with this preliminary statement: "The present petition was filed by the private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 1700-1706, People v. Pablo Sola, et al., pending trial before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Rightly, any petition before this Honorable Court on behalf of the People of the Philippines can, under the law, be instituted only by the Solicitor General. The assertion of the petitioner private prosecutors that they are instituting the action `subject to the control and supervision of the Fiscal' will not, therefore, improve their legal standing." 6 Nonetheless, it did not press the legal point but instead adopted "the two-pronged thrusts of the petition: 1. the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in the criminal cases mentioned above, and 2. the petition for a change of venue or place of

trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice." 7

The facts were therein narrated thus: "On September 15, 1980, acting on the evidence presented by the Philippine Constabulary commander at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, the Court of First Instance of that province issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the deceased bodies of seven persons believed in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. . . . On September 16, 1980, armed with the above warrant, elements of the 332nd PC/INP Company proceeded to the place of Sola. Diggings made in a canefield yielded two common graves containing the bodies of Fernando Fernandez, Mateo Olimpos, Alfredo Perez, Custodio Juanica, Arsolo Juanica, Rollie Callet and Bienvenido Emperado. On September 23 and October 1, 1980, the PC provincial commander of Negros Occidental filed seven (7) separate complaints for murder against the accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, Ricardo Garcia, Jose Bethoven Cabral, Florendo Baliscao and fourteen (14) other persons of unknown names. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140 of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan. After due preliminary examination of the complainant's witnesses and his other evidence, the municipal court found probable cause against the accused. It thus issued an order for their arrest. However, without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail for their temporary release. The accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, and Jose Bethoven Cabral availed themselves of this right and have since been released from detention. In a parallel development, the witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at the Court of First Instance branch in Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least two of the accused are officials with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have been released on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large. Indeed, there have been reports made to police authorities of threats made on the families of the witnesses." 8 The facts alleged argue strongly for the remedies sought, namely a change of venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds. LLpr

On the very next day, March 15, 1981, this Court issued the following resolution: "The Court Resolved to: (a) [Note] the comment of the Solicitor General on the urgent petition for change of venue and cancellation of bail bonds, adopting the

plea of the petition, namely, (1) the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140, all entitled `People of the Philippines v. Mayor Pablo Sola, et al.; (2) the petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice; (b) [Transfer] the venue of the aforesaid criminal cases to Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City, presided by Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio, considering that District Judge Ostervaldo Emilia of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental, Branch VI at Himamaylan has an approved leave of absence covering the period from January 12 to March 12, 1981 due to a mild attack of cerebral thrombosis and that the said Branch V is the nearest court station to Himamaylan; and (c) [Await] the comment of respondents on the petition to cancel bail, without prejudice to the public officials concerned taking the necessary measures to assure the safety of the witnesses of the prosecution." 9 Thus, the issue of a change of venue has become moot and academic. The comments respectively submitted by respondent Florendo Baliscao on March 5, 1981, respondent Francisco Garcia on March 11, 1981 and respondent Pablo Sola on March 16, 1981, dealt solely with the question of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Such comments were considered as answers, with the case thereafter deemed submitted for decision.

The sole remaining issue of the cancellation of the bail bonds of respondents, there being a failure to abide by the basic requirement that the prosecution be heard in a case where the accused is charged with a capital offense, prior to bail being granted, must be decided in favor of petitioner. The bail bonds must be cancelled and the case remanded to the sala of Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio for such hearing. So we rule.

1. It may not be amiss to say a few words on the question of transferring the place of trial, in this case, from Himamaylan to Bacolod City. The constitution is quite explicit. The Supreme Court could order "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice." 10 The Constitutional Convention of 1971 wisely incorporated the ruling in the landmark decision of People v. Gutierrez, 11 where Justice J.B.L. Reyes as ponente vigorously and categorically affirmed: "In the particular case before Us, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what

they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been established." 12 Why a change of venue is imperative was made clear in the Comment of the Solicitor General. Thus: "The exercise by this Honorable Court of its above constitutional power in this case will be appropriate. The witnesses in the case are fearful for their lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of this fear, they may either refuse to testify or testify falsely to save their lives." 13 Respondent Florendo Baliscao was not averse to such transfer, but his preference is for a court anywhere in Metro Manila. 14 Respondent Francisco Garcia confined his comment to the question of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Respondent Pablo Sola made clear that he had "no objection to the transfer." 15 It may be added that there may be cases where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some individuals, be less than terrifying, but the question must always be the effect it has on the witnesses who will testify. The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue, As a matter of fact, there need not be a petition of this character filed before this Court. Such a plea could have been done administratively. In this particular case, however, there is justification for the procedure followed in view of the fact that along with the change of venue, the cancellation of the bail bonds was also sought. LLphil

2. Equally so the cancellation of the bail bonds is more than justified. Bail was granted to the accused in the Order of the Municipal Court without hearing the prosecution. That is to disregard the authoritative doctrine enunciated in People v. San Diego. 16 As pointed out by Justice Capistrano, speaking for the Court: "The question presented before us is, whether the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process. The answer is in the affirmative. We are of the considered opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground." 17 These words of Justice Cardozo come to mind: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a

defendant charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true." 18 This norm which is of the very essence of due process as the embodiment of justice requires that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt. It does not suffice, as asserted herein, that the questions asked by the municipal judge before bail was granted could be characterized as searching. The fact did not cure an infirmity of a jurisdictional character. 19

WHEREFORE, the assailed order of judge Rafael Gasataya granting bail to private respondents is nullified, set aside, and declared to be without force and effect. Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to whose sala the cases had been transferred by virtue of the resolution of this Court of March 5, 1981, is directed forthwith to hear the petitions for bail of private respondents, with the prosecution being duly heard on the question of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the respondents is strong. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.

Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ ., concur.

Barredo and Abad Santos, JJ ., are on official leave.

Footnotes

1.According to Article X, Section 5(4) of the Constitution: "The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (4) Order of a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice."

2.According to Article IV, Section 18 of the Constitution: "All persons, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties. Excessive bail shall not be required."

3.The name of the highly-experienced counsel Juan Hagad was included in the list of private prosecutors, but he did not sign the petition.

4.The private respondents are Francisco (Ecot) Garcia and Ricardo (Cadoy) Garcia.

5.He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Roberto E. Soberano and Solicitor Roberto A. Abad.

6.Comment, 1-2.

7.Ibid., 2.

8.Ibid., 2-4.

9.Resolution of the Court dated March 5, 1981.

10.Article X, Section 5(4) of the Constitution.

11.L-32282-83, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 172.

12.Ibid., 180.

13.Comment of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 9.

14.Comment of respondent Florendo Baliscao, erroneously entitled Rejoinder to the Petition, 1.

15.Comment of respondent Pablo Sola, erroneously entitled Opposition of respondent Mayor Sola, 1.

16.L-29676, December 24, 1968, 26 SCRA 522.

17.Ibid., 524.

18.Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1933).

19.Cf. Inocencio v. Alconcel, G.R. No. 55658, February 5, 1981.

||| (People v. Sola, G.R. No. 56158-64, March 17, 1981)

EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 79690-707. October 7, 1988.]

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALES, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 80578. October 7, 1988.]

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner, vs. HON. RAUL M. GONZALES, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.

D E C I S I O NPER CURIAM p:The following are the subjects of this Resolution:1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by a petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar against public respondent Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzales, in connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578, and 2) a Resolution of this Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to show cause why he should

not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making certain public statements.

I

The pertinent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) pending before the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary investigation and filed the criminal informations in those cases (originally TBP Case No. 86-00778).

On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus (G.R. Nos. 79690-707) naming as respondents both the Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez. Among other things, petitioner assailed: (1) the 5 February 1987 Resolution 1 of the Tanodbayan" recommending the filing of criminal informations against petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in TBP Case No. 86-00778; and (2) the 1 September 1987 Resolution 2 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177 denying his Motion to Quash the criminal informations filed in those cases by the "Tanodbayan." In this respect, petitioner alleged that respondent Gonzales, as Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with power and authority independently to investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and corruption against public officials and employees, and hence that the informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177 were all null and void.

On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which read:

"G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan and Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez, Claiming To Be and Acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution). — Acting on the special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with urgent motion for preliminary injunction, the Court Resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require the

respondents to COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.

The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from hearing and trying Criminal cases Nos. 12159 to 12161 and 12163 to 12177 insofar as petitioner Enrique Zaldivar is concerned and from hearing and resolving the Special Prosecutor's motion to suspend dated September 3, 1987."

The parties later filed their respective pleadings.

Petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a second Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No. 80578) on 19 November 1987, initially naming only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as respondent. The Petition assailed the 24 September 1987 Resolution 3 of the "Tanodbayan" in TBP Case No. 87-01304 recommending that additional criminal charges for graft and corruption be filed against petitioner Zaldivar and five (5) other individuals. Once again, petitioner raised the argument of the Tanodbayan's lack of authority under the 1987 Constitution to file such criminal cases and to investigate the same. Petitioner also moved for the consolidation of that petition with G.R. No. 79690-707.

In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, 4 this Court, without giving due course to the second petition: (1) required respondent Gonzalez to submit a comment thereon: and (2) issued a temporary restraining order "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01394 . . . and particularly, from filing the criminal information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary investigation therein." In a separate resolution of the same date, 5 G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578 were ordered consolidated by the Court.

In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior to issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 80578, the Office of the Tanodbayan instituted Criminal Case No. 12570 6 with the Sandiganbayan, which issued on 23 November 1987 an Order of Arrest 7 for

petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in Criminal Case No. 12570. Upon Motion 8 of petitioner Zaldivar, this Court issued the following Resolution on 8 December 1987.

"G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan). The motion filed by the Solicitor General for respondents for extensions of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original period within which to file comment on the petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order is GRANTED:

Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the Sandiganbayan as party-respondent, the Court Resolved to (a) Consider IMPLEADED the Sandiganbayan as party respondent; and (b) In pursuance of and supplementing the Temporary Restraining Order of November 24, 1987 ordering respondent Hon Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further acting TBP No. 87-01304 entitled, "Commission on Audit vs. Gov. Enrique Zaldivar, et al., and particularly, from filing the criminal information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary investigation therein" ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering respondents Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in Criminal case No. 12570, entitled, "People of the Philippines vs. Enrique M. Zaldivar, et al. and from enforcing the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan in said case."

The Solicitor general filed a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R. No. 80578, and we required the petitioner to submit a Reply 10 thereto.

On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in Contempt 11 directed at respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited as bases the acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the filing of the information against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in G.R. No. 80578. In respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his Motion a photocopy of a news article, reproduced here in toto, which appeared in the 30 November 1987 issue of the "Philippine Daily Globe."

Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case

TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the Supreme Court order stopping him from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar 'can aggravate the thought that affluent persons can prevent the progress of a trial.'

'What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course.' Gonzales told the Daily Globe in an exclusive interview.

Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order 'heightens the people's apprehension over the justice system in this country, especially because the people have been thinking that only the small fry can get it while big fishes go scot-free.'

Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last week after Zaldivar petitioned the court to stop the Tanodbayan from investigating graft cases filed against him.

Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his investigations because the latter wanted to help promote the

political fortunes of a friend from Antique, lawyer Bonifacio Alentajan.

Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez from investigating a graft charge against the governor, and from instituting any complaint with the Sandiganbayan.

'While President Aquino had been prodding me to prosecute graft cases even if they involve the high and mighty, the Supreme Court had been restraining me.' Gonzalez said.

In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez said he had filed graft cases against two 'very powerful' officials of the Aquino government — Commissioner Quintin Doromal of the Presidential Commission on Good Government and Secretary Jiamil I.M. Dialan of the Office of Muslim Affairs and Cultural Communities.

'While I don't wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition before the Supreme Court, I am a little bit disturbed that (the order) can aggravate the thinking of some people that affluent persons can prevent the progress of a trial,' he said.

He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief Executive over the weekend and that while she sympathizes with local officials who are charged in court during election time, 'she said that it might be a disservice to the people and the voters who are entitled to know their candidates.'

Gonzalez said that while some cases against local against local officials during election time could be mere harassment suits, the Constitution makes it a right of every citizen to be informed of the

character of the candidate, who should be subject to scrutiny."(Emphasis supplied)

Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16 February 1988 required respondent Gonzalez "to COMMENT on aforesaid Motion within ten (10) days from notice." 12

On 27 April 1988 , the Court rendered its Decision 13 (per curiam) in the Consolidated Petitions. The dispositive portion thereof read:

"WHEREFORE, We hereby:

(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and hereby NULLIFY the criminal informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan; and

(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez ro cease and desist from conducting investigations and filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising the powers and functions of the Ombudsman.

SO ORDERED."

A Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed by respondent Gonzalez the next day, 28 April 1988. In his Motion, respondent Gonzalez, after having argued the legal merits of his position, made the following statements totally unrelated to any legal issue raised either in the Court's Decision or in his own Motion:

1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the court . . . and he was asked to 'go slow' on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him;'"

2. That he "was approached and asked to 'refrain' from investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarrass the Court; '" and

3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against (two Members of the Court)."

Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten notes 15 which he claimed were sent by "some members of this Honorable Court, interceding for cases pending before this office (i. e., the Tanodbayan)." He either released his Motion for Reconsideration with facsimiles of said notes to the press or repeated to the press the above extraneous statements: the metropolitan papers for the next several days carried long reports on those statements and variations and embellishments thereof.

On 2 May 1988, the Court issued the following Resolution in the Consolidated Petitions:

"G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al.); G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, etc.). —

1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Gonzalez under date of April 28, 1988, the Court Resolved to REQUIRE the petitioner to COMMENT thereon within ten (10) days from notice hereof.

2. It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez has made public statements to the media which not only deal with matters sub-judice but also appear offensive to and disrespectful of the Court and its individual members and calculated, directly or indirectly, to bring the Court into disrepute, discredit and ridicule and to denigrate and degrade the administration of justice, the Court Resolved to require respondent Gonzalez to explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making such public statements reported in the media,

among others, in the issues of the 'Daily Inquirer,' the 'Journal,' the 'Manila Times,' the 'Philippine Star,' the 'Manila Chronicle,' the 'Daily Globe' and the 'Manila Standard' of April 29 and 30, and May 1, 1988, to wit:

(a) That the Court resolution in question is merely 'an offshoot of the position he had taken that SC Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by government prosecutors,' or motivated by a desire to stop him 'from investigating cases against some of their porteges or friends;'

(b) That no less than six of the members of the Court 'interceded for and on behalf of persons with pending cases before the Tanodbayan,' or sought 'to pressure him to render decisions favorable to their colleagues and friends;'

(c) That attempts were made to influence him 'to go slow' on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him,' and 'to refrain' from investigating the Commission on Audit report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarrass the Court;'

(d) That there were also attempts to cause the dismissal of cases against two Associate Justices; and

(e) That the Court had dismissed judges 'without rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without due process.'

3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits relative to the purpose of and circumstances attendant upon the notes written to said public respondent by three (3) members of the Court have since been submitted to the Court and now form part of its official records, the Court further Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to ATTACH to this Resolution copies of said sworn statements and the annexes thereto appended, and to DIRECT respondent Gonzalez also to comment thereon within the same period of ten(10) days.

4. It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution of February 16, 1988 addressed to respondent Gonzalez was misdelivered and therefore not served on him, the Court Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to CAUSE SERVICE of said Resolution on the respondent and to REQUIRE the latter to comply therewith."

Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on 9 May 1988 an Omnibus Motion for Extension and Inhibition 16 alleging, among other things: that the above quoted 2 May 1988 Resolution of the Court "appears to have overturned that presumption [of innocence] against him;" and that "he gravely doubts whether that 'cold neutrality [of an impartial judge]' is still available to him" there being allegedly "at least 4 members of this Tribunal who will not be able to sit in judgment with substantial sobriety and neutrality." Respondent Gonzalez closed out his pleading with a prayer that the four (4) Members of the Court identified and referred to there by him inhibit themselves in the deliberation and resolution of the Motion to Cite in Contempt.

On 19 may 1988, 17 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration,

18 this Court in an extended per curiam Resolution 19 denied the Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. That denial was made "final and immediately executory."

Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of record:

1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibit, 20 dated 23 May 1988;

2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, 21 dated 20 May 1988;

3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex Abundante Cautelam, 22 dated 26 May 1988;

4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion

(a) For Extension of Time

(b) For Inhibition, and

(c) For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to the IBP, Under Rule 139-B, 23 dated 4 June 1988 (with Annex "A"; 24 an anonymous letter dated 27 May 1988 from the alleged Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court" and addressed to respondent);

5. Ex-Parte Manifestation, 25 dated 7 June 1988;

6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration, 26 dated 6 June 1988; and

7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion 27 dated 23 September 1988.

In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted earlier, respondent Gonzalez submitted on 17 June 1988 an Answer with Explanation and Comment 28 offering respondent's legal arguments and defenses against the contempt and disciplinary charges presently pending before this Court. Attached to that pleading as Annex "A" thereof was respondent's own personal Explanation/Compliance. 29 A second explanation called "Compliance," 30 with annexes, was also submitted by respondent on 22 July 1988.

II

We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court and members of the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regular and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court's constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of law. 31 Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. 32 Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court. 33 The power to punish for contempt is "necessary for its own protection against an improper interference with the due administration of justice, " "(it) is not dependent upon the complaint of any of the parties litigant." 34

There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that before us here; the Court's inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is broader that the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be committed both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. 35 Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority

over lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct with which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. 36 The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyers is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.

It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for contempt or to the disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar, the Court is acting as offended party, prosecutor and arbiter at one and the same time. Thus, in the present case, respondent Gonzalez first sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of this case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the issues involved in this proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the Court has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly.

Respondent Gonzalez misconceives the nature of the proceeding at bar as well as the function of the members of the Court in such proceeding. Respondent's contention is scarcely an original one. In In Re Almacen, 37 then Associate (later Chief) Justice Fred Fruiz Castro had occasion to deal with this contention in the following lucid manner:

"xxx xxx xxx

It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have it appear, the members of the Court are the 'complainants, prosecutors and judges' all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the

proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor there. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileged as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but only as a duly constituted court. The distinct individualities are lost in the

majesty of their office. So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof — as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, may, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.

Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of the power because public policy demands that they, acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.

xxx xxx xxx." 38

It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to disclaim any bias or prejudice against the respondent that would prevent them from acting in accordance with the exacting requirements of their oaths of office. It also appears to the Court that for all the members to inhibit themselves from sitting on this case is to abdicate the responsibility with which the Constitution has burdened them. Reference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court; such reference to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge consists of acts done before the Supreme Court. There is no need for further investigation of facts in the present case for it is not substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to him. In any case, respondents had the amplest opportunity to present his defense; his defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him but that those statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve such issues.

III

It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez was saying in his statements set out above. Respondent has not denied making the above statements; indeed, he acknowledges that the newspaper reports of the statements attributed to him are substantially correct. 39

Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme Court deliberately rendered an erroneous or wrong decision when it rendered its per curiam Decision dated 27 April 1988 in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. That decision according to respondent Gonzales, was issued as an act of retaliation by the Court against him for the position he had taken "that the (Supreme Court) Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by government prosecutors," and in order to stop respondent from investigating cases against "some of (the) proteges or friends (of some Supreme Court Justices)." The Court cannot, of course, and will not debate the correctness of its Decision of 27 April 1988 and of its Resolution dated 19 May 1988 (denying respondent Gonzalez' Motion for Reconsideration) in the consolidated Zaldivar case. Respondent Gonzalez, and anyone else for that matter, is free intellectually to accept or not accept the reasoning of the Court set out in its per curiam Decision and Resolution in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. This should not, however, obscure the seriousness of the assault thus undertaken by respondent against the Court and the appalling implications of such assault for the integrity of the system of administration of justice in our country. Respondent has said that the Court

rendered its Decision and Resolution without regard to the legal merits of the Zaldivar cases and had used the judicial process to impose private punishment upon respondent for positions he had taken (unrelated to the Zaldivar cases) in carrying out his duties. It is very difficult to imagine a more serious affront to, or greater outrage upon, the honor and dignity of this Court than this. Respondent's statements is also totally baseless. Respondent's statements were made in complete disregard of the fact that his continuing authority to act as Tanodbayan or Ombudsman after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, had been questioned before this Court as early as 10 September 1987 in the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus filed against him in these consolidated Petitions, 40 that is more than seven (7) months before the Court rendered its Decision. Respondent also ignores the fact that one day later, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order effective immediately ordering the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from hearing the criminal cases filed against petitioner Zaldivar by respondent Gonzalez. Respondent also disregards the fact that on 24 November 1987, upon the filing of a second Petition for Certiorari for Prohibition by Mr. Zaldivar, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order this time requiring the respondent to cease and desist from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-0934. Thus, the decision finally reached by this Court in April 1988 on the constitutional law issue pending before the Court for the preceding eight (8) months, could scarcely have been invented as a reprisal simply against respondent.

A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of the Supreme Court is that they have improperly "pressured" him to render decisions favorable to their "colleagues and friends," including dismissal of "cases" against two (2) members of the Court. This particularly deplorable charge too is entirely baseless, as even a cursory examination of the contents of the handwritten notes of three (3) members of this Court addressed to respondent (which respondent attached to his Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Court of 27 April 1988 in the consolidated Petitions) will show. It is clear, and respondent Gonzalez does not pretend otherwise, that the subject matters of the said notes had no relation at all to the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. This charge appears to have made in order to try to impart some substance (at least in the mind of respondent) to the first accusation made by respondent that the Court had deliberately rendered a wrong decision to get even with

respondent who had, with great fortitude, resisted "pressure" from some members of the Court. Once again, in total effect, the statements made by respondent appear designed to cast the Court into gross disrepute, and to cause among the general public scorn for and distrust in the Supreme Court and, more generally, the judicial institutions of the Republic.

Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him from prosecuting "rich and powerful persons," that the Court was in effect discriminating between the rich and powerful on the one hand and the poor and defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused persons to go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders. This accusation can only be regarded as calculated to present the Court in an extremely bad light. It may be seen as intended to foment hatred against the Supreme Court; it is also suggestive of the divisive tactics of revolutionary class war.

Respondents, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed judges 'without rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without due process.'" The Court notes that this last attack is not without relation to the other statements made by respondent against the Court. The total picture that respondent clearly was trying to paint of the Court is that of an "unjudicial" institution able and willing to render "clearly erroneous" decisions by way of reprisal against its critics, as a body that acts arbitrarily and capriciously denying judges and lawyers due process of law. Once again, the purport of respondent's attack against the Court as an institution unworthy of the people's faith and trust, is unmistakable. Had respondent undertaken to examine the records of the two(2) judges and the attorney he later identified in one of his Explanations he would have discovered that the respondents in those administrative cases had ample opportunity to explain their side and submit evidence in support thereof. 41 He would have also found that there were both strong reasons for and an insistent rhyme in

the disciplinary measures there administered by the Court in the continuing effort to strengthen the judiciary and upgrade the membership of the Bar. It is appropriate to recall in this connection that due process as a constitutional precept does not, always and in all situations, require the trial-type proceeding, 42 that the essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support' of one's defense. 43 "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. 44

As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to explain why he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative discipline for making the statements adverted to above. In his subsequent pleadings where he asked the full Court to inhibit itself and to transfer the administrative proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent made, among others, the following allegations:

(a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit [themselves] in the contempt and administrative charges against the respondent, in the light of the manifest prejudice and anger they hold against respondent as shown in the language of the resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration;" (b) That "the entire membership of the court has already lost that 'cold neutrality of an impartial judge' [to] be able to allow fairness and due process in the contempt citation as well as in the possible administrative charge;"

(c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court as angry and prejudiced as it is, respondent has no china man's chance to get fair hearing in the contempt and possible administrative charges;"

(d) That one must consider "the milieu before this Tribunal with, perhaps passion and obfuscation running riot;"

(e) That respondent, "after having been castigated with such venom by the entire Court in its decision denying the Motion for Reconsideration, does not have confidence in the impartiality of the entire Court" and that he "finds it extremely difficult to believe that the members of this Tribunal can still act with unbiased demeanor towards him; and

(f) That "the Tribunal is determined to disbar [respondent] without due process" and that a specified Member of the court "has been tasked to be the ponente, or at least prepare the decision." (Emphasis in the original)

Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier made, respondent sought to heap still more opprobrium upon the Court, accusing it of being incapable of judging his acts and statements justly and according to law. Once again, he paints this Court as a body not only capable of acting without regard to due process but indeed determined so to act. A grand design to hold up this Court to public scorn and disrespect as an unworthy tribunal, one obfuscated by passion and anger at respondent, emerges once more. It is very difficult for members of this Court to understand how respondent Gonzalez could suppose that judges on the highest tribunal of the land would be ready and willing to violate their most solemn oath of office merely to gratify any imagined private feelings aroused by respondent. The universe of the

Court revolves around the daily demands of law and justice and duty, not around respondent nor any other person or group of persons.

Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may reasonably be regarded by this Court as contumacious or as warranting exercise of the disciplinary authority of this Court over members of the Bar, may best be assayed by examining samples of the kinds of statements which have been held in our jurisdiction as constituting contempt or otherwise warranting the exercise of the court's authority.

1. In Montecillo v. Gica, 45 Atty. Quirino del Mar as counsel for Montecillo, who was accused in a slander case, moved to reconsider a decision of the Court of Appeals in favor of the complainant with a veiled threat that he should interpose his next appeal to the President of the Philippines. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he referred to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment," and "judgment rendered through negligence" and implied that the Court of Appeals had allowed itself to be deceived. Atty. del Mar was held guilty of contempt of court by the Court of Appeals. He then sued the three (3) justices of the Court of Appeals for damages before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, seeking to hold them liable for their decision in the appealed slander case. This suit was terminated, however, by compromise agreement after Atty. del Mar apologized to the Court of Appeals and the justices concerned and agreed to pay moral damages to the justices. Atty. del Mar some time later filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals in a slander case. This Court denied the Petition for review. Atty. del Mar then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and addressed a letter to the Clerk of the Supreme Court asking for the names of the justices of this Court who had voted in favor of and those who had voted against his Motion for Reconsideration. After his Motion for Reconsideration was denied fore lack of merit, Atty. del Mar filed a Manifestation in this Court saying:

"I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suits as I did to

the justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorrent falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well know them and work for their extermination." (60 SCRA at 240; Emphasis supplied)

Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for making the above statements. In his additional explanation, Atty. del Mar made the following statements:

". . . Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It is this state of things that convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and as stated in my manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling-up deficiencies." (60 SCRA at 242)

The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders," from the practice of law saying:

". . . Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as justification for his contemptuous statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged existence of rampant corruption, graft and injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in G.R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt , the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic. . .

xxx xxx xxx

"To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering justice."

xxx xxx xxx

As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. 45604-R was based on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn denied in G.R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the decision because We found no reason for disturbing the appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals and this Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure contumely for said tribunals.

It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest

court of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.

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. . . To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose to enter this profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions.": (60 SCRA at 242-247; emphasis supplied)

2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 46 four (4) members of the bar, acting as counsels for MacArthur International Minerals Company were required by this Court to explain certain statements made in MacArthur's third Motion for Reconsideration:

"d. ' . . .; and the Supreme Court has overlooked the applicable law due to the misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel.' (Last sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).

e. '. . . Never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives to cover and excuse losses to the public, a government agency or just plain fraud . . . and it is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court intends to

create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner.' (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968)." (31 SCRA at 6)

They were also asked to explain the statements made in their Motion to Inhibit filed on 21 September 1968 asking —

"Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges '[t]hat the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31, 1968' and the ex-parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above entitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states '[t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto to Conception was given a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case.' The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates 'incidents' which, according to the motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's belief that 'unjudicial prejudice' had been caused it and that there was 'unjudicial favoritism' in favor of 'petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party

directly benefited by the said decision.'" (31 SCRA at 6-7)

Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for MacArthur and filed a fourth Motion for Reconsideration without leave of court, which Motion contained the following paragraphs:

"4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case — which condition is prohibited by the new Rules of Court - Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote" '

'Justices; who may take part. — . . . Only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication . . .' This requirement is especially significant in the present instance because the member who penned the decision was the very member who was absent for approximately four months or more. This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.

xxx xxx xxx

6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its quest for justice in the judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government Officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation or property and/or to the United States

Government, either its executive or judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government without either compensation or due process of law — and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually, until restitution or compensation is made." (31 SCRA at 10-11)

Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, held three (3) attorneys guilty of contempt:

"1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for reconsideration, we indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as 'vulturous executives.' He speaks of this Court as a 'civilized, democratic tribunal,' but by innuendo would suggest that it is not.

In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as 'false, erroneous and illegal' in a presumptuous manner. He then charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the vice president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, 'a significant appointment in the Philippine

Government by the President, a short time before the decision of July 31 1968 was rendered.' In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that 'it would seem that the principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority] by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself.' He puts forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro 'would be less likely to engender favoritism and prejudice for or against a particular cause or party.' Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment. He points out that courts must be above suspicion at all times like Ceasar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country, 'although the process has already begun.'

xxx xxx xxx

What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is also asked if, we repeated, 'any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents or principals, including the president.' The

absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the President and in that sense may be considered to have each received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves every time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know this. But why the unfounded charge? There is the not-too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court.

The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief.

xxx xxx xxx

The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules — against improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice — is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.

xxx xxx xxx

Third. The Motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or the United States government. It must be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were injected. More specifically, the motion announced that MacArthur 'will inevitably . . . raise the graft and corruption of [the] Philippine government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 . . . to the World Court' and would invoke 'the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually . . .'

This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this Court to decide the case in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads' return. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as threat to effect a change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.

xxx xxx xxx

The dignity of the court, experience teaches, can never be protected where infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The people should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the assaults of

disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice." (31 SCRA at 13-23; emphasis supplied)

3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in protest against what he asserted was "a great injustice committed his client by the Supreme Court," filed a Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title. He alleged that his client was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," and had become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy," saying that "justice as administered by the presents members of the Supreme Court [was] not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." Atty. Almacen vowed to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum" so that "the people may know of this silent injustice committed by this Court" and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed [may] never be repeated." Atty. Almacen released to the press the contents of his Petition and on 26 September 1967, the "Manila Times" published statements attributed to him as follows:

"Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did not expose the tribunal's unconstitutional and obnoxious practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason.

Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut justice,' Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay P120, 000, without knowing why he lost the case.

xxx xxx xxx

There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, 'where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.'

xxx xxx xxx

He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the present members of the Supreme Court 'will become responsible to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or denied resolutions.'" (31 SCRA at 565-566; emphasis supplied)

Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him. His explanation which in part read:

"xxx xxx xxx

The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in paintings that can be found in all courts and government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of or beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeals has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given . . . We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only described the impersonal state of things and nothing more.

xxx xxx xxx

As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we

have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter." (31 SCRA at 572; emphasis supplied)

was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical" and rejected. The Court indefinitely suspended Almacen from the practice of law holding through Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, that Almacen had exceeded the boundaries of "fair criticism."

4. In Paragas v. Cruz, 47 counsel, whose Petition for Certiorari was dismissed by this Court, made the following statements in his Motion for Reconsideration:

"The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration of the resolution of this Honorable Court dated April 20, 1965 on the ground that it constitutes a violation of Section 14 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court promulgated by this very Hon. Supreme Court, and on the further ground that is likewise a violation of the most important right in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Philippines, a culpable violation which is a ground for impeachment.

. . . The rule of law in a democracy should always be upheld and protected by all means, because the rule of law creates and preserves peace and order and gives satisfaction and contentment to all concerned. But when the laws and the rules are violated, the victims resort, sometimes, to armed force and to the ways of the cave-men! We do not want Verzosa and Reyes repeated again and again, killed in the premises of the Supreme Court and in those of the City Hall of Manila. Educated people should keep their temper under control at all times! But justice should be done to all concerned to perpetuate the very life of

Democracy on the face of the earth.'" (14 SCRA at 810; emphasis supplied)

The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the dignity of the Court and required counsel to show cause why administrative action should not be taken against him. Counsel later explained that he had merely related factual events (i.e., the killing of Verzosa and Reyes) and to express his desire to avoid repetition of such acts. The Court, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, found these explanations unsatisfactory and the above statements contumacious:

". . . The expressions contained in the motion fore reconsideration . . . are plainly contemptuous and disrespectful, and reference to the recent killing of two employees is but a covert threat upon the members of the Court. . . That such treats and disrespectful language contained in a pleading filed in courts are constitutive of direct contempt has been repeatedly decided(Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil,. 724; People vs. Venturanza, 52 Off. Gaz. 769; Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal , L-9785, September 19, 1956; Sison vs. Sandejas, L-9270, April 29, 1959; Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86). What makes the present case more deplorable is that the guilty party is a member of the bar; for, as remarked in People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 580 —

'Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases with that courtesy all have a right to expect. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.'

It is right and plausible that an attorney in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so, for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts require. (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, [In re Francisco], 61 Phil. 729)" (14 SCRA at 811-812; emphasis supplied)

5. In In re Sotto, 48 a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo, invoking the Press Freedom Law, refused to divulge the source of the news item which carried his by-line and was sent to jail for so refusing. Atty. Vicente Sotto, a senator and author of said law, caused the publication of the following item in a number of daily newspapers in Manila:

"As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53), interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a news published in his paper, I regret to say that our high Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members. In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which I will introduce in the coming congressional sessions, will have as its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, the Supreme Court of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly,, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: The supreme Court of

today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." (82 Phil. at 597-598; Emphasis supplied)

In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith his invocation of the constitutional guarantee of free speech and in requiring to show why he should not be disbarred, the Court, through Mr. Justice Feria, said —

"To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately 'so many blunders and injustices,' that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in may cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower and degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippine is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the

oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation." (82 Phil. at 601-602; emphasis supplied)

6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 49 Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a Motion before the Supreme Court which contained the following paragraph (in translation):

"We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court, denying our motion for reconsideration is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our power in order that this error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of 'sakdalism' and make the public lose confidence in the administration of justice." (61 Phil. at 726; emphasis supplied)

When required by the Court to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt, Atty. Francisco responded

by saying that it was not contempt to tell the truth. Examining the statement made above, the Court held:

'. . . [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights of the parties, and of the untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client, because the acts of outraging and mocking from which the words 'outrage' and mockery' used therein are derived, means exactly the same as all these, according to the Dictionary of the Spanish Language published by the Spanish Academy (Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 15th ed., pages 132-513).

The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, for many years a member of the Philippine bar, was neither justified nor in the least necessary, because in order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and good practice can ever sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of serene and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of question submitted for resolution.

There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente Francisco's motion contains a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be judicial outrage of which his client has been victim; and because he states in a threatening manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion to promote distrust in the administration of justice an increase the proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.

As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it has conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St., Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the

administration of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief." (61 Phil. at 727-728; emphasis supplied)

It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed exhaust our case law on this matter. In the following cases, among others, the Supreme Court punished for contempt or administratively disciplined lawyers who had made statements not very different from those made in the cases discussed above:

1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);

2) Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978);

3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441 (1967);

4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);

5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, 99 Phil. 907 (1956);

6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);

7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per curiam Resolution (unreported), Promulgated 29 April 1955;

8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);

9) People v. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);

10) Intestate Estate of Rosario Olba; Contempt Proceedings against Antonio Franco, 67 Phil. 312 (1939); and

11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).

Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the Court has in the past penalized as contemptuous or as warranting application of disciplinary sanctions, this Country is compelled to hold that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent's statements, especially the charge that the Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decisions in the Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that the justices of this Court betrayed their oath of office, merely to wreak vengeance upon the respondent here, constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Court. Such statements ever clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country. That respondent's baseless charges have had some impact outside the internal world of subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated by the filing of a complaint for impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then fourteen (14) incumbent members of this Court, a complaint the centerpiece of which is a repetition of the appalling claim of respondent that this Court deliberately rendered a wrong decision as an act of reprisal against the respondent.

IV

The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely exercising his constitutional right of free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of qualified privileged communications and fair criticism in the public interest.

Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interest. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions

for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:

". . . A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free society.

The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent means for assuring judges their independence is a free press." 50

Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following:

"The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This constitutional right must be protected in its fullest extent. The Court has heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under the Libel Law which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the citizens must be preserved in all of its completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizens should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as is the maintenance of unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizens is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential proceedings to the embarrassment of

the parties and the courts." 51 (Emphasis supplied)

Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the Court effectively to prevent and control professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who are, first and foremost, indispensable participants in the task of rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held, persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer's right of free expression may have to be more limited than that of a layman. 52

It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to this Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the republic. The responsibility of the respondent "to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court" and "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice " 53 is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.

Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize the rulings of this court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. Once more, however, the right of criticism is not unlimited. Its limits were marked out by Mr. Justice Castro in In re Almacen which are worth noting:

"But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action."

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those

gifted with superior intellect — are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

. . . " 54 (Emphasis supplied)

The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has criticized the Court; it is addressed rather to the nature of that criticism or comment and the manner in which it was carried out.

Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the court. The subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain import of his words and acts. 55 It is, upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out that respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and exhibited no repentance. 56

Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to the judiciary has been shown, and points to the fact that this Court denied his Motion for Reconsideration of its per curiam Decision of 27 April 1988 and reiterated and amplified that Decision in its Resolution of 19 May 1988. In the first place, proof of actual damage sustained by a court or the judiciary in general is not essential for a finding of contempt or for the application of the disciplinary authority of the Court. Insofar as the Consolidated Petitions are concerned this Court after careful review of the bases of its 27 April 1988 Decision, denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration thereof and rejected the public pressures brought to bear upon this Court by the respondent through his much publicized acts and statements for which he is here being required to account. Obstructing the free and undisturbed resolution of a particular case is not the only species of injury that the Court has a right and a duty to prevent and redress. What is at stake in cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial institutions of the country in general and of the Supreme Court in particular. Damage to such institutions might not be quantifiable at a given moment in time but damage there will surely be if acts like those of respondent Gonzalez are not effectively stopped and countered. The level of trust and confidence of the general public in the courts, including the court of last resort, is not easily measured; but few will dispute that a high level of such trust and confidence is critical for the stability of democratic government.

Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggest that punishment for contempt is not the proper remedy in this case and suggests that the members of this Court have recourse to libel suits against him. While the remedy of libel suits by individual members of this Court may well be available against respondent Gonzalez, such is by no means an exclusive remedy. Moreover, where as in the instant case, it is not only the individual members of the Court but the Court itself as an institution that has been falsely attacked, libel suits cannot be an adequate remedy. 57

The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the practice of law indefinitely and until further others from this Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman, the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

||| (Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, 80578, October 07, 1988)

IN RE: CUNANAN, ET ALSECOND DIVISION

[Resolution. March 18, 1954.]

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN ET AL., petitioners.

Jose M. Aruego, M. H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.

Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1.ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; ADMISSION; RELATION TO COURT AND PUBLIC. — By its declared objective, Republic act No. 972 is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of the legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problems evolved by the times become more difficult.

2.ID.; ID.; A JUDICIAL FUNCTION. — In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles."

3.ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO REPEAL, ALTER OR SUPPLEMENT RULES. — The Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities governing the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes, continue to reside in this court. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court.

4.ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS AND THAT OF SUPREME COURT MAY BE HARMONIZED. — Being coordinate and independent branches the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high

virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of repeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys-at-law is realized. They are powers which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of justice.

5.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CLASS LEGISLATION. — Republic act No. 972 is a class legislation. There is no actual nor reasonable basis to classify unsuccessful bar candidates by years nor to exclude those of other years.

6. ID.; TITLE OF LAW MUST EMBRACE ALL ITS PROVISIONS. - Article 2 of Republic act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins. Being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.

7.ID.; Republic act No. 972, PART OF SECTION 1 DECLARED TO BE IN FORCE. — There being no unanimity in the eight Justices who constitute the majority of the court in this case, that part of article 1 Republic act No. 972 which refers to the examinations of 1953 to 1955 shall continue in force.

D E C I S I O NDIOKNO, J p:

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as Republic act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to

the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:

Republic act No. 972.

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1.Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered on hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in

the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2.Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3.This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by this decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic act No. 972, are appended to this decision as

Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the following statistical data are set forth:

(1)The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic act No. 972 total 1,168, classified as follows:

1946 (August)206121181946 (November)477228431947749340019488994091119491,21853216419501,3168932619512,068879196419522,7381,03342619532,555986284Total12,2305,4211,168.

Of the aforesaid 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for reconsideration.

(2)In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different subjects in previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act 972.

(3)The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which ar still pending because they could be favorably affected by Republic act No. 972, - although as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades.

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF Republic act No. 972.

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal profession and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the court

set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole question of whether or not Republic act No. 972 is constitutional.

We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the members of the bar who have amply argued, orally and in writing, on the various aspects in which the question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema, themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation for along time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a new member in order to place it as humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.

Republic act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:

"The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation."

Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."

By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the public during those years and private enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette has been published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.

Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.

The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable principles, but the resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case of similar background been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been directly derived the judicial system established where with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States, and which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous juridical history of more than half a century? From the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those against its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the

President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and which the proponent of the contested law respects.

This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed law.

To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been cited to us as a favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the Supreme Court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.

It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:

"They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of them for any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office. Any male citizen of the age of twenty- one years, of good moral character, and who possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission to practice in all the courts of this State." (p. 93)

According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:

"Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously rested with the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they possessed. The convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been exercised, and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon admission to

practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of the provision respecting the admission of attorneys, in its particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the object of this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any portion of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from the use of the word 'admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken of must be by the court; that to admit means to grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily implies the power of refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the applicant possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.

"These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act." (p. 93.)

Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that the possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution required of applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or accessible private library in the country.

In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:

"The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an institution of established reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able professors, the students in which department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law committee of the institution, but to a

certain definite period of study before being entitled to a diploma as graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this examination together with the preliminary study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court; and as rendering the latter examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and burdensome.

"The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and for the mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for that of the court. It could have had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be given to its provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense with the plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate an intention that the authorities of the college should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as a modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection with these statutes and with the Constitution itself in order to determine the present condition of the law on the subject." (p. 89)

xxx xxx xxx

"The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission, that has simply prescribed what shall be competent

evidence in certain cases upon that question." (p. 93)

From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly seen. Please note only the following distinctions:

(1)The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.

(2)The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the admission of any lawyer.

(3)The Constitution of New York at the time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on the matter of admission to the practice of law.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment the proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.

We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which

the validity of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the following paragraphs:

"This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the English speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate qualifications of attorneys at law, but in England and in every state of the Union the act of admitting an attorney at law has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of legislative power. (p. 444)

"No greater responsibility rests upon this court than that of preserving in form and substance the exact form of government set up by the people. (p. 444)

"Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in character, the Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)

"But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)

"Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, and coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty, but each is supreme in that branch of sovereignty which properly belongs to its department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass the other in the discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme and thought of the people

setting upon the form of government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)

"The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our state government, under a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot escape responsibility for the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)

"The relation of the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an attaché of the courts. The quality of justice dispensed by the courts depends in no small degree upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p. 445)

"Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at least in the English speaking countries." (p. 445)

After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:

"Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the adoption of our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the Revolution of 1688, had exercised the right of determining who should be admitted to the practice of law, which, as was said in Matter of the

Sergeants at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235, 'constitutes the most solid of all titles.' If the courts and the judicial power be regarded as an entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to practice law is a constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance that it is either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of the judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity cannot be denied. Our people borrowed from England this judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign institution, but made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the government. They took this institution along with the power traditionally exercised to determine who should constitute its attorneys at law. There is no express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional power of the judicial department should in any manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make the three great departments of government separate and independent of one another. The idea that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the judicial independent of the legislative department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the absence of express constitutional provision. While the Legislature may legislate with respect to the qualifications of attorneys, its power in that respect does not rest upon any power possessed by it to deal exclusively with the subject of the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power to protect the

public interest. When it does legislate fixing a standard of qualifications required of attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected, such qualifications constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from which the court must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the course for the proper administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law." (p. 450)

"Furthermore it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely true that the Legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N. J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 52, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N. W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.

"The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been so generally held that the act of a court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment for the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the

Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the power to determine the qualifications may reside." (p. 451)

In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:

"It is indispensable to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there be members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character. This arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be protected from incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C. L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N. Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N. E. 487, 489, 60 A. L. R. 851: 'Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions.' One is admitted to the bar 'for something more than private gain.' He becomes 'an officer of the court, and, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His cooperation with the court is due 'whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys at law the judicial department of government would be hampered in the performance of its duties. That has been the history of attorneys under the common law, both in this country and in England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial

action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open and notorious by a decision of the court entered upon its records. The establishment by the Constitution of the judicial department conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate department of government. It is an inherent power of such a department of government ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, 'It has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be removed.'" (p. 727)

In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the legal profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:

"In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has always been the general practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties. In this court the fact of the admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to which they, respectively, belong, for three years preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and professional character is fair. The order of admission

is the judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers of the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, 7 How. (Miss. 127; Fletcher vs. Daingerfield, 20 Cal. 430. Their admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It was so held by the court of appeals of New York in the matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. 'Attorneys and Counsellors,' said that court, 'are not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their appointment may, with propriety, be intrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing his duty, may very justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650- 651).

We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:

"Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this point. Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of the court." — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.

"Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of the court." — A. C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A. L. R. 1512.

On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government.

"The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to alteration or change either by legislative action or by judicial decrees.

"The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other departments of the government." — 16 C. J. S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.

"If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry." — Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.

In decreeing that bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.

That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the

admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:

"Section 13.The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines." — Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.

Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of repeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercised within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of justice.

The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña took the examination and failed by a few points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a previous examination. The Government appointed Guariña and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This Tribunal refused to give his license without previous examinations. The court said:

"Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the office of provincial fiscal for

the Province of Batanes. Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:

"SEC. 2.Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled 'An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands,' is hereby amended to read as follows:

"1.Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this Act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, assistant prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippines Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court."

"The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to pass the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning upon which he

was examined, thus falling four points short of the required percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he presented his former application for admission to the bar, we should grant him a license to practice law in the courts of these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now 'possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability.'

"But it is contended that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination 'upon motion before the Supreme Court' accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the context generally and especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act which specifically provides for the admission of certain candidates without examination, the clause may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without any examination.' It is contended that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised."

And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:

"Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word 'may,' as used in the above citation from Act No. 1597, a mandatory rather than a permissive effect. But any act of the commission which has the effect of setting at naught in whole or in part the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining

or limiting the power conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its rightful limits and authority.

Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court held:

"In the various cases wherein applications for admission to the bar under the provisions of this statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.

"In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and never had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.

"In the light of this affirmative proof of his deficiency on that occasion, we do not think that his appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof of his possession of the necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.

"In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short of the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since that time he has held the responsible office of the governor of

the Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which will be given him by a committee of the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule." — (In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

The law in question, like those in the Case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.

In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until December 31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would pass an examination, or to those who had studied for three years if they commenced their studies after the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being, among others, a class legislation. The Court said:

"This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas from law schools issued to the applicants. The act

of the general assembly passed in 1899, under which the application is made, is entitled 'An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors,' approved March 28, 1894, in force July 1, 1874.' The amendment, as far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists in the addition to the section of the following: 'And every applicant for a license who shall comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard to admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant commend the study of law, either in a law office or a law school or college, shall be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules'." — In re Day et al, 54 N. Y., p. 646.

. . . "After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the laws of this state, whose regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by the student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the student began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for two years in a law office, or part of such time in a law office, 'and part in the aforesaid law school,' and whose course of study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination by the examining board in the branches now required by the rules of this court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons named therein, and establishes rules of

legislative creation for their admission to the bar." (p. 647.)

"Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation, prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to practice in the courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could prescribe the character of evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive of the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be done by a general law, and not by granting special and exclusive privileges to certain persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice law is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil process while attending court. The law conferring such privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long as the law establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable relation to the end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for different legislation as to the different classes, and not a purely arbitrary one, having no just relation to the subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 III. 66, 35 N. E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 III. 98, 40 N. E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.

"The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill.

48, II N. E. 881); but the place where such physician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N. E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession of the law and plainly, any classification must have some reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into two classes - First, those presenting diplomas issued by any law school of this state before December 31, 1899; and, second, those who studied law for the period of two years in a law office, or part of the time in a law school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the subjects specified in the present rules of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for making application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as between the two different conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted upon the completion of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon the mere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those who began the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as well as those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend only two years in study, while those who commenced the next day must spend three years, although they would complete two years before the

time limit. The one who commenced on the 3d. If possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination before December 31, 1899, and without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)

In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N. W. 441, where the legislature attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of being a class legislation:

"But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to prescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and license those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner here attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which will apply to all alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: 'It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling, business or profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and condition. This right may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring

years of study and great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the 'estate' acquired in them - that is, the right to continue their prosecution - is often of great value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their real or personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of government that all similarly situated and possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of medicine, requiring examinations to establish the possession on the part of the application of his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been challenged, and courts have seriously considered whether the exemption from such examinations of those practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered such law unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N. C. 643, 28 S. E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N. W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N. W. 468.

"This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law and to constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not material that he had once established his right to practice law and that one time he possessed the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in no manner affect the power of the Legislature to select from the great body of the public an individual upon whom it would confer its favors.

"A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to admit to the practice of law without

examination, all who had 'serve in the military or naval forces of the United States during the World War and received an honorable discharge therefrom and who (were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as 'World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act." This Act was held unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses of the constitution of that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N. W. 179.

A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:

"The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid must rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those excluded and, furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial once. Therefore, any law that is made applicable to one class of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference between the situation of that class and other individuals to which it does not apply and must rest on some reason on which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a difference between the situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation and circumstances of all other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural reason for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general because

it operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and not generally on all." (12 Am Jur. pp. 151-153.)

Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the abovementioned authorities, for this classification? If there is none, and none has been given, then the classification is fatally defective.

It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his right to an equal consideration.

To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing averages during those years were all that could be

objected to or criticized. Now, is it desired to undo what had been done — cancel the license that was issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the general average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.

Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in the title of the Act. While this law according to its title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21(1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affects the entire law.

Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative

powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.

Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:

1.Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.

2.Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and after them. In attempting to do it directly Republic act No. 972 violated the Constitution.

3.By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules.

4.The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.

5.Article 2 of Republic act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void..

6.Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in force.

RESOLUTION

Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced their decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribe to this decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:

1.That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.

2.That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.

Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on

the date or dates that the Chief Justice may set. So ordered..

Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla and Reyes, JJ., concur.

ANNEX I

PETITIONERS UNDER Republic act No. 972

A resume of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows:

August, 1946 1

Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo Florendo, Atty. Bernardino Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty. Crispin Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Jose Perez Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, members.

Number of candidates206Number of candidates whose grades were raised12

73's672's6

Number of candidates who passed85Number of candidates who failed121Number of those affected by Republic act No. 97218Percentage of success(per cent)41.62Percentage of failure(per cent)58.74Passing grade(per cent)72

November, 1946

Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except Hon. Jose Teodoro who was substituted by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.


(72 per cent and above but below 73 per cent —Minutes of March 31, 1947).

Number of candidates who passed249Number of candidates who failed228Number of those affected by Republic act No. 97243Percentage of success(per cent)52.20Percentage of failure(per cent)47.80Passing grade(per cent)72.

(By resolution of the Court).

October, 1947

Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Antonio Araneta, Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la Costa, Atty. Celso B. Jamora, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Members.


70.55 per cent with 2 subjects below 50 per cent169 per cent4068 per cent2

Number of candidates who passed409Number of candidates who failed340Number of those affected by Rep. Act No. 972972Percentage of success(per cent)54.59Percentage of failure(per cent)45.41Passing grade(per cent)69.


NOTE. — In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per cent and 68.1 per cent respectively, the Court found out that they were not benefited at all by the bonus of 12 points given by the Examiner in Civil Law.

August, 1948

Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman Hon. Luis P. Torres, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G. Barrera, Hon. Rafael Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Members.


71's2970's35

Number of candidates who passed490Number of candidates who failed409Number of those affected by Rep. Act No. 97211Percentage of success(per cent)62.40Percentage of failure(per cent)37.60Passing grade(per cent)70

(By Resolution of the Court).

August, 1949

Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando Jugo, 1 Hon. Enrique Filamor, Atty. Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Federico Agrava, Hon. Mariano H. de Joya, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty. Emeterio Rarcelon, Members.

Number of candidates1,218Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's)55Number of candidates who passed686Number of candidates who failed532Number of those affected by Republic act No. 972164Percentage of success(per cent)56.28Percentage of failure(per cent)43.72Passing grades(per cent)74


August, 1950

Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, 1 Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Francisco A. Delgado, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, Members.

Number of candidates1,316Number of candidates whose grades were raised38

(The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by recommendation and authority of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Delgado).

Number of candidates who passed423Number of candidates who failed894Number of those affected by Republic act No. 97226Percentage of success(per cent)32.14Percentage of failure(per cent)67.86Passing grade(per cent)75

August, 1951

Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo Alafriz, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon, Alfonso Felix, Members.

Number of candidates2,068Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's)112Number of candidates who passed1,189Number of candidates who failed879Number of those affected by Republic act No. 972196Percentage of success(per cent)57.49Percentage of failure(per cent)42.51Passing grade(per cent)75

August, 1952

Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Emilio P. Virata, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Members.

Number of candidates2,733Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's)163Number of candidates who passed1,705Number of candidates who failed1,033Number of those affected by Republic act No. 972426Percentage of success(per cent)62.27Percentage of failure(per cent)37.73Passing grade(per cent)75

August, 1953

Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members.

Number of candidates2,555Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's)100Number of candidates who passed1,570Number of candidates who failed986Number of those affected by Republic act No. 972284Percentage of success(per cent)61.04Percentage of failure(per cent)38.96Passing grade(per cent)75

A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under Republic act No. 972, grouped by the years in which they took the bar examinations, with annotations as to who had presented motions for reconsideration which were denied (MRD), and who filed mere motions for reconsideration without invoking said law, which are still pending, follows:

PETITIONERS UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW

Civ.LandMerc.Int.Pol.Crim.Rem.Leg.Gen. Av.

MRD-1.Agunod, Filemon L667161768083737571.4MRD-2.Cunanan, Albino767274757070657271.45

3.Mejia, Flaviano V.646465688374688069.85

1948

MRD-4.Orlina, Soledad R.716866756375708869.9MRD-5.Vivero, Antonio Lu.757373656366658069.95MRD-6.Gatchalian, Salud72667175786865 5069.65

1949

7.Abaya, Jesus A.697975757189557570.8

MRD-8.Advincula, David D.768062868172606570.5

9.Agraviador, Alfredo L.638570778081658071.810.Alacar, Pascual C.616383797185658072.0511.Amog, Pedro M.756676788174558572.212.Apolinario, Miguel S.758478787070607571.9513.Aquino, Maximo G.827771777677607573.1514.Asinas, Candido D.758369808183558572.6515.Baldivino, Jose B.756572828269608071.9516.Balintona, Bernardo75806478746765707017.Banawa, Angel L.787070758183606072.318.Bandala, Anacleto A.668066719372557069.619.Bandon, Alawadin L.747969779173608073.3520.Baquero,

Benjamin767964778572657572.521.Blanco, Jose757570757776609072.522.Buenaluz, Victoriano T.757172786782607570.8523.Canda, Benjamin S.757275827677657573.5524.Canon, Guillermo778667887569708573.925.Carlos, Estela S.758181797273657073.826.Cerezo, Gregorio O.697676797180558070.427.Clarin, Manuel L.758276817369707573.9528.Claudio, Conrado O.766278777372607071.429.Condevillamar, Antonio V.686574808575607571.6

MRD-30.Cornejo, Crisanto R.727569828379658073.4

31.Corona, Olvido D.687673818172607571.1532.Dizon, Marcial C.768669837574658073.133.Enriquez, Agustin P.757770818177658073.7534.Espiritu, Ireneo E..808869757677657573.835.Fernandez, Macario J.638276758184657572.9536.Gallardo, Amando C.787967777675606570.9537.Garcia, Freidrich M.768066757270607569.738.Garcia, Julian L.647768828977657572.1539.Garcia, Leon Mo.778671806082657571.8540.Garcia, Pedro V.768273817483608573.641.Garcia, Santiago C.629179757275658071.842.Genoves, Pedro758370788776558072.743.Gonzales, Amado P.757171758675607572.6544.Guia, Odon R.

de777666817476607570.945.Fernandez, Simeon626871807490657570.8546.Jakosalem, Filoteo828373826187657073.647.Jesus, Felipe D. de758367797885607572.4548.Jocom, Jacobo M.777774777464558570.6549.Juares, Nicolas77845676738260857050.Kalalang, Remegio657574807070658570.351.Layumas, Vicente L.678465758966608070.352.Leyson, Amancio F.698375768175657573.1553.Libanan, Marcelino718361778081658571.7554.Lim, Jose E.777772767264657071.1555.Lim, Jose F.707562838071658070.456.Linao, Mariano M.668476788075607571.7557.Lopez, Angelo P.67817572798155807158.Lopez, Eliezar M.777560757785607570.759.Lopez, Nicanor S.727170787784607571.5560.Manoleto, Proceso D.727065788190608071.9561.Mancao, Alfredo P.676471837676658070.9562.Manera, Mariano A.75787575687960657163.Mercado, Arsenio N.676471837676658070.9564.Miranda, Benjamin G.768167827477658072.5565.Manad, Andres B.777568826972657571.15

1949

66.Orosco, Casimiro P.728469817082657571.967.Padua, Manuel C.767668807979507570.1

68.Palang, Basilio S.717582715587557569.669.Palma, Cuadrato627569938079558069.570.Pañganiban, Jose V.678361819174607570.671.Pareja, Felipe667175816774607068.7572.Patalinjug, Eriberto737778737871557571.2573.Paulin, Jose C.666971778382657572.14.Pido, Serafin C.727863807185708072.0575.Pimentel, Luis P.777576817668558071.676.Plantilla, Rodrigo C.727868897981658573.5577.Regalario, Benito B.728064807581558069.5578.Robis, Casto P.627774736880708070.979.Rodil, Francisco C.686970817675657570.7580.Rodriguez, Mariano I.807569807280658073.3581.Romero, Crispulo P.787566777683657572.8582.Saez, Porfirio D.75757281697760757183.Saliguma, Crisogono D.797974786965657071.884.Samano, Fortunato A.758472777082607571.985.Santos, Faustina C.716868767585557569.586.Santos, Josefina R.686976717782657572.387.Seludo, Ananias G.758069797782657573.2588.Semilia, Rafael I.688555838979658071.2589.Telan, Gaudencio777970757075607570.8590.Tesorero, Leocadio T.757163758262656369.6591.Torre, Valentin S. de la858171766965557070.492.Torres, Ariston

L.787172816184558570.493.Veyra, Zosimo C. de707571796580658070.6594.Viado, Jose677074757590558070.795.Villacarlos, Delfin A.738771826970758573.8596.Villamil, Leonor S.738176868673558573.697.Zabala, Amando A.767067757676607570.6

1950

MRD-98.Cruz, Filomeno de la707178817672649673.4

99.Española, Pablo S.717855768569659370.2100.Foronda, Clarencio J.607868798488629371.9101.Hechanova, Vicente597675756968759671.3

MRD-102.Peñalosa, Osias R.807861766177668570.2

103.Sarmiento, Floro A. 658663828972607270.15

MRD-104.Torre, Catalino P.758568786967656970.25

105.Ungson, Fernando S.618775705785838272.8

1951

106.Abasolo, Romulo777064657670766471.7107.Adeva, Daniel G.755974656951786770.4108.Aguilar, Vicente Z.736368757069757571.25109.Amodia, Juan T.757666757660777672.35

MRD-110.Añosa, Pablo S.767863757461757971.6

111.Antiola, Anastacio R. 687675707170816673.05112.Aquino, S. Rey

A.707171607462767771.1113.Atienza, Manuel G.7868808651827573.85114.Avanceña, Alfonso717165757072788071.8

MRD-115.Balacuit, Camilo N.757375707265757673.25

116.Barinaga, Jeremias L.686973707450807971.2

MRD-117.Barrientos, Ambrosio D.766067557463776270.25MRD-118.Benitez, Tomas P.677575607372757872.2

119.Biason, Sixto F.738267656672776871.25

MRD-120. Briñas, Isagani, A.716974707652797271.95

121. Buela, Arcadio P.727761707158797169.75122.Cabilao, Leonardo S.735075757560717971.25123.Cabrera, Ireneo M.75667065728170792.4124.Cacacho, Emilio V.125.Calilung, Soledad C.647373807357755969.65

MRD-126.Calimlim, Jose B.647373807357755969.65

127.Calimlim, Pedro B.668269606952837570128.Camello, Sotero H.707763657566846471.55129.Campos, Juan A.718870756469716270.15130.Castillo, Antonio del787870607967697672.65

MRD-131.Castillo, Dominador Ad.756172757471676671.1MRD-132.Castro, Jesus B.728672756575767172.85

133.Casuga, Bienvenido B.757272706961756070.95134.Cabangbang, Santiago B. 776761807359837672.2

135.Cruz, Federico S. 697475756865767071.65136.Dacanay, Eufemio P.707362757269857172.05137.Deysolong, Felisberto666272757062836270.85

MRD-138.Dimaano, Jr., Jose N.787963757375815973.5

139.Espinosa, Domingo L.786358707067876371.6

MRD-140.Farol, Evencia C.807866758172627372.25

141.Felix, Conrado S.717175657058756970.75142.Fernan, Pablo L.678866857368787572.35143.Gandioco, Salvador G.645866657670897572.1144.Gastardo, Crispin B.706968757866867273.9145.Genson, Angelo B.755773656754785669.55146.Guiani, Guinaid M.686075657467757771.5147.Guina, Graciano P.666967607852836169.6

MRD-148.Homeres, Praxedes P.747475757169757173.35

149.Ibarra, Venancio M.607574707470807571.9150.Imperial, Monico L.727875757256827773.7

MRD-151.Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M717063857160855370.85

152.Inandan, Fortunato C.777767557375795772.5153.Jimenez, Florencio C.757070757261757872.05154.Kintanar, Woodrow M.708372657673756972.95155.Languido, Cesar V.637163857061857970.55156.Lavilles, Cesar L.61975557363757870.55157.Llenos, Francisco

U.647065607265927571.75158.Leon, Marcelo D. de 637360857575907072.75159.Llanto, Priscilla 72 68 657667846871.35160.Macachor, Oscar 68597870757757570.15

MRD-161.Magsino, Encarnacion 776670707671756172.25MRD-162.Maligaya, Demetrio M.706175657550915172.3

163.Manio, Gregorio676769807167757570.65164.Puzon, Eduardo S.728260606970687268.05

MRD-165.Marcial, Meynardo R.667574707567817573.15

166.Martin, Benjamin S.687263756963846270.1

MRD-167.Monterroyo, Catalina S708075807666825173.95MRD-168.Montero, Leodegario C.736766808165817573.75

169.Monzon, Candido T.707274756770776972.05170.Natividad, Alberto M.737968657369757972.2

MRD-171.Navallo, Capistrano C.707268858166717472.1

172.Nisce, Camilo Z.666675657968856273.5

MRD-173.Ocampo, Antonio F. de 758176657467756973.75

174.Olaviar, Jose O.727069556670777570.5

MRD-175.Perez, Cesario Z.757666807263826972.95

176.Pogado, Causin O.706665707564757069.95177.Ramos-Balmori, Manuela757362657859756670.2178.Cecinto, Ireneo I.737668757468805372.3

MRD-179.Redor, Fransisco, K.627773756964766970MRD-180.Regis, Deogracias A.767468656565887573.35

181.Rigor, Estelita C.677861807177796570.9

MRD-182.Rimorin-Gordo, Estela707262608866677970.15

183.Rosario, Prisco del706470707273855772.65184.Rosario, Vicente D. del759165756868796272.2185.Saavedra, Felipe738063757673686270.35186.Salazar, Alfredo N.667273756768776970.85187.Salem, Romulo R.778172657360767573188.Foz, Julita A.757275756570766472.5189.Santa Ana, Candido T.776965758175707573190.Santos, Aquilino726669656870817171.7191.Santos, Valeriano V.7672756862767973.1192.Suico, Samuel737972757159846573.3193.Suson, Teodorico746866806659796770.35194.Tado, Florentino P.647667657672765369.7195.Tapayan, Domingo A.697269707673827973.75

MRD-196.Tiausas, Miguel V.676071757967846072.7

197.Torres, Carlos P.687171707063827171.6198.Tria, Hipolito 697275606954786670.05199.Velasco, Avelino A.657275757167787672.1200.Villa, Francisco C.658073756879657570.2201.Villagonzalo, Job R.786774657251697170.25

202.Villarama, Jr., Pedro75747555566677571.45

1952

203.Abacon, Pablo757278817872645572.7

MRP-204.Abad, Agapito737673857563627570.95MRP-205.Abella, Ludovico B.708176817066775872.7

MRP-206.Abellera, Geronimo F.7579798776516370717MRP-207.Abenojar, Agapito N.7278847075697072.9

208.Alandy, Doroteo R.648393916859606071.2209.Alano, Fabian T.708361837287727071.9

MRP-210.Alcantara, Pablo V.717980817370726273.65

211.Arcangel, Agustin Ag.758571737665686571.85212.Acosta, Dionisio N.758178875665777072.8

MRP-213.Abinguna, Agapito C.668580847558767573.65

214.Adove, Nehemias C.768678776678696273.55215.Adrias, Inocencio C.758361887667797573.4216.Aglugub, Andres R.758373887262726272.65217.Andrada, Mariano L.768566876377757773

MRP-218.Almeda, Serafin V.72 7275816167736570.75

219.Almonte-Peralta, Felicidad737172917567655370.7

MRP-220.Almodia, Juan T.757968856264757871.4MRP-221.Antonio, Felino A.717681837952727073.3

MRP-222.Antonio, Jose S.759290686564686073.75

223.Añonuevo, Ramos B.718778816463747672.7224.Aquino, S. Rey A.677757786970698067.7225.Arteche, Filomeno D.788350897677707070.8

MRP-226.Arribas, Isaac M.757870817370677872.2MRP-227.Azucena, Ceferino D.726778897267776573.95

228.Atienza, Ricardo728770796655757570.85229.Balacuit, Camilo N.757889757054667573.3

MRP-230.Baclig, Cayetano S.778483806970616573

231.Balcita, Oscar C.757779906460675070.65232.Barilea, Dominador Z.716782776461658070.5

MRP-233.Banta, Jose Y.758077817563717573.95MRP-234. Barrientos, Ambrosio D.767067806765708170.7

235.Batucan, Jose M.667678886276677871.2236.Bautista, Atilano C.708284855861716271.25237.Bautista, Celso J.716863878067807072.75238.Belderon, Jose 768176927066676272.65

MRP-239.Belo, Victor B.767764737571767672.85MRP-240.Bejec, Conseso D.798073826377755073.15

MRP-241.Beltran, Gervasio M.727581737557758073.95MRP-242.Benaojan, Robustiano O.748477847563686272.85

MRP-243.Beriña, Roger C.708079796872647871.85MRP-244.Bihis, Marcelo M.758665926464847573.45

MRP-245.Binaoro, Vicente M.736978837359708272.75MRP-246.Bobila, Rosalio B.768676836859717873.05

247.Buenafe, Avelina R.788075757055728072.75248.Bueno, Anastacio F.737871787167716071.15249.Borres, Maximino L.678562917263768070.9

MRP-250.Cabegin, Cesar V.727176757470716072.2MRP-251.Cabello, Melecio F.727878895870677170.5

MRP-252.Cabrera, Irineo M.798853917185757673.3

253.Cabreros, Paulino N.7179 83846062715070.85254.Calayag, Florentino R.697966886975687670.6

MRP-255.Calzada, Cesar de la767280676271666270.85

256.Canabal, Isabel708281777851757573.7

MRP-257.Cabugao, Pablo N.768769805864787571.8

258.Calañgi, Mateo C.739371877066696271.8259.Canda, Benjamin S.727177906275668271.95260.Cantoria, Euologio718071897055727571261.Capacio, Jr., Conrado677871906575726070.65262.Capitulo, Alejandro P.757053877863769171.2

MRP-263.Calupitan, Jr., Alfredo 759381766475685673.15MRP-264.Caluya, Arsenio V.758670877752778273.9

MRP-265.Campanilla, Mariano B. ...807578777371637673.65MRP-266.Campos, Juan A. ...668583846761805773.25

267.Cardoso, Angelita G. ...787173767956696071.8268.Cartagena, Herminio R. ....717265896473807071.65

MRP-269.Castro, Daniel T.657577768560756973.15

270.Cauntay, Gaudencio V.707872737769648071.2271.Castro, Pedro L. de706869877675727072.35272.Cerio, Juan A.758275866054767571.75273.Colorado, Alfonso R.687580747766678072.6274.Chavez, Doroteo M.736579847369668473.1275.Chavez, Honorato A.777679867453717573.65

MRP-276.Cobangbang, Orlando B.698174827661788073.85

277.Cortez, Armando R.786088866066696473.1278.Crisostomo, Jesus L.768774766255766671.45

MRP-279.Cornejo, Crisanto R.688778867950806073.7MRP-280.Cruz, Raymundo 758179857257687572.95

MRP-281.Cunanan, Jose C.789263837672686572.4

282.Cunanan, Salvador F.708264926775737671.45283.Cimafranca, Agustin B.717676807071757173.35284.Crisol, Getulio R.709178856855715070.8

MRP-285.Dusi, Felicisimo R.768269826662807172.85MRP-286.Datu, Alfredo J.707572868055687971.5

287.Dacuma, Luis B.716787837150657071.25

MRP-288.Degamo, Pedro R.738082748067675773.65

289.Delgado, Vicente N.708482847752735072.65

MRP-290.Diolazo, Ernesto A.758386735454757572.25

291.Dionisio, Jr., Guillermo738464897178756672.8

MRP-292.Dichoso, Alberto M.717771816975807073.65MRP-293.Dipasupil, Claudio R.707682737970725673.9

MRP-294.Delgado, Abner758463676460707268.35MRP-295.Domingo, Dominador T.706981826863717572.2

296.Ducusin, Agapito B.7078 53887577627668.05

MRP-297.Duque, Antonio S.757778867672647573.9

298.Duque, Castulo758073836667656670.65299.Ebbah, Percival B.708085766663767573.95300.Edisa, Sulpicio657775897562756572301.Edradan, Rosa C.707584847159698673.4

MRP-302.Enage, Jacinto N.667088937267657573.2MRP-303.Encarnacion, Alfonso B.758673816377697572.65

304.Encarnacion, Cesar657858686664757867.1305.Estoista, Agustin A.7876748658677707671.7

MRP-306.Fabros, Jose B.667580828071677073.05MRP-307.Fajardo, Balbino P776982836560757573.9

308.Fajardo, Genaro P.707977797950737572.5309.Evangelita, Felicidad

P.757572876363777072.15310.Familara, Raymundo Z.687587836465686571.85311.Fariñas, Dionisio707889666575705072.75312.Favila, Hilario B.718474707567735972.2

MRP-313.Feliciano, Alberto I.716970856981727072.25MRP-314.Fernando, Lope F.737786797076645073

MRP-315.Flores, Dionisio S.787277836760687372.05MRP-316. Fortich, Benjamin B.708270707865647570.35

MRP-317.Fuente, Jose S. de la768872746071797973.55

318.Fohmantes, Nazario S.727971776861766070.9

MRP-319.Fuggan, Lorenzo B.768174697171736072.85

320.Gabuya, Jesus S.708382837063756573.75321.Galang, Victor N.698384767057716071.95322.Gaerlan, Manuel L.738777906761727573.15323.Galem, Nestor R.727986786061757073.05324.Gallardo, Jose Pe B.758875756370706571.85

MRP-325.Gallos, Cirilo B.707884918051657072.85

326.Galindo, Eulalio D.708987657871626273.4327.Galman, Patrocino G.727280857156705371.15328.Gamalinda, Carlos S.767981866763695572.55329.Gamboa, Antonio G.716770727660756870.95330.Gannod, Jose A.698075816862736871.25

MRP-331.Garcia, Matias N.677874907959766572.8

MRP-332.Ganete, Carmelo758777827457688173.3

333.Gilbang, Gaudioso R.756780826757647070.5334.Gofredo, Claro C.687872867852707670.9335.Gomez, Jose S.717671817663696270.85

MRP-336.Gosiaoco, Lorenzo V.689385786469705472.35MRP-337.Gonzales, Rafael C.777571895570706070.05

MRP-338.Gracia, Eulalia L. de666890847759696573.3

339.Grageda, Jose M. A.708572677060737370.75340.Guzman, Juan de758669846479757673.6

MRP-341.Guzman, Mateo de767979737269688073.9

342.Guzman, Salvador B. 716174726166787570.75343.Guzman, Salvador T. de 758464817461785871.75344.Habelito, Geronimo E.717671877360675569.65345.Hedriana, Naterno G.756884766658766072.9346.Hernandez, Quintin B.677572817272667670.6

1952

347.Homeres, Agustin R.738465867077637670.7348.Ines, Leonilo F.658871887773617070.55349.Jamer, Alipio S.687583898061655072

MRP-350.Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M.756568857670835473.8MRP-351.Jardinico, Jr., Emilio738672788267676472.8

MRP-352.Jaen, Justiniano F.767578847166707773.85

353. Jaring, Antonio S.727779707257715070.75

MRP-354.Javier, Aquilino M.758479787761666673.05

355.Jomuad, Francisco7575728878587674356.Jose, Nestor L.786164736876648069.7357.La O, Jose M.757175727067815973.5358.Leon, Brigido C. de677578927851728072.55359.Leones, Constante B.688179847360776073360.Liboro, Horacio T.726980877362706172.4361.Llanera, Cesar L.778180786459756373362.Lomontod, Jose P.757669707376747573.2363.Luna, Lucito707569835953747568.4

MRP-364.Luz, Lauro L.769078886458757773.95MRP-365.Macasaet, Tomas S.738172836675727072.5

366.Magbiray, Godofredo V.806784767062656873.05367.Majarias, Rodolfo P706264828875717972.85

MRP-368.Makabenta, Eduardo759077835971727873.3MRP-369.Malapit, Justiniano S.748374895860727671.1

370.Maloles, Iluminado M.708773767750767672.3371.Maniquis, Daniel R.758073916971657072.1372.Maraña, Arsenio657960727351758667.9373.Marasigan, Napoleon757183756962697072.75

MRP-374.Marco, Jaime P.756774766475755771.9

MRP-375.Martir, Osmundo P.708676787271755372.95

MRP-376.Masancay, Amando E.738775777250788073.2MRP-377.Mati-ong, Ignacio T.628772797376697771.3

378.Mara, Guillermo L.707878897567666572.35

MRP-379.Mercado, Felipe A.737782827852698573.9MRP-380.Miculob, Eugenio P.708273867752796572.8

381.Mison, Rafael M. Jr.,797873757168695371.95

MRP-382.Monponbanua, Antonio D.797968886478698373.1MRP-383.Montero, Leodegario C.728969897068707572.15

384.Morada, Servillano S.757667716566757670.9385.Morocco, Generoso788478846073687073

MRP-386.Mosquera, Estanislao L.757875857255776673.15

387.Motus, Rodentor P.807870947275705773.75388.Macario, Pedro R.706774867863726672.15

MRP-389.Nadela, Geredion T.726464817350757569.15MRP-390.Nazareno, Romeo P.677071767679755772.05

391.Nieto, Benedicto S.697977777262767672.9

MRP-392.Noguera, Raymundo718681807356727073.15MRP-393.Nodado, Domiciano R. 707069735737647263.6

394.Nono, Pacifico G.677778677559717671.35

MRP-395.Nuval, Manuel R.787267907268786773.65

396.Ocampo, Augusto759077726955656760.7397.Oliveros, Amado A.727568728450757971.9398.Opiña, Jr., Pedro767774677366687071.85

MRP-399. Olaviar, Jose O.706285817450687971.8MRP-400.Olandesca, Per O.709176877266707973.45

401.Orden, Apolonio J.726584866650726871.45402.Ortiz, Melencio T.717578816667707872.1

MRP-403.Pablo, Fedelino S.726476867261767572.95

404.Pacifico, Vicente V.767969807652728071.95

MRP-405.Paderna, Perfecto D.756972757858757072.6

406.Padlan, Crispin M.716676796867746671.65407.Padilla, Jose C.706567827875787573.3408.Padilla, Jr., Estanislao E.718878865975785072.95

MRP-409.Palma, Bartolome678180827175697573.25MRP-410.Papa, Angel A.757285857759637173.45

MRP-411.Parayno, Mario V.718874896966767373.65

412.Pariña, Santos L.708785776467637671.85

MRP-413.Pasion, Anastacio638068818279765872.55

414.Pastrana, Rizal R.697671766863778371.65

MRP-415.Paulin, Jose O.706680877550658070.9MRP-416.Pelaez, Jr., Vicente C.798773836971686573.2

417.Peña, Jesus757575627570606670.4418.Perez, Toribio R.716481926958677071.25419.Pestaño, Melquiades778174875968767573.2

MRP-420. Pido, Serafin C.778172826971607571.15

421.Pinlac, Filemon677674866579657270.55422.Poblete, Celso B.727982766664745072.15

MRP-423.Piza, Luz68707587746647570.8

424.Puzon, Eduardo S.728081697253677071.05425.Quetulio, Josefina D.759060936478768372.9

MRP-426.QuÃpanes, Melchor V.698879826562716671.55MRP-427.Quietson, Bayani R.737576777081715372.85

428.Racho, Macario D.687581827853665470.55429.Ramirez, Sabas P. 718073876262758071.65

MRP-430.Raffiñan, Jose A.808379796272686573.25MRP-431.Ramos, Patricio S.758776757272617572.25

MRP-432.Ramos-Balmori, Manuela788476904875806573.45

MRP-433.Raro, Celso758176677577557771.4MRP-434.Rayos, Victor S.758679917167677073.9

435.Revilla, Mariano S.757881907054698173.35436.Reyes, Abdon L.726481787673695372.85437.Reyes, Domingo B.728778837275627072.738.Reyes, Francisco M.758584687571685073.9

439Reyes, Lozano M.805778797865647973.35

MRP-440.Reyes, Oscar R.757582827664686073.65

441.Rigonan, Cesar V.718565867570767072.7442. Rivera, Honorio715670907165757171.2

MRP-443. Rivero, Buenaventura A.728872946873668072.6MRP-444. Robles, Enrique757775778264697073.7

445.Rodriguez, Orestes Arellano767576636977657872.25446.Roldan, Jose V.678079837371757073.9447.Rosario, Adelaida R. del807565706872807073.1548.Rosario, Restituto F. del757579906865666372.1

MRP-449.Sabelino, Conrado S.718169757771757072.95

450.San Juan, Damaso778672895976657271.6451.Sañiel, Felix L.729376806775666272.1452.Samaniego, Jesus B.758076726067687070.6

MRP-453.Sandoval, Emmanuel M.758370837767776073.95MRP-454.Sanidad, Emmanuel Q.717581906264766872.95

455.Santiago, Jr., Cristobal757684936365597071.8456.Santillan, Juanito Ll768983836358655271.25

MRP-457.Santos, Rodolfo C.757578827376667073.7MRP-458.Santos, Ruperto M.675469766364716066.75

MRP-459.Santos, Aquilino C.727173797379718573.8MRP-460.Santos, Rufino A.758179857472665473.3

461.Suanding, Bantas756767927959767673.1

MRP-462.Sulit, Feliz M.767976787275686773.5

463.Songco, Felicisimo, G.706882846069766573.35464.Soriano, Aniceto S.647977808053706570.7465.Suarez, Pablo D.738570877670647071.9

MRP-466.Sybico, Jesus L.797070727575726073.05

467.Tabaque, Benjamin R.696877797468726071.85

MRP-468. Tan Kiang, Clarita817972806275738073.95MRP-469.Tando, Amado T.718278837161716072

470.Tasico, Severo E.716975897075676371.65471.Tiburcio, Ismael P.738272937657685471.15

MRP-472.Tiongson, Federico T.707076847775755073.45MRP-473.Tolentino, Jesus C.758963848573735073.4

474.Torrijas, Alfredo A.776667836875716371.3

MRP-475.Tobias, Artemio M.695874817155655767.55MRP-476.Trillana, Jr., Apolonio 768676867068755073.8

MRP-477.Trinidad, Manuel O.669183756366676570.8

478.Trinidad, Pedro O.667878857851647570.3

MRP-479.Urdarbe, Flavio J.808277826756687572.6

480.Umali, Osmundo C.687581807169686071.7

481.Umayam, Juanito C.77758785565666 6071

MRP-482.Usita, Gelacio U.7572757473 76717073.55

483.Valino, Francisco M.728180846278717573.7484.Varela, Dominador M.677581867257817073.85485.Vega, Macairog L. de786279877070716573.8

MRP-486. Velasco, Emmanuel D.718074856066767671.85

487.Velez, Maria E.737089805650726771.05

MRP-488.Venal, Artemio V.789158677655757373.65

489.Venus, Conrado B.698174856266727777.05

MRP-490.Verzoza, Federico B.757972887668745973.7MRP-491.Villafuerte, Eduardo V.758370766464756571.2

MRP-492.Villanueva, Cecilio C.758579886677677073.95

493.Villar, Custodio R.736970887666695070.75

MRP-494.Villaseñor, Leonidas F.808567776275767373.15

495.Viterbo, Jose H.807765937065656570.65496.Yaranon, Pedro707776857250757571.85

MRP-497.Yasay, Mariano R.757572766377706071.1MRP-498.Ygay, Venancio M.738083846259727772.65

499.Yulo, Jr., Teodoro738278756081757673.95500.Zamora, Alberto706576796277698271.3501.Rigonan, Felipe C.707969897662716471.2

A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation of their grades in subjects passed in previous examinations, showing the years in which they took the examinations together with their grades and averages, and those who had filed motions for reconsideration which were denied, indicated by the initials MRD, follows:

PETITIONERS UNDER Republic act No. 972

Civ.LandMerc.Int.Pol.Crim.Rem.Leg.Gen.Ave.

1.Amao, Sulpicio M.

194668677676737349 5066.5

1950598067776280715767.4

2.Baldo, Olegario Ga.

1951657658555963757264.9

1952656875847259735769.75

1953577468687652717666.7

3.Blanco ,Jose B.

MRD-1949757570757776609072.15

1951647158656870757166.95

4.Condeno, Mateo

1950718062757581559269.3

195170606165776764678167.85

5.Ducusin, Agapito B.

MRD-1949697076737671556068.65

1950607155676775568963.1

6.Garcia, Manuel N.

MRD-1949607082797069608069.25

1950576551695485568460.3

7.Luna, Lucito A.

1946635369767576576966.55

1952707569835953747568.4

8.Maraña, Arsenio S.

1949726868757572607569.35

1952657960727351758667.9

9.Montano, Manuel M.1951616058607063756464.8

1952707765796652705066.4

1953786466688150717870.65

10.Peña, Jesus S.

1950257545754552467146.2

1951746162656965755768.2

1952757575627570606670.4

11.Placido, Sr., Isidro

1950687870756970586967.75

1951656275607357757166.8

12.Rementizo, Filemon S.

1949657572756075558566.65

1951685748609166557564.05

1952685368675856756465.7

13.Rivera, Eulogio J.1952678051696977735366.35

1953656778747562698070.9

14.Rodulfa, Juan T.

1951676070656856756667.75

1952707167786775717070.1

15.Sanchez, Juan J.

1948396982757672555063.5

MRD-1949675669757277607568

1951705955606857786765.8

16.Santos, Constantino

1952627654827277666566.65

1953737170657864657870.4

17.Santos, Salvador H.

1951606455706852707562.85

1952756470817655617569.11953707179657254668070

18.Sevilla, Macario C.

MRD-1948506476666669605263.1

MRD-1949476678647186658568

1950356540756357247945

MRD-1951685972556965757569.3

1953707374708156697171.05.

Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while some candidates — 85 in all — presented motions for reconsideration of their grades, others invoked the provisions of Republic act No. 972. A list of those candidates separating those who filed mere motions for reconsideration (56) from those who invoked the aforesaid Republic Act, is as follows:

1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION.

Civ.LandMerc.Int.Pol.Crim.Rem.Leg.

1.Acenas, Calixto R.737068628251677773.45

2.Alcantara, Pedro N.677075858754718072.8

3.Alejandro, Exequiel677271758076757773.4

4.Andres, Gregorio M.707386587950717872.7

5.Arnaiz, Antonio E.668076587968778173.4

6.Asis, Floriano U. de667875817755736971.25

7.Bacaiso, Celestino M.716576687650757070.95

8.Bala, Florencio F.648247708258758267

9.Baldo, Olegario A.67746868765277666.7

10.Barrios, Benjamin O.657176758062837373.95

11.Buhay, Eduardo L.737671917661747873.35

12.Burgos, Dominador C.728089616637696870.05

13.Cariño, Eldo J.798160757474767473

14.Casar, Dimapuro 677384797761717473.35

15.Castañeda, Gregorio707380717570737873.95

16.Estrellado, Benjamin R.677964738262717470.2

17.Fabunan, Edilberto C.707268697760767471.1

18.Feril, Domingo B.757184657060657071.6

19.Fernandez, Alejandro G.657587808163618072.8

20.Gapus, Rosita S. (Miss) 768086776474666973.9

21.Garcia, Rafael B.708670757363737571.65

22.Gracia, Miguel L. de736875598051727171

23.Gungon, Armando G.687676847757778373.6

24.Gutierrez, Antonio S.687766707259717469.1

25.Ilejay, Abraham I.777076778162706873.7

26.Leon, Benjamin La. de666675707755718270.35

27.Lugtu, Felipe L.627078657856698169.9

28.Lukman, Abdul-Hamid766467697359737570.45

29.Maloles, Jr., Benjamin G.777668687151757870.85

30.Maloles, Julius G.777160717962687269.75

31.Mandi, Santiago P.657670617968757271.1

32.Margete, Rufino C.707666758573717572.75

33.Melocoton, Nestorio B.708173788352727572.35

34.Molina, Manuel C.757870617563668570.95

35.Muñoz, Mariano A.758086677457687673.75

36.Navarro, Buenaventura M.807565758355737973

37.Nodado, Domiciano R.606767507050567561.7

38.Papas, Sisenando B.656271617056666766

39.Pagulayan-Sy, Fernando637571628367707270.4

40.Padula, Benjamin C.707754627478756869.05

41.Pasno, Enrique M.787266547158727869.85

42.Peña, Jr., Narciso709581786766677372.55

43.Peralta, Rodolfo P.707052816863596963.7

44.Pigar, Leopoldo R.767578617272717973.75

45.Publico, Paciano L.686976767059746770.6

46.Radaza, Leovigildo757876617750718672.2

47.Ramos, Bernardo M.646275938152668070.1

48.Rabaino, Andres D.687275737855697670.65

49.Ravanera, Oscar N. 707780718262697873.6

50.Renovilla, Jose M.657580687952627869.5

51.Sabaot, Solomon B.697380698269697973.85

52.Sumaway, Ricardo S.667669767456726869.1

53.Torrefiel, Sofronio O.707774757350687269.55

54.Vera, Federico V. de606147776950677760.9

55.Viray, Venancio Bustos 656767527364716567.15

56.Ylaya, Angela P. (Miss) 637056756854707764.5

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT. NO. 972

1.Ala, Narciso707173597374817773.5

2.Alcantara, Pedro N.677075858754718072.8

3.Arellano, Antonio L.746673607863787272.9

4.Buhay, Eduardo L.737671917661747873.35

5.Calautit, Celestino R.717884757561687273.2

6.Casuncad, Sulvio P.617382698168718473.05

7.Enriquez, Pelagio y Coñcepcion846976758250587972.05

8.Estonina, Severino807464898156688272.4

9.Fernandez, Alejandro Q.657587808163618072.8

10.Fernandez, Luis N.707577757867727373.35

11.Figueroa, Alfredo A.707587787550686872.3

12.Formilleza, Pedro657589688351707573.25

13.Garcia, Manuel M.696883837362627071

14.Grospe, Vicente E.686578667961698271.6

15.Galema, Nestor R. (1952)727986786061757073.05

16.Jacobo, Rafael F.767675747650727672.3

17.Macalindong, Reinerio L.677779797472687772.75

18Mangubat, Antonio M.707078618074627071.45

19.Montano, Manuel M.786466688150717870.65

20.Plomantes, Marcos736774586870767171.6

21.Ramos, Eugenio R.708076677269727972.6

22.Reyes, Juan R.717377768159727473.2

23.Reyes, Santiago R.657883607675707072.9

24.Rivera, Eulogio J. 656778747562698070.9

25.Santos, Constantino P.737170657864657870.4

26.Santos, Salvador H.707179657254668070

27.Sevilla, Macario C.707374708156697171.05

28.Villavicencio, Jose A. ..... 787570676977647773.2

29.Viray, Ruperto G.767376738058688373.25

These are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected by this resolution. Adding 490 candidates who have not presented any petition, they reach a total of 1,094.

The Enactment of Republic act No. 972

As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general average in the bar examination of August and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949; maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused the introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law to the practice of the profession. The amendments embrace many interesting matters, but those referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately concern us. The proposed amendment is as follows:

"SEC. 14.Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without

falling below 50 per cent in any subject. In determining the average, the foregoing subjects shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law, 10 per cent; International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful candidates shall not be required to take another examination in any subject in which they have obtained a rating of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken into account in determining their general average in any subsequent examinations: Provided, however, That if the candidate fails to get a general average of 70 per cent in his third examination, he shall lose the benefit of having already passed some subjects and shall be required to the examination in all the subjects.

"SEC. 16.Admission and oath of successful applicants. — Any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office.(Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).

With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:

"It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be compelled to repeat even those subjects which they have previously passed. This is not the case in any other government examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been amended in this

measure to give a candidate due credit for any subject which he has previously passed with a rating of 75 per cent or higher."

Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested the comments of this Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was signed by seven Justices while three chose to refrain from making any and one took no part. With regards to the matter that interests us, the Court said:

"The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides that if a bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass the examination, he need not be examined in said subject in his next examination. This is a sort of passing the Bar Examination on the installment plan, one or two or three subjects at a time. The trouble with this proposed system is that although it makes it easier and more convenient for the candidate because he may in an examination prepare himself on only one or two subjects so as to insure passing them, by the time that he has passed the last required subject, which may be several years away from the time that he reviewed and passed the first subjects, he shall have forgotten the principles and theories contained in those subjects and remembers only those of the one or two subjects that he had last reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because there is nothing in the law which requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations every year in succession. The only condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must pass the examination in no more than three installments; but there is no limitation as to the time or number of years intervening between each examination taken. This would defeat the object and the requirements of the law and the Court in admitting persons to the practice of law. When a person is

so admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed that he possesses the knowledge and proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law subjects required in bar examinations, so as presently to be able to practice the legal profession and adequately render the legal service required by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the candidates who may have obtained a passing grade on any five subjects eight years ago, another three subjects one year later, and the last two subjects the present year. We believe that the present system of requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general average with no grade in any subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and satisfactory. It requires one to be all around, and prepared in all required legal subjects at the time of admission to the practice of law.

xxx xxx xxx.

"We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office. In other words, Bar candidates who obtained not less than 70 per cent in any examination since the year 1946 without failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite their non-admission to the Bar by the Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a passing general average in any of those years, will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only prospective but retroactive in its effects.

"We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are not exactly in

favor of reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to govern even in the future. As to the validity of making such reduction retroactive, we have serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of the fact that after every bar examinations, the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing general average grade, but also rejecting and denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The present amendment would have the effect of repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or more but less than the general passing average fixed for that year. It is clear that this question involves legal implications, and this phase of the amendment if finally enacted into law might have to go thru a legal test. As one member of the Court remarked during the discussion, when a court renders a decision or promulgate a resolution or order on the basis of and in accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or resolution already promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no effect.

"Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are officers of the courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the Bar, the Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and qualified to be its officer. Conversely, when it refused and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who in any year since 1946 may have obtained a general average of 70 per

cent but less than that required for that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally and impliedly considered and declared that he was not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be its officer. The present amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general average runs counter to all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically and in effect says that a candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its officer because he was unprepared, undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and in spite of all, must be admitted and allowed by this Court to serve as its officer. We repeat, that this is another important aspect of the question to be carefully and seriously considered."

The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:

"I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of the legal profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by admitting to practice precisely a special class who have failed in the bar examination. Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which I find serious fundamental objections.

"Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding oath of office. This provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it does specifically one group of persons, namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations.

"The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the Supreme Court made in accordance with the law then in force. It should be noted that after every bar examination the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing general average but also rejecting and denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The provision under consideration would have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those who may have failed to obtain the passing average fixed for that year. Said provision also sets a bad precedent in that the Government would be morally obliged to grant a similar privilege to those who have failed in the examinations for admission to other professions such as medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy."

Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by 2/3 vote of each House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND INCLUDING 1953

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1.Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to the August 1951 bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in

the 1964 bar examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing general average shall be restored in all succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2.Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar examination after July 4, 1946 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3.This bill shall take effect upon its approval.

With the following explanatory note:

"This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another opportunity to those who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to 1951 when those who would otherwise have passed the bar examination but were arbitrarily not so considered by altering its previous decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme Court has been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order to cure the apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all parties concerned, it is proposed in this bill a gradual increase in the general averages for passing the bar examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar examination, 71

per cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be restored with the condition that the candidate shall not obtain in any subject a grade of below 50 per cent. The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade, is the tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation. It is believed that by 1956 the preparation of our students as well as the available reading materials will be under normal conditions, if not improved from those years preceding the last world war.

In this bill we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the supervision as well as the administration of the study of law which was objected to by the President in the Bar Bill of 1951.

"The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the bill would admit to the practice of law 'a special class who failed in the bar examination'. He considered the bill a class legislation. This contention, however, is not, in good conscience, correct because Congress is merely supplementing what the Supreme Court have already established as precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the passing mark of those who took the Bar examination in 1947. These bar candidates for whom this bill should be enacted, considered themselves as having passed the bar examination on the strength of the established precedent of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the insurmountable difficulties and handicaps which they were unavoidably placed. We believe

that such precedent cannot or could not have been altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without giving due consideration to the rights already accrued or vested in the bar candidates who took the examination when the precedent was not yet altered, or in effect, was still enforced and without being inconsistent with the principles of their previous resolutions.

"If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or corrective statute which Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of a 'valid classification' as against class legislation, is very expressed in the following American Jurisprudence:

"'A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who possess a common disability, attribute, or classification, and there must be a "natural" and substantial differentiation between those included in the class and those it leaves untouched. When a class is accepted by the Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and then have the dissevered factions of the original unit designated with different rules established for each.'" (Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).

"Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions which must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a class. If so, the correcting statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect only a few. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The constitution does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when there are special evils with which the general laws are incompetent to cope. The special

public purpose will sustain the special form. *** The problem in the last analysis is one of legislative policy, with a wide margin of discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be revision by the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 71 L. Ed. 1015, 63 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932).

"This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroact to the extent of the care or correction only as in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated from the rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of Court.

"For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.

(Sgd.) "PABLO ANGELES DAVID

"Senator"

Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed. The President again asked the comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:

Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the information that, with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are taking the same views they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951, contained in the first indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant Executive Secretary.

(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS.

The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by virtue of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972 (many times erroneously cited as No. 974).

It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the President and the author of the Bill were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost in the polls.

EN BANC

[B.M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003.]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.

Percival D. Castillo for complainant.

Raul Tito A. Estrella for respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Complainant charged respondent for unauthorized practice of law, violation of law, grave misconduct and grave misrepresentation. The Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant ("OBC").

The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar. Respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers and filed various pleadings without license to do so. Respondent called himself "counsel," knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. The Court however, ruled, that the two other charges of violation of law and grave misconduct were not supported by evidence. HCacTI

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; PRACTICE OF LAW; RIGHT TO PRACTICE LAW IS NOT A NATURAL OR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT BUT IS A PRIVILEGE. — The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.

2. ID.; ID.; ADMISSION TO THE BAR; REQUISITES THEREOF. — Respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer's oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. TEDAHI

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J p:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.

The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre ("complainant") filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyer's oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers ("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan," and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan ("Bunan").

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan ("Bunan") without the latter engaging respondent's services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyer's oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his "specific assistance" to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that "he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law." Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an "attorney" in the pleading.

On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondent's Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao ("Estipona-Hao") filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government.

Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondent's Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is "motivated mainly by political vendetta."

On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant ("OBC") for evaluation, report and recommendation.

OBC's Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise

found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyer's oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondent's misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondent's unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.

On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.

The Court's Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.

Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyer's oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as "counsel for George Bunan." In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the "(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN." Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had "authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him" before the MBEC and similar bodies.

On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also "retained" respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that "Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party." Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his "appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC." On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the

proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.

All these happened even before respondent took the lawyer's oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.

In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, 1 the Court elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) . . .

In Cayetano v. Monsod, 2 the Court held that "practice of law" means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. 3

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust 4 since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license. 5

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, 6 a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. 7

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer's oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. 8 Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. 9

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning "effective upon your acceptance." 10 Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondent's resignation effective 11 May 2001. 11 Thus, the evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Footnotes||| (Aguirre v. Rana, B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003)

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 1928. August 3, 1978.]

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLON (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD - 1).

SYNOPSIS

For respondent's stubborn refusal to pay his memebership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since the latter's constitution, notwithstanding due notice, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines unanimously adopted and submitted to the Supreme Court a resolution recommending the removal of respondent's name from its Roll of Attorneys, pursuant to Par. 2, Sec. 24, Art. III of the By-Laws of the IBP.

Respondent, although conceding the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, questions the all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership therein and the obligation to pay membership dues arguing that the provisions therein (Section 1 and 9 of the Court Rule 139-A) constitute an invasion of his constitutional right in the sense that he is being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Respondent likewise questions the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that this matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is of an administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body.

The Supreme Court unanimously held that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar are valid exercise of the police power over an important profession; that to compel a lawyer to be a member of the IBP is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate; that the requirement to pay membership fees is imposed as a regulatory measure designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration; that the penalty provisions for non-payment are not void as unreasonable or arbitrary; that the Supreme Court's jurisdiction and power to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys is expressly provided by Art.X,

Section 5(5) of the Constitution and held as an inherent judicial function by a host of decided cases; and that the provisions of Rules of Court 139-A ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines and the IBP By-Laws complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

Respondent disbarred and his name ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

SYLLABUS

1. ATTORNEYS; BAR INTEGRATION; NATURE AND PURPOSE. — An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.

2. ID.; ID.; INTEGRATION OF THE BAR, A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER; PRACTICE OF LAW NOT A VESTED RIGHT BUT A PRIVILEGE. — All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the Court. The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has

created. The expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power"

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGISLATION TO EFFECT THE INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR. — The Congress in enacting Republic Act No. 6397, approved on September 17, 1971, authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively," the Supreme Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPOSITION OF RESTRAINTS JUSTIFIED. — The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.

5. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTION VESTS SUPREME COURT WITH PLENARY POWER IN ALL CASES REGARDING ADMISSION TO AND SUPERVISION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW. — Even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law, "(Sec. 5[5], Art. X, 1973 Costitution) it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.

6. ID.; ID.; COMPULSORY MEMBERSHIP THEREIN NOT VIOLATIVE OF A LAWYER'S CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM TO ASSOCIATE. — To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He becomes a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.

7. ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF MEMBERSHIP FEE; A REGULATORY MEASURE NOT PROHIBITED BY LAW. — There is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Supreme Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY PROVISIONS, NOT VOID. — If the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. The practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer s public responsibilities.

9. ID.; POWER TO PASS UPON FITNESS TO REMAIN A MEMBER OF THE BAR VESTED IN THE SUPREME COURT. — The matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and

responsibilities. The power of the Supreme Court to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted.

10. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The provisions of Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines and the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is neither unconstitutional nor illegal, and a lawyer's stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, notwithstanding due notice, in violation of said Rule and By-Laws, is a ground for disbarment and striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

R E S O L U T I O N

CASTRO, C.J p:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:

". . . . Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the

cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned."

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:

"SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in

the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule: LLphil

"SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court."

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:

"SEC. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. . . . ."

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably

come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.

The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was.

". . . . fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable' . . ."

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the Court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).

When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectivity." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est

supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.

But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:

"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

"(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar . . .",

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

"SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and

procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law, " it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim. prLL

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. 8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the

subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. 9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the state. 10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer s public responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of

admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice . . . the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. . ."

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice . . . and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar . . ." (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal. cdll

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[Bar Matter No. 491. October 6, 1989.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES; NON-POLITICAL IN CHARACTER; OFFICERS, DELEGATES AND GOVERNORS CHOSEN ON THE BASIS OF PROFESSIONAL MERIT AND ABILITY TO SERVE. — A basic postulate of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its organization and commencement of existence, is that the IBP shall be non-political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or regional, or chapter. The fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates and. governors would be chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to serve.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VIOLATION OF IBP BY-LAWS. — It is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws. The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The Hyatt — the better for them to corral and entertain the delegates billeted therein; the procurement of written commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their chances" among the chapter presidents in the Bicol provinces; all these practices made a political circus of the proceedings and tainted the whole election process.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VIOLATION OF THE ETHICS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION. — The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal processes" and to abstain from "activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be minions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their observance. The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public’s esteem.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ANNULMENT OF IBP ELECTION. — The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top positions in the organization which, as the recently

concluded elections revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously diminished the stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the Court hereby ORDERS: The IBP elections held on June 3, 1989 should be as they are hereby annulled.

5. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES; IBP BY-LAWS PROVIDING DIRECT ELECTION BY THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF NATIONAL OFFICERS, REPEALED. — The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of Delegates (approved by this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1980 in Bar Matter No. 287) of the following national officers: (a) the officers of the House of Delegates; (b) the IBP president; and (c) the executive vice-president, are repealed.

6. ID.; FORMER SYSTEM OF HAVING THE IBP PRESIDENT AND EXECUTIVE VICE-PRESIDENT ELECTED BY THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, RESTORED. — The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [9] IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court’s resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.

7. ID.; RIGHT OF AUTOMATIC SUCCESSION BY THE EXECUTIVE VICE-PRESIDENT TO THE PRESIDENCY UPON EXPIRATION OF THEIR TWO-YEAR TERM, RESTORED. — At the end of the President’s two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.

8. ID.; SPECIAL ELECTIONS FOR THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS IN THE NINE (9) IBP REGIONS WITHIN THREE (3) MONTHS AFTER THE PROMULGATION OF THE RESOLUTION IN THE CASE AT BAR; ORDERED. — Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9) IBP regions within three (3) months after the promulgation of the Court’s resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board of Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to

elect from among themselves the IBP national president and executive vice-president. In these special elections, the candidates in the election of the national officers held on June 3, 1989, particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of this Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those identified in this Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon that election, are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidate for any position.

R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:

In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter "IBP") held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International Convention Center (or PICC), the following were elected by the House of Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their alternates) and proclaimed as officers:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

NAME POSITION

Atty. Violeta Drilon President

Atty. Bella Tiro Executive Vice-President

Atty. Salvador Lao Chairman, House of Delegates

Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo Secretary, House of Delegates

Atty. Teodoro Quicoy Treasurer, House of Delegates

Atty. Oscar Badelles Sergeant-at-Arms, House of Delegates

Atty. Justiniano Cortes Governor & Vice-President for Northern Luzon

Atty. Ciriaco Atienza Governor & Vice-President for

Central Luzon

Atty. Mario Jalandoni Governor & Vice-President for

Metro Manila

Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon Governor & Vice-President for

Southern Luzon

Atty. Teodoro Almine Governor & Vice-President for

Bicolandia

Atty. Porfirio Siyangco Governor & Vice-President for

Eastern Visayas

Atty. Ricardo Teruel Governor & Vice-President for

Western Visayas

Atty. Gladys Tiongco Governor & Vice-President for

Eastern Mindanao

Atty. Simeon Datumanong Governor & Vice-President for

Western Mindanao

The newly-elected officers were set to take their oath of office on July 4, 1989, before the Supreme Court en banc. However, disturbed by the widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities, the Supreme Court en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.

It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the voting and the canvassing of votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec," headed by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of Appeals, was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be above board. For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device safeguards to prevent tampering with, and marking of, the ballots.

What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported electioneering and extravagance that characterized the campaign conducted by the three candidates for president of the IBP.

I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. —

Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila Standard, Sunday, June 17, 1989), Luis Mauricio, in two successive columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya, June 10, 1989) and "The Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin, Jr. in an article, entitled "Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free Press, July 8, 1989), and the editorial, entitled "Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8, 1989), were unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and pressure tactics" allegedly employed in the campaign by the three principal candidates: Attys. Violeta C. Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured heart, soul, money and influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates."cralaw virtua1aw library

Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon’s rivals who felt at a disadvantage because Atty. Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing Bigay Puso donations, and she had the added advantage of having regional directors and labor arbiters of the Department of Labor and Employment (who had been granted leaves of absence by her husband, the Labor Secretary) campaigning for her. Jurado’s informants alleged that there was rampant vote-buying by some members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary Drilon’s fraternity), as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara, Concepcion, Cruz, Regala and Abello Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is employed, and that government positions were promised to others by the office of the Labor Secretary.

Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in addition, mentioned "talk of personnel of the Department of Labor, especially conciliators and employers, notably Chinese Filipinos, giving aid and comfort to her (Atty. Drilon’s) candidacy," the billeting of out-of-town delegates in plush hotels where they were reportedly "wined and dined continuously, womened, and subjected to endless haggling over the price of their votes . . ." which allegedly "ranged from P15,000 to P20,000, and, on the day of the election, some twelve to twenty votes which were believed crucial, appreciated to P50,000."cralaw virtua1aw library

In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top

official of the judiciary allegedly involved himself in IBP politics on election day by closeting himself with campaigners as they plotted their election strategy in a room of the PICC (the Philippine International Convention Center where the convention/election were held) during a recess . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially reechoed Mauricio’s reports with some embellishments.

II. THE COURT’S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE. —

Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution dated June 15, 1989, directed the outgoing and incoming members of the IBP Board of Governors, the principal officers and Chairman of the House of Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o’clock p.m., and there to inform the Court on the veracity of the aforementioned reports and to recommend, for the consideration of the Court, appropriate approaches to the problem of confirming and strengthening adherence to the fundamental principles of the IBP.

In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its organization and commencement of existence, is that the IBP shall be non-political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or regional, or chapter. The fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates and. governors would be chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to serve."cralaw virtua1aw library

The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note that in connection with the election of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, there is a widespread belief, based on reports carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth, that there was extensive and intensive campaigning by candidates for IBP positions as well as expenditure of considerable sums of money by candidates, including vote-buying, direct or indirect."cralaw virtua1aw library

The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus, Jose B.L. Reyes, attended the dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to give counsel and advice. The meeting between the Court en banc on the one hand, and the

outgoing and in-coming IBP officers on the other, was an informal one.

Thereafter, the Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to determine whether the prohibited acts and activities enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were committed before and during the 1989 elections of IBP’s national officers.

The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as Chairman, and Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, as members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court, Atty. Daniel Martinez, acted as the committee’s Recording Secretary.

A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to subpoenas issued by the Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections. The managers of three five-star hotels — the Philippine Plaza, the Hyatt, and the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) allegedly set up their respective headquarters and where they billeted their supporters — were summoned. The officer of the Philippine National Bank and the Air Transport Office were called to enlighten the Court on the charge that an IBP presidential candidate and the members of her slate used PNB planes to ferry them to distant places in their campaign to win the votes of delegates. The Philippine Airlines officials were called to testify on the charge that some candidates gave free air fares to delegates to the convention. Officials of the Labor Department were also called to enable the Court to ascertain the truth of the reports that labor officials openly campaigned or worked for the election of Atty. Drilon.

The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia, and Emil Jurado were subpoenaed to determine the nature of their sources of information relative to the IBP elections. Their stories were based, they said, on letters, phone calls and personal interviews with persons who claimed to have knowledge of the facts, but whom they, invoking the Press Freedom Law, refused to identify.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and analyzing and assessing evidence given by such persons as were perceived to have direct and personal knowledge of the relevant facts; and the Court, after deliberating thereon, has Resolved to accept and adopt the same.

III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS. —

Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. — The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political, and every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to IBP elections:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. — The following acts and practices relative to election are prohibited, whether committed by a candidate for any elective office in the Integrated Bar or by any other member, directly or indirectly, in any form or manner, by himself or through another person:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign material;

(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other than a statement of the biodata of a candidate on not more than one page of a legal-size sheet of paper; or causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the elections;

(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof;

(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as well as the advertisement thereof;

(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate, (1) payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any member; (2) giving of food, drink, entertainment, transportation or any article of value, or any similar consideration to any person; or (3) making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made, offered or promised to any person."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14 (Prohibited Acts and Practices relative to elections) of the by-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal from office if elected, without prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the By-laws of the Integrated Bar."cralaw virtua1aw library

At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating committee, the following violations were established:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for president, executive vice-president, the officers of the House of Delegates and Board of Governors.

The three candidates for IBP president — Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo — began travelling around the country to solicit the votes of delegates as early as April 1989. Upon the invitation of IBP President, Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n., July 13, 1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench and Bar dialogues held in Cotabato in April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123), in Tagaytay City, Pampanga, and in Baguio City (during the conference of chapter presidents of Northern Luzon (t.s.n., July 3, 1989, p. 113; t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p. 47) where they announced their candidacies and met the chapter presidents.

Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of IBP chapter officers, soliciting their votes, and securing their written endorsements. He personally hand-carried nomination forms and requested the chapter presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the forms to formalize their commitment to his nomination for IBP President. He started campaigning and distributing the nomination forms in March 1989 after the chapter elections which determined the membership of the House of Delegates composed of the 120 chapter presidents (t.s.n., June 29, 1989,

pp. 82-86). He obtained forty (40) commitments. He submitted photocopies of his nomination forms which read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Nomination Form

I Join in Nominating

RAMON M. NISCE

as

National President of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines

—————— ——————

Chapter Signature"

Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P. Tejada, Candido P. Balbin, Jr., Conizado V. Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico, Ernesto S. Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo, Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor L. Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neri, Roem J. Arbolado, Democrito M. Perez, Abelardo Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg, Confesor R. Sansano, Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., Ernesto A. Amores, Romeo V. Pefianco, Augurio C. Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C. Cabanas, Jose S. Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C. Fernandez, Ricardo B. Teruel, Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio C. Villalon, Renato F. Ronquillo, Antonio G. Nalapo, Romualdo A. Din, Jr., Jose P. Icaonapo, Jr., and Manuel S. Pecson.

Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel based on the commitments he had obtained (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85). Unfortunately, despite those formal commitments, he obtained only 14 votes in the election (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is that some of those who had committed their votes to him were "manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or remunerated" (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 86-95; Exhibit "M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-104).

(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign. —

The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo and Exhibit C-2-Crudo) show that Secretary Fulgencio S.

Factoran, Jr. of the Department of Environment & Natural Resources (DENR) borrowed a plane from the Philippine National Bank for his Bicol CORD (Cabinet Officers for Regional Development) Assistant, Undersecretary Antonio Tria. The plane manifest (Exh. C-2-Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon, Arturo Tusi (Tiu), Assistant Secretary for Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Tony Tria, Atty. Gladys Tiongco, and Amy Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest of the passengers were IBP candidates.

Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane. She said that she was informed by Atty. Tiu about the availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n., July 3, 1989, pp. 116-118).

Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-president in the Drilon ticket, testified that sometime in May 1989 he failed to obtain booking from the Philippine Airlines for the projected trip of his group to Bicol. He went to the DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for a client. While at the DENR, he learned that Assistant Secretary Tria was going on an official business in Bicol for Secretary Fulgencio Factoran and that he would be taking a PNB plane. As Assistant Secretary Tria is his fraternity brother, he asked if he, together with the Drilon group, could hitch a ride on the plane to Bicol. His request was granted. Their purpose in going to Bicol was to assess their chances in the IBP elections. The Drilon company talked with the IBP chapter presidents in Daet, Naga, and Legaspi, and asked for their support (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 5-49).

Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by Atty. Drilon and her group. He recalled that on May 23, 1989, DENR Secretary Factoran instructed him to go to Bicol to monitor certain regional development projects there and to survey the effect of the typhoon that hit the region in the middle of May. On the same day, Atty. Tiu, a fraternity brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to the Sigma Rho fraternity) went to the DENR office and requested the Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu) could be allowed to hitch a ride on the plane. Assistant Secretary Tria, together with the Drilon group which included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy Wong, Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the Domestic Airport bound for Naga, Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi the Drilon group had lunch with Atty. Vicente Real, Jr., an IBP chapter president (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69).

(3) Formation of tickets and single slates. —

The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted

having formed their own slates for the election of IBP national officers on June 3, 1989.

Atty. Paculdo’s slate consisted of himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for Executive Vice-President; and for Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez (Central Luzon), Mario C.V. Jalandoni (Greater Manila), Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern Luzon), Teodorico C. Almine, Jr. (Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel (Western Visayas), Porfirio P. Siyangco (Eastern Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat (Western Mindanao), Guerrero A. Adaza, Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).

The Drilon ticket consisted of: Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu for Executive Vice President, Salvador Lao for Chairman of the House of Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil Rupisan (Northern Luzon), Acong Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon (Southern Tagalog), Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo (Eastern Visayas), Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas), Gladys Tiongco (Eastern Mindanao), Simeon Datumanong (Western Mindanao) (Exhibit M-1-Nisce).

Atty. Ramon N. Nisce’s line-up listed himself and Confessor B. Sansano, Benjamin B. Bernardino, Antonio L. Nalapo, Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C. Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin, Jr., Oscar C. Fernandez, Cesar G. Viola, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban, Joel A. Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite, and Oscar V. Badelles.

(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates.

Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to the convention. He mentioned Oscar Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip tickets (worth about P10,000) from Iligan City to Manila and back. Badelles was a voting delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a written commitment from him because Atty. Medialdea assured him (Nisce) "sigurado na ‘yan, h’wag mo nang papirmahin."cralaw virtua1aw library

Badelles won as sergeant-at-arms, not in Nisce’s ticket, but in that of Drilon.

Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets, but he (Badelles) said that he did not use them, because if he did, he would be committed to Nisce, and he (Badelles) did not want to be committed (t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 77-79, 95-96).

Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his candidate, and another ticket to Mrs. Linda Lim of Zamboanga.

Records of the Philippine Airlines showed that Atty. Nisce paid for the plane tickets of Vicente Real, Jr. (Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica (Exh. D-2-Calica), Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh. D-2-Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh. D-3-Calica), and Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3-Calica).chanrobles law library : red

In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce’s candidates won: Renato Ronquillo of Manila 4, as Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n. July 3, p. 161).

(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to delegates.

(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO —

Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at the Holiday Inn, which served as his headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be occupied by his staff (mostly ladies) and the IBP delegates. The three suites were to be occupied by himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar Association, and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000 for the hotel bills of his delegates at the Holiday Inn, where a room cost P990 per day with breakfast.

Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Ernesto C. Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan, Judge Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio Bisnar, Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus Castro, Restituto Villanueva, Serapio Cribe, Juanito Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem Arbolado, Ricardo Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro Quicoy, Manito Lucero, Fred Cledera, Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo, Francisco Felizmenio, Marvel Clavecilla, Amador Capiral, Eufronio Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes, Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero Adaza, Diosdado Peralta, Luis C. Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores, Dennis Rendon, Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo, Bella Tiro, Antonio Santos, Tiburcio Edano, James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza, Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge Jaime Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay, Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven Zach, and Benjamin Padon.

Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn’s credit manager, testified that Atty. Paculdo booked 52 (not 24) rooms, including the presidential suite, which was used as the Secretariat. The

group bookings were made by Atty. Gloria Paculdo, the wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The total sum of P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for the use of the rooms.

(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON

The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine Plaza Hotel where her campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40 rooms, 5 of which were suites. According to Ms. Villanueva, Philippine Plaza banquet and conventions manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta signed with the Philippine Plaza was made in the name of the "IBP c/o Atty. Callanta."cralaw virtua1aw library

Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it was Mr. Mariano Benedicto who first came to book rooms for the IBP delegates. She suggested that he obtain a group (or discounted) rate. He gave her the name of Atty. Callanta who would make the arrangements with her. Mr. Benedicto turned out to be the Assistant Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).

The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms, food, and beverages consumed by the Drilon group, with an unpaid balance of P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel Martinez’s last telephone conversation with Ms. Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding account of P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.

Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the Philippine Plaza. He made a downpayment of P123,000. His "working sheet" showed that the following persons contributed for that down payment:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) Nilo Peña (Quasha Law Office) P25,000

(b) Antonio Carpio 20,000

(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office) 10,000

(d) Jay Castro 10,000

(e) Danny Deen 20,000

(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office) 10,000

(g) Alfonso Reyno 20,000

(h) Cosme Rossel 15,300

(t.s.n. July 4, 1989, pp. 3-4)

Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have been contributing money every time the IBP embarks on a project. This time, they contributed so that their partners or associates could attend the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention too.

Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta had billeted her delegates at the Philippine Plaza. She allegedly did not also know in whose name the room she occupied was registered. But she did ask for a room where she could rest during the convention. She admitted, however, that she paid for her hotel room and meals to Atty. Callanta, through Atty. Loanzon (t.s.n. July 3, 1989).

The following were listed as having occupied the rooms reserved by Atty. Callanta at the Philippine Plaza: Violeta Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria C. Loanzon, Leopoldo A. Consulto, Ador Lao, Victoria Borra, Aimee Wong, Callanta, Peña, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores, Silao, Caingat, Manuel Yuson, Simeon Datumanong, Manuel Pecson, Sixto Marella, Joselito Barrera, Radon, Macalalag, Oscar Badelles, Antonio Acyatan, Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula, Array Corot, Dimakuta Corot, Romeo Fortez, Irving Petilla, Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma, Danilo Deen, Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad, Espina, Guerrero, Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis Formilleza, Felix Macalag, Mariano Benedicto, II, Atilano, Araneta, Renato Callanta.

Atty. Nilo Peña admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which he is a senior partner, gave P25,000 to Callanta for rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that some members of his law firm could campaign for the Drilon group (t.s.n. July 5, 1989, pp. 76-78) during the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention. Most of the members of his law firm are fraternity brothers of Secretary Drilon (meaning, members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity). He admitted being sympathetic to the candidacy of Atty. Drilon and the members of her slate, two of whom, — Jose Grapilon and Simeon Datumanong — are Sigma Rhoans. They consider Atty. Drilon as a "sigma rho sister," her husband being a sigma rhoan.

Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for the members of his own firm who attended the legal aid

seminar and the convention. He made the reservation through Atty. Callanta to whom he paid P20,000 (t.s.n. July 6, 1989, pp. 30-34).

Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the convention, by soliciting the votes of delegates he knew, like Atty. Albacite, his former teacher (but the latter was already committed to Nisce), and Atty. Romy Fortes, a classmate of his in the U.P. College of Law (t.s.n. July 6, 1989, pp. 22, 29, 39).

(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.

Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered into a contract with the Hyatt Hotel for a total of 29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-floor room. He made a downpayment of P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 58) on April 20, 1989, and P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of P57,632.45.

Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the sales department manager, credit manager, and reservation manager, respectively of the Hyatt, testified that Atty. Nisce’s bill amounted to P216,127.74 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, F-Jacinto, G-Ocampo).

As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms for those who committed themselves to his candidacy.

The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos, Dennis Habanel, B. Batula, John E. Asuncion, Reynaldo Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin, Romualdo Din, Antonio Nalapo, Israel Damasco, Candido Balbin, Serrano Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin, Reymundo P. Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, R. Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo, Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto Sabulan, Yusop Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icampo, Abelardo Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan, Daniel Macaraeg, Onofre Tejada.

(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon

In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a candidate while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government" (Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP By-Laws), Mariano E. Benedicto II, Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, testified that he took a leave of absence from his office to attend the IBP convention. He stayed at the Philippine Plaza with the Drilon group admittedly to give "some moral assistance" to Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did so because he is a member of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. When asked about the significance of

Sigma Rho, Secretary Benedicto explained: "More than the husband of Mrs. Drilon being my boss, the significance there is that the husband is my brother in the Sigma Rho."cralaw virtua1aw library

He cheered up Mrs. Drilon when her spints were low. He talked to her immediate circle which included Art Tiu, Tony Carpio, Nilo Peña, Amy Wong, Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin, and Boy Reyno. They assessed the progress of the campaign, and measured the strengths and weaknesses of the other groups. The group had sessions as early as the later part of May.

Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary Benedicto toted up a bill of P23,110 during the 2-day IBP convention/election. A total of 113 phone calls (amounting to P1,356) were recorded as emanating from his room.

Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the names of Mrs. Drilon, Gladys Tiongco (candidate for Governor, Eastern Mindanao) and Amy Wong (candidate for Governor, Metro Manila). These two rooms served as the "action center" or "war room" where campaign strategies were discussed before and during the convention. It was in these rooms where the supporters of the Drilon group, like Attys. Carpio, Callanta, Benedicto, the Quasha and the ACCRA lawyers met to plot their moves.

(7) Playing the dues or other indebtedness of any member (Sec. 14[e], IBP By-Laws).

Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of candidates paying the IBP dues of lawyers who promised to vote for or support them, but she has no way of ascertaining whether it was a candidate who paid the delinquent dues of another, because the receipts are issued in the name of the member for whom payment is made (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28).

She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March, April, May during any election year. This year, the collections increased by P100,000 over that of last year (a non-election year) — from P1,413,425 to P1,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25).

(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of legal size sheet of paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws).

On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused to be distributed his bio-data and copies of a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as well as, the lists of his slate. Attys. Drilon and Nisce similarly distributed their tickets and bio-data.

The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000. They were printed by his own printing shop.

(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws).

Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign materials on the convention floor. Atty. Carpio noted that there were more campaign materials distributed at the convention site this year than in previous years. The election was more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July 6, 1989, p. 39).

Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, and a candidate for chairman of the House of Delegates on Nisce’s ticket, testified that campaign materials were distributed during the convention by girls and by lawyers. He saw members of the ACCRA law firm campaigning for Atty. Drilon (t.s.n. July 3, 1989, pp. 142-145).

(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP By-Laws).

Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged him to withdraw his candidacy for chairman of the House of Delegates and to run as vice-chairman in Violy Drilon’s slate, but he declined (t.s.n. July 3, 1989, pp. 137, 149).

Atty. Gloria Agunos, personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio and president of the Baguio-Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third week of May 1989, after the Tripartite meet of the Department of Labor & Employment at the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio City, she met Atty. Drilon, together with two labor officers of Region 1, Attys. Filomeno Balbin and Atty. Mansala. Atty. Drilon solicited her (Atty. Agunos’) vote and invited her to stay at the Philippine Plaza where a room would be available for her. Atty Paculdo also tried to enlist her support during the chapter presidents’ meeting to choose their nominee for governor for the Northern Luzon region (t.s.n. July 13, 1989, pp. 43-54).chanrobles law library

Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino, who had earlier committed his vote to Nisce changed his mind when he was offered a judgeship (This statement, however, is admittedly hearsay). When Nisce confronted Magsino about the alleged offer, the latter denied that there was such an offer. Nisce’s informant was Antonio G. Nalapo, an IBP candidate who also withdrew.

Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused to be nominated (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104).

Vicente P. Tordilla who was Nisce’s candidate for Governor became Paculdo’s candidate instead (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104).

Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City, Court Administrator Tiro went around saying, "I am not campaigning, but my wife is a candidate."cralaw virtua1aw library

Nisce said that the presidents of several IBP chapters informed him that labor officials were campaigning for Mrs. Drilon (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, pp. 109-110). He mentioned Ciony de la Cerna, who allegedly campaigned in La Union (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 111).

Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce’s supporter and candidate for governor of the Western Visayas, expressed his disappointment over the IBP elections because some delegates flip-flopped from one camp to another. He testified that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport he was met by an assistant regional director of the DOLE who offered to bring him to the Philippine Plaza, but he declined the offer. During the legal aid seminar, Atty. Drilon invited him to transfer to the Philippine Plaza where a room had been reserved for him. He declined the invitation (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, pp. 102-106).

Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew that the three candidates had their headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo, at the Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine Plaza; and Nisce, at the Hyatt. He knew about this because a week before the elections, representatives of Atty. Drilon went to Dumaguete City to campaign. He mentioned Atty. Rodil Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office, accompanied by Atty. Julve, the Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Labor in Dumaguete City. These two, he said, offered to give him two PAL tickets and accommodations at

the Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, pp. 101-104). But he declined the offer because he was already committed to Atty. Nisce.

Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a businessman, Henry Dy, approached him to convince him to vote for Atty. Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that he was already committed to Nisce.

He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his two companions (Atty. Eltanal and Atty. Ruperto) had earlier bought their own tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p. 101).

SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED

BY THE CANDIDATES

Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks of campaigning. Of this amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of which he was the chapter president) contributed about P150,000. The Capitol Bar Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City lawyers.

He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces (Bicol provinces, Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, pp. 9-14).

Atty. Nisce’s hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not include the expenses for his campaign which began several months before the June 3rd election, and his purchases of airplane tickets for some delegates.

The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon’s camp, showed that her campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and beverage consumed by Atty. Drilon’s supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at convention’s end.

FINDINGS. —

From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.

The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The Hyatt - the better for them to corral and entertain the delegates billeted therein; the island-hopping to solicit the votes of the chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates that elects the national officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets, slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective positions aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement of written commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their chances" among the chapter presidents in the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets and bio-data of the candidates which in the case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to P20,000; the employment of uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their campaign materials on the convention floor on the day of the election; the giving of assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and escort them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel accommodations to delegates (and some families who accompanied them) in exchange for their support; the pirating of some candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flip-flop" from one ticket to another for some rumored consideration; all these practices made a political circus of the proceedings and tainted the whole election process.

The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal processes" and to abstain from "activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be minions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their observance.

The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did not uphold

the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public’s esteem.

The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials and outright prevarications that tainted the statements of the witnesses, including some of the candidates, during the initial hearing conducted by it before its fact-finding committee was created. The subsequent investigation conducted by this Committee has revealed that those parties had been less than candid with the Court and seem to have conspired among themselves to deceive it or at least withhold vital information from it to conceal the irregularities committed during the campaign.

CONCLUSIONS. —

It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987 Constitution (Sec. 8, Art. VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a representative of the Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the reason why the position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among the lawyers. The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top positions in the organization which, as the recently concluded elections revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously diminished the stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the Court hereby ORDERS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. The IBP elections held on June 3, 1989 should be as they are hereby annulled.

2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of Delegates (approved by this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1980 in Bar Matter No. 287) of the following national officers:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;

(b) the IBP president; and

(c) the executive vice-president,

be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the By-Laws of the IBP under Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws.

3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [9] IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court’s resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.

4. At the end of the President’s two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.

5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Section 47. National Officers. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex oficio Vice-President for their respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board."cralaw virtua1aw library

6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeant-at-Arms shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the House of Delegates."cralaw virtua1aw library

7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary-Treasurer and Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby repealed.

8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Section 37. Composition of the Board. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one (1) Governor for each region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The position of Governor should be rotated among the different Chapters in the region."cralaw virtua1aw library

9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. — At least one (1) month before the national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region."cralaw virtua1aw library

10. Section 33(a), Article V hereby is amended by adding the following provision as part of the first paragraph:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general membership shall be held prior to any election in an election year."cralaw virtua1aw library

11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should be as they are hereby deleted.

All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the Resolution en banc of this Court of July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified.

12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9) IBP regions within three (3) months after the promulgation of the Court’s resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board of Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among themselves the IBP national president and executive vice-

president. In these special elections, the candidates in the election of the national officers held on June 3, 1989, particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of this Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those identified in this Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon that election, are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidate for any position.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by the Court to administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the dispositions here made are without prejudice to its adoption in due time of such further and other measures as are warranted in the premises.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J. and Medialdea, J., No part.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., On leave.

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