Ormoc Sugar Central vs Ormoc City

Facts:The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to USA and other foreign countries. Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation. The court rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:Whether or not constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed?

Held:Yes. Equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where 1) it is based upon substantial distinctions; 2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; 3) the classification applies not only to present conditions, but also to future conditions substantially identical to those present; and 4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. A perusal of the requisites shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central for the coverage of the tax.

Basco v. PAGCORGRN 91649, 14 May 1991)

FACTS:On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under Presidential Decree 1869, pursuant to the policy of the government, to regulate and centralize through an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. This was subsequently proven to be beneficial not just to the government but also to the society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash-strapped Government.

Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and public order, among others.

ISSUES:Whether PD 1869 is unconstitutional because:1.) it is contrary to morals, public policy and public order;

2.) it constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to improve taxes and legal fees; and that the exemption clause in PD 1869 is violative of constitutional principle of Local Autonomy;

3.) it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution in that it legalizes gambling thru PAGCOR while most other forms are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices; and

4.) it is contrary to the avowed trend of the Cory Government, away from monopolistic and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization.

HELD:1.) Gambling, in all its forms, is generally prohibited, unless allowed by law. But the prohibition of gambling does not mean that the government can not regulate it in the exercise of its police power, wherein the state has the authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.

2.) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal Corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. Its charter was created by Congress, therefore subject to its control. Also, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.

3.) Equal protection clause of the Constitution does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law, provided it is not unreasonable or arbitrary. The clause does not prohibit the legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate.

4.) The Judiciary does not settle policy issues which are within the domain of the political branches of government and the people themselves as the repository of all state power.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, thus, to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. In this case, the grounds raised by petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. Therefore, it is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

BINAY vs DOMINGO

Facts:

The Burial Assistance Program (Resolution No. 60 assisting those who only earn less than P2,000/month of burial assistance in the amount of P500.00) made by Makati Mayor Jejomar Binay, in the exercise of the police power granted to him by the municipal charter, was referred to the Commission on Audit after the municipal secretary certified the disbursement of four hundred thousand pesos for its implementation was disallowed by said commission of such disbursements because there cannot be seen any perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc. of its inhabitants.

Issue:Whether or not Resolution No. 60 of theMunicipalityofMakatiis a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.

Held:

Resolution No. 60 of theMunicipalityofMakatiis a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas (use your property so as not to impair others) and Salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law). Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.It is the most essential, insistent,and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

Himagan vs PeopleHimagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar Jr and for the attempted murder of Benjamins younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.ISSUE:Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.HELD:The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time from within which the trial should be finished.The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar asthe applicationof the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policemans constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted?Theansweris certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word shall before the phrase be terminated within ninety (90) days, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.