Consti Cases New

8/3/2019 Consti Cases New

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SEPARATION OF POWERS

Senate of the Philippines vs Executive Secretary Ermita

Question Hour EO 464

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail

Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to

conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the

alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued

invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before

the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of

the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due

to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga

likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said

requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made

and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect

immediately. EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials

of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are

covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed

Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of

the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National

Police (PNP) officers with rank of Chief superintendent or higher and such

other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by

the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the

judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive

privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President,

from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first

securing the presidents approval. The department heads and the military

officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to

except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with

only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyos order

barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without

her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their

military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s

constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights


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obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the

power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under

Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle

of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of

the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by

refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress

exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt

themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt

by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive

official may be exempted from this power the President on whom

executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except

through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest

official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal

branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The

requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as

it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under

Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department

heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot,

however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid

of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal

of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of

privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the

Executive Secretary.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are

implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information

is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive,

such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter

of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of

powers, states that Congress may only requesttheir appearance.

Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance

is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatoryfor

the same reasons stated inArnault.

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES


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GR No. 174689October 22, 2007CORONA,J.:When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created

them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heardvoices coming from inside the bamboo. Oh North Wind! North Wind! Pleaselet us out!, the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a

sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings;

one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man

Malakas (Strong) and the woman Maganda (Beautiful). (The Legend ofMalakas and Maganda)When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, doesthe law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs andcounseling with regard to a persons sex? May a person successfully petitionfor a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect theresult of a sex reassignment surgery?

FACTS:On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed apetition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in theRTC of Manila, Branch 8, alleging that he is a male transsexual, that is,anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female and that he had

always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in amans body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. Heunderwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast

augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a woman culminatedon January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery inBangkok, Thailand. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was infact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birthcertificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex frommale to female.

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner,stating that granting the petition would be more in consonance with theprinciples of justice and equity; that with his sexual re-assignment,petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, nowpossesses the physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune to be trapped ina mans body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken

against him. Likewise, the court believes that no harm, injury or prejudicewill be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On thecontrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness onthe part of the petitioner and her fianc and the realization of their dreams.


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On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru theOSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged thatthere is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate byreason of sex alteration. On February 23, 2006, the Court ofAppeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic, and set aside the

decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not the change of petitioners name and sex in his birthcertificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.HELD:A PERSONS FIRST NAME CANNOT BE CHANGED ON THE GROUND OF

SEX REASSIGNMENTThe State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities forpurposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right.Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. In this connection,Article 376 of the Civil Code provides: No person can change his name orsurname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). Inparticular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 1.Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Changeof First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed orcorrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errorsand change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by

the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general inaccordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules andregulations.RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power andauthority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city ormunicipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is nowprimarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intentand effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from thecoverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation orCorrection of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until andunless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed andsubsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulatingchange of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name maybe allowed:


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SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition

for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following

cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous,

tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and

continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that

first name or nickname in the community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sexreassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex

he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a changeof name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does notsanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Ratherthan avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared

purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and thepublic interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present properor reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. Inaddition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true andofficial name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice

that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change ofpetitioners first name was not within that courts primary jurisdiction as thepetition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned,assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because theproper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. Itwas also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office ofthe Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. Moreimportantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does

not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctlydismissed petitioners petition in so far as the change of his first name wasconcerned.

NO LAW ALLOWS THE CHANGE OF ENTRY IN THE BIRTHCERTIFICATE AS TO SEX ON THE GROUND OF SEX REASSIGNMENTThe determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is alegal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection,


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Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: No entry in the civil register shall bechanged or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended byRA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographicalerrors are involved. The

correction or change of such matters can now be made throughadministrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. Ineffect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Courtthe correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantialchanges and corrections in entries in the civil register.Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a clerical or typographical error is: Clerical or typographical error refers to a mistake committed in the

performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing anentry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelledname or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes orobvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only byreference to other existing record or records: Provided, however,Thatno correction must involve the change ofnationality, age, statusor sex of the petitioner.Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sexis not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change forwhich the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable underRule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 ofthe Civil Code:

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of

persons shall be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments

of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)

legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)

naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil

interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary

emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the CivilCode include even those that occur after birth. However, no reasonableinterpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers thecorrection on the ground of sex reassignment.


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To correct simply means to make or set aright; to remove the faults or

error from while to change means to replace something with something

else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute. Thebirth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, includingthose corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No

correction is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry ofcertain acts(such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate childrenand naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization anddeaths) and judicial decrees(such as legal separations, annulments ofmarriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, lossor recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiationand changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legalconsequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of aperson. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sexreassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407.Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly orimpliedly.Status refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, thesum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age,nationality and his family membership.

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities andrelations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminableat his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being

married or not. The comprehensive term status include such matters asthe beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights ingeneral, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation,adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is apart of a persons legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article413 of the Civil Code provides: All other matters pertaining to theregistration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sexreassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioners cause.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the

physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the

declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the


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registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt

from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not

later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in

attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.

In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to thefollowing facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant;(c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is notknown, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where theinfant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in theregulations to be issued.Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of thefacts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person isdetermined at birth,visually done by the birth attendant (the physician ormidwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is nolaw legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons

sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, isimmutable.When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their commonand ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. Thewords sex, male and female as used in the Civil Register Law and lawsconcerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore beunderstood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislativeintent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as the sum of

peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a femaleor the distinction between male and female.Female is the sex that

produces ova or bears youngand male is the sex that has organs toproduce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova.Thus, the words male and female in everyday understanding do not include persons who haveundergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, words that are employed in a

statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to havebeen used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary. Sincethe statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term sex as

used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows apost-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the categoryfemale.

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his bodyand appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no lawauthorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason.Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change ofthe entries in his birth certificate.


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NEITHER MAY ENTRIES IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS TO FIRST

NAME OR SEX BE CHANGED ON THE GROUND OF EQUITYThe trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance withthe principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petitionwould cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legaland public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found thatthe petition was but petitioners first step towards his eventual marriage to

his male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred socialinstitutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and awoman. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contractingparties who must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought bypetitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws onmarriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with anotherman who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operativetranssexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly towomen such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption ofsurvivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules ofCourt, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation towomen which could be substantially affected if petitioners petition were to

be granted.It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that [n]o judge or court

shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity orinsufficiency of the law. However, it is not a license for courts to engage in

judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not

to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to doso, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effectsof sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularlyimportant in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of firstname and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where theymay be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presentedand what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to conferon a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to changehis name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enactlegislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment ofthat privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when aperson may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However,


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this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anythingelse. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply orinterpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.

Petitioner pleads that [t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of

happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams. No argumentabout that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferencesand orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters ofsocial convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal.However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy tobe addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Case: Kilusang Mayo Uno vs NEDA Director General

Facts: President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 420

that directs a unified ID system among government agencies and

Government owned and controlled corporations in order to have a uniform

ID for all government agencies.

Kilusang Mayo Uno and other respondents assailed this executive order for

being a usurpation of legislative powers by the president and it infringes

the citizens right to privacy.

Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 420 is valid.

Decision: Executive Order 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance

under the presidents constitutional power of control over government

entities in the executive department, as well as the presidents constitutional

duty to ensure that all laws are faithfully executed, thus said executive order

is not a usurpation of legislative power. Furthermore, it is not usurpation of

legislative power because the act of issuing ID cards and the collection of

some necessary information to imprint in them do not require a legislation.

What needs legislation is the system of appropriation to enforce the unified

ID system, when unified ID system includes the citizens and when personal

data that are beyond of what is routinely needed is collected for the ID.


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DELEGATION OF POWERS

ARANETA VS DINGLASAN

Political Law First Emergency Powers Cases

Araneta is being charged under violation of EO 62 which regulates rentals forhouses and lots for residential buildings. Dinglasan is the judge hearing the

case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from

proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of

Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671. 3 other cases were consolidated with this

one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against

EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; he is seeking to have

permit. L-3054 is filed by Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing

funds [from 49- 50] pursuant to EO 225. L-3056 is filed by Barredois attacking EO 226 w/c is appropriating funds to hold the national elections.

CA 671 is otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL

EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND

AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS

TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act. All the

petitioners aver that CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect hence all

EOs passed pursuant to it had likewise ceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.HELD: CA 671 became inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in

regular session on May 25, 1946, and thatExecutive Orders Nos. 62, 192,

225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the first regular

session of Congress instead of the first special session which preceded it as

the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose and

intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may

consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may

designate. Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding dates ofadjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, unless sooner

amended or repealed by the National Assembly. Even if war continues to

rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in order to continue

the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.


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RODRIGUEZ VS GELLA

Political Law Second Emergency Powers Cases

Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in

1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent andessential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600

for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts,

earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. These EOs were pursuant

to Commonwealth Act 671. Note that prior to Araneta vs Dinglasan,

Congress passed House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but the same

was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his perception that

war is still subsisting as a fact.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EOs are valid.HELD: As similarly decided in theAranetacase, the EOs issued in pursuant

to CA 671 shall be rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any

actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world war for

which CA 671 has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the

president cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be

attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed

the repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given due weight. For it

would be absurd to contend otherwise. For while Congress might delegateits power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by

two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate

its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not

to be the law. Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract

of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in

the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way

that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the

will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency created underthe Act is coupled with interest.

PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL

Political Law Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test
http://www.uberdigests.info/2011/11/antonio-araneta-vs-judge-rafael-dinglasan/http://www.uberdigests.info/2011/11/antonio-araneta-vs-judge-rafael-dinglasan/


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From Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President (Marcos)

issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this is purportedly in

pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that

the President of the Philippines may by executive order define the

boundary, or boundaries, of any province, sub-province, municipality,

[township] municipal district or other political subdivision, and increase or

diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or

more subprovincesThe VP Emmanuel Pelaez and a taxpayer filed

a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to

be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs are

unconstitutional. He said that Sec 68 of the RAC has been impliedly repealed

by Sec 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be created or

their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act of Congress

or of the corresponding provincial board upon petition of a majority of the

voters in the areas affected and the recommendation of the council of the

municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated.

Pelaez argues, accordingly: If the President, under this new law, cannot

even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of

several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities? The Auditor

General countered that only barrios are barred from being created by the

President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that t a municipality

can be created without creating barrios. Existing barrios can just be placed

into the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import

of Pelaez argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential

authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to

create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios

to the President by virtue of Sec 68 of the RAC.

HELD: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the

government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or

administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle

of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set

forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the

delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently


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determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the

performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of

policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is

the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there

would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the

delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.

In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative

in character not administrative.

STATE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

No. L-24761 September 7, 1985

Leon G. Maquera,petitionervs.

Juan Borra, Cesar Miraflor, and Gregorio Santayana, in theirrespective capacities as chairman and members of the Commissionin Elections, and The Commission in Elections, respondent.

No. L-24828 September 7, 1965

Felipe N. Aurea and Melecio Malabanan,petitionervs.

The Commission on Elections, respondent.

Facts:

A question of constitutionality of Republic Act 4421 was filed by LeonG. Maquera.

Republic Act No. 4421 requires a candidate to post surety bondequivalent to one-year salary of position to which he is a candidate, whichbond shall be forfeited in favor of the government, if the candidate, exceptwhen declared winner, fails to obtain at lest 10% of the votes cast for theoffice, there being not more than four candidates for the same office.

Issue:

Whether or not Republic Act No. 4421 constitutional?

Ruling:


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The court resolved without prejudice to rendering an extended decisionto declare that said Republic Act No. 4421 is unconstitutional and hence nulland void.

The said property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and

essence of the Republican System ordained in our constitution and principleof social justice underlying the same, for said political system is premisedupon the tenet that sovereignty resides in the people and all governmentauthority emanates from them, and this, in turn, implies necessarily that theright to vote and to be voted for shall not be dependent upon the wealth ofthe individual concerned, whereas social justice presupposes equalopportunity for all, rich and poor alike and that accordingly, no person shall,by reason of poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to public office.The bond required in Republic Act No. 4421 and the confiscation of said bondare not predicated upon the necessity of defraying certain expenses or of

compensating services given in connection with elections, and is therefore,arbitrary and oppressive.

The Constitution only sets forth only age, citizenship, voting andresidence qualification, it does not require property qualification to holdpublic office. Therefore, R.A 4421 goes against the provision of ourconstitution, thus, unconstitutional.

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs.

JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.

Issue:

The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that

the respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al

deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of

the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their

knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.

Facts:

Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the

city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of

October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were

shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as


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laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in

Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.

That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to

dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their

jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses

were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons

according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by

affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not

safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented

affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived theright to be present.

Held:

The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of

400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of

court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the

Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him

beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to

defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that theperson was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction

over this other municipality.

We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the

jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court

and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to

do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has

illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the

writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of

police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the

city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same

means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the

reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her

liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with

impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty


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has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily

evaded.

VILLEGAS VS SUBIDO

Political Law Women Workers

Then Mayor Villegas approved the appointing of 91 women street sweepers

in the City of Manila. But the appointing would still have to be approved by

the Office of Civil Service Commission under Subido. Subido on the

other hand refused to extendapproval to such appointments on the ground

that appointing women to manual labor is against Memorandum Circular No.

18 s 1964. Villegas however pointed out that the said Memo has already

been set aside by the Office of the President hence the same is no longer in

effect.

HELD: The reliance of then respondent Commissioner was not on any law or

rule but simply on his own concept of what policy to pursue, in this instance

in accordance with his own personal predilection. Here he appeared to be

unalterably convinced that to allow women laborers to work outside their

offices as street sweepers would run counter to Filipino tradition. A public

official must be able to point to a particular provision of law or rule justifying

the exercise of a challenged authority. Nothing is better settled in the law

than that a public official exercises power, not rights. The government itself

is merely an agency through which the will of the state is expressed and

enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the

responsibility of discharging its functions. As such there is no presumption

that they are empowered to act. There must be a delegation of such

authority, either express or implied. In the absence of a valid grant, they are

devoid of power. What they do suffers from a fatal infirmity. That principle

cannot be sufficiently stressed. In the appropriate language ofChiefJustice

Hughes: It must be conceded that departmental zeal may not

be permittedto outrun the authority conferred by statute. Neither the high

dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the motive then is an

acceptable substitute. Otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth. Such an

eventuality, we must take all pains to avoid.


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People vs Veneracion

5112010

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Duty of a Judge to Impose Prescribed Penalty

On August 2, 1994, four accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubtof rape with homicide of a seven year old girl in the RTC presided by JudgeLorenzo P. Veneracion. Respondent judge however, refused to impose thecorresponding penalty of death and he rather imposed reclusion perpetua toeach of the accused. The city prosecutor filed a motion for reconsiderationpraying that the penalty of death be imposed upon the four accused. Therespondent judge refused to act.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge can impose penalty lower thanthat prescribed by law.

HELD: The Supreme Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose the proper penalty provided for by the law on theaccused regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs. In this case therespondent judge must impose the death penalty. This is consistent in therule laid down in the Civil Code Article 9 that no judge or court shall declineto render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency ofthe laws.


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LEGISLATURE

CITY DAVAO VS RTC

G.R. No. 127383, August 18, 2005

tax exemption rules governing GSIS and exceptions the plenary powers of Congress cannot be limited by passage of un-

repealable laws

FACTS:

GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice

of Public Auction, scheduling public bidding of its properties for non-

payment of realty taxes from 1992-1994, amounting to the sum total of Php

295, 721.61. The auction was, however, subsequently reset by virtue of a

deadline extension given by Davao City.

On July 28, 1994, GSIS received Warrants of Levy and Notices of Levy on

three parcels of land it owned and another Notice of Public Auction. InSeptember of that same year, GSIS filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,

Mandamus and/or Declaratory Relief with the Davao City RTC.

During pre-trial, the only issue raised was whether sec. 234 and 534 of the

Local Government Code, which have withdrawn real property tax from

GOCCs, have also withdrawn from the GSIS its right to be exempted

from payment of realty tax.

RTC rendered decision in favor of GSIS. Hence this petition.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the GSIS tax exemptions can be deemed as withdrawn by the LGC

W/N sec. 33 of P.D. 1146 has been repealed by the LGC


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HELD:

Reading together sec. 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, as a general rule: the

taxing powers of LGUs cannot extend to the levy of taxes, fees, andcharges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and

instrumentalities, and LGUs.

However, under sec. 234, exemptions from payment of real property

taxes granted to natural or juridical persons, including GOCCs, except as

provided in said section, are withdrawn upon effectivity of LGC. GSIS being a

GOCC, then it necessarily follows that its exemption has been withdrawn.

Regarding P.D. 1146 which laid down requisites for repeal on the laws

granting exemption, Supreme Court found a fundamental flaw in Sec. 33,

particularly the amendatory second paragraph.

Said paragraph effectively imposes restrictions on the competency of the

Congress to enact future legislation on the taxability of GSIS. This places an

undue restraint on the plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal

laws.

Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or place restrictions on the

amendment or repeal laws. These conditions imposed under P.D. 1146, if

honored, have the precise effect of limiting the powers of Congress.

Supreme Court held that they cannot render effective the amendatory

second paragraph of sec. 33, for by doing so, they would be giving sanction

to a disingenuous means employed through legislative power to bind

subsequent legislators to a subsequent mode of repeal. Thus, the two

conditions under sec. 33 cannot bear relevance whether the LGC removed

the tax-exempt status of GSIS.

Furthermore, sec. 5 on the rules of interpretation of LGC states that any tax

exemption, incentive or relief granted by any LGU pursuant to the provision

of this Code shall be construed strictly against the person claiming it.

The GSIS tax-exempt stats, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC but


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restored by the GSIS Act of 1997, sec. 39. The subject real property

taxes for the years 1992-1994 were assessed against GSIS while the LGC

provisions prevailed and thus may be collected by the City of Davao.

GSIS vs The City Treasurer of Manila

Facts

Petitioner GSIS owns or used to own two (2) parcels of land, onelocated at Katigbak 25th St., Bonifacio Drive, Manila (Katigbak property), andthe other, at Concepcion cor. Arroceros Sts., also in Manila (Concepcion-Arroceros property). Title to the Concepcion-Arroceros property was

transferred to this Court in 2005 pursuant to Proclamation No.835[3]dated April 27, 2005. Both the GSIS and the Metropolitan Trial Court(MeTC) of Manila occupy the Concepcion-Arroceros property, while theKatigbak property was under lease to Manila Hotel Corporation.

the City Treasurer of Manila addressed a letter ated September 13,2002 to GSIS informing of the unpaid real property taxes due on theaforementioned properties for years 1992 to 2002, broken down as follows:(a) PhP 54,826,599.37 for the Katigbak property; and (b) PhP48,498,917.01 for the Concepcion-Arroceros property. The letter warned of

the inclusion of the subject properties in the scheduled October 30, 2002public auction of all delinquent properties in Manila should the unpaidtaxes remain unsettled before that date. On September 16, 2002, the CityTreasurer of Manila issued separate Notices of Realty Tax Delinquency forthe subject properties, with the usual warning of seizure and/or sale. OnOctober 8, 2002, GSIS, through its legal counsel, wrote back emphasizingthe GSIS exemption from all kinds of taxes, including realty taxes, under

Republic Act No. (RA) 8291.

Two days after, GSIS filed a petition for certiorari andprohibition[7]with prayer for a restraining and injunctive relief before the

Manila RTC.

RTC ruled that the assessment of Manila was valid.

ISSUES
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1. Whether or not GSIS isexempt from the payment of real propertytaxes from 1992 to 2002;2. Whether GSIS is exempt from the payment of real property taxes

on the property it leased to a taxable entity; and3. Whether GSISs real properties are exempt from warrants of levy

and from tax sale for non-payment of real property taxes.

Ruling

1. GSIS Exempt from Real Property Tax

Full tax exemption granted through PD 1146 Revised Insurance GovernmentAct

RA 7160 lifted GSIS Tax Exemptions

Local Governement Code or RA 7160 was enacted in 1991. Sec 193 vis-avis

Sec234.

GSIS tax-exempt status withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC was restored in

1997 by RA 8291

Full tax exemption reenacted through RA 8291

Under it, the full tax exemption privilege of GSIS was restored, the

operative provision being Sec. 39 thereof, a virtual replication of the earlier

quoted Sec. 33 of PD 1146. Sec. 39 of RA 8291 reads:


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SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. It is hereby

declared to be the policy of the State that the actuarial solvency of the funds

of the GSIS shall be preserved and maintained at all times xxx Accordingly,

notwithstanding, any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its assets, revenues

including all accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exemptfrom all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all

kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and

specifically revoked and any assessment against the GSIS as of the

approval of this Act are hereby considered paid. Consequently, all

laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions or jurisprudence contrary

to or in derogation of this provision are hereby deemed repealed, superseded

and rendered ineffective and without legal force and effect.

Real property taxes assessed and due from GSIS considered paid

Sec. 39 which, for all intents and purposes, considered as paid any

assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act.If only to

stress the point, we hereby reproduce the pertinent portion of said Sec. 39:

SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. x xx xxx Accordingly, notwithstanding, any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its

assets, revenues including all accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be

exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all

kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and specifically

revoked and any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of

this Act are hereby considered paid.

GSIS an instrumentality of the National Government

The Manila International Airport Authority Doctrine, which provides that,

since MIAA does not qualify as a GOCC, not having been organized either as

a stock corporation, its capital not being divided into shares, or as a non-

stock corporation because it has no members. MIAA is rather

an instrumentality of the National Government and, hence, outside the


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purview of local taxation by force of Sec. 133 of the LGC providing in context

that unless otherwise provided, local governments cannot tax national

government instrumentalities.

GSIS is not, in the context of the afore quoted Sec. 193 of the LGC,

a GOCC following the teaching ofManila International Airport Authority, for,

like MIAA, GSIS capital is not divided into unit shares. Also, GSIS has no

members to speak of. And by members, the reference is to those who,

under Sec. 87 of the Corporation Code, make up the non-stock corporation,

and not to the compulsory members of the system who are government

employees. Its management is entrusted to a Board of Trustees whose

members are appointed by the President.

Second, the subject properties under GSISs name are likewise owned by the

Republic.

Third, GSIS manages the funds for the life insurance, retirement,

survivorship, and disability benefits of all government employees and their

beneficiaries. This undertaking, to be sure, constitutes an essential and vital

function which the government, through one of its agencies orinstrumentalities, ought to perform if social security services to civil service

employees are to be delivered with reasonable dispatch.

2. Beneficial Use Doctrine Applicable

the leased Katigbak property shall be taxable pursuant

to the beneficial use principle under Sec. 234(a) of the LGC.

SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The following are

exempted from payment of the real property tax:


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(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the

Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when

the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or

otherwise, to a taxable person.

SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of

Local Government Units. Unless otherwise provided herein, the

exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and

barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:

(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kinds on the

National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and local

government units. (Emphasis supplied.)

GSIS, as a government instrumentality, is not a taxable juridicalperson under Sec. 133(o) of the LGC. GSIS, however, lost in a sense thatstatus with respect to the Katigbak property when it contracted its beneficialuse to MHC, doubtless a taxable person. Thus, the real estate taxassessment of PhP 54,826,599.37 covering 1992 to 2002 over the subjectKatigbak property is valid insofar as said tax delinquency is concerned asassessed over said property.

Taxable entity having beneficial use of leased property liable for realproperty taxes thereon

the unpaid tax attaches to the property and is chargeable against the

taxable person who had actual or beneficial use and possession of it

regardless of whether or not he is the owner. eing in possession and having

actual use of the Katigbak property since November 1991, MHC is liable for

the realty taxes assessed over the Katigbak property from 1992 to 2002.

Moreover, MHC is obligated itself under the GSIS-MHC Contract ofLease to shoulder such assessment. Stipulation l8 of the contractpertinently reads:


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18. By law, the Lessor, [GSIS], is exempt from taxes,assessments and levies. Should there be any change in the law or theinterpretation thereof or any other circumstances which would subjectthe Leased Property to any kind of tax, assessment or levy whichwould constitute a charge against the Lessor or create a lien against

the Leased Property, the Lessee agrees and obligates itself toshoulder and pay such tax, assessment or levy as it becomesdue.[28](Emphasis ours.)

3. GSIS Properties Exempt from Levy

it is without doubt that the subject GSIS properties are exempt from anyattachment, garnishment, execution, levy, or other legal processes.

SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. x x x.

x x x x

The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the

benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the benefits under this

Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution, levyor other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or

administrative bodies xxx

Summary

In sum, the Court finds that GSIS enjoys under its charter full tax

exemption. Moreover, as an instrumentality of the national government, it is

itself not liable to pay real estate taxes assessed by the City

of Manila against its Katigbak and Concepcion-Arroceros

properties. Following the beneficial use rule, however, accrued real

property taxes are due from the Katigbak property, leased as it is to a
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Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of

candidates for senator.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 is an amendment to the

Constitution on the qualifications of Senators.

HELD: Pimentels contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is

unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates

any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no

effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no

act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their

defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but

to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it

imposes must be observed. The provision [n]o person elected to any

public office shall enter upon theduties of his office until he has undergone

mandatory drug test.Is not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications.

COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws

or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose

qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution

prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such

additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such

power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not

be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise

specified in the Constitution.

Garcia vs HRET (312 SCRA 353 - 1999)

Nature: May a petition for quo warranto before the House ofRepresentatives Electoral Tribunal be summarily dismissed for failure to paycash deposit, notwithstanding that petitioner rectified payment thereof?

Facts: On May 29, 1998, within the prescribed ten (10) day period fromrespondent Harry Angpings proclamation as duly elected Representative for

the 3rd District of Manila, petitioners, all duly registered voters in thedistrict, filed a petition for quo warranto[1 before the House ofRepresentatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) against Congressman HarryAngping. Petitioner questioned the eligibility of Congressman Angping tohold office in the House of Representatives, claiming that the latter was nota natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a constitutional requirement. Theyprayed that Congressman Angping be declared ineligible to assume or holdoffice as member of the House of Representatives and for the candidate who


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discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitraryand improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial ofdue process of law, or upon a determination of a very clear unmitigatederror, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion, that there hasto be a remedy for such abuse.

This leads us to the second issue of whether or not the HRET has committedgrave abuse of discretion in summarily dismissing the petition for quowarranto of petitioners and in refusing to reinstate the same even after thepayment of the required Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) cash deposit. Rule32 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET provides:

RULE 32. Cash Deposit. - In addition to the fees prescribed in the precedingRule, each protestant, counter-protestant or petitioner in quo warranto shallmake a cash deposit with the Tribunal in the following amounts:

(1) in a petition for quo warranto, Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos;(2) if the protest or counter-protest does not require the bringing to theTribunal of ballot boxes and other election documents and paraphernaliafrom the district concerned, Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos;

(3) if the protest or counter-protest requires the bringing of ballot boxes andother election documents and paraphernalia, Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesosfor each precinct involved therein; Provided, that in no case shall the depositbe less than Ten Thousand (P10,000.00)Pesos;

(4) if, as thus computed, the amount of the deposit does not exceed

Seventy Five Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos, the same shall be made in fullwith the Tribunal within ten (10) days after filing of the protest or counter-protest;

(5) if the deposit exceeds Seventy Five Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos,partial deposit of at least Seventy Five Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos shallbe made within ten (10) days after the filing of the protest or counter-protest. The balance shall be paid in such installments as may be requiredby the Tribunal on at least five (5) days advance notice to the party requiredto make the deposit.

Rule 21 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET governing summary dismissal ofelection contests provides, to wit:

RULE 21. Summary Dismissal of Election Contest. An election protest orpetition for quo warranto may be summarily dismissed by the Tribunalwithout the necessity of requiring the protestee or respondent to answer if,inter alia:


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(1) the petition is insufficient in form and substance;

(2) the petition is filed beyond the period provided in Rules 16 and 17 ofthese Rules;

(3) the filing fee is not paid within the period provided for filing the protestor petition for quo warranto;

(4) in case of protests where a cash deposit is required, the cash deposit orthe first P100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within ten (10) days after the filingof the protest;

(5) the petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed with theTribunal are not clearly legible. (underscoring ours)

Rule 33 of the Rules likewise provides:

RULE 33. Effect of Failure to Make Cash Deposit. If a party fails to make thecash deposits or additional deposits herein provided within the prescribedtime limit, the Tribunal may dismiss the protest, counter-protest, or petitionfor quo warranto, or take such action as it may deem equitable under thecircumstances.

Therefore, we find that the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion inapplying its Rules strictly and in dismissing the petition for quo warranto.Accordingly, the instant petition for certiorari cannot prosper.

Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there isconcurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board orofficer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess ofjurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excessor jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy andadequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annullingor modifying the proceeding. There must be a capricious, arbitrary andwhimsical exercise of power for it to prosper.

To question the jurisdiction of the lower court or the agency exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, the remedy is a special civil action forcertiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner in such cases

must clearly show that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction orwith grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but generally refers tocapricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack ofjurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amountto an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoinedby law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is


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exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion andhostility.

It has been held, however, that no grave abuse of discretion may beattributed to a court simply because of its alleged misappreciation of facts

and evidence. A writ of certiorari may not be used to correct a lowertribunals evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. In other words, it isnot a remedy for mere errors of judgment, which are correctible by anappeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Article VI, Section 17 Case Digest - Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. 178831-32, April 1,

2009

Jocelyn Limkaichong v. COMELEC

G.R. 178831-32

April 1, 2009

FACTS

Limkaichong rans as a representative in the 1st district of Negros Oriental, with Paras

as her rival. Paras, together with other concerned citizens, filed a disqualification

case against Limkaichong. They alleged that she was not a natural born citizen of teh

Philippines because when she was born, her father was still a Chinese, although her

mom was a Filipino, also lost her citizenship by virtue of marriage. When the case

was still pending in the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), election still continuedand votes were casted. The results showed that Limkaichong won over her rival,

Paras. COMELEC, after due hearing declared Limkaichong disqualified, at about 2

days after the counting of votes. On the following days however, notwithstanding

their proclamation discqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a proclamation

announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the conducted elections. This is in

compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy guidelines of not

suspending the proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification

cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing

and resolution of the involved cases. Paras then petitioned before the COMELEC,

regarding its proclamation. Limkaichong, on the other hand argued that the

Commission had already proclaimed her as winner, and with that, COMELEC could no

longer exercise jurisdiction over the matter. It should be the House of

Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which should exercise jurisdiction from

then on, not the COMELEC. And the COMELEC agreed.


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ISSUE

When does the jursidiction of the COMELEC end and when does the jurisdiction of

the HRET begin?

HELDIn Limkaichong's case, the HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong's

proclamation. The Supreme Court has invariably held that once awinning candidate

has been proclaimed, taken oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of

Representatives (HOR), the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to

his election, returns, and disqualification ends. With that, the HRET's own jurisdiciton

begins. It follows that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC

of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The

party questioning COMELEC's proclamation should now present his case before the

HRET, which is the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case

involving a Member of the House of Representatives. Under Section 17 of Article VI

of the Constitution and Section 250 of the OEC underscores, the word "sole" is used

to emphasize the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunal's jurisdiction over

election contests relating to its members.ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY V. COMELEC, GR No. 190582, April 8, 2010

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of

preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang LadladLGBT Party ( Ang Ladlad) against theResolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 (the First Assailed

Resolution) and December 16, 2009 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL)(collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELECs refusal to accreditAng

Ladladas a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-ListSystem Act.

FACTS:

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT (lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgender)

community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of

their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, andviolence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexualorientation; and thatAng Ladladcomplied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court inAng

Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. Ang Ladladlaid out its nationalmembership base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined itsplatform of governance. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladladfiled a Petition for registration with the

COMELEC.


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On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division)dismissed the Petition on moral grounds that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious

beliefs, and advocates sexual immorality. Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for

advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it said that it or any of its

nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations

relating to the elections. Furthermore, states COMELEC,Ang Ladladwill be exposing our youth to anenvironment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. When Ang Ladladsoughtreconsideration, COMELEC still, on December 16, 2010, upheld the First Assailed Resolution.

On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlada Petition, praying that the Supreme Court annul the Assailed

Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grantAng Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang Ladladalso sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which

had previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections byJanuary 25, 2010.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the denial of accreditation by COMELEC, violated the constitutional guaranteesagainst the establishment of religion. insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma.

2. Whether or not the Assailed Resolutions contravened the constitutional rights to privacy, freedomof speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, ofAng Ladlad, as well as constituted

violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexualorientation.

HELD:

1. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that No law shall be made respecting anestablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-

establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,

governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.The Supreme Court ruled that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the

COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion ofAng Ladlad. Rather thanrelying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on

whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mereconformity to religious doctrine. The government must act for secular purposes and in ways that

have primarily secular effects.

2. The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed byAngLadlad. Even the Office of the Solicitor General agrees that there should have been a finding by

the COMELEC that the groups members have committed or are committing immoral acts.Respondent have failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special

protection is required for the youth. Under our system of laws, every group has the right to

promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal

democratic means. Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of ademocratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also


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to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Absent of any compelling state interest, it is not for theCOMELEC or the Supreme Court, to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the

COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting anapproved message or discouraging a disfavored one. Laws of general application should apply

with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same

basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors. This is in accord with the countrysinternational obligations to protect and promote human rights. The principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the

ICCPR should be recognized. The Constitution and laws should be applied uninfluenced bypublic opinion. True democracy should be resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate due to

conflicting opinions.

The Petition was GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections datedNovember 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) was SET ASIDE and the

COMELEC was directed to GRANTpetitioners application for party-list accreditation.

PRESIDENCYPimentel vs. vs. Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the Votes Cast for President andVice-President in the 10 May 2004 Elections

[GR 163783, 22 June 2004]

En Banc Resolution

Facts:By a Petition for Prohibition, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring nulland void the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress (Joint Committee) to determinethe authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the votescast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the 10 May 2004 elections following the

adjournment of Congress sine die on 11 June 2004. The petition corollarily prays for the issuance ofa writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist from conducting any furtherproceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing.

Issue [1]:Whether legislative procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of bothHouses of Congress supports Pimentels arguments against to the existence and proceedings of theJoint Committee of Congress after the sine die adjurnment of Congress.

Held [1]: NO. Pimentels claim that his arguments are buttressed by legislative procedure,precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of both Houses of Congress is directly contradictedby Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by the Senate, of which he is an incumbent member.This section clearly provides that the Senate shall convene in joint session during any voluntary orcompulsory recess to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President not later than thirty daysafter the day of the elections in accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Moreover,the precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not support the move to stop theongoing canvassing by the Joint Committee. Thus, during the 1992 Presidential elections, bothHouses of Congress adjourned sine die on 25 May 1992. On 16 June 1992, the Joint Committeefinished tallying the votes for President and Vice-President. Thereafter, on 22 June 1992, the EighthCongress convened in joint public session as the National Board of Canvassers, and on even dateproclaimed Fidel V. Ramos and Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Vice-President,respectively. Upon the other hand, during the 1998 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congressadjourned sine die on 25 May 1998. The Joint Committee completed the counting of the votes for


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President and Vice-President on 27 May 1998. The Tenth Congress then convened in joint publicsession on 29 May 1998 as the National Board of Canvassers and proclaimed Joseph EjercitoEstrada as President and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President and Vice-President, respectively.

Issue [2]:Whether the existence and proceedings of the Joint Committee of Congress are invalid,illegal and unconstitutional following the adjournment sine die of both Houses of Congress of their

regular sessions on 11 June 2004.

Held [2]: NO. The term of the present Twelfth Congress did not terminate and expire upon theadjournment sine die of the regular session of both Houses on 11 June 2004. Section 15, Article VIof the Constitution (which provides that "The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourthMonday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to bein session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of itsnext regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call aspecial session at any time.") does not pertain to the term of Congress, but to its regular annuallegislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the opening of its next regular session(subject to the power of the President to call a special session at any time). Section 4 of Article VIIIalso of the Constitution clearly provides that "the term of office of the Senators shall be six years andshall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June nextfollowing their election." Similarly, Section 7 of the same Article provides that "the Members of theHouse of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unlessotherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election."Consequently, there being no law to the contrary, until June 30, 2004, the present Twelfth Congressto which the present legislators belong cannot be said to have "passed out of legal existence." Thelegislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the final adjournmentof its regular sessions on 11 June 2004, but this does not affect its non-legislative functions, such asthat of being the National Board of Canvassers. In fact, the joint public session of both Houses ofCongress convened by express directive of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass thevotes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and Vice-President has not, and cannot,adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a boardof canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio. Its membership may change,

but it retains its authority as a board until it has accomplished its purposes. Since the TwelfthCongress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the dulyelected President and Vice-President, its existence as the National Board of Canvassers, as well asthat of the Joint Committee to which it referred the preliminary tasks of authenticating andcanvassing the certificates of canvass, has not become functus officio. In sum, despite theadjournment sine die of Congress, there is no legal impediment to the Joint Committee completingthe tasks assigned to it and transmitting its report for the approval of the joint public session of bothHouses of Congress, which may reconvene without need of call by the President to a specialsession.

2003 bar - is people power recognized by 1987 consti?

- Is "people power" recognized by the 1987 Constitution? Explain fully. SUGGESTED ANSWER:"People power" is recognized in the Constitution. Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitutionguarantees the right of the people peaceable to assemble and petition the government for redress ofgrievances.Article VI, Section 32 of the 1987 Constitution requires Congress to pass a law allowing the people todirectly propose and enact laws through initiative and to approve or reject any act or law or part of itpassed by Congress or a local legislative body.Article XIII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right of the people and theirorganizations to participate at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall notbe abridged and that the State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation


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mechanisms.Article XVII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides that subject to the enactment of animplementing law, the people may directly propose amendments to the Constitution throughinitiative.

No I - Is "people power" recognized by the 1987 Constitution? Explain fully.SUGGESTED ANSWER:"People power" is recognized in the Constitution. Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitutionguarantees the right of the people peaceable to assemble and petition the government for redress ofgrievances. Article VI, Section 32 of the 1987 Constitution requires Congress to pass a law allowingthe people to directly propose and enact laws through initiative and to approve or reject any act orlaw or part of it passed by Congress or a local legislative body. Article XIII, Section 16 of the 1987Constitution provides that the right of the people and their organizations to participate at all levels ofsocial, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged and that the State shall, by law,facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms. Article XVII, Section 2 of the 1987Constitution provides that subject to the enactment of an implementing law, the people may directly

propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative. 2009 Bar: Congressmanm nonoy delivered a privilege speech...... etc

answer:

The IUB officials filed suit to prohibit the HCGG from proceeding with the injury and to quash thesubpoena, raising the ff arguments:

a.) the subject of thelegislative iinvestigation is also the subject of criminal and civil action pendingbefore the court and the prosecutors office; thus the legislative inquiry would preempt judicial action.the legislative inquiry is only aid of legislative. it is not binding on the criminal or civil aspect of the

case. thus, the motion to quash in legislative body is unvailing.

b.) the BSP governor may refuse attendance provided he can prove that his office is covered by theexecutive privilege. otherwise, he may be compelled to appear before body.

No IV. In an election case, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal rendered a decisionupholding the election protest of protestant A, a member of the Freedom Party, against protestee B,a member of the Federal Party. The deciding vote in favor of A was cast by Representative X, amember of the FederalParty. For having voted against his party mate, Representative X was removed by Resolution of theHouse of Representatives, at the instance of his party (the Federal Party), from membership in theHRET. Representative X protested his removal on the ground that he voted on the basis of theevidence presented and contended that he had security of tenure as a HRET Member and that he

cannot beremoved except for a valid cause. With whose contention do you agree, that of theFederal Party or that of Representative X? Why? (5%)SUGGESTED ANSWER:I agree with the contention of Representative X. As held In Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792(1991), the members of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal are entitled to security oftenure like members of the judiciary. Membership in it may not be terminated except for a just cause.Disloyalty to party is not a valid ground for the expulsion of a member of the House of


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Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Its members must discharge their functions with impartiality andindependence from the political party to which they belong.

No V - During his third term, "A", a Member of the House of Representatives, was suspended fromoffice for a period of 60 days by his colleagues upon a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the

House. In the next succeeding election, he filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position."B", the opposing candidate,filed an action for disqualification of "A" on the ground that the latter's, candidacy violated Section 7.Article VI of the Constitution which provides that no Member of the House of Representatives shallserve for more than three consecutive terms. "A" answered that he was not barred from runningagain for that position because his service was interrupted by his 60- day suspension which wasinvoluntary. Can 'A', legally continue with his candidacy or is he already barred? Why? (5%)SUGGESTED ANSWER:"A" cannot legally continue with his candidacy. He was elected as Member of the House ofRepresentatives for a third term. This term should be included in the computation of the term limits,even if "A" did not serve for a full term. (Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. n, p. 592.) Heremained a Member of the House of Representatives even if he was suspended.

No XVII. - Suppose that Congress passed a law creating a Department of Human Habitat andauthorizing the Department Secretary to promulgate implementing rules and regulations. Supposefurther that the law declared that violation of the implementing rules and regulations so issued wouldbe punishable as a crime and authorized the Department Secretary to prescribe the penalty for suchviolation. If the law defines certain acts as violations of the law and makes them punishable, forexample, with imprisonment of three (3) years or a fine in the amount of P10,000.00, or both suchimprisonment and fine, in the discretion of the court, can it be provided in the implementing rules andregulations promulgated by the Department Secretary that their violation will also be subject to thesame penalties as those provided in the law itself? Explain your answer fully. (5%)SUGGESTED ANSWER:The rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Human Habitat cannot provide that thepenalties for their violation will be the same as the penalties for the violation of the law. As held inUnited States v. Barrias, 11 Phil. 327 (1908), the fixing of the penalty for criminal offenses involvesthe exercise of legislative power and cannot be delegated. The law itself must prescribe the penalty.

-SANTIAGO V. RAMOS

253 SCRA 559

(CONCEPCION)

FACTS:

This is an original action filed before the SC acting as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

Miriam Defensor-Santiago (DS) ran for presidency in the 1992 National Elections. She lost, but filed this present protest

against the winner, Pres. FV Ramos.

Subsequently however, she ran for Senator in the 1995 Senatorial elections. She won and assumed office as Senator in

1995. Considering this factual milieu, the issues revolve on whether

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