Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSPECIAL THIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 170146 June 8, 2011HON. WALDO Q. FLORES, in his capacity as Senior Deputy Executive Secretary in the Office of the President, HON. ARTHUR P. AUTEA, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Secretary in the Office of the President, and the PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION (PAGC),Petitioners,vs.ATTY. ANTONIO F. MONTEMAYOR,Respondent.R E S O L U T I O NVILLARAMA, JR.,J.:This resolves the motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated August 25, 2010 setting aside the October 19, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstating the Decision dated March 23, 2004 of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 03-1-581, which found the respondent administratively liable for failure to declare in his 2001 and 2002 Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL) two expensive cars registered in his name, in violation of Section 7, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 in relation to Section 8 (A) of R.A. No. 6713. The OP adopted the findings and recommendations of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC), including the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service on respondent, with all accessory penalties.The motion is anchored on the following grounds:1. Respondent was subjected to two (2) administrative/criminal Investigations equivalently resulting in violation of his constitutional right against "double jeopardy".2. Who to follow between conflicting decisions of two (2) government agencies involving the same facts and issues affecting the rights of the Respondent.3. Respondents constitutional right to due process was violated.4. Penalties prescribed by the Honorable Court is too harsh and severe on the alleged offense committed/omitted.1On the first ground, the Court finds it bereft of merit. Respondent asserts that since the PAGC charge involving non-declaration in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL was already the subject of investigation by the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-04-0568-LSC, along with the criminal complaint for unexplained wealth, the former can no longer be pursued without violating the rule on double jeopardy.Double jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.2We have held that none of these requisites applies where the Ombudsman only conducted a preliminary investigation of the same criminal offense against the respondent public officer.3The dismissal of a case during preliminary investigation does not constitute double jeopardy, preliminary investigation not being part of the trial.4With respect to the second ground, respondent underscores the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the criminal and administrative complaints against him, including the charge subject of the proceedings before the PAGC and OP. It is argued that the Office of the Ombudsman as a constitutional body, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. No. 6770, has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, as against the PAGC which is not a constitutional body but a mere creation of the OP. Under said law, it is the Ombudsman who has disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government, such as herein respondent.The argument is untenable.The same wrongful act committed by the public officer can subject him to civil, administrative and criminal liabilities. We held in Tecson v. Sandiganbayan5:[I]t is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or employee is under a three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or omission. This simply means that a public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if such violation or wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the public officer may be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party. If the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may be punished criminally. Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension, removal from office, or other administrative sanctions. This administrative liability is separate and distinct from the penal and civil liabilities. (Italics in the original.)Dismissal of a criminal action does not foreclose institution of an administrative proceeding against the same respondent, nor carry with it the relief from administrative liability.6Res judicatadid not set in because there is no identity of causes of action. Moreover, the decision of the Ombudsman dismissing the criminal complaint cannot be considered a valid and final judgment. On the criminal complaint, the Ombudsman only had the power to investigate and file the appropriate case before the Sandiganbayan.7In the analogous case of Montemayor v. Bundalian,8this Court ruled:Lastly, we cannot sustain petitioners stance that the dismissal of similar charges against him before the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case against him before the PCAGC moot and academic. To be sure, the decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers. Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and control of the President over him. As the PCAGCs investigation of petitioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied.)Respondent argues that it is the Ombudsman who has primary jurisdiction over the administrative complaint filed against him. Notwithstanding the consolidation of the administrative offense (non-declaration in the SSAL) with the criminal complaints for unexplained wealth (Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019) and also for perjury (Article 183, Revised Penal Code, as amended) before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondents objection on jurisdictional grounds cannot be sustained.Section 12 of Article XI of the1987 Constitutionmandated the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency, instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Under Section 13, Article XI, the Ombudsman is empowered to conduct investigations on his own or upon complaint by any person when such act appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. He is also given broad powers to take the appropriate disciplinary actions against erring public officials and employees.The investigative authority of the Ombudsman is defined in Section 15 of R.A. No. 6770:SEC. 15.Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)Such jurisdiction over public officers and employees, however, is not exclusive.This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies, such as the PCGG and judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary investigation on charges against public employees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the local Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local elective officials.9(Emphasis supplied.)Respondent who is a presidential appointee is under the disciplinary authority of the OP. Executive Order No. 12 dated April 16, 2001 created the PAGC which was granted the authority to investigate presidential and also non-presidential employees "who may have acted in conspiracy or may have been involved with a presidential appointee or ranking officer mentioned x x x."10On this score, we do not agree with respondent that the PAGC should have deferred to the Ombudsman instead of proceeding with the administrative complaint in view of the pendency of his petition for certiorari with the CA challenging the PAGCs jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is a matter of law. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.11It may be recalled that at the time respondent was directed to submit his counter-affidavit under the Ombudsmans Order dated March 19, 2004, the PAGC investigation had long commenced and in fact, the PAGC issued an order directing respondent to file his counter-affidavit/verified answer as early as May 19, 2003. The rule is that initial acquisition of jurisdiction by a court of concurrent jurisdiction divests another of its own jurisdiction.12Having already taken cognizance of the complaint against the respondent involving non-declaration in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL, the PAGC thus retained jurisdiction over respondents administrative case notwithstanding the subsequent filing of a supplemental complaint before the Ombudsman charging him with the same violation.As to the third ground raised by respondent, we find no merit in his reiteration of the alleged gross violation of his right to due process. Records bear out that he was given several opportunities to answer the charge against him and present evidence on his defense, which he stubbornly ignored despite repeated warnings that his failure to submit the required answer/counter-affidavit and position paper with supporting evidence shall be construed as waiver on his part of the right to do so.The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain ones side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.13What is offensive to due process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard.14This Court has repeatedly stressed that parties who choose not to avail themselves of the opportunity to answer charges against them cannot complain of a denial of due process.15Having persisted in his refusal to file his pleadings and evidence before the PAGC, respondent cannot validly claim that his right to due process was violated.In his dissenting opinion, my esteemed colleague, Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, concurred with the CAs finding that respondents right to due process was violated by the "unilateral investigation" conducted by the PAGC which did not furnish the respondent with a copy of the "prejudicial PAGC resolution." The dissent also agreed with the CAs observation that there was a "rush" on the part of the PAGC to find the respondent guilty of the charge. This was supposedly manifested in the issuance by the PAGC of its resolution even without taking into consideration any explanation and refutation of the charges that he might make, and even before the CA could finally resolve his suit to challenge the PAGCs jurisdiction to investigate him. On the other hand, the dissent proposed that the non-submission by respondent of his counter-affidavit or verified answer as directed by the PAGC should not be taken against him. Respondents refusal was "not motivated by bad faith, considering his firm belief that PAGC did not have jurisdiction to administratively or disciplinarily investigate him."We do not share this view adopted by the dissent.Records reveal that on August 26, 2003, the CA already rendered a decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 77285 dismissing respondents petition challenging the jurisdiction of the PAGC. Respondents motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA. Upon elevation to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 160443), the petition suffered the same fate. Under the First Divisions Resolution dated January 26, 2004, the petition was denied for failure of the petitioner (respondent) to show that the CA committed any reversible error in the assailed decision and resolution. Said resolution became final and executory on April 27, 2004. Thus, at the time respondent submitted his counter-affidavit before the Ombudsman on May 21, 2004, there was already a final resolution of his petition challenging the PAGCs investigative authority.On the other hand, the PAGC submitted to the OP its September 1, 2003 resolution finding respondent guilty as charged and recommending that he be dismissed from the service, after the expiration of the 60-day temporary restraining order issued on June 23, 2003 by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 77285. The OP rendered its Decision adopting the PAGCs findings and recommendation on March 23, 2004. As thus shown, a period of ten (10) months had elapsed from the time respondent was directed to file his counter-affidavit or verified answer to the administrative complaint filed against him, up to the rendition of the OPs decision. It cannot therefore be said that the PAGC and OP proceeded with undue haste in determining respondents administrative guilt.Still on respondents repeated claim that he was denied due process, it must be noted that when respondent received a copy of the OP Decision dated March 23, 2004, his petition for review filed in this Court assailing the CAs dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 77285 was already denied under Resolution dated January 26, 2004. However, despite the denial of his petition, respondent still refused to recognize PAGCs jurisdiction and continued to assail the same before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 84254, a petition for review underRule 43from the OPs March 23, 2004 Decision and May 13, 2004 Resolution.16In any event, respondent was served with a copy of the OP Decision, was able to seek reconsideration of the said decision, and appeal the same to the CA.We also find nothing irregular in considering the investigation terminated and submitting the case for resolution based on available evidence upon failure of the respondent to file his counter-affidavit or answer despite giving him ample opportunity to do so. This is allowed by the Rules of Procedure of the PAGC. The PAGC is also not required to furnish the respondent and complainant copy of its resolution.The dissent of Justice Bersamin assails the OPs complete reliance on the PAGCs findings and recommendation which "constituted a gross violation of administrative due process as set forth in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations17." Among others, it is required that "[T]he tribunal or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the facts and the law of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision". Justice Bersamin thus concludes that the OP should have itself reviewed and appreciated the evidence presented and independently considered the facts and the law of the controversy." It was also pointed out that the OPs statement that the respondents arguments in his Motion for Reconsideration With Motion For Leave To Admit Explanation/Refutation of Complaint were a mere reiteration of matters previously considered, was "a patent untruth."We disagree.The OP decision, after quoting verbatim the findings and recommendation of the PAGC, adopted the same with a brief statement preceding the dispositive portion:After a circumspect study of the case, this Office fully agrees with the recommendation of PAGC and the legal premises as well as the factual findings that hold it together. Respondent failed to disclose in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL high-priced vehicles in breach of the prescription of the relevant provisions of RA No. 3019 in relation to RA No. 6713. He was, to be sure, afforded ample opportunity to explain his failure, but he opted to let the opportunity pass by.18The relevant consideration is not the brevity of the above disquisition adopting fully the findings and recommendation of the PAGC as the investigating authority. It is rather the fact that the OP is not a court but an administrative body determining the liability of respondent who was administratively charged, in the exercise of its disciplinary authority over presidential appointees.In Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna,19this Court ruled that the rights of parties in an administrative proceedings are not violated by the brevity of the decision rendered by the OP incorporating the findings and conclusions of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), for as long as the constitutional requirement of due process has been satisfied. Thus:It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution need not apply to decisions rendered in administrative proceedings, as in the case a[t] bar. Said section applies only to decisions rendered in judicial proceedings. In fact, Article VIII is titled "Judiciary," and all of its provisions have particular concern only with respect to the judicial branch of government. Certainly, it would be error to hold or even imply that decisions of executive departments or administrative agencies are oblige[d] to meet the requirements under Section 14, Article VIII.The rights of parties in administrative proceedings are not violated as long as the constitutional requirement of due process has been satisfied. In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. CIR, we laid down the cardinal rights of parties in administrative proceedings, as follows:1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit evidence in support thereof.2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.3) The decision must have something to support itself.4) The evidence must be substantial.5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.7) The board or body should, in all controversial question, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.As can be seen above, among these rights are "the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;" and that the decision be rendered "in such a manner that the parties to the proceedings can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered." Note that there is no requirement in Ang Tibay that the decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. For as long as the administrative decision is grounded on evidence, and expressed in a manner that sufficiently informs the parties of the factual and legal bases of the decision, the due process requirement is satisfied.At bar, the Office of the President apparently considered the Decision of HLURB as correct and sufficient, and said so in its own Decision. The brevity of the assailed Decision was not the product of willing concealment of its factual and legal bases. Such bases, the assailed Decision noted, were already contained in the HLURB decision, and the parties adversely affected need only refer to the HLURB Decision in order to be able to interpose an informed appeal or action for certiorari under Rule 65.1avvphi1x x x xAccordingly, based on close scrutiny of the Decision of the Office of the President, this Court rules that the said Decision of the Office of the President fully complied with both administrative due process and Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.The Office of the President did not violate petitioners right to due process when it rendered its one-page Decision. In the case at bar, it is safe to conclude that all the parties, including petitioner, were well-informed as to how the Decision of the Office of the President was arrived at, as well as the facts, the laws and the issues involved therein because the Office of the President attached to and made an integral part of its Decision the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, which it adopted by reference. If it were otherwise, the petitioner would not have been able to lodge an appeal before the Court of Appeals and make a presentation of its arguments before said court without knowing the facts and the issues involved in its case.20(Emphasis supplied.)Since respondent repeatedly refused to answer the administrative charge against him despite notice and warning by the PAGC, he submitted his evidence only after an adverse decision was rendered by the OP, attaching the same to his motion for reconsideration. That the OP denied the motion by sustaining the PAGCs findings without any separate discussion of respondents arguments and belatedly submitted evidence only meant that the OP found the same lacking in merit and insufficient to overturn its ruling on respondents administrative liability.On the fourth ground cited by the respondent, we maintain that the penalty of dismissal from the service is justified as no acceptable explanation was given for the non-declaration of the two expensive cars in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL.Pursuant to Section 11, paragraph (b) of R.A. No. 6713, any violation of the law "proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him." Respondents deliberate attempt to evade the mandatory disclosure of all assets acquired during the period covered was evident when he first claimed that the vehicles were lumped under the entry "Machineries/Equipment" or still mortgaged, and later averred that these were already sold by the end of the year covered and the proceeds already spent.Under this scheme, respondent would have acquired as many assets never to be declared at anytime. Such act erodes the function of requiring accuracy of entries in the SSAL which must be a true and detailed statement. It undermines the SSAL as "the means to achieve the policy of accountability of all public officers and employees in the government" through which "the public are able to monitor movement in the fortune of a public official; [as] a valid check and balance mechanism to verify undisclosed properties and wealth."21IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED WITH FINALITY.Let entry of judgment be made in due course.SO ORDERED.MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.Associate Justice

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 170512 October 5, 2011OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,Petitioner,vs.ANTONIO T. REYES,Respondent.D E C I S I O NLEONARDO DE CASTRO,J.:This Petition for Review onCertiorari1under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the reversal of the Decision2dated July 4, 2005 and the Resolution3dated October 27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70571. The judgment of the appellate court reversed and set aside the Decision4dated September 24, 2001 and the Joint Order5dated February 15, 2002 of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao in OMB-MIN-ADM-01-170; while the appellate courts resolution denied the motion for reconsideration6assailing its decision.On January 11, 2001, Jaime B. Acero executed an affidavit against herein respondent Antonio Reyes and Angelito Pealoza, who were the Transportation Regulation Officer II/Acting Officer-in-Charge and Clerk III, respectively, of the Land Transportation Office (LTO) District Office in Mambajao, Camiguin. Acero narrated thus:That, on January 10, 2001, at about 2:00 oclock P.M. I went to the Land Transportation Office, at Mambajao, Camiguin to apply for a drivers license;That, I was made to take an examination for drivers license applicants by a certain Tata Pealoza whose real name isAngelito, a clerk in said office;That, after the examination, [Pealoza] informed me that I failed in the examination; however if I am willing to pay additional assessment then they will reconsider my application and I am referring to [Pealoza] and [Reyes];That, I asked how much will that be and [Pealoza] in the presence of [Reyes] answeredP680.00, so I agreed;That, I then handedP1,000.00 to [Pealoza] and [Pealoza] handed it to the cashier;That, [Pealoza] in turn handed to me the change ofP320.00 only and a little later I was given the LTO Official Receipt No. 62927785 (January 10, 2001) but only forP180.00 which O.R. serves as my temporary license for 60 days; and the balance ofP500.00 was without O.R. and retained by Pealoza;That, I feel that the actuation of Antonio Reyes and Angelito Pealoza are fraudulent in that they failed to issue receipt for the extraP500.00 paid to them; and [Reyes] know that I am with [the Commission on Audit];That, I execute this affidavit to file charges against the guilty parties.7Attached to Aceros affidavit was the LTO Official Receipt No. 62927785, showing his payment ofP180.00.8The above affidavit was apparently filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Camiguin, but the same was later referred9to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The latter office thereafter ordered10Reyes and Pealoza to submit their counter-affidavits within ten days from notice.On June 19, 2001, Pealoza filed his Counter-Affidavit.11He denied telling Acero that if the latter were willing to pay additional costs, Reyes and Pealoza would reconsider his application. Pealoza stated that he did administer the examination to Acero but since he was very busy, he requested their security guard, Dominador Daypuyat, to check the answers of Acero using their answer guide. After Daypuyat checked Aceros paper, Pealoza noted the score of 22/40. Pealoza informed Acero of the failing grade and told him that it was up to Reyes to decide on the matter. Acero then went to the office of Reyes and after a few minutes, he came back and returned his application documents to Pealoza. After examining the application form, Pealoza saw that the same did not contain Reyes signature but a plus sign (+) and the number 27 beside the score of 22/40. Pealoza knew that it was Reyes who wrote the "+ 27" and the same indicated that Acero had to pay additional costs in order to pass the examination, as was done in the past.Thereafter, when Pealoza allegedly informed Reyes that Acero was an auditor, the latter was summoned into Reyes office. Reyes asked if Acero wanted to retake the examination or just pay the additional costs. Acero eventually said "yes" and Pealoza inferred that the former agreed to pay Reyes the extra costs. Pealoza recounted that Reyes instructed him to prepare the drivers license of Acero. Pealoza gave Aceros application documents to Lourdes Cimacio, the senior statistician, who processed the drivers license. When the cashier asked for Aceros payment, the latter gave Pealoza a one-thousand-peso bill. The cashier, in turn, handed to Pealoza a change ofP820.00. From the said amount, Pealoza gave to AceroP320.00, whileP500.00 was given to Reyes. Acero soon left the office. Pealoza said that Acero called their office not long after, asking for a receipt for theP500.00. Pealoza then asked if Acero had not come to an understanding with Reyes that a receipt would not be issued for the additional cost. Acero insisted on a receipt then hanged up. Pealoza told Reyes of Aceros demand and Reyes told him to cancel the drivers license. When told that the same could not be done anymore, Reyes allegedly gave PealozaP500.00, instructing the latter to return the money to Acero under circumstances where nobody could see them. Pealoza stated that he waited for Acero to come back to their office but the latter did not do so anymore.Pealoza also submitted in evidence the affidavit12of Rey P. Amper. Amper narrated that he started working at the LTO in Mambajao, Camiguin in September 1988 as a driver-examiner. In February 1994, Reyes became the acting Head of Office, and eventually the Head of Office, of the LTO in Mambajao. About four months thereafter, Reyes verbally instructed Amper to send to him (Reyes) all the applicants for drivers licenses who failed the examinations. In case Reyes was absent, the applicants were to wait for him. Subsequently, Reyes gave Amper a piece of paper containing the rates to be charged to the "applicant-flunkers" in addition to the legal fees. Amper was also told to deliver the additional payments to Reyes. Amper stated that his office table and that of Reyes were located in one room. Reyes would allegedly tell the applicant-flunkers to either re-take the examinations or pay additional costs. In most cases, Amper said that the applicant-flunkers would only be too willing to pay the extra costs. Reyes would then instruct Amper to add more points to applicant-flunkers scores, which meant that Reyes and the applicants concerned had come to an agreement for the payment of additional costs. Amper added that the said practice of Reyes was a "goad to his conscience" and he talked about it to Pealoza. They allegedly reported the matter to their District Representative Pedro Romualdo, but the latter could only express his regrets for having recommended Reyes to his position. The practice of Reyes of claiming additional costs continued up to the time Amper left the LTO. Amper declared that he knew that it was Reyes alone who took and benefitted from his illegal exactions. The employees of the LTO in Mambajao were purportedly aware of the practice of Reyes but they were afraid to come out against their Head of Office.The affidavit13of Margie B. Abdala was also presented by Pealoza. Abdala stated that she accompanied Pealoza and the latters wife, Ebony, to the house of Acero on January 13, 2001. Ebony urged Acero not to include Pealoza anymore in the complaint. Acero assured them that his complaint was principally directed against Reyes for requiring him (Acero) to pay additional costs for which he was not issued any official receipt. Pealoza brought with him Aceros application form for a drivers license, which had already been approved by Reyes, and he asked the latter to complete the same. Pealoza also tried to return theP500.00 from Reyes that was not covered by a receipt. Acero, however, refused to fill up the application form and to accept the money. When Ebony asked why Acero agreed to pay the additional cost required by Reyes, the latter answered that he did not understand what was meant by additional cost.On June 19, 2001, Reyes manifested14that, for purposes of the instant case, he was adopting the counter-affidavit he filed in another Ombudsman case, docketed as OMB-MIN-01-0090,15as both cases involved the same parties and the same incident.In his counter-affidavit,16Reyes claimed that Aceros complaint was a "blatant distortion of the truth and a mere fabrication of the complainant."17Reyes asserted that a perusal of the affidavit-complaint revealed that the only imputation against him was that Pealoza allegedly told Acero to payP680.00 in his (Reyes) presence. The affidavit revealed that it was Pealoza who processed the application of Acero; the money was allegedly given to Pealoza and it was he who handed the change back to Acero; and he had no participation and was not present when the money changed hands. Reyes stated that when he conducted an informal investigation on the complaint, Pealoza admitted to having pocketed the extraP500.00. Reyes allegedly reprimanded Pealoza and ordered the latter to return the money to Acero. Based on the receipt submitted by Acero, the same proved that as far as the LTO and Reyes were concerned, what was received by the office was onlyP180.00. Reyes contended that he did not ask or receive money from Acero and it was Pealoza who pocketed theP500.00.In an Order18dated June 20, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao directed the parties to appear before its office on July 11, 2001 for a preliminary conference. The parties were to consider, among others, the need for a formal investigation or whether the parties were willing to submit their case for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record and such other evidence as they will present at the conference.On July 6, 2001, Acero sent the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a telegram,19stating that he was waiving his right to avail of the preliminary conference.On July 11, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an Order,20stating that none of the parties appeared in the preliminary conference scheduled for that day. In view of the non-appearance of the respondents therein, they were considered to have waived their right to a preliminary conference. The case was then deemed submitted for decision.On July 23, 2001, the counsel for Pealoza informed the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao that his client was waiving his right to a formal investigation and was willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record. Pealoza also submitted the additional affidavit of one of their witnesses, Rickie Valdehueza.In his affidavit,21Valdehueza stated that on January 5, 2001, he applied for a drivers license with the LTO in Mambajao, Camiguin. He took an examination on that day, which was conducted by an employee he later came to know as Dominador Daypuyat. After the latter checked his test paper, Valdehueza was told that he got a failing score. His application was then turned over to Pealoza, who told him to see Reyes. Valdehueza said that Reyes advised him not to retake the examination anymore and just payP1,500.00. Valdehueza bargained forP1,200.00 since he had no money and Reyes agreed. Reyes then wrote the sign "+ 20" next to Valduezas score of 30, such that what appeared on the test paper was "30 + 20." Reyes returned the test paper and instructed Valdehueza to tell Pealoza to add "20" to his score. Valdehueza went back to the LTO on January 10, 2001 bringingP1,200.00. Before he could go to Reyes office, he was accosted by Daypuyat in the lobby who informed him that his license was already completed. Daypuyat also tookP700.00 to give to Reyes. Valdehueza gaveP500.00 to the cashier as payment for theP240.00 license fee. He told the cashier to just give his change to Reyes.On September 24, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao rendered a Decision in OMB-MIN-ADM-01-170, adjudging Reyes guilty of grave misconduct and finding Pealoza guilty of simple misconduct. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:Here, as borne out of the record, there is no denying the fact that [Acero] failed in the examination given for a drivers license, yet ultimately, herein complainant was granted a temporary drivers license. It is therefore very logical to presume that something in between was agreed upon between the applicant and the person charged with the grant of license.Based on the testimony of [Pealoza] and corroborated by the testimonies of Rey P. Amper (Record, pp. 31-32) and Rickie Valdehueza (Record, pp. 44-45), [Reyes] would give the flunker the option of retaking the examination or to simply pay an additional cost to have a passing grade without actually re-taking the same. As testified to by Rey P. Amper, "xxx in almost all cases, the applicant-flunker would only be too willing to pay the additional costs, in which case, Mr. Reyes would instruct him to go back to my table. Then Mr. Reyes would call me, saying: Ray, just add more to his score., which to me meant that he and the applicant-flunker had come to an agreement to pay the additional costs." Mr. Amper testifies further that this matter of extending a passing grade to a flunker for a monetary consideration has been a system within this LTO agency perpetrated by [Reyes] since he assumed as Head of Office thereat.Verily, [Reyes] took advantage of his position and office in exacting the so-called additional cost from those who flunked the examination. There is nowhere in the record authorizing the Head of Office of the LTO to adjust a failing grade into a passing grade. In addition, there is nowhere in the record that supports the legality of collecting additional costs over and above the legal fees. This is a pure and simple case of extortion and certainly, such act is a breach of his oath of office as well as a deliberate disregard of existing rules and regulations. Based on the foregoing, this Office finds respondent [Reyes] guilty of grave misconduct.As regards [Pealoza], while he may have helped or facilitated in the collection of that additional costs, he could not be as guilty as [Reyes].Understandably, it is normal for a subordinate to keep mum while an anomaly is going on specially when the perpetrator is the Head of Office. There is fear in him and normally, such subordinate would just "ride along", so to speak. But nonetheless, [Pealoza] has to be sanctioned. While the infraction he had helped accomplished may not have been voluntary on his part but as a public official, he should have registered his objection regardless of the consequence that may occur. Based on the foregoing, this Office finds respondent [Pealoza] guilty of simple misconduct.WHEREFORE, there being substantial evidence, this Office finds respondent Antonio T. Reyes guilty of grave misconduct and he is hereby meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service pursuant to Section 23(c) [Grave Offenses], Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. Likewise, this Office finds respondent Angelito G. Pealoza guilty of Simple Misconduct and he is hereby meted the penalty of SUSPENSION from office without pay for a period of Six (6) months based on Section 23(b) [Less Grave Offenses] Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. In both instances, the execution of the penalties imposed shall be made immediately after the same shall have been final and executory.22In their bid to challenge the above ruling, Reyes filed a Motion for Reconsideration cum Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Conference,23while Pealoza filed a Motion for Reconsideration.24On February 15, 2002, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued a Joint Order,25denying the aforesaid motions of Reyes and Pealoza.Reyes elevated the case to the Court of Appealsviaa Petition for Review26under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70571.In the assailed Decision dated July 4, 2005, the Court of Appeals granted the petition of Reyes and reversed the judgment of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The appellate court reasoned thus:It must be pointed out that in the complaint-affidavit filed by Acero, it was only Pealoza who received the money and the balance of P 500.00 which was without O.R. was retained by Pealoza. Nowhere in the complaint-affidavit could one find the name of Reyes, herein petitioner, nor is it alleged there that Reyes was around when Acero handed to Pealoza the P 1000.00. From the evidence on record, it was, clearly, only Pealoza all along. Nowhere in the record is Reyes complicity suggested or even slightly hinted.x x x xIt does not appear on record that [Reyes] was the one who ordered and received the "additional assessment". Rather, it was Pealoza alone who approached the complainant, discussed about the "additional assessment", and retained the balance of P 500 basing on the complaint-affidavit filed by Acero.We note with sadness that the counter-affidavit of Pealoza, of itself, was considered enough evidence by the investigation officer in finding [Reyes] guilty of grave misconduct, and dismissing him from government service. The testimony of Pealoza is, however, a self-serving declaration considering that he is the co-respondent in the Ombudsman case filed by Acero. Such a declaration which was obviously made principally to save his own neck should have been received with caution. This vital objection to the admission of this kind of evidence is its hearsay character and to permit its unqualified introduction in evidence would open the door to frauds and perjuries.It may be true that Reyes failed to attend the scheduled preliminary conference where he could have refuted all the hearsay evidence submitted against him. The introduction of such as evidence does not, however, give them the probative value which they did not bear in the first place. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence.The self-serving evidence presented in the form of a counter-affidavit by Pealoza should not have been taken hook, line and sinker, so to speak, for there was no way of ascertaining the truth of their contents. Moreover, in the Motion for Reconsideration dated November 13, 2001 [Reyes] claimed that he was not furnished any copy of Pealozas counter-affidavit. Thus, admissions made by Pealoza in his sworn statement are binding only on him.Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another.The charge of misconduct is a serious charge, a "capital offense" in a manner of speaking, which may cause the forfeiture of ones right to hold a public office. Therefore, said charge must be proven and substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Mere allegation will not suffice. It should be supported by competent evidence, by substantial evidence. We find the case against [Reyes] wanting in this regard.FOR THESE REASONS, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision dated 24 September 2001 and the Joint Order dated 15 February 2002 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. [Reyes] is hereby exonerated from the administrative charge for insufficiency of evidence.27The Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Motion for Reconsideration28of the Court of Appeals decision. The same was, however, denied in the assailed Resolution dated October 27, 2005.Hence, the Office of the Ombudsman (petitioner) filed the instant petition, raising the following issues:WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN NULLIFYING THE D E C I S I O N OF THE OMBUDSMAN, DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE CONTRARY TO LAW AND APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN THAT:(i) It re-examined and weighed the evidence submitted in the administrative proceedings and worse, substituted its judgment for that of the Ombudsman; and,(ii)It made a conclusion that substantial evidence does not exist to warrant a finding of administrative culpability on the part of respondent Reyes.29In essence, the fundamental issue in the instant case is whether the charge of grave misconduct against Reyes was sufficiently proven by substantial evidence. Petitioner settled this issue in the affirmative, while the Court of Appeals ruled otherwise.InSalazar v. Barriga,30the Court characterized the administrative offenses of misconduct and grave misconduct as follows:Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of official functions and duties of a public officer.In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest. Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official who unlawfully or wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself, contrary to the rights of others.31Here, petitioner adjudged Reyes guilty of grave misconduct after finding that Reyes, being then the Head of Office of the LTO in Mambajao, Camiguin, illegally exacted money from Acero in exchange for the issuance of a drivers license to the latter, notwithstanding that Acero did not pass the requisite written examination therefor.In assailing the judgment of the Court of Appeals, petitioner avers that the findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman are entitled to great weight and must be accorded full respect and credit as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner argues that it is not the task of the appellate court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before an administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence.Indeed, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 mandates that the findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence.32In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is necessary to establish the case for or against a party. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.33Dadulo v. Court of Appeals34reiterates that in reviewing administrative decisions, it is beyond the province of this Court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. However, while it is not the function of the Court to analyze and weigh the parties' evidence all over again, an exception thereto lies as when there is serious ground to believe that a possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result.After carefully perusing the records of this case, we find that the above-cited exception, rather than the general rule, applies herein. Otherwise stated, the Court deems it proper that a review of the case should be made in order to arrive at a just resolution.In the main, the evidence submitted by the parties in OMB-MIN-ADM-01-170 consisted of their sworn statements, as well as that of their witnesses. In the affidavit of Acero, he categorically identified both Reyes and Pealoza as the persons who had the prerogative to reconsider his failed examination, provided that he paid an additional amount on top of the legal fees. For his part, Pealoza ostensibly admitted the charge of Acero in his counter-affidavit but he incriminated Reyes therein as the mastermind of the illicit activity complained of. To corroborate this allegation, Pealoza submitted the affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza. Amper was a former LTO employee who allegedly had first-hand knowledge of the practice of Reyes of imposing and pocketing additional fees; while Valdehueza declared that he was an applicant for a drivers license who was likewise made to pay the said additional fees to Reyes. Upon the other hand, Reyes counter-affidavit repudiated the allegations of Acero, insisting that it was Pealoza who illegally took the amount ofP500.00 from Acero.Reyes faults petitioner for placing too much reliance on the counter-affidavit of Pealoza, as well as the affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza. Reyes claims that he was not furnished a copy of the said documents before petitioner rendered its Decision dated September 24, 2001. Reyes, thus, argues that his right to due process was violated. Petitioner, on the other hand, counters that Reyes was afforded due process since he was given all the opportunities to be heard, as well as the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration of petitioners adverse decision.On this point, the Court finds merit in Reyes contention.Ledesma v. Court of Appeals35elaborates on the well established doctrine of due process in administrative proceedings as follows:Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.36Moreover,Department of Health v. Camposano37restates the guidelines laid down inAng Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations38that due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5)the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues involved.39In the present case, the fifth requirement stated above was not complied with.1avvphi1Reyes was not properly apprised of the evidence offered against him, which were eventually made the bases of petitioners decision that found him guilty of grave misconduct.To recall, after the affidavit of Acero was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, the respondents therein,i.e., Reyes and Pealoza, were ordered to submit their counter-affidavits in order to discuss the charges lodged against them. While Pealoza acknowledged in his counter-affidavit his participation in the illicit transaction complained of, he pointed to Reyes as the main culprit. Pealoza thereafter submitted the affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza as witnesses who would substantiate his accusations. However, the records reveal that only the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao and Acero were furnished copies of the said affidavits.40Thus, Reyes was able to respond only to the affidavit of Acero. It would appear that Reyes had no idea that Pealoza, a co-respondent in the administrative case, would point an accusing finger at him and even supply the inculpatory evidence to prove his guilt. The said affidavits were made known to Reyes only after the rendition of the petitioners Decision dated September 24, 2001.The fact that Reyes was able to assail the adverse decision of the petitionerviaa Motion for Reconsideration Cum Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Conference did not cure the violation of his right to due process in this case. Reyes filed the said motion precisely to raise the issue of the violation of his right to due process. There is nothing on record to show that Reyes was furnished with, or had otherwise received, a copy of the affidavits of Pealoza, Amper and Valdehueza, whether before or after the Decision dated September 24, 2001 was issued. Thus, it cannot be said that Reyes had a fair opportunity to squarely and intelligently answer the accusations therein or to offer any rebuttal evidence thereto.It is true that, in the past, this Court has held that the right to due process of a respondent in an administrative case was not violated if he was able to file a motion for reconsideration to refute the evidence against him. However, the instant case should be differentiated fromRuivivar v. Office of the Ombudsman,41which likewise involved the issue of administrative due process. In the said case, Ruivivar was found administratively liable for discourtesy in the course of her official functions and was meted the penalty of reprimand. In her motion for reconsideration, Ruivivar argued that she was deprived of due process because she was not furnished copies of the affidavits of complainants witnesses. Thereafter, the Ombudsman ordered that Ruivivar be furnished with copies of the affidavits of the witnesses, with the directive for her to file any pleading that she may deem appropriate. As Ruivivar still opted not to controvert the affidavits that were belatedly provided to her, the Ombudsman ruled that her right to due process was not violated and her administrative liability was upheld. The Court affirmed the ruling of the Ombudsman, declaring that "the law can no longer help one who had been who had been given ample opportunity to be heard but who did not take full advantage of the proffered chance."42In the instant case, petitioner plainly disregarded Reyes protestations without giving him a similar opportunity, as inRuivivar, to be belatedly furnished copies of the affidavits of Pealoza, Amper and Valdehueza to enable him to refute the same. As it were, petitioner rendered its Decision dated September 24, 2001 on the basis of evidence that were not disclosed to Reyes. This the Court cannot sanction. A judgment in an administrative case that imposes the extreme penalty of dismissal must not only be based on substantial evidence but also rendered with due regard to the rights of the parties to due process.WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 4, 2005 and the Resolution dated October 27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70571, as well as the Decision dated September 24, 2001 and the Joint Order dated February 15, 2002 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-MIN-ADM-01-170, are herebyREVERSEDandSET ASIDE.The records of OMB-MIN-ADM-01-170 areREMANDEDto the Office of the Ombudsman, which is hereby ordered (a) to furnish respondent Antonio T. Reyes copies of the affidavits of Angelito G. Pealoza, Rey P. Amper and Rickie Valdehueza, and (b) to conduct further proceedings in OMB-MIN-ADM-01-170 as may be appropriate.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTROAssociate Justice

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 159781 February 2, 2011PETER BEJARASCO, JR.,Petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent.D E C I S I O NBERSAMIN,J.:This case concerns the dire consequences of a litigants failure to periodically follow up with his counsel on the developments of his appeal.The petitioner was convicted on February 16, 2001, for grave threats and grave oral defamation in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Sibonga, Cebu. On July 31, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, in Argao, Cebu affirmed the convictions. In due course, the petitioner, then represented by the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), sought the reconsideration of the RTC decision, claiming that he had not filed his appeal memorandum because of the MTCs failure to give him free copies of the transcripts of stenographic notes. He argued that the RTCs decision should be set aside and the criminal cases against him should be dismissed due to the prematurity and the serious errors of facts and law. However, the RTC denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration on September 24, 2001.On October 12, 2001, the petitioner, this time represented by Atty. Luzmindo B. Besario (Atty. Besario), a private practitioner, filed in the Court of Appeals (CA) a motion for extension of time to file his petition for review (C.A.-G.R. CR No. UDK-181). The CA granted his motion. Instead of filing his petition for review within the period granted, however, Atty. Besario sought another extension, but still failed in the end to file the petition for review. Thus, on March 13, 2002, the CA dismissed his appeal. After the dismissal became final and executory, entry of judgment was made on April 4, 2002.Thereafter, on March 31, 2003, the MTC issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioner, who surrendered himself on May 22, 2003.On July 16, 2003, the petitioner filed in the CA his petition for review through another attorney, alleging that Atty. Besario had recklessly abandoned him and had disappeared without leaving a trace.In its resolution dated August 14, 2003, the CA denied admission to the petition for review and ordered it expunged from the records; and reiterated its March 13, 2002 resolution of dismissal.1Aggrieved, the petitioner is now before the Court to plead his cause. He submits that Atty. Besarios reckless abandonment of his case effectively deprived him of his day in court and of his right to due process; and that said former counsels actuation constituted reckless and gross negligence that should not be binding against him.The petition is denied due course.That Atty. Besario was negligent in handling the petitioners case was clear. Indeed, his abject failure to file the petition for review in the CA despite his two motions for extension for that purpose warranted no other conclusion but that he was negligent.Nonetheless, we find no justification to reverse the CAs disposition of the appeal. The petitioner was bound by Atty. Besarios negligence.The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsels acts, including even mistakes in the realm of procedural technique.2The rationale for the rule is that a counsel, once retained, holds the implied authority to do all acts necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his client, such that any act or omission by counsel within the scope of the authority is regarded, in the eyes of the law, as the act or omission of the client himself.3A recognized exception to the rule is when the reckless or gross negligence of the counsel deprives the client of due process of law. For the exception to apply, however, the gross negligence should not be accompanied by the clients own negligence or malice, considering that the client has the duty to be vigilant in respect of his interests by keeping himself up-to-date on the status of the case. Failing in this duty, the client should suffer whatever adverse judgment is rendered against him.Truly, a litigant bears the responsibility to monitor the status of his case, for no prudent party leaves the fate of his case entirely in the hands of his lawyer. It is the clients duty to be in contact with his lawyer from time to time in order to be informed of the progress and developments of his case;4hence, to merely rely on the bare reassurances of his lawyer that everything is being taken care of is not enough.1avvphi1Here, the petitioner took nearly 16 months from the issuance of the entry of judgment by the CA, and almost 22 months from when the RTC affirmed the convictions before he actually filed his petition for review in the CA. He ought to have been sooner alerted about his dire situation by the fact that an unreasonably long time had lapsed since the RTC had handed down its dismissal of his appeal without Atty. Besario having updated him on the developments, including showing to him a copy of the expected petition for review. Also, he could have himself verified at the CA whether or not the petition for review had been filed, especially upon realizing that Atty. Besario had started making himself scarce to him. In short, the petitioners failure to know or to find out the real status of his appeal rendered him undeserving of any sympathy from the Court vis--vis the negligence of his former counsel.The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but is merely a statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the law.5The right is unavoidably forfeited by the litigant who does not comply with the manner thus prescribed. So it is with the petitioner.WHEREFORE,the Court affirms the resolution promulgated on August 14, 2003 in C.A. G.R. CR No. UDK-181 for failure of the petitioner to show a reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals.SO ORDERED.LUCAS P. BERSAMINAssociate JusticeRepublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 191366 December 13, 2010PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff-Appellee,vs.ARNOLD MARTINEZ Y NGELES, EDGAR DIZON Y FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ Y CAROLINO, and RAFAEL GONZALES Y CUNANAN,Accused-Appellants.D E C I S I O NMENDOZA,J.:This is an appeal from the August 7, 2009 Decision1of the Court of Appeals(CA), in CA-G.R. HC-NO. 03269, which affirmed the February 13, 2008 Decision2of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City(RTC),in Criminal Case No. 2006-0525-D, finding the accused guilty of violating Section 13, in relation to Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 for Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings.The FactsThe Information indicting the accused reads:That on or about the 2nd day of September 2006, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ARNOLD MARTINEZ y ANGELES, EDGAR DIZON y FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ y CAROLINO, ROLAND DORIA y DIAZ and RAFAEL GONZALES y CUNANAN, without authority of law, confederating together, acting jointly and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, sniff and possess dangerous drugs (shabu residues) contained in empty plastic sachets and rolled aluminum foil, during a party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or in the proximate company of at least two (2) person[s].Contrary to Section 13, Article II, R.A. 9165.3Version of the ProsecutionAs culled from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Police Officer 1 Bernard Azardon (PO1 Azardon), one of the apprehending officers, and Police Inspector Lady Ellen Maranion (P/Insp. Maranion), the forensic chemical officer, it appears that on September 2, 2006, at around 12:45 oclock in the afternoon, PO1 Azardon was on duty at the Police Community Precinct II along Arellano Street, Dagupan City, when a concerned citizen entered the precinct and reported that a pot session was going on in the house of accused Rafael Gonzales(Gonzales)in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon receipt of the report, PO1 Azardon, PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz (PO1 Dela Cruz), and members of the Special Weapons and Tactics(SWAT)team hied to Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon inquiry from people in the area, the house of Gonzales was located.As the police officers entered the gate of the house, they saw accused Orlando Doria(Doria)coming out of the side door and immediately arrested him. Inside the house, they saw accused Gonzales, Arnold Martinez(A. Martinez), Edgar Dizon(Dizon),and Rezin Martinez(R. Martinez)in a room. The four were surprised by the presence of the police. In front of them were open plastic sachets (containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled used aluminum foil and pieces of used aluminum foil.The accused were arrested and brought to the police precinct. The items found in the room were seized and turned over to the Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime Laboratory Officer, P/Insp. Maranion. The latter conducted a laboratory examination on the seized items and all 115 plastic sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used aluminum foil, and 27 of the 49 pieces of used aluminum foil tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The accused were subjected to a drug test and, except for Doria, they were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.Version of the DefenseThe defense, through its witnesses, accused A. Martinez, Dizon, and R. Martinez, claimed that in the morning of September 2, 2006, the three of them were along Arellano Street in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City, to meet with a certain Apper who bumped the passenger jeep of R. Martinez and who was to give the materials for the painting of said jeep. As they were going around the subdivision looking for Apper, they saw Gonzales in front of his house and asked him if he noticed a person pass by. While they were talking, Doria arrived. It was then that five to seven policemen emerged and apprehended them. They were handcuffed and brought to the police station in Perez, Dagupan City, where they were incarcerated and charged with sniffing shabu.The Ruling of the RTCThe case against Doria was dismissed on a demurrer to evidence.On February 13, 2008, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositve portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused ARNOLD MARTINEZ y Angeles, EDGAR DIZON y Ferrer, REZIN MARTINEZ y Carolino, and RAFAEL GONZALES y Cunanan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings defined and penalized under Section 13 in relation to Section 11, Article II of Republic Act 9165, and each of them is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay the fine in the amount of P500,000.00, and to pay the cost of suit.The subject items are hereby forfeited in favor of the government and to be disposed of in accordance with the law.SO ORDERED.4The RTC was of the view that the positive testimony of prosecution witness PO1 Azardon, without any showing of ill-motive on his part, prevailed over the defenses of denial and alibi put up by the accused. The accused were held to have been in constructive possession of the subject items. A conspiracy was also found present as there was a common purpose to possess the dangerous drug.The Ruling of the CAThe CA ruled that there was sufficient evidence to support the findings of the RTC as to the constructive possession of the dangerous drugs by the accused. It further held that although the procedure regarding the custody and disposition of evidence prescribed by Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not strictly complied with, the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence were nonetheless safeguarded. The CA was of the view that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty was not sufficiently controverted by the accused.Not in conformity, the accused now interposes this appeal before this Court praying for the reversal of the subject decision, presenting the followingAssignment of ErrorsFor accused Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon and Rezin Martinez1. The lower court erred in finding the accused-appellants to be having a pot session at the time of their arrest;2. The lower court erred in not seeing through the antics of the police to plant the shabu paraphernalia to justify the arrest of the accused-appellants without warrant;3. The lower court erred in not finding that thecorpus delictihas not been sufficiently established;4. The lower court erred in not finding the uncorroborated testimony of PO1 Azardon insufficient to convict the accused-appellants of the crime charged;5. The lower court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellants.For accused Rafael GonzalesITHE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.IITHE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE ALLEGED CONFISCATED DRUG.After an assiduous assessment of the evidentiary records, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused. The principal reasons are 1] that the evidence against the accused are inadmissible; and 2] that granting the same to be admissible, the chain of custody has not been duly established.Illegal Arrest, Search and SeizureIndeed, the accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he fails to raise such issue before arraignment.5However, this waiver is limited only to the arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.6Although the admissibility of the evidence was not raised as in issue by the accused, it has been held that this Court has the power to correct any error, even if unassigned, if such is necessary in arriving at a just decision,7especially when the transcendental matter of life and liberty is at stake.8While it is true that rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice, they nevertheless must not be met at the expense of substantial justice. Time and again, this Court has reiterated the doctrine that the rules of procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate the attainment of justice, rather than frustrate it. Technicalities should never be used to defeat substantive rights.9Thus, despite the procedural lapses of the accused, this Court shall rule on the admissibility of the evidence in the case at bench. The clear infringement of the accuseds right to be protected against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be ignored.The State cannot, in a manner contrary to its constitutional guarantee, intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their houses, papers and effects.10Sec. 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution provides:Section 2. - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.This constitutional guarantee, however, is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures without warrant. Arrests and seizures in the following instances are allowed even in the absence of a warrant (i) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;11(ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) stop and frisk; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.12This case would appear to fall under either a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest or a plain view search, both of which require a lawful arrest in order to be considered valid exceptions to the constitutional guarantee. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the circumstances under which a warrantless arrest is lawful. Thus:Sec. 5.Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.A review of the facts reveal that the arrest of the accused was illegal and the subject items were confiscated as an incident thereof. According to the testimony of PO1 Azardon and his Joint Affidavit13with PO1 Dela Cruz, they proceeded to, and entered, the house of accused Gonzales based solely on the report of a concerned citizen that a pot session was going on in said house, to wit:Q: I go back to the information referred to you by the informant, did he not tell you how many persons were actually conducting the pot session?A: Yes, sir.Q: When you went to the place of Rafael Gonzales, of course you were not armed with a search warrant, correct?A: None, sir.Q: Before the information was given to you by your alleged informant, you did not know personally Rafael Gonzales?A: I have not met [him] yet but I heard his name, sir.Q: When this informant told you that he was told that there was [an] ongoing pot session in the house of Rafael Gonzales, was this report to you placed in the police blotter before you proceeded to the house of Rafael Gonzales?A: I think it was no longer recorded, sir.Q: In other words, you did not even bother to get the personal data or identity of the person who told you that he was allegedly informed that there was an ongoing pot session in the house of Rafael Gonzales?A: What I know is that he is a jeepney driver of a downtown jeepney but he does not want to be identified because he was afraid, sir.Q: And likewise, he did not inform you who told him that there was an ongoing pot session in the house of Rafael Gonzales?A: No more, sir.Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney driver you immediately formed a group and went to the place of Rafael Gonzales?A: Yes, sir.x x xQ: When you were at the open gate of the premises of Rafael Gonzales, you could not see what is happening inside the house of Rafael Gonzales?A: Yes, sir.Q: You did not also see the alleged paraphernalia as well as the plastic sachet of shabu on the table while you were outside the premises of the property of Rafael Gonzales?x x xQ: Before they entered the premises they could not see the paraphernalia?COURT: Answer.A: Of course because they were inside the room, how could we see them, sir.Q: But still you entered the premises, only because a certain person who told you that he was informed by another person that there was an ongoing pot session going on inside the house of Rafael Gonzales?A: Yes, sir.Q: And that is the only reason why you barged in inside the house of Rafael Gonzales and you arrested the persons you saw?A: Yes, sir.14Paragraph (c) of Rule 113 is clearly inapplicable to this case. Paragraphs (a) and (b), on the other hand, may be applicable and both require probable cause to be present in order for a warrantless arrest to be valid. Probable cause has been held to signify a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.15Although this Court has ruled in several dangerous drugs cases16that tipped information is sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search,17such rulings cannot be applied in the case at bench because said cases involve either a buy-bust operation or drugs in transit, basically, circumstances other than the sole tip of an informer as basis for the arrest. None of these drug cases involve police officers entering a house without warrant to effect arrest and seizure based solely on an informers tip. The case of People v. Bolasa18is informative on this matter.In People v. Bolasa, an anonymous caller tipped off the police that a man and a woman were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house. The police immediately proceeded to the house of the suspects. They walked towards the house accompanied by their informer. When they reached the house, they peeped inside through a small window and saw a man and woman repacking marijuana. They then entered the house, introduced themselves as police officers, confiscated the drug paraphernalia, and arrested the suspects. This Court ruled:The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall under any of the above-enumerated categories. Perforce, their arrest is illegal. First, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants had just committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime. Second, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor did they have any reasonable ground to believe that accused-appellants committed it. Third, accused-appellants were not prisoners who have escaped from a penal establishment.Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain view. First, there was no valid intrusion. As already discussed, accused-appellants were illegally arrested. Second, the evidence,i.e., the tea bags later on found to contain marijuana, was not inadvertently discovered. The police officers intentionally peeped first through the window before they saw and ascertained the activities of accused-appellants inside the room. In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a customs search, or a stop and frisk; it cannot even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for the evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing.On the contrary, it indicates that the apprehending officers should have conducted first a surveillance considering that the identities and address of the suspected culprits were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause for arresting accused-appellants, they should have secured a search warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegalab initio, the accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every evidence thus obtained during the illegal search cannot be used against accused-appellants; hence, their acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law.19It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when the suspicion, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing an offense, is based on actual facts, that is, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.20As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of the arrest, accused had just committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime, as they had no probable cause to enter the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in order to arrest them. As to paragraph (b), the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead them to believe that the accused had just committed an offense. As admitted in the testimony of PO1 Azardon, the tip originated from a concerned citizen who himself had no personal knowledge of the information that was reported to the police:Q: Mr. Witness, you claimed that the reason for apprehending all the accused was based on a tip-off by an informant?A: Yes, sir.Q: What exactly [did] that informant tell you?A: He told us that somebody told him that there was an ongoing pot session in the house of one of the accused Rafael Gonzales, sir.Q: You mean to say that it was not the informant himself to whom the information originated but from somebody else?A: That was what he told me, sir.Q: Because of that you proceeded to where the alleged pot session was going on? [No Answer]Q: Did you[r] informant particularly pinpointed [sic] to where the alleged pot session was going on?A: No more because he did not go with us, sir.Q: So you merely relied on what he said that something or a pot session was going on somewhere in Arellano but you dont know the exact place where the pot session was going on?A: Yes, sir.Q: Andyour informant has no personal knowledgeas to the veracity of the alleged pot session because he claimed that he derived that information from somebody else?A: This is what he told us that somebody told him that there was an ongoing pot session, sir.Q: Despite of [sic] that information you proceeded to where?A: Trinidad Subdivision, sir.x x xQ: Mr. Witness, did your informant named [sic] those included in the alleged pot session?A: No, sir.Q: That was, because your informant dont [sic] know physically what was really happening there?A: He was told by another person that there was an ongoing pot session there, sir.21[Emphasis supplied]Neither can it be said that the subject items were seized in plain view. The elements of plainview are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.22The evidence was not inadvertently discovered as the police officers intentionally entered the house with no prior surveillance or investigation before they discovered the accused with the subject items. If the prior peeking of the police officers in Bolasa was held to be insufficient to constitute plain view, then more so should the warrantless search in this case be struck down. Neither can the search be considered as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a customs search, a stop and frisk, or one under exigent and emergency circumstances.The apprehending officers should have first conducted a surveillance considering that the identity and address of one of the accused were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause, then a search warrant should have been secured prior to effecting arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal, the ensuing search as a result thereof is likewise illegal. Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded.23The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are thus inadmissible. The drug, being the verycorpus delictiof the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, its inadmissibility thus precludes conviction, and calls for the acquittal of the accused.As has been noted previously by this Court, some lawmen, prosecutors and judges have glossed over illegal searches and seizures in cases where law enforcers are able to present the alleged evidence of the crime, regardless of the methods by which they were obtained. This attitude tramples on constitutionally-guaranteed rights in the name of law enforcement. It is ironic that such enforcement of the law fosters the breakdown of our system of justice and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law.24Chain of CustodyEven granting that the seized items are admissible as evidence, the acquittal of the accused would still be in order for failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the chain of custody requirement in dangerous drugs cases.The accused contend that the identity of the seized drug was not established with moral certainty as the chain of custody appears to be questionable, the authorities having failed to comply with Sections 21 and 86 of R.A. No. 9165, and Dangerous Drug Board(DDB)Resolution No. 03, Series of 1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990. They argue that there was no prior coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency(PDEA), no inventory of the confiscated items conducted at the crime scene, no photograph of the items taken, no compliance with the rule requiring the accused to sign the inventory and to give them copies thereof, and no showing of how the items were handled from the time of confiscation up to the time of submission to the crime laboratory for testing. Therefore, thecorpus delictiwas not proven, thereby producing reasonable doubt as to their guilt. Thus, they assert that the presumption of innocence in their favor was not overcome by the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.The essential requisites to establish illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: (i) the accused was in possession of the dangerous drug, (ii) such possession is not authorized by law, and (iii) the accused freely and consciously possessed the dangerous drug.25Additionally, this being a case for violation of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9165, an additional element of the crime is (iv) the possession of the dangerous drug must have occurred during a party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons.The existence of the drug is the verycorpus delictiof the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs and, thus, a conditionsine qua nonfor conviction. In order to establish the existence of the drug, itschain of custodymust be sufficiently established. The chain of custody requirement is essential to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed through the monitoring and tracking of the movements of the seized drugs from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the court.26Malillin v. Peoplewas the first in a growing number of cases to explain the importance of chain of custody in dangerous drugs cases, to wit:As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.27Section 1(b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,28defines chain of custody as follows:b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and used in court as evidence, and the final disposition;Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, provides for safeguards for the protection of the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized, to wit:SEC. 21.Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.People v. Habanathoroughly discusses the proper procedure for the custody of seized or confiscated items in dangerous drugs cases in order to ensure their identity and integrity, as follows:Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance turns it over to a supervising officer, who would then send it by courier to the police crime laboratory for testing. Since it is unavoidable that possession of the substance changes hand a number of times, it is imperative for the officer who seized the substance from the suspect to place his marking on its plastic container and seal the same, preferably with adhesive tape that cannot be removed without leaving a tear on the plastic container. At the trial, the officer can then identify the seized substance and the procedure he observed to preserve its integrity until it reaches the crime laboratory.If the substance is not in a plastic container, the officer should put it in one and seal the same. In this way the substance would assuredly reach the laboratory in the same condition it was seized from the accused. Further, after