Consti 2 Due Process Digests
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Transcript of Consti 2 Due Process Digests
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Trustees of Dartmouth College vs. Woodward
FACTS:Eleazar Wheelock set up an Indian charity school, with
the help of several established Americans, clothed,
maintained and educated a number of children of the
Indian natives, with a view of carrying the Gospel and
spreading the word of God. The school became reputable
among Indians in such a way that a vast number of
Indians would want their children to study in his institution
although his personal finances and estate could nolonger handle the same. Wheelock thought that the
undertaking should be accomplished by collecting funds
from well-off individuals from England. Wheelock
requested Reverend Nathaniel Whitacker for that purpose
and gave him a special power of attorney to solicit from
the worthy and generous contributors for the cause.
Eventually, Whitacker appointed several persons to be
trustees for the funds collected through a deed of trust
ratified and executed by Whitacker. Through the efforts of
the trustees alongside Wheelock and Whitacker,
Dartmouth College has been instituted with the Trustees
of Dartmouth College. Any heirs of the Trustees, as
granted by the courts, will be part of the body politic for
the furtherance of Darthmouth College.
[I tried to make a digest but the case was too long, sorry]
Villegas v Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho
FACTS:
The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537
requiring aliens (except those employed in the diplomatic
and consular missions of foreign countries, in technical
assistance programs of the government and anothercountry, and members of religious orders or
congregations) to procure the requisite mayors permit so
as to be employed or engage in trade in the City of
Manila. Thus, a case was filed with CFI-Manila to stop
enforcement of the ordinance. CFI-Manila declared the
ordinance void. Thus, the present petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:(1) Is the ordinance violative of the cardinal rule of
uniformity of taxation?
(2) Does it violate the principle against undue
designation of legislative power?
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(3) Does it violate the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution?
RULING:
(1) Yes. The P50 fee is unreasonable not only because it
is excessive but because it fails to consider valid
substantial differences in situation among individual
aliens who are required to pay it. The same amount of
P50 is being collected from every employed alien whether
he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or
whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paidexecutive.
(2) Yes. It does not lay down any criterion or standard to
guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has
been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails
to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or
limit the action, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary
and unrestricted power, such ordinance is invalid.
(3) Yes. Requiring a person before he can be employed
to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may
withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him
the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage
in a means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under
the due process and equal protection clause is given to
all persons, both aliens and citizens.
Thus, the ordinance is invalid.
Buck v. Bell 274 U.S. 200
FACTS: Carrie Buck is a feeble minded white woman
who was committed to the State Colony Epileptics and
Feeble Minded. She is the daughter of a feeble mindedmother in the same institution, and the mother of an
illegitimate feeble-minded child. She was eighteen years
old at the time of the trial of her case in the latter part of
1924. An Act of Virginia, approved March 20, 1924,
recites that the health of the patient and the welfare of
society may be promoted in certain cases by the
sterilization of mental defectives, under careful safeguard,
that the sterilization may be effected in males byvasectomy and in females by salpingectomy, without
serious pain or substantial danger to life; that the
Commonwealth issue supporting in various institutions
many defective persons who, if now discharged, would
become a menace, but, if incapable of procreating, might
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be discharged with safety and become self-supporting
with benefit to themselves and to society, and that
experience has shown that heredity plays an importantpart in the transmission of insanity, imbecility, etc. The
statute then enacts that, whenever the superintendent of
certain institutions, including the above-named State
Colony, shall be of opinion that it is for the best interests
of the patient sand of society that an inmate under his
care should be sexually sterilized, he may have the
operation performed upon any patient afflicted with
hereditary forms of insanity, imbecility, etc., on complyingwith the very careful provisions by which the act protects
the patients from possible abuse.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said statute authorizing
compulsory sterilization of the mentally retarded denies
the due process and equal protection of the laws.
HELD: The procedure can be no doubt had the due
process of law. Carrie Buck is the probable potential
parent of socially inadequate offspring, likewise afflicted,
the she may be sexually sterilized without detriment to
her general health, and that her welfare and that of
society will be promoted by her sterilization. We have
seen more than once that the public welfare may call
upon the best citizens for their lives. It is better for all the
world if, instead of waiting to execute degenerateoffspring for crime or to let them starve for their imbecility,
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind.
IMBONG vs. OCHOA
FACTS:
The Reproductive Health Law is a consolidation and
enhancement of existing reproductive laws. It seeks to
enhance the population control program of thegovernment in order to promote public welfare. However,
when coercive measures are found within the law,
provisions must be removed or altered in order to ensure
that it does not defy the Constitution by infringing on the
rights of the people.
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Petition: to declare provisions of Republic Act No.10354 as unconstitutional
Factual Antecedents
December 21, 2012: Congress enacted RA No.
10354 also known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH LAW)
The presidents imprimatur and support for the
said law lead to a range of petitions against the
law leading to iuris controversy in court.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition were
placed by numerous parties. All in all, 14
petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention were
filed.
March 15, 2013: the RH-IRR or enforcement
of the law took place
March 19, 2013: After deliberating the issues
and arguments raised, the court issued Status
Quo Ante Order (SQAO) which lead to a 120
day halt on the implementation of the
legislation
Due to further arguments and debates fromopposing parties, the SQAO was extended until
further orders of the court last July 16, 2013
Statute Involved:
Republic Act 10354, The Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012
Position of Petitioner:
o Petitioners claim that the provisions of RA
10354 are unconstitutional as they violate
the rights to life, to health, to freedom of
expression and speech, to the privacy offamilies, to academic freedom, to due
process of law, to equal protection, and
against involuntary servitude. They also
intrude on the autonomy of local
governments and the ARMM, and violate
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natural law. Furthermore, they claim that
Congress delegation of authority to the
FDA in determining which should beincluded in the EDL is invalid.
Position of Respondent
There is no actual case or controversy and,
therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for
judicial determination
Some petitioners lack standing to question
the RH Law
The petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief
over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether the provisions of RA 10354 infringe
upon the Right to Life, as in the Due Process, of every
person?
HELD:
Right to Life NO
Constitution intended that 1.) conception to refer to
the time of fertilization and 2.) the protection of the
unborn upon said fertilization Not all contraceptives are to be banned (only those
that kill a fertilized ovum)
Contraceptives that prevent union of sperm and egg
are thus permissible
It is the intended by the framers of the 1987
Constitution to prevent the enacting of a law that
legalizes abortion.
RH law prohibits abortion
RH law recognizes that abortion is a crime
RH law prohibits abortifacients.
Due Process - NO
The definitions of several terms pinpointed by thepetitioners in the RH Law are not vague.
Private health care institution = private health care
service provider.
service and methods are also broad enough to
include giving information and performing medical
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procedures, so hospitals run by religious groups can
be exempted.
incorrect information connotes a sense of maliceand ill motive to mislead the public.
Nebbia vs. State of New York
Facts. The New York legislature established a Milk
Control Board that was vested with the power to fix
minimum and maximum retail prices for milk sold within
the state. Appellant, Mr. Nebbia, an owner of a New York
grocery store, was convicted of selling milk for prices in
excess of the price set by the Board.
Issue. Whether the Constitution prohibits a state from
fixing the selling price of milk?
Previous
Held. No. Judgment affirmed. The production and
distribution of milk is a paramount industry of the state
and largely affects the health and prosperity of its people.
Property rights and contract rights are not absolute in
nature and may be subject to limitations. Since the price
controls were not arbitrary, discriminatory, or
demonstrably irrelevant to the policy adopted by the
legislature to promote the general welfare, it was
consistent with the Constitution.
Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila
Facts: Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other
Chinese laundrymen who has general and the same
interest, filed a complaint for a preliminary injunction. The
Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of enforcingOrdinance No. 532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance No.
532 requires that the receipt be in duplicate in English
and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of
articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning
establishments. The permanent injunction was denied by
the trial court. The appellants claim is that Ordinance No.
532 savors of class legislation; putting in mind that they
are Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates betweenpersons in similar circumstances; and that it constitutes
an arbitrary infringement of property rights. They also
contest that the enforcement of the legislation is an act
beyond the scope of their police power. In view of the
foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme Court.
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Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532
is an act beyond the scope of police power
(2) Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a
class legislation that infringes property rights.
Held: Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such
purposes are permissible under the police power. The
police power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No.
532 is based on Section 2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of
the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744,
authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila, with
the approval of the mayor of the city:
(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for
the following: xxxx xxxxx laundries xxxx.
(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and
proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good
order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the
city and its inhabitants.
The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No.
532 was to avoid disputes between laundrymen and their
patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not
able to decipher Chinese characters from being
defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s, people of
Manila are more familiar with Spanish and maybe
English.)
In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court
held that the ordinance invades no fundamental right, and
impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police
regulation, an attempt is not made to violate personal
property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory
nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public
laundries without distinction, whether they belong to
Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality.
All, without exception, and each every one of them
without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. The
obvious objection for the implementation of the ordinance
is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code.
Although, an additional burden will be imposed on the
business and occupation affected by the ordinance such
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as that of the appellant by learning even a few words in
Spanish or English, but mostly Arabic numbers in order to
properly issue a receipt, it seems that the same burdensare cast uponthem. Yet, even if private rights of person or
property are subjected to restraint, and even if loss will
result to individuals from the enforcement of the
ordinance, this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold
the power of the legislative body. The very foundation of
the police power is the control of private interests for the
public welfare.
Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed,
and the petition for a preliminary injunction is denied, with
costs against the appellants.
Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad
Facts: On 1921, Act No. 2972 or the Chinese
Bookkeeping Law was passed, regulating that the
account books should not be in any other language exc.
English, Spanish or any dialect, otherwise a penalty of
fine of not more than 10K or imprisonment for not more
than 2 years will be imposed
- fiscal measure intended to facilitate the work of thegovernment agents and to prevent fraud in the returns of
merchants, in conformity with the sales tax and the
income tax
On March 1923, BIR inspected the books of
account of Yu Cong Eng where it was found out that it is
not in accordance with Act 2972
A criminal case was filed against Yu Cong Eng
before the CFI Manila for keeping his books of account in
Chinese
Yus defense:
Yu Cong Eng et al are Chinese merchants,
claiming that they represent the other 12K filed a petition
for prohibition and injunction against the CIR, questioning
the constitutionality of Act No. 2972 or the Chinese
Bookkeeping Law
Issue: W/N Act No. 2972 is constitutional?
Ruling:
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality
must be raised in the lower court and that court must be
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given an opportunity to pass upon the question before it
may be presented to the appellate court for resolution
Power of taxation- strongest of all the powers of government,
practically absolute and unlimited
- It is a legislative power. All its incidents are within
the control of the legislature. It is the Legislature which
must questions of state necessarily involved in ordering a
tax, which must make all the necessary rules and
regulations which are to be observed in order to produce
the desired results, and which must decide upon the
agencies by means of which collections shall be made
The power to tax is not judicial power and that a
strong case is required for the judiciary to declare a law
relating to taxation invalid. If, of course, so great an
abuse is manifest as to destroy natural and fundamental
rights, it is the duty of the judiciary to hold such an Act
unconstitutional
The Chinese petitioners are accorded treaty rights
of the most favored nation
Their constitutional rights are those accorded all
aliens, which means that the life, liberty, or property of
these persons cannot be taken without due process of
law, and that they are entitled to the equal protection of
the laws, without regard to their race
Act No. 2972 is a fiscal measure which seeks to
prohibit not only the Chinese but all merchants of
whatever nationality from making entries in the books ofaccount or forms subject to inspection for taxation
purposes in any other language than either the English or
Spanish language or a local dialect
the law only intended to require the keeping of
such books as were necessary in order to facilitate
governmental inspection for tax purposes
The Chinese will not be singled out as a special
subject for discriminating and hostile legislation since
there are other aliens doing business in the Phils. There
will be no arbitrary deprivation of liberty or arbitrary
spoliation of property. There will be no unjust and illegal
discrimination between persons in similar circumstances.
The law will prove oppressive to the extent that all tax
laws are oppressive, but not oppressive to the extent of
confiscation
Act No. 2972 as meaning that any person,
company, partnership, or corporation, engaged in
commerce, industry, or any other activity for the purpose
of profit in the Philippine Islands, shall keep its account
books, consisting of sales books and other records and
returns required for taxation purposes by regulations of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, in effect when this action
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was begun, in English, Spanish, or a local dialect, thus
valid and constitutional
Ichong vs. Hernandez
Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf
of other alien residents corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No.
1180, An Act to Regulate the Retail Business, filed to
obtain a judicial declaration that said Act isunconstitutional contending that: (1) it denies to alien
residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of
their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2)
the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended
in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and
treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4)
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by
aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession,
and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a
corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail
business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII
and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether RA 1180 denies to alien residents the
equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty
and property without due process of law
Held: No. The equal protection of the law clause is
against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which
is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which is to operate. It does not demand
absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that
all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to
those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies
alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exists for making a distinction between those
who fall within such class and those who do not. (2
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
The due process clause has to do with the
reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the
police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is
public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary
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for the accomplishment of the legislatures purpose; is it
not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there
sufficient foundation or reason in connection with thematter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of
the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be
achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an
unjustified interference with private interest? These are
the questions that we ask when the due process test is
applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the
guarantees of due process and equal protection of the
laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the
power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The
balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate
aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no
absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be
tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that
would mean license and anarchy. So the State can
deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided
there is due process of law; and persons may be
classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is
given the equal protection of the law. The test or
standard, as always, is reason. The police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between
purposes and means. And if distinction and classificationhas been made, there must be a reasonable basis for
said distinction.
The law does not violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the
distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the
occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause,
because the law is prospective in operation and
recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that
the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its
objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a
matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually
necessary and that in any case such matter falls within
the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and
discretion the Judicial department of the Government
may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are
clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no
duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the
segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be
said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty
obligations because no treaty has actually been entered
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into on the subject and the police power may not be
curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.
NO ESPINA VS ZAMORA DIGEST
SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES INC. &
MARLOWE NAVIGATION CO., INC.
Facts:
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.
and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a
POEA-approved Contract of Employment. On March 19,
1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was
constrained to accept a downgraded employment
contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthlysalary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and
representation of respondents that he would be made
Chief Officer by the end of April. However, respondents
did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief
Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second
Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May.
Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12
months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999,
but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he
had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his
contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months
and twenty-three (23) days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint
against respondents for constructive dismissal and forpayment of his money claims. LA rendered the dismissal
of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits.
Respondents appealed to the NLRC to question the
finding of the LA. Likewise, petitioner also appealed to
the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not
applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated
Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission
that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to theirsalaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts.
Petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole
issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the
Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor
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Relations Commission that in case of illegal dismissal,
OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired
portion of their contracts. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Partial Reconsideration; he questioned the
constitutionality of the subject clause. Petitioner filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the
constitutional challenge against the subject clause. CA
affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the
applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the
constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
The last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of
overseas employment without just, valid or authorized
cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee
with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA
computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the
monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three
months out of the unexpired portion of nine months and
23 days of his employment contract or a total of
US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause,
petitioner contends that, in addition to the US$4,200.00
awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to
US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23,
equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and
23 days left of his employment contract, computed at the
monthly rate of US$2,590.00
Issue:
1.) Is petitioner entitled to his monetary claim which is
the lump-sum salary for the entire unexpired portion of
his 12-month employment contract, and not just for a
period of three months?
2.) Should petitioners overtime and leave pay form
part of the salary basis in the computation of his
monetary award, because these are fixed benefits that
have been stipulated into his contract?
Held:
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1.) Yes. Petitioner is awarded his salaries for the entire
unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting
of nine months and 23 days computed at the rate of
US$1,400.00 per month. The subject clause or for three
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional.
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers
with fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged
were treated alike in terms of the computation of their
money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their
salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their
contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042,
specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally
dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or
more in their employment contract have since been
differently treated in that their money claims are subject
to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed
on local workers with fixed-term employment.
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a
suspect classification in that, in the computation of the
monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are
illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the
claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or
more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other
OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The
subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and
burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
The Court further holds that the subject clause violates
petitioner's right to substantive due process, for it
deprives him of property, consisting of monetary benefits,
without any existing valid governmental purpose. The
subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled
to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine
months and 23 days of his employment contract,
pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment
of R.A. No. 8042.
2.) No. The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not
include overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like
petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996,
provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers,
in which salary is understood as the basic wage,
exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses;
whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work
performed in excess of the regular eight hours, and
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holiday pay is compensation for any work performed on
designated rest days and holidays.
By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis for the
automatic inclusion of overtime and holiday pay in the
computation of petitioner's monetary award; unless there
is evidence that he performed work during those periods.
CLAUDIO S. YAP,
Petitioner, vs.
THENAMARIS SHIP'S MANAGEMENT and
INTERMARE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC.,
Respondents.
Facts:
Claudio S. Yap was employed as electrician of the vessel,
M/T SEASCOUT on 14 August 2001 by Intermare
Maritime Agencies, Inc. in behalf of its principal, Vulture
Shipping Limited. for a duration of 12 months. On 23
August 2001, Yap boarded M/T SEASCOUT and
commenced his job as electrician. However, on or about
08 November 2001, the vessel was sold. Yap, along with
the other crewmembers, was informed by the Master of
their vessel that the same was sold and will be scrapped.
Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra
bonus along with the scrapping bonus. However, with
respect to the payment of his wage, he refused to accept
the payment of one-month basic wage. He insisted that
he was entitled to the payment of the unexpired portion of
his contract since he was illegally dismissed from
employment. He alleged that he opted for immediate
transfer but none was made.
The Labor Arbiter
Thus, Claudio S. Yap (petitioner) filed a complaint for
Illegal Dismissal with Damages and Attorneys Fees
before the Labor Arbiter (LA). On July 26, 2004, the LA
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, finding the latter
to have been constructively and illegally dismissed by
respondents.
LA opined that since the unexpired portion of petitioners
contract was less than one year, petitioner was entitled to
his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract for a
period of nine months.
The NLRC
Aggrieved, respondents sought recourse from the NLRC.
The NLRC affirmed the LAs findings that petitioner was
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indeed constructively and illegally dismissed. However,
the NLRC held that instead of an award of salaries
corresponding to nine months, petitioner was only entitled
to salaries for three months as provided under Section
108 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042,9 as enunciated in
our ruling in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission .Respondents filed a Motion
for Partial Reconsideration. Finding merit in petitioners
arguments, the NLRC reversed its earlier Decision,
holding that "there can be no choice to grant only three
(3) months salary for every year of the unexpired term
because there is no full year of unexpired term which this
can be applied."
The Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the findings and ruling of the LA and the
NLRC that petitioner was constructively and illegally
dismissed. However, the
CA ruled that the NLRC erred in sustaining
the LAs interpretation of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. In
this regard, the CA relied on the clause "or for three
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less" provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A.
No. 8042.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 10 of R.A. [No.] 8042, to the
extent that it affords an illegally dismissed migrant worker
the lesser benefit of "salaries for [the] unexpired portion
of his employment contract or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" is
unconstitutional. - YES
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
granting petitioner only three (3) months backwages
when his unexpired term of 9 months is far short of the
"every year of the unexpired term" threshold. YES
Held:
The said provision of law has long been a source of
abuse by callous employers against migrant workers; and
that said provision violates the equal protection clause
under the Constitution because, while illegally dismissed
local workers are guaranteed under the Labor Code of
reinstatement with full backwages computed from the
time compensation was withheld from them up to their
actual reinstatement. It imposes a 3-month cap on the
claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or
more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other
OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment.
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Respondents, aware of our ruling in Serrano, aver that
our pronouncement of unconstitutionality should not
apply in this case because Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is
a substantive law that deals with the rights and
obligations of the parties incase of Illegal Dismissal of a
migrant worker and is not merely procedural in character.
Thus, pursuant to the Civil Code, there should be no
retroactive application of the law in this case.
As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has
not been passed at all. The doctrine of operative fact
serves as an exception to the aforementioned general
rule. The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the
general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair
play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot always be
ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those
who have relied on the invalid law.
Following Serrano, we hold that this case should not be
included in the aforementioned exception. To rule
otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other
OFWs, and would, in effect, send a wrong signal that
principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies
may violate an OFWs security of tenure which an
employment contract embodies and actually profit from
such violation based on an unconstitutional provision of
law. Invoking Serrano, respondents claim that the tanker
allowance should be excluded from the definition of the
term "salary." Fair play, justice, and due process dictate
that this Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal,
pass upon this question. Matters not taken up below
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. A close
perusal of the contract reveals that the tanker allowance
of US$130.00 was not categorized as a bonus but was
rather encapsulated in the basic salary clause, hence,
forming part of the basic salary of petitioner.
White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila
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FACTS:
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774
entitled An Ordinance prohibiting short time admission
in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and
similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light
Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought
to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance
infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC
ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes
at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the
Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is
valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the
LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the
establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,
restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments,
including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in
favor of the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and
void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also
violates the due process clause which serves as a
guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or
seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note
that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up
rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are
tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen up.
Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said
ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited
group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights
may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public
interest or public welfare.
Tanada v. Tuvera
GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 (146 SCRA 446)
Facts:
On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the
publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished
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presidential issuances which are of general application,
and unless so published, they shall have no binding force
and effect. Decision was concurred only by 3 judges.
Petitioners move for reconsideration / clarification of the
decision on various questions. Solicitor General avers
that the motion is a request for advisory opinion.
February Revolution took place, which subsequently
required the new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on
the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of
Court).
Issue:
Whether publication is still required in light of the clause
unless otherwise provided.
Held:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided, in Article 2
of the Civil Code, refers to the date of effectivity and not
to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in
any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date, without its previous
publication. The legislature may in its discretion provide
that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended. Publication requirements applies to (1) all
statutes, including those of local application and private
laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative
powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or directly conferred by the Constitution; (3)
Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of
enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a
valid delegation; (4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that
it applies to only a portion of the national territory and
directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5)
Monetary Board circulars to fill in the details of the
Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
Further, publication must be in full or it is no publication at
all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents
of the laws.
Reasoning:
The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above
defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon
thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official
Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their
publication, or on another date specified by the
legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
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Ynot v IAC(1987) 148 SCRA 659
Facts:
Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo
in 1984 and these wer confiscated by the station
commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A
which prohibits transportation of a carabao or carabeef
from one province to another. Confiscation will be a result
of this.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing
of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering
the merits of the case, the court sustained the
confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no
longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond.
The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of
the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of
authority and also for its presumed validity.
The same result was decided in the trial court.
In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the
constitutionality of the E.O. due to the outright
confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard
before an impartial court as guaranteed by due process.
He also challenged the improper exercise of legislative
power by the former president under Amendment 6 of the
1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given emergency
powers to issue letters of instruction that had the force of
law.
Issue: Is the E.O. constitutional?
Holding: The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.
Ratio:
The lower courts are not prevented from examining the
constitutionality of a law.
Constitutional grant to the supreme court to review.
Justice Laurel's said, courts should not follow the path of
least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality
of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they
should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the
abscess, and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive
order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a
new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law
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due to the grant of legislative authority over the president
under Amendment number 6.
Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise
language to avoid controversy. In the due process clause,
however, the wording was ambiguous so it would remain
resilient. This was due to the avoidance of an iron rule
laying down a stiff command for all circumstances. There
was flexibility to allow it to adapt to every situation with
varying degrees at protection for the changing conditions.
Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition
for due process lest they be confined to its interpretation
like a straitjacket.
There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a
safeguard against arbitrariness.
There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption
which bars omission of contrary evidence as long as
such presumption is based on human experience or
rational connection between facts proved and fact
presumed. An examples is a passport of a person with a
criminal offense cancelled without hearing.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular
function of police power which both restrains and is
restrained by due process. This power was invoked in
626-A, in addition to 626 which prohibits slaughter of
carabaos with an exception.
While 626-A has the same lawful subject as the original
executive order, it cant be said that it complies with the
existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition
and the purpose sought has a gap.
Summary action may be taken in valid admin
proceedings as procedural due process is not juridical
only due to the urgency needed to correct it.
There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would
not have been proved in a court of justice with the
accused acquired the rights in the constitution.
The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police
power because the method to confiscate carabaos was
oppressive.
Due process was violated because the owner was denied
the right to be heard or his defense and punished
immediately.
This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
against the separation of powers.
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The policeman wasnt liable for damages since the law
during that time was valid.
Evelio Javier vs COMELEC and Arturo Pacificador
Facts:
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under
Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan in
May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained
of massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying,
fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under
duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes
perpetrated by the armed men of Pacificador. COMELEC
just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same
complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on
Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of
Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the
proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders.
On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the
board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner
without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the
Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the
proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set
aside as premature, having been made before the lapse
of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had
seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the
irregularities of the election must first be resolved before
proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the
Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former
law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was
made by only the 2nd Division but the Constitute requires
that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb
1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The
Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it
being moot and academic by virtue of Javiers death.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in
the proclamation of Pacificador.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled
the Sol-Gens tenor. The SC has repeatedly and
consistently demanded the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge as the indispensable imperative of due process.
To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge
must not only be impartial but must also appear to be
impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his
decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less
than that. They should be sure that when their rights are
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violated they can go to a judge who shall give them
justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not
go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of
fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment.
Without such confidence, there would be no point in
invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by
requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls
the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice.
There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches
a court already committed to the other party and with a
judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized
after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a
formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial)
proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the
parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the
denouement according to a prepared script. There is no
writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his
conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the
arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts
and the pertinent law.
Criselda Gacad vs. Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr., RTC
Branch 3, Nabunturan, Compostela Valley
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a Verified Complaint against Judge
Clapis for Grave Misconduct and Corrupt Practices,
Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the Law,
and violations of Canon 1 (Rule 1.01, 1.02), Canon 2
(Rule 2.01), and Canon 3 (Rule 3.05) of the Code of
Judicial Conduct relative to a criminal case.
Petitioner alleged that she met Judge Clapis at
the Golden Palace Hotel in Tagum City to talk about the
case of her brother. The prosecutor of the said case,
Graciano Arafol, informed the petitioner that the Judge
will do everything for her favor but on the pretext that in
return she has to give P50,000.00 to the Judge. During
the meeting, the Judge, after being satisfied of the
promise of the petitioner for that amount, told her "Sige,
kay ako na bahala, gamuson nato ni sila." (Okay, leave it
all to me, we shall crush them.)
When the case was set on hearing, the Notices of
Hearings were mailed to the petitioner only after the date
of hearing. Judge Clapis started conducting the bail
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hearings without an application for bail and granting the
same without affording the prosecution the opportunity to
prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. He set a
preliminary conference seven months from the date it
was set, patently contrary to his declaration of speedy
trial for the case. However, the judge claimed that notices
were made verbally because of time constraints.
Nevertheless, he stressed that both sides were given the
opportunity to be heard since in almost all proceedings,
petitioner was in court and the orders were done in open
court. He admitted that his personnel inadvertently
scheduled the preliminary conference of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge is guilty of
the charges.
HELD: YES.
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or
deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior in connection with ones performance of official
functions and duties. For grave or gross misconduct to
exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or
inspired by the intention to violate the law, or a persistent
disregard of well-known rules. The misconduct must
imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of
judgment.
The acts of Judge Clapis in meeting the petitioner,
a litigant in a case pending before his sala and telling
those words, constitute gross misconduct. Judge Clapis
wrongful intention and lack of judicial reasoning are made
overt by the circumstances on record. Judge Clapis
cannot escape liability by shifting the blame to his court
personnel. He ought to know that judges are ultimately
responsible for order and efficiency in their courts, and
the subordinates are not the guardians of the judges
responsibility.
The arbitrary actions of respondent judge, taken
together, give doubt as to his impartiality, integrity and
propriety. His acts amount to gross misconduct
constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, particularly: Canon 2, Section 1 and 2; Canon
3, Section 2 and 4; and Canon 4, Section 1.
We also find Judge Clapis liable for gross ignorance
of the law for conducting bail hearings without a petition
for bail being filed by the accused and without affording
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the prosecution an opportunity to prove that the guilt of
the accused is strong. Here, the act of Judge Clapis is
not a mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and
judgment but a patent disregard of well-known rules.
When an error is so gross and patent, such error
produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge
liable for gross ignorance of the law. If judges are allowed
to wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by the law,
there will not only be confusion in the administration of
justice but also oppressive disregard of the basic
requirements of due process.
Tumey vs. Ohio[273 US 510, 7 March 1927]
Taft (CJ):
Facts: Tumey was arrested at White Oak, and was
brought before Mayor Pugh, of the village of North
College Hill, charged with unlawfully possessing
intoxicating liquor. He moved for his dismissal because of
the disqualification of the mayor to try him under the 14th
Amendment. The mayor denied the motion, proceeded to
the trial, convicted Tumey of unlawfully possessing
intoxicating liquor within Hamilton county as charged,
fined him $100, and ordered that he be imprisoned until
the fine and costs were paid. Tumey obtained a bill of
exceptions and carried the case on error to the court of
common pleas of Hamilton county. That court heard the
case and reversed the judgment, on the ground that the
mayor was disqualified as claimed. The state sought
review by the Court of Appeals of the First Appellate
District of Ohio, which reversed the common pleas and
affirmed the judgment of the mayor. On 4 May 1926, the
state Supreme Court refused Tumeys application to
require the Court of Appeals to certify its record in the
case. Tumey then filed a petition in error in that court as
of right, asking that the judgment of the mayors court and
of the appellate court be reversed on constitutional
grounds. On 11 May 1926, the Supreme Court adjudged
that the petition be dismissed for the reason that no
debatable constitutional question was involved in the
cause. The judgment was then brought to the US
Supreme Court upon a writ of error allowed by the Chief
Justice of the state Supreme Court, to which it was rightly
directed.
Issue: Whether the pecuniary interest of the Mayor and
his village, and the system of courts in prosecuting
violations of the Prohibition Act, renders the mayor
disqualified from hearing the case.
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Held: All questions of judicial qualification may not involve
constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal
bias, state policy, remoteness of interest would seem
generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion.
But it certainly violates the 14th Amendment and deprives
a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law to
subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court,
the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial
pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in
his case. Herein, the mayor has authority, which he
exercised in the case, to order that the person sentenced
to pay a fine shall remain in prison until the fine and costs
are paid. The mayor thus has a direct personal pecuniary
interest in convicting the defendant who came before him
for trial, in the $12 of costs imposed in his behalf, which
he would not have received if the defendant had been
acquitted. This was not exceptional, but was the result of
the normal operation of the law and the ordinance. The
system by which an inferior judge is paid for his service
only when he convicts the defendant has not become so
embedded by custom in the general practice, either at
common law or in this country, that it can be regarded as
due process of law, unless the costs usually imposed are
so small that they may be properly ignored as within the
maxim de minimis non curat lex. The Court cannot
regard the prospect of receipt or loss of such an
emolument in each case as a minute, remote, trifling, or
insignificant interest. It is certainly not fair to each
defendant brought before the mayor for the careful and
judicial consideration of his guilt or innocence that the
prospect of such a prospective loss by the mayor should
weigh against his acquittal. But the pecuniary interest of
the mayor in the result of his judgment is not the only
reason for holding that due process of law is denied to
the defendant here. The statutes were drawn to stimulate
small municipalities, in the country part of counties in
which there are large cities, to organize and maintain
courts to try persons accused of violations of the
Prohibition Act everywhere in the county. The inducement
is offered of dividing between the state and the village the
large fines provided by the law for its violations. The trial
is to be had before a mayor without a jury, without
opportunity for retrial, and with a review confined to
questions of law presented by a bill of exceptions, with no
opportunity by the reviewing court to set aside the
judgment on the weighing of evidence, unless it should
appear to be so manifestly against the evidence as to
indicate mistake, bias, or willful disregard of duty by the
trial court. Thus, no matter what the evidence was
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against him, the defendant had the right to have an
impartial judge. He seasonably raised the objection, and
was entitled to halt the trial because of the disqualification
of the judge, which existed both because of his direct
pecuniary interest in the outcome, and because of his
official motive to convict and to graduate the fine to help
the financial needs of the village. There were thus
presented at the outset both features of the
disqualification. The judgment of the Supreme Court of
Ohio is reversed, and the cause remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with the present opinion.
Pedro Azul vs. Judge Jose Castro & Rosalinda
Tecson
Azul owns and operates a construction shop. To finance
it he entered a loan agreement with Tecson in the amount
of P391k. Tecson was only able to collect P141k thus
leaving about P250k as a balance. She filed a petition for
collection of sum of money before the Rizal RTC and the
case was given to J Sarmiento. On 27 Mar 79, Azul
received the copy of the complaint. On 10 Apr 79, Azul
filed a motion for a 15 day extension to file for responsive
pleading. Azul was unaware that J Sarmiento retired and
was temporarily substituted by J Aover who granted the
extension but only for 5 days starting the next day. But
Azul only received the notice granting such on the 23rd of
the same month way passed the 5 day period. On the
17th of April, Tecson already filed a motion to dismiss
averring that Azuls 5 day extension has already lapsed.
On the 18th of the same month, J Castro, the permanent
judge to replace J Sarmiento took office and he ordered
Azul to be in default due to the lapse of the 5 day
extension. J Castro proceeded with the reception of
evidence the next day and of course without Azuls
evidence as he was still unaware of him being in default.
On April 27th, J Castro ruled in favor Tecson. On May
2nd Azul, unaware that J Castro already decided the
case appealed to remove his default status. On May 7th
Azul received the decision rendered by the court on Apr
27th (but on record the date of receipt was May 5th). Azul
filed a motion for new trial on June 6th. The lower court
denied the same on the 20th of the same month. On Aug
1st, Azul filed a notice of appeal it was denied on the 3rd
but was reconsidered on the 7th hence Azul filed his
record on appeal on the 21st and J Castro approved it on
the 27th but surprisingly upon motion of Tecson on the
30th, J Castro set aside its earlier decisaion on the 27th.
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Finally, J Castro denied the appeal on the 7th of
September.
ISSUE: Whether or not Azul has been denied due
process.
HELD: The SC agreed with the Azul that he was denied
due process. The constitutional provision on due process
commands all who wield public authority, but most
peremptorily courts of justice, to strictly maintain
standards of fundamental fairness and to insure that
procedural safeguards essential to a fair trial are
observed at all stages of a proceeding. It may be argued
that when the Azuls counsel asked for a fifteen (15) day
extension from April 11, 1979 to file his answer, it was
imprudent and neglectful for him to assume that said first
extension would be granted. However, the records show
that Atty. Camaya personally went to the session hall of
the court with his motion for postponement only to be
informed that J Sarmiento had just retired but that his
motion would be considered submitted for resolution.
Since the sala was vacant and pairing judges in Quezon
City are literally swamped with their own heavy loads of
cases, counsel may be excused for assuming that, at the
very least, he had the requested fifteen (15) days to file
his responsive pleading. It is likewise inexplicable why J
Aover, who had not permanently taken over the sala
vacated by the retired judge, should suddenly rule that
only a five-day extension would be allowed. And to
compound the Azuls problems, the order was sent by
mail and received only twelve (12) days later or after the
five-day period. Before the much publicized Project
Mercury of the Bureau of Posts, a court should have
known that court orders requiring acts to be done in a
matter of days should not be sent by mail. Meanwhile, the
petitioner was declared in default. The motion to declare
defendant in default is dated April 17, 1979. No copy was
furnished the petitioner. It was acted upon on April 18,
1979, the very first day in office of J Castro in Quezon
City.
Mayor Miguel Paderanga vs. Judge Cesar Azura
Paderanga was the mayor of Gingoog City, Misamis
Oriental. He petitioned that J Azura inhibits himself from
deciding on pending cases brought before him on the
grounds that they have lost confidence in him, that he
entertained tax suits against the city and had issued
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TROs on the sales of properties when it is clearly
provided for by law (Sec 74 PD 464) that the remedy to
stop auction is to pay tax, that J Azura is bias, oppressive
and is abusive in his power.
ISSUE: Whether or not J Azura should inhibit himself
from the trial.
HELD: The SC ruled that Azura must. As decided in the
Pimentel Case (21 SCRA 160), All the foregoing
notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any
to draw attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in
a situation where their capacity to try and decide fairly
and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge
from any one of the parties. A judge may not be legally
prohibited from sitting in a litigation But when suggestion
is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor
of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant
arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of
inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful
self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a
way that the peoples faith in the courts of justice is not
impaired.
The reminder is also apropos that next in importance to
the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of
doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of
the fairness and integrity of the judge.
NO CONCIO VS. DOJ CASE
PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR. v. OFFICE OF THE
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGALAFFAIRS, et al. G.R. No. 196425, 24 July 2012, EN
BANC(Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
Executive Order No. 13 which abolishes the Presidential
Anti-Graft Commission and transfers its functions to the
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division of the Office of the
Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, is
constitutional pursuant to the Presidents continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency.
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In 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III issued
Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and
transferring its functions to the Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division of the Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA).
Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima later on filed before
the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit for grave
misconduct against Prospero A. Pichay, Jr. (Pichay),
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water
Utilities Administration (LWUA) for the purchase by the
LWUA of shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
In defense, Pichay filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex
Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case
involving the same transaction is already pending before
the Office of the Ombudsman. Alleging that no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available, Pichay
has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not E.O. 13 is constitutional
2. Whether or not there is usurpation of legislative power
to appropriate
public funds in view of such reorganization
3. Whether or not the IAD-ODESLA encroaches upon the
powers and
duties of the Ombudsman
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 13 violates
Pichays right to due
process and the equal protection of the laws
HELD:
E.O. 13 is constitutional
Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292),
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987,
vests in the President the continuing authority to
reorganize the offices under him to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency.
The Office of the President must, in order to remain
effective and efficient, be capable of being shaped and
reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to
carry out his directives and policies.
Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its
functions to a division specially created within the
ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the
President under his continuing delegated legislative
authority to reorganize his own office. Since both of these
offices belong to the Office of the President Proper, the
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reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and
transferring its functions to the IAD-ODESLA is allowable
under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
There is no usurpation of the legislative power to
appropriate public funds.
There is an express recognition under Section 78 of
Republic Act No. 9970 or the General Appropriations Act
of 2010 of the Presidents authority to direct changes in
the organizational units or key positions in any
department or agency. This recognizes the extent of the
Presidents power to reorganize the executive offices and
agencies under him, which is, even to the extent of
modifying and realigning appropriations for that purpose.
Thus, while there may be no specific amount earmarked
for the IAD-ODESLA from the total amount appropriated
by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the
President, the necessary funds for the IAD-ODESLA may
be properly sourced from the Presidents own office
budget without committing any illegal appropriation. After
all, the President simply allocates the existing funds
previously appropriated by Congress for his office.
The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers
and duties of the Ombudsman
The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate
and prosecute cases refers to criminal cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases. It
is only in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the
Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the investigation
being conducted by another investigatory agency. Since
the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an
administrative disciplinary case for grave misconduct,
Pichay may not invoke the primary jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman to prevent the IAD-ODESLA from
proceeding with its investigation. In any event, the
Ombudsmans authority to investigate both elective and
appointive officials in the government, extensive as it may
be, is by no means exclusive. It is shared with other
similarly authorized government agencies.
Moreover, as the function of the Ombudsman goes into
the determination of the existence of probable cause and
the adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, the
investigative authority of the IAD-ODESLA is limited to
that of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations
and recommendations remain so until acted upon by the
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President. As such, it commits no usurpation of the
Ombudsmans constitutional duties.
Executive Order No. 13 does not violate Pichays right to
due process and the equal protection of the laws.
Pichays right to due process was not violated when the
IAD-ODESLA took cognizance of the administrative
complaint against him. In administrative proceedings, the
filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the
person so charged to answer the accusations against him
constitute the minimum requirements of due process,
which simply means having the opportunity to explain
ones side. Hence, as long as Pichay was given the
opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the
requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied
with because what the law abhors is an absolute lack of
opportunity to be heard.
Also, Pichay is a presidential appointee occupying the
high-level position of Chairman of the LWUA. Necessarily,
he comes under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the
President, who is well within his right to order an
investigation into matters that require his informed
decision. There are substantial distinctions that set apart
presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in
government from non-presidential appointees and those
that occupy the lower positions in government.
Erminita Muoz v. Atty. Victoriano Yabut
Petition for review on certiorari of the decisions and
resolutions of the CA. The subject is a house and lot sold
Munoz which she sold to her sister Emilia Ching, who in
turn sold it to the Go spouses. When the Go spouses
defaulted on their loan to BPI the property was
foreclosed. BPI won as the highest bidder at the auction
and the property was sold to the Chan spouses. Munoz
registered her adverse claim and filed a complaint with
the RTC for annulment of a deed of absolute sale,
cancellation of TCT in the spouses Gos names and for
revival of the TCT under her name. She also caused the
annotation of a lis pendens.
The RTC granted Gos motion for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and Munoz was driven out of the
property. Munoz, meanwhile, filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with the CA assailing the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction granted by the RTC, but
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it was dismissed. The RTC rendered its judgment against
Emilia Ching and the Go spouses. It
found that Munozs signature and the absolute deed of
sale was forged.
Munoz never sold the subject property to her sister and
that the Go spouses were not innocent purchasers for
value. The sale was null and void. Emilia Ching appealed
the decision, but the appellate court not only affirmed the
decision of the RTC, it ordered the spouses Go and their
successors in interest to vacate the premises. After the
RTC filed a writ of execution implementing its judgment,
the spouses Chan came forward and filed an urgent
motion to stop the execution against them. They asserted
ownership and possession on the basis of a clean title
registered in their names, also contending that the final
judgment cannot be executed against them as they were
not parties to the case and that they purchased the
property from BPI without any defects to the title.
Munoz discovered the cancellation of her adverse claim
and notice of lis pendens, plus the subsequent events
that led to transfer and registration from Go, to BPI then
to the Chans.
It was denied by the RTC. The photocopy of BPIs TCT
could hardly be regarded as proof that Munozs adverse
claim and notice of lis pendens were missing from the
original, also pointing out that the registration in the day
book is what serves as sufficient notice to the world.
There was no more need to annotate the title. They were
deemed to have taken the property subject to the final
outcome of the present dispute. The RTC then issued an
alias writ of execution and the subject property was taken
from the spouses and returned to Munoz. Their motion
for reconsideration was denied. Munoz then instituted a
complaint for forcible entry with a prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction alleging that with the aid of armed
men, Chan and Atty. Yabut forcibly ousted Munoz of
possession. They claim Chan to be the true owner that
his possession was never interrupted, and the men were
there to attend services at the Buddhist Temple on the
fourth floor of the building on the property. Munozs claim
of
forcible entry should be dismissed for lack of merit and
legal basis. The MeTC granted Munozs petition and
restored possession to her.
Yabut and Chan questioned the MeTCs decision through
a petition for certiorari with a prayer for a TRO and writ of
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preliminary injunction before the RTC. They asserted that
they were not bound by the final judgment between Go
and Munoz. Munoz on the other hand argued that the
MeTC order was an interlocutory order, and is thus a
prohibited pleading under the rules of summary
procedure. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the implementation of the MeTC
order. The RTC found that the MeTC had committed
grave abuse of discretion for not dismissing the complaint
for forcible entry on the ground of lis pendens as the
issue to who had a better right to possession between
Chan and Munoz was the subject of a pending
proceeding. The RTC dismissed the ejectment suit.
Munoz appealed to the CA, but the CA sustained the
RTC orders holding that the Chans right to due process
was vitiated by impleading them only at the execution
stage of the civil case. The order of the RTC in the civil
case was null and void, and considering they are
strangers to the case and they are innocent purchasers
for value. Thereafter Munoz filed a motion for contempt
with the RTC against the Chan spouses and Atty. Yabut.
Munoz also filed a Motion for an alias writ of execution
and application for surrender of the owners duplicate
TCT, in which she prayed to direct the RD not only to
cancel the TCT of Go, but all documents declared null
and void, and to restore her TCT free from all liens and
encumbrances.
In its order the RTC denied Munozs motion for contempt,
but ordering an alias writ of execution to deliver the
property to Munoz, ordering Go to vacate. It also ordered
the RD to cancel from the records all documents
determined void and to restore Munozs TCT.
Unrelenting Munoz filed a motion for clarificatory order,
pointing out that the spouses Chan are the present
occupants and that the property could not be delivered
unless the spouses Chan are evicted. The motion was
denied reiterating the rule that once a judgment has
become final only clerical errors may be corrected.
Munoz elevated the complaint to the SC, but it was
remanded to the CA in observance of the hierarchy. The
CA dismissed Munozs petition agreeing with the RTC
that the Chan spouses could not be covered by the writ of
execution considering they were not impleaded in the civil
case. Munoz claims that the decision in the civil case
binds not only Ching, the Go spouses and BPI, but their
successors in interest, assigns or persons acting on their
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behalf, hence they cannot be considered as innocent
purchasers for value.
Issue:
Held:
The SC denies Munozs petition for contempt and motion
for clarificatory order seeking that the Chans be executed
against because the prior civil case against Go is an
action for reconveyance which is an action in personam.
Since the Chans and BPI were not impleaded as parties,
the effect of the judgment cannot bind or be extended to
them by simply issuing alias writs of execution. No man
shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a
stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any
judgment rendered to the court. Although the titles of
Ching and Go were deemed void, there was no similar
determination as to the titles that BPI and Chan had.
Munoz cannot collateraly attack the title that the Chans
have; they must be given their day in court in a
proceeding designated for that purpose.
Filemon David vs. Judge Gregorio Aquilizan, et. al.
Facts:
David has a large parcel of land in Polomolok, Cotabato.
He let Felomeno Jugar and Ricardo Jugar tend and
caretake separate portions of his land in 1971. The land
is estimated to be yielding 60-70 cavans of corn cobs and
the share agreed upon is 50-50. In 1973, David withdrew
the land from the brothers and has not allowed them to
go back there. The brothers prayed for reinstatement but
David refused to do so. David denied that the brothers
were his tenants. He said that Ricardo was his tractor
driver before but he resigned to take care of his dad and
to work for DOLE. Filemon on the other hand
surrendered the portion of the land he was tending to
continue his faith healing. J Aquilizan handled the case
filed by the brothers against David and after three months
he rendered a decision in favor of the brothers without
any hearing. David averred he was denied due process. J
Aquilizan admitted that there was indeed no hearing
conducted but he said the decision has already become
final and executory as the period for appeal has already
lapsed.
ISSUE: Whether or not David is entitled to an appeal.
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HELD: The SC ruled in favor of David. A decision
rendered without a hearing is null and void and may be
attacked directly or collaterally. The decision is null and
void for want of due process. And it has been held that a
final and executory judgment may be set aside with a
view to the renewal of the litigation when the judgment is
void for lack of due process of law. In legal
contemplation, it is as if no judgment has been rendered
at all.
Anita Lorenzana vs. Polly Cayetano
FACTS:
Lorenzana was renting a parcel of land from the Manila
Railroad Company (later from the Bureau of Lands). She
later purchased the land (San Lazaro Estate). She had
the property be rented to tenants occupying stalls. Due to
nonpayment of rents, she filed 12 ejectment cases
against her tenant. On the other hand, Cayetano was an
occupant of a parcel of land adjacent to that of
Lorenzanas land. Cayetano was renting the same from
the Bureau of Lands. The lower court granted
Lorenzanas ejectment cases. Lorenzana then secured a
writ of execution to forcibly eject her tenants but she
included to eject Cayetanos property. Cayetano was not
a party to the ejectment cases so she prayed for the
lower court that her property be not touched. The lower
court denied Cayetanos petition. The CA, upon appeal,
favored Cayetano. Lorenzana averred that Cayetano is
now a party to the ejectment cases as she already
brought herself to the Courts jurisdiction by virtue of her
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cayetanos right to due process has been
violated.
HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of Cayetano and has affirmed the
CA. It must be noted that respondent was not a party to
any of the 12 ejectment cases wherein the writs of
demolition had been issued; she did not make her
appearance in and during the pendency of these
ejectment cases. Cayetano only went to court to protect
her property from demolition after the judgment in the
ejectment cases had become final and executory. Hence,
with respect to the judgment in said ejectment cases,
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Cayetano remains a third person to such judgment, which
does not bind her; nor can its writ of execution be
informed against her since she was not afforded her day
in court in said ejectment cases.
NO CAOILE VS. VIVO DIGEST
NO LOBETE VS. SUNDIAM DIGEST
NO MARVEL BLDG. CORP. VS OPLE DIGEST
NO VALLADOLID VS. INCIONG DIGEST
Anglo-Fil Trading Corp. v. Lazaro, 124 SCRA 494
(1983)
F: The petitioners were among 23 stevedoring and
arrastre operators at the Manila South Harbor. Their
licenses had expired but they were allowed to continue to
operate on the strength of temporary permits. On May 4,
1976, the Phil Ports Authority decided to allow only one
org. to operate the arrastre and stevedoring services. On
April 28, 1980, based on the report and recommendation
of an evaluation committee, the PPA awarded the
exclusive contract for stevedoring services to the Ocean
Terminal Services Inc (OTSI). The petitioners brought suit
in the