EVIDENCE UNDER JUDGE TAN: RULE 128 SECS. 1-41

1. Reyes vs. Court of Appeals216 SCRA 25November 26, 1992

Doctrine: As an exception to the scope of the Rules of Evidence, Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 ( a decree reorganizing the courts of agrarian relations) provides that the rules of court shall not be applicable even in a suppletory character in Agrarian cases.

Facts: Juan Mendoza, father of Olympio Mendoza is the owner of Farm Lots No. 46 and 106.The lots were tenanted and cultivated by Julian dela Cruz, husband of respondent Eufrocina dela Cruz. Eufrocina filed a complaint before the Agrarian Court for recovery of possession and damages against Olympio Mendoza and petitioners. She alleged that upon the death of Julian, Olympio Mendoza in conspiracy with petitioners Reyes, Parayao, Aguinaldo and Mananghaya, prevented her daughter and workers from entering and working on the subject lots.Petitioners in this case were duly elected and/or appointed barangay officials in Pampanga,denied interference in the tenancy relationship existing between respondent Eufrocina and defendant Mendoza,particularly in the cultivation of the latter's farm lots. They asked for the case to be dismissed claiming that they have always exercised fairness, equity, reason and impartiality in the discharge of their official functions. For his part, Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without his consent and approval, and non-payment of rentals, irrigation fees and other taxes due the government, as his defenses.

The agrarian court ordered petitioners to restore possession of the farm lots to Eufrocina. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On appeal, the petitioners questioned the favorable consideration given to the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson, since the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination.

Issue: Whether the lower court erred in giving favorable consideration to the affidavits o Eufrocina and EfrenTecson even if the affiant was not subjected to cross-examination?

Held: No. The trial court did not err when it favorably considered the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson although the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 of P.D.No. 946 provides that the "Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory character." The same provision states that "In the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence".

Sec. 2, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings, except as otherwise provided by the law or these rules. Section 16 of P.D 946 is covered by the phrase , except as otherwise provided by the law or these rules.

The Court also affirmed the findings of the lower court that petitioners participated in the dispossession of the farm lots tenanted by Eufrocina Dela Cruz. Hence, they are jointly and severally liable with Olympio Mendoza.2. PEOPLE V TURCOG.R. No. 137757 | August 14, 2000 | J. Melo

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka Totong) was charged with the rape of his neighbor 13-year-old Escelea Tabada. Escelea was about to sleep when she heard a familiar voice calling her from outside her house. She recognized appellant Turco immediately as she had known him for 4 years and he is her second cousin. Unaware of the danger that was about to befall her, Escelea opened the door. Turco, with the use of towel, covered Esceleas face, placed his right hand on the latters neck and bid her to walk. When they reached a grassy part, near the pig pen which was about 12 meters away from the victims house, appellant lost no time in laying the victim on the grass, laid on top of the victim and took off her short pants and panty and succeeded in pursuing his evil design-by forcibly inserting his penis inside Esceleas private part despite Esceleas resistance. Appellant then threatened her that he will kill her if she reports the incident to anybody.

For almost 10 days, she just kept the incident to herself until she was able to muster enough courage to tell her brother-in-law, Orlando Pioquinto, who in turn informed Alejandro, the victims father, about the rape of his daughter. Alejandro did not waste time and immediately asked Escelea to see a doctor for medical examination and eventually file a complaint after the issuance of the medical certificate. Turco, meanwhile, alleged that he and Escelea were sweethearts.

The trial court found Turco guilty of the charge.

In his appeal, Turco argues, among others, that no actual proof was presented that the rape of the complainant actually happened considering that although a medical certificate was presented, the medico-legal officer who prepared the same was not presented in court to explain the same.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the lower court erred in finding the appellant guilty of rape.

Whether or not the appellants contention that the medical certificate may not be considered is with merit.

RULING:

1. No. The Supreme Court agrees with the lower courts finding of credibility in the testimony and evidence presented by the victim, and finds the appellant guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Yes. With regards to appellants argument on the proof of medical certificate, while the certificate could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule since entries in official records constitute exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule, since it involved an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications. Emphasis must be placed on the distinction between admissibility of evidence and the probative value thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or the rules or is competent. Since admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and competence, admissibility is, therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule forbids its reception.

Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence admissible as evidence, it has very little probative value due to the absence of the examining physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely on the medical certificate. In fact, reliance was made on the testimony of the victim herself which, standing alone even without medical examination, is sufficient to convict. It is well-settled that a medical examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of rape. The absence of medical findings by a medico-legal officer does not disprove the occurrence of rape. It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction is proper. In the instant case, the victims testimony alone is credible and sufficient to convict.

3. Bautista Aparece

Doctrine:The test for the admissibility or inadmissibility of a certain document is whether or not it is relevant, material or competent.

FACTS: Nicolas Anasco, sold his lot to Valentin Justiniani.In the same year, Valentin sold this property toClaudio Justiniani. In October 12,1935 Claudio Justiniani executed a public instrument whereby he sold the same property forP100 to Apolonio Aparece in whose name it was assessed since 1935.While Aparece was inpossession,HermogenesBautistaillegallyenteredapartofthelandandtookpossession.Thus, Aparece fileda complaint with the guerilla forcesoperating in the province of Bohol.When the case was called for hearing, and after inspection was made by a guerilla officer,BautistaexecutedapublicinstrumentwhereinhepromisedtoreturnthelandtoApareceingoodwill,andrecognizedApareceslawfulownershipovertheland.Thus,possession of the land was restored to Aparece. However, claiming that the property belongs to him, and alleging that with the aid ofarmed men and pretending to be owner, usurped the land, Bautista filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Bohol.The CFI rendered judgment declaring Aparece as owner of the land. On appeal, Bautista raised as defense the error of the trial court in admitting the public instrument which he executed as evidence.He argued that the document was executed underduress, violence, and intimidation, and that the guerilla officer before whom it was executed, had no jurisdiction over the matterISSUE :Whether the trial court erred in admitting as evidence, a public document executed before an officer who had no jurisdiction over the matter.RULING: No.The public document is not only relevant, but is also material and competent to the issue of ownership between theparties litigants.Relevant evidence is one that has anyvalue in reason as tending to prove any matter probable in action.And evidence issaid to be materialwhen it is directed to prove a fact in issue as determined by the rules of substantive law and pleadings, while competentevidence is one that is not excluded by law in a particular case. The mere fact that the public document was executedbeforeaguerillaofficerdoesnotmakethesameasirrelevant,immaterialorincompetent tothe main issueraised inthe pleadings.The publicdocument,considered together with the otherevidence,documentary andoral, satisfies theCourt that theportions ofland in question really belong to defendant Aparece.

4. Jesse G. LOPEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert HEESEN and Sears, Roebuck and Company, a corporation, Defendants-Appellees.

The proper rule is that industry standards are not conclusive as to ordinary care in design, but rather are admissible evidence.

Facts: Jesse G. Lopez, originally filed suit against Robert Heesen, alleging that on October 15, 1958, Heesen unlawfully, violently, maliciously and feloniously assaulted and shot him with a shotgun, thereby inflicting dangerous and painful wounds and injuries, causing him great bodily and mental pain and anguish. Heesen answered denying the allegations of the complaint and thereafter Lopez filed a demand for jury trial. Sears, Roebuck and Company was joined as a party-defendant. Sears, was engaged in the design and manufacture of hunting firearms and was also engaged in the selling of firearms in Albuquerque.

It was also alleged that on October 14, 1958, Sears, sold to Heesen, one Higgins Model 51 hunting rifles; that said rifle was negligently designed or manufactured by Sears, in that the safety mechanism moved readily and in a dangerous manner from a "safe" to a "fire" position. In addition, it was alleged that the rifle in this dangerous condition known to Sears, was sold to Heesen, and that Sears, negligently failed to warn Heesen, of the dangerous and defective condition of the rifle.

The complaint further alleged that on the afternoon of October 15, 1958, in Colfax County, New Mexico, Heesen, negligently permitted the rifle to discharge while hunting and that as a proximate result of the joint and concurrent negligence of both Heesen and Sears, Lopez sustained a severe and disabling wound and injury to his chest, requiring hospital and surgical care. Appellant demanded damages against both appellees, jointly and severally. Both appellees denied the allegations.

The jury returned its verdict finding the issues for both Heesen and Sears and against Lopez. Judgment was entered for appellees and this appeal followed. Lopez abandoned any contention that the verdict in favor of Heesen was erroneous and this appeal concerns only appellee Sears.

During the trial, the jury (composed of 6 men and 6 ladies, requires specialized knowledge or experience and cannot be determined independently merely from deductions made and inferences drawn on the basis of ordinary knowledge) was instructed that expert testimony is intended only to assist them in coming to a correct conclusion upon facts which are of a technical nature, but that the opinion of experts was not binding upon them and the jury must determine the weight to be given to such testimony.

Lopez introduced evidence tending to prove that the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 rifle is easy to knock off safety, making the rifle dangerous. Lopezs witness, Frank Doyle, expressed the opinion that the safety device, without the telescopic sight, is not a safe piece, in that the projection is too long and it is too prone to be knocked from "safe" to "fire" position. There is also testimony of certain tests made with the Higgins Model 51 and the witness, Ira Kessler, expressed the opinion that the Higgins Model 51 was unsafe without the telescopic sight. Another witness, Robert Allen, testified as to the manner in which the safety lever of the Higgins Model 51 moved from "safe" to "fire" position without his knowledge.

Sears, introduced testimony of witnesses who were either experts in the small arms field or experts in gun designing. The witness, Paul A. La Violette, Jr., testified that he is a gun designer employed by High Standard Manufacturing Company who manufacture the Higgins Model 51 for Sears. He qualified as an expert gun designer with many years' experience with other rifle manufacturers and in factories designing and building weapons of the small arms design. La Violette testified that the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 is supplied to High Standard Manufacturing Company by Fabrique Nationale of Belgium. He also testified extensively as to the advantages of the safety device of the Higgins Model 51 and stated that six different makes of guns have the same modified leaf safety device as does the Higgins Model 51. The manufacturers of these guns are F.N. Mauser, Colt, Marlin, Nato and Weatherby. The evidence also shows that since 1951, 75,572 Higgins Model 51 rifles with the modified leaf safety device have been sold by High Standard Manufacturing Company to Sears. High

Standard Manufacturing Company has never been sued by reason of the design of the Higgins Model 51 rifle. There is also opinion evidence that the Higgins Model 51 rifle is safe by all commercial sporting goods standards.

Sears appears to concede that the number of rifles manufactured with the modified leaf safety device, and the fact that other companies manufacture guns with the same design, is relevant as tending to show that the design is proper. Lopez also seems to concede that the reputation of Fabrique Nationale of Belgium may be relevant to the issue.

Subsequent to the testimony as to the reputation of the various firearms companies who use a similar safety device as the Higgins Model 51, the witness, Paul A. La Violette, Jr., testified without objection that the Higgins Model 51 rifle is safe by all commercial sporting goods standards, and that the design of the safety device of the Higgins Model 51 was not negligent or defective. The witness, Thomas Raymond Robinson, Jr., testified that in his opinion the Higgins Model 51 is good and practical in the field for a prudent hunter, and is suitable for hunting. Ira L. Kessler, an expert witness called by defendant, Heesen, testified that the Marlin Firearms Company has a fair reputation, and that the Colt Firearms Company has an excellent reputation

Issue: Whether or not the trial court committed error in permitting testimony as to the general reputation of other firearms companies who use the same modified leaf safety device as the Higgins Model 51.

Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the experts to express their opinion. Under New Mexico Rule, which is the same as the Federal Rule, the rule which favors the reception of the evidence governs, the basis being that any evidence which throws light on the question in issue should be admitted, leaving it to the trial court to hold the hearing within reasonable bounds.

Circuit Judge Bratton, in stating the rule, quoted from United States Smelting Co. v. Parry, 8 Cir., 166 F. 407, as follows: "It is true that in trials by jury it is their province to determine the ultimate facts, and that the general rule is that witnesses are permitted to testify to the primary facts within their knowledge, but not to their opinions. And it is also true that this has at times led to the statement that witnesses may not give their opinions upon the ultimate facts which the jury are to decide, because that would supplant their judgment and usurp their province.

But such a statement is not to be taken literally. It but reflects the general rule, which is subject to important qualifications, and never was intended to close any reasonable avenue to the truth in the investigation of questions of fact. Besides, the tendency of modern decisions is not only to give as wide a scope as is reasonably possible to the investigation of such questions, but also to accord to the trial judge a certain discretion in determining what testimony has a tendency to establish the ultimate facts, and to disturb his decision admitting testimony of that character only when it plainly appears that the testimony had no legitimate bearing upon the questions at issue and was calculated to prejudice the minds of the jurors.

Applying the above principles we hold that the testimony as to the reputation of Fabrique Nationale, who manufacture the safety device on the Higgins Model 51, and the reputation of Marlin Firearms Company, Weatherby Corporation, Colt Firearms Company and Jefferson Corporation, who manufacture rifles which have the same modified leaf safety device as the Higgins Model 51, was relevant to the issue of whether the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 was unsafe or safe, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony.

5. State v BallFacts: About 14.30h on October 15, 1958, two men entered the Krekeler Jewelry store and proceeded to purchase several items from the store. One of the two men, however, looked into the items in the store and mingled about while the other made the purchases. Both men returned about 17.50 as John Krekeler was preparing to close the shop. Both men announced a stick up and directed Krekeler, with the aid of a firearm, out of the way while they divested the store of its goods. Both men thereafter fled. Three weeks later, appellant Ball was captured by the police and was identified by Krekeler. The court found appellant guilty of first degree robbery and convicted him, prompting appellant to ask for a new trial on the basis of prejudicial evidence, in particular, a roll of cash that was confiscated from him after his arrest and was introduced as evidence in the trial as having came from the robbery.Issues:a.) Whether or not there was evidence of fear of injury as was necessary in order to sustain a conviction for first degree robbery.b.) Whether or not the testimony of the arrest officers that appellant attempted to flee as he was being arrested was relevant.c.) Whether or not the money taken from appellant after he was arrested was relevant evidence and could be admitted as evidence.Ruling:a.) There was, even though Krekeler did not testify that he was in fear of injury. The circumstances of the case in particular, the fact that assailant had a firearm tends to lend credence to the fear that Krekeler must have had, that if he did not follow the instructions of the assailants, he may be hurt.b.) The Court ruled in the affirmative. Unexplained flight even after some time had passed after the incident is relevant circumstance, the remoteness of the flight going to the weight of evidence rather than its relevance.c.) The Court ruled in the negative. The money taken from the appellant could not be used as evidence because they are not relevant, there having been no claim that this is the same money that had been taken from the store over the course of the robbery. It must be remembered that a few days had already passed, and the more than two hundred dollars could have been obtained by the appellant somewhere else. In fact, appellant had named a place and circumstance on how he had obtained said money. The complainant had not even identified the confiscated cash as the one that had been taken from him.

6. Gaanan vs. IAC

Facts: Complainant atty. Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon decided to offer Leonardo Laconico a proposition that the former will withdraw the complaint for direct assault against the latter in exchange for several conditions. Through a telephone call, atty Pintor informed Laconico of the said proposition which contains a condition that Laconico shall pay atty. Pintor the sum of 8000 for the withdrawal of the case. However, during the telephone conversation, appellant Ganaan, the lawyer of Laconico, secretly listened to the conversation through a telephone extension. Appellant Ganaan executed an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Complainant Pintor charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.Lower court: Ganaan and Laconico were found guilty.IAC: Affirmed. The extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.Issue: WON an extension of a telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.Ruling: NO. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place ' to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a partyline or a telephone unitwhich shares its line with another.The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or thedeliberateinstallation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.

7. Salcedo-Ortanez vs. Court of Appeals

Facts: Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with RTC-QC a complaint for annulment of marriage against petitioner Teresita Salcedo on the grounds of lack of marriage cert. and/or Psychological incapacity. The case was presided by respondent judge Zamora.Private respondent , after presenting his evidence , orally formally offered in evidence Eshibits A to M . Among the exhibits offered were 3 cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between the petitioner and unidentified persons. Petitioner submitted her objection to the oral offer of evidence . However, the trial court admitted all of private respondents offered evidence. MR denied. A certiorari was then filed by petitioner in CA assailing the admission in evidence of the cassette tapes.CA: dismissed the petition for certiorari, thus,petitioner filed this this petition for review.Issue: Whether the cassette tapes are admissible in evidence?Held: No. RA 4200 expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. Sec. 1 of RA 4200 provides that : It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, or to tap any wire or cable or by using any other device or orrangment , to secretly overhear, intercept or record such communication, or dictagraph, or detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder or however otherwise described.Therefore, RTC and CA failed to consider RA 4200 in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is MANDATORY under RA 4200.

8.Ramirez vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 93833 | September 28, 1995

Facts: Socorro Ramirez filed a civil case for damages against Ester Garcia for allegedly being vexed, insulted and humiliated by the latter. In support of her claim, Ramirez produced a verbatim transcript culled from a tape recording of the confrontation. Consequently, Garcia filed a criminal case against Ramirez for violating R.A. 4200. Ramirez moved to quash the information which was granted by the trial court. But, the Court of Appeals voided the trial courts order. In her petition, Ramirez contended that (1) Section 1, R.A. 4200 merely refers to unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication, (2) the substance and content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged do not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200, and (3) R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a private communication not a private conversation and so her act is not illegal.

Ruling:(1) Even a person privy to the conversation who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter will qualify as a violator under Section 1, R.A. 4200. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.

(2) The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1, R.A. 4200. The nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information.

(3) The word communicate comes from the Latin word communicare, meaning to share or to impart. In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation. The terms conversation and communication were interchangeably used by Senator Tanada in his explanatory note to the bill. Hence, the contention of Ramirez narrows the ordinary meaning of the word communication to a point of absurdity.

Note: The instant case turns on a different note from Gaanan vs. IAC (1994) because the applicable facts and circumstance in this case pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized recording of a private communications with the use of tape recorders as among the acts punishable.

Case Digests c/o Castillo, Danduan, Fumera, Merlin, Rivera, Rodriguez, Superable, Uy,