Conserving Nature; Preserving Identity I

As conscious beings, we exist only in response to other things, and we cannot

know ourselves at all without knowing them – Harry Frankfurt, 2005

Introduction

Fundamental approaches to environmental ethics currently seem polarized between two broad

varieties: the “conservationist” approach on which we should conserve the environment when it is in our

interest to do so and the “preservationist” approach on which we should preserve the environment even

when it is not in our interest to do so. The first approach obviously has a broader potential audience and is

invoked even by preservationists when they seek to marshal the broadest possible support for

environmental protection. For preservationists, however, the conservationist approach has obvious

limitations. It permits damage to the environment whenever required by the balance of human interests. It

does not express all of the real reasons we must protect nonhuman animals, streams, or forests.

Preservationists believe that harm to sentient beings, to teleological centers of life, and even to ecological

communities should be prevented independently of whether of not it also harms our interests (Singer, 1974;

Taylor, 1981; Leopold, 1981).ii Some preservationists insist on a fully non-anthropocentric theory.

Nevertheless, we take the central commitment of preservationists to be that we should preserve nature

whether or not it is in our interests to do so (Norton, 1991). To conservationists, the idea that the

environment ought to be preserved even when it is not in our interest to preserve it often appears

inscrutable or flaky. They believe that nature is a precious resource that we should use wisely but when it is

not in our interest to conserve nature they do not believe we must do so. Preservationists would object that

consideration of human interests does not amount to due consideration of everything that has value. But, it

is unclear what preservationists can say to change conservationists’ minds on the matter.

In this essay we deploy a third approach to dealing with environmental problems “relationalism.”

Like conservationism, this approach tells us to conserve nature when doing so is necessary to respect

people in the right way. Unlike conservationisism, relationalism does not so prescribe on the basis of an

analysis of what would best satisfy our interests. Like preservationism this approach tells us to preserve

nature even when it is not necessary to do so to protect human interests. Relationalism, rather, tells us to

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preserve nature as part of what makes us who we are or could be. Relationalism starts from a relational

conception of human identity. The basic idea is that the nonhuman world may enter into who we are, just as

other human beings and communities may enter into who we are. If we, as persons, have value, whatever is

bound up with us in positive ways ought also be valued and this gives us reason to conserve or preserve

(henceforth “care for”) nature. After setting out the relationalist account, we argue that it can explain key

preservationist and conservationist intuitions, though its policy recommendations in particular cases may

coincide with neither. Finally, we defend the account against objections.

The Relational Self

A relational approach to environmental ethics starts with a relational conception of the self. The

idea that the self is relational is, perhaps, most clearly expressed in Confucianism. One is never simply a

moral agent in the Analects but a son or daughter or parent, a student or teacher, one who holds office

under the ruler of a Chinese state or one who aspires to such office. One’s responsibilities are conceived as

responsibilities to particular others standing in a social relationship to the self.

A way to clarify the relational nature of the relational self is to make use of the notion of a local or

situational character trait. Many of a person’s constituting traits involve dispositions that are triggered by

specific persons in specific social contexts. In Analects 10.1, Confucius is described as submissive and

seemingly inarticulate in the local community, while fluent in the ancestral temple and at court, though he

did not speak lightly. In 10.2, he is described as affable at court with Counselors of lower rank, frank

though respectful with Counselors of upper rank, and respectful and composed when with his lord. For a

contemporary example of situational-sensitive traits, consider that people might manifest certain traits

when with family and close friends, but manifest very different traits when with colleagues. People may be

warm-and-generous-with-their-friends-and-family, respectful-and-reserved-with-their-colleagues.

Perhaps, then, other people may be thought to constitute one’s identity if these others form part of

the context in terms of which one’s constituting traits are specified. I am not warm and generous simpliciter

but warm and generous to certain people, and other ways to other people. Who I am partly depends on the

situation I am in and on the company I am keeping.

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What is important here is that for even some of the best character traits to be expressed,

individuals must be in certain contexts. Expressing such character traits can be important to who a person

is. Thus, preserving some contexts can be important to preserving individuals’ very identity.iii

Confucianism recognizes that others enter into one’s identity and that discharging one’s

responsibilities to them is not subordination to others but affirmation of the ways in which one’s good is

bound up with their goods. When there are conflicts between the interests of self and others, the moral task

is to reconcile and balance those interests so as to sustain the relationship and its contribution to the well

being of all involved. The story of sage-king Shun’s marriage, as told in the Mencius is a dramatic and

surprising example of how interests might best be balanced and mutually adjusted. Shun’s parents were

unfavorably inclined towards him despite his legendary filiality. When the time came for Shun to marry, he

knew that his father would refuse permission if asked. So, Shun did not ask.

One of the reasons given for this surprising decision, coming from the ultimate filial son, is that

letting his parents prevent his marriage would have prevented him from having the most important of

human relationships, and that would have caused bitterness toward his parents (5A2). That is, the

satisfaction of one of Shun’s most vital interests is crucial for the viability of his relationship to his parents.

It would have been foolish for Shun simply to have swallowed his bitterness and submitted to what he

knew his parents’ wishes to be, foolish in terms of his own interests in marriage, and foolish for his

relationship to his parents. Shun’s action illustrates that the welfare of the self is bound up with the health

of its relationship to others entering into its identity. A self that consistently denies its own interests, even

for the sake of those others, cannot maintain the health of its relationships to them. As we shall argue

below, a similar idea applies to the human relationship to the nonhuman environment.

The Relational Self and the Natural World

A Daoist conception of the self is relational in a different way. It invites us to consider the human

relationship to a world that is more extensive than the human social world. A view of human identity that

connects it to other human beings is easier to grasp, and more salient than the view of human identity

which is in part constituted by the natural world (in fact, in a deeper sense, Daoists would view the human

as just another part of the natural world, and in distinguishing between the human versus the nonhuman, we

are not denying this deeper sense in which the human is part of the natural). This is mainly because our

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perceptions are oriented towards other persons, and they speak to us and remind us of their presence and

influence on our selves. The ways in which nonhuman things, conditions, and places can enter into one’s

identity is less apparent than the way that other people enter into one’s identity, but can be as real. Susan

Hartwick, a professor of geography investigating the relation between identity and place in Galveston,

Texas, interviewed one islander who strikingly illustrates this relation:

What's it like to live in Galveston? Well uh, it's all about survival. And I'm not talkin'

about survivin' the "Great Storm" now. I mean, it's all about surviving the heat and rain

and weird tourists and bugs. I don't really think I could survive one day without all these

special things about life here in Galveston (Hartwick, 2001, 338).

There are two kinds of identification at play in this self-description. It is quite clear that this

islander subjectively identifies himself with a place and a community. That is, he explicitly and consciously

identifies himself with a place. But he also seems to be pointing to a way of living in response to relatively

extreme environmental conditions (including some extreme people), a set of dispositions to act and think

and feel in certain ways that are indexed to these conditions that help to make him the person that he is.

This is an objective sense of identification. A place can objectively enter into an identity whether or not one

“subjectively avows” the place as part of his or her identity. For example, the islander, before his interview

with Hartwick, might never have thought that Galveston enters into his identity. But he might have realized

in the course of the interview, for example, that he feels very much at home, more relaxed and confident of

himself, in hot weather. He might realize that when he goes away on vacation, he becomes bored and starts

looking for eccentric people to talk with. Another islander might subjectively appropriate the identity of

belonging to Galveston, but objectively might not behave or feel very differently, say, in Dallas or St.

Louis.

Some of us choose to be much less engaged with the nonhuman than others but their identities

may still be shaped by nature. Urban dwellers may primarily live within human-built environments, and for

them it is not so clear that the nonhuman enters into their identities. We hold, however, that the nonhuman

may objectively enter into our identities in ways that we do not recognize and hence do not subjectively

appropriate.

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Moreover, there is reason to further engage with the nonhuman environment. Nature can

objectively (as well as subjectively) enter into our identities. Engaging with the non-human world in the

right ways can also teach us new ways to use, appreciate, and live in greater harmony with nature.

Let us show how nature can enter into our identities subjectively or objectively and can have value

to the person who has them by drawing from the first chapter of one of the two great Daoist texts of the

ancient period: the Zhuangzi. The Zhuangzi begins by taking its readers into the ocean to swim with the

enormous fish Kun, who then turns into the bird Peng and flies up high in the sky where it looks down

towards the ground. All it sees is blue, just like we human beings see when we look up at the sky. We are

then taken into the perspective of a cicada and dove that cannot comprehend the scale of Peng’s flight

because their idea of the upper limit of flight extends only to a tree branch. After this excursion with

nonhuman creatures, we are returned to the world of smug human beings content with our small

achievements in a way comparable to the outlooks of the cicada and dove. The title of this chapter can be

translated as “Going Rambling Without a Destination,” and indeed we are taken rambling beyond the

familiar domains of the human social world to absorb the lesson that the perceptions of all creatures are

shaped by their size and location in relation to what they perceive in their environments. The life span of

each kind of creature also conditions its experience of the world: “The mushroom of a morning does not

know old and new moon, the cricket does not know spring and autumn; their time is too short” (chapter 1,

translation by Graham, 2001, 44). We are invited to compare a great tree with eight thousand years for its

spring and eight thousand for its autumn, with the life span of the human Pengzu whom common men think

unsurpassable.

Chapter 1, then, immediately inducts the reader into the wider world of nature, not just to point out

the way the perceptions of all creatures are conditioned by their constitution, size and time scale, but to

open us up to what the rest of nature has to teach if only we attend to it. We are invited to consider the

perspectives of other creatures and this invites us to enlarge our perspective. Going rambling without a

destination suggests that one’s course in the world is not pre-determined by a destination, by a set of goals

one adopts before setting out. If we are not focused on getting somewhere, we are free to find what there is

to find wherever we go. If our perception of the world is not filtered by a set of pre-determined goals, we

are freer to perceive whatever there is to perceive.

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The Daodejing, the other great Daoist text of the ancient period, also invites us to learn from the

way that things get accomplished in nature: water wears away harder substances such as rock by being soft

and flowing around that which it cannot overcome right away. A style of action that is responsive and

adaptive to the current circumstances and obstacles can be more effective than a style that is aggressive and

unmindful of all except one’s pre-determined goal.iv

Near the end of the first chapter, Zhuangzi pokes fun at his logician friend Huizi for being unable

to think of a use for some huge gourds he had grown. Failing to find conventional uses for the shells, as

water dippers for instance, Huizi ended up smashing them to pieces in frustration. This preoccupation with

pre-conceived uses, Zhuangzi suggests, prevented Huizi from finding unconventional uses for the gourds,

such as lashing them together to make a raft with which to go floating down the river. This story suggests

the possibility of changing perspectives, even broadening one’s original perspectives, to take in more of

what the world has to offer. Huizi really is missing something when he neglects the possibility of using the

gourds for a raft, blinded, as we all tend to be, by calcified ideas of what is valuable and what is not.

Rambling through a world we have not built to satisfy our preconceived purposes provides more

opportunity for the kind of discovery that Zhuangzi urged upon his friend.

Running through the texts of early Daoism, then, are these themes that nature conditions our

perceptions and the extent of our knowledge, and that we can learn how to expand and enrich our

perspectives if we take it as a model and not just a resource. Those who do not consider their identities to

be much related to the nonhuman in nature are well advised to consider both themes, the first about the

valuable ways that nature enters into our traits and the second about the possibilities for enrichment of

perspective and of life. The first shows them that the content of their subjective identifications does not

reveal all that goes into their identities, and in particular the environmental conditions that trigger some of

our most basic responses to the world. The energizing and uplifting effect of sunlight on mood is often

noted, as is the depressing effect of sunlight dimmed or darkened, and both very likely are effects of a

biological constitution stemming from our hunter-gatherer origins. There is evidence that contact with

animals, plants, landscapes, and wilderness can under the right conditions reduce stress, promote feelings

of calm and well-being, faster healing from physical ailments, and facilitate recovery from mental fatigue

(Heerwagen and Orians, 1993). Landscapes that evoke some of the most positive response from people are

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savannah-like and again may reflect a biological heritage from human hunter-gather origins (see Frumkin

2001). Contact with horses, dolphins, and other animals may help heal both physical and emotional wounds

(Antonioli & Reveley, 2005).

The second theme suggests that those who have isolated themselves from the greater part of nature

have something to gain from rambling through it. Even if we may sometimes fail to appreciate it, there is

great value in having one’s preconceptions of value upset and overturned, because entrenched

preconceptions can act as blinders on our perception of the world. We see only that which promises to

satisfy or frustrate our ends and interests. We fail to see much that could delight us and exhilarate us or

suggest new ends and interests to us, but to do so, we must loosen the grip of the drive to bend things to our

wills. After all, even when we confirmed city-folk spurn such rambling we often fail to see the value in our

environments. Searching the shelves of a library with an eye only to finding a particular book we may pass

over unseeing others of even greater value. Traveling abroad and searching only for restaurants we

recognize can preclude from up exciting new adventures in the culinary arts.

To further describe what might be found upon rambling, we find useful J.J. Gibson’s theory of

“affordances.” In setting out his seminal “ecological theory of perception,” Gibson defined “affordances”

as that which the environment provides, furnishes, and invites in relation to a particular kind of perceiving

organism; affordances are new sources of value the environment offers us. The environment offers different

affordances to these creatures in the form of terrain, shelters, water, fire, tools, other animals and human

displays. Affordances are relative to the kind of organism in question and imply the complementarity of the

perceiver and the environment. They are neither purely subjective nor purely objective but cut across that

distinction. As organisms of a certain kind, we are on the lookout for those features of the environment that

provide, furnish and invite us to further engagement, for good or for ill (Gibson, 1986, 127). However, our

conceptions of what affordances there are for us to discover can become calcified. When Zhuangzi pointed

out the way Huizi could have used the shells of huge gourds to make a raft, he pointed out an affordance

provided by the gourds that his friend could not see because his sight was occluded by the humdrum uses of

gourds as water dippers. We stress that affordances are not simply instruments for ends we already have,

but that the discovery of affordances can provide us with new ends. The use of the gourds to build a raft is

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ultimately directed not to getting anywhere on bodies of water, but simply having a good ride to nowhere in

particular. Something can be an affordance to pure play, for example.

In trying further to understand how attention to the natural environment might help one to discover

new affordances that do not fit one’s preconceptions, it is helpful to keep in mind a distinction made by

William James between two kinds of attention. Directed attention is a willed focus on a particular task and

a blocking out of extraneous stimuli. Involuntary attention is attention that is grabbed and arises in response

to inherently interesting or unexpected external stimuli, such as accidentally coming upon a waterfall.

When people use directed attention, neural inhibitory mechanisms allow them to block out potential

distractions and focus on a task (James, 1962, 87-94). But the efficiency achieved through blocking out

potential distractions narrows attention enormously: gourds must be water dippers or quite useless. The

narrowing of attention occludes experience that does not fit our preconceptions of affordances in nature for

us.

Directed attention requires enormous effort and tends to result in mental fatigue. Such attention is

hard to sustain. Periods of involuntary attention can refresh the mind, and it is often observed that the

experience of nature, containing as it does inherently interesting and unexpected events, can bring such

periods about. In its most intense forms, it results in wonder and awe,v as exemplified by the story of Ziqi’s

meditation on the mystery of the Great Clod of dirt blowing out its breath through the ten thousand

hollows:

The Great Clod belches out breath and its name is wind. So long as it doesn’t come forth,

nothing happens. But when it does, then ten thousand hollows begin crying wildly. Can’t

you hear them, long drawn out? In the mountain forests that lash and sway, there are huge

trees a hundred spans around with hollows and openings like noses, like mouths, like

earths, like jugs, like cups, like mortars, like rifts, like ruts. They roar like waves, whistle

like arrows, screech, gasp, cry, wail, moan, and howl, those in the lead calling out yeee!,

those behind calling out yuuu! In a gentle breeze they answer faintly, but in a full gale the

chorus is gigantic. And when the fierce wind has passed on, then all the hollows are

empty again. Have you never seen the tossing and trembling that goes on?”vi

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We read this in wonder and awe engendered by reflection on the whole of nature, its intricate diversity and

yet a mysterious unity that cannot be plumbed.

The quality of enhanced receptivity accompanying involuntary attention can eventually be turned

to the uses of directed attention, or perhaps more accurately, suggest new uses for directed attention. To

cease being guided by one’s pre-set goals and conceptions of uses is to be open to the perception of new

affordances, to new sources of valuevii the environment offers us, to which we can then direct our attention.

A kind of involuntary attention may also enable us to perceive what really does best fulfill our existing

purposes. Having those purposes at the forefront of one’s mind can be distracting and ultimately defeating

of their realization. In chapter 19 of the Zhuangzi, one is said to be skillful in an archery contest when

playing for tiles; when playing for fancy belt-buckles, one loses confidence; and in playing for gold, one

becomes flustered.viii

When we attend to nature in the right way, open to its influence and what it has to offer we can

experience its transformative effects. It is precisely the fact that we open ourselves up to something that is

not entirely of our making, something that presents us with what we do not already conceive and value, that

we can have such valuable experiences. This is the idea at the heart of the relational approach to

environmental ethics.

Respecting Others

Even if one does not see the value of identifying with nature one’s self in the way we have

suggested one ought to identify with it, one must at least recognize that many others’ identities are tied up

with nature in the way we have described. One has reason to respect nature in respecting these individuals,

at least if their identities are tied to nature in ways we can understand and appreciate, if acting on these

identities does not require doing wrong to others or violating their rights, and even if we do not desire these

ways for ourselves. We are required to respect people and this often requires one to respect what is

necessary for others’ identities regardless of the nature of one’s own identity.ix

A number of cultures express the theme that both knowledge and personhood grow out of

relationships to particular places. Ties between knowledge, place, and identity are prominent in many

Native American cultures. For example, anthropologist Arlene Stairs calls Inuit identity “ecocentric

identity…” with “eco-” “encompassing human, animal, and material” (Stairs, 1992). Rather than viewing

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maturation as achieving autonomy, the Inuit see maturation as a process of “grounding” oneself in social

and environmental relations. One develops personal identity through active engagement with the world

(Stairs, 1992, 120; Borr, 1991).

Or consider Arizona’s Western Apache people who also seem to have a conception of the self that

acknowledges the ways in which knowledge and identity are tied to particular places and ecologies. They

talk, for example, about using the land to orient themselves morally. Place-names have special significance

for the Western Apache, and they figure centrally in Apache moral stories. When a person violates a

i The authors would like to thank audiences and colleagues at the University of Arizona, University of Utah, the University of Hawaii, and Colorado State

University for incredibly helpful comments. We would also like to thank a few anonymous reviewers and Christopher Knapp for helpful comments.

Stanford’s Center on Ethics in Society, Justitia Amplificata and the Center for Advanced Studies at the University of Frankfurt for their support during this

project’s completion.

ii Some preservationists argue that we should let ecosystems or species evolve according to their own dynamics, as free from human interference as

possible because it merits that kind of respect. For further characterization of preservationism, see (Schmidtz, 2002b)

iii Recognizing the relational nature of at least many of our character traits is consistent with situationist criticisms of the folk conception of character traits

as global traits that manifest themselves across a wide variety of situations. Gilbert Harman and John Doris have recently argued that we should recognize

the existence of traits of a much more local nature. See Harman, 1998-9 and 1999-2000, and Doris, 2002. They point to a body of experimental work in

psychology purporting to show that behavior is a lot more influenced by situations than is commonly thought. For example, they cite the Milgram

experiment in which the majority of subjects were willing to administer severe and dangerous electric shocks to test the effect of punishment on learning.

The situational variable thought to be responsible for the surprising willingness to hurt others is the authority of the experimenter in charge. See Milgram,

1974. We hold that situationist critiques go too far, however, when they attribute all explanatory and predictive power to the situation and none to the

individual. Even Harman must admit the existence of psychological disorders such as depression and schizophrenia and innate aspects of temperamental

traits such as shyness. Once one admits the existence of systematic regularities that underlie psychological disorders and innate temperaments, it seems

difficult to stop short of admitting that there are interesting and useful regularities that go under the heading of character traits, even if they are

considerably more context-dependent than is usually assumed. Innate temperaments interact with situational factors in complex ways and are often self-

consciously modified by individuals themselves, but regularities of perception and behavior relative to certain kinds of situations can result. The social

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particular custom or tradition, another person will often tell a relevant tale to this person, or to a group in

which the person is present: a not-so-subtle admonishment and reminder of the violation. These stories

always begin and end with the name of the place where the story occurred, and the place-name thus serves

to physically locate the story and acts as a reminder of the moral lesson associated with it. The Apache

often recite place-names, which are highly descriptive (e.g., “valley with elongated red bluffs”), both

because they enjoy the sound of the names, and because these names are filled with social meaning.

psychologist Ziva Kunda has expressed skepticism about the existence of global character traits, but points out that the nonexistence of such traits is

consistent with systematic differences between individuals such as someone’s being quite extroverted in one-to-one interactions, moderately so in small

groups and not at all in large groups, whereas another person might display the reverse profile. See Kunda, 1999. Such local traits, which involve the

specification of activating circumstances, are what we call relational traits in this paper.

iv See chapters 8 and 78 of the Wang Bi version of the Daodejing. [citation?]

v There is some anecdotal evidence for the existence of wonder in nonhuman primates. . Gombe chimpanzees in one incident are described as reacting to a

waterfall with a mixture of silent contemplation and euphoric celebration. . In another incident an entire chimpanzee colony excitedly gathered around a

female giving birth. . In still another incident, a group of captive mandrills clustered around an adult male who was gingerly examining a toad that was

badly pretending that he was dead. . See Verbeek and de Waal, 2002, 17-8. Perhaps exploratory tendencies are an adaptation shared by human and

nonhuman primates, and wonder as a state of attention is an outgrowth of this adaptation in cognitively complex creatures.

vi Chapter 2, translation by Burton Watson, 1964, 31-2. We use Watson’s translation here because it much better conveys the sense of wonder in this

passage.

vii This points to something of ethical cum aesthetic value – a world view with both ethical and aesthetic aspects (Hassoun, 2012).

viii In interviews with women and men who had earned recognition for their creative achievements in some domain of culture (e.g., the sciences, arts,

government, business), Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi concluded that the kind of environment that induces involuntary attention can assist the creative process

at a certain stage. For instance, “when attention is focused on the view during a walk, part of the brain is left to pursue associations that normally are not

made. This mental activity takes place backstage, so to speak; we become aware of it only occasionally. Because these thoughts are not in the center of

attention, they are left to develop on their own. There is no need to direct them, to criticize them prematurely, to make them do hard work. And of course it

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As Keith Basso puts it: “[These] locations, charged as they are with personal and social

significance, work in important ways to shape the images that Apaches have—or should have—of

themselves” (Basso, 1987, 114). The Apache blend the social and physical worlds in their place-naming

and place-centered storytelling. They describe the land as “stalking people” and as “[looking] after people”

(Mrs. Annie Peaches, Basso, 1987, 95). The land is a repository for moral knowledge. The Western Apache

do not see the capacity to be moral as residing exclusively within the individual; here, both the social and

physical environment provide moral knowledge and support the individual’s ability to live rightly. One

Western Apache man described his experience of leaving the reservation, losing touch with the land, and

consequently, drinking and fighting with his wife: “It was bad. I forget about this country here around

Cibecue. I forget all the [place-]names and stories . . . I forget how to live right, forget how to be strong”

(Mr. Wilson Lavender, Basso, 1987, 97). Basso’s portrayal of the Western Apache suggests that both

knowledge and personhood grow out of relationships to particular places.

There is some evidence that indigenous people in the Pacific Northwest also identify with the

lands on which their tribes have lived for centuries, with the rivers and the forests that provide the contexts

for their lives. For instance, Grey Owl, a member of the Southern Cheyenne tribe living on the Nez Perce

reservation described his community as “salmon people.” He said “the salmon are of this land just as we

are. We both share a connection to this land that is hardwired into our DNA. They teach us many spiritual

lessons such as the circle of life, giving of yourself to help others, and that our life’s purpose should be to

help someone else live” (Header, 2005). And a tribal leader of the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla

Indian Reservation said, “without the rivers and the salmon and the land, we are not Cayuse or Umatilla or

is just this freedom and playfulness that makes it possible for leisurely thinking to come up with original formulations and solutions.” (Csikszentmihalyi,

1996, 138).

ix For our view to remain a distinct alternative to conservationism it must be the case that the value of identity does not come down to the value of certain

kinds of interests. So, our argument offers an important challenge to conservationists to make the case that identities matter only because of our interests in

them. Moreover, even if relationalsim, on some accounts, is a sophisticated kind of conservationism, our paper still points to the importance of something

–respecting a certain kind of valuable identity or the opportunity for this kind of identity – that is often neglected in debates about conservationism

and/preservationism.

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Walla Walla people. Without the rivers and salmon, we become different people” (DNR & CTUIR, 2002).

These people seem to have a conception of the self that acknowledges the ways in which their identities are

tied to the natural world. Ties between knowledge, place, and identity are prominent in many Native

American cultures.

Of course, some non-indigenous people recognize that the natural world can enter into the

identities as well. For instance, in the Pacific Northwest many non-indigenous people, too, identify with the

salmon and the river ecosystems where they live. Many have come to recognize the importance of the

Northwestern river and forest ecosystems to their own identities as these ecosystems have become

threatened. Perhaps the battle to conserve and preserve these ecosystems has even helped to forge these

identities. As those defending the salmon note, opinion polls and public hearings show that people in the

Northwest want to restore salmon populations because they “recognize the importance of watershed health

to community well-being and value salmon as the critical element of Northwestern identity” (American

Rivers, 2006).x Of course some loggers also identify as loggers of the Pacific Northwest forests. Similarly,

some indigenous peoples identify as woodcarvers though the kind of wood that is best for carving comes

from endangered trees. Fortunately, it is possible to respect both of these identities without allowing

environmentally destructive practices. One might, for instance, allow some wood cutting and carving while

maintaining old growth forests and preserving endangered trees. In the carving case, for instance, giving

carving licenses only to indigenous people or small scale carving operations may be a good solution. It is

only if there are no other ways to protect old growth forests or endangered trees besides preventing forestry

and woodcarving that it may be impossible to respect these identities and protect the environment.

There are two possible responses to cases where it is really impossible to respect identities and

protect the environment. First, one might argue that some ways of nature entering into identities may not be

valuable. If, for instance, an identity limits rather than enhances the possibility of the kind of (positive)

transformative experiences we are concerned with here it may not merit the same sort of respect in some

circumstances. (Of course, some other kinds of identification may also lack value or even have negative

value – identifying as someone who holds slaves or harms others is, for instance, morally reprehensible.)

x Of course some loggers also identify as loggers of the Pacific Northwest forests. Fortunately, it is possible to respect this identity of the people without

advocating unsustainable use.

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Second, some identities, though valuable, are unsustainable and may not merit respect for this reason. For

an identity to be sustainable all people in all generations must normally have the opportunity to have the

identity – at least holding that identity cannot make it less likely that others can do so in the future. xiIf we

are concerned that all people in every generation have opportunities for engagement with nature then

unsustainable identities, which limit these opportunities, may not merit respect.xii It is in this way that the

value of nature to particular individuals’ identities connects with the value of nature to each person’s

identity. Each person should have the opportunity to have valuable transformative identity-shaping

experiences of nature. On the relational approach to environmental ethics, once these identities are shaped

we must respect them by protecting the environment.

One might challenge this argument by suggesting that most indigenous people might be like

Crocodile Dundee. Most indigenous peoples may be at home in their native landscapes but flexible enough

to create valuable identities in New York City as well. If this is right, would not it be just as good on the

relational approach to move these people as to allow them to maintain their lands.

Importantly, however, few indigenous peoples are relocated to New York a la Crocodile Dundee.

Nor do we believe many would many fare so well were they relocated in this way. xiii Many indigenous

peoples who are removed from their lands identify as displaced people and see themselves as forced onto

marginal lands. Finally, even when indigenous peoples do go on to form other valuable identities, the

particular valuable identities these people had with their natural environments is lost.

The Relational Approach to Environmental Ethics

xi It may not be a problem, for instance, if some identities are no longer possible due to natural causes. Not everyone can be a mammoth hunter given non-anthropocentric climate change.

We owe thanks to an anonymous reviewer and Christopher Knapp for discussion here.

xii It is obviously impossible to give a full account of what makes identities valuable or sustainable here. Rather, our paper suggests the need to develop

such an account.

xiii Another possible response to this argument is that the identities of indigenous peoples gain value in part from their rarity. Just as environmentalists

who want to preserve biodiversity have a reason to preserve rare species, those who care about preserving identity have reason to care about identities

made fragile by their rarity.

14

Suppose, then, that a case has been made for the relational nature of human identity: both a case

that it is relational in relation to the nonhuman, and that those of us spending our lives within built

environments have reason to increase our engagement with the nonhuman or at least reason to respect the

engagement of others whose identities are bound up with the environment. What are the implications for an

approach to environmental ethics and for a third alternative to conservationism and preservationism?

The relational approach to environmental ethics differs from the preservationist approach in that it

does not entail that we must care for the nonhuman environment independently of human beings and their

interests. It starts from the relatively uncontroversial assumption that human beings have value, and asks

what must be true for them to have value. Our approach holds that we cannot attach value to human beings

or to whatever promotes their (at least subjectively appropriated) interests without attaching value to the

constituents of their identities. We are not asserting that the nonhuman world has value only because it

enters into human identities. Rather, we are identifying a ground for attributing value to the nonhuman

world that we believe to be less controversial than the idea that the nonhuman world has value

independently of whatever value human beings have. We do not claim that the relational approach is the

only legitimate justification for attributing value to the nonhuman environment, but rather it is a

justification that offers greater common ground for those who take environmental ethics seriously. If one

accepts the relational approach to environmental ethics we have reason to care for nature because it is

important for human identity.

The relational approach differs from the conservationist in denying that the nonhuman world

should be conserved only when doing so is necessary to promote human interests. For one thing, the

nonhuman world enters into human identity (or we have good reason to let it enter into our identity) more

deeply than at the level of answering to human interests. If the environment can shape who we are, it can

shape our very interests, leading us to recognize things, events, and processes that are of genuine value and

that we have not previously recognized as such. Our environment, as the story about cicada and dove

shows, shapes our sense of possibility and therefore our sense of what there is to value. Furthermore, the

relational approach questions the very separation between the human and nonhuman that the

conservationist approach presupposes. It is not that we should care for the environment simply because it

15

serves human interests, rather, the nonhuman can be so implicated in who we are that caring for nature is a

necessary condition of properly respecting human identities.xiv

One might challenge the claim that relationalism is distinct from conservationism. Don’t we, like

conservationists, derive a way of valuing the nonhuman from the value of the human? Is not relationalism a

viciously anthropocentric view?

We do not derive a way of valuing the nonhuman from an instrumentalist analysis of what would

best serve our interests. We are arguing that for some, e.g., indigenous peoples, human identities include

the nonhuman and that respecting their identities means respecting their relation to the nonhuman. To those

whose identities do not include the nonhuman, we have tried to present as appealing the idea of opening

oneself up to transformative interaction with the nonhuman. The fact that we distinguish between (what

may be short-term, transient) interests and our identities, and the fact that nature can help constitute our

very identities, helps to explain why relationalism is not a viscously anthropocentric view. Part of

respecting identities is respecting nature and visa versa.

Now the conservationist might further object that the answer to the question "When is it important

to preserve a context which can shape our identities?" is going to be "When it is in our interest to have such

an identity." Conservationism in taking into account the importance of nature for meeting human interests

will take into account the importance of nature for preserving our identities. We need to say more about

what counts as an interest to distinguish our theory from a conservationist theory.

xiv It might be objected that the main thrust of our argument could be put in simpler terms that avoid talk of identities that are related to nature. Someone

who thought all our character traits were context-independent might at least see that the ways in which nature can have a transformative effect on

individuals can be valuable. Isn’t that the main point of the argument? We grant that someone could recognize the value of deeper engagement with

nature without necessarily buying into the idea of relational identities. But given our belief that many of our traits are relational, arguing for the value of

deeper engagement with the environment is equivalent to arguing for the value of having such a relational identity. Another way to put our point is that we

have been arguing for the value of being open to having one's interests shaped by interaction with the environment. But if our significant and long-

standing interests go into our identities, that just is being open to having our identities related to nature. Furthermore, we are arguing that some indigenous

peoples do have such relational identities and that other things being equal we owe respect to that which is included in those identities. That part of the

argument directly needs to be put in terms of relational identities

16

One possible response might be along these lines: Interests can be understood in subjective terms

(e.g. as on desire or preference satisfaction account) or objective terms (e.g. as on objective lists theories).

The fact that a valuable identity need not be subjectively appropriated shows that identities can be valuable

even when it is not in our subjective interest to have them. Furthermore, even if traditional conservationist

views understand interests in an objective sense, conservationists’ other commitments may preclude them

from assimilating the value of nature’s transformative impact on identity to welfare. On many traditional

conservationist views, cost benefit analysis is supposed to allow us to figure out what is in our interests

(Schmidtz, 2002d). One cannot include the transformative impact of nature on our identities in such an

analysis because we cannot know what kind of value the experience will yield.

A follow-up objection might be that if we cannot know ahead of time what value that impact will

have, our relational approach likewise cannot properly assess that impact. Hence we cannot claim an

advantage over the conservationist approach in this regard.

Our response is that properly accommodating the transformative impact of nature on our identities

requires that we view our identities as subject to significant change and that we open ourselves up to the

value of such change even if we cannot know in any precise terms what that value will be ahead of time.

We often do not know what the value of an activity will be until we start trying it, and even then, our

conception of its value may change over time as we further engage in it. An experimental attitude towards

life that remains open to new sources of value in the world and the way those sources may become parts of

ourselves is not fully compatible with cost-benefit analysis. As Zhuangzi might say, “So much the worse

for cost-benefit analysis.”

Another objection to our argument might be that we are attributing to conservationism an

implausible assumption that human interests do not change. We know, however, that human interests do

change. Good versions of conservationism can accommodate this.

We are not denying that conservationism can accommodate preference change, and that policies

should change when they do. The conservationist approach can indeed recognize that preferences change

but it cannot adequately capture the value of opening ourselves up to preference change on the basis of

interaction with nature. How can we decide how good it is to open ourselves up to preference change by

interacting with nature on a conservationist view? To do so based on our interests seems suspiciously

17

circular. Some of the very interests that would form the basis for such an analysis might be changed by

opening ourselves up to interaction with nature! It is true that we might have a higher-order interest in

acquiring new and different interests and in discovering new things to value, but it is unclear how such an

interest might be weighed against whatever interests might be changed and whatever new interests might

develop through interaction with nature. Deciding to open up to fundamental and unpredictable changes in

our interests is something that can be presented in an appealing light (as we have tried to present it here),

but it should not (and, perhaps, cannot) be decided on the basis of an instrumentalist calculation of what

best serves our interests. We believe it is a decision about a stance to be taken toward life that is prior to

such analysis. It is a stance based on openness to change, to what might included within the human that is

not included now and to new sources of value in which we might come to take an interest.xv

Implications of Relationalism: Similar Suggestions, Different Rationale

Preservationists often think that we must keep wild places wild; we must let nature be (Matthews,

2002). They believe that some places should be kept free from human interference. Conservationists care

about conserving the environment for future generations. They think that we should not needlessly destroy

the environment but that we can live in harmony with nature; we should use nature wisely (Norton, 2002;

Norton, 2002a).

Sometimes the recommendations of conservationists and preservationists coincide. For instance,

they might work together to create national parks like Yellowstone or Yosemite. They do not always agree.

Once a park has been created, conservationists, but not preservationists, might want to build a parking lot

so that people can visit the park (Norton, 2003).

When the recommendations of conservationists and preservationists diverge, those holding the

relational approach will sometimes agree with the recommendations of the preservationists and sometimes

with the conservationists. There may be decisive reasons to let some wild places remain wild. To remake

the world entirely in the image of humanity’s purposes is to limit the possibilities for our learning from that

which has not been bent to our wills. On the other hand, the relational approach does not hold that “letting

xv Again, we are not unduly concerned if relationalism, on some analyses, ends up being a very sophisticated kind of consequentialism or preservationism.

The main point of this paper is to make clear a new basis for concern for nature that might help us resolve or avoid many kinds of environmental conflict.

18

alone” is necessarily better than intervening and changing nature. We need to show proper respect for

humans in developing and promoting an environmental ethic.

However, even when the relational approach coincides in its recommendations with

conservationism or preservationism, the rationale for action or inaction will often differ. To see how this

might be so, consider the rationale that one who accepts the relational theory (the “relationalist”) might

give in a few cases for coming to the same conclusions as a conservationist or preservationist.

Let us return to Daoism first. In its notion of wu wei, or effortless action, Daoism envisions a kind

of human action that seeks to act in harmony with nature and work within natural constraints, rather than

dominating or simply using it. The Zhuangzi illustrates this kind of action in its story of Woodcarver Qing

who makes marvelous bellstands. When he goes to make one, he fasts in order to still his mind. As he fasts,

the distracting thoughts of congratulation and reward melt away, honors and salary, blame and praise, skill

and clumsiness, even his awareness of having a body and limbs. Only when he is able to focus does he go

into the forest to observe the nature of the wood, and only then does he have a complete vision of the

bellstand. The woodcarver says that he joins “what is Heaven’s to what is Heaven’s” (Graham, 2001, 135).

The word translated as “Heaven” here is tian, and perhaps less misleadingly translated as nature and

perhaps even less misleadingly as “natura naturata,” nature in its active and productive aspect. Note that the

woodcarver’s fasting is a vigorous effort of the will and is guided by steadfast purpose. However, it also

puts him in a state of mind of receptiveness to what he will find in the forest. At that time, all the goal-

oriented thoughts that might normally crowd his mind are gone.

In a perceptive essay that focuses on this story, Michael LaFargue points out a way in which it

confounds a putative pair of opposites: that which comes about through human effort and that which is

natural. In saying that he is joining what is Heaven’s to what is Heaven’s, the woodcarver confounds the

conventional contrast between the natural and human artifice. His efforts result in something that is of a

piece with nature. On LaFargue’s view, “wu wei” is something human beings can do to create potential

organic harmonies that are not in “pristine” nature to begin with. “Organic harmony” is a:

…kind of harmony that arises out of spontaneous mutual adjustment among many

elements and forces in a given system, in contrast to that kind of order that is imposed by

some dominant force or goal outside the system or that kind of order resulting from

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subordination of all elements and forces to one dominant center. Organic harmony refers

to a stable, homeostatic order that arises out of the mutual adjustment of parts, in contrast

to a random, disorderly, and unstable situation that might also sometimes be produced

when different parts develop according to their own spontaneous (competitive and

individualistic) impulses. (LaFargue, 2001, 52)

Organic harmony is usually more stable than order imposed from the outside; it requires less work

to maintain. For instance, some gardens are low maintenance and form an organic homeostatic part of the

larger environment. To create such gardens, though, one must work within natural constraints, choosing

plants appropriate to the water, soil, and climate conditions. Indigenous species generally need less

maintenance by the gardener (LaFargue, 2001, 52). Identification with nature, then, can lead to a kind of

action that blends the human with the nonhuman that not only conserves human resources and energy but

creates the kinds of value that exemplifies human harmony with the larger world.

We will return to this point in the next section but, first, consider an example of how the

relationalist may come to the same conclusion as a conservationist or preservationist about a particular case

but for different reasons. A few years ago, the international aid community was abuzz about a program

called CAMPFIRE. Raymond Bonner tells CAMPFIRE’s story in the area around Kruger park. Before the

program was implemented, the farmers who lived near the park often came into conflict with the wildlife

from the preserve. The animals would destroy crops, homes, and occasionally people. Because the animals

were protected, the farmers could not get rid of them. If they shot the animals, they were jailed.

CAMPFIRE, in effect, gave the wildlife to the people. The program let the people keep 80% of the

money they were able to collect from managing the wildlife (Schmidtz, 2002a). The remaining money was

used to hire wardens and create a compensation program for any destruction the animals caused to the

farmers’ property (Schmidtz, 2002a). CAMPFIRE gave the people the power to decide how wildlife would

be used. Instead of raising cattle on marginal land (a major contributor to deforestation) many of the

farmers were able to live off of the money generated from protecting and utilizing the wild animals

(Schmidtz, 2002a). They could sell hunting licenses and generate revenue via tourism. They were also able

to supplement their diets by occasionally culling the herds of Impala for meat (Schmidtz, 2002a).

20

CAMPFIRE compensated farmers for their losses, gave people jobs and decision making power, and

provided them with the incentive to protect the wildlife (Schmidtz, 2002a).

Conservationists have argued that CAMPFIRE is an important program. It created the right

incentives for villagers to conserve wildlife. Deadly conflict between people and the wildlife was averted.

The program enhanced the well being of people and encouraged wise use.

We agree that CAMPFIRE served human interests but furthermore hold that the creation of

harmony between the villagers and wildlife was itself a good and expressed the valuable relation to the

nonhuman that exists and/or should exist in human identities. CAMPFIRE was not just a good solution to a

problematic conflict between human beings and wildlife, but the kind thing that should be promoted. At the

same time, we hold that CAMPFIRE gave people the time and helped them secure the resources necessary

to start showing the kind of respect for wildlife that concerns preservationists.

Severe poverty can undermine individuals’ identification with their environment and thus make it

more likely that they will not respect nature. Consider the villagers’ position in the area around Kruger

before CAMPFIRE began. Observing the situation from the outside, it is not clear that the wildlife entered

into the villagers’ identities at all. Perhaps the villagers, primarily concerned about survival, could not see

the way that their identities depended on the wildlife. Perhaps they could not afford to care. Even if the

villagers cared immensely, however, they certainly did not have the leisure to act on that concern

(Schmidtz, 2002b). The villagers were forced to act in a self-destructive way to survive. They could not

afford to preserve their identities; they could not afford to conserve nature.

CAMPFIRE provided the people around Krueger the leisure to connect with nature in an essential

way (Schmidtz, 2002a). Before the programs started, the villagers were literally locked in a contest for

survival with the wildlife. CAMPFIRE provided them with the opportunity to establish, re-establish, or

preserve a healthy connection between nature and their identities. The program encouraged the villagers to

see their own well being as inextricably tied to the wellbeing of the wildlife – perhaps in a way analogous

to Leopold’s idea of the land being part of our moral community – it encouraged villagers to forge this

identity, if they did not already have it, and to protect it, if and when they did (Leopold, 1981).

Preservationists want us to respect the environment even if it does not serve human practical uses

and we relationalists agree with this for our own reasons. The environment enters into our identities, or can

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and should, in ways that can transcend or transform our practical uses for it. The relational approach allows

us to give this kind of respect to nature while also making it possible for us to use it wisely. We should

respect nature the way we should respect ourselves so we should probably only use nature in the ways we

should use our own bodies (Mathews, 2002). At least this provides a model for how we should treat the

environment. It is not that the nonhuman has value simply because it serves human interests, and it is not

that we have to regard the nonhuman as having a value independently of our existence. Rather, the

nonhuman can be so implicated in who we are that caring for nature is necessary to respect people.

When the relationalist agrees with preservationists about how we should care for nature, the

rationale also differs. Consider a situation in which it is in human interests to develop a natural area, but

development would exact the cost of severely reducing the biological diversity of that area (suppose there

are disturbance-sensitive species in the area). The relational approach assigns value independently of

human interests (a threatened species is not necessarily pretty or dramatic in human eyes), but the relational

approach would at least recognize the potential value of such diversity precisely because it does not

conform to human ideas of “beautiful” or “impressive” diversity. Wetlands may not be beautiful or

impressive enough according to our standards to preserve. This is to the end of preserving some areas that

we have not transformed according to our ideas of what has value. In effect, this is the relationalist

equivalent to Zhuangzi asking Huizi not to smash the gourds to pieces but to use his imagination in finding

new uses for them. Now of course, human interests in development should be weighed in the balance.

Wetlands, for instance, can provide breeding grounds for mosquitoes bringing deadly diseases (Willott,

2004). Still, the fact that a potential course of action seems to be in our interest is not the end of the story on

the relational approach. The relationalist approach might prompt us to look for other areas to develop that

do not have the threatened biological diversity, or suggest introducing some non-native fish into restored

areas to control mosquitoes (Willott, 2004).

Objections to the Relational Approach

Consider how a preservationist might respond to our recommendation in the CAMPFIRE case.

She might grant that it is better to have a program like CAMPFIRE than to allow the villagers and wildlife

to compete for survival. However, she might not believe that this is the only option. Perhaps the villagers

could be relocated to a different area and the wildlife around Krueger preserved. Perhaps there is some way

22

the villagers could live with the wildlife without having to kill it or let others kill it. Maybe they could do

photo safaris instead of hunting safaris. Maybe they could sell crafts. CAMPFIRE, though better than the

status quo, the preservationist might continue, does not give enough respect to wildlife.

This is a fair enough response in some circumstances. However, given the conditions around

Krueger this response may not be sufficient. Some argue that without human intervention, the elephants

will overpopulate in Krueger threatening biodiversity. There may eventually be so many elephants that

many will be unable to survive droughts. In the past, elephants could roam the savannah freely, but

constrained to the bounds of the park population pressure can be devastating for many species.

Furthermore, some speculate that humans have co-evolved with elephants as their main predator (Willott,

2005). Thus, one might argue that any feasible solution to the environmental problems around Kruger must

include human intervention. Without human predation, elephants near Krueger might come to destroy the

ecosystems that they inhabit. The general lesson to draw here might be something like this. Because the

environment enters deeply into human identity, the extensive causal influence of human beings on the

planet is often difficult to “extract.” For good or for ill, we are already deeply implicated in the present

nature and fate of the earth’s environment. “Letting alone” in many cases may simply not be a viable

option.

Another objection to the idea of promoting interdependence between human beings and the

environment of the kind that CAMPFIRE illustrates is that people can sometimes contribute to

environmental destruction and this destruction can threaten their very existence. The latest theory about the

disappearance of the Mayan people in Copan, Honduras provides an illustrative example. Some speculate

that population growth led to environmental degradation and scarcity. Migration to the less productive

hillsides where the soil was not particularly fertile caused erosion; flooding and droughts probably occurred

as a result (Diamond. 2003). As people competed for fewer and fewer resources things probably got worse

for everyone. The remains of the people show that they became malnourished and life expectancy declined

(Diamond. 2003). Eventually the people migrated out of the Copan valley. Furthermore, the objector might

point out that there are many modern examples of environmental destruction by people who depend in

rather direct ways on their environment too. Consider again the conflict between the Jewelmer corporation

and the indigenous people on the island of Balbac in the Southern Philippines. This island contains some

23

the worlds last living coral reefs. The Palawan and Molbog tribes’ people say that the pearl farming

corporation has unjustly had the reef declared a protected area to deprive the people of their ancestral

fishing grounds. The corporation responds that the reef should be protected from the tribes’ destructive

fishing practices since the cyanide and dynamite the tribes people sometimes use will harm the reef on

which both fish and oysters survive.

However, we believe that we must be careful in deciding that a group of people should be forced

off their lands. We need to fully understand the causes of the environmental problems we are dealing with

and who is responsible for these problems before penalizing people for them. The Palawan case provides an

illustrative example. Assuming that everyone is telling the truth, the reason people have begun using

destructive fishing practices is probably complicated. The proximal cause may be that they cannot survive

by fishing and farming alone. Those who are hungry will often do whatever is necessary to get food.

However, part of the reason why people cannot survive using traditional fishing and farming techniques is

that the population density of the island has gotten too high. Migration by non-indigenous people to the

island may have caused the land to reach its carrying capacity. Outside factors are also at work. The reason

that people migrate to Balbac is because conditions in the rest of the Philippines are bad. These poor

conditions force people to migrate in search of better opportunities.

Had Marcos not given the pearl farm to the corporation, the people might have had more room to

fish. Without Marcos and a long history of corruption, the Philippines’ problems in general might not be so

bad (Bello et. al., 2004). Perhaps the population pressure on the island would be less. Maybe there would

not be so much competition for scarce resources.

Even conditions outside of the Philippines contribute to these peoples’ dilemma. Had the rules of

trade and investment been different, Marcos and his cronies wouldn't have been able to sustain power for so

long (Pogge, 2002). The situation in the Philippines might have been much improved. U.S. support for

Marcos, and the loans of the International Financial Institutions probably also helped to keep Marcos in

power. Anti-immigration laws also, indirectly, prevent most people from migrating to more promising

locations.

Finally, other external factors are probably at work as well. The tribes’ people would have had to

get the dynamite and cyanide from somewhere. Without this technology their fishing would not have such

24

bad consequences. This story is not new. The Inuit adopted environmentally destructive hunting practices

once they got guns. Most of the seals that they would kill with the guns would sink before they could be

collected (Ornstein & Ehrlich, 1989). The Inuit and their environment suffered as a result. Had the Inuit not

gotten the guns from foreigners their hunting practices may have been less destructive.

We are certainly not claiming that all external influence is bad; the trade that brought cyanide also

brought medicine and building materials. Nor are we claiming that all of the environmental destruction that

indigenous people, like those on Balbac, do is caused by external factors. Sometimes, indigenous peoples

may be as greedy, short-sighted, and destructive as the rest of us. It is not clear that many Native American

peoples needed to hunt by driving herds of bison off of cliffs, but they did. They did this even though the

practice resulted in a lot of waste and death (Krech, 2006).

When indigenous peoples seem to be using nature in a wasteful and destructive way, their sense of

self may not be appropriately connected with their context. But appearances can be deceiving. For instance,

there may just have been too many bison on the plains in previous centuries. Maybe Native Americans

were playing an important ecological role in the same way that hunters in Africa may play an important

ecological role by hunting elephants in Southern Africa today.

The point we hope to stress here is not a new one for environmentalists. We need to be humble in

our dealings with other cultures just as we need to be humble in our dealings with the environment. What

looks like a problem may not be a problem at all. The way native Americans hunted bison might not have

been problematic in previous centuries. The way the settlers hunted bison was much more devastating. The

animals were hunted nearly to extinction. We need to ask ourselves if we have the right to interfere in

another cultures’ interaction with nature. We need to consider whether or not we are likely to do better in

managing their ecosystems than they do.

Even when we are sure that destruction is occurring, intervention may still not be acceptable, all

things considered. The relational approach to environmental ethics implies that we should respect people as

well as nature. Part of the value of nature comes from the value it has for individuals’ identity. Sometimes

“preservationism doesn’t preserve” (Schmidtz, 2002a). Sometimes conserving isn’t all that matters.

Further Implications of Relationalism: New Recommendations

25

Finally, the relationalist may sometimes give different recommendations than either a

preservationist or conservationist would give for dealing with environmental problems. For instance,

restoring a degraded area that has been put to agricultural or industrial use might not be justified in terms of

existing human interests, but neither does preservation directly address the need for restoration of degraded

areas (letting alone does not help an area that has already been degraded by human use) (Dobson,

Bradshaw, and Baker, 1997). The relational approach might prompt us to restore the area to achieve the

kind of organic harmony LaFargue describes. The right action might be the analogue of creating a “low

maintenance garden.” For example, a plant species might be introduced by encouraging the migration of

seed-carrying birds to the area (Dobson, Bradshaw, and Baker, 1997). In the dry desert of Tucson,

xeriscaping (or creating low water landscapes) by reintroducing native species, may help save precious

water resources.

Consider another case where the relationalist might give a different recommendation than either a

preservationist or conservationist. Consider the case of the Mossyrock dam built on the Cowlitz river. The

Cowlitz river system drains over 2,450 square miles of Washington State (American Rivers, 2006). The

water comes from Mt. Rainier glaciers and runs 133 miles, fed by the Cispus and Tilton rivers, and the

Olequa, Salmon, Winston, Lacamas, and Silver creeks (American Rivers, 2006). In 1968 the Tacoma

Power Cowlitz River Project introduced the Mossyrock Dam in Lewis County, Washington (American

Rivers, 2006). The City of Tacoma built the dam over the objections of the State of Washington which

wanted to protect the Cowlitz as a salmon sanctuary. Preservationists would probably argue that this dam is

unacceptable. They would probably want the dam to be removed. Conservationists, however, might very

well think the dam is acceptable. They might argue that the dam best protects human interests. To

understand why, though, one must understand more about the river and the dam.

Mossyrock is a 70 megawatt hydroelectric dam 606 feet high and approximately 1,648 feet long

(Tacoma Power, 2005). The reservoir that resulted from building the dam has a surface area of about 610

acres (Meridian Environmental Inc., 2004). Because the dam is so large, it changes the course of the river,

the ecology of the river, and the surrounding habitats. Many species rely on this habitat including deer,

Roosevelt elk, northern spotted owl, bald eagle, harlequin duck, river otter, mink, osprey, porcupine, and

beaver. (American Rivers, 2006). In fact, the dam is so large that the Salmon cannot swim over it even with

26

the help of fish-ladders or elevators. Salmon can no longer migrate up the river without help. The Cowlitz

used to produce more than 90,000 Chinook, as well as steelhead, Coho, and sea-run cutthroat trout. Now

relatively few wild salmon remain. This impacts many species besides fish (American Rivers, 2006).

Salmon provide food and nutrients for a variety of organisms in multiple ecosystems.

To ameliorate these problems, abide by environmental regulations, and protect human interests,

Tacoma Power created a reservoir buffer zone and a wildlife management plan. For instance, they now

operate the Cowlitz Salmon Hatchery to reintroduce salmon and steelhead in the upper Cowlitz River

basin. Tacoma power then transports the fish by truck to the upper Cowlitz from the hatcheries. When both

hatchery and naturally spawned juveniles head downstream, they are collected at the Cowlitz Falls Dam

(the uppermost dam on the river). The company then transports the fish (again by truck) to the hatchery

where they are placed in holding ponds.

Tacoma power is making a great effort to make sure the project is in the interests of the human

population in Lewis County. When the Cowlitz Salmon Hatchery opened (in 1968) it was the largest

salmon hatchery in the world. In 2001 it produced nearly 13 million fish - 1.6 million spring Chinook, 4.8

million Coho salmon, and 5.9 million fall Chinook. Because of Tacoma Power’s efforts, Anglers have a

chance to catch fish, the reservoir provides many recreational opportunities, and communities displaced by

the dam were compensated. The dam produces about 1,100,000,000 kWh annually (Tacoma Power, 2005).

Because the Lewis County Public Utility Department has gone to such great lengths to meet

human needs, it seems that the conservationist should be satisfied with the project. After all, most of the

other plausible alternative sources for meeting our energy needs have negative impacts on humans and the

environment as well (Hassoun, 2006). The conservationist may argue that it is not wise to create more

hydropower dams in general but objecting to this project independently would be hard.

The preservationist can object to the project more easily. The preservationist can argue that the

fish, wildlife, and river ecosystem have been harmed by the project. Farmed salmon are not as healthy as

wild salmon. They have to be inoculated against a variety of diseases to survive and the brood stock is so

polluted by anesthetics that they cannot even be used as dog food and must be buried rather than allowed to

fertilize the river banks. Because the fish populations have been reduced there is also less food for bears

27

and other predators. Other species are harmed by the dam too. Perhaps preservationists would argue that we

should not use such brute force technology at all.

One who accepts the relational theory might disagree with both the preservationist and

conservationist here. The relationalist might argue that we should not maximize energy production by using

such large hydropower dams on the Cowlitz. Rather, she might point out that doing so is incompatible with

respecting the identities of people in the Pacific Northwest. Relationalists would argue that better options

are available in this case though hydropower dams may be appropriate in some contexts. She might say

hydropower dams are acceptable if they blend with the ecosystem in a natural way. For instance, if we can

harness energy from natural waterfalls with minor modifications this might be a good option. Smaller dams

might also be worth considering. Finally, wind, geothermal, and solar energy are better ways to generate

energy and sometimes these options are cost competitive with traditional energy resources (Hassoun,

2006).

Conclusion

The conservationist and preservationist approaches have one thing in common: they take human

interests as exogenous relative to their preferred environmental ethic. In the one case, the preferred ethics is

based on the idea that actions toward the environment should ultimately serve those exogenous interests. In

the other, ethics is declared independent of exogenous interests.

The relational approach claims that human identities are so intimately tied to nature that human

interests evolve in relationship to nature. It claims that human beings have good reason to engage with

nature so as to form such relational identities with nature and therefore to be open to the evolution of

human interests.

We believe relationalism presents a distinctive approach to the problems of environmental ethics

and highlight considerations that neither the conservationism nor preservationism brings to the forefront.

Conservationism and preservationism both fail to appreciate the importance of the environment to

individuals’ identities.

Although there may be other ways of rectifying the problems with conservationism and

preservationism, here is one way to summarize the thrust of this paper: the conservationist approach, by

pushing human interests to the foreground of attention, truncates the possibilities of being human in

28

relation to nature; the preservationist approach pushes the human part of nature too far into the background;

the relational approach is an attempt to bring humanity and nature into a viable balance, for the sake both of

humanity and nature.

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