1

“CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS AND RISK ASSESSMENT OF LPG

TRANSPORTATION THROUGH RAIL AND ROAD”

A PROJECT REPORT

Submitted by

AMALDAS P K

COLIN K PALLIPPATTU

PRASOON K P

SACHIN EARNEST

SANGEETH SATHEESH

SOORAJ A S

In partial fulfillment for the award of the degree of

BACHELOR OF TECHNOLOGY IN

SAFETY AND FIRE ENGINEERING

SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING

COCHIN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

KOCHI 682 022

APRIL 2015

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the project report entitled “CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS AND RISK

ASSESSMENT OF LPG TRANSPORTATION THROUGH RAIL AND ROAD” submitted

by Amaldas P K, Colin K Pallipattu, Prasoon K P, Sachin Earnest, Sangeeth Satheesh, Sooraj

A S is a bonafide record of the project carried out by them towards the partial fulfilment of the

requirements for the eighth semester of B-Tech degree course in Safety &Fire, under my

supervision.

SIGNATURE SIGNATURE

Dr. DEEPAK KUMAR SAHOO Dr. V R RENJITH

HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR

SAFETY AND FIRE ENGG. SAFETY AND FIRE ENGG.

SOE, CUSAT SOE, CUSAT

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

For Successful completion of this Project, we have received so much help from so many people.

This project wouldn’t have been possible without the contribution of so many peoples.

We could like to express our sense of gratitude to our guide Dr. V R RENJITH. It has been our

good opportunity to work with Dr.V R RENJITH. He give us the freedom to work on project.

We would like to express the sense of gratitude to HOD of Safety and Fire engineering Dr. DIPAK

KUMAR SAHOO.

We express our sincere thanks to faculties of Safety and Fire engineering

We express our hearty thanks to Mr. RAIZ (son of victim Chala gas tanker disaster), who helped

to describe about the Chala accident to us

We extend to our sincere thanks to Mr. AMARNATH PhD Scholar, Department of environmental

Studies, Cochin University of Science And Technology for the guidance on ALOHA, MAR PLOT

and Q-GIS software

We express sincere thanks to our friend ASIF Department of Electronics and communication, SOE

CUSAT, for helping us to develop the software FIREMODE.

We are very thankful to our Parents and Friends for their constant encouragement and support

throughout this project

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CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

ABSTRACT

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 General 14

1.2 Motivation behind project 15

1.3 Objectives 17

2 LPG DEMAND 18

3 LPG MSDS 20

3.1 Identification of substance or Preparation 20

3.2 Hazard identification 20

3.3 First aid measures 24

3.4 Firefighting measures 25

3.5 Accidental release measures 26

3.6 Handling and storage 26

3.7 Exposure control and Personal protection 27

3.8 Recommended Personal protective equipments 27

3.9 Environmental Exposure control 28

3.10 Physical and chemical properties 28

3.11 Chemical stability and Reactivity information 29

3.12 Toxicological information 29

3.13 Ecological information 29

3.14 Transport information 30

3.15 Regulatory information 30

4 MODES OF TRANSPORTATION

31

5

5 HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH LPG 33

5.1 JET FIRE 33

5.2 Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) 33

5.2.1 Definition of VCE 34

5.2.2 Vapour Cloud Deflagration 34

5.2.3 Vapour Cloud Detonation 34

5.3 BLEVE 35

6 BURNS 36

6.1 Types of burns 36

6.2 Traditional classification of burns 36

6.2.1 Types of burns: cause 38

6.3 Types of burns and treatments in detail 38

6.3.1 First Degree Burns- Superficial Burns 38

6.3.2 Second Degree Burns- Partial Thickness Burns 39

6.3.3 Superficial Second Degree 39

6.3.4 Mid-Second Degree-Mid Partial Thickness Burn 40

6.3.5 Deep Second Degree-Deep Partial Thickness 40

6.3.6 Full Thickness Burns 41

6.4 ZONES OF INJURY 41

6.5 LOCAL EFFECTS FOLLOWING A BURN 41

6.6 SYSTEMIC EFFECTS FOLLOWING A BURN 42

6.7 CRITERIA FOR HOSPITALIZATION 42

6.8 CALCULATING TBSA (EXTENT) 44

6.8.1 Adults: Rule of Nines 45

6.8.2 Children: Rule of Nineteen 45

6.9 SUMMARY OF INJURY AND FATALITY

DATA

45

6.10 BURN VS. THERMAL DOSE

RELATIONSHIP

46

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6.11 THERMAL DOSE HARM CRITERIA

GUIDANCE

47

6.12 DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 48

6.13 TYPES OF FIRE AND ITS EFFECTSs 51

6.14 DIRECT EFFECTS 53

6.14.1 Thermal Radiation Causing Direct Burns 53

6.14.2 BURNS CAUSING FATALITY 53

6.15 TIME DEPENDENCE 54

7 HISTORY OF EVENTS 56

7.1 LIST OF INCIDENTS 58

8 STUDY AREA 71

9 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 75

9.1 ALOHA 75

9.2 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS USING

ALOHA

77

9.2.1 ALOHA INPUTS- ALUVA RAILWAY

STATION

77

9.2.3 ALOHA INPUTS- ALUVA BYPASS 83

9.2.4 ANALYSIS RESULTS- ROAD 85

9.2.5 ALOHA FOOTPRINTS FORBLEVE OF

OTHER STUDY LOCATIONS

89

9.3 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS USING

MATHEMATICAL MODELS

91

9.3.1 Modelling Of Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE) 91

9.3.2 TNT Equivalent model for VCE 92

9.3.3 Pressure of blast wave 92

9.3.4 Modelling Of Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor

Explosion (BLEVE)

93

9.3.5 Mathematical modeling –ANALYSIS 97

9.3.6 Inputs Parameters – BLEVE 97

9.3.7 Mathematical modeling inputs – VCE 99

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10 SOCIETAL RISK DIAGRAM 101

10.1 PROCEDURE 101

11 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 104

12 EVENT TREE ANALYSIS 110

13 FIREMODE 113

13.1 FIREMODE 2 113

14 CONCLUSION 114

15 BIBILIOGRAPHY 115

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ABBREVATIONS

1. LPG - Liquefied petroleum Gas

2. TNT - Tri Nitro Toluene

3. BLEVE - Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion

4. VCE - Vapour Cloud Explosion

5. ALOHA - Areal Location Hazard Atmosphere

6. FTA - Fault Tree Analysis

7. ETA - Event Tree Analysis

8. BPCL - Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited

9. MRPL - Mangalore refinery petroleum limited

10. IOCL - Indian Oil Corporation Limited

11. KRL - Kochin Refinery Limited

12. TMT - Thousand Metric Tonnes

13. PPE - Personal Protective Equipments

14. ANSI - American national standard institute

15. MSDS - Material safety data sheet

16. ISO - International Standard Organization

17. LNG - Liquefied Natural Gas

18. RIL - Reliance Industries Limited

19. UVCE - Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion

20. TBSA - Total Body Surface Area

21. VCF - Vapour Cloud Fire

22. EX - Explosion

23. EKM - Ernakulam

24. TSR - Thrissur

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LIST OF TABLES

TABLE NO

TITLE PAGE NO

TABLE 1 LPG Penetration In Domestic Sector 18

TABLE 2 Hazard Category 20

TABLE 3 GHS Category 20

TABLE 4 Route Of Entry: 21

TABLE 5 Acute Toxicity Data 29

TABLE 6 Eco toxicity Data: 29

TABLE 7 Types Of Burns 37

TABLE 8 Special Areas 43

TABLE 9 Characteristics Of Process Fire Incidents 51

TABLE 10 Burn Area For 50% Fatality 53

TABLE 11 Approximate Mortality Probabilities 54

TABLE 12 Karunagappaly incident Data 56

TABLE 13 Uppinagady incident Data 57

TABLE 14 Chala incident Data 57

TABLE 15 BLEVE Incidents 58

TABLE 16 Fire Ball Incidents 59

TABLE 17 VCE Incidents 60

TABLE 18 Incidents Involving LPG 67

TABLE 19 Incidents Involving Road Tankers 69

TABLE 20 Study –Area Details. 72

TABLE 21 Study Area – Population Details 72

TABLE 22 Fire Stations 73

TABLE 23 Study Area – Hospital Details 74

TABLE 24 Aloha Analysis Results 80

TABLE 25 Aloha Results- Road 86

TABLE 26 Distance Vs Radiation 98

TABLE 27 Vce –Analysis Results 99

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig No TITLE PAGE NO

Fig.1 Demand & availability data of LPG 19

Fig 2 Indigenous Production 19

Fig 3 LPG ship 31

Fig 4 LPG bullet Tanker 32

Fig 5 LPG Wagon- Indian Railway (BTPGLN) 32

Fig 6 Cross-section of degrees of burns 36

Fig 7 Rule of 9 and Rule of 19 44

Fig 8 Fatality Predictions Using Probit Relations (2kW/m2) 49

Fig 9 Fatality Predictions Using Probit Relations (5kW/m2) 49

Fig 10 Fatality Predictions Using Probit Relations (10kW/m2) 50

Fig 11 Dose vs. Time Plot 50

Fig 12 ALOHA footprint- BLEVE 79

Fig 13 ALOHA footprint- Jet fire 79

Fig 14 ALOHA footprint- Blast Area 80

Fig 15 Bleve Area – Aluva Railway 81

Fig 16 Flammable area- aluva railway station 81

Fig 17 Blast Area- Aluva railway station 82

Fig 18 Jet Fire Area – Aluva railway Station 82

Fig 19 ALOHA footprint of Jet fire area 85

Fig 20 ALOHA footprint of Blast Area 85

Fig 21 ALOHA Footprint of BLEVE 86

Fig 22 BLEVE Area Aluva bypass 87

Fig 23 Flammable Area- ALUVA bypass 87

Fig 24 Jet Fire Area- Aluva bypass 88

Fig 25 Blast area- Aluva bypass 88

Fig 26 BLEVE area Angamaly 89

Fig 27 BLEVE Area – Chalakudy 89

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Fig 28 BLEVE Area – Kalamassery 90

Fig 29 BLEVE Area – Paravoor Kavala 90

Fig 30 Graph for Scaled Distance Calculation 93

Fig 31 Distance Vs Radiation Graph 98

Fig 32 Distance Vs Overpressure Graph 100

Fig 33 Societal Risk Diagram 103

Fig 34 FTA Road Accident (VCE) 105

Fig 35 FTA of Road Accident (BLEVE) 106

Fig 36 FTA for Rail Accident (BLEVE) 108

Fig 37 FTA for Rail Accident (VCE 109

Fig 38 ETA for LPG Release 111

Fig 39 ETA For Tire Puncture 112

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ABSTRACT

The Demand of LPG in India is growing tremendously, to satisfies these demands LPG has to

transport by various modes. From exporting country to terminals, terminals to refineries, terminals

to various bottling plants, major industries. In India the mode transportation include by rail, road

and pipelines .This operations are very hazardous in nature. The hazards associated with the

transportation of LPG through rail and road are Fire and explosion .qualitative and quantitative

hazard analysis are essential for identification of quantification of hazards associated with

transportation This project work presents the risk assessment and consequence analysis of the LPG

transportation. For these work two study areas has been selected,

1. 35 km road distance from Kalamassery to Chalakudy

2. Aluva railway station

For consequence analysis two approaches have been applied Mathematical modeling & Software

application. For mathematical modeling TNT equivalent model TNO model, Robertson model are

carried out for BLEVE, VCE For software application ALOHA air modeling is used.

Developments of FTA and ETA for the events associated with LPG accident have been made.

Also develops Risk diagrams for fatalities associated with Fire and explosion in the area. Designed

and developed modeling software in Android platform for the modeling of BLEVE, VCE, pool

fire, jet fire.

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INTRODUCTION

1.1 GENERAL

The LPG demand in the India is increasing in high speed. Every year the percentage of growth is

very high industrially as well as domestically. LPG is well accepted as a user friendly energy

source. Ease of use, more energy content and eco-friendly and no emission to atmosphere.

Although the hazards associated with the LPG is very high. When we consider the midstream

operation of LPG in India. From exporting country to the individual consumers, the mode of

transportation includes. Transportation by ships (exporting country to various importing Terminals

in our country, this may be as direct transportation of LPG or as Crude). Transportation by

pipelines (these may be from terminals to refineries, bottling plants. big industries or refineries to

bottling plant, big industries).But this mode of transportation is very less in India that is due to

various reasons. Especially in Kerala only short length pipeline are available. Pipeline

transportation is much safer mode of transportation

Transportation by rails is from refineries to various demanding locations in large quantity and this

mode of transportation is highly hazardous. Once the scenario occurs there is a possibility of

domino effect and projectiles are possible. The effects due to these sorts of scenarios will be

dreadful. When these types of incidents occur in a major Railway station or highly populated area

surrounding the railway station. We are considering the possibility of terrorist attacks as the worst

case scenario

Transportation through roads, this mode of transportation is widely used for LPG bulk carriage

mainly from refineries to bottling plants and large industries. According to Kerala, this mode of

transportation is considered more other than the remaining two. No transportation through rail is

encouraged due to variety of reasons such as track problem and low production. So that’s why the

transportation of LPG through road is 80 percentages. On an average 200 tanker bullets are passing

daily through Kerala Routes at peak demand of time. From Kochi refinery Limited about 150

tanker bulletins are travelling in its peak demand time. This may increases to 400-500 tankers

when the upcoming Indian oil corporation transporting terminal project is established.

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Transportation through road is highly hazardous process especially in Kerala roads. Many of

highways are surrounded with high populated area. When an accident occur in these areas its result

will be very dreadful. If we didn’t give information about the release and consequences the chance

of increasing fatalities is more. CHALA, KARUNAGAPPILLY, UPPINAGADY are the worst

LPG tanker accidents occur in India. Among these incidents CHALA incident was even bigger

and resulted in 24 deaths.

We cannot avoid the transportation through this ways, it is essential for the national energy security

and development. We can provide a safer mode of transportation and also give awareness to people

who exposed to these area on these scenarios. Risk assessment and consequence analysis helps to

give awareness to government, public although it is helpful in decision making at various levels,

it helps in emergency planning etc. The study areas of the projects are the main LPG routes in

Kerala. The LPG transportation, mainly associated with BPCL Kochi refinery, MRPL Mangalore,

CRPL Chennai.

Concentrated on 35km length of NH47 from Kalamassery to Chalakudy. Five major points have

been selected for study and assumed different scenario going to occur on these points. Different

cause consequences are developed and analyzed. Aluva railway station has been selected for study

area 2. For analysis here the works on LPG wagons risk assessment and consequence analysis.

LPG transportation through rail is now a days is stopped due to track problems, low production of

LPG on KRL. But the expansion of the refinery and new IOCL importing terminal projects may

again give the chance of transportation of LPG through rail.

This project mainly estimates the consequence of BLEVE, VCE, and Jet fire using the

mathematical models, TNO, TNT equivalent model, Robertson Model. Also uses the ALOHA air

modeling for the analysis. Here the radiation and overpressure estimation for various distances

from source of origin can be plotted graphically. Super imposing of the ALOHA modeled design

into study location on Google map is done in with the help of MAR plot software. This project

develops Fault tree analysis and Event Tree Analysis For the various scenarios associated with

both Rail and Road incidents and find out the basic events, cause and consequences. Also

development of risk diagram which tells the Fatality rate for this Probit function equation for

radiation and overpressure is involved. The population data collected from villages is utilized for

risk diagrams

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1.2 MOTIVATION BEHIND PROJECT

Chala, Karunagapilly, Uppinangadi. These three are the major and painful LPG incidents in indian

history. All three are in south India and among them 2 are in Kerala, more than 50 killed from

these three explosions. The severity of the accident can be produced if the people have the

knowledge on how to behave in two occasions. This analysis gives the awareness to the public and

authority to the potential of hazards associated with the operation.

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1.3 OBJECTIVES

Fault Tree Analysis

Find out basic events for various final events like BLEVE, VCE etc.

To find out various causes and consequences of the scenario.

Event Tree Analysis

To find out the various consequences of single basic events.

To find out the cause, consequence and development of scenarios.

Consequence Analysis

Mathematical models provide quantitative estimation of radiation and over

pressure from BLEVE, VCE and radiation from Jet fire.

ALOHA models provides graphical representation of the BLEVE, VCE, Jet fire

on the basis of Radiation, over pressure, vapour cloud depression, etc.

Risk Diagram and Societal Risk

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2.0 LPG DEMAND

India is the Fourth largest consumer of LPG in the world after USA, China & Japan also

the Third largest consumer in domestic sector in the world after China & USA

Major market of LPG is Domestic Sector

Home Delivery of 3 Million LPG Gas cylinders per day(i.e.900 Million/ year)

Steady Growth @ 8% p.a. in LPG Consumption in India

Demand in 2009‐10 stands at 12746 TMT

Indigenous Production in 09‐10 was 10323 TMT

Imports @22% of total LPG Demand

Indigenous LPG production through State Run, Private and Fractionators

TABLE 1: LPG penetration in domestic sector

Particulars Urban Rural Total

Population in Million 326.2 838.8 1165

Households in Million 95 159 254

LPG Connections in Million 83.8 31.2 115

Penetration of LPG 88 % 19.6% 45%

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Fig.1: Demand & availability data of LPG

Fig.2: Indigenous Production

1005210531

1133111778

12746

76488409

8973 9287

10323

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

2005 06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10

DEMAND AVAILABILITY

FRACTINATORS23%

PRIVATE36%

STATE RUN41%

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3.0 LPG MSDS

3.1 IDENTIFICATION OF THE SUBSTANCE/PREPARATION

1. Identification of the substance/preparation:

Commercial name: Liquefied Petroleum Gas

Chemical name: Liquefied Petroleum Gas

2. Use of the substance /preparation: Raw material of petrochemicals

3.2 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

TABLE 2: Hazard Category:

Health Environmental Physical

Carcinogenicity – Category 1A

Mutagenicity – Category 1B

Aquatic Toxicity –

Category- NA

Flammable – Category 3

TABLE 3: GHS Category

Study/hazar

d statement

Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 Category 5

Acute Oral

LD50

< 5 mg/kg

Fatal if

swallowed

> 5 < 50

mg/kg Fatal

if

swallowed

> 50 < 300

mg/kg Toxic if

swallowed

> 300 < 2000

mg/kg Harmful

if swallowed

> 2000 <

5000mg/kg May

be harmful if

swallowed

Acute

Dermal

LD50

< 50 mg/kg

Fatal in

contact with

skin

> 50 < 200

mg/kg Fatal

in contact

with skin

> 200 < 1000

mg/kg Toxic in

contact with

skin

> 1000 < 2000

mg/kg Harmful

in contact with

skin

> 2000 < 5000

mg/kg May be

harmful in

contact with skin

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Acute

Inhalation

Dust LC50

Gases

LC50

Vapours

LC50

< 0.05

mg/L < 100

ppm/V <0.5

mg/L Fatal

if inhaled

> 0.05 <

0.5 mg/L >

100 < 500

ppm/V >0.5

< 2.0 mg/L

Fatal if

inhaled

> 0.5 < 1.0

mg/L > 500 <

2500 ppm/V >

2.0 < 10 mg/L

Toxic if

inhaled

> 1.0 < 5

mg/L >2500 <

20000 ppm/V

> 10 < 20

mg/L Harmful

if inhaled

Flammable

liquids

Flash point

<23 degrees

C and initial

boiling

point < 35

degrees

C.Extremely

flammable

liquid and

vapour

Flash point

< 23

degrees C

and initial

boiling

point > 35

degrees C.

Highly

flammable

liquid and

vapour

Flash point >

23 degrees C<

60 degrees C.

Flammable

liquid and

vapour

Flash point >

60 degrees C <

93 degrees C.

Combustible

liquid

Not Applicable

Study/hazard

statement

Category 1 Category 2 Category 3

Eye Irritation Effects on the cornea, iris

or conjunctiva that are

not expected to reverse

or that have not fully

reversed within 21 days.

Causes severe eye

damage.

2A: Effects on the cornea,

iris or conjunctiva that

fully reverse within 21

days. Causes severe eye

irritation.

2B : Effects on the cornea,

iris or conjunctiva that

fully reverse within 7 days.

Causes eye irritation

Not applicable

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Skin Irritation Destruction of skin

tissue, with sub

categorization based on

exposure of up to 3

minutes (A), 1 hour (B),

or 4 hours (C). Causes

severe skin burns and eye

damage.

Mean value of >2.3 > 4.0

for erythema / eschar or

edema in at least 2 of 3

tested animals from

gradings at 24, 48, and 72

hours (or on 3 consecutive

days after onset if

reactions are delayed);

inflammation that persists

to end of the (normally 14-

day) observation period.

Causes skin irritation.

Mean value of

>1.5 < 2.3 for

erythema / eschar

or edema in at least

2 of 3 tested

animals from

gradings at 24, 48,

and 72 hours (or on

3 consecutive days

after onset if

reactions are

delayed). Causes

mild skin

irritation.

Environment:

Acute Toxicity

Category

96 hr LC50 (fish) <1

mg/L 48 hr EC50

(crustacea) < 1 mg/L,

72/96 hr ErC50 (aquatic

plants) < 1 mg/L Very

toxic to aquatic life

96 hr LC50 (fish) >1< 10

mg/L 48 hr EC50

(crustacea) >1< 10 mg/L

72/96 hr ErC50 (aquatic

plants) >1< 10 mg/L Toxic

to aquatic life

96 hr LC50 (fish)

>10< 100 mg/L 48

hr EC50

(crustacea) >10<

100 mg/L 72/96 hr

ErC50 (aquatic

plants) >10< 100

mg/L Harmful to

aquatic life

Flammable

Aerosol

Extremely flammable

aerosol

Flammable aerosol Not Applicable

Flammable

solids

Using the burning rate

test, substances or

mixtures other than

metal powders: (a)

wetted zone does not

stop fire and (b) burning

Using the burning rate test,

substances or mixtures

other than metal powders:

(a) wetted zone does not

stop fire for at least 4

minutes and (b) burning

Not Applicable

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time < 45 seconds or

burning rate > 2.2

mm/second Using the

burning rate test, metal

powders that have

burning time < 5 minutes

Flammable solid

time < 45 seconds or

burning rate > 2.2

mm/second Using the

burning rate test, metal

powders that have burning

time > 5 < 10 minutes

Flammable solid

Flammable gases Gases, which at 20

degrees C and a standard

pressure of 101.3 kPA:

(a) are ignitable when in

a mixture of 13% or less

by volume in air; or (b)

have a flammable range

with air of at least 12

percentage points

regardless of the lower

flammable limit.

Extremely flammable

gas

Gases, other than those of

category 1, which, at 20

degrees C and a standard

pressure of 101.3 kPA,

have a flammable range

while mixed in air.

Flammable gas

Not Applicable

TABLE 4: Route of entry:

Skin Contact Skin Absorption Eye Contact Inhalation Ingestion

Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes

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Inhalation: Severely irritating if inhaled and acute exposure may be fatal.

Ingestion: May be fatal if swallowed.

Skin contact: Highly irritating to skin. May cause allergic skin reaction.

Eye contact: Highly corrosive to eyes.

Chronic exposure: Weakness, coughing, laboured breathing, headache Confusion

nausea/vomiting convulsions heart rate and pulse variations coma respiratory failure

Aggravations to pre-existing conditions: Those with history of lung diseases, or skin

problems may be more susceptible to the effects of this substance.

Information pertaining to particular dangers for human: Toxic substance with carcinogenic

and mutagenic effects. High vapour concentrations irritate respiratory system and eyes and

may lead to fast coma and death.

Information pertaining to particular dangers for the environment: NA

Other adverse effects: Highly flammable and easily ignitable substance. Danger of ignition at

normal temperature. Readily evaporates and vapours form with air toxic and explosive mixtures

heavier than air. Mixtures keep above ground and after ignition they spread fast into far distances.

Ignition possible when exposed to hot surfaces, sparks, naked flames and by electrostatic

discharges too. The substance is practically insoluble in water, floats on the water level and forms

toxic and explosive mixtures above the water level.

3.3 FIRST AID MEASURES

1. General advice: IMMEDIATE MEDICAL ATTENTION IS REQUIRED AFTER

INHALATION OR AFTER SWALLOWING.

In case of health troubles or doubts, seek medical advice immediately and show this Material

Safety Data Sheet. Ensure activity of vitally important functions until the arrival of the

doctor (artificial respiration, inhalation of oxygen, heart massage). If patient is unconscious, or

in case of danger of blackout, transport patient in a stabilized position. In case of first degree burns

(painful redness), and second degree burns (painful blisters), cool the affected area with cold

25

running water for a long time. In case of third degree burns (redness, cracking pale skin, usually

without pain), do not cool affected skin, dress the area with sterile dry gauze only.

2. Inhalation Remove patient to fresh air, keep him warm and in order to rest quietly. Avoid

walking. Seek medical advice. SYMPTOMS AND EFFECTS: irritation, headache, dizziness,

weakness, stupefaction, irritant coughing, convulsions, unconsciousness, possible respiratory

inhibition or arrest.

3. Skin contact immediately take off all contaminated clothing and footwear. Flush effected

area with copious quantities of water. Seek medical advice. SYMPTOMS AND EFFECTS:

mild irritation, degreasing, absorption, blistering.

4. Eye contact Immediately flush eyes with clean lukewarm water and continue flushing

for at least 15 minutes – keep the eyelids widely apart and flush thoroughly with mild

water stream from the inner to the outer. Seek medical advice. SYMPTOMS AND EFFECTS:

severe irritation, cornea damage.

5. Swallowing If patient is conscious and without convulsion, immediately try to induce

vomiting. Never give anything by mouth to an unconscious person, just put patient into a

stabilized position. Seek medical advice immediately. SYMPTOMS AND EFFECTS: nausea,

vomiting, convulsions, irregular heartbeat

3.4 FIRE FIGHTING MEASURES

1. Suitable extinguishing media Foam, Dry chemical powder, CO2. Cool containers which are

not on fire with water spray.

2. Extinguishing media to be avoided: Water.

3. Caution about specific danger in case of fire and fire-fighting procedures Danger of violent

reaction or explosion. Vapours may travel considerable far distances and cause subsequent

ignition. Vapours are heavier than air, may cumulate along the ground and in enclosed

26

spaces – danger of explosion. When burning, it emits carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide

and irritant fumes. Containers with the substance exposed to excessive heat may explode.

4. Special protective equipment for fire-fighters Wear full protective fire-resistant clothing and

self-contained breathing apparatus.

3.5 ACCIDENTAL RELEASE MEASURES

1. Person-related safety precautions Isolate hazard area. Evacuate all unauthorized personnel

not participating in rescue operations from the area. Avoid entry into danger area. Remove all

possible sources of ignition. Stop traffic and switch off the motors of the engines. Do not smoke

and do not handle with naked flame. Use explosion-proof lamps and non-sparking tools.

Avoid contact with the substance. Apply recommended full protective personal equipment.

2 .Precautions for protection of the environment Prevent from further leaks of substance. Do

not allow substance to enter soil, water and sewage systems. In case of substance discharge to

water courses or water containers, inform water consumers immediately, stop service and

exploitation of water.

3. Recommended methods for cleaning and disposal Pump off substance safely, soak up

residues with compatible porous material and forward for disposal in closed containers. Dispose

off under valid legal waste regulations.

3.6 HANDLING AND STORAGE

1. Information for safe handling Observe all fire-fighting measures (no smoking, do not handle

with naked flame and remove all possible sources of ignition). Take precautionary measures

against static discharges. Wear recommended personal protective equipment and observe

instructions to prevent possible contact of substance with skin and eyes and inhalation. Avoid

leak to environment.

2. Information for storage Storerooms should meet the requirements for the fire safety of

constructions and electrical facilities and should be in conformity with valid regulations. Store

in cool, well-ventilated place with effective exhaust, away from heat and all sources of

27

ignition. Store in tightly closed container. Do not store together with oxidizing agents. Take

precautionary measures against static discharges. Avoid leak to environment.

3. Information for specific use: Not applicable.

3.7 EXPOSURE CONTROL AND PERSONAL PROTECTION

Individual protection measures: Personal protective equipment (PPE) for the protection of

eyes, hands and skin corresponding with the performed labour has to be kept at disposition

for the employees. In cases, where the workplace exposure control limits cannot be observed

with the help of technical equipment or where it is not possible to ensure that the respiratory

system exposure does not represent a health hazard for the personnel, adequate respiratory

protection have to be kept at disposition. In the case of continuous use of this equipment

during constant work, safety breaks have to be scheduled, if the PPE-character requires

this. All PPE have to be kept in disposable state and the damaged or contaminated equipment

has to be replaced immediately.

3.8 RECOMMENDED PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE):

Respiratory protection: If the exposure limit is exceeded and engineering controls are not

feasible, wear a supplied air, full-face piece respirator, airline hood, or full face piece self-

contained breathing apparatus.

Protective mask with canister A (brown coloured, protecting against organic vapours), self-

contained breathing apparatus. Eye protection: Use chemical safety goggles and/or a full face

shield where splashing is possible. Maintain eye wash fountain and quick-drench facilities in work

area.

Hand protection: Wear gloves of impervious material.

Body protection: Wear impervious protective clothing, including boots, gloves, lab coat, apron

or coveralls, as appropriate, to prevent skin contact. Protective coverall antistatic design

recommended, impervious when handling big amounts (nitrile rubber), sealed leather footwear

(free from synthetic adhesives)

28

Hygiene Measures: Wash hands, forearms and face thoroughly after handling. Appropriate

techniques should be used to remove potentially contaminated clothing. Wash contaminated

clothing before reusing. Ensure that eyewash stations and safety showers are close to the

workstation location.

3.9 ENVIRONMENTAL EXPOSURE CONTROLS

Engineering measures: Use only with adequate ventilation. If user operations generate dust,

fumes, vapor or mist, use process enclosures, local exhaust ventilation or other engineering

controls to keep worker exposure to airborne contaminants below any recommended limits. The

engineering controls also need to keep gas, vapor or dust concentrations below any lower explosive

limits. Use explosion-proof ventilation equipment.

3.10 PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL PROPERTIES

Appearance Liquefied Gas

Odour Mustard

odour Solubility in water Negligible

Relative Density 0.506 – 0.583

Boiling Point °C -162 - -0.5°C

Melting Point °C -183 - -20°C

Relative Vapour Density NA

Flash point °C -56°C

Closed cup Auto ignition °C 410 - 540°C

Vapour pressure (hPa) 600 – 39000

C Molecular weight NA

Explosive limits in air % by volume LEL 1.9% to 5.3 %, UEL 8.5% to 15 %

PH NA

Viscosity mPa.s @25 °C NA

Pour point NA

Evaporation rate (ether=1) NA

Octanol/water partition coefficient log Kow 2.8

29

3.11 CHEMICAL STABILITY AND REACTIVITY INFORMATION

1. Conditions to avoid Concentrations within the explosion limits, sources of ignition, high

temperature, sun radiation.

2. Material to avoid Explosive reaction with chlorine (on light), with acid.

3. Hazardous decomposition products Thermal decomposition generates carbon monoxide and

carbon dioxide.

3.12 TOXICOLOGICAL INFORMATION

1. Acute effects Toxic substance with carcinogenic and mutagenic effects. Acute intoxication

leads to central nervous system attenuation and narcotic effects occur.

TABLE 5: Acute toxicity data

Parameter Route Species Values Exposure period

LC50 Inhalation Rat 800000 ppm 15 minutes

2. Repeated dose toxicity chronic effects cause bone marrow damage, haemopoiesis disorder and

may develop leukemia.

3. Sensitization May cause skin allergy.

4. CMR effects (carcinogenicity, mutagenicity, toxicity for reproduction) Proved carcinogenic

effects for humans. Substance has mutagenic effects.

5. Toxic kinetics, metabolism, distribution: Not applicable.

3.13 ECOLOGICAL INFORMATION

TABLE 6: Ecotoxicity data:

Parameter Route Species Values Exposure

period

Condition of

bioassay

LC50 Inhalation Fish 1000 mg/m3

96 hours Not specified

30

3.14 TRANSPORT INFORMATION

1 International Transport Regulation: ADR/RID (Road/Rail), IMDG (Sea) and ICAO/IATA (Air)

Proper Shipping Name: Liquefied Petroleum Gas

Hazard Class: 2.1, Liquefied Petroleum Gas

UN Number: 1075

Packing Group: II

Emergency Action Code: 2YE

Special transport precautionary measures Not applicable.

3.15 REGULATORY INFORMATION

MSDS format on a 16 Section based on guidance provided in:

Indian Regulation: Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rule, 1989. The

Factories Act 1948

International Regulations: European SDS Directive ANSI MSDS Standard ISO 11014-1 1994

WHMIS Requirements

United States Hazard Communication Standard

Canada Hazardous Products Act and Controlled Products Regulations

Europe Dangerous Substance and Preparations Directives

Australia National Model Regulations for the Control of Workplace Hazardous Substances

31

4.0 MODES OF TRANSPORTATION

Ship

Pipeline

By rail

By road

The transportation of LPG can be divided into 2-phases, international and national. The

international transportation mainly the exportation of LPG from source countries mainly from the

Middle East ships is mainly used for the international transportation. Cross country pipelines are

a possible way of transportation in international sector. India Iran pipeline is under construction.

Which mainly supplies LNG, LPG is also possible through this stream. If demand and availability

occurs.

In national sector, road transportation is more and railways is used in high demanding sectors and

for transportation from large refineries like RIL and pipelines are employed for short distance from

certain refineries to bottling plants.

Fig.3: Ship Carrying LPG

32

Fig.4: LPG bullet Tanker

Fig. 5: LPG Wagon- Indian Railway (BTPGLN)

33

5.0 HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH LPG

Jetfire

Vapour cloud explosion

BLEVE

Poolfire

5.1 JET FIRE

The jet fire occurs when the release of LPG from the pressurised tank through a small hole and the

jet of fuel when catches fire forms a jet fire. It is comparatively small fire and can be controlled

easily.

5.2 VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION (VCE)

A vapour cloud explosion is a result of a release of flammable material in the atmosphere,

dispersion of flammable material in air, and, after some delay, ignition of the flammable portion

of the vapour cloud. First, there must be a release of flammable material into a confined congested

area. Second, ignition must be delayed long enough to allow the formation of the ignitable mixture,

with the fuel-air concentration lying within the flammable limits. Third, there must be an ignition

source of sufficient energy to ignite the fuel-air mixture.

Once the above conditions are met and a VCE is initiated, the following effects to the

surroundings may include:

A wide spectrum of air blast effects, ranging from minimal to catastrophic.

A fireball.

Throw of lightweight materials such as insulation and thin metal sheathing within the

explosion zone and immediate surrounding area.

Dispersal of very light materials carried upward in the fireball or secondary fire updraft

and carried downwind.

Secondary fire at the initial release sources, and often other release sources caused by

displacement of equipment.

34

5.2.1 Definition of VCE

A VCE is one type of fuel-air explosion. Historically, this phenomenon was referred to as

“Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion (UVCE)”, to emphasis that the incidents are outdoor events.

But the term “unconfined” is a misnomer, since a truly unconfined scenario will not result in

detectable damage to the surroundings. It is more accurate to call this type of explosion simply a

“vapour cloud explosion (VCE).” Internal vapour explosion is another class of fuel-air explosion

that refers to an explosion inside of an enclosure such as building (room) or vessel. The presence

of the enclosure and turbulence created by failure of any portion of the enclosure affects the

combustion process. Prediction of internal vapour explosions is beyond the scope of this book.

Like other types of explosions, VCEs can also be categorized into two modes, deflagration and

detonation, according to propagation mechanisms.

5.2.2 Vapour Cloud Deflagration

In a vapour cloud deflagration, the flame propagates through the unburned fuel-air mixture at

a burning velocity less than the speed of sound. The overpressure generated in a VCE deflagration

varies with combustion rate: minimal overpressure is produced at low flame speed. Consequently,

the damage to the surroundings caused by VCE deflagration ranges from minimal to more severe.

VCE detonations are typically more severe than deflagration due to the high overpressure

generated by a supersonic wave. The situation for VCE deflagration is complex because the flame

speed and the pressure buildup in the deflagration are not unique for a given cloud composition,

but vary in a wide spectrum depending on many factors. Moreover, the composition of fuel and

combustion products at the flame front within the cloud, which supports the deflagration, changes

continuously. The vast majority of accidental VCEs are vapour cloud deflagrations.

5.2.3 Vapour Cloud Detonation

In a vapour cloud detonation, the combustion wave propagates at supersonic velocity

through the unburned fuel-air mixture. A detonation is the most violent form of vapour cloud

explosions and can cause the most severe damage. While the detonation mode is the expected

result in FAE weapon systems, it is very unlikely to occur in accidental vapour cloud explosions.

As with other types of explosions, VCE detonations can be achieved through either direct initiation

or the transition from a deflagration. One method of direct initiation used in research testing has

35

been a “bang box”, which is a strong enclosure inside of which an internal VCE is initiated, and

allowed to propagate through an opening or breached wall to provide high energy initiation of the

external vapour cloud. A bang box must be capable of withstanding high explosion pressures, and

such strong enclosures are typically not found in chemical processing plants. There are restrictive

conditions that must be met if a detonation is to propagate.

5.3 BLEVE

Boiling liquid expanding vapor explosions (BLEVEs) are one of the most severe accidents

that can occur in the process industry or in the transportation of hazardous materials. Strictly

speaking, these explosions do not necessarily imply thermal effects. However, in most cases the

substance involved is a fuel that causes a severe fireball after the explosion. Usually BLEVE refers

to the combination of these two phenomena, BLEVE and fireball, i.e., to an accident

simultaneously involving mechanical and thermal effects. BLEVEs occur with a certain frequency:

the substances that can lead to them (butane, propane, vinyl chloride, chlorine, etc.) are relatively

common in the industry, as well as the installations in which they can happen (tanks and tank cars).

They can have diverse origins, such as runaway reactions and collisions, but the most frequent one

is the action of fire on a container. 900 fatalities and over 9,000 injured in 77 BLEVEs occurring

between 1941 and 1990. Description of The Phenomenon

If a tank containing a pressurized liquid is heated—for example, due to the thermal radiation from

a fire—the pressure inside it will increase. At a certain moment, its walls will not be able to

withstand the high stress and they will collapse (the steel typically used for the construction of

LPG vessels may fail at pressures of about 15 atm, when the temperature of the walls reaches

approximately 650_C). This is most likely to occur in the top section of the container, where the

walls are not in contact with the liquid and therefore not cooled by it; the temperature of the walls

will increase and their mechanical resistance will decrease (Birk, 1995). Instead, the wall in contact

with the liquid will transfer heat to the liquid, thus maintaining a much lower temperature. If a

safety valve opens, the boiling liquid will have a stronger cooling action due to the heat of

evaporation

36

6.0 BURNS

The results of consequence of LPG tanker explosion are mainly in the form

of burns

6.1 TYPES OF BURNS

In a fire, you may be called on to help a co-worker who has been burned. You need to know the

first aid measure to take until emergency medical assistance arrives on the scene. That means you

must know how to recognize and treat first-, second-, and third-degree burns.

Fig.6: Cross-section of degrees of burns

6.2 TRADITIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF BURNS

1. First-Degree Burns

Signs: Redness of skin, pain, and mild swelling.

Treatment: Apply cool, wet compresses, or immerse in cool, fresh water-not ice or salt

water. Continue until pain subsides. Leave uncovered.

2. Second-Degree Burns

Signs: Deep reddening of skin. Glossy appearance from leaking fluid. Possible loss of some

skin. Blisters.

Treatment: Immerse in fresh, cool water-not ice or salt water-or apply cool compresses.

Continue for 10 to 15 minutes. Dry with clean cloth and cover with sterile gauze. Do not

break blisters. Elevate burned arms or legs. Further medical treatment is required.

37

3. Third-Degree Burns

Signs: Loss of skin layers. Painless. Skin is dry and leathery. Possible charring of skin

edges. Patches of first- and second-degree burns often surround third-degree burns.

Treatment: Cover burn lightly with sterile gauze or clean cloth. (Do not use material that

can leave lint on the burn.) If face is burned, have person sit up. Watch closely for possible

breathing problems. When possible, burned area should be elevated higher than the victim's

head. Keep person warm and comfortable, and watch for signs of shock. Immediate

medical attention is required.

TABLE 7: types of Burns

Degree Depth History Etiology Sensation Appearance Healing

1st degree Superficial Momentary

exposure

Sunburn Sharp,

uniform

pain

Blanches red,

pink,

edematous,

soft, flaking,

peeling

± 7 days

2nd

degree

Partial

thickness

Exposure

of limited

duration to

lower

temperature

(40-55oC)

Scalds,

flash burn

without

contact,

weak

chemical

Dull or

hyperactive

pain,

sensitive to

air/temp

changes

Mottled red,

blanches

red/pink,

BLISTERS,

edema,

serious

exudates,

moist

14-21 days

3rd degree Full

thickness

Long

duration of

exposure to

high

temperature

Immersion,

flame,

electrical,

chemical

Painless to

touch and

pinprick,

may hurt at

deep

pressure

No blanching,

pale white,

tan charred,

hard, dry,

leathery, hair

absent

Granulates,

requires

grafting

38

4th degree Underlying

structures

Prolonged

duration of

exposure to

extreme

heat

Electrical

flame,

chemical

Usually

painless

Charred,

‘skeletonized’

Amputation

fasciectomy

6.2.1 Types of Burns: Cause

Thermal Burn: caused by conduction or convection

Ex. Hot liquid, fire or steam

Electrical Burn: caused by the passage of electrical current through the body. There is

typically an entrance & an exit wound.

Ex. lightning

Chemical Burn: occurs when certain chemical compounds come in contact with the body.

Ex. Sulfuric acid, lye, hydrochloric acid, gasoline

6.3 TYPES OF BURNS AND TREATMENTS IN DETAIL

6.3.1 First Degree Burns- Superficial Burns

A first degree burn is confined exclusively to the outer surface and is not considered a significant

burn. No skin barrier functions are altered. The most common form is sunburn which heals by

itself in less than a week without a scar.

39

Treatment

Topical antimicrobial (Bacitracin) applied several times a day

6.3.2 Second Degree Burns- Partial Thickness Burns

Second degree burns cause damage to the epidermis and portions of the dermis. Since it does not

extend through both layers, it is termed partial thickness. There are a number of depths of a second

degree or partial thickness burn which are used to characterize the burn.

6.3.3 Superficial Second Degree

Involves the entire epidermis and no more than the upper third of the dermis is heat destroyed.

Rapid healing occurs in 1-2 weeks, because of the large amount of remaining skin and good blood

supply. Scar is uncommon. Initial pain is the MOST SEVERE of any burn, as the nerve endings

of the skin are exposed to the air.

Appearance

The micro vessels perfusing this area are injured resulting in the leakage of large amounts of

plasma, which in turn lifts off the heat destroyed epidermis, causing blisters to form. The blisters

often increase in size even after the burn. A light pink, wet appearing very painful wound is seen

as the blisters are disrupted. ** Frequently, the epidermis does not lift off the dermis for 12 to 24

hours and what initially appears to be first degree is actually a second degree burn.

Treatment

Debridement of affected skin to expose underlying wound. Debride blisters that are limiting joint

movement.

Clean wound and apply antimicrobial ointment such as bacitracin. Excellent alternative is the use

of skin substitute which seals the wound and decrease pain. Below is an example of Biobrane

application-usually put on in the Emergency Department setting. Also can apply closed dressing

of gauze for absorbency and wrap. This will need to be changed daily.

Healing

This type of burn heals in 10-12 days without scarring. There is a low risk of infection.

6.3.4 Mid-Second Degree-Mid Partial Thickness Burn

40

In this type of burn, destruction to about half the dermis occurs. Healing is slower due to the fact

that there is less remaining dermis and less of a blood supply. Pain can be severe but is usually less

intense than the superficial due in part by nerves that are destroyed.

Appearance

The burn surface may have blisters but is redder and less wet.

Treatment

Treatment is typically Silvadene cream and occlusive dressing with a closed dressing technique.

A temporary skin substitute is also a treatment of choice.

Healing

This type of burn usually heals in 2 to 4 weeks. The longer the healing time, the more chance of

scarring.

6.3.5 Deep Second Degree-Deep Partial Thickness

In this type of burn most of the skin is destroyed except a small amount of remaining dermis. The

wound looks white or charred indicating dead tissue. Blood flow is compromised and a layer of

dead dermis or eschar adheres to the wound surface. Pain is much less as the nerves are actually

destroyed by the heat. Usually, it is difficult to distinguish a deep dermal burn from a full thickness

burn by visualization. The presence of sensation to touch usually indicates the burn is a deep partial

injury.

Appearance

The wound surface may be dry and red in appearance with white areas in the deeper parts. There

is marked decrease in blood flow making the wound very prone to conversion to a deeper injury

and to infection. Direct contact with flames is a common cause. The appearance of the deep dermal

burn changes dramatically over the next several days after burn as the area of dermal necrosis

along with surface coagulated protein turns the wound a white to yellow color. This resembles the

third degree burn and differentiation sometimes is difficult. The presence of some pain can assist

in diagnosis because the pain is usually absent in full thickness injury.

Treatment

Wash with antimicrobial soap and water. Apply silvadene closed dressing. Often grafting is needed

to speed healing. Monitor for infection. Often converts to full thickness injury.

Healing

This type of burn may heal in 2-3 months. If it heals scarring is usually severe.

41

6.3.6 Full Thickness Burns

Both layers of skin are completely destroyed leaving no cells to heal. Any significant burn will

require skin grafting. Small burns will heal with scar. Entire destruction of the epidermis and

dermis, leaving no residual epidermal cells to repopulate.

Appearance

A characteristic initial appearance of the avascular burn tissue is a waxy white color. If the burn

produces char or extends into fat as with prolonged contact with a flame source, a leathery brown

appearance can be seen along with surface coagulation veins. The burn wound is painless and has

a coarse non-pliable texture to touch.

Treatment

Wash with antimicrobial soap and water. Apply Silvadene cream with a closed dressing. Grafting

is treatment of choice. High risk for infection.

6.4 ZONES OF INJURY

Zone of Coagulation: area of greatest destruction, tissue necrosis, irreversible cell and

tissue damage due to coagulation of the constituent proteins.

Zone of Stasis: damaged tissue, area of less severe injury that possesses reversible damage

and surrounds the Zone of Coagulation

Zone of Hyperemia: Pink, no cell death, the area surrounding the Zone of Stasis that

presents with inflammation, but will fully recover without any intervention or permanent

damage

6.5 LOCAL EFFECTS FOLLOWING A BURN

Loss of water regulation by the skin (direct or by water evaporation)

Loss of protein

Loss of electrolytes

Wound infection

Vascular thrombosis (deep burns)

Development of necrotic tissue

42

Blisters

Oedema.

6.6 SYSTEMIC EFFECTS FOLLOWING A BURN

• Shock

• Hypovolaemia

• Increased blood viscosity

• Pulmonary effects

• Toxic gases (direct)

• Oedema (indirect)

• Airway obstruction

• Hyperventilation

• Increased hormones

Catecholamine

Cortisone

Glucagon

• Gastric effects

Acute gastroduodenalmucosal lesions

Prolonged gastroduodenal mucosal lesions

Duodenal ulcer induced by surgery

Stomach dilatation.

6.7 CRITERIA FOR HOSPITALIZATION

20% or greater TBSA (total body surface area)

10% or greater TBSA in child or older adult

5% or greater full thickness burn

Burns to any of the 4 special areas

Burns to the eyes or ears

43

TABLE 8: SPECIAL AREAS

MAJOR BURNS MODERATE BURNS MINOR BURNS

Burn surface involvement of 25%

body surface area. Full-thickness

burns 10% body surface area.

Deep burns of the head, hands,

feet, and perineum.

Inhalation injury.

Chemical or high-voltage

electrical burn.

Burn area of 15-25% body

surface area.

Superficial partial-thickness

burns of the head, hands, feet or

perineum.

Suspected child abuse.

Concomitant trauma.

Significant pre-existing disease.

15% body surface area.

Nothing involving

head, feet, hands or

perineum.

If any of the 4 special areas are burned, it is classified as a severe burn and will require

hospitalization

Special areas: face, hands, feet, groin

44

6.8 CALCULATING TBSA (EXTENT)

Fig. 7: Rule of 9 and Rule of 19

45

6.8.1 Adults: Rule of Nines

Head & neck 9 %

Anterior trunk 18 %

Posterior trunk 18 %

Bilateral anterior arm, forearm and hand 9 %

Bilateral posterior arm, forearm and hand 9 %

Genital region 1%

Bilateral anterior leg and foot 18 %

Bilateral posterior leg and foot 18 %

6.8.2 Children: Rule of Nineteen

A child under one year has 9 % taken from the lower extremities and added to the head region.

Each year of life, 1 % is distributed back to the lower extremities until age 9 when the head region

is considered to be the same as an adult.

6.9 SUMMARY OF INJURY AND FATALITY DATA

Table 1 shows the spread of selected experimental burn data for infrared radiation. Very little third

degree burn data is available and some non-threshold data has not been selected. Ultra-violet

radiation data has not been considered as typical emissions from hydrocarbon fires mainly

comprise infrared radiation, which is found to produce burns at lower doses (Rew, 1996). Ultra-

violet radiation data has been used historically and frequently since Eisenberg interpreted nuclear

bomb fatalities as a thermal radiation probit (Eisenberg et al., 1975).

46

6.10 Burn vs. Thermal Dose Relationship

Harm Caused Infrared Radiation Thermal Dose (TDU), (kW/m2)4/3s

Mean Range

Pain 92 86-103

Threshold first degree burn 105 80-130

Threshold second degree burn 290 240-350

Threshold third degree burn 1000 870-2600

It is expected that an individual either in pain from a thermal dose received or suffering from 1o

burns should escape rapidly as the injury should not be sufficient to impede movement, yet the

pain will be too uncomfortable to bear standing still.

An individual with 2o burns will have even greater motivation to escape, commonly

referred to as the fight or flight response. However at this level of injury, any exposed skin will be

very uncomfortable and difficult to use in contact with another surface. Simple tasks, such as

turning door handles or dressing in survival equipment will take longer, if they are at all possible.

Depending on the location and extent of injury, more difficult tasks, such as operating control

panels or turning valves may be impossible.

With 3o burns an individual will be in severe pain and will certainly realize that they are

in immediate danger of losing their life. Individual response is hard to predict.

However fine control of injured extremities will be impossible and other functions will be severely

impaired. Escape will probably incur further injury as skin may fall away from the wound.

Individuals with 3o burns should be considered as casualties who cannot evacuate unaided.

Table 2 summarizes the estimated thermal dose to produce the relevant harm criteria.

The values quoted take into account the factors considered in Appendix 2. The dose is relevant for

a typical offshore population on a typical offshore platform, where the source of the radiation is a

hydrocarbon flame from a jet-, pool- or flash- fire or a fireball.

47

6.11 Thermal Dose Harm Criteria Guidance

Harm Caused Thermal Dose (TDU), (kW/m2)4/3s

Escape impeded 290

1-5% Fatality offshore 1000

50% Fatality offshore with radiation only to

the front or back (i.e. from a fireball)

1000

50% Fatality offshore 2000

100% Fatality offshore 3500

The above table shows the best estimates of harm criteria. The 50% fatality level (2000

TDU) is an estimate based on the assumption that, prior to clothing ignition, less than 50% of

individuals will become fatalities and following clothing ignition more than 50% of individuals

will become fatalities. As most offshore clothing is nominally identical, the threshold of piloted

clothing ignition is taken as a conservative value. Where only one side of an individual is presented

to a fire, only half the normal dose is required for the same effect. This will only occur with short

duration (<10s) events.

1% fatality is a conservative estimate based on Rew (1996). Rew concluded that serious

burns may be received or a small % of onshore workers would die following exposure to 1000

TDU. It is assumed that the training and clothing of offshore workers is generally superior to that

of onshore workers, but the increased difficulty of escape etc. nulls this advantage. It is assumed

that the exposure to 1000 TDU is evenly distributed to the front and back of the victim, due, for

example, to a winding escape route.

As stated above, even 2o burns impede escape, however unassisted escape is still possible

until the onset of 3o burns over a large body area or sensitive areas, or until clothing ignition

occurs.

The 100% fatality level is difficult to distinguish from some lower levels. In the interest of

setting a guiding figure, 3500 TDU is estimated. However, 100% fatality may occur at slightly

lower doses. At 3500 TDU, un-piloted ignition of clothing will occur, thus even 100% clothed

individuals will not survive. At this level of thermal dose, self-extinguishment is unlikely due to

injury from heat transmitted through the clothing, unless fire protective clothing (PPE) is worn.

48

6.12 BURNS - DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Above figures present a comparison of commonly used fatality prediction probits. For the probit

equations, discussion of figures below.

The harm criteria guidance in Table 2 has been plotted on Figures 1-3 in order to enable

comparison with other author’s advice. Figures 1-3 have been drawn at selected heat flux levels

for illustrative and comparative purposes only. In particular, 2kW/m2 corresponds to strong

sunlight. 5 and 10 kW/m2 are heat flux levels at which fatality rates are frequently evaluated.

From Figures 1-3, it is clear that both Eisenberg’s (1975) and Lees’ (1994) probits are more

optimistic than Tsao & Perry’s (1979) probit. The harm criteria guidance in

Table 2, reflecting a cautious best estimate, lies centrally within this range; more conservative than

Eisenberg (1975) and more optimistic than Tsao & Perry (1979).

Figure 4 demonstrates the time to 2o burns can be as low as 10s for a 10 kW/m2 heat flux.

Where the flux is only 5 kW/m2, 10s exposure only results in the onset of pain.

Although the logarithmic scale exaggerates the dose scale, Figure 4 indicates a longer duration

between 2o and 3o burn injury than between other injuries. Some authors have reported a period of

constant injury in this region of received dose.

49

Fig.8: Fatality Predictions Using Probit Relations (2kW/m2)

Fig. 9: Fatality Predictions Using Probit Relations (5kW/m2)

50

Fig. 10: Fatality Predictions Using Probit Relations (10kW/m2)

Fig. 11: Dose vs. Time Plot

51

6.13 TYPES OF FIRE AND ITS EFFECTS

The types of fire encountered offshore will usually involve the combustion of large quantities of

liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons. This was the type of fire considered by Rew (1996). He concluded

that such fires emit mainly in the infrared part of the spectrum and fall into four distinct categories:

pool, flash, jet fires and fireballs

(BLEVEs – Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosions are a particular type of fireball

involving pressurized liquefied gases). Table 9 gives the main characteristics of these events in

terms of duration, size, radiation intensity, etc.

TABLE 9: Characteristics of Process Fire Incidents

Type Size Duration Radiated Surface

Emissive Heat

Flux (kW/m2)

Hazard

Pool fire (open) Medium Long 50-150 Radiation,

smoke,

engulfment

Pool fire (severe

or confined)

Medium Long 100-230 Radiation,

smoke

Jet fire (open) Medium Medium/Long 50-250 Radiation,

smoke

Jet fire

(confined)

Medium Medium/Long 100-300 Radiation,

smoke

Flash fire Large Short 170 Engulfment

Fireball Large Short 270 (HID

SRAG)

Radiation

Pool fires may form over liquid or solid surfaces and can spread over large surface areas, thus

increasing the fuel burn rate. The vaporized fuel has little if any momentum and is easily affected

by wind. In general pool fire hazards decay rapidly with distance but, at high speeds, the wind may

cause significant flame tilt and the attacking of areas some distance from the seat of the fire.

Depending on ventilation conditions, large quantities of smoke may be produced. This can make

52

received radiation calculations more difficult but also increase fatality rates and incapacitation due

to smoke inhalation, and prevention of evacuation.

Although flash fires are generally low intensity transitory events, the burning velocity is

quite high and escape following ignition is not possible. Flash fires often remain close to the

ground, where most ignition sources and personnel are present. It is usually assumed that those

caught inside a flash fire will not survive while those outside suffer no significant harm.

Jet fires often have very high thermal radiation emissions, with local maxima up to

300kW/m2. Jet fires may burn for longer than flash fires and fireballs, but the effects are usually

more restricted in space as the release is directed and momentum controlled so that it is largely

unaffected by wind direction or strength.

Fireballs usually burn more fuel rich than flash fires and have a higher surface heat flux.

As the cloud burns, it heats up the remainder of the fuel and entrained air, so that fireballs usually

rise up while they burn, presenting a larger emitting surface to those exposed. Fireball durations

can be predicted with Roberts’ Model (Lees, 1994):

Duration (s) = 0.83 x Mass (kg)0.316

A 2.6 Te flammable gas would take 10 s to burn and a 7.0 Te cloud would take 13.6 s to

burn. Although optimistic, it should be assumed that an individual would turn and flee a fireball

after 10 s, thus the full exposure from a fireball might not only be to a single side of an individual.

Fireballs and BLEVEs may result from a jet or pool fire directly impinging a pressure vessel. As

the tank surface heats up, the steel weakens, while the internal pressure rises. At some point, the

vessel will rupture catastrophically releasing its contents as a cloud.

53

6.14 DIRECT EFFECTS

6.14.1 Thermal Radiation Causing Direct Burns

The effect of thermal radiation is to initially warm the skin, which then becomes painful. Shortly

after, the onset of 2o burns occurs, with depth of burn increasing with time for a steady level of

radiation. Ultimately, the entire thickness of the skin will burn and the underlying flesh will start

to be damaged - 3o burns. Table 1, Section 1 shows the typical radiation dose required to generate

burns. Many factors account for the range of values found in the literature, including type of heat

source and type of animal skin used.

6.14.2 Burns Causing Fatality

Rew (1996) looked for an equivalent LD50 for burns and the thermal radiation that caused burns.

Looking at both the UK population distribution and medical data presented by Lawrence (1991)

and Clark & Fromm (1987) among others, Rew concluded that as little as 30% burn area

(unspecified burn type) is required to produce 50% fatality in conjunction with inhalation injury.

Other data takes account of more recent medical treatment techniques, which have improved

survivability. For example, Davies (1982) presents data from Feller et al. (1980):

TABLE 10: Burn Area For 50% Fatality

Age Group (Years) Burn Area (%)

0-4 60.0

5-34 71.2

35-49 61.8

50-59 52.1

60-74 33.7

Over 75 19.6

The data in this table was reported by National Burn Information Exchange and

corresponds to patients in hospital over the period 1976-79. 50% fatality means 50% of patients

admitted to hospital die of their injuries (either 2o or 3o burns).

54

Davies also presents data from 15 other sources indicating a trend of increasing survival

rates with time, up to 1981, when Griffiths et al. (1981) state that 50% of 15-44 year olds will die

from 70% body area burns.

For reference, the fatality rate for different burn areas is tabulated below for the 40-44 year

old age range. These statistics do not specify which burn type was present, principally because of

the difficulty of assessing the burn depth, without causing further injury. Additionally, there is no

indication of how much of the exposed skin has been burned or the cause of the burn.

TABLE 11: Approximate Mortality Probabilities

Body Area Burned (%) Mortality Probability

78-100 1

68-77 0.9

63-67 0.8

53-62 0.7

48-52 0.6

43-47 0.4

33-42 0.3

28-32 0.2

18-27 0.1

0-17 0

6.15 TIME DEPENDENCE

For short duration fires, e.g. fireballs, account must be taken of delayed reaction. If the entire

thermal dose is on one side of a person (i.e. they don’t turn around as they retreat), piloted ignition

of clothing may occur at thermal doses as low as 900 – 1000 TDU. This is because an even thermal

loading is assumed for longer duration fires where escape is involved. Assumed reaction time must

be at least 5 seconds. For such short duration fires it may be overly conservative to assume 100%

fatality for ignition of clothing, as the thermal radiation after the fireball has burned may be very

low, allowing the approach of colleagues with fire extinguishers.

55

Fatality statistics do not usually discriminate between different survival durations, however

delayed medical attention (as would be expected offshore) can only increase fatality rates.

Additionally, over 1 – 5 days up to 70% of people with 20-30% area, 3o burns will become

‘incapacitated’ (Ingram), whereas <5% will become incapacitated within 15 minutes. If the longer

duration is considered important (e.g. in bad weather when helicopter rescue is impossible), the

criteria may have to be adjusted to minimize long term incapacitation.

56

7.0 HISTORY OF EVENTS

In Indian sector of LPG transportation 3-major incidents are happened. These 3 are in south India,

karunagapailly, chala, uppinangady more than 50 people died in these incidents, lots of people

injured, lost their houses normal life etc.

TABLE 12: Karunagappally incident data

KARUNAGAPPALLY

Date December 31-2009

Thursday

Accident time 3:50 AM

BPCL

LPG route Kochi refinery to IOCL bottling plant kollam

Location Puthebtherur junction

NH-47 karunagapilly

What happened

Tanker rammed with maruthiwagnor

car and overturned, leak of LPG occurred

Formation of vapour cloud

Vapour cloud explosion happens

Causes of Accidents Collision with maruthi car

Causes of Explosion Spark from police jeep when it starts

Consequence VCE

No. of death 4

No. of injuries 15

Remarks

The firefighting personal didn’t have sufficient

knowledge “how to tackle the situation“

People also didn’t have the awareness of these

type of accidents.

They were simply watching the extinguishing

process within 100 meter radius

57

TABLE 13:Uppinangady incident data

UPPINGADY

Date April-9 2013

Accident time Morning 10AM

LPG route HPCL manglore to bottling plant banglore

Location Perne, near uppingamdy NH-47

What happened Tanker overturned, release of LPG in huge

amounts

VCE occurred

Cause Tanker overturned while negotiating of curve

Consequence VCE

No.of death 9

No.of injuries N.A

TABLE 14:Chala incident data

CHALA

Date 27 august 2012

Accident time 10:00PM

LPG route Mangalapuram to Kozhikode

Location Chala bypass NH17

What happened while negotiating a curve it hit the median and

the tanker overturned , release of LPG

occured

Causes Over speed, deep curve, splittedmidean ,no

reflectors

Consequence JET FIRE, VCE, BLEVEE

No.of death 24

No.of injuries 40

58

7.1 LIST OF INCIDENTS

Various industrial disasters happened time to time in world wide , here is some list of incidents

involving BLEVE incidents, VCE incidents, incidents involving LPG, tanker accidents.

TABLE 15: BLEVE Incidents

No. Date & Year Location Plant/Transport Chemical Event Death/Injury

1. July 7, 1951 Port

Newark, NJ

Storage Propane VCF,BL

EVE

0d, 14i

2. July 19, 1955 Ludwigshaf

en, FRG

Rail tank car Ethylene BLEVE 2i

3. July 29, 1956 Dumax, TX Storage vessel HC BLEVE 19d, 32i

4. Oct 22, 1956 Cottage

Grove, OR

Storage LPG BLEVE 12d, 12i

5. Jan 8, 1957 Montreal,

Quebec

Storage vessel Butane BLEVE 1d

6. May 22, 1958 Signal Hill,

CA

Tank farm Oil froth F,

BLEVE

2d, 18i

7. May 28, 1959 McKittrick,

CA

Storage LPG BLEVE 2i

8. Jun 2, 1959 Deer Lake,

PA

Rail tank car LPG BLEVE 11d, 10i

9. Jan 4, 1966 Feyzin,

France

Storage vessel Propane BLEVE 18d, 81i

10. Jan 1, 1968 Dunreith, IN Rail tank car Ethylene

oxide

BLEVE 5i

11. Jan 25, 1969 Laurel, MS Rail tank car LPG BLEVE 2d, 33+i

12. Jun 21, 1970 Crescent

City, IL

Rail tank car Propane BLEVE 66i

13. Oct 19, 1971 Houston,

TX

Rail tank car VCM BLEVE 1d, 5i

14. Sep 21, 1972 Rio de

Janeiro,

Brazil

Storage vessel Butane BLEVE 37d, 53+i

15. Jul 5, 1973 Kingman,

AZ

Rail tank car Propane BLEVE 13d, 95i

16. Jan 11, 1974 West St.

Paul, MN

Storage vessel LPG BLEVE 4d, 6i

59

17. Feb 12, 1974 Oneonta,

NY

Rail tank car LPG BLEVE 25i

18. Apr 17, 1974 Bielefeld,

FRG

BLEVE

19. Aug 31, 1975 Gadsden,

AL

Tank farm Gasoline BLEVE 4d, 28i

20. Sep 1, 1975 Des Moines,

IA

Rail tank car LPG BLEVE 3i

21. Nov 26, 1976 Belt, MT Rail tank car LPG BLEVE 22i

22. Feb 24, 1978 Waverly,

TN

Rail tank car Propane BLEVE 16d, 43i

23. May 30, 1978 Texas City,

TX

Storage vessel LPG BLEVE 7d, 10i

24. Sep 8, 1979 Paxton, TX Rail tank car Chemicals BLEVE 8i

25. Mar 3, 1980 Los

Angeles,

CA

Road tanker Gasoline BLEVE 2d, 2i

26. Sep 28, 1982 Livingston,

LA

Rail tank car Flammabl

es, toxics

DEL,

BLEVE

0d, 0i

27. Jul 23, 1984 Romeoville,

IL

Absorption

column

Propane VCE,

BLEVE

15d, 22i

28. Nov 19, 1984 Mexico

City,

Mexico

Terminal LPG VCF,

BLEVE

~650d,

~6400i

TABLE 16: Fire Ball Incidents

No. Date & Year Location Plant/Transport Chemical Event Death/Injury

1. Jul 29, 1956 Amarillo,

TX

Storage tanks Oil FB 20d, >32i

2. Mar 9, 1972 Lynchburg,

VA

Road tanker Propane FB 2d, 5i

3. Jan 17, 1974 Aberdeen,

UK

Road tanker FB

4. Apr 30, 1975 Eagle Pass,

TX

Road tanker LPG FB 17d, 34i

60

5. Aug 31, 1976 Gadsden,

AL

FB 33d, 28i

6. Dec 28, 1977 Goldonna,

LA

Rail tank car LPG FB 2d, 9i

7. May 29, 1978 Lewisville,

AR

Rail tank car VCM FB 2i

8. Aug 4, 1978 Donnellson,

IA

Pipeline LPG FB 3d, 2i

9. Aug 30, 1979 Good Hope,

LA

Tank barge Butane FB 12d, 25i

TABLE 17: VCE Incidents

No. Date & Year Location Plant/Transp

ort

Chemical Event Death/Injur

y

1. Jan 2, 1939 Newark, NJ Butane VCE

2. Jan18, 1943 Los Angeles,

CA

Road tanker Butane VCF 5d

3. July 29, 1943 Ludwigshafen

, Germany

Rail tank car Butadiene VCE 57d, 439i

4. July 23, 1948 Ludwigshafen

, FRG

Rail tank car Dimethyl ether VCE 207d,

~3818i

5. Dec 30, 1949 Detroit, IL Cat cracker Propane, Butane VCE 5d

6. Aug 1950 Wray, CO Road tanker Propane VCF 2d

7. July 7, 1951 Port Newark,

NJ

Storage Propane VCF,

BLEVE

0d, 14i

8. Aug 16, 1951 Baton Rouge,

LA

Naphtha

treating

HCs VCE 2d

9. Aug 6, 1953 Campana,

Argentina

Refinery

recovery unit

Gasoline VCE 2d

10. Oct 18, 1954 Portland, OR Rail tank car LPG VCE 0d

11. July 14, 1955 Freeport, TX Polyethylene

plant

Ethylene VCE

12. July 22, 1955 Wilmington,

CA

Gasoline

plant

Butane VCE

61

13. July 26, 1956 Baton Rouge,

LA

Alkylation

unit

Butylene VCE

14. Dec 19, 1956 North

Tonawanda,

NY

Polyethylene

plant

Ethylene VCE 0d

15. Oct 24, 1957 Sacramento,

CA

Loading

terminal

LPG VCE 1d

16. Apr 15, 1958 Ardmore, OK Loading

terminal

Propane VCE

17. July 30, 1958 Augusta, GA Loading

terminal

LPG VCE 1d

18. Jun 28, 1959 Meldrin, GA Rail tank car LPG VCE 23d

19. Jan 31, 1961 Lake Charles,

LA

Alkylation

unit

Butane VCE 2d

20. Dec 17, 1961 Freeport, TX Caprolactam

plant

Cyclohexane VCE 1d

21. Apr 17, 1962 Doe Run, KY Feed vessel Ethylene oxide IE, VCE 1d, 21i

22. Apr 17, 1962 Fawley, UK Cat cracker VCE

23. Apr 17, 1962 Houston, TX Tank farm Gasoline VCE 2d

24. July 25, 1962 Berlin, NY Road tanker LPG VCE 10d, 17i

25. Aug 4, 1962 Ras Tanura,

Saudi Arabia

Storage

vessel

Propane VCE, F 1d, 115i

26. May 3, 1963 Plaquemine,

LA

Ethylene

plant

Ethylene VCE 7i

27. Jan 9, 1964 Jackass Flats,

NV

Research

laboratory

Hydrogen VCE

28. Oct 25, 1964 Liberal, KS Compressor

station

Propane VCE

29. Oct 25, 1964 Orange, TX Polyethylene

plant

Ethylene VCE 2d

30. July 13, 1965 Lake Charles,

LA

Ethylene

plant

Methane or

Ethylene

VCE

31. July 31, 1965 Baton Rouge,

LA

Reactor Ethyl chloride VCE

32. Oct 24, 1965 Escambia,

USA

Chemical

plant

Hydrogen,

Carbon

monoxide

VCE

33. Dec 23, 1965 Baltimore,

MD

Detergent

plant

Benzene VCE

62

34. Jan 19, 1966 Raunheim,

FRG

Ethylene

plant

Methane,

Ethylene

VCE 3d, 83i

35. Feb 6, 1966 Scotts Bluff,

LA

Reactor Butadiene VCE 3d

36. May 23, 1966 Philadelphia,

PA

Refinery Benzene,

Cumene,

Propane

VCF

37. Jan 20, 1967 Sacramento,

CA

Saturn rocket Hydrogen,

oxygen fuel

VCE

38. Aug 8, 1967 Lake Charles,

LA

Alkylation

unit

Isobutylene VCE 7d, 13i

39. Jan 21, 1968 Pernis,

Netherlands

Slops tank Oil slops VCE 2d, 85i

40. May 14, 1969 Wilton, UK Oxidation

plant

Cyclohexane VCE 2d, 23i

41. Sept 9, 1969 Houston, TX Pipeline Natural gas VCE 9i

42. Sept 11, 1969 Glendora, MS Rail tank car VCM TOX, VCE 1i

43. Oct 1, 1969 Escombreras,

Spain

Storage Propane VCE 4d, 3i

44. Oct 23, 1969 Texas City,

TX

Butadiene

recovery unit

Butadiene IE, VCE 3i

45. Dec 28, 1969 Fawley, UK Hydroformer Hydrogen,

Naphtha

VCE 0d

46. Feb 6, 1970 Big Springs,

TX

Alkylation

unit

VCE

47. Dec 5, 1970 Linden, NJ Refinery

reactor

C10 HC VCE 40i

48. Dec 10, 1970 Port Hudson,

MO

Pipeline Propane VCE 10i

49. Jan 19, 1971 Baton Rouge,

LA

Rail tank car Ethylene VCE 0d, 21i

50. Feb 25, 1971 Longview, TX Polyethylene

plant

Ethylene VCE 4d, 60i

51. July 19, 1971 Texas Chemical

plant

Ethylene VCE 3d

52. Sept 15, 1971 Houston,TX Butadiene

plant

Butadiene VCE 1d, 6i

53. Dec 23, 1971 Lake Charles,

LA

Chemical

plant

Trichloroethyle

ne,

VCF 4d, 3i

63

Perchloroethyle

ne

54. Aug 14, 1972 Billings, MT Alkylation

unit

Butane VCF 1d, 4i

55. Oct 22, 1972 East St Louis,

IL

Rail tank car Propylene VCE 1d, 230i

56. Feb 1, 1973 St-Amand-

les-Eaux

Road tanker Propane VCE 9d, 37i

57. Feb 22, 1973 Austin, TX Pipeline NGL VCE 6d, many

injured

58. July 5, 1973 Lodi, NJ Reactor Methanol VCF 7d

59. July 8, 1973 Tokuyama,

Japan

Ethylene

plant reactor

Ethylene VCE 1d, 4i

60. Oct 28, 1973 Shinetsu,

Japan

Chemical

plant

VCM VCE 1d, 23i

61. Dec 27, 1973 Freeport, TX Tank Ethylene oxide VCF 29i

62. Jan 4, 1974 Holly Hill, FL Road tanker Propane VCE 0d

63. Jun 1, 1974 Flixborough,

UK

Caprolactam

plant

Cyclohexane VCE 28d, 104i

64. Jun 26, 1974 Climax, TX Rail tank car VCM VCE 7d

65. July 7, 1974 Cologne, FRG Vinyl

chloride plant

VCM VCE

66. July 18, 1974 Plaquemine,

LA

Cracking

plant

Propylene VCF

67. July 18, 1974 Pitesti,

Roumania

Ethylene

plant

Ethylene VCE ~100d

68. July 18, 1974 Texas Chemical

plant

Pentanes VCE 2d

69. July 19, 1974 Decatur, IL Rail tank car Isobutane VCE 7d, 152i

70. July 21, 1974 Zaluzi,

Czechoslovak

ia

Ethylene

plant

Ethylene VCE 14d, 79i

71. Aug 25,1974 Petal, MO Salt dome

storage

Butane VCE 24i

72. Aug 30,1974 Fawley, UK Polyethylene

plant

Ethylene VCE

73. Sept 5, 1974 Barcelona,

Spain

Chemical

plant

VCM, ethylene

dichloride

VCF

74. Sept 21, 1974 Houston, TX Rail tank car Butadiene VCE 1d, 235i

64

75. Nov 29, 1974 Beaumont,

TX

Isoprene

plant

Isoprene VCE 2d, 10i

76. Feb 10, 1975 Antwerp,

Belgium

Polyethylene

plant

Ethylene VCE 6d, 13i

77. Aug 17, 1975 Philadelphia,

PA

Tank farm Crude oil

vapours

VCF, EX 8d, 2i

78. Sept 5, 1975 Rosendaal,

Netherlands

Gasoline VCE

79. Nov 7, 1975 Beek,

Netherlands

Petrochemica

l plants

Propylene VCE 14d, 107i

80. Nov 21, 1975 Cologne, FRG Cyclic

hydroformer

Hydrogen,

Naphtha

VCE 0d

81. Nov 21, 1975 Deer Park, TX Polyethylene

plant

Ethylene VCF 1d, 4i

82. Dec 2, 1975 Watson, CA Hydrogen

plant

Hydrogen VCE

83. Feb, 1976 Texas Pipeline Ethylene VCF 1d, 15i

84. Jun 16, 1976 Los Angeles,

CA

Pipeline Gasoline VCE 9d, many

injured

85. Aug 6, 1976 Lake Charles,

LA

Refinery Isobutane VCE 7d

86. Sept 26, 1976 Puerto Rico Storage Pentanes VCF 1d

87. Oct 15, 1976 Longview, TX Ethanol plant Ethylene VCE 1d

88. Jan 27, 1977 Baytown, TX Tanker Gasoline VCE 3d

89. Feb 20, 1977 Dallas, TX Rail tank car Isobutane VCE 1i

90. Mar 18, 1977 Port Arthur,

TX

Stabilizer

unit

Propane VCE 4d

91. Jun 4, 1977 Abqaiq, Saudi

Arabia

NGL plant Fuel gas VCF

92. Jun 19, 1977 Puebla,

Mexico

VCF

93. July 20, 1977 Ruff Creek,

PA

Pipeline Propane VCF 2d

94. Dec 8, 1977 Brindisi, Italy Ethylene

plant

Light HCs VCE 3d, 22i

95. Dec 10, 1977 Pasacabolo,

Columbia

Fertilizer

plant

Ammonia, etc. TOX, VCE 30d, 22i

96. Feb 11, 1978 Poblado Tres,

Mexico

Pipeline Natural gas VCE 40d

65

97. Apr 15, 1978 Abqaiq, Saudi

Arabia

Gas plant (1)Methane

(2)LPG

(1)F,

(2)VCE

98. July 11, 1978 San Carlos,

Spain

Road tanker Propylene VCF 216d, 200i

99. July 15, 1978 Xilatopic,

Mexico

Road tanker Butane VCF 100d, 220i

100. Sep 16, 1978 Immingham,

UK

Ammonia

plant

Syngas VCE

101. Oct 3, 1978 Denver, CO Cat

polymerizati

on unit

Propane VCE 3d

102. Oct 30, 1978 Pitesti,

Roumania

Gas

concentration

unit

Propane,

Propylene

VCE

103. Mar 20, 1979 Linden, NJ Cat cracker LPG VCF

104. Jun 26, 1979 Ypsilanti, MI Storage Propane VCE

105. July 21, 1979 Texas City,

TX

Alkylation

unit

Propane VCE

106. Sep 4, 1979 Pierre Port,

LA

Pipeline LNG VCF

107. Sep 18, 1979 Torrance, CA Cat cracker C3-C4 HCs VCE

108. Jan 20, 1980 Borger, TX Alkylation

unit

Light HCs VCE 41i

109. Mar 26, 1980 Enschede,

Netherlands

Propane VCE

110. Oct 21, 1980 New Castle,

DE

Polypropylen

e plant

Hexane,

Propylene

VCE 5d, 25i

111. May 8, 1981 Gothenburg,

Sweden

Pipeline Propane VCE 1d, 2i

112. Oct 1, 1981 Czechoslovak

ia

Ammonia

plant

Syngas VCE

113. Mar 9, 1982 Philadelphia,

PA

Phenol plant Cumene VCE

114. Oct 1, 1982 Pine Bluff,

AR

Pipeline Natural gas VCF

115. Jan 7, 1983 Port Newark,

NJ

Storage tank Gasoline VCE 1d

116. Sep 30, 1983 Basile, LA Gas plant HCs VCF

117. Apr 20, 1984 Sarnia, Ont. Benzene

plant

Hydrogen VCE 2d

66

118. July 23, 1984 Romeoville,

IL

Absorption

column

Propane VCE,

BLEVE

15d, 22i

119. Aug 15, 1984 Fort

McMurray,

Alberta

Coking unit HCs VCF

120. Nov 19, 1984 Mexico City,

Mexico

Terminal LPG VCF,

BLEVE

~650d,

~6400i

121. Jan 18, 1985 Cologne, FRG Ethylene

plant

Ethylene VCE

122. Jan 23, 1985 Wood River,

IL

Deasphalting

-dewaxing

unit

Propane VCF

123. Feb 19, 1985 Edmonton,

Alberta

Pipeline NGL VCE

124. Mar 9, 1985 Lake Charles,

LA

Reforming

unit

Propane VCE

125. Nov 5, 1985 Mont Belvieu Salt dome

storage

Ethane, Propane VCE

126. Nov 21, 1985 Tioga, ND Gas

processing

plant

HCs IE, VCE

127. Aug 15, 1987 Ras Tanura,

Saudi Arabia

Gas plant Propane VCE

128. Nov 14, 1987 Pampa, TX Acetic acid

plant

Acetic acid,

Butane

VCE 3d

129. Apr 7, 1988 Beek,

Netherlands

Polyethylene

plant

Ethylene VCE

130. May 5, 1988 Norco, LA Cat cracker C3 HCs VCE 7d, 28i

131. Sep 8, 1988 Rafnes,

Norway

VC plant VCM, Ethylene

dichloride

VCE

132. Jun 2, 1989 Minnebeavo,

USSR

Gasoline

plant

Propane VCE 4d

133. Jun 3, 1989 Ufa, USSR Pipeline NGL VCE 645d, ~500i

134. Jun 7, 1989 Morris, IL Distillation

column

Propylene VCF

135. Oct 23, 1989 Pasadena, TX Polyethylene

plant

Isobutane VCE

136. Dec 24, 1989 Baton Rouge,

LA

Refinery Ethane, Propane VCE

67

137. Mar 3, 1990 North

Blenheim, NY

Pipeline Propane VCF 2d, 7i

138. May 14, 1990 Tomsk, USSR Ethylene

plant

Gas VCE

139. Sep 24, 1990 Bangkok,

Thailand

Road tanker LPG VCF 68d, >100i

140. Nov 3, 1990 Chalmette,

LA

Hydrocracke

r

HCs VCE

141. Nov 6, 1990 Nagothane,

Bombay,

India

Ethylene

plant

Ethane, Propane VCE 31d

142. Nov 15, 1990 Porto de

Leixhos,

Portugal

Deasphalting

unit

Propane VCE

143. Mar 11, 1991 Pajaritos,

Mexico

Vinyl

chloride plant

Propane VCE 3d

144. Mar 12, 1991 Seadrift, TX Ethylene

oxide plant

Ethylene oxide VCE 1d

145. July 14, 1991 Kensington,

GA

Synthetic

rubber

Butadiene plant VCE

146. Oct 16, 1992 Sodegaura,

Japan

Refinery Hydrogen VCE 10d, 7i

TABLE 18: Incidents Involving LPG

No. Date & Year Location Plant/Transport Chemical Event Death/Inju

ry

1. Dec, 1932 Detroit, MI Storage LPG

2. Nov 21, 1944 Denison, TX Tank LPG F 10d

3. Oct, 1949 Winthrop,

MO

Rail tank car LPG F 1d

4. Feb 8, 1951 St. Paul, MN Loading terminal LPG VEEB 14d

5. July 24, 1952 Kansas City,

KS

Loading terminal LPG VCE

6. Oct 18, 1954 Portland, OR Rail tank car LPG VCE 0d

7. Oct 22, 1956 Cottage

Grove, OR

Storage LPG BLEVE 12d, 12i

8. Oct 24, 1957 Sacramento,

CA

Loading terminal LPG VCE 1d

68

9. July 30, 1958 Augusta, GA Loading terminal LPG VCE 1d

10. Feb 27, 1959 Portland, OR Road tanker LPG REL

11. May 28, 1959 McKittrick,

CA

Storage LPG BLEVE 2i

12. Jun 2, 1959 Deer Lake, PA Rail tank car LPG BLEVE 11d, 10i

13. Jun 28, 1959 Meldrin, GA Rail tank car LPG VCE 23d

14. July 25, 1962 Berlin, NY Road tanker LPG VCE 10d, 17i

15. Dec, 1968 Yutan, NE Pipeline LPG F 5d

16. Jan 25, 1969 Laurel, MS Rail tank car LPG BLEVE 2d, 33+i

17. Mar 6, 1969 Repesa, Spain Refinery LPG,

Propylen

e

F 0d

18. Nov 12, 1970 Hudson, OH Road tanker LPG F 6d

19. Dec 5, 1970 Mitcham, UK LPG IE

20. Nov 6, 1973 Ventura

County, CA

Rail tank car LPG REL 2d, 4i

21. Jan 11, 1974 West St. Paul,

MN

Storage vessel LPG BLEVE 4d, 6i

22. Feb 12, 1974 Oneonta, NY Road tank car LPG BLEVE 25i

23. Apr 30, 1075 Eagle Pass,

TX

Road tanker LPG FB 17d, 34i

24. May 13, 1975 Devers, TX Pipeline LPG F 4d

25. Sep 1, 1975 Des Moines,

IA

Rail tank car LPG BLEVE 3i

26. Nov 26, 1976 Belt, MT Rail tank car LPG BLEVE 22i

27. Apr 3, 1977 Umm Said,

Qatar

Gas plant LPG F 7d, 13+i

28. Dec 8, 1977 Cassino, Italy LPG IE 1d, 9i

29. Dec 28, 1977 Goldonna, LA Rail tank car LPG FB 2d, 9i

30. Dec 28, 1977 Jacksonville,

USA

LPG F

31. Jan 12, 1978 Conway, KS Pumping station LPG EX

32. May 30, 1978 Texas City,

TX

Storage vessel LPG BLEVE 7d, 10i

33. Aug 4, 1978 Donnellson,

IA

Pipeline LPG FB 3d, 2i

34. Mar 20, 1979 Linden, NJ Cat cracker LPG VCF

35. Aug, 1979 Orange, TX Pipeline LPG EX 1d, 1i

36. Feb 11, 1980 Longport, UK Warehouse LPG, etc. F, EX

69

37. May 15, 1981 San Rafael,

Venezuela

Pipeline LPG EX 18d, 35i

38. Mar 15, 1983 West Odessa,

TX

Pipeline LPG EX, F 6d

39. Nov 19, 1984 Mexico City,

Mexico

Terminal LPG VCF,

BLEVE

~650d,

~6400i

40. Apr 1, 1990 Warren, PA FCC LPG EX, F

41. Sep 24, 1990 Bangkok,

Thailand

Road tanker LPG VCF 68d, >100i

TABLE 19: Incidents Involving Road Tankers

No. Date & Year Location Plant/Transport Chemical Event Death/Inju

ry

1. Jan 18, 1943 Los Angeles,

CA

Road tanker Butane VCF 5d

2. Oct 13, 1948 Sacramento,

CA

Road tanker Butane F 2d

3. Aug, 1950 Wray, CO Road tanker Propane VCF 2d

4. Feb 27, 1959 Portland, OR Road tanker LPG REL

5. July 25, 1962 Berlin, NY Road tanker LPG VCE 10d, 17i

6. Apr 3, 1963 Norwich, CT Transport tank Organic

peroxides

EX 4d, 4i

7. Aug 21, 1968 Lievin, France Road tanker Ammoni

a

TOX 5d, 20i

8. May 30, 1970 Brooklyn, NY Road tanker Oxygen F 2d, 30i

9. Nov 12, 1970 Hudson, OH Road tanker LPG F 6d

10. Jun 4, 1971 Waco, GA Road vehicle Explosiv

es

HEX 5d, 33i

11. Aug 8, 1971 Gretna, FL Road tanker Methyl

bromide

TOX 4d

12. Mar 9, 1972 Lynchburg,

VA

Road tanker Propane FB 2d, 5i

13. Sept 21, 1972 NJ Turnpike,

NJ

Road tanker Propane F 2d, 28i

14. Feb 1, 1973 St-Amand-

les-Eaux

Road tanker Propane VCE 9d, 37i

15. Jan 4, 1974 Holly Hill, FL Road tanker Propane VCE 0d

16. Jan 17, 1974 Aberdeen, UK Road tanker FB

70

17. Apr 30, 1975 Eagle Pass,

TX

Road tanker LPG FB 17d, 34i

18. Dec 4, 1975 Seattle, WA Road tanker F

19. Dec 14, 1975 Niagara Falls,

NY

Road tanker Chlorine TOX 4d, 80i

20. May 11, 1976 Houston, TX Road tanker Ammoni

a

TOX 6d, 178i

21. Sept 11, 1976 Westoning,

UK

Road tanker Petrol EX 3i

22. Jan 27, 1977 Baytown, TX Tanker Gasoline VCE 3d

23. Sept 24, 1977 Beattyville,

KY

Road tanker Gasoline F 7d, 6i

24. May 29, 1978 Mexico City,

Mexico

Road tanker Propylen

e

F 12d

25. July 11, 1978 San Carlos,

Spain

Road tanker Propylen

e

VCF 216d, 200i

26. July 15, 1978 Xilatopic,

Mexico

Road tanker Butane VCF 100d, 220i

27. July 16, 1978 Tula, Mexico Road tanker Butane EX 12d

28. Jan 8, 1979 Bantry Bay,

Eire

Oil tanker Crude oil EX 50d

29. Apr 19, 1979 Port Neches,

TX

Oil tanker Crude oil EX

30. Nov 1, 1979 Galveston

Bay, TX

Oil tanker Crude oil EX 32d

31. Mar 3, 1980 Los Angeles,

CA

Oil tanker Gasoline BLEVE 2d, 2i

32. July 24, 1980 Rotterdam,

Netherlands

Oil tanker Crude oil Ship

split

apart

33. Nov 25, 1980 Kenner, LA Road tanker Gasoline F 7d, 6i

34. May 3, 1982 Caldecott

Tunnel,

Oakland, CA

Road tanker Gasoline F 7d

35. Dec 29, 1982 Florence, Italy Road tanker Propane EX 5d, 30i

36. Mar 22, 1989 Peterborough,

UK

Road vehicle Explosiv

es

EX 1d, 107i

37. Sept 24, 1990 Bangkok,

Thailand

Road tanker LPG VCF 68d, >100i

71

8.0 STUDY AREA

For the Project two cases are under study transportation of liquefied fuel gases by road and rail

Study Area 1

35 Kilometers road of NH 47 from Kalamassery to Chalakudy has been taken as study area 1. In

this route mainly tankers from Kochi refinery to various bottling plants of different companies are

under consideration. 5 major points in the route have been selected for the study namely

Kalamassery, Aluva, Angamaly, Chalakudy, Paravurkavala. An assumption is made that the LPG

tanker overturned in the points in the study area and LPG released occurred and the different

consequences are Analyses for particular area by considering various atmospheric conditions.

Study Area 2

Aluva Railway station is considered as the study area for the Project for the case of LPG

transportation through rail.(include current situation). Here we assume different scenarios is going

to occur, such as derailment, collision of trains and terrorist attack

Aluva railway station is located one of the most populated and business area of the city. If LPG

explosion occurring in this area have a huge impact on the environment.

Daily a lot of people come around this location and the traffic around this area is very high

72

TABLE 20: Study –Area Details.

No

.

Location

Points

Latitude Longitude Elevation District Distance From

District H-Q

1 Chalakudy

10° 18´ N 76° 20´ E 49 Ft Thrissur 30

1 Angamaly

10° 11´ N 76° 23´ E 63 Ft Ernakulam 25

3 Paravoorka

vala

10° 7 ´ N 76° 20´ E 35 Ft Ernakulam 14

4 Aluva

10° 6´ N 76° 20´ E 26 Ft Ernakulam 13

5 kalamassery

10° 3´ N 76° 19´ E 61 Ft Ernakulam 6

TABLE 21: Study Area – Population Details

Sl. No. Name District Panchayath/

Municipality

Wards Exposed To

The Study Area

Total

Population

1. Chalakudy TSR M 12,8,7,6,5 12121

2. Melur TSR P 14, 15 5556

3. Koratty TSR P 1, 15 6026

4. Karukutty EKM P 13,8,7,3,15 7204

5. Angamaly EKM M 5,8,12,13,15 11233

6. Nedumbassery EKM P 2,4,5,8,9 7512

7. Aluva EKM M 2,5,6,7 9456

8. Churnikara EKM P 3,4,7,12 6320

9. Kalamassery EKM M 5,6,23 6412

73

TABLE 22: Fire Stations

NO FIRE STATION DISTRICT

DISTANCE

FROM

H.Q(KM)

DISTANCE

FROM

N.H(KM)

PH ONE NO

1 CLUB ROAD

ERNAKULAM ERNAKULAM 3 1 2355101

2 COCHIN PORT ERNAKULAM 12 1 2666555

3 COCHIN

REFINERIES ERNAKULAM 13 3.6 2720789

4 FACT

AMBALAMUGAL ERNAKULAM 15 6 2720246

5 FACT

UDYOGMANDAL ERNAKULAM 14 4 2545109

6 GANDHINAGAR ERNAKULAM 7 2 2205550

7 ALUVA ERNAKULAM 18 0.2 04842624101

8 ANGAMALY ERNAKULAM 30 0.85 2452101

9 KOTHAMANGALAM ERNAKULAM 48 0.15 2822420

10 PERUMBAVOOR ERNAKULAM 32 1 2523123

11 THRISSUR THRISSUR 3 1 04872423650

12 CHALAKUDY THRISSUR 30 0.1 04802702000

13 IRINJALAKUDA THRISSUR 20 1 04802820558

14 MUVATTUPUZHA ERNAKULAM 39 0.1 04852832727

15 PARAVOOR ERNAKULAM 29 1 2443101

16 THRIKKAKKARA ERNAKULAM 10 2.5 24223100

TABLE 23: Study Area – Hospital Details

74

No Hospital Name District

Distance From

Head

Quarters(Km)

Distance

From N

H(Km)

Phone No

1 Amritha imsrc Ernakulam 11 1 0484 2802000

2 Ernakulam medical

center(palarivattam) Ernakulam 4.7 0.1 04842807101

3 Lakeshore hospital Ernakulam 15 0.1 0484 2701032

4 Luke memorial Ernakulam 6.2 1.5 0484 522123

5 Medical trust hospital Ernakulam 12 2 2358001

6 PVS memorial Ernakulam 6.8 01 2345451

7 Cochin port hospital Ernakulam 19 3 2666403

8 Lisie hospital Ernakulam 7.7 100 04842452547

9 Little flower angamaly Ernakulam 26 50 04842452547

10 Lourds hospital Ernakulam 10 2.5 391507

11 Elite mission Thrissur 1.9 0.1 2335185

12 Aswini hospital Thrissur 2.9 0.1 04872334238

13 Bishopalappat mission Thrissur 17 3 04802877320

14 Dhanya mission Thrissur 26 0.1 04802703386

15 Holy family hospital Thrissur 6.8 2 04872353030

16 Irinjalakuda co-operative

hospital Thrissur 22 0.1 04802822779

17 Jubilee mission hospital Thrissur 2.4 2.4 04872420361

18 Karuna hospital Thrissur 5.3 2 04872630283

19 Modern hospital Thrissur 39 0.1 2802922

20 St james hospital Thrissur 28 0.15 04802702887

9.0 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

75

In this project the consequence analysis employed by two methods

1. Using ALOHA air modelling software.

2. Mathematical modelling.

The consequence analysis considered the consequence like BLEVE, VCE and JETFIRE. It

estimates radiation area due to different fires developed and pressure blast area from the explosion

9.1 ALOHA

ALOHA is an air dispersion model which can be used as a tool for predicting the movement

and dispersion of gases. It predicts pollutant concentrations downwind from the source of a spill,

taking into consideration the physical characteristics of the spilled material. ALOHA also accounts

for some of the physical characteristics of the release site, weather conditions, and the

circumstances of the release. Like many computer programs, it can solve problems rapidly and

provide results in a graphic easy-to-use format. This can be helpful during an emergency response

or planning for such a response ALOHA originated as a tool to aid in emergency response. It has

evolved over the years into a tool used for a wide range of response, planning, and academic

purposes. There are some features that would be useful in a dispersion model (for example,

equations accounting for site topography) that have not been included in ALOHA because they

would require extensive input and computational time. Surface topography can modify the general

pattern of wind speed and direction. One such case is the mountain breeze. During the day air near

the mountain slope warms up faster than air at the same altitude but farther from the mountain

[51]. This causes a local pressure gradient towards the mountain side and air is forced to flow up

the mountain slope as mountain breeze. With sun set the pressure gradient is reversed and the less

buoyant air flows downward into valleys One of the limitations of the ALOHA software is that, it

doesn’t account for the effects of topography. But Ichikawa and Sada [56] developed a model

evaluating the topographical effect on atmospheric dispersion using numerical model. In this

model, the topographical effect was evaluated in terms of the ratios of maximum concentration

and the distance of the point of maximum concentration from the source on the topography to the

respective values on a flat plane and the relative concentration distribution along the ground

surface plume axis normalized for the maximum concentration on a flat plane

76

ALOHA is intended to be used for predicting the extent of area downwind of a chemical

accident where people may be at risk of exposure to hazardous concentrations of toxic gas. It is

not intended for use with accidents involving radioactive chemicals. Since most first responders

do not have dispersion modelling background, ALOHA has been designed to require input data

that are either easily obtained or estimated at the scene of an accident. The results of toxic gas

dispersion modelling are used as input data for vulnerability modeling.

77

9.2 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS USING ALOHA

CASE 1 - LPG released from Rail wagon at Aluva Railway station due to Terrorist attack

SCENARIO

Leak from wagons through 2 inch hole. Formation of vapor cloud and after some time VCE

occurred. Leading to the BLEVE scenario on one of the wagon and simultaneously the adjacent

wagons, Causes a Domino effect and Projectile of Bogies

9.2.1 Aloha Inputs- Aluva Railway Station

SITE DATA

Location ALUVA RAILWAY STATION, INDIA

Building Air Exchanges Per Hour 0.66 (sheltered single storied)

Time March 17, 2015 1400 hours ST (user

specified)

CHEMICAL DATA

Chemical Name BUTANE

Molecular Weight 58.12 g/mol

AEGL-1 (60 min) 5500 ppm

AEGL-2 (60 min) 17000 ppm

AEGL-3 (60 min) 53000 ppm

LEL 16000 ppm

UEL 84000 ppm

Ambient Boiling Point -0.5° C

Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature greater than 1 atm

Ambient Saturation Concentration 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0%

78

ATMOSPHERIC DATA (MANUAL INPUT OF DATA)

Wind 3.8 meters/second from ESE at 3 meters

Ground Roughness urban or forest

Cloud Cover 0 tenths

Air Temperature 32° C

Stability Class C

No Inversion Height

Relative Humidity 70%

SOURCE STRENGTH:

BLEVE of flammable liquid in horizontal cylindrical tank

Tank Diameter 2.4 meters

Tank Length 17.994 meters

Tank Volume 81.4 cubic meters

Tank contains Liquid

Internal Storage Temperature 32° C

Chemical Mass in Tank 38.2 tons

Tank 75% full

Percentage of Tank Mass in Fireball 75%

Fireball Diameter 172 meters

Burn Duration 11 seconds

Pool Fire Diameter 61 meters

: Burn Duration 25 seconds

Flame Length 85 meters

79

9.2.2 Analysis Results

Fig. 12: ALOHA footprint- BLEVE

Fig. 13; ALOHA footprint- Jet fire

80

Fig.14: ALOHA footprint- Blast Area

TABLE 24: ALOHA Analysis Results

NO INCIDENT EFFECT

1

Spread of flammable

vapor

10 % LEL up to 80 m distance which depend on the wind

direction

2 JET FIRE

Radiation of 10 kw/m2 up to 35m radius area

Radiation of 2 kw/ m2 up to 80 m radius area

3 BLEVE

Radiation of 10 kw/m2 up to 400 m radius area

Radiation of 5kw/m2 up to 500m radius area

Radiation of 2 kw/m2 up to 750m radius area

4 VCE

Overpressure of 8 psi up to 54 m which is depend on the wind

direction

Overpressure of 1 psi up to 120m which is depend on the wind

direction

81

Fig. 15: Bleve Area – Aluva Railway

Fig.16: Flammable area- aluva railway station

82

Fig. 17: Blast Area- Aluva railway station

Fig.18: Jet Fire Area – Aluva railway Station

83

CASE 2 - LPG Release from overturned Bullet tanker at study location ( ALUVA )

SCENARIO

Assumed a LPG tanker bulletin tanker overturned and damage happened to the LPG bullet. A two

inch hole is formed. LPG is spread to the atmosphere according to the wind direction. A cloud of

vapors formed at the different locations and settled in lower regions. After sometime the vapor

cloud met with ignition source and VCE occurred .The fire is reached to the source of release and

the jet fire Radiate the bullet tank and some portion is engulfed by the jet fire. A BLEVE condition

formed finally BLEVE occurred

9.2.3 ALOHA INPUTS- ALUVA LOCATION

SITE DATA

Location ALUVA, INDIA

Building Air Exchanges Per Hour : 0.65 (sheltered single storied)

Time : March 10, 2015 1951 hours ST (user specified)

CHEMICAL DATA

Chemical Name BUTANE

Molecular Weight 58.12 g/mol

AEGL-1 (60 min) 5500 ppm

AEGL-2 (60 min) 17000 ppm

AEGL-3 (60 min) 53000 ppm

LEL 16000 ppm

UEL 84000 ppm

Ambient Boiling Point -0.6° C

Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature greater than 1 atm

84

ATMOSPHERIC DATA

MANUAL INPUT OF DATA

Wind 3.5 meters/second from wsw at 3 meters

Ground Roughness open country

Cloud Cover 3 tenths

Air Temperature 32° C

Stability Class E

No Inversion Height

Relative Humidity 70%

SOURCE STRENGTH:

Leak from short pipe or valve in horizontal cylindrical tank

Flammable chemical escaping from tank (not burning)

Tank Diameter 2.3 meters

Tank Length 9 meters

Tank Volume 37.4 cubic meters

Tank contains Liquid

Internal Temperature 32° C

Chemical Mass in Tank 18.7 tons

Tank is 80% full

Circular Opening Diameter .8 inches

Opening from tank bottom 0.71 meters

Release Duration ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour

Max Average Sustained Release Rate 56.8 kilograms/min (averaged over a

minute or more)

Total Amount Released 3,394 kilograms

85

9.2.4 Analysis Results- Road Tanker

Fig.19: ALOHA footprint of Jet fire area

Fig. 20: ALOHA footprint of Blast Area

86

Fig. 21: ALOHA Footprint of BLEVE

TABLE 25: ALOHA Analysis Results- Road

NO INCIDENT EFFECT

1 Spread of flammable vapor

cloud

10 % LEL up to 80 m in one minute which is depend on

wind direction

2 JET FIRE Radiation of 10 kw/m2 up to 10 m radius area

3

BLEVE

Radiation of 10 kw/m2 up to 250m radius area

Radiation of 5 kw/m2 up to 400m area

Radiation of 2 kw/m2 up to 650m radius area

4

VCE

Overpressure of 8 psi up to 20 m depend on the wind

direction

Overpressure of 2 psi up to 38m depend on the wind

direction

87

Fig.22: BLEVE Area Aluva bypass

Fig.23: Flammable Area- ALUVA bypass

88

Fig.24: Jet Fire Area- Aluva bypass

Fig.25: Blast area- Aluva bypass

89

9.2.5 Aloha Footprints For BLEVE of Other Study Locations (Super Imposed Model

On Google Map)

Fig.26: BLEVE area Angamaly

Fig.27: BLEVE Area - Chalakudy

90

Fig.28: BLEVE Area - Kalamassery

Fig.29: BLEVE Area – Paravoor Kavala

91

9.3 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS USING MATHEMATICAL MODELS

9.3.1 Modelling Of Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE)

When a large amount of flammable vaporizing liquid or gas is rapidly released, a vapour cloud

forms and disperses with the surrounding air. There lease can occur from a storage tank, process,

transport vessel, or pipelines. If this cloud is ignited before the cloud is diluted below its lower

flammability limit (LFL), a vapour cloud explosion (VCE) will occur. Centre for Chemical Process

Safety (CCPS) of American Institute of Chemical Engineers provides an excellent summary of

vapour cloud behavior. They describe four features, which must be present for a VCE to occur.

First the release material must be flammable. Second, a cloud of sufficient size must form prior to

ignition. Third, a sufficient amount of the cloud must be within the flammable range. Fourth,

sufficient confinement or turbulent mixing of a portion of the vapour cloud must be present.

Following models are used for VCE modelling

1. TNT equivalent model

2. TNO multi energy model

3. Modified Baker model

All of these models are quasi-theoretical and are based on the limited field data and accident

investigation. TNT equivalency model is easy to use andhas been applied for many QRA studies

[8]. It is described in Baker, Decker, Lees and Merex. TNT model is well established for high

explosives but when applied to flammable vapour clouds it requires the explosion yield η,

determined from the past incidents. Following methods are used for estimating the explosion

efficiency.

1. Braise and Simpson uses 2% to 5% of the heat of combustion of the total quantity of fuel spilled.

2. Health and Safety Executive uses 3% of the heat of combustion of the quantity of fuel present

in the cloud.

3. Industrial Risk Insures [33] uses 2% of the heat of combustion of thequantity of the fuel spilled.

92

4 .Factory Mutual Research Corporation [34] uses 5%, 10% and 15% of theheat of combustion of

the quantity of fuel present in the cloud, dependanton the reactivity of the material.

9.3.2 TNT Equivalent model for VCE

The TNT equivalent model is based on the assumption ofequivalence between the flammable

material and TNT factored by an explosionefficiency term. The TNT equivalent W is given by

𝑊 = 𝜂𝑀𝐻𝐶

𝐸𝑇𝑁𝑇− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −(3.6)

Where,

𝑊- Equivalent mass of TNT (kg),

𝜂 - Empirical explosion efficiency,

𝑀- Mass of hydrocarbon (kg),

𝐻𝐶- Heat of combustion of flammable substance (J/kg),

𝐸𝑇𝑁𝑇- Heat of combustion of TNT (J/kg).

Pressure of blast wave

The explosion of a TNT charge is shown in Fig. 3.1 for a hemispherical TNT surface charge at sea

level. The pressure wave effects are correlated as a function of scaled range. The scaled range is

defined as distance X by the cube root of TNT mass.

𝑍 = 𝑋

𝑊1

3⁄− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − (3.7)

Where,

𝑍 - Scaled distance in the graph

𝑋- Radial distance from the surface of the fire ball (m),

𝑊 - TNT equivalent (kg).

93

Using X and W, we can find out Z. From the graph we can find out over pressure corresponding

to Z.

Fig.30: Graph for Scaled Distance Calculation

9.3.4 Modelling Of Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (Bleve)

Among the diverse major accidents which can occur in process industries, in energy installations

and in the transportation of dangerous materials, Boiling liquid expanding vapor explosions or

BLEVEs are important especially due to their severity and the fact that they involve

simultaneously diverse effects which can cover large areas, overpressure, thermal radiation and

missile effect. Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE) is a type of physical

significantly higher than its boiling point at atmospheric pressure. The physical force that causes

the BLEVE is on account of the large liquid to vapor expansion of the liquid in the container.LPG

will expand to 250 times its volume when changing from liquid to vapor. It is this expansion

process that provides the energy for propulsion of the container and the rapid mixing of vapor from

the container with air, resulting in the fireball characteristic when flammable liquids are involved.

Boiling Liquid expanding vapour explosions were defined by Walls, who first proposed the

94

acronym BLEVE as “a failure of a major container into two or more pieces occurring at a moment

where the container is at a temperature above boiling point at normal atmospheric pressure.

In most BLEVE cases caused by exposure to fire, the container failure originates in the

container metal significantly where it is not in contact with liquid. The liquid conducts the heat

away from the metal and acts as a heat absorber. Therefore the metal around the vapor space can

be heated to the point of failure. The major hazards of BLEVE are thermal radiation, velocity of

fragments and over pressure from shock wave.

Radiation received by a target

The radiation received by a receptor (for the duration of BLEVE incident) is given by CCPS of

AIChE as.

𝐸𝑟 = 𝜏𝑎𝐸𝐹21 − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −(3.8)

Where,

𝐸𝑟- Emissive radiative flux received by a receptor (W/m2),

𝜏𝑎 - Transmissivity (dimensionless),

𝐸 -Surface emitted radiative flux (W/m2),

𝐹21-View factor (dimensionless).

Roberts, Hymes and CCPS provide a means to estimate surface heat flux based on the

radiative fraction of the total heat of combustion.

𝐸 = 𝑅𝑀𝐻𝐶

𝜋𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥2𝑡𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒

− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − (3.9)

Where,

𝐸 - Radiative emissive flux (W /m2),

𝑅 - Radiation fraction of heat of combustion (dimensionless),

𝑀 - Initial mass of fuel in the fire ball (kg),

95

𝐻𝐶-Heat of combustion per unit mass (J/kg),

𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥- Maximum diameter of fire balls (m),

𝑡𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒- Duration of fireballs

Hymes [39] suggest the following values for R, 0.3 for fireball from vessel bursting below

the relief set pressure and 0.4 for fireballs from vessels bursting at or above the relief set pressure.

Pietersen and Huerta [40] and TNO [25] recommended a correlation formula that accounts

the humidity for transmissivity.

𝜏𝑎 = 2.02(𝑃𝑊𝑋𝑆)−0.09 − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −(3.10)

Where,

𝜏𝑎- Atmospheric transmissivity (0-1),

𝑃𝑊- Water partial pressure (N/m2),

𝑋𝑆- Path length distance from the flame surface to the target (m).

An expression for water partial pressure as a function of the relative humidity and

temperature of the air is given by Mudan and Corce.

𝑃𝑊 = 1013.25(𝑅𝐻)𝑒𝑥𝑝 (14.4114 − 5328

𝑇𝑎) − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − (3.11)

Where,

𝑅𝐻 - Relative humidity,

𝑇𝑎- Ambient temperature (K).

As the effects of BLEVE mainly relates to human injury, a geometric view factor for a sphere to

receptor is required. In general the fire ball centre has a height of H above the ground. The distance

L is measured from a point at the ground directly beneath the centre of fire ball to the receptor at

ground level.

96

Equation for view factor given by Sengupta are as follows

Pitblado developed correlation for BLEVE fire ball diameter as a function of mass released

and Tasneem Abbasi et.al. Compared the various correlations for BLEVE fire ball diameter

calculation. The TNO formula proposed by Peterson and Huerta [40] give good overall fit to

observed data. All models use power law correlations to relate BLEVE diameter and duration to

the mass.

Empirical equations for maximum diameter of fire ball, duration of BLEVE and distance

between the fireball centre and the ground given by AIChE/CCPS are as follows

𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 5.8 𝑀1

3⁄ − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − (3.14)

𝑡𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒 = 2.6 𝑀1

6⁄ − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − (3.15)

𝐻𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒 = 0.75 𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −(3.16)

Where,

𝑀 Is the initial mass of the flammable material in kg.

97

9.3.5 Mathematical modeling –ANALYSIS

SCENARIO:

For mathematical modeling approach the quantity of fuel is mainly considered, an LPG tanker

containing 18 tonnes of LPG is overturned and LPG Release Happened VCE and BLEVE

occurred

9.3.6 Inputs Parameters - BLEVE

SL. NO. PARAMETERS VALUES

1. Distance 120 m

2. Mass Of Fuel

16 Te

3. Temperature 30 oC

4. Height 0.75 Dmax

5. Diameter Of Fireball 5.8 M1/3

6. Heat Of Combustion 4900 kj/kg

7. Radiative Fraction Of Heat Of

Reaction

0.3

8. Relative Humidity 0.7

98

TABLE 26: BLEVE Analysis Results

DISTANCE RADIATION

100

24.9

110

21.8

120

20.7

130

18.1

140

15.8

150

13.9

160

12.2

170

10.7

180

9.5

190

8.4

200

7.5

Fig. 31 Distance Vs Radiation Graph

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200

RA

DIA

TIO

N(k

w/m

2 )

DISTANCE(m)

DISTANCE VS RADIATION

RADIATION

99

9.3.7 Mathematical modeling inputs – VCE

Sl.

No. Parameters Values

1. Distance (R) 45 m

2. Mass Of H.C (M) 250 kg

3. Empirical explosion efficiency (η) 0.05

4. Heat Of Combustion (Hc) 4900

5. Constant a -0.2143

6. Constant b 1.3503

TABLE 27: VCE –ANALYSIS RESULTS

DISTANCE(m) OVERPRESSURE(kpa)

40 4789

45 2579

50 1532

55 949

60 604

65 395

100

Fig.32: Distance Vs Overpressure Graph

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

40 45 50 55 60 65

OV

ERP

RES

SUR

E(kp

a)

DISTANCE (m)

OVERPRESSURE2

101

10.0 SOCIETAL RISK DIAGRAM

CASE: LPG tanker overturned containing 18 tonnes of LPG, BLEVE occurred and the number

of fatalities calculated for Each shell according to Radiation value

10.1 PROCEDURE

1. Compute the distance from Ground zero to the center of the current shell

2. Compute the receptor distance from the fireball center to the current shell

3. Compute the incident heat flux at the shell center using equation 𝐸𝑟 =8.28×105 𝑀0.771

𝑋𝐶2

4. Compute the probit for fatality using equation 𝑌 = −14.9 + 2.56 𝑙𝑛 (𝑡 𝐼

43⁄

104 )

5. Convert the probit to a percentage using table

6. Calculate the total shell area

7. Determine the total workers in the shell

8. Multiply the total number of workers by the percent fatalities to determine the total fatalities

9. Sum up the fatalities in all shells to determine the total

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TABLE 28: Probit to Percentage Conversion

% 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

0 - 2.67 2.95 3.12 3.25 3.36 3.45 3.52 3.59 3.66

10 3.72 3.77 3.82 3.87 3.92 3.96 4.01 4.05 4.08 4.12

20 4.16 4.19 4.23 4.26 4.29 4.33 4.36 4.39 4.42 4.45

30 4.48 4.50 4.53 4.56 4.59 4.61 4.64 4.67 4.69 4.72

40 4.75 4.77 4.80 4.82 4.85 4.87 4.90 4.92 4.95 4.97

50 5.00 5.03 5.05 5.08 5.10 5.13 5.15 5.18 5.20 5.23

60 5.25 5.28 5.31 5.33 5.36 5.39 5.41 5.44 5.47 5.50

70 5.52 5.55 5.58 5.61 5.64 5.67 5.71 5.74 5.77 5.81

80 5.84 5.88 5.92 5.95 5.99 6.04 6.08 6.13 6.18 6.23

90 6.28 6.34 6.41 6.48 6.55 6.64 6.75 6.88 7.05 7.33

% 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9

99 7.33 7.37 7.41 7.46 7.51 7.58 7.65 7.75 7.88 8.09

TABLE 29:

103

Fig.33 Societal Risk Diagram

104

11.0 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS

CASE 1

LPG Road tanker met with Accident and overturned , considered various cases

For the basic events of LPG Release and source of Ignition

SCENARIO -1

LPG tanker overturned, Release of LPG to the atmosphere, from manifold, pressure gauge, and

from a crack developed is considered

Considered various sources of ignition like spark from electric cable, motor vehicles, open flame

etc

The causes considered for accident are Tyre puncture, over speed, collision with median etc

Fire happened and engulfed the tanker and BLEVE condition satisfied then finally BLEVE took

place

SCENARIO -2

LPG Tanker overturned, Release LPG to atmosphere from manifold, pressure gauge and

crack/hole developed on tanker is considered

The ignition of LPG cloud is delayed vapor cloud is spread to more areas

After some time the ignition source, found that the vapor cloud and VCE took place

The ignition source considered are open flame, spark from the electric cable motor vehicle etc

105

Fig. 34 FTA Road Accident (VCE)

106

Fig.35: FTA of Road Accident (BLEVE)

107

CASE 2

Release of LPG from a Wagon due to derailment, terrorist attack, collision at Aluva railway

station and various sources of ignition are considered

SCENARIO 1

Release of LPG from Various parts like pressure gauge, manifold, crack developed, hole

developed due to terrorist attack. Found the ignition source and Fire occurred. Radiation from this

fire enrich BLEVE condition finally BLEVE took place, the ignition source may be Spark, open

flame, intentionally ignited by the terrorist etc

SCENARIO 2

Release of LPG from Various parts like pressure gauge, manifold, and crack developed/ hole

developed due to terrorist attack, Vapor cloud formed, ignition of vapor cloud delayed for a while,

found the ignition sources and VCE established

108

Fig.36: FTA for Rail Accident (VCE)

109

Fig.37: FTA for Rail Accident (BLEVE)

110

12.0 ETA SCENARIO

CASE 1

LPG Release from tank and various consequences cases like BLEVE, VCE, are considered for

analysis

SCENARIO

Considered the type of release of LPG, type of ignition, protection facility and the consequence

outcome considered

CASE 2

LPG release and Explosion from LPG road Tanker

SCENARIO

LPG tanker met with an accident and overturned due to tyre puncture. Then the possible scenarios

are considered by analyzing various conditions like control of driver on driving. Such situation

will damage the manifold, Release of LPG and considered various possible events like BLEVE,

VCE, and JET FIRE

111

Fig.38: ETA for LPG Release

112

Fig.39: ETA of LPG Road Tanker

113

13.0 FIREMODE

Fire mode is QRA tool for fire modelling it estimates various parameters like Thermal radiation,

air blast overpressure due to explosion of different modes of fire such as BLEVE, VCE,JET FIRE

& POOL FIRE. This software uses proven mathematical models

13.1 FIREMODE 2

Fire mode 2 shall be the updated version for the software firemode, It seems to include

additional features such as graphical representation of models. This features enables to

estimate how much area be affected by a particular consequence from the point source of

origin

Conversion of graphical representation of modelling to KML files. These KML files have

to superimpose the model on google maps

Wish to include societal and individual risk estimating features

Risk contours

114

14.0 CONCLUSION

India is a developing country. For a positive development energy sources are necessary.

LPG is a good mode of energy source. It is very useful in various sectors like Industrial, domestic

and commercial. Even though the LPG is a hazardous energy source, we cannot avoid the use of

LPG. We have seen disasters like Chala, Uppinagady and karunagappilly. But we cannot stop the

transportation of LPG due to that reasons, because it is very necessary for the energy security. Risk

assessment and consequence analysis procedure in this sector will help for emergency planning

procedure, awareness to public and government. Also it will be act as a decision tool for the

Refinery people. For quick actions, it can assess the damage area, effect on population, the damage

to structure etc. Fault tree and event tree analysis will help to find out the frequency of events, also

it will assist to find out the consequences and its initiating events. Probit function for societal risk

and risk diagrams helps to find out the percentage of fatalities in the shell area.The consequence

analysis in study area shows that the Radiation effect from BLEVE reaches up to 2 km with in this

area. Important section like Bus stand, Railway stations, Business buildings etc include this show

that the spread of damage

115

BIBILIOGRAPHY

Less loss prevention volume 1 and 3

Guidelines for chemical process quantitative risk analysis

OISD 144 – LPG Installations

OISD 159 - LPG tank trucks – requirements of safety on design/ fabrication and Fittings.

OISD 161- LPG Tank trucks incidents : rescue and relief operations

Check sheet for BOGIE LPG tank wagon type – BTPGLN - - government of India

ministry of railways.

Q & A for shell LPG depot (PHI Assessment).

CCPS, 1999 Guidelines for Evaluating the Characteristics of Vapour Cloud Explosions,

Flash Fires and BLEVEs Center for Chemical Process Safety.

Case study of chala accident by OISD representatives

Risk analysis of LPG transport by road and rail – Roberto Bubbico, Cinzia Ferrari,

Barbara Mazzarotta – Journal of loss prevention.

J. casal. , J Arnold, H. Montiel, E. Planas-Cuchi,- modelling and understanding of

BLEVE

Experimental charaterisation and modelling of hazards of BLEVE and boilover –

Delphine laborer

www.hindu.com

www.hindustanpetroleum.com

www.youtube.com

www.asianetnews.com

116

www.indiavisiontv.com

www.wikipedia.com

www.keralapcb.org

www.punjllogd.com

www.shell.com

www.totalgas.com