1. Luspo v. People

Issue: Was Tugaoen under custodial investigation when he was “invited” and made statement before PNP investigating committee?

Ruling: At any rate, even if we were to hold that the investigation conducted by the PNP was custodial in nature, the improprieties that Tugaoen bewail would not prevail against strong and overwhelming evidence showing her and her co-conspirators guilt. Allegations of impropriety committed during custodial investigation are material only when an extrajudicial admission or confession is the basis of conviction. In the present case, the conviction of Montano, Duran, and Tugaoen was not deduced solely from Tugaoens admission, but from the confluence of evidence showing their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

2. People v. Ibanez

Issue: Was Nabilgas provided with a competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice when he executed the extra judicial confession?

Ruling: No. The Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must satisfy the following requirements: “(1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel[,] preferably of the confessant's chaoice; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.” Nabilgas’ confession was not made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel. The services of Atty. Melita Go, the lawyer who acted in Nabilgas’ behalf, were provided by the very same agency investigating Nabilgas – the NBI itself; she was assigned the task despite Nabilgas’ open declaration to the agency’s investigators that he already had a lawyer in the person of Atty. Donardo Paglinawan.

3. People v. Guillen

Issue: Was appelant’s silence during the investigation an implied admission of guilt?

Ruling: No. Clearly, when appellant remained silent when confronted by the accusation of "AAA" at the police station, he was exercising his basic and fundamental right to remain silent. At that stage, his silence should not be taken against him. Thus, it was error on the part of the trial court to state that appellant’s silence should be deemed as implied admission of guilt. In fact, this right cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of

counsel and any admission obtained in violation of this rule shall be inadmissible in evidence

4. Tanengge v. People

Issue: Is the Petitioner’s written statement admissible in evidence if the questioning was initiated an internal affairs management bank?

Ruling: Yes. The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the commencement thereof, viz: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights above.19 In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his written statement.

De la Cruz v. People

Issue: Is the drug test on urine samples admissible in evidence if they were obtained from the suspect (arrested for extortion) during custodial investigation and without the assistance of counsel?

Ruling: No. The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165. Extortion is not one of those enumerated under the particular section. Making the phrase “a person apprehended or arrested” in Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for any crime. To overextend the application of this provision would run counter to our pronouncement in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency ”To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 6195. Drug testing in this case would violate a person’s right to

privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.”

In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made.

Rights of the Accused; Counsel of his Choice2005 BAR Mariano was arrested by the NBI as a suspect in the shopping mall bombings. Advised of his rights, Mariano asked for the assistance of his relative, Atty. Santos. The NBI noticed that Atty. Santos was inexperienced, incompetent and inattentive. Deeming him unsuited to protect the rights of Mariano, the NBI dismissed Atty. Santos. Appointed in his place was Atty. Barroso, a bar topnotcher who was in the premises visiting a relative. Atty. Barroso ably assisted Mariano when the latter gave a statement. However, Mariano assailed the investigation claiming that he was deprived of counsel of his choice. Was the NBI correct in dismissing Atty. Santos and appointing Atty. Barroso in his stead? Is Mariano's statement, made with the assistance of Atty. Barroso, admissible in evidence? ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:The NBI was not correct in dismissing Atty. Santos and appointing Atty. Barroso in his stead. Article III, Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have no less than "competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice " This is meant to stress the primacy accorded to the voluntariness of the choice under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation' Thus, the lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. The appointment of Atty. Barroso is questionable because he was visiting a relative working in the NBI and thus his independence is doubtful. Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic. Considering that Mariano was deprived of counsel of his own choice, the statement is inadmissible in evidence. (People v. Januario, G.R. No. 98252, February 7, 1997)ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:The NBI was correct in dismissing Atty. Santos as he was incompetent. The 1987 Constitution requires counsel to be competent and independent. Atty. Barroso, being a bar topnotcher ably assisted Mariano and there is no showing that his having a relative in the NBI affected his independence. Moreover, the accused has the final choice of counsel as he may reject the one chosen for him and ask for another. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he raises no objection against the lawyer during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the truth of his statement before the

swearing officer. Thus, once the prosecution shows there was compliance with the constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is involuntary and untrue. A confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency which are not present in this case. Accordingly, the statement is admissible. (People v. Jerez, G.R. No. 114385, January 29, 1998)

2008 BAR Having received tips that the accused was selling narcotics, two police officers forced open the doors of his room. Finding him sitting partly dressed on the side of the bed, the officers spied two capsules on a night stand beside the bed. When asked, “Are these yours?” the accused seized the capsules and put them in his mouth. A struggle ensued, in the course of which the officers pounced on the accused but failed to extract the capsules. The officers handcuffed the accused, took him to a hospital where at their direction, a doctor forced an emetic solution through a tube into the accused’s stomach against his will. This process induced vomiting. In the vomited matter were found two capsules which proved to contain heroin. In the criminal case, the chief evidence against the accused was the two capsules.

a) As counsel, for the accused, what constitutional rights will you invoke in his defense?

b) How should the court decide the case?

ANSWERS:a) As counsel for the accused, I would invoke the Constitutional right to

be secured against unreasonable searches and seizures(Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution) which guarantees:( 1) sanctity of the home, (2) inadmissibility of the capsules seized, (3) and inviolability of the person. A mere tip from a reliable source is not sufficient to justify warrantless arrest or search(Peo v Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233 Feb. 22, 2007).

b) The court should declare the search and seizure illegal:

1) The entry into the accused’s home was not a permissible warrantless action because the police had no personal knowledge that any crime was taking place.

2) Due to the invalid entry whatever evidence the police gathered would be inadmissible.

3) The arrest of the accused was already invalid and causing him to vomit while under custody was an unreasonable invasion of personal privacy(US v Montoya, 473 US 531(1985)).

2009 BAR William, a private American citizen, a university graduate and frequent visitor to the Philippines, was inside the U.S. embassy when he got into a heated argument with a private Filipino

citizen. Then, in front of many shocked witnesses, he killed the person he was arguing with. The police came, and brought him to the nearest police station. Upon reaching the station, the police investigator, in halting English, informed William of his Miranda rights, and assigned him an independent local counsel. William refused the services of the lawyer, and insisted that he be assisted by a Filipino lawyer currently based in the U.S. The request was denied, and the counsel assigned by the police stayed for the duration of the investigation. William protested his arrest. He claimed that his Miranda rights were violated because he was not given the lawyer of his choice; that being an American, he should have been informed of his rights in proper English; and that he should have been informed of his rights as soon as he was taken into custody, not when he was already at the police station. Was William denied his Miranda rights? Why or why not? ANSWER: William was not denied with his Miranda rights. True that he has the right to counsel preferably of his choice. But if he cannot afford the services of a counsel, he should be provided with one. Moreover, the Miranda rights are available only during custodial investigation that is, from the moment the investigating officer begins to ask questions for the purpose of eliciting admissions, confessions or any information from the accused. Therefore, it is proper that he was only informed of his right at the police station. ALTENATIVE ANSWER: The fact that the police officer gave him the Miranda warning in halting English does not detract from its validity. Under Section 2(b) of Republic Act No. 7438, it is sufficient that the language used was known to and understood by him. William need not be given the Miranda warning before the investigation started. William was not denied his Miranda rights. It is not practical to require the police officer to provide a lawyer of his own choice from the United States (Gamboa vs. Cruz, 162 SCAR 642, [1998]). If William applies for bail, claiming that he is entitled thereto under the international standard of justice and that he comes from a US State that has outlawed capital punishment, should William be granted bail as a matter of right? Reasons.SUGGESTED ANSWER: William is not entitled to bail as a matter of right. His contention is not tenable. Observing the territorial jurisdiction of commission of the offense, the applicable law in the case is Philippine laws not the law of the country to where he is a national (Section 13, Art. III of the Constitution). Under our law, bail is not a matter of right if the felony or offense committed has an imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua or higher and the evidence of guilt is strong. 2011 BAR Mr. Brown, a cigarette vendor, was invited by PO1 White to a nearby police station. Upon arriving at the police station, Brown was asked to stand side-by-side with five (5) other cigarette vendors in a police line-up. PO1 White informed them that they were looking for a certain cigarette vendor who snatched the purse of a passer-by and the line-up was to allow the victim to point at the

vendor who snatched her purse. No questions were to be asked from the vendors. (a) Brown, afraid of a "set up" against him, demanded that he be allowed to secure his lawyer and for him to be present during the police line-up. Is Brown entitled to counsel? Explain SUGGESTED ANSWER Brown is not entitled to counsel during the police line-up. He was not yet being asked to answer for a criminal offense. (Gamboa vs. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642.)(b) Would the answer in (a.) be the same if Brown was specifically invited by White because an eyewitness to the crime identified him as the perpetrator? Explain. SUGGESTED ANSWER Brown would be entitled to the assistance of a lawyer. He was already considered as a suspect and was therefore entitled to the rights under custodial investigation. (People vs. Legaspi, 331 SCRA 95.)(c) Briefly enumerate the so-called "Miranda Rights". SUGGESTED ANSWER The Miranda warning means that a person in custody who will be interrogated must be informed of the following: (a) He has the right to remain silent; (b) Anything said can be used as evidenced against him; (c) He has the right to have counsel during the investigation; and (d) He must be informed that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. (Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).

2010 BAR Which statement best completes the following phrase: “Freedom from torture is a right_____”

(A)subject to derogation when national security is threatened.”(B). confined only during custodial investigation.”(C) which is non-derogable both during peacetime and in a situation of

armed conflict.” (D) both (a) and (b) (E) none of the above.Article 2(2) of the U.N. Convention Against Torture provides that “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political in stability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.” Because of the importance of the values it protects, the prohibition of torture has evolved into a peremptory norm or jus cogens, that is, a norm that enjoys a higher rank in the international hierarchy than treaty law and even ordinary customary rules. The most conspicuous consequence of this higher rank is that the norm prohibiting torture cannot be derogated from by States through international treaties or local or special customs or even general customary rules not endowed with the same normative force. (Prosecutor v. Furundzija, ICTY, December 10, 1998)

Page 1282011 BarAfter X, a rape suspect, was apprised of his right to silence and to counsel, he told the investigators that he was waiving his right to have his own counsel or to be provided one. He made his waiver in the presence of a retired Judge who was assigned to assist and explain to him the consequences of such waiver. Is the waiver valid?(A) No, the waiver was not reduced in writing.(B) Yes, the mere fact that the lawyer was a retired judge does not cast doubt on his competence and independence.(C) Yes, the waiver was made voluntarily, expressly, and with assistance of counsel.(D) No, a retired Judge is not a competent and independent counsel.2012 BarUnder Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent, etc. The investigation referred to is called:a. preliminary investigation; b. summary investigation; c. criminal investigation; d. custodial investigation.2013 BarA robbery with homicide had taken place and Lito, Badong and Rollie were invited for questioning based on the information furnished by a neighbor that he saw them come out of the victim's house at about the time of the robbery/killing. The police confronted the three with this and other information they had gathered, and pointedly accused them of committing the crime.Lito initially resisted, but eventually broke down and admitted his participation in the crime. Elated by this break and desirous of securing a written confession soonest, the police called City Attorney Juan Buan to serve as the trio's counsel and to advise them about their rights during the investigation. Badong and Rollie, weakened in spirit by Lito's early admission, likewise admitted their participation. The trio thus signed a joint extra-judicial confession which served as the main evidence against them at their trial. They were convicted based on their confession.Should the judgment of conviction be affirmed or reversed on appeal?Suggested Answer:The judgment of conviction should be reversed on appeal. It relied mainly on the extrajudicial confession of the accused. The lawyer assisting them must

be independent. City Attorney Juan Buan is not independent. As City Attorney, he provided legal support to the City Mayor in performing his duties, which include the maintenance of peace and order (People vs. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624).Alternative Answer:The judgment of conviction should be reversed. The police officers committed an offense by confronting the three accused. This is a violation to Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which states that any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.2014 BarSuggested Answer:The evidence is inadmissible against Edward Gunman. The rule begins to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and direction is aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating statements. Edward should have been informed of his Miranda rights when the policemen interrogated him. Failure to do so, the evidence is inadmissible against him.Page 134

CYRIL CALPITO QUI vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 196161

September 26, 2012

Facts: Petitioner was charged with two counts of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. (RA) 7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.

The RTC in Quezon City convicted petitioner as charged, and sentenced her to two equal periods of imprisonment for an indeterminate penalty of 5 years, 4 months, and 21 days of prision correccional in its maximum period, as minimum, to 7 years, 4 months, and 1 day of prision mayor in its minimum period, as maximum.

Petitioner then appealed and subsequently filed an Urgent Petition/Application for Bail Pending Appeal. The OSG urged for the denial of the bail application on the ground of petitioner’s propensity to evade the law and that she is a flight-risk. The CA denied petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal on the basis of Sec. 5(d) of Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue: Is the accused entitled to the right to bail?

Ruling: No. Sec. 5 of Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. xxx

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

xxx

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail;

xxx

Petitioner disobeyed court processes when she lied in order to justify her non-appearance on the March 8, 2010 hearing before the RTC. She gave the excuse that her father was hospitalized and died days later when in fact her father died a year ago. The RTC notice sent to petitioner’s bonding company was also returned with the notation "moved out," while the notice sent to petitioner’s given address was returned unclaimed with the notation "RTS no such person.” The fact of transferring residences without informing her bondsman and the trial court can only be viewed as petitioner’s inclination to evade court appearance, as indicative of flight. Consequently, the Court agrees with the appellate court’s finding of the presence of the fourth circumstance enumerated in the above-quoted Sec. 5 of Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Also, petitioner’s argument that she has the constitutional right to bail and that the evidence of guilt against her is not strong is spurious. Certainly, after one is convicted by the trial court, the presumption of innocence, and with it, the constitutional right to bail, ends. Therefore, petitioner's application for bail pending appeal is denied.

Jorda vs Judge Bitas

A.M. RTJ-14-236 and 14-237

March 5, 2014

Facts: The complaint stemmed from 3 criminal cases for Qualified Trafficking (RA 9208) and Violation of Article VI, Section 10 of RA 7610, which were filed against Miralles, et al. before the RTC Tacloban City where respondent Judge Bitas presides.

Respondent judge issued an Order which states that the Court finds that there is probable cause to hold the accused for trial for Violation of 4 (a & e) of R.A. 9208.

Complainant lamented that respondent judge disregarded his duties and violated mandatory provisions of the Rules of Court when he did not issue a warrant of arrest against the accused Miralles, who was charged with non-bailable criminal offenses. Moreover, respondent judge granted a reduced

bail of P40,000.00 for accused Miralles in the absence of a motion to fix bail, and the prosecution was not given the opportunity to interpose its objections.

Respondent judge reasoned that it was wrong to arrest Miralles, because the court was still in the process of determining whether there is sufficient evidence to hold the accused for trial. Respondent judge also claimed that there was no more need for a petition for bail, because in the judicial determination of probable cause the court found that the evidence against accused was weak.

Issue: Is bail hearing required if the accused-applicant is charged with Qualified Trafficking?

Ruling: Yes. The hearing of the application for bail in capital offenses is absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecution’s evidence is weak or strong. In the instant case, Miralles was charged with Qualified Trafficking, which under Section 10 (C) of R.A. No. 9208 is punishable by life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00). Thus, by reason of the penalty prescribed by law, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion which can be exercised only by respondent judge after the evidence is submitted in a hearing.

With life imprisonment as one of the penalties prescribed for the offense charged against Miralles, he cannot be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, in accordance with Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Clearly, respondent judge's act of fixing the accused's bail and reducing the same motu proprio is not mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment, but a patent disregard of well-known rules.

People v Wagas G.R. No. 157943September 04, 2014

ISSUEIf Wagas innocence is in doubt but his identity is not established, is he entitled to an acquittal?

RULINGYes. In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check. The check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash. Furthermore, under the Negotiable Instruments Law, this type of check was payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery without the need of an indorsement.

It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have used the check in order to defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere issuance of the worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply because he had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still clearly show that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by means of the check.

Atienza v People G.R. No. 188694February 12, 2014

ISSUEIf the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanation, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, does the evidence fulfill the test of moral certainty to sustain a conviction?

RULING No. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction, as in this case.

In the case at bar, the discrepancy of accounts on the very subject matter of the crimes charged dilutes the strength of the evidence required to produce a conviction. Atibula attempted to bribe him to take out Volume 260 but the alleged intercalation actually occurred in a different document that is Volume 266. Hence, the bribery attempt may be deemed as a demonstration of interest on the part of Atienza over said subject matter and in this regard, constitutes a mere proof of motive. Mere proof of motive, no matter how strong, is not sufficient to support a conviction.

People v FelicianoG.R. No. 196735May 5, 2014

ISSUEWas the constitutional rights of the accused to be informed of the nature and case of the accusation against them violated with the inclusion of the phrase “wearing masks and/or other form of disguise” in the information?

RULINGNo. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended pary; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. Every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court. What is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by the accused hence the inclusion of disguise in the information

was enough to sufficiently appraise the accused that in the commission of the offense they were being charged with.

Sevilla v PeopleG.R. No. 194390August 13, 2014

ISSUECan Sevilla be convicted of the felony of falsification of public document through reckless imprudence notwithstanding that the charge against him in the Information was for the intentional felony of Falsification of public document under Article 170 (4) of the RPC?

RULINGNo. The proper designation of the felony should be reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents and not falsification of public documents through reckless imprudence. A variance exists between the offense alleged against Sevilla and that proved by the prosecution – the Information charged him with the intentional felony of falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of the RPC while the prosecution was able to prove reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents.

Moreover, Sevilla’s claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents, when the Information only charged the intentional felony of falsification of public documents, is untenable. To stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents is an offense that is necessarily included in the willful act of falsification of public documents, the latter being the greater offense. As such, he can be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents notwithstanding that the Information only charged the willful act of falsification of public documents.

NOTE: The Sandiganbayan designation of Sevilla’s felony (falsification of public documents through reckless imprudence) implies that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a modality of committing it. Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC are distinct and separate crimes and not a mere modality in the commission of a crime.

1982 BarA, a taxpayer, a voter, and a member of the BAR, filed a petition for the COMELEC to enjoin the latter form enforcing Section 4, BP Blg 52 which provides for the disqualification as candidate of any person convicted of subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar offenses. Said law further provides that “the filing of charges for xxxx such crimes before a civil or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact”. “A” maintains that the above-quoted proviso is unconstitutional because it contravenes the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Constitution. Is “A”’s contention tenable? Explain.

Answer

Yes, “A”’s contention is meritorious. Explicit is the constitutional provision, that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. It is clear that the law challenged therein did in fact establish a presumption of guilt from the mere filing of the information or criminal complaint, in violation of the constitutional right to presumption of innocence. (Dumlao vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980)

1983 BarSection 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A 1379) provided that whenever a public officer has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as public officer and his other lawful income, the same property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquire. Under this law, forfeiture proceedings against X, a customs collector, to confiscate his unexplained wealth. X questioned the constitutionality of said Section 2 as being violative of due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence. He contended that thereunder, the respondent has the burden of proving his innocence. Decide.

AnswerThe presumption of innocence clause of the Constitution refers to criminal prosecutions and not to forfeiture proceedings which are civil actions in rem. The Constitution is likewise not violated by RA 1379 because statutes which declare that as a matter of law a particular inference follows from the proof of a particular fact, one fact becoming prima facie evidence of another, are not necessarily invalid, the effect of the presumption being merely to shift the burden of proof upon the adverse party. (Ong vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126858, September 16, 2005)

1998 BAR (Question No. 5)Norberto Malasmas was accused of estafa before the Regional Trial

Court ofManila. After the trial, he was found guilty. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. After the records of his case had been remanded to the Regional Trial Court for execution, and after the latter Court had set the date for the promulgation of judgment, the accused filed a motion with the Court of Appeals to set aside the entry of judgment, and to remand the case to the Regional Trial Court for new trial on the ground that he had just discovered that "Atty. Leonilo Maporma" whom he had chosen and who had acted as his counsel before the trial court and the Court of Appeals, is not a lawyer. Resolved the motion of the accused with reasons.Suggested Answer:

The motion should be granted and the entry of judgment should be set aside. An accused is entitled to be heard by himself or counsel. (Art. III, sec. 14(2)). Unless he is represented by an attorney, there is a great danger that any defense presented in his behalf will be inadequate considering the legal requisite and skill

needed in court proceedings. There would certainly be a denial of due process. (Delgado v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 357 (1986)).

2000 BAR (Question No. XV)Charged by Francisco with libel, Pablo was arraigned on January 3,

2000, Pre-trial was dispensed with and continuous trial was set for March 7, 8 and 9, 2000. On the first setting, the prosecution moved for its postponement and cancellation of the other settings because its principal and probably only witness, the private complainant Francisco, suddenly had to go abroad to fulfill a professional commitment. The judge instead dismissed the case for failure to prosecute.

a) Would the grant of the motion for postponement have violated the accused's right to speedy trial?

Suggested Answer: The grant of the motion for postponement would not have

violated the right of the accused to speedy trial. As held In People v. Leviste, 255 SCRA 238 (1996). since the motion for postponement was the first one requested, the need for the offended party to attend to a professional commitment is a valid reason, no substantial right of the accused would be prejudiced, and the prosecution should be afforded a fair opportunity to prosecute its case, the motion should be granted.ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Since continuous trial of cases is required and since the date of the initial hearing was set upon agreement of all parties, including the private complainant, the judge properly dismissed the case for failure to prosecute.

2001 BAR (Question No. X)For the death of Joey, Erning was charged with the crime of homicide

before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela. He was arraigned. Due to numerous postponements of the scheduled hearings at the instance of the prosecution, particularly based on the ground of unavailability of prosecution witnesses who could not be found or located, the criminal case was pending trial for a period of seven years. Upon motion of accused Erning who invoked his right to speedy trial, the court dismissed the case. Eventually, the prosecution witnesses surfaced, and a criminal case for homicide, involving the same incident was filed anew against Erning. Accused Erning moved for dismissal of the case on the ground of double jeopardy. The prosecution objected, submitting the reason that it was not able to present the said witnesses earlier because the latter went into hiding out of fear. Resolve the motion.Suggested Answer:

The motion should be granted. As held in Caes us. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54 (1989), the dismissal of

a criminal case predicated on the right of the accused to a speedy trial amounts to an acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt and bars his subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

2004 BAR (Question No. 5-b)OZ lost five heads of cattle which he reopened to the police as stolen

from his barn. He requested several neighbors, including RR for help in looking for the missing animals. After an extensive search, the police found two heads in RR’s farm. RR could not explain to the police how they got hidden in a remote area of his farm. Insisting on his innocence, RR consulted a lawyer who told him that he has a right to be presumed innocent under the Bill of Rights. But there is another presumption --- of theft arising from his unexplained possession of stolen cattle --- under the penal law. Are the two presumptions capable of reconciliation in this case? If so, how can they be reconciled? If not, which should prevail? Suggested Answer:

The two presumptions can be reconciled. The presumption of innocence stands until the contrary is proved. It may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon human experience. The presumption that RR is the one who stole the cattle of OZ is logical, since he was found in possession of the stolen cattle. RR can prove his innocence by presenting evidence to rebut the presumption. The burden of evidence is shifted to RR, because how he came into possession of the cattle is peculiarly within his knowledge. (Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, 234 SCRA 63 (1994)).

2012 BAR (Question # 46)Criminal trial may proceed, notwithstanding the absence of the

accused provided that he has been duly notified, and his failure to appear is unjustifiable, after: ______.

a. Preliminary investigationb. Arraignment ------ (Sec. 19, Art. III)c. Sentencingd. Prosecution has rested its case.

p. 1462012 BAR (Question #47)

The requisites of a valid trial in absentia exclude: _____. a. Wherein his/her failure to appear is unjustifiable;b. Wherein he/she allows himself/herself to be identified by the

witness in his/her absence, without further unqualified admitting that every time a witness mentions a name by which he/she is known, it shall be understood to refer to him/her; ------- (Carredo v. People, 183 SCRA 373)

c. Wherein he/she has been duly notified of the trial;d. Wherein the accused has already been arraigned.

2012 BAR (Question # 99)(Accused was charged with slight illegal detention. On the day set for

the trial,) [t]he trial court proceeded as follows: Q: “Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?”A: “I have no lawyer and I will plead guilty.”Accused was then arraigned, pleaded guilty, was found guilty and

sentenced. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. The accused was deprived of his:

a. Right to cross-examination;b. Right to be presumed innocent;c. Right to counsel ;------- (People v. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752)d. Right to production of evidence.

2012 BAR (Question #100)The constitutional right of an accused “to meet the witnesses face to

face” is primarily for the purpose of affording the accused a n opportunity to:a. Identify the witness;b. Cross-examine the witness; ----- (People v. Montenegro, 436

SCRA 33) c. Be informed of the charge;d. Be heard.

2013 BAR (Question No. VII) (p.37 of the Complied Q&A 2007-2013)As he was entering the bar, Arnold – who was holding an unlit cigarette

in his right hand – was handed a match box by someone standing near the doorway. Arnold unthinkingly opened the matchbox to light his cigarette and as he did so, a sprinkle of dried leaves fell out, which the guard noticed. The guard immediately frisked Arnold, grabbed the matchbox, and sniffed its contents. After confirming that the matchbox contained marijuana, he immediately arrested Arnold and called in the police. At the police station, the guard narrated to the police that he personally caught Arnold in possession of dried marijuana leaves. Arnold did not contest the guard’s statement; he steadfastly remained silent and refused to give any written statement. Later in court, the guard testified and narrated the statements he gave the police over Arnold’s counsel’s objections. While Arnold presented his own witnesses to prove that his possession and apprehension had been set-up, he himself did not testify. The court convinced Arnold, relying largely on his admission of the charge by silence at the police investigation and during trial. From the constitutional law perspective, was the court correct in its ruling? Explain. Suggested Answer:

No. The court was wrong in relying on the silence of Arnold during the police investigation and during the trial. Under Article III, Section 12 off the 1987 Constitution, he had the right to remain

silent. His silence cannot be taken as a tacit admission, otherwise, his right to remain silent would be rendered nugatory. Considering that his right against self-incrimination protects his right to remain silent, he cannot be penalized for exercising it. (People v. Galvez, 519 SCRA 521)

44. Lozada vs. Arroyo, et. al.; G.R. Nos. 184379-80; April 24, 2012

ISSUE # 1: Must the alleged threat be imminent or continuing for Petition for Writ of Amparo to prosper?

HELD: Yes. The writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. Considering that this remedy is aimed at addressing these serious violations of or threats to the right to life, liberty, and security, it cannot be issued on amorphous and uncertain grounds, or in cases where the alleged threat has ceased and is no longer imminent or continuing. Instead, it must be granted judiciously so as not to dilute the extraordinary and remedial character of the writ.

ISSUE # 2: Were the petitioners entitled to the Writ of Amparo?

HELD: No. In cases where the violation of the right to life, liberty or security has already ceased, it is necessary for the petitioner in an amparo action to prove the existence of a continuing threat. The Court is in agreement with the factual findings of the CA to the extent that Lozada was not illegally deprived of his liberty from the point when he disembarked from the aircraft up to the time he was led to the departure area of the airport, as he voluntarily submitted himself to the custody of respondents. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that if Lozada had in fact been illegally restrained, so much so that his right to liberty and security had been violated, the acts that manifested this restraint had already ceased and has consequently rendered the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo moot. In this case, the totality of the evidence presented by petitioners fails to meet the requisite evidentiary threshold, and the privilege of the writ of amparo has already been rendered moot and academic by the cessation of the restraint to Lozada’s liberty.

45. Navia vs. Pardico; G.R. No. 184467; June 19, 2012

ISSUE # 1: For the protective Writ of Amparo to issue, will the allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing be sufficient?

HELD: No. For the protective writ of amparo to issue in enforced disappearance cases, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation.

ISSUE # 2: Can the writ be issued against private parties?

HELD: Yes. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides: SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

46. Adonis vs. Tesoro; G.R. No. 182855; June 5, 2013

ISSUE: Is Adonis entitled to the Writ of Habeas Corpus?

HELD: No. In the instant case, Adonis was convicted for libel by the RTC Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 48679-2001. Since his detention was by virtue of a final judgment, he is not entitled to the Writ of Habeas Corpus. He was serving his sentence when the BPP granted him parole, along with six (6) others, on December 11, 2007. While it is true that a convict may be released from prison on parole when he had served the minimum period of his sentence; the pendency of another criminal case, however, is a ground for the disqualification of such convict from being released on parole. Notably, at the time he was granted the parole, the second libel case was pending before the RTC Branch 14. In fact, even when the instant petition was filed, Criminal Case No. 48719-01 was still pending. The issuance of the writ under such circumstance was, therefore, proscribed. There was basis for the Court to deny his immediate release at that time.

47. Mangila vs. Judge Pangilinan; G.R. No. 160739; July 17, 2013

ISSUE: Is Mangila entitled to the Writ of Habeas Corpus?

HELD: No. The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. With Mangila’s arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order lawfully issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint on her liberty. This is because the restraint, being lawful and pursuant to a court process, could not be inquired into through habeas corpus. Thus, the Court agrees with the CA that the writ of habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for another available remedy.

48. Caram vs. Atty. Segui; G.R. No. 193652; August 5, 2014

ISSUE: Can the issue of child custody and parental rights be the subject of a Writ of Amparo?

HELD: No. In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her "enforced separation" from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an "enforced disappearance" within the context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however, the respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD's May 28, 2010 Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition for review on certiorari that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing held in the afternoon of August 5, 2010. There is

therefore, no "enforced disappearance" as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.

Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him. Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.

1997 BAR

When may the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus be suspended? (b) If validly declared, what would be the full consequences of such suspension?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

a) Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended when there is an invasion or rebellion and public safety requires it.

(b) According to Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged with rebellion or offenses Inherent to or directly connected with invasion. Any person arrested or detained should be judicially charged within three days. Otherwise, he should be released. Moreover, under Section 13. Article III of the Constitution, the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.

1997 BAR

A while serving imprisonment for estafa. upon recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, was granted pardon by the President on condition that he should not again violate any penal law of the land. Later, the Board of Pardons and Parole recommended to the President the cancellation of the pardon granted him because A had been charged with estafa on 20 counts and was convicted of the offense charged although he took an appeal therefrom which was still pending. As recommended, the President canceled the pardon he had granted to A. A was thus arrested and imprisoned to serve the balance of his sentence in the first case. A claimed in his petition for habeas corpus filed in court that his detention was illegal because he had not yet been convicted by final judgment and was not given a chance to be heard before he was recommitted to prison. Is A's argument valid?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The argument of A is not valid. As held in Torres vs. Gonzales. 152 SCRA 272 a judicial pronouncement that a convict who was granted a pardon subject to

the condition that he should not again violate any penal law is not necessary before he can be declared to have violated the condition of his pardon. Moreover, a hearing is not necessary before A can be recommitted to prison. By accepting the conditional pardon, A, agreed that the determination by the President that he violated the condition of his pardon shall be conclusive upon him and an order for his arrest should at once issue.

2005 BAR

Bruno still had several years to serve on his sentence when he was conditionally pardoned by the President. Among the conditions imposed was that he would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines." Bruno accepted all of the conditions and was released. Shortly thereafter, Bruno was charged with 2 counts of estafa. He was then incarcerated to serve the i expired portion of his sentence following the revocation by the President of the pardon. Bruno's family filed a petition for habeas corpus, alleging that it was error to have him recommitted as the charges were false, in fact, half of them were already dismissed. Resolve the petition with reasons.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The petition should not be given due course. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are PURELY EXECUTIVE ACTS which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. The acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner carried with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. Where the President opts to revoke the conditional pardon given, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, is a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny. (Torres v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 76872, July 23, 1987)

2012 BAR

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of:

a. imminent danger of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it;

b. grave danger of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it;c. clear and present danger of invasion or rebellion when the public

safety requires it;d. invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.

2013 BAR

On March 1, 2013, Condrad informed his mother, Vannie, that uniformed security guards had invited him for a talk in their office but he refused to

come. Later that day, however, Condrad appeared to have relented; he was seen walking into the security office flanked by two security guards. Nobody saw him leave the office afterwards. Condrad did not go home that night and was never seen again. The following week and after a week-long search, Vannie feared the worst because Col. Sangre’s reputation. She thus reported Condrad’s disappearance to the police. When nothing concrete resulted from the police investigation, Vannie-at the advice of counsel-filed a petition for a writ of amparo to compel Col. Sangre and the Sagittatius Security Office to produce Condrad and to hold them liable and responsible for Condrad’s disappearance.

a.) Did Vannie’s counsel give the correct legal advice?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, Vannie’s counsel gave the correct legal advice. The Writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, or security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. Since there has been an enforced disappearance on the part of Conrad, the writ is applicable.

b.) If the petition would prosper, can Col. Sangre be held liable and/or responsible for Conrad’s disappearance? (6%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes. Colonel Sangre, together with the Sagittarius Security Office should be held fully accountable for the enforced disappearance of Conrad because of strong evidences supporting the claim of the Writ of Amparo as shown in the case.

ASSIGNED CASE

Issue: Was Dacudao’s right to speedy disposition of the case violated?

Ruling:

No. The Constitution prohibits only the delays that are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive, and tend to render rights nugatory. The cases against Delos Angeles, Jr. were consolidated in order to obtain expeditious justice for the parties with the least cost and vexation to them. Inasmuch as the cases filed involved similar or related questions to be dealt with during the preliminary investigation, the Secretary of Justice rightly found the consolidation of the cases to be the most feasible means of promoting the efficient use of public resources and of having a comprehensive investigation of the cases. While there is a possibility that there would be more cases

reaching the DOJ in addition to those already brought by petitioners and other parties, yet, any delays in petitioners’ cases occasioned by such other and subsequent cases should not warrant the invalidation of DO No. 182.

Braza vs. Sandiganbayan; GR No. 195032Facts:

The Philippines was assigned for the hosting rights of the 12th ASEAN Leaders Summit. In preparation thereof, province of Cebu as the designated venue, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) identified projects relative to the improvement and rehabilitation of roads and installation of traffic safety devices and lighting facilities. After the summit, a complaint was filed before the Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention Office (PACPO), Ombudsman – Visayas, alleging that the ASEAN Summit street lighting projects were overpriced. Braza, being the president of FABMIK Construction was impleaded as one of the respondents. Braza was charged for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act.He pleaded not guilty.

Issue:Was Braza’s right to speedy disposition of his case violated?

Ruling:

No. The right to a speedy disposition of a case is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. It is a relative or flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows:

(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.

Using the foregoing yardstick, the Court finds that Braza’s right to speedy disposition of the case has not been infringed.

Coscolluela vs. Sandiganbayan; GR No. 191411

Facts:Coscolluela served as governor of the Province of Negros Occidental

for three (3) full terms. During his tenure, Nacionales served as his Special Projects Division Head, Amugod as Nacionales’ subordinate, and Malvas as Provincial Health Officer. A complaint was received by the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas, to to investigate the anomalous purchase of medical and agricultural equipment for the Province a month before Coscolluela stepped down from office. Petitioners were charged for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash the Complaint, arguing that his constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was violated as the criminal charges against him were resolved only after almost eight (8) years since the complaint was instituted.

Issue:Were petitioner’s right to speedy disposition of their case violated?

Ruling:Yes. This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal

proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. The right to speedy disposition of cases is a relative or flexible concept such that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not be sufficient. This right is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.

In this case, the petitioners’ right to a speedy disposition of their criminal case had been violated. First, it is observed that the preliminary investigation proceedings took a protracted amount of time to complete. Second, the Ombudsman’s delay in the resolution of the case largely remains unjustified. Third, the Court deems that petitioners cannot be faulted for their alleged failure to assert their right to speedy disposition of cases. Fourth, the Court finally recognizes the prejudice caused to the petitioners by the lengthy delay in the proceedings against them.

People vs. Perez; GR No. 188165

Facts: Cong. Wilfrido B. Villarama of Bulacan delivered a privilege speech

denouncing acts of bribery allegedly committed by a high ranking

government official whom he then called the "2 Million Dollar Man." In reaction, the Office of the President directed the Presidential Anti- Graft and Commission (PAGC) to conduct an inquiry on the exposé of Cong. Villarama. Cong. Villarama responded by letter to PAGC’s invitation by confirming that Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez was the government official who had knowledge or connection with the bribery subject of his expose. Secretary Perez denied being the Million-Dollar Man referred to in Cong. Villarama’s privilege speech. Thus, Information was filed alleging the violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019.

Issue:Did the Ombudsman violate respondent’s right to speedy disposition of

their case?

Ruling:Yes. The right to the speedy disposition of a case, like the right to

speedy trial, is deemed violated when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. In this case, there was a delay on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman which is vexatious, capricious, and oppressive. The fact-finding investigation and preliminary investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman lasted nearly five years and five months. It is clear from the foregoing that the Office of the Ombudsman had taken an unusually long period of time just to investigate the criminal complaint and to determine whether to criminally charge the respondents in the Sandiganbayan. Such long delay was inordinate and oppressive, and constituted under the peculiar circumstances of the case an outright violation of the respondents’ right under the Constitution to the speedy disposition of their cases.

2000 BAR:Charged by Francisco with libel, Pablo was arraigned on January 3,

2000. Pre-trial was dispensed with and continuous trial was set for March 7, 8 and 9, 2000. On the first setting, the prosecution moved for its postponement and cancellation of the other settings because its principal and probably only witness, the private complainant Francisco, suddenly had to go abroad to fulfill a professional commitment. The judge instead dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. Would the Reversal of the trial court’s assailed dismissal of the case place the accused in double jeopardy?

Answer:Since the postponement of the case would not violate the right of the

accused to speedy trial, the precipitate dismissal of the case is void. The reversal of the dismissal will not place the accused in double jeopardy.

2001 BAR:

For the death of Joey, Eming was charged with crime of homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela. He was arraigned. Due to numerous postponements of the scheduled hearings at the instance of the prosecution, particularly based on the ground of unavailability of prosecution witnesses who cannot be found or located, the criminal case has been pending for a period of seven years. Upon motion of accused Eming who invoked his right to speedy trial, the court dismissed the case. Eventually, the said prosecution witnesses surfaced and a criminal case for homicide, involving the same incident was filed anew against Eming. Accused Eming moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of double jeopardy. The prosecution objected submitting the reason that it was not able to present said witness earlier because the latter went into hiding out of fear. Resolve the motion.

Answer:The motion should be granted. As held in Caes vs. Intermediate

Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54 (1989), the dismissal of a criminal case predicated on the right of the accused to a speedy trial amounts to an acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt and bars his subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

Marcos vs. Republic; GR No. 189434

Facts:Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed a Petition

for Forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the forfeiture law, Republic Act No. 1379. It sought the forfeiture of the assets of dummy corporations and entities established by nominees of Marcos and his wife, Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, as well as real and personal properties manifestly out of proportion to the spouses’ lawful income. PCGG and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also sought the declaration of Swiss bank accounts and two treasury notes as ill-gotten wealth.

Issue:Can the right against self-incrimination be invoked in forfeiture

proceedings?

Ruling:Yes. Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be civil and

in the nature of proceedings in rem. The statute providing that no judgment or other proceedings in civil cases shall be arrested or reversed for any defect or want of form is applicable to them. The proceeding is one against the owner, as well as against the goods; for it is his breach of the laws which has to be proved to establish the forfeiture and his property is sought to be forfeited. The prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a witness against himself applies only to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by reason of the commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which the penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in nature. Forfeiture cases partake of a quasi-criminal nature only in the sense that the right against self-incrimination is applicable to the proceedings.

The right of the Marcoses against self-incrimination is amply protected by the provisions of R.A. 1379, which prohibits the criminal prosecution of individuals for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which they are compelled, after having claimed the privilege against self-incrimination , to testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise.

61. De la Cruz vs People, GR 200748, 23 July 2014FACTS: Petitioner was arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI agents. When he was at the NBI Office, he was required to extract urine for drug examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be done by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI. His request was, however, denied. He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine sample, to no avail.ISSUE: Can the urine drug test of the petitioner arrested of extortion be used against him without violating his right against self-incrimination?RULING: No. Because the urine test was conducted without the presence of counsel and he was nevertheless compelled to do so by the NBI, petitioner’s right against self-incrimination under Sec. 17, Article III in relation to his right to privacy under Sec. 2, Article III was violated. 62. 1986 BAR Q: At the trial of a rape case, the prosecution submitted in evidence a pair of pants which the victim in her testimony, identified as the very pair of pants left by the accused when he hurriedly jumped from the window to escape rescuers who heard cries for help while being raped. When it was the accused’s turn to testify on his defence, the fiscal, on cross-examination asked the accused to put on the pair of pants. The defence objected, invoking the right of the accused against self-incrimination. As judge, would you sustain or overrule the objection?Answer: I would sustain the objection. The right of the accused against self-incrimination would be violated if he is not allowed to refuse, via counsel’s objection, to put on the pair of pants. Unlike with ordinary witnesses, the right is given broader application with regard to the accused, who may thus refuse to take the witness stand and/or refuse to answer any and all questions or request asked of him. (Chavez vs CA, 24 SCRA 663) To compel the accused to wear the pants amounts to a deprivation of his right to testify to a fact which would be a necessary link in a chain of evidence to prove the commission of a crime. (Fernando vs Maglanoc, 1954). Alternative Answer: I would overrule the objection. In the case of People vs Otadora, the Supreme Court, citing Wigmore, ruled that the right of the accused against self-incrimination does not cover the act of being asked by the court to remove or replace his garments—in this case, the pair of pants.

63. 1988 BAR Q: Dr. Juan Sto. Tomas is a practicing dentist in Marikina, Metro-Manila. He was charged with immorality before the Board of Dentistry by a lady patient, who claims that Dr. Sto. Tomas took liberties with her person and kissed her while she was under treatment at the latter’s clinic. At the initial hearing of the administrative complaint, the complainant’s counsel called the respondent as his first witness. The respondent, through counsel, objected vigorously, claiming his constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Decide.

A: The objection should be sustained. In the case of Pascual Jr vs Board of Medical Examiners, it was ruled that a doctor who faces an administrative complaint for immorality and malpractice enjoys the right against self-incrimination since the revocation of his license could even be a more serious deprivation than forfeiture of property. The constitutional right grants the accused the right to refuse to take the witness stand altogether. The objection of respondent’s counsel is a rightful invocation of said right.

64. 1998 BAR Q:Suppose Congress passed a law to implement the Constitutional principle that public office is a public trust, by providing as follows: “No employee of the Civil Service shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, records, correspondence, documents or other evidence in any administrative investigation concerning the office in which he is employed on the ground that his testimony or the evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject to a penalty or forfeiture but his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not he used against him in criminal prosecution based on the transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled , after invoking his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence. Provided, however, that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office. Any employee who refuses to testify or produce any documents under this Act shall be dismissed from service.” Suppose further, that Ong, a member of the Professional Regulatory Board, is required to answer question in an investigation regarding a LEAKAGE in a medical examination.

i. Can Ong refuse to answer questions on the ground that he would incriminate himself?

No. The law gives Ong protection from self-incrimination while positively requiring him to testify. Thus, his constitutional right remains enforced and his testimony is prohibited by law to be used as evidence to prosecute him.

ii. Suppose he refuses to answer, and for that reason, is dismissed from the service, can he plausibly argue that the Civil Service Commission has inferred his guilt from his refusal to answer in violation of the Constitution?

No. The law clearly provides that refusal to testify is a ground for dismissal. Thus, his dismissal is not on the ground of an inference of guilt, but a clear disobedience of the law. No constitutional right was violated because the law also provided that Ong’s testimony would not have been used in any proceedings against him.

iii. Suppose, on the other hand, he answers the question on the basis of his answers, he is found guilty and is dismissed. Can he plausibly assert that his dismissal is based on coerced confession?

Yes. In such a case, the power of the law—with the threat of dismissal—was used precisely to coerce self-incriminating testimony out of Ong.

65. 2000 BAR Q: A man was shot and killed and his killer fled. Moments after the shooting, an eye-witness described to the police that the slayer wore white pants, a shirt with floral design, had boots and was about 70 kilos and 1.65 meters. Borja, who fit the description given, was seen nearby. He was taken into custody and brought to the police precinct where his pants, shirt and boots were forcibly taken and he weighed, measured, photographed, fingerprinted and subjected to paraffin testing. At his trial, Borja objected to the admission in evidence of the apparel, his height and weight, his photographs, fingerprints comparison and the results of the paraffin test, asserting that these were taken in violation of his right against self-incrimination. Rule on the objection.Answer: The objection should be overruled. All information inferred from the listed pieces of evidence do not partake of a communicative nature; therefore, there is no testimonial compulsion. Various jurisprudence have ruled that paraffin tests (People vs Gamboa, 25 Feb. 1991), mugshots (People vs Gallarde, 17 Feb. 2000), fingerprinting, and seized personal effects (People vs Malimit, 14 November 1996) are not covered by the right against self-incrimination.

66. 2010 BAR Q: A, the wife of an alleged victim of enforced disappearance, applied for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo before the RTC in Tarlac. Upon motion of A, the court issued inspection and production orders addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff to allow entry at Camp Aquino and permit the copying of relevant documents, including the list of detainees, if any. Accompanied by a court-designated Commission on Human Right (CHR) lawyers, A took photographs of a suspected isolation cell where her husband was allegedly seen being held for three days and tortured before he finally disappeared. The CHR lawyers requested one Lt. Valdez for a photocopy of the master plan of Camp Aquino and to confirm in writing that he had custody of the master plan. Lt. Valdez objected on the ground that it may violate his right against self-incrimination. Decide with reasons.Lt. Valdez’s objection is untenable. The act of providing a photocopy of the master-plan does not constitute testimonial evidence; thus, the act does not partake of communicative nature which the right against self-incrimination only covers. As for confirming custody of it in writing, the rule enunciated in

Beltran vs Samson is that a witness may be not required to furnish a sample of his handwriting of it is tantamount to creating evidence against himself of falsifying documents. In this case, however, the purpose was merely to confirm Lt. Valdez to be the custodian of the master plan.

2011 BAR: [Page 160] The right of the State to prosecute crimes by available evidence must yield to the right of:

A. the accused against self-incrimination. B. another State to extradite a fugitive from justice. C. the State to deport undesirable aliens. D. the complainant to drop the case against the accused.

2012 BAR: [Page 160] The right of the accused against self-incrimination will be violated if:

A. he is charged with violation of the Anti-Money Laundering Act and he was required to produce his bank passbook;

B. he is a public officer charged with amassing ill-gotten wealth and his statement of assets and liabilities will be presented as evidence;

C. his gun was subjected to a ballistics test; D. a sample of his blood was taken if his blood type matches the blood

type found at the scene of the crime.

2014 BAR: [Page 160] Alienmae is a foreign tourist. She was asked certain questions in regard to a complaint that was filed against her by someone who claimed to have been defrauded by her. Alienmae answered all the questions asked, except in regard to some matters in which she invoked her right against self-incrimination. When she was pressed to elucidate, she said that the questions being asked might tend to elicit incriminating answers insofar as her home state is concerned. Could Alienmae invoke the right against self-incrimination if the fear of incrimination is in regard to her foreign law?

Answer:The US Supreme Court that absent immunity, one federal jurisdiction may not compel a witness to give testimony that might incriminate him in a second jurisdiction.1

However, the decisions in some of its circuit courts have ranged from denying the application of the Fifth Amendment privilege under foreign law2

1 Murphy v. Waterfront, 378 U.S. 52 (1964)2 US v. (Under Seal) Araneta, the Fourth Circuit denied the Araneta’s the protection of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination with regard to their foreign law.

to extending the privilege if there is a “reasonable” fear of foreign prosecution3.

1980 BAR: [Page 162] D, a resident of Davao, borrowed PHP9,666.00 from E, his employer, a resident of Manila. D agreed in writing that he would work as helper in the house of E; that his account would be paid back to him at the rate of PHP400.00 a month; and that in case D fails to pay in cash, he would continue to render service as domestic helper in E’s household. On the sixth month, he requested to be allowed to leave E’s service because he had a better opportunity in Davao, salary-wise. E refused to release D from his service and insisted on D’s compliance with his agreement even as D promised to continue remitting from Davao the monthly amounts due until his debt was fully paid. Evaluate the rights of the parties based on the Constitution. Which of the conflicting rights should prevail?

Answer:D is invoking his right to liberty, specifically the freedom to choose whom to work for and where. E is invoking his right to property, or the right to collect the sum of money he previously lent to D.

D’s right to liberty must prevail over E’s right to property. In the hierarchy of rights, the right to liberty is above that of property. Furthermore, Section 18, Article III of the Constitution specifically provides that there shall be no involuntary servitude unless as a punishment for a crime and the party has been duly convicted. In the present problem, D was never convicted of a crime of which he must be forced to render his services as punishment. As such, the general rule that no involuntary servitude shall exist is applicable. D’s rights must prevail over E’s.

1986 BAR: [ Page 162 ] Mabagal, a court stenographer, transfers to the Far East Bank before she can finish transcribing stenographic notes taken during the intestate proceedings in the Cebu Regional Trial Court. The Court of Appeals, where the RTC decision was elevated, orders Mabagal’s arrest and detention for ignoring the court’s repeated orders to submit the transcript of stenographic notes. Mabagal files a habeas corpus petition with the Supreme Court stating that her small children are deprived of their mother’s care and that she is being subjected to involuntary servitude, never having been charged, tried, or convicted of any crime. How would you resolve the petition? Explain.

Answer:3 Moses v. Allard(in re Moses), 799 F. Supp. 857, 970-83 (E.D. Mich. 1991), Yves Farms, Inc. v. Rickett, 659 F. Supp. 932, 939-41 (M.D.Ga. 1987), etc.

Her petition must fail. There is no involuntary servitude in the instant case. Involuntary servitude denotes a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another or the condition of one who is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment, and against his will, to labor for another, whether he is paid or not.4

The order of the CA compelling Mabagal to submit the transcript of stenographic notes is an ancillary or incidental prerogative of the appellate court in its appellate jurisdiction, is a part of its inherent powers which are necessary to the ordinary and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction, and is essential to the due administration of justice.

The traditional sanctions of a negligent stenographer are to hold her in contempt or to imprison her until she obeys the order. The court may also hold her resignation or clearance until she completes her transcription.

In the present case, despite Mabagal’s transfer to a private institution, she remains to be a court stenographer with unfinished duties. As such, she is still subject to Section 12, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court on the Clerk’s order to attach the copies of the transcript of the oral evidence on the record on appeal. Hence, the court deemed it still proper to require her to submit her transcribed stenographic notes.

Her habeas corpus petition must also fail because her detention was a consequence of her disobedience of a lawful court order. Such detention is lawful.

Section 19, Article III

Wilkins v. Gaddy, No. 08-10914Feb. 22, 2010, 559 US __ (2010)

Issue: May the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner constitute cruel and unusual punishment even when the inmate does not suffer serious injury?

Ruling:

Yes, the US Supreme Court has consistently ruled that “the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual 4 In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus. SEGIFREDO L. ACLARACION v. Gatmaitan, G.R. No. L-39115, May 26, 1975

punishment even when the inmate does not suffer serious injury. The “core judicial inquiry,” was not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated whether or not significant injury is evident. A contrary ruling would then result to the Eighth Amendment permitting any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury.

2012 Bar The death penalty shall not be imposed:

a) unless reasons penalty for compelling death the involving crimes and executive hereafter provides for it;

b) unless reasons for compelling heinous involving crimes and a constitutional amendment provides for it;

c) unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes and Congress hereafter provides for it;

d) unless reasons crimes for compelling heinous Supreme involving and the Court hereafter upholds it.

Answer: C, Equal Protection; Subsidiary Imprisonment

(1990) No. 4: "X" was sentenced to a penalty of 1 year and 5 months of prision correctional and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of solvency. After serving his prison term, "X" asked the Director of Prisons whether he could already be released. "X" was asked to pay the fine of P5,000.00 and he said he could not afford it, being an indigent. The Director informed him he has to serve an additional prison term at the rate of one day per eight pesos in accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, The lawyer of "X" filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that the further incarceration of his client for unpaid fines violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Decide.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(1) The petition should be granted, because Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code is unconstitutional. In Tate vs. Short, 401 U.S. 395, the United States Supreme Court held that imposition of subsidiary imprisonment upon a convict who is too poor to pay a fine violates equal protection, because economic status cannot serve as a valid basis for distinguishing the duration of the imprisonment between a convict who is able to pay the fine and a convict who is unable to pay it.

(2) On the other hand, in United States ex rel. Privitera vs. Kross, 239 F Supp 118, it was held that the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for inability to pay a fine does not violate equal protection, because the punishment should be tailored to fit the individual, and equal protection does not compel the eradication of every disadvantage caused by indigence. The decision was affirmed by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals in 345 F2d 533, and the United States Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari in 382 U.S. 911. This ruling was adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in People vs. Williams, 31 ALR3d 920.

G.R. No. 195032 February 20, 2013

Braza v. Sandiganbayan

Issue: Will there be double jeopardy if the first information charged an offense different from that charged in the second information but both charges arose from the same transaction?Held: No. Braza cannot plausibly rely on the principle of double jeopardy to avoid arraignment under the second information because the offense charged therein is different and not included in the offense charged under the first information.There is simply no double jeopardy when the subsequent information charges another and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts.33 Prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is the prosecution for the same offense.(Can be omitted) To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, the accused has the burden of demonstrating the following requisites: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as in the first.29 As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment, (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.30 The test for the third element is whether one offense is identical with the other or is an attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information.

G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014Disini v. Secretary of Justice

Issue: Does Sec. 7 of the Cybercrime Law, insofar as online libel and child pornography are concerned, violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy?Held: Online Libel. Yes. If the published material on print, said to be libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription against double jeopardy.Child Pornography. Yes. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the ACPA’s scope so as to include identical activities in cyberspace. ACPA’s definition of child pornography in fact already covers the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means." Thus, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be tantamount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

G.R. No. 179080, November 26, 2014

Geroche v. People

Issue: Can the accused who were charged with Violation of Domicile but convicted with Less Serious Physical Injuries invoke double jeopardy if on their appeal they were found guilty of Violation of Domicile?Held: No. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question including one not raised by the parties. When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he or she waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate. An appeal confers upon the appellate court jurisdiction to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase (or reduce) the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. Thus, when petitioners appealed the trial court’s judgment of conviction for Less Serious Physical Injuries, they are deemed to have abandoned their right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy since it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the assailed judgment.

Villareal vs People, GR 151258FACTS: Accused are members of the Aquila Fraternity and in one of their initiation rites held last February 9, 1991, a neophyte by the name of Lenny Villa died as a result of the multiple traumatic injuries inflicted upon him. ISSUE: Can the dismissal of the criminal case against Escalona, et. Al on account of speedy trial be appealed or reconsidered without violating their rights against double jeopardy? Can the completion by Tecson et al, of the terms and conditions of their probation be annulled and reconsidered without violating their rights against double jeopardy?RULING: We emphasize that in light of the finding of violation of the right of Escalona et al. to speedy trial, the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case against them amounted to an acquittal, and that any appeal or reconsideration thereof would result in a violation of their right against double jeopardy. Though we have recognized that the acquittal of the accused may be challenged where there has been a grave abuse of discretion, certiorari would lie if it is convincingly established that the CA’s Decision dismissing the case was attended by whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The rule on double jeopardy is not triggered when a petition challenges the validity of the order of dismissal instead of the correctness

thereof. Rather, grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy from attaching. Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified offenders who immediately admit their liability and thus renounce their right to appeal. Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its government of any of the latter’s prerogatives, rights or remedies.

People and AAA vs Carampatana, GR 183652FACTS: Accused were convicted of raping AAA, but the judgment was reversed by the CA, thus this appeal.

ISSUE: Can a judgment of acquittal be challenged on certiorari? Can it be filed by the private respondent without the intervention of the Solicitor General? RULING: Judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and void. In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in [the] name of said complainant.1981 BARX was accused of Libel before the CFI in 1975. After the arraignment, no further proceedings were had because of the unavailability of prosecution witnesses. Finally, at the trial on February 10, 1981, the complaining witnesses testified on direct examination. However, on February 15, 1981, the day set for his cross examination, the complainant failed to appear. The court sustained the defense’s objection to the postponement, dismissed the case, but qualified the dismissal as “provisional”. The next day, the Fiscal moved for reconsideration of the order if dismissal on the ground that the complainant was not able to attend the trial because he was delayed by the traffic. The court reconsidered the

order and reset the case for trial. Is the order reinstating the case valid? Reason.No, it is invalid. Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court states that “a case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.” The dismissal, without his express consent, would bar the revival of the case based on the rule on double jeopardy.1986 BARMabilis, charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, pleads “Guilty” and is accordingly convicted and sentenced in open court. The following day, the Fiscal filed an amended information for homicide through reckless imprudence since it turns out that the victim died from his injuries three days before Mabilis was arraigned and convicted. Defense counsel moved to quash the amended information invoking double jeopardy. The fiscal opposes the motion. Resolve the motion.Doctrine of supervening event is "where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense" (15 Am. Jur. 66), the accused cannot be said in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense." That rule applies to the present case where, after the first prosecution for a lesser crime, new facts have supervened which together with those already in existence at the time of the first prosecution, have made the offense graver and the penalty first imposed legally inadequate. 1986 BARThe Filipino seamen detained at Kota Kinabalu, allegedly fishing in Malaysian territorial waters, had been acquitted, after trial by the sessions court in the same city. They could not be released and returned to the Philippines, because the prosecution had appealed the judgment of acquittal to the Supreme Court of Malaysia. Assume the situations had been reversed and a Malaysian had been apprehended in Shasi, Sulu for an alleged offense, charged before the RTC and after trial, acquitted. May the Province Fiscal of Sulu appeal such judgments of acquittal to the Supreme Court, like what the Malaysians did in the case of the Filipino seamen at Kota Kinabalu. Explain your answer. No, because it would place the accused in double jeopardy, contrary to Art. III, sec. 21 of our Constitution. A judgment of acquittal in criminal proceedings is final and unappealable whether it happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals. This right is guaranteed to aliens (People v. Ang Chio Kio, 95 Phil. 475)

1997 Bar The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila approved an ordinance (No. 1000) prohibiting the operation in the streets within the city limits of taxicab units over eight years old (from year of manufacture). The imposable penalty for violation thereof is a fine of P4,000.00 or imprisonment for one year upon the erring operator. Thereafter and while the city ordinance was already in effect. Congress enacted a law (Republic Act No. 500) prohibiting the operation in the streets of cities throughout the country of taxicab units beyond ten years old. The imposable penalty for violation thereof is the same as in Ordinance No. 1000. A, an owner/operator of a taxicab unit operating in the City of Manila, was charged with violation of the city ordinance. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty; whereupon, trial was set five days thereafter. For failure of the witnesses to appear at the trial, the City Court dismissed the case against A. The City Prosecutor of Manila forthwith filed another information in the same court charging A with violation of Republic Act No. 500 for operating the taxicab unit subject of the information in the first case. The accused moved to dismiss the second case against him invoking double JeopardyAnswer: If I were the judge, I would grant the motion. The dismissal of the first case for failure of the witnesses to appear terminated the first jeopardy. As held in Caes vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54, the dismissal of a case for failure of the witnesses for the prosecution to appear constitutes an acquittal. The acquittal of A for violation of Ordinance No. 1000 bars his prosecution for violation of Republic Act No. 500. Under Section 21, Article in of the Constitution, if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either bars another prosecution for the same act.2000 Bar Charged by Francisco with libel, Pablo was arraigned on January 3, 2000, Pre-trial was dispensed with and continuous trial was set for March 7, 8 and 9, 2000. On the first setting, the prosecution moved for its postponement and cancellation of the other settings because its principal and probably only witness, the private complainant Francisco, suddenly had to go abroad to fulfill a professional commitment. The judge instead dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. Would the reversal of the trial court's assailed dismissal of the case place the accused in double jeopardy?Answer: Since the postponement of the case would not violate the right of the accused to speedy trial, the precipitate dismissal of the case is void. The reversal of the dismissal will not place the accused in double Jeopardy. As held In People v. Leviste, 255 SCRA 238 (1996). since the motion for postponement was the first one requested, the need for the offended party to attend to a professional commitment is a valid reason, no substantial right of the accused would be prejudiced, and the prosecution should be afforded a fair opportunity to prosecute its case, the motion should be granted.2001 Bar For the death of Joey, Erning was charged with the crime of homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela. He was arraigned. Due to numerous postponements of the scheduled hearings at the instance of the prosecution, particularly based on the ground of unavailability of prosecution witnesses who could not be found or located, the criminal case was pending trial for a period of seven years. Upon motion of accused Erning

who invoked his right to speedy trial, the court dismissed the case. Eventually, the prosecution witnesses surfaced, and a criminal case for homicide, involving the same incident was filed anew against Erning. Accused Erning moved for dismissal of the case on the ground of double jeopardy. The prosecution objected, submitting the reason that it was not able to present the said witnesses earlier because the latter went into hiding out of fear. Resolve the motion.Answer: The motion should be granted. As held in Caes us. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54 (1989), the dismissal of a criminal case predicated on the right of the accused to a speedy trial amounts to an acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt and bars his subsequent prosecution for the same offense.2002 Bar A Tamaraw FX driven by Asiong Cascasero, who was drunk, sideswiped a pedestrian along EDSA in Makati City, resulting in physical injuries to the latter. The public prosecutor filed two separate information against Cascasero, the first for reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, and the second for violation of an ordinance of Makati City prohibiting and penalizing driving under the influence of liquor. Cascasero was arraigned, tried and convicted for reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code. With regard to the second case (i.e., violation of the city ordinance), upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash the information invoking his right against double jeopardy. He contended that, under Art. III, Section 21 of the Constitution, if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act He argued that the two criminal charges against him stemmed from the same act of driving allegedly under the influence of liquor which caused the accident. Was there double jeopardy? Explain your answerAnswer 1: Yes, there is double jeopardy. Under the second sentence of Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution, if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. In this case, the same act is involved in the two cases. The reckless imprudence which resulted in physical injuries arose from the same act of driving under the influence of liquor. In Yap v. Lutero, G.R. No. L-12669, April 30, 1959, the Supreme Court held that an accused who was acquitted of driving recklessly in violation of an ordinance could not be prosecuted for damage to property through reckless imprudence because the two charges were based on the same act. In People v, Relova, 148 SCRA 292 (1987), it was held that when there is identity in the act punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall bar prosecution under the other.Answer 2: There is no double jeopardy because the act penalized under the Revised Penal Code is different from the act penalized by the ordinance of Makati City. The Revised Penal Code penalizes reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries, while the ordinance of Makati City penalizes driving under the influence of liquor.2008 Bar JC, a major in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is facing prosecution before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the murder of his neighbor whom he suspected to have molested his (JC's) 15-year old

daughter. Assume that upon being arraigned, JC entered a plea of guilty and was allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. JC then testified to the effect that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense because the latter was strangling him and that he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities. Subsequently, the trial court rendered a decision acquitting JC. Would an appeal by the prosecution from the decision of acquittal violate JC's right against double jeopardy? Why or why not?Answer: JC will not be placed in double jeopardy because he had no valid plea. One of the requisites to constitute double jeopardy is that there must be a valid plea. The fact that he was allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances and he testified for an incomplete self-defense and for a voluntary surrender to the authorities has the effect of vacating his plea of guilt. Therefore, there was actually no standing plea for JC. As a consequence, JC cannot invoke double when the prosecution appeal from his judgment of acquittal.

Page 1761. (2011 Bar) There is double jeopardy when the dismissal of the first case is (A) made at the instance of the accused invoking his right to fair trial. (B) made upon motion of the accused without objection from the prosecution. (C) made provisionally without objection from the accused.(D) based on the objection of the accused to the prosecution's motion to postpone trial.

2. (2012 Bar) In which of the following would there be no double jeopardy even if a subsequent case is filed?

a. Pot is accused before the RTC of qualified theft. After innumerable postponements against Pot’s wishes, he moves for dismissal for denial of the right to a speedy trial. Prosecutor objected. Dismissal granted;

b. Pot is accused before the RTC of qualified theft. After innumerable postponements against Pot’s wishes, the prosecutor moves for dismissal with the consent of Pot. Granted;

c. Pot is accused before the RTC of qualified theft. After innumerable postponements against Pot’s wishes, he moves for dismissal for denial of the right to a speedy trial. Prosecutor posts no objections. Dismissal granted;

d. Pot is accused before the RTC of qualified theft. After innumerable postponements against Pot’s wishes, the prosecutor moves for dismissal over the objections of Pot. Granted.

(2012 Bar) Butchoy installed a jumper cable. He was prosecuted under a Makati ordinance penalizing such act. He moved for its dismissal on the ground that the jumper cable was within the territorial jurisdiction of

Mandaluyong and not Makati. The case was dismissed. The City of Mandaluyong thereafter filed a case against him for theft under the Revised Penal Code (RCP). Is there double jeopardy?

a. No. The first jeopardy was terminated with his express consent;

b. Yes. This is double jeopardy of the second kind – prosecution for the same act under an ordinance and a law;

c. Yes. He is prosecuted for the same offense which has already been dismissed by the City of Makati;

d. No. The second kind of double jeopardy under Section 21, Article III only contemplates conviction or acquittal which could terminate a first jeopardy.

Page 183. 3. Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014

Issue: Is Sec. 20 of the Cybercrime Law a bill of attainder?

Held: No. The act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be done "knowingly or willfully." There must still be a judicial determination of guilt, during which, as the Solicitor General assumes, defense and justifications for non-compliance may be raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck down by the Court.

4. (1982 Bar) A municipal ordinance required every municipal employee every municipal employee, as a condition for continued employment, to take an oath of loyalty which included an affirmation that during the period of (5) years immediately preceding the effectivity of the ordinance. He had not advocated or taught the overthrow of the government by force and that he had not, during the said period belonged to any organization advocating or teaching such doctrine. He challenges the constitutionality of the ordinance on the ground that it is a bill of attainder. Is his contention tenable? Reason. Answer: The municipal employer is not disabled because it is an agency of the State from inquiring of its employees as to matters that may prove relevant to their fitness and suitability for the public service. Past conduct may well relate to present fitness; past loyalty may have a reasonable relationship to present and future trust. Both are commonly inquired into in determining fitness for both high and low positions in private industry and are not less relevant in public employment. While the amendment deprived no one of employment with or without trial, yet from its effective date it terminated any privilege to work for the city in the case of persons who thereafter engaged in the activity proscribed. The ordinance would be ex post facto if it imposed punishment for past conduct lawful at the time it was engaged in. Bills of attainder are 'legislative acts that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial. Punishment is a prerequisite. Whether legislative action curtailing a privilege previously enjoyed amounts to punishment depends upon 'the circumstances attending and the causes of the deprivation. We are unable to conclude that

punishment is imposed by a general regulation which merely provides standards of qualification and eligibility for employment. (GARNER v. BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS OF LOS ANGELES)

5. (1987 Bar) Congress passed a law relating to officials and employees who had served in the Government for the period from September 21, 1972 up to February 25, 1986. One provision of the law declared all officials from the rank of assistant head of a department, bureau, office or agency "Unfit" for continued service in the government and declared their respective positions vacant. Is the provision valid? Why?

The law is a bill of attainder by which Congress, by assuming judicial magistracy, in effect declares all officials and employees during martial law (September 21, 1972- February 25, 1986) as disloyal and, on this basis, removes some while subjecting others to a loyalty test. With respect to the provision declaring positions vacant, even the power to reorganize cannot be invoked because under the Freedom Constitution such power can be exercised only by the President and only up to February 25, 1987. Since the law under question was presumably passed after February 25, 1987 and by Congress, it is unconstitutional.

[1988 BAR] Because of the marked increase in the incidence of labor strikes and work stoppages in industrial establishments, Congress intending to help promote industrial peace, passed, over the objections of militant labor unions, an amendment to the Labor Code, providing that no person who is or has been a member of the Communist Party may serve as officer of any labor organization in the country. An association of former NPA’s (New People’s Army) who had surrendered, availed of amnesty, and are presently leading quiet and peaceful lives, comes to you asking what could be done against the amendment. What would you advise the association to do? Explain.

ANSWER: The disqualification of members of the CPP and its military arm, the NPA, from being officers of a labor organization would (1) nullify the amnesty granted by the President with the concurrence, it may be assumed, of the majority of the members of Congress and (2) permit the condemnation of the former NPA members without judicial trial in a way that makes it contrary to the prohibition against the enactment of bill of attainder and ex post facto law. The amnesty granted to the former NPAs obliterated their offense and relieved them of the punishment imposed by law. (Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, 82 Phil. 642, 1949). The amendment would make them guilty of an act, that of having been former members of the NPA, for which they have already been forgiven by Presidential amnesty.

For these reasons, I would advise the association to work for the veto of the bill and, if it is not vetoed but becomes a law, to challenge it in court.

[2005 BAR] The Philippines and Australia entered into a Treaty of Extradition concurred in by the Senate of the Philippines on September 10, 1990. Both governments have notified each other that the requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have been complied with. It took effect in 1990. The Australian government is requesting the Philippine government to extradite its citizen, Gibson, who has committed in his country the indictable offense of Obtaining Property by Deception in 1985. The said offense is among those enumerated as extraditable in the Treaty. For his defense, Gibson asserts that the retroactive application of the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law. Rule on Gibson’s contention.

ANSWER: Gibson’s contention is wrong. The prohibition against ex post facto laws applies to penal laws only and does not apply to extradition treaties. Extradition does not define crimes. It merely provides a means by which a State may obtain the return and punishment of a person charged with or convicted of having committed a crime, who has fled the jurisdiction of the State whose law has been violated. It was held that an extradition treaty applies to crimes committed before its effectivity unless the extradition treaty expressly exempts them. It is therefore immaterial whether at the time of the commission of the crime for which extradition is sought no treaty was in existence. If at the time extradition is requested there is in force between the requesting and the requested States a treaty covering the offense on which the request is based, the treaty is applicable.

[2007 BAR] Lawrence is a Filipino computer expert based in Manila who invented a virus that destroys all the files stored in a computer. Assume that in May 2005, this virus spread all over the world and caused $50million in damages to property in the United States, and that in June 2005, he was criminally charged before United States courts under their anti-hacker law. Assume that in July 2005, the Philippines adopted its own anti-hacker law, to strengthen existing sanctions already provided against damage to property. The United States has requested the Philippines to extradite him to US courts under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.

(a) Is the Philippines under an obligation to extradite Lawrence? State the rule and its rationale.

ANSREW: The Philippine is under no obligation to extradite Lawrence. Under the principle of dual or double criminality, the crime must be punishable in both the requesting and requested states to make it extraditable. In this case, only the United States had an anti-hacker law at the time of the commission of the crime in May 2005. The rationale for the principle of dual criminality rests on the basic principle of reciprocity and of the legal maxim nulla poena sine lege.

(b) Assume that the extradition request was made after the Philippines adopted its anti-hacker legislation. Will that change your answer?

ANSWER: No. The Philippines is still under no obligation to extradite Lawrence. The rule is that the crime must be punishable in both countries at the time of the commission of the offense. Since there was yet no such crime in the Philippines at the time when the acts complained of were done, in so far as the Philippines is concerned, Lawrence did not commit any crime. Hence, an extradition of Lawrence would tantamount to an ex post facto application of the Philippine anti-hacker law, prohibited by Section 22, Article III of the Constitution.

[2008 BAR] The Philippine National Police (PNP) issued a circular to all its members directed at the style and length of male officers’ hair, sideburns and moustaches, as well as the size of their waistlines. It prohibits beards, goatees, and waistlines over 38 inches, except for medical reasons. Some police officers questioned the validity of the circular, claiming that it violated their right to liberty under the Constitution. Resolve the controversy.

ANSWER: Although the National Police is civilian in character, it partakes of some of the characteristics of military life, thus permitting the imposition of reasonable measures for discipline, uniformity in behavior and presentableness. The circular does not go beyond what is reasonable and therefore passes the test of due process. It is the policy of the state to secure peace and order through the PNP. Therefore, it is reasonable to require them to be physically fit in order to secure peace and order in the community. This is to boost the confidence of the public that they are not lazy and they are doing their job with dedication.

[2012 BAR] An ex post facto law has been defined as one: _____.(A) which aggravates a crime or makes it lesser than when it was committed;(B) which mitigates a crime or makes it lesser than when it was committed;(C) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed;(D) which aggravates a crime or makes it non-criminal after it was committed.

[2012 BAR] A bill of attainder is: _____.(A) an executive act which inflicts punishment without tender;(B) a judicial act which inflicts punishment without tender;

(C) a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial;(D) a legislative act which pardons punishment after tender.