G.R. No. 160708 October 16, 2009PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA,Petitioners,vs.MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE, for herself and in behalf of INGRID D'LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE, INGREMARK D'WIGHT VILLA ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS VILLA ABRILLE AND INGRELYN DYAN VILLA ABRILLE,Respondents.Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have four children, who are also parties to the instant case and are represented by their mother, Mary Ann.In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land denominated as Lot 7, located at Kamuning Street, Juna Subdivision, Matina, Davao City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-88674 in their names. Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and which is registered solely in his name under TCT No. T-26471.Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedros lot. The house was finished in the early 1980s but the spouses continuously made improvements, including a poultry house and an annex.In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their movables to support the family and the studies of her children. By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Anns consent, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale5dated June 21, 1991. It appears on the said deed that Mary Ann did not sign on top of her name.On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in school, Pedro together with armed members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and acting in connivance with petitioners6began transferring all their belongings from the house to an apartment.When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped from entering it. They waited outside the gate until evening under the rain. They sought help from the Talomo Police Station, but police authorities refused to intervene, saying that it was a family matter. Mary Ann alleged that the incident caused stress, tension and anxiety to her children, so much so that one flunked at school. Thus, respondents Mary Ann and her children filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale, Specific Performance, Damages and Attorneys Fees with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction7against Pedro and herein petitioners (the Ravinas) in the RTC of Davao City.During the trial, Pedro declared that the house was built with his own money. Petitioner Patrocinia Ravina testified that they bought the house and lot from Pedro, and that her husband, petitioner Wilfredo Ravina, examined the titles when they bought the property.On September 26, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of herein respondent Mary Ann P. Villa Abrille as follows:WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:1. The sale of lot 8 covered by TCT No. 26471 by defendant Pedro Abrille appearing in the Deed of Sale marked as Exh. "E" is void as to one half or 277.5 square meters representing the share of plaintiff Mary Villa Abrille.2. That sale of Lot 7 covered by TCT No. [88674] by defendant Pedro Villa Abrille in the Deed of Sale (Exh. "A") is valid as to one half or 277.5 square meters of the 555 square meters as one half belongs to defendant Pedro Abrille but it is void as to the other half or 277.5 square meters as it belongs to plaintiff Mary Abrille who did not sell her share nor give her consent to the sale.3. That sale of the house mentioned in the Deed of Sale (Exh. "A") is valid as far as the one half of the house representing the share of defendant Pedro Abrille is concerned but void as to the other half which is the share of plaintiff Mary Abrille because she did not give her consent/sign the said sale.4. The defendants shall jointly pay the plaintiffs.4. A. Seventeen Thousand Pesos (P17,000.00) representing the value of the movables and belonging[s] that were lost when unknown men unceremoniously and without their knowledge and consent removed their movables from their house and brought them to an apartment.4. B. One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) to plaintiff Mary Abrille as moral damages.4. C. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to each of the four children as moral damages, namely:a) Ingrid Villa Abrille Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), b) Ingremark Villa Abrille Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), c) Ingresoll Villa Abrille Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and d) Ingrelyn Villa Abrille Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).5. Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as exemplary damages by way of example and correction for the public good.6. The costs of suit.8On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision, thus:WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is herebyMODIFIEDas follows:1. The sale of lot covered by TCT No. 26471 in favor of defendants spouses Wilfredo and Patrocinia Ravina is declaredvalid.2. The sale of lot covered by TCT No. 88674 in favor of said defendants spouses Ravina, together with the house thereon, is declarednullandvoid.3. Defendant Pedro Abrille is ordered toreturnthevalueoftheconsiderationfor the lot covered by TCT No. 88674 and the house thereon to co-defendants spouses Ravina.4. Defendants spouses Ravina [a]re ordered to reconvey the lot and house covered by TCT No. 88674 in favor of spouses Pedro and Mary Villa Abrille and to deliver possession to them.5. Plaintiffs are given the option to exercise their rights under Article [450] of the New Civil Code with respect to the improvements introduced by defendant spouses Ravina.6. Defendants Pedro Villa Abrille and spouses Ravina are ordered to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs as follows:a) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) to plaintiff Mary Villa Abrille as moral damages.b) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages to each of the four children, namely: Ingrid Villa Abrille, Ingremark Villa Abrille, Ingresoll Villa Abrille and Ingrelyn Villa Abrille.c) Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) as exemplary damages by way of example and correction for the public good.SO ORDERED.9Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed this petition. Petitioners argue that:I.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED x x x THE SALE OF LOT COVERED BY TCT NO. 88674 IN FAVOR OF SPOUSES RAVINA, TOGETHER WITH THE HOUSE THEREON, AS NULL AND VOID SINCE IT IS CLEARLY CONTRARY TO LAW AND EVIDENCE.II.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS PATROCIN[I]A RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA ARE NOT INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE, THE SAME BEING CONTRARY TO LAW AND EVIDENCE.III.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS PATROCIN[I]A RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA ARE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES, THE SAME BEING CONTRARY TO LAW AND EVIDENCE.10In essence, petitioners assail the appellate courts declaration that the sale to them by Pedro of the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 is null and void. However, in addressing this issue, it is imperative to determine: (1) whether the subject property covered by TCT No. T-88674 is an exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal property, and (2) whether its sale by Pedro was valid considering the absence of Mary Anns consent.Petitioners assert that the subject lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was the exclusive property of Pedro having been acquired by him through barter or exchange.11They allege that the subject lot was acquired by Pedro with the proceeds of the sale of one of his exclusive properties. Allegedly, Pedro and his sister Carmelita initially agreed to exchange their exclusive lots covered by TCT No. T-26479 and TCT No. T-26472, respectively. Later, however, Pedro sold the lot covered by TCT No. T-26472 to one Francisca Teh Ting and purchased the property of Carmelita using the proceeds of the sale. A new title, TCT No. T-88674, was issued thereafter. Thus, petitioners insist that the subject lot remains to be an exclusive property of Pedro as it was acquired or purchased through the exclusive funds or money of the latter.We are not persuaded. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, which was an exclusive property of Pedro, having been acquired by him before his marriage to Mary Ann. However, the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. No evidence was adduced to show that the subject property was acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro.12Petitioners bare assertion would not suffice to overcome the presumption that TCT No. T-88674, acquired during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann, is conjugal. Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property, having been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house.1avvphi1Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouses inability, the authority of the court. Article 124 of the Family Code, the governing law at the time the assailed sale was contracted, is explicit:ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis supplied.)The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property by the husband without the consent of the wife is null and void.Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date the contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case.13Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale within five (5) years from the date of sale and execution of the deed. However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house and lot and does not include the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can dispose of freely without Mary Anns consent.On the second assignment of error, petitioners contend that they are buyers in good faith.14Accordingly, they need not inquire whether the lot was purchased by money exclusively belonging to Pedro or of the common fund of the spouses and may rely on the certificates of title.The contention is bereft of merit. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, a purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property.15To establish his status as a buyer for value in good faith, a person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller need only show that he relied on the face of the sellers certificate of title. But for a person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller whose capacity to sell is restricted, such as by Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code orArticle 124of the Family Code, he must show that he inquired into the latters capacity to sell in order to establish himself as a buyer for value in good faith.161avvphi1In the present case, the property is registered in the name of Pedro and his wife, Mary Ann. Petitioners cannot deny knowledge that during the time of the sale in 1991, Pedro was married to Mary Ann. However, Mary Anns conformity did not appear in the deed. Even assuming that petitioners believed in good faith that the subject property is the exclusive property of Pedro, they were apprised by Mary Anns lawyer of her objection to the sale and yet they still proceeded to purchase the property without Mary Anns written consent. Moreover, the respondents were the ones in actual, visible and public possession of the property at the time the transaction was being made. Thus, at the time of sale, petitioners knew that Mary Ann has a right to or interest in the subject properties and yet they failed to obtain her conformity to the deed of sale. Hence, petitioners cannot now invoke the protection accorded to purchasers in good faith.Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been given is proper. The relationship between the parties in any contract even if subsequently annulled must always be characterized and punctuated by good faith and fair dealing.17Hence, in consonance with justice and equity and the salutary principle of non-enrichment at anothers expense, we sustain the appellate courts order directing Pedro to return to petitioner spouses the value of the consideration for the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 and the house thereon.However, this court rules that petitioners cannot claim reimbursements for improvements they introduced after their good faith had ceased. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner Patrocinia Ravina made improvements and renovations on the house and lot at the time when the complaint against them was filed. Ravina continued introducing improvements during the pendency of the action.18Thus, Article 449 of the New Civil Code is applicable. It provides that, "(h)e who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity."19On the last issue, petitioners claim that the decision awarding damages to respondents is not supported by the evidence on record.20The claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by which respondent and her children were removed from the family home deserves our condemnation. On July 5, 1991, while respondent was out and her children were in school, Pedro Villa Abrille acting in connivance with the petitioners21surreptitiously transferred all their personal belongings to another place. The respondents then were not allowed to enter their rightful home or family abode despite their impassioned pleas.Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: "Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."22When a right is exercised in a manner that does not conform with such norms and results in damages to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrong doer must be held responsible. Similarly, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages caused.23It is patent in this case that petitioners alleged acts fall short of these established civil law standards.WHEREFORE, we deny the instant petition for lack of merit. The Decision dated February 21, 2002 and the Resolution dated October 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54560 are AFFIRMED.Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 178902 April 21, 2010MANUEL O. FUENTES and LETICIA L. FUENTES,Petitioners,vs.CONRADO G. ROCA, ANNABELLE R. JOSON, ROSE MARIE R. CRISTOBAL and PILAR MALCAMPO,Respondents.D E C I S I O NSabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar, Zamboanga City. On October 11, 1982 she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale.1But Tarciano did not for the meantime have the registered title transferred to his name.Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). They arranged to meet at the office of Atty. Romulo D. Plagata whom they asked to prepare the documents of sale. They later signed an agreement to sell that Atty. Plagata prepared2dated April 29, 1988, which agreement expressly stated that it was to take effect in six months.The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a down payment ofP60,000.00 for the transfer of the lots title to him. And, within six months, Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale. Upon Tarcianos compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take possession of the lot and pay him an additionalP140,000.00 orP160,000.00, depending on whether or not he succeeded in demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of the lot without any further formality and payment.The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then worked on the other requirements of the sale. According to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in one of his trips to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent.3As soon as Tarciano met the other conditions, Atty. Plagata notarized Rosarios affidavit in Zamboanga City. On January 11, 1989 Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale4in favor of the Fuentes spouses. They then paid him the additionalP140,000.00 mentioned in their agreement. A new title was issued in the name of the spouses5who immediately constructed a building on the lot. On January 28, 1990 Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who died nine months afterwards.Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely, respondents Conrado G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, and Rose Marie R. Cristobal, together with Tarcianos sister, Pilar R. Malcampo, represented by her son, John Paul M. Trinidad (collectively, the Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City in Civil Case 4707. The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since Tarcianos wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the property be reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.6The spouses denied the Rocas allegations. They presented Atty. Plagata who testified that he personally saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her residence in Paco, Manila, on September 15, 1988. He admitted, however, that he notarized the document in Zamboanga City four months later on January 11, 1989.7All the same, the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the claim of forgery was personal to Rosario and she alone could invoke it. Besides, the four-year prescriptive period for nullifying the sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed.Both the Rocas and the Fuentes spouses presented handwriting experts at the trial. Comparing Rosarios standard signature on the affidavit with those on various documents she signed, the Rocas expert testified that the signatures were not written by the same person. Making the same comparison, the spouses expert concluded that they were.8On February 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, dismissing the case. It ruled that the action had already prescribed since the ground cited by the Rocas for annulling the sale, forgery or fraud, already prescribed under Article 1391 of the Civil Code four years after its discovery. In this case, the Rocas may be deemed to have notice of the fraud from the date the deed of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds and the new title was issued. Here, the Rocas filed their action in 1997, almost nine years after the title was issued to the Fuentes spouses on January 18, 1989.9Moreover, the Rocas failed to present clear and convincing evidence of the fraud. Mere variance in the signatures of Rosario was not conclusive proof of forgery.10The RTC ruled that, although the Rocas presented a handwriting expert, the trial court could not be bound by his opinion since the opposing expert witness contradicted the same. Atty. Plagatas testimony remained technically unrebutted.11Finally, the RTC noted that Atty. Plagatas defective notarization of the affidavit of consent did not invalidate the sale. The law does not require spousal consent to be on the deed of sale to be valid. Neither does the irregularity vitiate Rosarios consent. She personally signed the affidavit in the presence of Atty. Plagata.12On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC decision. The CA found sufficient evidence of forgery and did not give credence to Atty. Plagatas testimony that he saw Rosario sign the document in Quezon City. Its jurat said differently. Also, upon comparing the questioned signature with the specimen signatures, the CA noted significant variance between them. That Tarciano and Rosario had been living separately for 30 years since 1958 also reinforced the conclusion that her signature had been forged.Since Tarciano and Rosario were married in 1950, the CA concluded that their property relations were governed by the Civil Code under which an action for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent may be brought by the wife during the marriage within 10 years from the transaction. Consequently, the action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of the January 11, 1989 sale.Considering, however, that the sale between the Fuentes spouses and Tarciano was merely voidable, the CA held that its annulment entitled the spouses to reimbursement of what they paid him plus legal interest computed from the filing of the complaint until actual payment. Since the Fuentes spouses were also builders in good faith, they were entitled under Article 448 of the Civil Code to payment of the value of the improvements they introduced on the lot. The CA did not award damages in favor of the Rocas and deleted the award of attorneys fees to the Fuentes spouses.13Unsatisfied with the CA decision, the Fuentes spouses came to this court by petition for review.14The Issues PresentedThe case presents the following issues:1. Whether or not Rosarios signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarcianos sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged;2. Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed; and3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to annul that sale.The Courts RulingsFirst. The key issue in this case is whether or not Rosarios signature on the document of consent had been forged. For, if the signature were genuine, the fact that she gave her consent to her husbands sale of the conjugal land would render the other issues merely academic.The CA found that Rosarios signature had been forged. The CA observed a marked difference between her signature on the affidavit of consent15and her specimen signatures.16The CA gave no weight to Atty. Plagatas testimony that he saw Rosario sign the document in Manila on September 15, 1988 since this clashed with his declaration in the jurat that Rosario signed the affidavit in Zamboanga City on January 11, 1989.The Court agrees with the CAs observation that Rosarios signature strokes on the affidavit appears heavy, deliberate, and forced. Her specimen signatures, on the other hand, are consistently of a lighter stroke and more fluid. The way the letters "R" and "s" were written is also remarkably different. The variance is obvious even to the untrained eye.Significantly, Rosarios specimen signatures were made at about the time that she signed the supposed affidavit of consent. They were, therefore, reliable standards for comparison. The Fuentes spouses presented no evidence that Rosario suffered from any illness or disease that accounted for the variance in her signature when she signed the affidavit of consent. Notably, Rosario had been living separately from Tarciano for 30 years since 1958. And she resided so far away in Manila. It would have been quite tempting for Tarciano to just forge her signature and avoid the risk that she would not give her consent to the sale or demand a stiff price for it.What is more, Atty. Plagata admittedly falsified the jurat of the affidavit of consent. That jurat declared that Rosario swore to the document and signed it in Zamboanga City on January 11, 1989 when, as Atty. Plagata testified, she supposedly signed it about four months earlier at her residence in Paco, Manila on September 15, 1988. While a defective notarization will merely strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument, that falsified jurat, taken together with the marks of forgery in the signature, dooms such document as proof of Rosarios consent to the sale of the land. That the Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the notarized affidavit as proof of Rosarios consent does not matter. The sale is still void without an authentic consent.Second. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the system of conjugal partnership of gains on their property relations. While its Article 165 made Tarciano the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 16617prohibited him from selling commonly owned real property without his wifes consent. Still, if he sold the same without his wifes consent, the sale is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 gave Rosario the right to have the sale annulled during the marriage within ten years from the date of the sale. Failing in that, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of the marriage, only the value of the property that Tarciano fraudulently sold. Thus:Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.But, as already stated, the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on Property Relations Between Husband and Wife.18Further, the Family Code provisions were also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested rights.19Thus:Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n)Consequently, when Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, the law that governed the disposal of that lot was already the Family Code.In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husbands sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouses written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. Article 124 thus provides:Art. 124. x x x In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. x x xUnder the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that are declared void by positive provision of law,20as in the case of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouses written consent. A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription.21But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it aside, when any of its terms have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it.22This action, according to Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe. Thus:Art. 1410. The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without their mothers (his wifes) written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action.Besides, even assuming that it is the Civil Code that applies to the transaction as the CA held, Article 173 provides that the wife may bring an action for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent during the marriage within 10 years from the transaction. Consequently, the action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of the January 11, 1989 sale. It did not yet prescribe.The Fuentes spouses of course argue that the RTC nullified the sale to them based on fraud and that, therefore, the applicable prescriptive period should be that which applies to fraudulent transactions, namely, four years from its discovery. Since notice of the sale may be deemed given to the Rocas when it was registered with the Registry of Deeds in 1989, their right of action already prescribed in 1993.But, if there had been a victim of fraud in this case, it would be the Fuentes spouses in that they appeared to have agreed to buy the property upon an honest belief that Rosarios written consent to the sale was genuine. They had four years then from the time they learned that her signature had been forged within which to file an action to annul the sale and get back their money plus damages. They never exercised the right.If, on the other hand, Rosario had agreed to sign the document of consent upon a false representation that the property would go to their children, not to strangers, and it turned out that this was not the case, then she would have four years from the time she discovered the fraud within which to file an action to declare the sale void. But that is not the case here. Rosario was not a victim of fraud or misrepresentation. Her consent was simply not obtained at all. She lost nothing since the sale without her written consent was void. Ultimately, the Rocas ground for annulment is not forgery but the lack of written consent of their mother to the sale. The forgery is merely evidence of lack of consent.Third. The Fuentes spouses point out that it was to Rosario, whose consent was not obtained, that the law gave the right to bring an action to declare void her husbands sale of conjugal land. But here, Rosario died in 1990, the year after the sale. Does this mean that the right to have the sale declared void is forever lost?The answer is no. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas.23As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.1avvphi1In fairness to the Fuentes spouses, however, they should be entitled, among other things, to recover from Tarcianos heirs, the Rocas, theP200,000.00 that they paid him, with legal interest until fully paid, chargeable against his estate.Further, the Fuentes spouses appear to have acted in good faith in entering the land and building improvements on it. Atty. Plagata, whom the parties mutually entrusted with closing and documenting the transaction, represented that he got Rosarios signature on the affidavit of consent. The Fuentes spouses had no reason to believe that the lawyer had violated his commission and his oath. They had no way of knowing that Rosario did not come to Zamboanga to give her consent. There is no evidence that they had a premonition that the requirement of consent presented some difficulty. Indeed, they willingly made a 30 percent down payment on the selling price months earlier on the assurance that it was forthcoming.Further, the notarized document appears to have comforted the Fuentes spouses that everything was already in order when Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor on January 11, 1989. In fact, they paid the balance due him. And, acting on the documents submitted to it, the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City issued a new title in the names of the Fuentes spouses. It was only after all these had passed that the spouses entered the property and built on it. He is deemed a possessor in good faith, said Article 526 of the Civil Code, who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.As possessor in good faith, the Fuentes spouses were under no obligation to pay for their stay on the property prior to its legal interruption by a final judgment against them.24What is more, they are entitled under Article 448 to indemnity for the improvements they introduced into the property with a right of retention until the reimbursement is made. Thus:Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. (361a)The Rocas shall of course have the option, pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil Code,25of indemnifying the Fuentes spouses for the costs of the improvements or paying the increase in value which the property may have acquired by reason of such improvements.WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 00531 dated February 27, 2007 as follows:1. The deed of sale dated January 11, 1989 that Tarciano T. Roca executed in favor of Manuel O. Fuentes, married to Leticia L. Fuentes, as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title T-90,981 that the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City issued in the names of the latter spouses pursuant to that deed of sale are DECLARED void;2. The Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City is DIRECTED to reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title 3533 in the name of Tarciano T. Roca, married to Rosario Gabriel;3. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R. Cristobal, and Pilar Malcampo are ORDERED to pay petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes theP200,000.00 that the latter paid Tarciano T. Roca, with legal interest from January 11, 1989 until fully paid, chargeable against his estate;4. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R. Cristobal, and Pilar Malcampo are further ORDERED, at their option, to indemnify petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes with their expenses for introducing useful improvements on the subject land or pay the increase in value which it may have acquired by reason of those improvements, with the spouses entitled to the right of retention of the land until the indemnity is made; and5. The RTC of Zamboanga City from which this case originated is DIRECTED to receive evidence and determine the amount of indemnity to which petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes are entitled.SO ORDERED.HEIRS OF IGNACIA AGUILAR-REYES,petitioners, vs.SPOUSES CIPRIANO MIJARES AND FLORENTINA MIJARES,respondents.D E C I S I O NYNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:Under the regime of the Civil Code, the alienation or encumbrance of a conjugal real property requires the consent of the wife.The absence of such consent renders the entire transaction[1]merely voidable and not void.[2]The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, bring an action for the annulment of the contract entered into by her husband without her consent.[3]Assailed in this petition for review oncertiorariare the January 26, 2000 Decision[4]and June 19, 2000, Resolution[5]of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 28464 which declared respondents as purchasers in good faith and set aside the May 31, 1990 and June 29, 1990 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, in Civil Case No. Q-48018.The controversy stemmed from a dispute over Lot No. 4349-B-2,[6]approximately 396 square meters, previously covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 205445, located in Balintawak, Quezon City and registered in the name of Spouses Vicente Reyes and Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes.[7]Said lot and the apartments built thereon were part of the spouses conjugal properties having been purchased using conjugal funds from their garments business.[8]Vicente and Ignacia were married in 1960, but had been separatedde factosince 1974.[9]Sometime in 1984, Ignacia learned that on March 1, 1983, Vicente sold Lot No. 4349-B-2 to respondent spouses Cipriano and Florentina Mijares for P40,000.00.[10]As a consequence thereof, TCT No. 205445 was cancelled and TCT No. 306087 was issued on April 19, 1983 in the name of respondent spouses.[11]She likewise found out that Vicente filed a petition for administration and appointment of guardian with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch XXI.Vicente misrepresented therein that his wife, Ignacia, died on March 22, 1982, and that he and their 5 minor children were her only heirs.[12]On September 29, 1983, the court appointed Vicente as the guardian of their minor children.[13]Subsequently, in its Order dated October 14, 1983, the court authorized Vicente to sell the estate of Ignacia.[14]On August 9, 1984, Ignacia, through her counsel, sent a letter to respondent spouses demanding the return of her share in the lot.Failing to settle the matter amicably, Ignacia filed on June 4, 1996 a complaint[15]for annulment of sale against respondent spouses.The complaint was thereafter amended to include Vicente Reyes as one of the defendants.[16]In their answer, respondent spouses claimed that they are purchasers in good faith and that the sale was valid because it was duly approved by the court.[17]Vicente Reyes, on the other hand, contended that what he sold to the spouses was only his share in Lot No. 4349-B-2, excluding the share of his wife, and that he never represented that the latter was already dead.[18]He likewise testified that respondent spouses, through the counsel they provided him, took advantage of his illiteracy by filing a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and appointment of guardian without his knowledge.[19]On February 15, 1990, the courta quorendered a decision declaring the sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 void with respect to the share of Ignacia.It held that the purchase price of the lot was P110,000.00 and ordered Vicente to return thereof or P55,000.00 to respondent spouses.The dispositive portion of the said decision, reads-WHEREFORE, premises above considered, judgment is herebyrendered declaring the subject Deed of Absolute Sale, dated March [1,] 1983 signed by and between defendants Vicente Reyes and defendant Cipriano Mijares NULL AND VOID WITH RESPECT TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE SAID PROPERTY;The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to cancel TCT No. 306083 (sic) in the names of defendant spouses Cipriano Mijares and Florentina Mijares and to issue a new TCT in the name of the plaintiff Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes as owner in fee simple of one-half (1/2) of said property and the other half in the names of defendant spouses Cipriano Mijares and Florentin[a] Mijares, upon payment of the required fees therefore;Said defendant spouses Mijares are also ordered to allow plaintiff the use and exercise of rights, as well as obligations, pertinent to her one-half (1/2) ownership of the subject property;Defendant Vicente Reyes is hereby ordered to reimburse P55,000.00 with legal rate of interest from the execution of the subject Deed of Absolute Sale on March 1, 1983, to the defendantspouses Cipriano Mijares and Florentina Mijares which corresponds to the one-half (1/2) of the actual purchase price by the said Mijares but is annulled in this decision (sic);Defendant Vicente Reyes is hereby further ordered to pay plaintiff the amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages, plus costs of this suit.SO ORDERED.[20]Ignacia filed a motion for modification of the decision praying that the sale be declared void in its entirety and that the respondents be ordered to reimburse to her the rentals they collected on the apartments built on Lot No. 4349-B-2 computed from March 1, 1983.On May 31, 1990, the trial court modified its decision by declaring the sale void in its entirety and ordering Vicente Reyes to reimburse respondent spouses the purchase price of P110,000, thus WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the subject Deed of Absolute Sale, dated March 1, 1983 signed by and between defendants Vicente Reyes and defendant Cipriano Mijares asnulland voidab initio, in view of the absence of the wifes conformity to said transaction.Consequent thereto, the Register of Deeds for Quezon City is hereby ordered to cancel TCT No. 306083 (sic) in the name of Cipriano Mijares and Florentin[a] Mijares and issue a new TCT in the name of the plaintiff and defendant Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes and Vicente Reyes as owners in fee simple, upon payment of required fees therefore.Defendant Vicente Reyes is hereby ordered to pay the amount of one hundred ten thousand pesos (P110,000.00) with legal rate of interest at 12% per annum from the execution of the subject Deed of Absolute Sale on March 1, 1983.Further, defendant Vicente Reyes is ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages, plus costs of this suit.SO ORDERED.[21]On motion[22]of Ignacia, the court issued an Order dated June 29, 1990 amending the dispositive portion of the May 31, 1990 decision by correcting the Transfer Certificate of Title of Lot No. 4349-B-2, in the name of Cipriano Mijares and Florentina Mijares, from TCT No. 306083 to TCT No. 306087; and directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to issue a new title in the name of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes and Vicente Reyes.The Order likewise specified that Vicente Reyes should pay Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes the amount of P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.[23]Both Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes and respondent spouses appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.[24]Pending the appeal, Ignacia died and she was substituted by her compulsory heirs.[25]Petitioners contended that they are entitled to reimbursement of the rentals collected on the apartment built on Lot No. 4349-B-2, while respondent spouses claimed that they are buyers in good faith.On January 26, 2000, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court.It ruled that notwithstanding the absence of Ignacias consent to the sale, the same must be held valid in favor of respondents because they were innocent purchasers for value.[26]The decretal potion of the appellate courts decision states WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from and the Orders dated May 31, 1990 and June 29, 1990, are SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof a new one is rendered 1.Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 1, 1983 executed by Vicente Reyes in favor of spouses Cipriano and [Florentina] Mijares valid and lawful;2.Ordering Vicente Reyes to pay spouses Mijares the amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees and legal expenses; and3.Ordering Vicente Reyes to pay spouses Mijares P50,000.00 as moral damages.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.[27]Undaunted by the denial of their motion for reconsideration,[28]petitioners filed the instant petition contending that the assailed sale of Lot No. 4392-B-2 should be annulled because respondent spouses were not purchasers in good faith.The issues for resolution are as follows: (1) What is the status of the sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 to respondent spouses? (2) Assuming that the sale is annullable, should it be annulled in its entirety or only with respect to the share of Ignacia? (3) Are respondent spouses purchasers in good faith?Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code,[29]the governing laws at the time the assailed sale was contracted, provide:Art.166.Unless the wife has been declared anon compos mentisor a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent.If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the sameArt. 173.The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property.Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, the husband could not alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife otherwise, the contract is voidable.Indeed, in several cases[30]the Court had ruled that such alienation or encumbrance by the husband is void.The better view, however, is to consider the transaction as merely voidable and not void.[31]This is consistent with Article 173 of the Civil Code pursuant to which the wife could, during the marriage and within 10 years from the questioned transaction, seek its annulment.[32]In the case ofHeirs ofChristina Ayuste v. Court of Appeals,[33]it was categorically held that There is no ambiguity in the wording of the law. A sale of real property of the conjugal partnership made by the husband without the consent of his wife is voidable.The action for annulment must be brought during the marriage and within ten years from the questioned transaction by the wife. Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation there is room only for application.[34]Likewise, inSpouses Guiang v. Court of Appeals,[35]the Court quoted with approval the ruling of the trial court that under the Civil Code, the encumbrance or alienation of a conjugal real property by the husband absent the wifes consent, is voidable and not void.Thus Under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent.The alienation or encumbrance if so made however is not null and void.It is merely voidable.The offended wife may bring an action to annul the said alienation or encumbrance.Thus, the provision of Article 173 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to wit:Art. 173.The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property.Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.This particular provision giving the wife ten (10) years x x x during [the] marriage to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code.It is thus clear that any alienation or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is null and voidIn the case at bar, there is no dispute that Lot No. 4349-B-2, is a conjugal property having been purchased using the conjugal funds of the spouses during the subsistence of their marriage.It is beyond cavil therefore that the sale of said lot to respondent spouses without the knowledge and consent of Ignacia is voidable.Her action to annul the March 1, 1983 sale which was filed on June 4, 1986, before her demise is perfectly within the 10 year prescriptive period under Article 173 of the Civil Code.Even if we reckon the period from November 25, 1978 which was the date when Vicente and the respondent spouses entered into a contract concerning Lot No. 4349-B-2, Ignacias action would still be within the prescribed period.Anent the second issue, the trial court correctly annulled the voidable sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 in its entirety.InBucoy v. Paulino,[36]a case involving the annulment of sale with assumption of mortgages executed by the husband without the consent of the wife, it was held that the alienation or encumbrance must be annulled in its entirety and not only insofar as the share of the wife in the conjugal property is concerned.Although the transaction in the said case was declared void and not merely voidable, the rationale for the annulment of the whole transaction is the same thus The plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that the contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband without the wife's consent, may be annulled by the wife. Had Congress intended to limit such annulment in so far as the contract shall prejudice the wife, such limitation should have been spelled out in the statute. It is not the legitimate concern of this Court to recast the law. As Mr. Justice Jose B. L. Reyes of this Court and Judge Ricardo C. Puno of the Court of First Instance correctly stated, [t]he rule (in the first sentence of Article 173) revokes Baello vs. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 213 and Coque vs. Navas Sioca, 45 Phil. 430, in which cases annulment was held to refer only to the extent of the one-half interest of the wifeThe necessity to strike down the contract of July 5, 1963 as a whole, not merely as to the share of the wife, is not without its basis in the common-sense rule. To be underscored here is that upon the provisions of Articles 161, 162 and 163 of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for many obligations while the conjugal partnership exists. Not only that. The conjugal property is even subject to the payment of debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, as those for the payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon them after the responsibilities in Article 161 have been covered (Article 163, par. 3), if it turns out that the spouse who is bound thereby, should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient. These are considerations that go beyond the mere equitable share of the wife in the property. These are reasons enough for the husband to be stopped from disposing of the conjugal property without the consent of the wife. Even more fundamental is the fact that the nullity is decreed by the Code not on the basis of prejudice but lack of consent of an indispensable party to the contract under Article 166.[37]With respect to the third issue, the Court finds that respondent spouses are not purchasers in good faith.A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property.He buys the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives the thing was the owner and could convey title to the property.A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith.[38]In the instant case, there existed circumstances that should have placed respondent spouses on guard. The death certificate of Ignacia, shows that she died onMarch 22, 1982.The same death certificate, however, reveals that (1) it was issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Lubao Pampanga onMarch 10, 1982; (2) the alleged death of Ignacia was reported to the Office of the Civil Registrar onMarch 4, 1982; and (3) her burial or cremation would be onMarch 8, 1982.[39]These obvious flaws in the death certificate should have prompted respondents to investigate further, especially so that respondent Florentina Mijares admitted on cross examination that she asked for the death certificate of Ignacia because she was suspicious that Ignacia was still alive.[40]Moreover, respondent spouses had all the opportunity to verify the claim of Vicente that he is a widower because it was their lawyer, Atty. Rodriguito S. Saet, who represented Vicente in the special proceedings before the Metropolitan Trial Court.Neither can respondent spouses rely on the alleged court approval of the sale.Note that the Order issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch XXXI, appointing Vicente as guardian of his 5 minor children, as well as the Order authorizing him to sell the estate of Ignacia were issued only on September 29, 1983 and October 14, 1983, respectively. On the other hand, the sale of the entire Lot No. 4349-B-2 to respondent spouses appears to have been made not on March 1, 1983, but even as early as November 25, 1978.In the Agreement dated November 25, 1978, Vicente in consideration of the amount of P110,000.00, sold to Cipriano Mijares Lot No. 4349-B-2 on installment basis, with the first installment due on or before July 31, 1979.[41]This was followed by a Memorandum of Understanding executed on July 30, 1979, by Vicente and Cipriano (1) acknowledging Ciprianos receipt of Vicentes down payment in the amount of P50,000.00; and (2) authorizing Florentina Mijares to collect rentals.[42]On July 14, 1981, Vicente and Cipriano executed another Memorandum of Agreement, stating, among other, that out of the purchase price of P110,000.00 Vicente had remaining balance of P19,000.00.[43]Clearly therefore, the special proceedings before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch XXXI, could not have been the basis of respondent spouses claim of good faith because the sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 occurred prior thereto.Respondent spouses cannot deny knowledge that at the time of the sale in 1978, Vicente was married to Ignacia and that the latter did not give her conformity to the sale.This is so because the 1978 Agreement described Vicente as married but the conformity of his wife to the sale did not appear in the deed.Obviously, the execution of another deed of sale in 1983 over the same Lot No. 4349-B-2, after the alleged death of Ignacia on March 22, 1982, as well as the institution of the special proceedings were, intended to correct the absence of Ignacias consent to the sale.Even assuming that respondent spouses believed in good faith that Ignacia really died on March 22, 1982, after they purchased the lot, the fact remains that the sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 prior to Ignacias alleged demise was without her consent and therefore subject to annulment.The October 14, 1983 order authorizing the sale of the estate of Ignacia, could not have validated the sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 because said order was issued on the assumption that Ignacia was already dead and that the sale dated March 1, 1983 was never categorically approved in the said order.The fact that the 5 minor children[44]of Vicente represented by the latter, signed the March 1, 1983 deed of sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 will not estop them from assailing the validity thereof.Not only were they too young at that time to understand the repercussions of the sale, they likewise had no right to sell the property of their mother who, when they signed the deed, was very much alive.If a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been given is proper.The relationship between parties in any contract even if subsequently annulled must always be characterized and punctuated by good faith and fair dealing.Hence, for the sake of justice and equity, and in consonance with the salutary principle of non-enrichment at anothers expense, the Court sustains the trial courts order directing Vicente to refund to respondent spouses the amount ofP110,000.00 which they have paid aspurchase price of Lot No. 4349-B-2.[45]The courta quocorrectly found that the subject of the sale was the entire Lot No. 4349-B-2 and that the consideration thereof is not P40,000.00 as stated in the March 1, 1983 deed of sale, but P110,000.00 as evidenced by the (1) Agreement dated November 25, 1978 as well as the July 30, 1979 Memorandum of Understanding and the July 14, 1981 Memorandum of Agreement which served as receipts of the installment payments made by respondent Cipriano Mijares; and (2) the receipt duly signed by Vicente Reyes acknowledging receipt of the amount of P110,000.00 from respondent spouses as payment of the sale of the controverted lot.[46]The trial court, however, erred in imposing 12% interest per annum on the amount due the respondents.InEastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[47]it was held that interest on obligations not constituting a loan or forbearance of money is six percent (6%) annually.If the purchase price could be established with certainty at the time of the filing of the complaint, the six percent (6%) interest should be computed from the date the complaint was filed until finality of the decision.InLui v. Loy,[48]involving a suit for reconveyance and annulment of title filed by the first buyer against the seller and the second buyer, the Court, ruling in favor of the first buyer and annulling the second sale, ordered the seller to refund to the second buyer (who was not a purchaser in good faith) the purchase price of the lots.It was held therein that the 6% interest should be computed from the date of the filing of the complaint by the first buyer.After the judgment becomes final and executory until the obligation is satisfied, the amount due shall earn interest at 12% per year, the interim period being deemed equivalent to a forbearance of credit.[49]Accordingly, the amount of P110,000.00 due the respondent spouses which could be determined with certainty at the time of the filing of the complaint shall earn 6% interest per annum from June 4, 1986 until the finality of this decision.If the adjudged principal and the interest (or any part thereof) remain unpaid thereafter, the interest rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from the time the judgment becomes final and executory until it is fully satisfied.Petitioners prayer for payment of rentals should be denied. Other than the allegation of Ignacia in her Sinumpaang Salaysay that the apartments could be rented at P1,000.00 a month, no other evidence was presented to substantiate her claim.In awarding rentals which are in the nature of actual damages, the Court cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork but must depend on competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable regarding the actual amount of loss.[50]None, having been presented in the case at bar, petitioners claim for rentals must be denied.While as a general rule, a party who has not appealed is not entitled to affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the court below, law and jurisprudence authorize a tribunal to consider errors, although unassigned, if they involve (1) errors affecting the lower courts jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) plain errors not specified, and (3) clerical errors.[51]In this case, though defendant Vicente Reyes did not appeal, the plain error committed by the courta quoas to the award of moral and exemplary damages must be corrected.These awards cannot be lumped together as was done by the trial court.[52]Moral and exemplary damages are different in nature, and require separate determination.Moral damages are awarded where the claimant experienced physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as a result of the act complained of.[53]The award of exemplary damages, on the other hand, is warranted when moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages were likewise awarded by the court.[54]Hence, the trial courts award of P50,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages should be modified.Vicente Reyes should be ordered to pay the amounts of P25,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.Since Vicente Reyes was among the heirs substituted to the late Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes, payment of moral and exemplary damages must be made by Vicente to his children, petitioners in this case.WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.The January 26, 2000 Decision and June 19, 2002, Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 28464 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.The May 31, 1990 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, in Civil Case No. Q-48018, which annulled the March 1, 1983 Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot No. 4349-B-2, and ordered the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel TCT No. 306087 in the name of respondent spouses Cipriano Mijares and Florentina Mijares covering the same property; as well as the June 29, 1990 Order correcting the typographical errors in the order dated March 1, 1983, are REINSTATED, with the followingMODIFICATIONS(1)The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is ordered to issue a new certificate of title over Lot No. 4349-B-2, in the name of petitioners as co-owners thereof;(2)Vicente Reyes is ordered to reimburse the respondent spouses the amount of P110,000.00 as purchase price of Lot No. 4349-B-2, with interest at 6% per annum from June 4, 1986, until finality of this decision.After this decision becomes final, interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the principal and interest (or any part thereof) shall be imposed until full payment.(3)Defendant Vicente Reyes is ordered to pay the heirs of the late Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes, the amounts of P25,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.SO ORDERED.