The Landscape of Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo

Jason K. Stearns and Christoph VogelDecember 2015

A publication by the Center on International Cooperation

Congo Research Group

Groupe d’Étude sur le Congo

Congo Research Group (CRG) is an independent, non-profit research project dedicated to understanding the violence that affects millions of Congolese. We carry out rigorous research on different aspects of the conflict, ranging from elections to armed group mobilization. All of our research is informed by deep historical and social knowledge of the problem at hand.

We are based at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University. We publish in English and French.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Landscape of Armed Groups in the Eastern CongoJason Stearns and Christoph Vogel

The Decline of the Regional 5

The Clustering of Conflict 6

Fragmentation 7

ANNEX: Methodological Notes 8

About the Authors 9

Endnotes 10

4 THE LANDSCAPE OF ARMED GROUPS IN THE EASTERN CONGO

5THE LANDSCAPE OF ARMED GROUPS IN THE EASTERN CONGO

THE LANDSCAPE OF ARMED GROUPS IN THE EASTERN CONGO

Two years ago, Congolese armed forces celebrated a historic victory against the M23 rebellion, raising hopes that the cycle

of violence in the eastern Congo was petering out. Today, however, disappointment has set it. At least seventy armed groups

are active in the eastern Congo, and approximately 1,6 million people remain displaced. The various approaches taken by the

Congolese government and its foreign partners––including the stabilization program, demobilization efforts, and security sector

reform––have produced meager results.

Who are these armed groups? The Congo Research Group has mapped around seventy armed groups and their areas of influence

in North and South Kivu, drawing on original field research (for earlier maps on which this exercise is based, see here). Most of

these groups are small, not numbering more than 200 soldiers, and recruit largely along ethnic lines. This short essay outlines

some of the main trends we can observe in the conflict in recent years.

THE DECLINE OF THE REGIONAL

The demise of the M23 marked a historic low of regional interference in the eastern Congo. For the first time since 1996, the

Rwandan government does not have a serious ally in this region. Even if Rwanda wanted to mobilize again, it would not be easy:

Congolese Tutsi and Hutu occupy prominent positions in the Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) but

many of them harbor deep resentment against their erstwhile allies in Kigali. The few rwandophone belligerents that remain, like

the various Nyatura and the Nyamusharaba groups, are either small in size, not very active, or in opposition to Rwanda.

This decline in the regional dimension of the conflict can also be perceived in the rhetoric of some of the remaining armed groups.

While anti-Tutsi and anti-Rwandan sentiment used to figure among their main justifications, the government in Kinshasa has

become the main object of their invective.

Despite these developments, the strongest and most disruptive armed groups in the eastern Congo include foreign ones. In

post-M23 eastern Congo, the Rwandan Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) is by far the largest armed group, both

in terms of numbers as well as geographic spread. The FDLR maintains varying degrees of influence––either alone or together

with the army, other militias, or state administration––in considerable parts of Walikale, Lubero, Rutshuru, Masisi (North Kivu),

Mwenga, Uvira, and Fizi territories (South Kivu). While there are contradictory claims regarding the group’s strength, it probably

numbers between 1,000 and 2,500 troops, several times larger than any other armed group in the area. It is, however, important

to highlight that the group has been unable to launch any major raids into Rwanda since 2001. Its importance with regards to

Rwanda is therefore more as a symbolic threat, as many of their leaders were members of the Rwandan army that helped organize

the genocide in 1994.

Besides the FDLR, two other foreign armed groups continue to operate in the Kivus: the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)

and the Nzabampema wing of the Burundian Forces nationales de libération (FNL). Both groups are small, the former no more than

300 troops and the latter probably half that size, but remain important. The ADF has been a key player in a series of massacres

around the town of Beni, arguably the worst violence the country has seen in a decade. Here, too, however, it is important to

highlight that the group, whose commander Jamil Mukulu was arrested this year, has largely given up on its ambition to overthrow

6 THE LANDSCAPE OF ARMED GROUPS IN THE EASTERN CONGO

the Ugandan government and has become deeply embedded in local dynamics, making it somewhat misleading to highlight its

foreign nature.

Similarly, Nzabampema’s FNL were a marginal group until early this year, involved in cattle rustling and cross-border raids from

their base in the Rusizi Plain. However––and this is where this regional trend could be reversed––the recent escalation in conflict

in Burundi has seen the remobilization of many ex-FNL combatants in the province of Bujumbura Rural, raising the possibility of

an intensification of cross-border troubles, although probably through other, still inchoate groups.

THE CLUSTERING OF CONFLICT

As the map shows, armed groups are scattered throughout the Kivutian highlands, but are much less present in the sparsely

populated lowlands to the west––large parts of Mwenga and Shabunda are examples of this. Most of the fighting is clustered in

other areas where a variety of armed groups are opposed to each other, or where the FARDC conducts military operations. Several

such hot spots can be identified:

• The border between Walikale and Masisi territories: Nine different armed groups are clustered in this area, which has also has

been the focus of recent FARDC Sukola II operations against both the FDLR and the Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et

souverain (APCLS), but is also the scene of fighting within the Nduma Defense of Congo (NDC) armed group (two wings, led by

Commanders Guidon and Sheka, have clashed repeatedly), as well as between the NDC and the APLCS, and the NDC and the

FDLR, and a few smaller militias crystallizing around these cleavages;

• The Rusizi Plain: This is the area with the highest density of armed groups in the Congo––we could count fifteen, including

groups based in the Moyen Plateau overlooking the plains. Conflicts here involve historical disputes between the Rundi,

Banyamulenge, and Fuliiro communities––as well as within these communities––over land and power that have drawn in and

been instrumentalized by political elites in Uvira and Bukavu;

• FARDC offensives: The worst displacement in the Kivus typically occurs in areas where the national army conducts

counterinsurgency operations. This is currently the case in the foothills of the Ruwenzori mountains east of Beni (Operation

Sukola I), as well as in the border of Masisi, Walikale, and Rutshuru territories (Operation Sukola II);

7THE LANDSCAPE OF ARMED GROUPS IN THE EASTERN CONGO

FRAGMENTATION

The most obvious trend among armed groups has been fragmentation. While there have not been similar mapping exercises in

the past, according to Congolese and United Nations estimates, there were probably no more than twenty armed groups in the

Kivus in January 2008.1

As other scholars have argued2 , several factors have led to this proliferation of armed groups. First, the simple lack of alternatives,

especially the failure or absence of sound demobilization programs, produced factionalization and generated security dilemmas at

the very local level. Most armed groups had never been very cohesive, and over time the lack of military pressure, the ample space

and resources at their disposal, and the government’s failure to offer their members alternative livelihoods led them to splinter

into multiple groups. Most of the groups present today––certain Raia Mutomboki groups are an exception to this3 ––are factions

of previous ones.

These dynamics were compounded by political developments brought about, ironically, by the peace process. Both the Global and

Inclusive Agreement of 2002, which ushered in a transitional government, and a series of failed DDR and army integration efforts

contributed to a fragmentation of the political arena, which was then reproduced among armed groups. Provincial and national

parliaments were created, and political parties multiplied. Some of these leaders politicians resorted to armed groups as a means

of intimidating their rivals and bolstering their reputations as strongmen as violence became as means of political leverage. This,

in turn, led to an escalation of violence as politicians and local communities mobilized in response to each other––a sort of security

dilemma compounded by a competition for political power and patronage.4

At the same time, the peace process forged a large, fractious army out of the former belligerents. The government used the FARDC

to dole out patronage, both in order to co-opt its armed rivals, as well as to reward loyalists and to keep its large officer corps

occupied in the east of the country.5 As a result, armed mobilization became a revolving door, as discontent army officers would

defect in order to negotiate better positions, often supported by opportunistic politicians. These perverse incentives were a key

factor in the proliferation of armed groups.6

This instrumentalization of violence, however, began to ebb after the 2011 elections. The government decided to stop negotiating

wholesale with armed groups––groups would no longer be rewarded with positions and cash payouts. While the government

has not been consistent with this policy––negotiations with the FRPI and the Yakutumba Mai Mai have been exceptions, although

neither came fully to fruition––it appears that this kind of revolving door military integration has subsided. It is possible, however,

that this policy, while necessary, may have further fragmentation, as armed group leaders lose their authority as negotiators with

the central government.

Finally, the persistence of local conflict has provided fertile ground for armed groups to mobilize. These conflicts, often driven by

struggles over customary succession or land, have often been politicized and seized upon by political elites in the region. struggles

over customary succession or land, have often been politicized and seized upon by political elites in the region.7

8 THE LANDSCAPE OF ARMED GROUPS IN THE EASTERN CONGO

THE RISE OF THE MILITARY APPROACH

While it is encouraging to see an end to Kinshasa’s incessant negotiations8 with armed groups, the result has been a single-

mindedly military approach to the conflict, both by the Congolese government and the UN peacekeeping mission. Despite two

rounds of a stabilization program, the government and its foreign partners have been unable to create a virtuous cycle of economic

development in the rural Kivus that could entice local leaders to invest in stability rather than conflict.9 At the same time, the

government has been slow to hold its army officers involved in racketeering and the support of armed groups accountable, and

had dragged its feet in implementing its new demobilization plan.

As a result, the Kivus are left with a military strategy that lacks much of a complementary diplomatic or peacebuilding effort.

ANNEX: METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

Mapping non-state armed groups is, like many other illicit phenomena,10 a sensitive task and will inevitably involve imprecisions,

especially since new armed groups pop up every month, and their deployments are in constant flux. The aim here is inform a

conversation about the complexity of the conflict and armed group activity in the eastern Congo. We welcome comments and

criticism; indeed, this will help us improve the next, updated version.

This map is the result of extensive fieldwork conducted by a network of researchers based in Uvira, Bukavu, Goma, and Butembo,

and has benefited from several rounds of internal and external reviews by experts on conflict dynamics in this region.

A few additional comments:

• This map is limited to North and South Kivu;

• We map ‘zones of influence’ rather than absolute control. While some armed groups exert effective control over an area,

others may be able to exert substantial influence over larger zones but lack full control over those areas. By zones of influence,

we include both kinds of influence. Hence the size of an armed group area does not necessarily correspond to its strength;

• The conflict in the Kivus is dynamic and any such mapping is quickly outdated. This map represents the situation in October

2015;

• We cannot account for certain armed actors. All groups included in this mapping have the following qualities: a self-perception

as armed group, an identifiable leadership and approximate structure, and the existence of combatants and arms. While

banditry is increasing in certain parts of the Kivu––most notably around Beni and between Lubero and Rutshuru territories––

we do not consider these actors as armed groups. Nonetheless, we have included actors ranging from micro-militias with no

more than 10 to 20 combatants to large-scale, sophisticated groups such as the FDLR.

10 THE LANDSCAPE OF ARMED GROUPS IN THE EASTERN CONGO

ENDNOTES

1Jason Stearns, “North Kivu: The background to conflict in North Kivu province of eastern Congo”, Rift Valley Institute, 2012.

2Judith Verweijen and Claude Iguma Wakenge, “The fragmentation of the armed group landscape in the eastern DRC,” Rift Valley Institute, 2015.

3Christoph Vogel, “Contested statehood, security dilemmas and militia politics: The rise and transformation of Raia Mutomboki in eastern DRC,” L’Afrique des Grand

Lacs: Annuaire, 2013.

4Timothy Raeymaekers, “Post-war Conflict and the Market for Protection: The Challenges to Congo’s Hybrid Peace,” International Peacekeeping, 2013.

5Maria Eriksson Baaz and Judith Verweijen, “Between Integration and Disintegration: The Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army1,” Social Science Research Council,

2013.

6Jason Stearns, Maria Eriksson Baaz and Judith Verweijen, “The national army and armed groups in the eastern Congo: Untangling the Gordian knot of insecurity,”

Rift Valley Institute, 2013.

7Koen Vlassenroot, “South Kivu: Identity, territory, and power in the eastern Congo,” Rift Valley Institute, 2013.

8Pierre Englebert and Denis Tull, “Contestation, négociation et résistance: L’état congolais au quotidien,” Politique Africaine, 2013.

9Hugo de Vries, “Going around in circles: Peacekeeping and stabilization in Congo,” Clingendael Institute, 2015

10Stephen Ellis and Janet MacGaffey, “Research on Sub-Saharan Africa’s Unrecorded International Trade: Some Methodological and Conceptual Problems,” African

Studies Review, 1996.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Jason K. Stearns is the director of the Congo Research Group at the Center on International Cooperation, New York University.

Christoph Vogel is a PhD candidate at the University of Zürich and a fellow at the Congo Research Group.

Cover photo: © Richard Mosse© Cover Photo: Richard Mosse

@GEC_CRG

Center on International Cooperation726 Broadway, Suite 543New York, NY 10003cic.nyu.educongoresearchgroup.org

Congo Research Group

Groupe d’Étude sur le Congo

Congo Research Group (CRG) is an independent, non-profit research project dedicated to understanding the violence

that affects millions of Congolese.