April 7, 2009

Adam Berg

Nancy Hayden

Michael Kniss

Country Overview and Background

Conflict in the Congo

Intervention

Current Situation

Lessons Learned

Size 3rd largest population in Africa (66

million) About the size of Western Europe Over 200 ethnic groups

Potential 2nd largest rainforest in the world Large areas of fertile land,

temperate climate, and plentiful rainfall

Rivers and lakes with potential for hydroelectric power

Resources: cobalt, coltan, gold, diamonds, zinc, iron ore, copper

Death 5.4 million deaths since 1998

45,000 deaths a month National mortality rate is 60% higher

than the sub-Saharan average

Rape 300,000 rapes in the past decade

Corruption Highly corrupt: ranked 168 out of

179 by Transparency International

Poverty GNI per capita: $130, 2nd lowest in

the world 74% of the population is

undernourished

Infrastructure 1,500 miles of paved roads (in a

country the size of Western Europe)

Failing Grade Congo is one of three

countries listed as “failed” by the Brookings Institution’s 2008 Index of State Weakness in the Developing World

How and why did the state collapse?

Belgian Rule Created by Belgian King

Leopold as a personal colony in 1885

Resources Ivory Rubber Gold

Brutal style of rule Estimated 5-10 million

deaths Belgian government took

control in 1907

Post-Colonial History 1960 – Independence

Democratic Republic of Congo created

DRC’s first Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, is assassinated

5 years of chaos

1965 – Colonel Mobutu takes over Colonel Joseph-Désiré Mobutu becomes a Cold War client of the U.S. Instills sense of national identity – yet Mobutu does little to develop

anything except his personal wealth Authoritarian and repressive regime Renames the country Republic of Zaire Changes his name to Mobutu Sese Seko Koko Ngbendu Wa Za Banga

(“The all-powerful warrior who, because of his endurance and inflexible will to win, will go from conquest to conquest, leaving fire in his wake”).

Cold War Mobutu is propped up

by aid from the U.S. U.S. interested in anti-

communist stance and resources: Copper Gold Diamonds Cobalt

Zaire’s income and services decline, but Mobutu is able to hold onto power.

Post-Cold War Nation slips further into decline as the

West loses interest in Zaire Already notoriously inept army goes

unpaid Ungoverned east

RPF Ends the Genocide Hutu civilians, interahamwe, and

defeated Rwandan soldiers flee to Kivu provinces in Eastern Congo

UNHCR sets up refugee camps Interahamwe ran many of the refugee

camps and refused to allow people to repatriate

Mobutu had strong ties to the deceased Habyarimana regime and saw the refugees as a way to control Eastern Congo and act as a conduit for aid

Rwandan Outrage Interahamwe launch offensives into Rwanda International community did not intervene to stop genocide, but is now

spending millions to shelter perpetrators Rwandan desire for reconciliation with citizens and justice for killers

Foreign Invasion + InsurgencyForeign Invasion + Insurgency

1. Expulsion of Tutsis triggers Congolese to organize under veteran revolutionary Laurent Kabila (AFDL)

2. Rwanda leads AFDL against Mobutu, supported by Uganda, Angola

Rwandan objective: secure border800,000 Hutu refugees return to RwandaHutu “Death March” to Kinshasa

Mobutu regime fallsSeeks Western aid to no avail

3. Kabila proclaimed President

US PolicyBilateral Talks

•Praise for Kabila: “strong start” on reforms •“Shared interests and joint willingness to solve problems.” •$40 million in aid for health programs and infrastructure projects

Instability and Despotism Continues…

Short honeymoon period Alienates potential political supporters

Alienates Mobutu opposition in Kinshasa (NGOs, political parties, civil society)

Refuses to cooperate with international inquiries into fate of Rwandan Hutus in war

Imposes Marxist-style dictatorship Rwandan Tutsi officers offend military

Fails to provide security Ugandan rebels in North Militias re-engage and recruit in East

Fails to establish democratic institutions

1997-2001

1998 Russia/NATO S&T MOU

CombatantsMai-Mai militia Tutsi-aligned Rebel ForcesHutu-Aligned Forces (RCD-G, RCD-ML, MCL)DRC Uganda

Namibia Rwanda

Zimbabwe BurundiAngola Chad

Strength Tutsi-aligned Rebel Forces:

Hutu-Aligned Forces: 10,000 25,000Mai-Mai: 20-30,000 Rwanda: 8000

Congolese: 30,000 Uganda: 3000Angola:4000

Zimbabwe:2000 Casualties

Civilians Killed: 3,500,000+

July 27, 1998 Rwanda military oustedAugust 2,1998 Rwanda and Uganda back rebels against Kabila; form RCD and advance to KinshasaAugust 23, 1998 Angola intervenes for Kabila to stop advanceAugust 1998-August 1999 Stalemate and proliferating rebellionsAugust 1999 Lusaka Cease-Fire

July 27, 1998 Rwanda military oustedAugust 2,1998 Rwanda and Uganda back rebels against Kabila; form RCD and advance to KinshasaAugust 23, 1998 Angola intervenes for Kabila to stop advanceAugust 1998-August 1999 Stalemate and proliferating rebellionsAugust 1999 Lusaka Cease-Fire

Ceasefire negotiated by regional powers to:

Provide UN mandate Establish three regions of control Demilitarize, disarm, and resettle,

repatriate, and reintegrate “Genius” is that it

Recognized overlapping layers of inter-state and intra-state actors Recognized security concerns of Rwanda & Uganda

Runs counter to established rules that allow legitimate governments to seek and receive military assistance but not rebel movements

Legitimized rebels and sponsors; delegitimized rebels not present at the negotiations

Lacked real support of parties involved

GLOBAL AND INCLUSIVE AGREEMENT ON TRANSITION IN THE DRC

Intended to: End war Facilitate power sharing in transition

government Rebuild national civil institutions Establish election process

Key players Five combatants Regional facilitator: Botswana

Failed to achieve results Rwanda, Uganda withdraw under

separate agreements

Transition government July 2003

Laurent Kabila assassinated 2001

son Joseph installed as president

Motivations

Group Leader    Security Political Economic Social

FARDC Kabila army Congo ? +K    RCD+ rebel East Congo   -K $  MLC+ Bemba rebel North Congo   -K $  CNDP Nkunda rebel East Congo X  -K,-FDRL $ ! 

Mai Mai various militia East Congo X <K> $ !FDRL "refugee"

army East Congo   -R $  

*LRA Kony  rebel North Congo   -U $  

RWANDA army Border X =K $

Uganda army Border X =K $

Zimbabwe army Congo X +K !

Cease Fire and Dialogues Fail East dominated by splinter rebel

groups & militias with shifting alliances who fight for control

Congo forces ineffective – looting Former combatants in integrated

battalions riot frequently Ongoing cross-border raids by

Rwanda Hutu (FDLR) Institutionalized corruptionLucrative rebel/militia trade with

Rwanda & Uganda Endemic poverty and disease

Doctors Without BordersDoctors Without BordersTeam reports horrifying abuse suffered by Congolese diamond miners forcibly driven across the border into the DRC from their homes in mining areas in Angola. In addition to being tortured with fire and machetes during the day, men were forced to perform sexual acts on soldiers while women were raped. Prisons for miners are surrounded by anti-personnel mines to prevent escape, contain between 1000 and 2000 people.

Genocide continuesMutilation and rape are tools of warKidnapping for forced labor, military service, ransomDenial of services, infrastructure, and international aid deprives citizens of basic needs

US/Global Interests Regional Stability

Conflict and war in the Great Lakes region undermines US and EU goals in Africa–stability, anti-terrorism, increased trade, Millennium Development Goals

Resource Wealth The world has much to gain

from stable and just resource extraction

Development and peace decreases the seemingly never-ending regional demand for foreign aid from the US and international community

Humanitarian/Human Rights Credibility 5.4 million deaths, 300,000

rapes, and continuing violence unacceptable by any value judgment

Background and Mandate

The signatories to the July 10, 1999 Lusaka Agreement called for UN peacekeepers to enforce the ceasefire and disarm the various militant groups throughout the country (Article III, par. 11.a) UN Security Council agrees to

creation of MONUC on September 30, 1999 (Res. 1279) and approves deployment of 5,537 peacekeepers on February 24, 2000 (Res. 1291)

MONUC 4-Phase Approach Phase I: Implement Ceasefire Phase II: Monitor/Report

Violations Phase III: DDRRR

(Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement, and Reintegration)

Phase IV: Facilitate Elections

Challenge of Size Mandate of 5,537 peacekeepers

inadequate for massive size of Congo and termed a “meaningless number” by Rwanda’s UN envoy Joseph Mutaboba African leaders requested

15,000-20,000 troops France advocated 10,000

deployed immediately U.S. Ambassador to UN Richard

Holbrooke and Secretary of Defense William Cohen felt 5,000 troops should be the maximum

Zimbabwe’s foreign minister Stan Mudenge was more direct, asking “Why does the UN act so quickly to [control] conflicts in Kosovo and East Timor but drags its feet when it comes to the DRC, Somalia and Rwanda? One cannot but wonder if the racial composition is the reason.”

Challenge of Scope UN entered conflict under

Lusaka framework Secretary-General Kofi Annan

warned that MONUC represented “the substitution of armed force for the rule of law”

Ceasefire lacked internal legitimacy as signatories used it to pursue their own interests

Laurent Kabila depended heavily on foreign militaries and Inter-Congolese Dialogue threatened monopoly on political power

Rwanda and Uganda kept 10,000-20,000 troops in DRC and funded rebel groups

Security vacuum left by withdrawing foreign forces

Phase III of mandate required broad, assertive operations

Developed countries unwilling to contribute troops (only Sweden)

Challenge of Tactics Lack of infrastructure and

credible central government required UN to bring all supplies in from out of country

Pursuing armed groups and forcing disarmament not seen as credible peacekeeping functions Further complicated by fact

that targets feared returning home and had trouble assimilating

Disarmament inextricably linked with political change

MONUC failed to meet expectations of host populations, thus delegitimizing both Lusaka Agreement and MONUC mandate

Difficulty to control/regulate valuable natural resources

Intrastate nature of conflict required high-level diplomatic pressure

Initial Security Focus Phase I: Advance team sent to pave

way for troop deployments (August 1999) Warring parties exhibited initial

resistance to even the advance team

Phase II: Disengagement - Military observers, humanitarian assistance, and training Congolese police force MONUC infantry battalions

approved to monitor disengagement of front line forces and protect foreign personnel; no active military engagement

Due to continued violence and lack of U.S. support, first troops did not deploy until March 29, 2001; 1,869 by June, 2,408 by October

Phase III: Withdraw foreign forces Accomplished by October 2002 Increased MONUC troop mandate

to fill security vacuum

Unrest in the East Phase IV: DDR - Disarmament,

Demobilization, and Reintegration MONUC recognized ethnic

tensions in the Northeast (Ituri), but only positioned 10 military observers

Intense violence spurred by Uganda

Due to unwillingness for robust mandate, Security Council endorsed French-led Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) to pacify region (June 5, 2003)

MONUC mandate increased to 10,800 troops and given full force authorization (July 28, 2003)

Phase V: Assist Transitional Government Robust operations against rebel

groups; MONUC soldiers targeted

Increased effectiveness of DDR – Battle in early 2005 encouraged over 13,000 Ituri militia to disarm from April to June

Brief Assessment NEED INTERNAL ACCEPTANCE

OF CEASEFIRE FRAMEWORK! Phased approach intended to

foster positive developments via the threat or “prospect” of intervention Ignored the pressing need for

security forces on the ground and eroded ceasefire legitimacy with extended delays

MONUC achieved very limited, and long-delayed, successes in repatriating foreign forces and demilitarizing Ethnic cleansing opened the

world’s eyes to the need for robust operations

Once MONUC asserted itself, it was relatively effective

Even with robust mandate, confusion of loyalties prevents effective protection of civilians

Lingering Questions If UN/U.S. is unwilling or

unable to intervene in a robust fashion, should regional actors be supported instead?

Empower Rwanda with a mandate to intervene, but then work closely with them to prevent abuses…?

Appropriate role for private sector peacekeepers under IPOA guidelines?

How to regulate natural resources?

Kimberley Process parallel for non-luxury goods in high demand?

December 2008 UN’s “Panel of Experts” publicly

documents Rwandan support for Nkunda/CNDP

Sweden and Holland suspend aid to Rwanda, and the UK threatens to do the same

January/February 2009 Laurent Nkunda arrested by Rwanda

Leader of CNDP - Rwanda’s main proxy in Eastern Congo Nkunda had claimed to be fighting to protect Tutsi in Eastern Congo Nkunda was accused of war crimes and financed his operations

through resources (coltan) Nkunda was becoming a liability for Rwanda

Congo allows Rwandan troops to mount five-week operation to pursue FDLR within Eastern Congo

March 23, 2009 CNDP signs peace agreement

Signing overseen by special envoy Olusegun Obasanjo and head of MONUC CNDP agrees to become political party operating in North Kivu

Questions Remain What was the deal struck with

Rwanda? Arrest of Nkunda Allow Rwanda to operate in Congo DRC stops supporting FDLR CNDP goes from illegal militia to

legitimate political party Why now?

Pressure was mounting on Paul Kagame from donors

Nkunda was not a good proxy: loved media attention and was becoming more brutal

What of the FDLR?

Preventing state failure is in the US/international community’s best interests. Fully developing indigenous

capabilities to provide internal security is necessary before disengagement.

Supporting corrupt leaders for separate security interests undermines indigenous state legitimacy.

Post-Failure Intervention Need internal acceptance of

ceasefire/peace framework. Phased approach or the “prospect” of

intervention inadequate to end violence.

Need for financial decentralization so that central government is not a zero-sum game.

Incentivize rebel soldiers into a national army with higher salaries and offer of stability.

In resource conflict, intervention must address the demand side of commerce. Kimberley Process? SEC

Regulation…

“The more the dead pile up, the more the killers become the focus, the dead only of interest as evidence.”

-Philip Gourevitch

“A single death is a tragedy, a million deaths is a statistic.”

-Joseph Stalin

Francine Murengezi Ingabire Age: 12 Favorite Sport: Swimming Favorite Food: Eggs and Chips Favorite Drink: Milk and Fanta

Tropical Best Friend: Her Elder Sister Claudette Cause of Death: Hacked by Machete