Conflict Resolution: Ireland and Beyond: [Opening Address]

Conflict Resolution: Ireland and Beyond: [Opening Address]Author(s): George MitchellSource: Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 14 (2003), pp. 3-8Published by: Royal Irish AcademyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30001960 .

Accessed: 16/06/2014 20:10

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Royal Irish Academy is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Irish Studies inInternational Affairs.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 188.72.126.181 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 20:10:13 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ria

http://www.jstor.org/stable/30001960?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


Conflict Resolution: Ireland and Beyond*

George Mitchell

Partner in the law firm of Piper Rudnick and former Majority Leader of the United States Senate

I had the privilege of being part of efforts to end two of the longest and most difficult conflicts of our time: Northern Ireland and the Middle East. I will discuss both of those experiences and their possible relevance to other conflicts. I begin with the Middle East by briefly recounting the origin and work of the International Fact- Finding Committee on violence there.

In October 2000 leaders of the government of Israel, the Palestinian Authority, the United Nations, the European Union, and the governments of Egypt, Jordan and the United States met for a summit at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. They agreed that an international committee should be formed to look into the then recent outbreak of violence between Israelis and Palestinians.

Following consultations with the other leaders, President Bill Clinton asked me to chair a five-member committee, which included one other American and three Europeans. After President George W. Bush took office, US Secretary of State Colin Powell asked me to continue as chairman and asked the committee to continue and complete its work. At the summit the participants hoped that a neutral report on the origins of the violence might help the parties take steps to end it. Unfortunately, as we all are aware, the violence and terrorism did not end, as the summit participants had hoped, but rather increased. In light of the ongoing violence, we focused our recommendations on three objectives: ending the violence, rebuilding confidence and resuming meaningful negotiations.

We were heartened by the initial response to our report. The government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority both praised it and accepted its recommendations. President Bush has said many times that implementation of the report is an objective of US policy in the region. The report was endorsed by the fifteen nations who are members of the EU, by the secretary general of the UN, Kofi Annan, and by a large number of other governments, including Japan, Russia, Canada and Australia. To the best of my knowledge, no government has opposed it.

This broad international support for the report has made the failure to implement its recommendations profoundly disappointing. There have been unsuccessful efforts to obtain a ceasefire. That was, of course, our first recommendation. There must be prompt movement on the other steps we recommended; if there is not, a cessation of

*Opening address to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Conference of the Irish National Committee for the

Study of International Affairs, 22 November 2002.

Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 14 (2003), 3-8.



4 Irish Studies in International Affairs

violence cannot be sustained. Among those steps are a cooling-off period, the renunciation of violence and the arrest of terrorists by the Palestinian Authority, the withdrawal of Israeli Defence Forces to their pre-Intifada positions, and the freezing of all settlement activity. Then, of course, there must be a prompt resumption of negotiations to achieve a two-state solution.

Whether it is our report or some other one that brings about these changes is not important. What is important is that the parties recognise that there is no military solution to the conflict, that they end the violence and return to negotiations. If they are to succeed they must give up some of their illusions. Some Palestinians and other Arabs continue to believe that they can destroy Israel and rid the Middle East of a Jewish state. That cannot and will not happen. It is a fantasy that will only generate more misery and suffering on both sides. Some Israelis believe that all of the Palestinians can be physically uprooted and moved to another country. That cannot and will not happen. It, too, is a fantasy.

The reality is that two proud peoples share a land and a destiny. Their competing claims and religious differences have led to a grinding, demoralising, dehumanising conflict. They can continue in conflict or they can negotiate to find a way to live side by side in peace. Those are the alternatives.

Contributing to the difficulty of finding a peaceful resolution is the fact that the circumstances and objectives of the two sides are different. The Israelis have a state. What they want is security. That is their overriding objective. The Palestinians do not have a state and they want one. They want an end to the occupation, and the establishment of an independent, economically viable, geographically contiguous state. That is their overriding objective. I believe that neither side can attain its objective by denying the other its objective. Palestinians will not achieve their state if Israel does not have security. Israel will not have sustainable security if the Palestinians do not have a state. I know there are some in both societies, perhaps even in this room, who disagree with this assertion, but for me it has been validated by the events of the past two years.

Our report was very tough on suicide bombing. We branded it reprehensible and unacceptable. It is also counter-productive. Rather than achieve its objective, it accomplishes the opposite. With each such attack the prospect of a Palestinian state is delayed. Such tactics are also destructive of Palestinian civil society and the reputation of the Palestinian people. In this respect our report remains relevant, as does our conclusion that a cessation of violence cannot be sustained unless there is prompt movement on other steps, including a return to negotiations.

There must be available to Palestinians the clear alternative of a non-violent path to the objective of a Palestinian state living in peace alongside a Jewish state--the two-state solution that a majority on both sides say they support. Palestinians, in turn, must accept that the Israeli demand for security is as real and as necessary as their demand for a state. Both demands are more likely to be met if reciprocal steps are taken to create a context in which meaningful negotiations can be conducted.

Since we issued our report there have been many other proposals. Most have substantial merit. All share the objective of encouraging an end to conflict and a return to negotiation. I hope that one or more of these proposals will succeed in engaging the parties. Which one, or which combination, is not important. What is important is that Israelis and Palestinians recognise that there is no lasting military solution to this conflict, although there may be some short-term illusions of success. In the end Palestinians must recognise and accept Israel's right to exist and its citizens' need for security. Israelis must end the occupation and recognise



MITCHELL-Conflict Resolution: Ireland and Beyond 5

and accept the Palestinians' right to a state. Even if that recognition were instantly to occur, a plan of action by which it can be translated into reality is necessary. Such a plan could not be developed by the parties themselves. Their mutual mistrust is total. The culture of peace, so carefully nurtured over the previous decade, has been shattered. In its place there is a sense of futility and despair, of the inevitability of conflict.

Yet public opinion polls on both sides show consistent majorities in support of a two-state solution and the political process that could bring it about. But because of the impact of the prolonged violence, a strong majority of Palestinians support suicide bombings of Israelis and a strong majority of Israelis support the use of whatever force is deemed necessary to suppress these attacks. In other words, majorities of the publics on both sides agree on the solution but they no longer trust the other side's intentions to reach it. The violence and terrorism has led them into a zero-sum game in which each side is inflicting suffering on the other. Any plan must involve reciprocal action to reverse the downward spiral that has taken hold. No one will take a first step on trust because there is no trust. There will have to be some assurance that each gesture is met by a gesture from the other side. That is already the pattern for acts of violence. It must become the pattern for acts of peace.

I will not repeat the long list of our recommendations. Some may have been overtaken by events, but most remain relevant. We did not link any of the recommendations and we did not weight them in terms of importance, but the parties, the press, any many analysts did. Most attention has been given to the cessation and renunciation of violence by the Palestinians and to the freeze on all settlement activity by the Israelis. On the subject of settlements, our report recommended a complete freeze. To quote from the report:

During the half-century of its existence, Israel has had the strong support of the United States. In international forums, the U.S. has at times cast the only vote on Israel's behalf. Yet, even in such a close relationship there are some differences. Prominent among those differences is the U.S. Government's long-standing opposition to the Government of Israel's policies and practices regarding settlements...As then-Secretary of State, James A. Baker, III, commented on May 22, 1991: 'I don't think there is any bigger obstacle to peace than the settlement activity that continues not only unabated but at an enhanced pace'...The policy described by Secretary Baker, on behalf of the Administration of President George H.W. Bush, has been, in essence, the policy of every American administration over the past quarter century, from Jimmy Carter to George W. Bush...The circumstances in the region are much changed from those which existed 20 years ago. Yet, President Ronald Reagan's words of September 1, 1982 remain relevant: 'The immediate adoption of a settlements freeze by Israel, more than any other action, could create the confidence needed.'

There has been much discussion about the state of relations between the United States and the Arab nations. That was outside our committee's mandate, but I would like to make a brief comment on it because it is an important part of the picture.

The current hostility to the US by many of the Arab peoples is not historically inevitable. What we now call the Middle East was part of the Ottoman Empire for four centuries. When that empire collapsed in the wake of the First World War, the victorious powers deliberated on who would govern the region. Britain and France competed for the mandate, but they did not seriously consult the Arab inhabitants of the region. The Arabs wanted an American mandate-the nation they most trusted




was the US-but in the aftermath of the war we turned inward again, and Britain and France divided up the region.

Obviously, much has changed since then. As the world's dominant power, the US is directly and deeply involved in the Middle East. Within the Arab states there are ambivalent feelings toward the US. The leaders repeatedly ask us to become more involved, while many of their citizens do not want us there at all. But public attitudes can change again, and I believe they will if, with American help, the conflict is resolved. With young, rapidly growing populations, the Arab countries need the modernisation of their societies, the expansion of democratic institutions, improved education, economic growth and job creation. Good relations with the US, which has the world's largest economy, will be helpful in that effort.

I do not underestimate the difficulties, but I believe an end to this conflict is possible. Unfortunately, it is unrealistic to expect that the process toward a final status agreement will be entirely free of violence, even if there is genuine, good-faith political dialogue aimed at resolving the issues. What is needed is strong leadership from the parties to the conflict and from the UN, the US and the EU, and a lot of patience and perseverance-most of which factors were present in Northern Ireland.

The pessimism that prevails in the Middle East today existed when the negotiations began in Northern Ireland. To their credit, the governments of the UK and Ireland had worked for a decade to organise inclusive negotiations to end the bitter sectarian conflict that had raged in the North for many years. Those negotiations lasted two years. Until the very end, there was little or no progress. In a real sense, we had 700 days of failure and one day of success. Just a few days before an agreement was reached opinion polls reported that the vast majority of people believed no agreement was possible, but Prime Ministers Blair and Ahern, President Clinton and the political leaders of Northern Ireland persevered, through violence, through setbacks, through delays and disappointments.

In the final months there was a surge of sectarian violence. Nationalist and Unionist leaders were under pressure from some of their constituents, who asked why they remained in failed talks while the killing continued. Those leaders knew that their political futures, even their lives, were on the line. The expedient course would have been to walk away from the process, blaming the other side for its recalcitrance and pointing to the violence as proof that the other side was not serious about a resolution. A few did that, but most did not. They persevered because they knew that the vast majority of their constituents wanted peace and security. Despite their differences most Unionists and Nationalists share a vision of a stable, peaceful and prosperous future for themselves and for their children. The leaders of Northern Ireland are ordinary men and women, often scorned for being politicians, but in 1998 they led their constituents through a difficult process of compromise, despite violence and political turbulence, ultimately to agreement.

By itself, the Good Friday Agreement does not provide or guarantee peace and stability, but it makes them possible. There have been many frustrations and setbacks in its implementation-and they continue to this day-but overall, progress has been made. The rate of killing is way down. The borders are open. Commerce and growth are up.

This is a difficult time in the North. The pro-Agreement parties have entered a new round of talks. My hope is that they and the vast peaceful majority will remain calm and steady on the path to durable peace and stability.

Ever since I got involved in Northern Ireland, I've been asked what lessons I learned there that might apply to other conflicts. I'll try to answer that question now.



MITCHELL-Conflict Resolution: Ireland and Beyond 7

I begin with caution. As I've already noted, a durable peace in Northern Ireland is not assured, but there are certain principles that arise out of my experience there, which I believe may be useful elsewhere.

First, I believe there is no such thing as a conflict that cannot be ended. Conflicts are created, conducted and sustained by human beings. They can be ended by human beings. No matter how ancient the conflict, no matter how hateful, no matter how hurtful, peace can prevail.

When I arrived in Northern Ireland I found, to my dismay, a widespread feeling of pessimism among the public and the political leaders. In this small, well-informed society, I quickly became well known. Every day, people would stop me on the street, in the airport, in a restaurant. They always began with kind words: 'Thank you Senator.' 'God bless you.' 'We appreciate what you're trying to do.' But they always ended in despair. 'You're wasting your time.' 'This conflict can't be ended.' 'We've been killing each other for centuries and we're doomed to go on killing each other forever.' As best I could, I worked to reverse such attitudes. This is the special responsibility of political leaders, from whom many in the public take their cue. Leaders must lead, and one way of doing this is to create an attitude of success-the belief that problems can be solved, that things can be better-not in a foolish or unrealistic way, but in a way that creates hope and confidence among the people.

A second need is for a clear and determined policy not to yield to the men of violence. Over and over, they tried to destroy the peace process in Northern Ireland; at times they nearly succeeded. There have been acts of appalling brutality and hatred. These must be totally condemned. To succumb to the temptation to retaliate would give the criminals what they want-escalating sectarian violence and the end of the peace process. The way to respond is to swiftly bring those who committed these crimes to justice and go forward in peace. That means there must be an endless supply of patience and perseverance. Seeking an end to conflict is not for the timid or the tentative. It takes courage, perseverance and steady nerves in the face of violence. I believe it a mistake to say in advance that if acts of violence occur the negotiations will stop. That is an invitation to those who use violence to destroy the peace process, and it transfers control of the agenda from the peaceful majority to the violent minority.

A third need is a willingness to compromise. Peace and political stability cannot be achieved in sharply divided societies unless there is a genuine willingness to understand the other point of view and to enter into principled compromise. That is easy to say but very hard to do, because it requires of political leaders that they take risks for peace. Most political leaders dislike risk-taking of any kind. Most get to be leaders by minimising risk. To ask them, in the most difficult and dangerous of circumstances, to be bold, is asking much. But it must be asked of them, and they must respond, if there is to be hope for peace.

A fourth principle is to recognise that the implementation of agreements is as difficult and as important as reaching them. That should be self-evident, but often just getting an agreement is so difficult that the natural tendency is to celebrate and then turn to other matters. As we are now seeing in Northern Ireland, in the Middle East and in the Balkans, getting it done is often harder than agreeing to do it. Once again, patience and perseverance are necessary. If a conflict is important enough to get involved in, it must be seen through all the way to a fair and successful conclusion.

There's a final point that to me is so important that it extends beyond open conflict. I recall clearly my first day in Northern Ireland, nearly eight years ago. I




saw for the first time the huge wall that physically separates the communities in Belfast. Thirty feet high, topped in places with barbed wire, the Peace Line is an ugly reminder of the intensity and duration of the conflict.

On that first morning I met with Nationalists on their side of the wall, and in the afternoon with Unionists on their side. Their messages had not been coordinated, but they were the same: In Belfast, they told me, there is a high correlation between unemployment and violence. They said that where men and women have no opportunity, no hope, they are more likely to take the path of violence. As I sat and listened to them, I thought that I could just as easily be in Chicago, or Calcutta, or Johannesburg, or in the Middle East. Despair is the fuel for instability and conflict everywhere. Opportunity and hope are essential for peace and stability. Men and women everywhere need income to support their families, and they need the satisfaction of doing something worthwhile and meaningful with their lives.

The conflicts in Northern Ireland and in the Middle East are obviously not exclusively or even primarily economic. They involve religion, national identity and territory. But underlying each conflict is the need for economic growth and job creation.

I am not objective; I am deeply biased in favour of the people of Northern Ireland. Having spent many years among them, I have come to like and admire them. While they can be quarrelsome and too quick to take offence, they are also warm and generous, energetic and productive. They deserve peace, and I hope they can keep it.

When the Good Friday Agreement was reached at about six o'clock on the evening of 10 April 1998, we had been in negotiations for nearly two years and continuously for about the last forty hours. We were elated and exhausted. In my parting comments I told the delegates that the agreement was, for me, the realisation of a dream that had sustained me for the longest, most difficult years of my life. Now, I said, I have a new dream. It is to return to Northern Ireland in a few years with my young son. We will roam the country, taking in the sights and sounds of that lovely land. Then, on a rainy afternoon, we will drive to Stormont and sit quietly in the visitor's gallery in the Northern Ireland Assembly. There, we will watch and listen as the members debate the ordinary issues of life in a democratic society- education, healthcare, tourism, agriculture. There will be no talk of war, for the war will have long been over. There will be no talk of peace, for peace will be taken for granted. On that day, the day on which peace is taken for granted in Northern Ireland, I will be finally fulfilled.



Conflict Resolution: Ireland and Beyond: [Opening Address]

Documents

Transcript of Conflict Resolution: Ireland and Beyond: [Opening Address]