The purpose of the first International Expert Forum, “Conflict Prevention andPreventive Diplomacy: What Works and What Doesn’t?,” was to explore thetheory and practice of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention. Launched atthe International Peace Institute (IPI) in New York on December 15, 2011, theforum is a joint collaboration of the Folke Bernadotte Academy, the SecDevGroup, IPI, and the Social Science Research Council (SSRC). The first forum wasdivided into three sessions: insights from research; insights from the field; and astock-taking session focusing on the implications of research and analysis forpolicy and practice.

The introductory session considered the historical precedents and legacy thathelped shape early efforts in the fields of diplomacy and conflict prevention. Intheir contributions, Ambassador Mårten Grunditz, permanent representativeof Sweden to the United Nations, Ambassador Ragnar Ängeby, head of theConflict Prevention in Practice Program at the Folke Bernadotte Academy, Mr.Francesco Mancini, director of research at IPI, and Dr. Robert Muggah,principal at the SecDev Group, spoke of the legacy and implications of theexpansion of these activities in the wake of the UN Secretary-General’s 1992Agenda for Peace report and the resurgence of investment in associated activi-ties following the Secretary-General’s 2001 report on conflict prevention. Thespeakers also mentioned the importance of the 2005 World Summit Outcomedocument and the Secretary-General’s 2011 report on preventive diplomacy,the first of its kind devoted exclusively to the issue. Particular attention wasdrawn to the apparent “renaissance” of these themes over the past five yearsand the increasing institutionalization of practices within and outside the UNsystem. Moreover, the value of analyzing the “big picture” or historical patternsof preventive diplomacy—as a complement to case studies—was stressed. Atthe same time, there are large knowledge gaps regarding what works, and whatdoes not, when it comes to preventing the emergence or escalation of conflicts.Preventive diplomacy is an art, not a science. Additional research may helpmove the field towards a fruitful synthesis of art and science.

A number of recurring policy prescriptions are part of the overall considera-tions for contemporary early diplomacy and conflict prevention. These includea concerted focus on adopting comprehensive strategies that take into accountlocal contextual realities; the value of early-warning systems; the undertaking ofjoint assessments; the promotion of information sharing and coordinationamong different actors; the enhanced participation and role of women asnegotiators and mediators; the leveraging potential of regional institutions such

2 CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

as the African Union (AU), the Organization ofAmerican States (OAS), the Organization forSecurity and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), andthe Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN); and the fundamental importance of localconflict-prevention capacities and of capacitysupport, including guidance for mediators. Theserecommendations are currently beingmainstreamed within and across the UN system.Forum participants also signaled a number ofimportant vehicles, including the MediationSupport Unit in the UN’s Department of PoliticalAffairs (DPA) and the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme’s (UNDP) crisis-response capacities,including its peace and conflict advisers andarchitectures for peacebuilding activities. The introductory session showed how changes in

the type and modalities of armed conflicts duringthe past two decades have precipitated transforma-tions in the nature of early diplomacy and conflict-prevention efforts. Specifically, new forms of armedconflict and collective violence and the expansionof perpetrators—from rebel groups to organizedcrime networks—have given rise to newapproaches and responses to diplomacy andprevention. These changes have compelled manyorganizations to alter and adapt their approaches.There is also a recognition by the internationalcommunity that the so-called “causes of conflict”are often different from the “causes of peace”—thefactors that caused the actors involved to resort toviolence may be quite different from the factors thatwill enable them to move towards a peaceful settle-ment of the dispute. This latter insight has directimplications for how diplomats and practitionerstailor their interventions. Preventive diplomacy is,most often, a stepwise undertaking, in which oneinitial meeting leads, hopefully, to a series offruitful discussions. One should, thus, think interms of cumulative steps to peace—initial stepsmay lack direct effects and only the last preventiontool may have a direct and decisive effect. Indeed,the idea of steps to peace implies that quickbreakthroughs should not be expected, and anyrapid progress should be the exception, rather thanthe norm. This suggests that a long-term plan isneeded when approaching the mediation ofindividual conflicts. Temperance is also important.Unfortunately, low-level conflicts that escalate towars almost always do so within an eighteen-month

period. Hence, time is of the essence. It is thereforevital that the tools of preventive diplomacy besharpened and made more effective.

Insights from Research

Speakers in the opening session noted that whereasmany mediation characteristics may appear to benew, much also remains the same. A new feature isthat the field has become more crowded withmediators and mediation attempts since the early1990s. Since 2005, normative shifts have arisen thathave effectively raised the bar in terms of promotinga “culture of prevention” and the protection ofcivilians in armed conflict. What has also changed isthe role of new communications technologies—fromsocial media to crowdsourcing—and their potentialto both influence and speed up the initiation andtermination of conflicts. A number of importanttrends were discussed that signal how approaches toearly diplomacy and conflict prevention areevolving.First, a growing consensus is emerging that early

prevention is as important as late prevention. Theshift from “supermen” mediators to a “sprinklersystem” of early-response systems that detectpotential instability was mentioned. Second, there isnow a common sense view that a “cycle of preven-tion” is critical—with as much focus on preventivepeacebuilding as postconflict peacebuilding. Finally,there is a growing commitment to so-calledstructural prevention, with a focus on creating rule-based and predictable mechanisms to deter andreduce the onset and duration of massive violence.A historical review of preventive diplomacy

suggests that states continue to be the primary actorsin successfully mediating armed conflicts. Nonstateactors have begun to play a more active role incooperation with the UN since the end of the ColdWar. An empirical review of what does and does notwork in conflict prevention generated a number offindings related to the characteristics of successfulintervention. A short list of key elements includes:(1) consideration of structural factors (geography,ethnic composition, etc.); (2) leveraged mediation(incentives and sanctions); (3) identification ofthird-party interveners (states versus NGOs); (4)timing (the earlier the better); and (5) multipartyinitiatives (“too many chefs may spoil the broth”).The field has become increasingly crowded with

mediators that often do not work in sync and,unproductively, even compete with one another. Atthe same time, the UN continues to be the mostactive actor, although its comparative role hasdecreased as the number of other actors engaged inmediation has risen. This latter development is inline with Article 33 the UN Charter which calls uponparties to any dispute that is “likely to endanger themaintenance of international peace and security” to“first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry,mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settle-ment, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, orother peaceful means of their own choice.”Research in this field of conflict prevention is still

in its infancy and the analysis of trends and casestudies is just underway. Broad comparative studiesare able to detect strategic-level patterns and trends,but are unable, and are not intended, to capture themore micro-level organizational and behavioralfactors detected in case studies. In other words,broad comparative research is usually able to saysomething about “what” is going on, but has less tosay about “why” a particular conflict occurs sincecontext and detail are not assessed. On the otherhand, case studies are unable to offer the big pictureor to identify whether individual cases are unique orcommonplace. The insights and analysis from casestudies and broad comparative studies thereforeneed to be combined, as together they offer an abilityto look at both sides of the coin and provide answersto different questions. Research to date has comparatively less to say

about the composition of mediation teams that provemost effective (gender, geography, etc.). The focus ofresearch has been, until recently, on the mediation ofinterstate versus intrastate conflicts, the mainconcern of mediators. The key reason for thisapproach is that much of the research has focused onthe issues of interest to practitioners at the strategiclevel (i.e., the policy planners) instead of theconcerns of practitioners at the operative or fieldlevel (the mediators). This asymmetry is caused, inlarge part, by the difficulty of obtaining field-leveldata. There is also a tension between the questionsbeing asked by researchers as opposed to the needsbeing raised by practitioners—there are simply fewrewards in academia for the latter. A closer workingrelationship between academia and the UNMediation Support Unit, among others, is urgentlyneeded in order to move the practice and research

forward together as efficiently as possible.Practitioners, on the one hand, want good and usefulpolicy answers, while academics, on the other hand,are constantly searching for good research questionswhose answers can be useful to practitioners. Thisjoint collaboration is invaluable and constitutes animportant platform upon which to build.The critical importance of research in informing

and shaping policy responses was noted. Thepossibilities for creating more structured exchangeswere highlighted, as was the need to operationalizeresearch in a more structured fashion. There is apressing need for a list of strategies that will workand, as a result, there is a need for further research toinform such a list. Speakers also underscored thelack of hard data and the need to create a consensuson how to measure both the short- and long-termimpacts of preventive efforts. Commentators calledfor a better definition of such key concepts as“conflict” and “prevention” and for improvedinteraction between practitioners and academicsthat may serve to address their mutual concerns.

Insights from the Field

The second session explored the experiences ofpractitioners in a wide range of settings. Thechallenges of “no-war, no-peace” situations wereraised; for example, Timor-Leste from 2006onwards. The importance of combining short-termoperational responses with longer-term structuralprevention was noted. A recurring theme related tothe particular ways in which the preventive-diplomacy tools of the United Nations and of theinternational community could be better leveraged,including good offices, mediation units, anddispute-resolution experts. Another theme relatedto the proliferation of actors—entities other thangovernment institutions or UN agencies—involvedin these activities. The critical role of coordina-tion—of what, by whom, and for whom—wasrepeatedly emphasized, together with the need tothink in terms of long time horizons (five to tenyears as a minimum) when evaluating the impact ofprevention.The importance of impartiality in shaping

effective outcomes was also raised, in that themoment when a mediating party is considered tobe “a player,” there is a rapid collapse of its legiti-macy. Moreover, public diplomacy seldom

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4 CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

generates a positive response: it is better to besupportive in public and harsh in private ratherthan the other way around. As noted by onespeaker: “The first best outcome is resolution of acrisis such that most people were unaware thatthere was ever a crisis. The second best outcome isthat any awareness is snuffed out before it escalates.The third best outcome is that local leaders areviewed as responsible for resolving the crisis. Theleast best outcome is that international parties areseen to resolve the crisis.”Practitioners also drew attention to the changing

dynamics and scales of armed conflicts in whichthey work. Specifically, there was discussion of“turbulence, tensions, and transitions.” Crises in thetwenty-first century have often occurred morerapidly than conventional responses were preparedto react. As such, they were more difficult toidentify in advance or respond to. Increasedattention, it was pointed out, would be required todevelop baselines to measure success and to betterunderstand the patterns of and relations betweenactors’ behavior. Two critical insights that the UNhas developed relate to “insider mediation”—individuals from a particular country who haveinspired trust and confidence and who canundertake quiet mediation. This may facilitate thedevelopment of “peace architectures,” whereby localprocesses and capacities for managing structuralrisks are strengthened. There are many examples ofpeace architectures, from Ghana to Kenya. Thisconstitutes an area for further topical research. The discussion highlighted the shifting terrain of

collective armed violence and, in particular, apossible role for new actors. The assumption thatthe state was the exclusive, or even the mostimportant, actor was challenged. Many participantsalluded to the increasingly pivotal role of privateand insider mediators and, most importantly, totheir ability to step outside of state-centricframeworks and to reach out to a broader group ofstakeholders in the course of negotiations.Moreover, business enterprises—not just multina-tional, but also national investors—have particularforms of access, skills, and information sources, andoften long-term planning horizons, to bettermanage risk and instability. Many companies arealready heavily invested in the business of preven-tion and new entry points are required to further

engage them.More research is needed on these questions and it

was argued that the discussion of definitions is ofreal, rather than just academic, concern. There is aneed to combine case studies with broad andsystematic comparative research to a greater extentthan is presently the case. At the same time,research is often difficult to carry out due to theconfidential nature of the negotiating process.There are, thus, hurdles to be overcome in order tomove mediation from a pure art form that relies ontoo many assumptions to a practice that is informedby insights emanating from research based on data.Participants also reviewed the large array of local

prevention activities already underway in societiesaffected by conflict and chronic violence. A recentlypublished OECD report, Investing in Security, wasmentioned. The report maps out the vast terrain ofsmall-scale, local-level mediation and conflict-prevention activities that seek to mitigate andcontain violence before it escalates. Most interlocu-tors agreed that while still only partiallyunderstood, many of these efforts could be (and arebeing) usefully harnessed, in some cases with aview towards scaling them up. In addition to identi-fying ways and means of financing these activities,donors were encouraged to improve communica-tions between them and to adopt more flexiblefinancing mechanisms. Likewise, to be moreeffective, some participants highlighted theimportance of adopting more comprehensive andproactive conflict-prevention efforts, beginningwith better inter-donor cooperation. There is also aneed to link international and local efforts and tobetter tap into local efforts and activities.

Taking Stock of Insights:Implications for Policy andPractice

Notwithstanding the important successes inpreventive-diplomacy and conflict-preventionefforts, the participants recalled the uneven recordto date. The recent crises and inaction in Sri Lanka,the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Syriawere reminders of the difficulties of turning princi-ples into action. When asked “what works?,” oneparticipant stressed the importance of (1)

recognizing the full cycle of crises in order to antici-pate and adequately respond; (2) increasinginternal and external awareness through publicdebate and media attention; (3) getting “close to thecrisis” and the needs on the ground; and (4) talkingproactively to all stakeholders and forging newpartnerships. In a world of scarce resources, thisparticipant added, it is also important to avoid whatpatently does not work, including: (1) one-size-fits-all approaches; (2) overly rigid institutionalstructures and institutional responses; (3) exclusiveownership of a crisis response; (4) ignorance of therealities on the ground; and (5) short-term andloose commitments that lack planning and follow-through.Most participants were optimistic about the

future of preventive diplomacy and conflict preven-tion. Indeed, it was noted that the wider norms ofprotection and prevention are increasingly beingaccepted across the UN and multilateral systems. Akey point, underlined one participant, was theimportance of “operationalizing” recent normativeguidelines and prescriptions. Moreover, the UNmay find it useful to build on and work with theexpanded networks of actors involved in theseissues. The UN is often involved in the mostdifficult cases, where others have failed and havegiven up, which explains, to a considerable extent,the UN’s mixed record. The easier cases are usuallyresolved without the UN’s involvement.The participants agreed that some persistent

challenges remain. These include difficulties inpredicting “threshold” events; the politicalchallenges within the Security Council and amongthe wider UN membership regarding intervention;lingering concerns associated with sovereigntyissues; and the difficulties of achieving coherence,coordination, and complimentarity given the rise ofdiverse actors. One participant offered a series ofrecommendations on how to get around theseobstacles, including (1) engaging earlier thantypical operational responses; (2) addressing rootcauses alongside issues of political leadership; (3)focusing on those fragile states and settings mostvulnerable to armed conflict and collectiveviolence; (4) initiating constructive engagement(track 1.5 and 2); and (5) developing more researchon the political economies of conflict.

Moving Forward

The first International Expert Forum reviewedsome important conventional wisdom and signaledemerging trends for the community of practiceconcerned with preventive diplomacy and conflictprevention. A prevalent theme was the need forpractice to be better informed by findings fromsolid research to complement the insights of practi-tioners. However, a number of key recommenda-tions can be distilled from the discussions and serveto move the prevention agenda forward: Acknowledge the changes in the landscapes of

armed conflict and collective violence. Recentevidence shows that the number of armed conflictshas dropped considerably from their height in the1990s (from thirty-nine in 1992 to twenty-five in2010) and that, on average, these conflicts havebecome much less deadly in terms of direct orbattle-related deaths. And yet, evidence alsosuggests that other forms of collective violence havebeen steadily increasing, such as violence generatedby transnational organized crime, drug trafficking,and ordinary crime. The participants noted thedeterminants and characteristics of these changingpatterns of violence, and the importance offocusing on those areas exhibiting greatest “need.” Address the root causes of conflict, but also

recognize that the causes of peace may bedifferent. In empirical terms, the so-called “causesof conflict” only partially overlap with the “causesof peace.” The factors that caused the actorsinvolved to resort to conflict are quite differentfrom the factors that will cause them to movetowards peace. This insight has direct implicationsfor how diplomats and practitioners tailor theirinterventions. Creating opportunities andincentives for peace should not be neglected infavor of a focus on the perceived causes of a partic-ular conflict.Recognize the critical opportunities for

diplomacy and prevention in these environments,but also recognize the challenges to coordination.DPA’s recently established Mediation Support Unithas fielded more than fifty missions. UNDP andother UN departments and agencies haveundertaken a vast range of programs to support

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conflict prevention. Regional organizations aremore active in preventive diplomacy than everbefore. Civil society organizations’ initiatives havealso proliferated. The early-diplomacy and conflict-prevention sector has become increasinglycrowded, and there is a lack of coordination, andeven competition, among the actors. The dramaticproliferation of nomenclatures, actors, and activi-ties has created some confusion and contradictionin the responses generated. The challenge isunderstanding how to develop effective, coordi-nated, and coherent responses and how to take fulladvantage of opportunities whenever and whereverthey are available.Deepen the knowledge base on the micro-

determinants of “success” in preventive diplomacyand conflict prevention. In the aggregate, there isoverwhelming evidence in the literature thatprevention succeeds—that is, it contributes to a de-escalation or end in fighting and a more durablepeace. And yet, there is less evidence andunderstanding of the basic micro-characteristics ofsuccess, including the influence of variables associ-ated with strategy, location, repeated trials,mediator identity, sequencing of different preven-tion tools (i.e., direct talks, moderated talks,indirect talks via mediators, good offices, etc.), andother factors. There are interesting findings fromsystematic research, but they are too few to consti-tute a solid—instead of suggestive—basis for policy.Further research and reflection is needed.Purposefully invest in and evaluate early-

diplomacy and conflict-prevention strategies thatappear to work. Early intervention is critical, beforeparties lock in their positions. Direct and bilateral

efforts are effective and their impartiality is key.Insider mediation, national architectures for peace,and other related strategies are of increasingrelevance (although still not subject to scientificevaluation). Likewise, one-size-fits-all solutionsshould be avoided given the unique contextualfeatures shaping each conflict situation. Whilelessons will be learned and can be applied withadaptations, the heterogeneity of each setting needsto be underlined. Support multiple collaborative tracks of

research on early diplomacy and conflict preven-tion. The participants supported the developmentof more predictable and collaborative researchbetween institutions and scholars. A more routineexchange—including through the InternationalExpert Forum and related seminars—would allowscholars to better understand the critical gaps inknowledge, particularly in the practitioner world.Formal collaborative efforts between UN organs,such as the Mediation Support Unit, and academicinstitutions were also encouraged to allow for moretargeted research. It was also widely recognized thatmultiple tracks of research are required: quantita-tive research on trends and patterns of success inmediation and prevention coupled with morefocused, in-depth studies of organizational andinstitutional change. Some participants suggesteddeveloping a typology or list of strategies that work,supported by case studies that include the experi-ences of particular regional institutions. Otherinterlocutors suggested developing a glossary ofterms or a lexicon to facilitate cross-sectoraldialogue.

6 CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

Agenda

Conflict Prevention and Preventive Diplomacy:What Works and What Doesn’t?

The International Expert Forum

Thursday, December 15, 2011

09:00 – 09:45 Welcome and Opening Remarks

Ambassador Mårten Grunditz, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations

IntroductionsMr. Francesco Mancini, Director of Research, International Peace InstituteAmbassador Ragnar Ängeby, Head of Conflict Prevention in Practice Program, FolkeBernadotte AcademyDr. Craig Calhoun, President, Social Science Research CouncilDr. Robert Muggah, Principal, SecDev Group

09:45 – 11:15 Session 1: Insights from Research

This session discusses the main findings and insights from recent research. What does thisresearch show regarding the different types and modalities of conflict prevention and preven-tive diplomacy? What diplomatic, military, and development options exist to preventdisputes from arising or spreading once conflict has occurred? Why do particular conflictstake a particular course of action? If a conflict was prevented, did it take place at a latertime and, if so, why? How do we evaluate the short- and long-term success of the toolsemployed?

ChairDr. Michael W. Doyle, Harold Brown Professor of International Affairs, Law and PoliticalScience, Columbia University

PresentersDr. Bernd Beber, Assistant Professor, New York University Dr. Karl deRouen, Professor, University of Alabama

DiscussantsAmbassador Josephine Ojiambo, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic ofKenya to the United NationsDr. Alice Ackermann, Senior Operational Adviser and Head, Planning and Analysis,Conflict Prevention Centre, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

11:15 Coffee Break

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11:30 – 13:00 Session 2: Insights from the Field

This session discusses the insights of practitioners. Which conflict prevention strategies havethe United Nations, member states, regional organizations, and other external and nationalactors pursued? Which strategies have been most and least successful, and why? How has thepractice of conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy evolved in recent years? What arethe comparative advantages and disadvantages of different actors? In particular, what is thecontribution of regional and subregional organizations?

Chair Ambassador Abdullah Alsaidi, Senior Fellow, International Peace Institute

PresentersMr. Atul Khare, Head of the Change Management Team, Executive Office of the UNSecretary-General; Former Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Timor-Lesteand Head of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste Dr. Chetan Kumar, Senior Conflict Prevention Adviser, Conflict Prevention and RecoveryTeam, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), United Nations DevelopmentProgramme

DiscussantsDr. Achim Wennmann, Executive Coordinator, Geneva Peacebuilding Platform; Researcher,Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP), Graduate Institute forInternational and Development StudiesMr. Steven A. Zyck, Afghanistan Team Leader, NATO Civil-Military Fusion Centre; Fellow,Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit, University of York

13:00 – 14:45 Session 3: Taking Stock of Insights: Implications for Policy and Practice

With the number of armed conflicts on the rise, and with the demands on the UnitedNations and regional organizations for preventive diplomacy increasing, a more effectiveapproach to conflict prevention is needed. Given the insights from research and practice,what conclusions can be made? What are the implications for research and for policy in theshort, medium, and long term?

ChairMs. Fabienne Hara, Vice President, International Crisis Group

Presenters Mr. Levent Bilman, Director of Policy and Mediation Division, UN Department of Political AffairsDr. Michael Lund, Senior Fellow, United States Institute of Peace

DiscussantDr. Bertrand Ramcharan, Director of the Guyana Institute of Public Policy; Fellow, Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, City University of New York

14:45 Closing Remarks

Mr. Francesco Mancini, Director of Research, International Peace InstituteDr. Birger Heldt, Director of Research, Folke Bernardotte AcademyDr. Robert Muggah, Principal, SecDev Group

8 AGENDA

Mohamed Diaaeldin AbdrabboPermanent Mission of the Arab Republic of Egyptto the United Nations

Gunnar AldénPermanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations

Tahir Hussain AndrabiPermanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations

Jane AnttilaPermanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations

Ewa AnzorgePermanent Mission of the Republic of Poland tothe United Nations

Malika BhandarkarUnited Nations Peacekeeping Support Office

Tatiana CarayannisConflict Prevention and Peace Forum, SocialScience Research Council

Madhushree ChatterjeeUnited Nations Change Management Team

Sarah ClarkeQuaker United Nations Office

Pedro CourelaPermanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations

Pablo de GreiffInternational Center for Transitional Justice

Jos De La HayeConflict Prevention and Recovery Team, UnitedNations Development Programme

Hugh DuganPermanent Mission of the United States to theUnited Nations

Håkan EdströmFolke Bernadotte Academy

Sebastian Einsiedel Policy and Mediation Division, United NationsDepartment of Political Affairs

Anita ErnstorferConflict Prevention and Recovery Team, United Nations Development Programme

Mari Etelapaa European Union Delegation to the United NationsHeadquarters in New York

Sakiko Fukuda-ParrThe New School for Social Research

Ufuk GokcenPermanent Observer of the Organisation ofIslamic Cooperation to the United Nations

Jean-Marie GuéhennoColumbia University

Steen Malthe HansenPermanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nations

Johanna KarankoPermanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations

Ílker KiliçPermanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations

Jennifer F. KlotSocial Science Research Council

Elisabeth LindenmayerColumbia University

Kishore Mandhyan Executive Office of the United Nations Secretary-General

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Participants

Vesna Markovic-DasovicBureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, United Nations Development Programme

Jim McClayPermanent Representative of New Zealand to theUnited Nations

Molly M. MelinLoyola University Chicago

Edmond MuletUnited Nations Assistant Secretary-General forPeacekeeping Operations

Tetsushi OgataSchool for Conflict Analysis and Resolution,George Mason University

Ana PatelOutward Bound Center for Peacebuilding

Gerald PachoudUnited Nations Peacebuilding Support Office

Pornprom (Poy) PetklaiPermanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations

Alexandra Pichler-FongPolicy and Mediation Division, United NationsDepartment of Political Affairs

Werner PuschraFriedrich Ebert Stiftung Foundation

Stéphane ReyPermanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations

Guillermo E. RishchynskiPermanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations

Paul RomitaSecurity Council Report

Colonel Per RønningPermanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations

Gay Rosenblum-KumarInteragency Framework Team for PreventiveAction, Bureau for Crisis Prevention andRecovery, United Nations DevelopmentProgramme

Barnett RubinCenter on International Cooperation

Tamrat Samuel United Nations Department of Political Affairs

Rhett SangsterStabilization and Reconstruction Task Force,Department of Foreign Affairs and InternationalTrade, Canada

Paul SegerPermanent Representative of Switzerland to theUnited Nations

Renata SeguraConflict Prevention and Peace Forum, SocialScience Research Council

Jake ShermanCenter on International Cooperation

Waheguru Pal Singh SidhuCenter on International Cooperation

Leon V. SigalSocial Science Research Council

Isa Li SjöbergFolke Bernadotte Academy

Urawadee SripiromyaPermanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations

Hanne StevensPermanent Mission of the United Kingdom to theUnited Nations

Lucas SwanepoelPermanent Observer Mission of the Holy See tothe United Nations

10 PARTICIPANTS

Sarah TaylorNGO Working Group on Women, Peace andSecurity

Andrew TomlinsonQuaker United Nations Office

Massimo TommasoliPermanent Observer of the International Institutefor Democracy and Electoral Assistance to theUnited Nations

Patrick TraversPermanent Mission of Canada to the UnitedNations

Necla TschirgiJoan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, University ofSan Diego

Joanna WeschlerSecurity Council Report

Teresa WhitfieldCenter on International Cooperation

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