CONFLICT BRIEFING NOTES

CONFLICT BRIEFING NO. 21, February 2015

KEY MESSAGES

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CONTEXT ANALYSIS & CONFLICT PROFILE

THE NATIONAL CONTEXT

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. 2

2. 2

3. POLITICAL 2

4. SOCIAL 4

5. ECONOMIC 5

6. 6

7. GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SUPPORT BOOST COUNTER-

INSURGENCY EFFORTS 6

8. CHANGING PROFILE OF JAS 6

9. IMPLICATION FOR PROGRAMMING IN SELECT STATES 6

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*Disclaimer: The contents of this briefing note do not necessarily reflect the views of DFID or the UK Government.

** All reports are based on anonymous NSRP sources.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Political

Security challenges recorded in previous months across the country and particularly in the North East

region persisted in February. Two factors that affected conflict dynamics are the postponement of elections

and the reported successes of coordinated counter-insurgency campaigns. Tensions over dissatisfaction

with the pace of distribution of voters register and divisive and inflammatory campaigns by political parties

and aspirants had raised concerns over outbreak of violence during earlier scheduled dates. However,

although controversial the postponement is generally believed to have averted or postponed feared

incidents of electoral violence. The Nigerian military successfully recovered several towns and villages held

by the Jamaatu Ahlis-Sunna Liddaawati Wal Jihad (JAS). Counter-insurgency efforts were boosted by the

cooperation of neighbouring countries, the political support of the African Union and ECOWAS, and

acquisition of new weapons, including fighter jets for the Nigerian military.

There are stronger indications of attempts by JAS to link up to the Islamic State (ISIS) through its discourses

and image. JAS used ISIS symbols in its video release and focussed on attacks on democracy and rule of

law.

Insecurity continued to adversely impact on mobilisations for elections even as electioneering campaigns

also undermined security in February. The major reason advanced by the Independent National Electoral

Commission (INEC) for the postponement of the elections was insecurity. The security agencies had

reportedly expressed misgiving about their capability to provide election security because it planned to step

up counter-insurgency mobilizations in the North East during the period. The controversial position of the

security agencies raised concerns about possible politicization of security institutions as it was perceived to

have been orchestrated by the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). The postponement of the elections

did not trigger incidents of violence as feared largely because of the different management mechanisms

adopted by INEC, security agencies and community leaders in different parts of the country. NSRP sources

aver that factors that mitigated risks of violence included consultation with the broad-based National

Council of States, consultations with the political parties and civil society, and deployment of soldiers and

police to key hot-spots. The timing of the announcement of the postponement, which occurred on a

Saturday evening and temperate response of the opposition All Progressive Congress (APC) also helped

to prevent violent reactions.

The state of insecurity also affected political campaigns in parts of the country, especially in the North East.

For instance, inability of security officials to manage the crowd that attended the presidential rally of the APC

in Maiduguri led to an unceremonious end of the campaign as General Muhammadu Buhari left the venue

after he failed to gain access to the podium as a result of the pressing crowd. Six persons reportedly died at

the stampede at the rally. Similarly, the presidential rally of the PDP scheduled to hold in Damaturu, Yobe

State was also cancelled for security reasons following bomb-blast in Potiskum.

Incidents of political violence were also recorded in Borno State. Political thugs reportedly set the PDP

campaign office ablaze and vandalized campaign billboards and posters belonging to the PDP presidential

and governorship candidates in Maiduguri. The office building belonged to former Governor Modu Sheriff

who decamped to the PDP in 2014. While the PDP accused the APC of sponsoring the thugs, the APC

alleged the thugs attacked the building because they were estranged with Sheriff who reneged on his

commitments to them after he failed to secure the PDP senatorial ticket. The PDP and APC also traded

blames for the reported ambush on the convoy of Governor Kashim Shettima near the PDP campaign the

following week. While the APC alleged that PDP thugs hurled stones at and destroyed the windscreen of

vehicles in the convoy, the PDP claimed the thugs were disenchanted thugs hired but dumped by the

governor after the APC presidential campaign. Although Shettima escaped unhurt, two persons were

Context Analysis/Conflict Profile

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reportedly killed as police shot into the crowd. The incidence of violence underscore fears that the

decamping of Modu Sheriff to the PDP will lead to more clashes between PDP and APC. This is especially

the case as both Sheriff and Shettima are suspected to be patronizing armed groups. The insurgency has

also encouraged the proliferation of communal and private armed security groups in the state.

Amidst security challenges, political campaigns intensified across the country despite the postponement of

the elections. In Kano State, the APC mobilised to consolidate on its incumbency and popularity. The APC

presidential candidate visited and met with the influential business elites in the city that had reportedly

opposed his candidacy in previous elections. The overture was successful as the group of business elites

reportedly expressed support for Buhari. No major incidence of election violence was reported in the state.

This was due to efforts by different actors to maintain peace and security. For instance, deployment of

troops and the intervention of Emir Muhammad Sanusi II helped to prevent protest and violence after

postponement of the elections. The Kano State Police Command also organized an event where they

mobilised gubernatorial candidates for 6 political parties to sign a peace accord.

The security situation was worse in neighbouring Kaduna state where there is perceptibly more balance of

power between the ruling PDP and the opposition APC. There were reports of clashes between supporters

of PDP and APC that resulted in a number of deaths and injuries. Suspected political thugs also attacked the

convoy of Governor Mukhtar Ramalan Yero during his campaigns at various locations, notably in Birnin

Gwari, Panteka, Bakin Ruwa and Pambegua. The stiff competition between the APC and PDP following

what appears to be the growing popularity of Nasir El Rufai and the personality cult of Buhari in the state

have raised concerns about the prospects for peaceful elections in the state. This prompted the Assistant

Inspector General of Police to convene a meeting in Kaduna where all governorship aspirants signed a

peace accord.

Similarly the growing appeal of the APC in Plateau State, which has been controlled by the PDP since 1999,

has raised the stakes for the elections. The APC appears to be gaining support across religious and ethnic

divides as a result of protests that trailed the PDP governorship primaries. This is because the alleged

preference of Governor Jonah Jang to be succeeded by Senator Gyang Pwajok, who hails from his native

Du Community in Jos South LGA, is seen as violating the power sharing arrangements. The intensification

of competition has triggered political violence. For instance, 2 local party officials crucial for mobilizing votes

were assassinated in their residences in Barkin Ladi and Riyom LGAs. The assassination, which occurred

in quick succession on February 15 and 16 affected both APC and PDP. Thus, it is not clear whether it

stemmed from intra or inter party rivalries.

In Rivers State where the APC and PDP are battling to win the presidential and governorship elections,

scheduled APC governorship campaign rally was postponed due to attacks on party office and campaign

venue in Okrika. The campaign was marred by violence when it eventually held as gunmen invaded the

venue leading to the death of a policeman. Okrika is the hometown of First Lady Dame Patience Jonathan

who has had a running battle with Governor Rotimi Amaechi. There were also indications in the state that

competing groups have adopted kidnapping as a political weapon. This followed the kidnap of the media

aide to Governor Amaechi.

In Bayelsa State, where there will not be a governorship election in 2015, intra- party conflicts in both APC

and the PDP continued to raise tensions. Though allies of Dame Patience Jonathan and Governor Seriake

Dickson collaborated to organize a successful PDP presidential campaign rally in Yenagoa, conflicts

intensified after the event. Allies of the governor reportedly stage-managed the suspension of chairman of

the state chapter of the PDP.

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Political competition in Delta State intensified during the period despite postponement of elections as the

APC reportedly gained momentum in its mobilization to unseat the PDP. This resulted in several clashes of

supporters of the parties and an attack on the APC senatorial candidate for Delta South Senatorial District.

NSRP sources claim the attack has heightened ethnic tensions and may reignite longstanding conflict

amongst the Urhobo, Ijaw and Itsekiri.

Social

Across NSRP target states residents endeavoured to continue with normal life in the midst of the security

challenges. For instance, the historic and much-awaited coronation of Mallam Muhammadu Sanusi II as

Emir of Kano was held under tight security. Although there were fears of possible violence following last

year's bomb blast that reportedly targeted the new emir in Kano Central Mosque, the event was held without

any incident. Apart from security put in place, the success of the event is traceable to the enormous progress

the emir has made in consolidating his position. Since his ascension to the throne, Sanusi has tried to reach

out to different groups, including groups that opposed his candidacy. The emir has also taken popular

positions on contemporary issues even at the risk of his personal security. He incurred the wrath of JAS when

he asked northerners to mobilise against the insurgents. He has also been very outspoken in mobilizations

against rising incidence of violence against women and girls in Northern Nigeria and for the protection of the

rights of women at the risk of attacks from conservative elements. In February, the Emir publicly advocated

against the banning of street begging by the state government. He was quoted as saying that government

should have offered alternatives for the vulnerable persons before commencement of the ban. Some

political watchers have claimed the Emir's position is indicative of his estrangement with Governor Musa

Kwankwaso who influenced his emergence and has been peeved by the Emir's independent stance and

neutrality.

Deteriorating security situation continued to take a toll on ordinary Nigerians as they go about their daily

lives. During the month, up to 70 persons were reportedly killed in three separate bomb incidents in

Damaturu, Biu, Potiskum, Gombe, Jos and Kano. The suicide bombers which included young girls targeted

security check points, stadia, political rallies, markets and motor parks. The latest wave of suicide bombings

were the first since JAS started occupying towns and villages in the North East. It is indicative of an effort by

JAS to demonstrate its continued strike capability despite the huge losses it has suffered in men and arms

since the strengthened Multinational Task Force renewed offensive in February to regain territories

controlled by JAS. The attacks imposed hardships on surviving residents as they led to security checks,

curfews, forced migration and further stress of social services, especially health services.

Many more communities were caught in the cross fires as fleeing JAS insurgents mounted vengeful attacks

on towns and villages on their escape routes. JAS insurgents reportedly burnt private houses and public

buildings in Askira Uba after losing about 300 fighters during a battle with the MTF which lasted over two

days. Fleeing insurgents also attacked island communities in Niger Republic near Lake Chad and prevented

residents from leaving villages in Marte District. The insurgents resorted to using residents of villages near

Gamboru as human shields as they attempted to evade aerial and ground attacks by the MTF. Some of the

affected villages include Kwalaram, Bukar-Mairam, Abbaganaram, Sidir, Kirta, Jibillaram, Zannari,

Kutukungulla, Baranga, Kitikime, Krenuwa and Jillam.

The scale of fighting and the quantity of weapons recovered from the insurgents have further raised fears of

residents. For instance, Borno police reported that troops uncovered and detonated 147 bombs in Aeno

village near Maiduguri. A large cache of bombs and explosives were also recovered near Mubi, Adamawa

State. Security sources also revealed that two armoured vehicles, two artillery guns and 17 Hilux vehicles

were among stock of weapons recovered from JAS insurgents after they were dislodged from Baga. The

revelations about the sophisticated weapons and number of fighters mobilised by JAS has affected early

return of residents to recovered villages and towns. The impressive successes of the MTF have however not

led to a reduction in the flows of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. 4

NSRP sources indicate that some residents started returning to their homes and reuniting with families in

Gamboru Ngala, Borno State. However, the joy of the returnees was dampened by the massive destruction

that fleeing JAS insurgents left behind. One of the most reported re-union was that of 158 women and

children abducted by JAS insurgents from Katarko village in Damaturu, Yobe. This followed the voluntary

release of the captives by JAS and their subsequent screening and admission for psychosocial support by

security agencies and government officials.

Another social impact of the conflict is the rising number of persons that become victims of extra-judicial

killings by community vigilante groups. In Kano State, a university professor whose Hilux vehicle was stolen

by insurgents was lynched by irate youths in Kibiya. The professor was killed while attempting to take

possession of the vehicle recovered from the insurgents by troops. In Plateau State, a young man reportedly

died as a result of injuries he sustained from beatings by the vigilante group in the Filin Ball area of Jos North

LGA. Vigilantes also stabbed another young man in Jos for befriending the sister of one of their members.

The development is causing tensions in relations between community members and the vigilantes. For

instance, angry community members burnt down the offices of neighbourhood watch groups in Dutse Uku

and Filin Ball in Jos and mobilised to attack their members. A major breach of security was averted by the

prompt intervention of the Security Task Force (STF).

There are also indications of tensions in relations between security agencies and vigilantes. For instance in

Maiduguri where the Civilian JTF has boosted counter-insurgency efforts, tensions rose after Nigerian

soldiers reportedly killed 5 members of a vigilante group. This was after the vigilante members reportedly

stopped a convoy of military vehicles which included a private truck with ammunition. The fatal shootings

happened after the vigilantes forcefully climbed onto the truck to inspect the contents following altercations

with the soldiers. NSRP sources claim that the insistence of the vigilantes stemmed from their resolve to

provide security for the visiting APC presidential candidate.

Incidence of organized crime also increased. In the Niger Delta, 7 cases of kidnap including those involving a

politician and 4 medical doctors were reported. There were also reports of confrontations between armed

groups and cults allegedly affiliated to politicians. The STF reportedly rescued the father of Senator Joshua

Chibi Dariye from Kidnappers one week after gunmen forcefully took him from his home in Mushere, Bokkos

LGA. The kidnappers had demanded $10million as ransom for the release of their victim. The kidnap

incidence was the second case reported in the central senatorial district of the state in the past two months.

A foreign worker was reportedly kidnapped in Gindiri area of Mangu LGA in January. Residents of Plateau are

worried that the relatively new crime will spread in the region during the election period.

Economic

Business activities have continued to suffer in Nigeria's North-East due to the parlous security situation.

Traders have also abstained from making previously regular visits to commercial centres like Kano. This has

affected incomes and investments in the affected towns. Many northern towns and villages are losing

population as a result of the state of insecurity. There were reports of mass exodus of non-indigenes from

Sabon Gari, Kano due to fears of attacks by insurgents and post-election violence. This situation has

invariably affected the economy of Kano as a significant portion of traders are non-indigenes.

The devaluation of the Naira is also negatively affecting incomes and investments. Many traders have been

affected by the fall in the value of the Naira and the alleged diversion of available funds for electioneering

campaigns has had its toll on the economy. Several projects have been abandoned in most states and delay

in payment of salaries and entitlements has led to protests in some states. For instance, disabled athletics

and pensioners in Rivers state organized protests against non-payment of salaries and pension. The cash

crunch has contributed to worsening economic security of the people.

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Other

Global and regional support boost counter-insurgency efforts

Pledges of support by the international community to Nigeria have contributed to boosting efforts to combat

the insurgency. During the month, the UN Secretary General sent his emissary in West Africa to offer Nigeria

the support of the UN peace keeping platform. Also the African Union agreed to raise 7500 troops to combat

the insurgents. The pledge of support has been strengthened by the renewed commitment of the

governments of Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republic to fight the insurgency.

There were reports of Chadian ground troops entering Nigerian territory in pursuit of JAS insurgents and

armoured vehicles crossing the bridge linking the Cameroonian town of Fotokol and the Nigerian town of

Gamboru, which had been re-captured from the insurgents. Also fighter aircrafts belonging to the French

military were seen carrying out reconnaissance missions along Nigeria's border. French authorities have

confirmed that these activities are in aid of Nigeria's fight against the JAS insurgents.

Chad authorities announced early February that its troops had killed over 200 JAS fighters and lost 9 soldiers

in Gamboru. Chad and Cameroonian televisions (whose signals are well received in Borno) gave daily

updates of their operations, including videos and pictures. Much of this interest derives from the fact that all

the countries by the Lake Chad basin increasingly see JAS as threats to their national security and survival.

Over the past 3 months, JAS has threatened to launch attacks on these countries for collaborating with

Nigerian military.

Nigerian authorities have given assurance that regional and global support for counter-insurgency has not

compromised Nigeria's territorial integrity. This followed widespread insinuations that troops from Cameroon,

Chad and Niger were entering Nigerian territory in pursuit of the insurgents without the knowledge and

permission of the Nigerian government. Nigerian authorities have also been concerned that some

commentators reportedly preferred giving credit of recent successes against JAS to the regional troops than

the Nigerian military. This is based on the perception that such commentaries are influenced by political

interest groups.

Changing profile of JAS

There was more evidence of the changing profile of JAS as it seeks to become a regional terror organization

and forge linkages with the Islamic State (ISIS). Some of this evidence appeared in a recent video released by

JAS. The video showed Abubakar Shekau, JAS leader vowing to defeat Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and

their western supporters. The video, which was released to coincide with a regional meeting on combating

JAS, featured a man believed to be Abubakar Shekau, delivering a 12-minute “message” to leaders in the

Nigerian government and western democracies. He condemned democracy and rule of law and urged their

leaders to turn to Allah. NSRP sources claim the style of delivery and resolution of the video was similar to the

ones released by ISIS. A graphic depicting the black flag typically used by ISIS and its supporters was visible

in the top right corner throughout the video. While JAS has long used the so-called 'Black Standard' over a

book and two crossed guns as their symbol, this new icon is more commonly associated with ISIS.

Impact for Programming in Select States (Borno, Yobe, Kano, Kaduna, Plateau, Bayelsa, Rivers and

Delta)

Ÿ Although February 2015 Presidential and Gubernatorial elections have been postponed to eliminate the

JAS insurgency in Northeast, violence continues and communities remain vulnerable

Ÿ Fears of electoral violence persist despite postponement of Elections

Ÿ Rivalry and Violence amongst APC and PDP supporters ahead of 2015 Election continues in the Middle

Belt

Ÿ New Tempo for Organized Crime in Niger Delta Raises Alarm for Breadth and Depth of Potential Electoral

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Recommendations

Peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance programmes initiated by the Nigerian Government should be

encouraged to work closely with neighboring countries to provide assistance to Nigerians seeking refuge in

Niger and Cameroon.

Peacebuilding and conflict resolution programmes in the North East should initiate activities to support

capacity building among local actors such as traditional rulers and religious leaders. The activities should be

based on stakeholder analysis to assure that the partnerships are built with trusted and non-partisan actors.

All development programmes should develop adjustment and contingency plans to adapt to changes in the

context following postponement of the elections. For programmes with additional funds that can be leveraged

for small projects in the North East, efforts to engage the CJTF in capacity building around non-violence and

countering potential manipulation by politicians may be beneficial to peace and security.

Programmes attempting to support violence-affected communities should consider integrating additional

psycho-social support to the portfolio of programming. Community members and returnees will require

psycho-social and trauma healing, emergency services and re-integration initiatives. Moreover, displaced

persons either in camps or in communities would benefit from additional layers of protection, psycho-social

support and trauma healing.

Programmes providing humanitarian assistance to IDPs and host communities should consider shifts in

distribution to beneficiaries from communities that choose to return to their villages previously occupied by

JAS. The movement of persons from towns hosting IDPs back to their places of origin in the short-to-medium

term will create more breadth to the distribution efforts of food and non-food items.

Programmes working on economic and market development in Kano state should account for the shifting

dynamics in the business community related to perceived fear of electoral violence. The shifts in spending

and selling patterns will impact the overall growth of the state and additional considerations for this dynamic

would be beneficial for programme delivery and beneficiaries.

Programmes with international staff operating in the Niger Delta may consider extra layers of protection for

their staff to alleviate potential kidnap for ransom attempts. Also, for those working on youth programming and

peacebuilding programming in the Middle Belt and Niger Delta, it may be important to hold low profile events

that are as politically neutral as possible to evade the attention of cult groups, gangs and political

entrepreneurs.

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