CONCRETE IMPOSSIBLE WORLDS Martin Vacek Institute of Philosophy Slovak Academy of Sciences...
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Transcript of CONCRETE IMPOSSIBLE WORLDS Martin Vacek Institute of Philosophy Slovak Academy of Sciences...
CONCRETE IMPOSSIBLE WORLDS
Martin VacekInstitute of Philosophy
Slovak Academy of [email protected]
www.martinvacek.com
Oklahoma Graduate Conference, Norman, 30/03/2013
Plan Exposition of modal realism
Applications of the theory
Why to bother with Impossibilia?
An Argument against Impossible Worlds
Proposals
Modal RealismWhat there is?
Concrete actual individualsConcrete nonactual individualsConcrete possible worldsSets Principle of unrestricted
mereological summationRecombination principleThere are no IMPOSSIBILIA.
Modal Realism
An individual x is a world iff any parts
of x are spatiotemporally related to
Each other, and anything spatiotemporally related to any
part of x is itself a part of x
Possible Worlds: Why We Need Them?
Analysis of modality
Properties and Propositions
Counterfactuals
Beliefs
Knowledge
Problems – several pre-theoretical opinions
Impossible properties
Impossible propositions
Counterfactuals with impossible antecedents
Impossible beliefs
IMPOSSIBILIA TO THE
RESCUE(?)
An Argument against Concrete Impossible Worlds
1. There exists an impossible world at which (P and ~P).
2. At w ~P iff ~(at w, P)3. At w (P and ~P) iff at w P and ~(at w P). 4. To tell the alleged truth about the
contradictory things is not different from contradicting yourself.
5. There is no subject matter about which you can tell the truth by contradicting yourself.
ThereforeImpossible worlds do not exist.
An Argument against Concrete Impossible Worlds
1. There exists an impossible world at which (P and ~P).
2. At w ~P iff ~(at w, P)3. At w (P and ~P) iff at w P and ~(at w P). 4. To tell the alleged truth about the
contradictory things is not different from contradicting yourself.
5. There is no subject matter about which you can tell the truth by contradicting yourself.
ThereforeImpossible worlds do not exist.
An Argument against Concrete Impossible Worlds
1. There exists an impossible world at which (P and ~P).
2. At w ~P iff ~(at w, P)3. At w (P and ~P) iff at w P and ~(at w P). 4. To tell the alleged truth about the
contradictory things is not different from contradicting yourself.
5. There is no subject matter about which you can tell the truth by contradicting yourself.
ThereforeImpossible worlds do not exist.
An Argument against Concrete Impossible Worlds
1. There exists an impossible world at which (P and ~P).
2. At w ~P iff ~(at w, P)3. At w (P and ~P) iff at w P and ~(at w P) 4. To tell the alleged truth about the
contradictory things is not different from contradicting yourself.
5. There is no subject matter about which you can tell the truth by contradicting yourself.
ThereforeImpossible worlds do not exist.
An Argument against Concrete Impossible Worlds
1. There exists an impossible world at which (P and ~P).
2. At w ~P iff ~(at w, P)3. At w (P and ~P) iff at w P and ~(at w P) 4. To tell the alleged truth about the
contradictory things is not different from contradicting yourself.
5. There is no subject matter about which you can tell the truth by contradicting yourself.
ThereforeImpossible worlds do not exist.
An Argument against Concrete Impossible Worlds
1. There exists an impossible world at which (P and ~P).
2. At w ~P iff ~(at w, P)3. At w (P and ~P) iff at w P and ~(at w P) 4. To tell the alleged truth about the
contradictory things is not different from contradicting yourself.
5. There is no subject matter about which you can tell the truth by contradicting yourself.
ThereforeImpossible worlds do not exist.
Proposal(s)
If
there is subject matter about which you can tell the truth by contradicting
yourself
Proposal(s)
If
there is subject matter about which you can tell the truth by contradicting
yourself
Paraconsictent Approach
Paraconsictent Approach
(A , ¬A) ⊨ B
Paraconsictent Approach
(A , ¬A) ⊨ B
Paraconsictent Approach
(A , ¬A) ⊨ B
(A ∧ ¬A)
Proposal(s)• is it a justified and legitimate
pre-theoretical opinion that classical logic holds
unrestrictedly?
Proposal(s)• is it a justified and legitimate
pre-theoretical opinion that classical logic holds
unrestrictedly?• localising the applicability of the
overall logic
Proposal(s)• is it a justified and legitimate
pre-theoretical opinion that classical logic holds
unrestrictedly?• localising the applicability of the
overall logic• we barely have an idea of what it
means for a world to obey one logic rather than another
THANKS