CONCEPTS, PARADIGMS AND KNOWLEDGE ORGANIZATION

Birger Hjørland, Royal School of LIS, Denmark

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Introduction

My basic idea is simple:

If concepts are the units in Knowledge Organization (KO) ,it follows that a theory of concepts is a theory of KO.

To understand concepts is to understand KO and vice versa.

Methods of concept analysis are methods of KO and vice versa.

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Introduction

If we are going to make progress, I believe we have to stick to some theoretical commitments.

We have to decide whether or not we take concepts as units in KO. If yes, then we have to examine the implications carefully (and relate to concept theory).

I believe there is a general lack of such explicit theoretical commitments in LIS and KO.

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Introduction

Perhaps some of you have examined papers on concept theory, and perhaps you did not find what you needed (and this may explain lack of theoretical commitment).

I too have searched for a long time to understand “concept theory” and found what I believe is needed outside “main-stream” research on concepts.

It has been difficult to develop an understanding that satisfy myself (which I believe is a precondition for developing a view that may convince other people).

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Concept theory

The approaches to concept theory that I have found most useful are:

“Begriffsgeschichte” (history of concepts), Hermeneutics The Cultural-Historical Activity Theory Pragmatism Speech-act theory

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Concept theory

These approaches are again related to a theoretical commitment on a higher level. But this is not just an arbitrary choice. I believe I have to make this theoretical commitment because this is the only way I can find a satisfactory solution to the problems of KO.

I may be wrong, of course. But then somebody has to produce a convincing argument- based on another commitment. That is the way progress is made!

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Concept theory

My suggested definition: Concepts are dynamically constructed and

collectively negotiated meanings which classify the world according to interests and theories.

Concepts and their development cannot be understood in isolation from the interests and theories which motivated their construction, and in general we should expect competing conceptions and concepts to be at play in all domains at all times.

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Concepts understood from different positions

The ideal of empiricism is to define concepts by clustering similar objects (relying on features that can be observed “objectively” and avoiding theoretical selection of defining properties).

The ideal of rationalism is to define concepts by a set of primitive concepts (or “semantic primitives”) considered “given”.

The ideal of historicism is to define concepts a) genealogically and b) by explicating their relations to theories and discourses.

The ideal of pragmatism is to define concepts by deciding which class of things best serves a given purpose and then to fixate this class in a sign.  

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Classification methods corresponding to each position

The ideal of empiricism is to classify by clustering similar objects (relying on features that can be observed “objectively” and avoiding the theoretical selection of defining properties).

The ideal of rationalism is to classify by a set of logical criteria of division considered “essential”.

The ideal of historicism is to classify by a) clustering genealogically related items b) by clustering by underlying theories and discourses.

The ideal of pragmatism is to classify by deciding which class of things best serves a given purpose.  

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Classification methods corresponding to each position

Each of these classification ideals can be identified in different approaches in Knowledge Organization:

Empiricist ideals e.g. in numerical techniques Rationalist ideals in e.g. facet analysis and logical

division Historicist ideals in e.g. evolutionary based

classifications and discourse analytic approaches Pragmatic ideals e.g. in feminist, critical and

domain-analytic approaches.

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Concept theory

Concepts are thus something that are constructed in communities based on negotiations between different views and interests.

Concepts cannot be defined by psychological studies or user studies. Nor can they be defined by purely logical analysis or by considering how words/signs have been understood formerly or are understood in communities.

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But is KO based on concepts?

Possible alternatives as units of KO could be:

Words Signs/symbols Classes Concepts “Universals and particulars which exist in reality”

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But is KO based on concepts?

There seems to be overall agreement that concepts should be considered the building blocks of KOS. Among the researchers arguing that concepts are the basic elements in KOS is the founder of ISKO, Ingetraut Dahlberg. She wrote:

“A concept is regarded as the common element of both classification systems and thesauri”. (Dahlberg, 1974, p. 12).

Dahlberg’s view is also reflected in the subtitle of ISKO’s journal Knowledge Organization: “International Journal devoted to Concept Theory, Classification, Indexing and Knowledge Representation”.

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But is KO based on concepts?

Some researchers, however, disagree with this. Smith (2004) thus “defends the thesis that ontologies developed for such purposes should be understood as having as their subject matter, not concepts, but rather the universals and particulars which exist in reality and are captured in scientific laws”(emphasis added).

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But is KO based on concepts?

“It is a matter of considerable astonishment to ontology-minded philosophers that many thoughtful members of the knowledge representation and related communities, including many of those involved in the development of ontologies, have embraced one or other form of idealist, skeptical, or constructionist philosophy. This means for example:

a view according to which there is no such thing as objective reality to which the concepts or general terms in our knowledge representation systems would correspond;

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But is KO based on concepts?

a view according to which we cannot know what objective reality is like so that there is no practical benefit to be gained from the attempt to establish such a correspondence;

a view according to which the term ‘reality’ in any case signifies nothing more than a construction built out of concepts so that every concept-system would in principle have an equal claim to constituting its own ‘reality’ or ‘possible world’.” (Smith, 2004)

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But is KO based on concepts?

“At the level at which I operate I do not embrace any one classification and say: this classification represents reality, and all others do not. Rather, I say that we should each choose the best classification on the basis of the best current scientific understanding and assume that it represents reality UNTIL WE RECEIVE EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY.. . .

Thus I do not deny the existence of other views -- clearly there are, at any given stage, many views, and there may be, at any given stage, two or more views both of which have equal scientific merit. My advice then would be to embrace neither, but to keep working to find out which is right.

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But is KO based on concepts?

What is the alternative to my view? To accept that all classification systems are equally good because they all refer to corresponding concepts, precisely tailored to the classifications you start with. Classification becomes easy. We never need to care about reality, or science, at all.” (Smith, 2009, emphasis in original).

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But is KO based on concepts?

I do agree with Smith that we should care about reality and science in our classifying activities.

In my opinion scientists construe concepts which may best support their activities. To say that scientific concepts are concepts is NOT to say that they do not reflect reality or that they are not based on scientific evidence.

To say that scientific concepts are concepts is just to ask about the arguments on which they are based.

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But is KO based on concepts?

Some theories of concepts see concepts as inborn or hardwired to our cognitive system.

Some theories of concepts and concept analysis see concepts as logically given.

Much theory of concepts is not realist and – as Smith said – neglects science.

I agree we should avoid psychologism, mentalism and Platonism, but I do not agree with Smith that we should avoid concepts.

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Concepts and KO

Smith’s idea only to classify in cases of scientific certainty is not useful. This is due both to the principle of fallibilism (knowledge claims are never 100% certain) and to the existence of competing conceptual systems in many fields.

In many cases (e.g. Ørom, 2003) it is possible to trace different theoretical views in classification systems.

Ørom’s study represents for me a model of what we in KO may do: We should consider knowledge production in a top down perspective and consider the different views in any domain.

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Conclusion

If scientific, scholarly and everyday knowledge is understood on the basis of competing interests and methodological ideals, then it makes sense to ask “which conception are we dealing with”? It makes sense to consider claims about relations among things in the world to be connected with larger “paradigms”. From this last perspective it would seem very problematic not to inform users about the different opinions at play. To accept “concepts” as units in KO by implication means to accept the theory-laden nature of KO and to realize that specific KOS support specific views about the knowledge being organized. To construe a KOS is to take part in the interests and discourses within the domain that is being represented.

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Conclusion

What I believe is the most important thing for our KO-community is to find some agreement about what the best studies in our field are.

Which contributions both reflect scholarly norms and at the same time contribute in a concrete way to improving classifications and KO.

My suggestion is, e.g., Ørom (2003). What is yours?

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References

Hjørland B., 2007, Semantics and Knowledge Organization. Annual Review of Information Science and Technology, 41, 367-405.

Hjørland B., 2008, What is Knowledge Organization (KO)? Knowledge Organization. International Journal devoted to Concept Theory, Classification, Indexing and Knowledge Representation, 35(2/3), 86-101.

Hjørland B., 2009, Concept theory. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 60(8), 1519–1536.

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References

Smith B., 2004, Beyond Concepts: Ontology as Reality Representation. In: Achille Varzi and Laure Vieu (eds.), Formal Ontology and Information Systems. Proceedings of the Third International Conference (FOIS 2004), Amsterdam: IOS Press, 73–84. Retrieved 2009-09-26 from: http://ontology.buffalo.edu/bfo/BeyondConcepts.pdf

Smith B, 2009, Personal communication. Email received: 16-07-2009 18:35.

Sowa J. F., 2006, Peirce's contributions to the 21st Century. Published in H. Schärfe, P. Hitzler, & P. Øhrstrøm, eds., Conceptual Structures: Inspiration and Application, LNAI 4068, Springer, Berlin, pp. 54-69. Retrieved 2009-09-26 from: http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/csp21st.pdf

Sowa J. F., 2009, Personal communication. Email received 22-07-2009 20:29.

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References

Ørom, Anders (2003). Knowledge Organization in the domain of Art Studies - History, Transition and Conceptual Changes. Knowledge Organization, 30(3/4), 128-143.