Concepts History and the Game of Giving

8172019 Concepts History and the Game of Giving

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullconcepts-history-and-the-game-of-giving 127

copy Koninklijke Brill NV Leiden 2013 DOI 983089983088983089983089983094983091983089983096983095983090983090983094983091983094-983089983090983091983092983089983090983094983088

Journal of the Philosophy of History 7 ( 2013 ) 426ndash452 brillcomjph

983081 I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Frank Ankersmit for his helpful com-

ments on an earlier draft of this essay

Concepts History and the Game of Giving

and Asking for Reasons

A Defense of Conceptual History

D Timothy Goering History Department Ruhr-University of Bochum

timothygoeringgmailcom

Abstract

This article o1048678fers a defense of the theoretical foundations of Conceptual History

(Begri1048678fsgeschichte) While Conceptual History has successfully established itself

as an historical discipline details in the philosophy of language that underpin Con-

ceptual History continue to be opaque Speci983142983145cally the de983142983145nition of what consti-

tutes a ldquobasic conceptrdquo (Grundbegri1048678f) remains problematic Reinhart Koselleckfamously claimed that basic concepts are ldquomore than wordsrdquo but he never spelled

out how these abstract entities relate to words or can be subject to semantic trans-

formation I argue that to clarify the de983142983145nition of what constitutes a basic concept

we should turn to the functionalist and inferentialist philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars

By viewing historical sources as partaking in what Sellars calls the lsquogame of giv-

ing and asking for reasonsrsquo Conceptual History can accurately trace the seman-

tic changes of basic concepts and thus o1048678fer an important tool to the historical

discipline

Keywords

Conceptual History conceptual change Reinhart Koselleck Wilfrid Sellars

I

One of the most intriguing features of Reinhart Koselleckrsquos (1924ndash2006)

thought is that he wrote history while he wrote about history That is he



D T Goering Journal of the Philosophy of History 7 ( 2013 ) 426ndash452 427

not only articulated new ways of understanding historical developments

since the 18th century he also underpinned these with keen theoretical

acuity giving other historians methodological tools along the way WhileKoselleckrsquos studies include a wide range of topics his most lasting contri-

bution is arguably in what has come to be called Conceptual History

(Begri1048678fsgeschichte) which traces the semantic transformation of ldquobasic

conceptsrdquo (Grundbegri1048678fe) that have shaped the epistemological frame-

work of the modern period

While Conceptual History has securely established itself as a 983142983145eld of

study it has occasionally run into unresolved philosophical di1048678983142983145culties

Koselleckrsquos writings on ldquobasic conceptsrdquo have been very in852070983148uential but when it comes to o1048678fering a robust account of the philosophy of language

behind Conceptual History Koselleck is content to o1048678fer no more than sug-

gestive remarks Speci983142983145cally the de983142983145nition of a ldquobasic conceptrdquo and how

there can be such entities as ldquobasic conceptsrdquo that are subject to change

has remained neglected and problematic

There are a number of possible options to address the di1048678983142983145culty of con-

ceptual change and the relationship between words and concepts Some

are better than others but in general the problems I focus on here pose no vital threat to the overall project of Conceptual History This article then

will not argue that Conceptual History is in dire straits and in need of res-

cue That would be setting up a straw man Rather the goal of this paper is

to put the approach of Conceptual History on a surer philosophical footing

by turning to the writings of Wilfrid Sellars whose philosophy I argue

bears a ldquofamily resemblancerdquo to Koselleckrsquos writings My reading of Koselleck

does not claim to remain a faithful one in every aspect However I do claim

that if we want to think of Conceptual History seriously we must seek amore sound philosophical foundation than has been o1048678fered so far

In a word I suggest that Conceptual History should integrate functional-

ist and normative categories into its theory of concepts I argue that Sellarsrsquo

philosophy and speci983142983145cally his notion of the ldquogame of giving and asking for

reasonsrdquo sets up the grid on which Conceptual History can be plotted It

will therefore be the task of this paper to show how Conceptual History can

and should be at home with Sellarsian philosophy

I will 983142983145rst elucidate the project of Conceptual History as originally con-

983142983145gured by Koselleck (Part II) Then I turn to a more in-depth discussion of

the philosophical di1048678983142983145culties that arise within the horizon of this project



428 D T Goering Journal of the Philosophy of History 7 ( 2013 ) 426ndash452

and discuss possible solutions (Part III) Next I argue that Sellarsrsquo nominal-

ism addresses a number of the di1048678983142983145culties (Part IV) and 983142983145nally that Sellarsrsquo

philosophy gives a robust account of the philosophy of language that is tac-itly presupposed in Koselleckrsquos Conceptual History (Part V) Before I close

I turn to a possible objection about representations and concepts (Part VI)

After the heavy lifting has been done I will conclude with remarks on how

Conceptual History backed by Sellarsrsquo philosophy is an important tool for

the historical discipline as it informs historians how to deal with meaning

language and truth (Part VII)

II

The fundamental thought which runs through Koselleckrsquos writings on Con-

ceptual History is Kantrsquos ldquointuitions without concepts are blindrdquo1048625 At the

end of his life Koselleck characterized Conceptual History as

a part of historical research that does not understand language as an epiphe-

nomenon of so-called reality [ ] but rather as a methodologically irreducible

guiding authority without which experiences could not be had and without which neither the natural nor social sciences could exist For Conceptual His-

tory language is on the one hand an indicator of encountered ldquorealityrdquo and on

the other hand a factor in the process of 983142983145nding reality1048626

The core statement that Conceptual History wants to commit to historians

is that language and historical reality can not be examined separately

Reconstructing the past will inevitably mean reconstructing language

because of the simple fact that rendering experiences intelligible is onlymade possible by the success of using concepts Another way of saying this

is that the state of knowing cannot be reduced to non-epistemic facts such

1048625983081 Koselleck explicitly points to Kant in R Koselleck ʻDie Geschichte der Begri1048678fe und

Begri1048678fe der Geschichteʼ in R Koselleck (ed) Begri983142fsgeschichten Studien zur Semantik und

Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen Sprache (Frankfurt aM 2010) p 59

1048626983081 R Koselleck ʻStichwort Begri1048678fsgeschichteʼ in R Koselleck (ed) Begri983142fsgeschichten

Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen Sprache (Frankfurt aM

2010) p 99

This quote and all following quotes are translated by the author unless otherwise

indicated




as sense contents To know that an apple is on the table or to know that a

state is experiencing a revolution is not a kind of knowledge that can be

derived from psychological states and cognitive processes Sense contentsare necessary but not su1048678983142983145cient for non-inferential beliefs The premise of

Conceptual History therefore is the notion that concepts not intuitions or

sense-data form the foundation of knowing and knowledge-claims And

accurately examining the uses of concepts in the past should therefore be

one of the dominant ambitions of every historian

With that said Koselleck was an historian and not a philosopher So

rather than looking at the nature of concepts from an epistemological per-

spective Koselleck was interested in unearthing the genealogy of conceptsfrom an historical standpoint He was interested in studying the historical

origins that lie behind the everyday use of concepts because they can give

us a glimpse of a past conceptual world In the introduction to the massive

Geschichtliche Grundbegri983142fe The Historical Encyclopedia of the Political-

Social Language in Germany1048627 of which Koselleck was the principal editor

from 1972 to 1997 he stated that the projectrsquos purpose was to examine ldquothe

dissolution of the old world and the emergence of the new in terms of the

historico-conceptual comprehension of this processrdquo1048628 All of the 122 articlesof the Geschichtliche Grundbegri983142fe examined di1048678ferent concepts (eg ldquoAnar-

chyrdquo ldquoDemocracyrdquo ldquoStaterdquo) and reconstructed semantic shifts in the devel-

opment of each concept throughout history The common thread of all of

the articles and the fundamental discovery of the entire project was that

ldquosince the middle of the 18th century a pervasive semantic shift of classical

topoi occurredrdquo983093 Koselleck famously called this period around the turn of

the 18th and 19th centuries the Sattelzeit ndash a period in which old words were

not always replaced by new words but rather the semantic content of old words were decanted or added to the words already in place

1048627983081 For more information on the purpose and goal of the project see C Dipper ʻDie

ldquoGeschichtlichen Grundbegri1048678ferdquo Von der Begri1048678fsgeschichte zur Theorie der historischen

Zeitenʼ Historische Zeitschrift 270 (2000) pp 281ndash308 For an introduction to Koselleckrsquos

conceptual history in English see M Richter The History of Political and Social Concepts

A Critical Introduction (New York 1995)

1048628983081 R Koselleck Einleitungʼ in O Brunner W Conze and R Koselleck (eds) Geschichtliche

Grundbegri983142fe Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland (Stuttgart

1974) p XV

983093983081 Ibid p XV




Modifying concepts that were constitutive of a language involved con-

ceptually refashioning the world of the late 18th century The ldquoSattelzeitrdquo

ushered in what was experienced as a new epoch The ldquoexperience ofmodernity [Neuzeit]rdquo Koselleck postulated ldquois at the same time the experi-

ence of a modern time [neue Zeit]rdquo1048630 This semantic shift released a sequence

of chain reactions that recon983142983145gured the semantic contents of concepts and

ultimately inaugurated our own modern age It essentially gave rise to new

ways of conceptually conveying experiences hopes reasons beliefs and

desires1048631

The details of the Sattelzeit thesis have been widely discussed and criti-

cized from various perspectives1048632 For present purposes it is more importantto concentrate on Koselleckrsquos methodological and theoretical framework

rather than on his historical theses

With Sellars in mind it might be helpful to stress that for Koselleck con-

ceptual change is always the result of a social practice No single person

could purport to change the meaning of a word by herself Concepts can

only be changed or stabilized in communicative exchange positioned

inside the framework of a speech community Like Sellars and the later

Wittgenstein but unlike Kant Koselleck identi983142983145es the possession of a con-cept with the mastery of its use in a linguistic community The meaning of

a concept is constituted by the rules of its use That is to say that concepts

are 983142983145rst and foremost social phenomena and not independent tools for the

individual subject to inspect his world ldquoAs a being endowed with languagerdquo

1048630983081 R Koselleck ʻDie Verzeitlichung der Begri1048678feʼ in R Koselleck (ed) Begri983142fsgeschichten

Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen Sprache (Frankfurt aM2010) p 76

1048631983081 It might be stressed that Koselleck is here not making an ontological claim but rather an

epistemological one He does not mean to say that the content of the modern concept ldquoloverdquo

or ldquofuturerdquo did not ontologically exist before the late 18th century He simply gives an account

of how a speech community came to be able to apply new concepts non-inferentially to

experiences and so for the 983142983145rst time came to notice and be aware of new thoughts and sense

impressions they might have had earlier

1048632983081 See eg G Motzkin ʻOn the Notion of Historical (Dis)Continuity Reinhart Koselleckrsquos

Construction of the Sattelzeitʼ Contributions to the History of Concepts 1 1 (2005) pp 145ndash158

H Jordheim ldquoUnzaumlhlbar viele Zeitenrdquo Die Sattelzeit im Spiegel der Gleichzeitigkeit des

Ungleichzeitigenʼ in H Joas (ed) Begri983142fene Geschichte Beitraumlge zum Werk Reinhart

Kosellecks (Frankfurt am Main 2009) pp 449ndash481




writes Koselleck ldquothe human individual originated with social existencerdquo983097

Thus no one makes his own concepts We are all lenders and borrowers

Koselleck argued that we have no clear concepts except as these are clari-983142983145ed in the process of being grasped by others

Unlike some postmodernists Koselleck argued that there will always

remain a disjunction between non-inferential knowledge and language10486251048624

Linguistic concepts do not mirror the experiences a person makes nor do

concepts produce the experiences on their own Although experiences can

only be understood through language they are independent of language

He endorsed the Kantian claim that knowledge begins with experience but

does not arise out of experience In this sense Koselleck was an historicalrealist Something must have actually taken place as a prerequisite he

believed for someone to say something about it Language and experience

thus are two di1048678ferent ontological animals10486251048625 ldquoBoth refer to one anotherrdquo

Koselleck claimed ldquowithout being able to supersede each otherrdquo10486251048626

It follows from this that concepts constitutive of a speech community do

not o1048678fer accurate empirical vocabulary perfectly tailored to an individualrsquos

experiences Koselleck repeatedly pointed out that ldquospoken language is

always more or less than actual historyrdquo10486251048627 By this he simply meant thatconcepts cannot perfectly convey the experiences of an individual In a

similar vein he also spoke of a ldquohiatus between social contents and the

983097983081 R Koselleck ʻSocial History and Conceptual Historyʼ International Journal of Politics

Culture and Society 2 3 (1989) p 312

10486251048624983081 Koselleck therefore did not endorse Jacques Derridarsquos ldquoaxial propositionrdquo that ldquothere is

nothing outside the textrdquo (il nrsquoy a pas de hors-texte See J Derrida Of Grammatology (2ndedn Baltimore 1997) p 163) For Koselleck there is a tangible reality beyond language that

can or cannot be made sense of with language There is a categorical di1048678ference between

language and experience for Koselleck (See eg R Koselleck ʻDie Geschichte der Begri1048678fe

und Begri1048678fe der Geschichtersquo)

10486251048625983081 He says that language and history have two di1048678ferent kinds of beings (ldquoverschiedene

Seinsweisenrdquo) R Koselleck ʻSprachwandel und Ereignisgeschichteʼ in R Koselleck (ed)

Begri983142fsgeschichten Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen Sprache

(Frankfurt aM 2010) p 32

10486251048626983081 Koselleck lsquoSocial History and Conceptual Historyrsquo p 311

10486251048627983081 Koselleck lsquoSprachwandel und Ereignisgeschichtersquo p 37 See also Koselleck ʻDie

Geschichte der Begri1048678fe und Begri1048678fe der Geschichteʼ p 70 Koselleck ʻStichwort

Begri1048678fsgeschichteʼ p 102




linguistic usage that seeks to 983142983145x this contentrdquo10486251048628 In a world where every indi-

vidual could use his or her own made up language language might be used

to give empirical descriptions of experiences But since language is sharedand semantically determined by a speech community and since experi-

ence and language are separate ontological species the primary role of

concepts is not to o1048678fer empirical descriptions but to justify claims about

experience When one argues that the experience ldquoXrdquo should not be

described with the concept ldquoφrdquo but rather with the concept ldquoγrdquo one is not

claiming that ldquoφrdquo is the false empirical description for ldquoXrdquo but that its use is

not su1048678983142983145ciently justi983142983145ed for that description

It is precisely because concepts are employed to justify claims that theiruse and content often come under attack Times of social upheaval or polit-

ical transformation tend to be accompanied by semantic shifts because

concepts are used to justify di1048678ferent claims and give various accounts of

experiences ldquoThe semantic struggle for the de983142983145nition of political or social

position defending or occupying these positions by deploying a given de983142983145-

nitionrdquo Koselleck claims ldquois a struggle that belongs to all times of crisesrdquo1048625983093

Alexis de Tocqueville in his famous Democracy in America emphasized

precisely this point when he described the ways in which American democ-racy have altered the English language ldquoThe general agitation and intellec-

tual competition [in a democracy] elicit a large number of new ideas Old

ideas may vanish or reappear or ramify to produce countless subtle vari-

ants Consequently some words must be retired from use while others

have to be introducedrdquo10486251048630 This sentiment was also voiced almost a century

later by Victor Klemperer the famous Jewish professor of literature whose

diaries detailed his experiences and observations under the Nazi Regime

The book that eventually resulted from this diary Lingua Tertii Imperii (1947) examined how ldquothe language of a clique became the language of a

peoplerdquo10486251048631 ldquoNazismrdquo he wrote ldquopermeated the 852070983148esh and blood of the people

through single words idioms and sentence structures which were imposed

on them in a million repetitions and taken on board mechanically and

10486251048628983081 R Koselleck ʻBegri1048678fsgeschichte and Social Historyʼ in R Koselleck (ed) Futures Past

On the Semantics of Historical Time (New York 2004) p 87

1048625983093983081 Ibid p 80

10486251048630983081 Ibid p 548

10486251048631983081 V Klemperer The Language of the Third Reich LTI ndash Lingua Tertii Imperii A Philologistrsquos

Notebook (London New York 2006) p 17




unconsciouslyrdquo10486251048632 Conceptual change thus attends the reconstitution of

social change and is itself a species of political innovation because con-

cepts are always used to justify claims1048625983097Insofar as concepts are not congruent with experience Koselleck takes

one step further and argues that ldquoconcepts have a di1048678ferent internal tempo-

ral structure than eventsrdquo10486261048624 Like trees concepts have growth rings The

task of Conceptual History is therefore to retrace the history and the seman-

tic shifts of concepts When this is successfully carried out as in many of

the articles of the Geschichtliche Grundbegri983142fe the di1048678ferent histories of

concepts become peepholes through which we can peer into past worlds

ldquoEach concept establishes a particular horizon for potential experience andconceivable theory and in this way sets a limit The history of concepts is

therefore able to provide knowledge that is not accessible through empiri-

cal study The language of concepts is a consistent medium in which expe-

riential capacity and theoretical stability can be evaluatedrdquo10486261048625 But not only

does Conceptual History reconstruct how single concepts came to justify

and enable di1048678ferent claims and historical processes Taken together the

histories of all concepts also elicit temporal patterns of historical develop-

ment that otherwise remain hidden if one simply describes features of suc-cessive events

By retracing the historical trajectories of concepts historians can not

only tell us the history of di1048678ferent interpretations of historical realities

they also reconstruct the representations of historical reality that are con-

tained within concepts themselves Like Frank Ankersmit Koselleck

upholds the priority of representation over interpretation10486261048626 And Concep-

tual History understands itself as an enterprise that is not only interested in

reconstructing various interpretations that people had in the past Concep-tual History is not only in the business of interpreting past interpretations

It is interested in carefully excavating the changing meanings of concepts

in order to give an account of the representational possibilities This is why

10486251048632983081 Ibid p 14

1048625983097983081 For conceptual change in the 20th century see W Steinmetz (ed) Political Languages in

the Age of Extremes (New York 2011)

10486261048624983081 Koselleck ʻSprachwandel und Ereignisgeschichteʼ p 45

10486261048625983081 Koselleck ʻBegri1048678fsgeschichte and Social Historyʼ p 86

10486261048626983081 See eg Frank Ankersmit Meaning Truth and Reference in Historical Representation

(Ithaca Cornell University Press 2012) especially pp 48ndash86




Koselleck himself felt a much greater a1048678983142983145nity to social history than to

hermeneutics10486261048627 He was not interested in ldquore-enacting the pastrdquo (Colling-

wood) or fusing the horizons between present and past (Gadamer) Ratherhe aimed at giving a detailed historical account of past social action in

terms of concepts

To summarize Conceptual History is committed to the Kantian notion

that concepts are tools with which we can interpret but not create reality

The limits of onersquos language do not mark the limits of onersquos world they

mark the limits of onersquos conceptual awareness of the world Conceptual

History concentrates on studying the history of concepts and looks at how

social and speci983142983145cally political practices change the semantic content ofconcepts in order to regain what Raymond Williams once called an ldquoextra

edge of consciousnessrdquo10486261048628 of the past Conceptual History is not interested in

bygone internal psychological processes rather it is interested in studying

shifts of the conceptual frameworks that de983142983145ne boundaries or open up new

ways of conceptualizing the world future politics or the self The study of

concepts is thus seen as an essential rather than incidental task of the his-

torical discipline

III

When we turn to the details of Koselleckrsquos philosophy of language and spe-

ci983142983145cally when we turn to the precise nature of a word and the relationship

between concept and ldquobasic conceptrdquo (Grundbegri983142f ) respectively we run

into di1048678983142983145culties that have not attracted enough attention

Before I start with the constructive part I must lay out the problems of

Conceptual History as I see them The relation between a concept and aldquobasic conceptrdquo is the least problematic the di1048678ference between both is not

ontological or categorical but one of signi983142983145cance ldquoBasic conceptsrdquo have

played a more signi983142983145cant role in political and cultural debates than other

concepts and can be viewed as what WB Gallie once called ldquoessentially

10486261048627983081 See Reinhart Koselleck ʻHistorik und Hermeneutikʼ in Reinhart Koselleck ed Zeit-

schichten Studien zur Historik (Frankfurt am Main Suhrkamp 2000) 97ndash118

10486261048628983081 R Williams Keywords A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (London 1976) p 21




contested conceptsrdquo1048626983093 ldquoFamilyrdquo ldquolaughterrdquo or ldquoredrdquo for example have not

sparked as much political and cultural debate as the concepts ldquorevolutionrdquo

ldquopatriotismrdquo or ldquostaterdquo And especially they have not been used to galva-nize people into as much political action as the concepts ldquorevolutionrdquo or

ldquopatriotismrdquo And so what should be counted as a ldquobasic conceptrdquo versus

merely a common ldquoconceptrdquo depends on the historical record and the judg-

ment of the historian

The relationship between a word and a concept is a much greater prob-

lem10486261048630 If one were to write a conceptual history for instance of the concept

ldquostaterdquo then one would encounter the use of related words such as ldquoadmin-

istrationrdquo ldquocommonwealthrdquo or ldquopeoplerdquo The diverse historical sources donot use the identical words but strikingly seem to be talking about one and

the same historical reality The historian thus immediately encounters the

di1048678983142983145culty of deciding whether or not to include di1048678ferent words in the his-

tory of a single concept A concept then appears to be an entity that is not

identical with a word The history of a concept goes beyond the history of a

word But then what is a concept

In the introduction to the Geschichtliche Grundbegri983142fe Koselleck wrote

that ldquothe concept is connected to a word but is at the same time more thana word [ ] Concepts are the concentrate of several substantial meaningsrdquo10486261048631

Concepts are more than words and so are extra- or nonlinguistic entities

But then how do the entities of this non-linguistic world relate to the world

of words Is the relationship between concepts and words like that of types

and tokens Are concepts something like Lovejoyean ldquounit-ideasrdquo10486261048632 Other

questions arise concerning conceptual meaning Where does the meaning

of a concept come from Koselleck clearly states that concepts are not

given in experience so the source of meaning cannot be found in the

1048626983093983081 WB Gallie Essentially Contested Concepts in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

New Series 56 1955ndash1956 S 167ndash198

10486261048630983081 For the problematic treatment of the relationship between words and concepts see

D Busse Historische Semantik Analyse eines Programms (Stuttgart 1987) pp 77ndash101 and

166ndash174 H Schultz ʻBegri1048678fsgeschichte und Argumentationsgeschichteʼ in H Joas (ed)

Begri983142fene Geschichte Beitraumlge zum Werk Reinhart Kosellecks (Frankfurt am Main 2009)

pp 225ndash263

10486261048631983081 Koselleck ʻEinleitungʼ p XXII see also Koselleck ʻBegri1048678fsgeschichte and Social Historyʼ

p 85

10486261048632983081 AO Lovejoy The Great Chain of Being A Study of the History of an Idea (Cambridge

1964) pp 3ndash23




relation between concept and sensation or in their relation to objects for

which they stand But how then can concepts be meaningful Are concepts

simply properly basic abstract entities that are a part of the metaphysicalfurniture of the world And are minds organs that can intuit these non-

empirical entities This seems to be an unfortunate ontological commit-

ment that Koselleck would not be willing to make

Koselleck never properly discusses these questions although they are of

the utmost importance for Conceptual History In a quite polemic attack

of Conceptual History Philip Sarasin has recently claimed that ldquoany use of

Grundbegri983142fe is bad metaphysicsrdquo because he can ldquonot discern how a basic

concept would be de983142983145nedrdquo1048626983097 I agree with Sarasin that Conceptual Historylacks what one could call a robust account in terms of philosophy of lan-

guage And I also agree with Sarasin that 983142983145lling the gap with postmodern

and hermeneutic philosophy is hardly going to pave the way out of the pre-

dicament But in contrast to Sarasin I do not rule out the possibility of

clearing up some of the metaphysical fog around Conceptual History by

turning to other options that present themselves in analytic philosophy It

is important and feasible I believe to clarify the goals of Conceptual His-

tory and o1048678fer a robust defense of its basic claims in terms of philosophy oflanguage

Now there are a host of methods and analytical tools one could employ

to understand the nature of concepts and how they relate to words One

way to grapple with this problem would be to simply hold that concepts

are universals10486271048624 This would be the answer of the platonic realist Univer-

sals it would here be claimed ndash although of course there are many di1048678fer-

ent forms of this position ndash are mind-independent and essentially

extralinguistic entities because they are causally inert and non-spatiotem-poral objects These entities populate a more real realm set apart from the

physical one Universals are instantiated by numerically distinct objects or

words but do not consist of them So the universal tree for instance

becomes instantiated when I point my 983142983145nger at a tree and utter ldquoThat is a

treerdquo The concept tree then becomes instantiated in my use of the word

1048626983097983081 ʻRoundtable Geschichtliche Grundbegri1048678fe Reloaded Writing the Conceptual History

of the Twentieth Centuryʼ Contributions to the History of Concept 7 2 (2012) 78ndash128 here

p 104

10486271048624983081 The most in852070983148uential work on universals is DM Armstrong Universals and Scienti1048678983145c

Realism vols 1 and 2 (Cambridge 1978 and 1980)




ldquotreerdquo The concept would then materialize in di1048678ferent words but retain an

ideal meaningful unity

Holding that there are metaphysical units like trees chairs kinds andproperties answers some perennial problems of philosophy such as how it

is possible that although all trees are physically di1048678ferent we have no prob-

lem identifying them with the single property tree It would also explain

how there are such things as concepts that seem to have an abstract exis-

tence and that can 983142983145nd expression in di1048678ferent words Roughly speaking

the overall strategy that platonic realism develops is helpful The idea

that there are ldquoonesrdquo that stand above and classify ldquomanysrdquo will play a key

role laterHowever the project of platonic realism in its entirety endorses existen-

tial commitments (eg mind-body dualism metaphysical foundational-

ism) that prove in the end to be problematic and in reference to our

discussion pose great problems for Conceptual History The notion that

concepts should be abstract ideas or units intuited by non-material minds

or souls runs into the face of most ontological commitments shared by 20th

century philosophers In fact Koselleck explicitly states that ldquobasic con-

cepts cannot be de983142983145ned as timeless ideasrdquo10486271048625 More to the point the coreproblem is that once a concept is taken to be an universal tracing the his-

tory of a concept becomes a senseless task Universals by de983142983145nition cannot

change over time And the history of concepts is not the history of various

interpretations of timeless concepts Thus platonic realism ultimately fails

to be a live option for Conceptual History

Another philosophical position that could o1048678fer answers to the above

questions would be a logical-positivist position that gives a formally logical

or mathematical account of concepts One might for instance argue withGottlob Frege that concepts are functions that correlate objects (or singu-

lar terms) to truth values10486271048626 These concepts are not only mathematical ones

for Frege but also contain concepts such as ldquoCaesarrdquo or ldquoLondonrdquo10486271048627 More

10486271048625983081 Koselleck ʻStichwort Begri1048678fsgeschichteʼ p 100

10486271048626983081 See G Frege ʻBegri1048678fsschriftʼ in G Frege and TW Bynum (eds) Conceptual Notation

and Related Articles (Oxford 1972) pp 101ndash203 G Frege ʻFunction and Concept (1891)ʼ in

G Frege and M Beaney (eds) The Frege Reader (Oxford 1997) pp 130ndash148 G FregeThe

Foundations of Arithmetic A Logico-Mathematical Enquiry into the Concept of Number

Translated by JL Austin (2nd edn New York 1960)

10486271048627983081 See Frege Function and Concept (1891)ʼ




speci983142983145cally in his 983142983145rst seminal work the Concept Notation ( Begri983142fsschrift

1879) Frege de983142983145nes conceptual content in virtue of the role it plays in judg-

ments or inferences ldquoOnly that part of judgments which a1048678fects the possibleinferences is taken into considerationrdquo10486271048628

So for Frege concepts are more than words but they are not abstract

entities in the platonic sense Rather for Frege concepts play a functional

role in language Concepts are not isolated islands of meaning instead they

are integral parts of a meaningful sentential structure Conceptual contents

are like pieces on a chess board that make correct moves and advance the

progress of a game Like a chess piece a concept has a certain function in a

game that allows one to make a correct move Concepts in Fregersquos philoso-phy are not words but are rather the implicit components of what is actu-

ally being expressed by words Although this highly formal explication of a

concept and its content is too abstract for our purposes the strategy of

explicating concepts in functional and inferential terms will be discussed

and adopted later

However and here we turn to the problems with Fregersquos concept of a

concept in order to discover the logical foundations of thinking Frege is at

pains to analyze away the historical dimension of concepts He states inThe Foundations of Arithmetic (1884) that the historical discipline is itself

not completely meaningless but he states that

the historical approach [ ] has its limitations If everything were in continual

852070983148ux and nothing maintained itself 983142983145xed for all time there would not longer be

any possibility of getting to know anything about the world and everything

would be plunged in confusion [ ] What is known as the history of concepts

is really a history either of our knowledge of concepts or of the meanings of

words1048627983093

I believe that Koselleck would have agreed to a large extent with Frege that

there must be ldquo983142983145xedrdquo elements built into the fabric of reality or at least into

the human mind in virtue of which we can make sense of the ldquocontinual

10486271048628983081 Ibid sect3 p 103

1048627983093983081 Frege The Foundations of Arithmetic p XIX His e1048678fort to de-historicize concepts can a

lso explicitly be seen in his treatment of the concept ldquoinhabitant of Germanyrdquo in sect46 of Ibid

pp 59f




852070983148uxrdquo10486271048630 But Koselleck is not convinced that these 983142983145xed structures must be

concepts that hold everything together His research in fact has argued

against this position and empirically demonstrated that concepts are notahistorical or static but have histories And the history of concepts is nei-

ther the history of our knowledge of concepts nor of the meaning of words

Rather it is the history of the possibility and conditionality of certain knowl-

edge and the capacity to articulate this knowledge10486271048631

The formally logical position therefore has a similar problem as that of

the platonic realist It fails to explain how a concept can have a history or

how a concept could ever change Could Frege explain why the concept

ldquofuturerdquo is so di1048678ferent in the 13th century compared to the 20th centuryCould there be a Fregean account for the transformation of this concept in

the late 19th century Frege does give us an idea of how new concepts can

logically evolve out of other concepts10486271048632 But this is a purely logical descrip-

tion He never ldquogoes historicalrdquo and tries to understand conceptual change

in terms of social practices In short a formally logical or mathematical

account of concepts predicates on de-historicizing concepts and is thus

useless for Conceptual History

Another classical position in this debate would be nominalism Thereare a multitude of di1048678ferent nominalist positions but what unites nominal-

ists is that they 852070983148atly reject the claim that there are abstract non-spatiotem-

poral and causally inert entities1048627983097 For nominalists there are only particulars

One argument against universals perhaps the most famous is based on

10486271048630983081 The 983142983145xed elements for Koselleck however are cast in existentialist terms He argues

that these existentialist categories structure reality ldquoEvery historical anthropology must

address presets that protrude into the realm of history as natural conditions One can call

these conditions [ ] metahistoricalrdquo (Koselleck ʻSprachwandel und Ereignisgeschichteʼp 33) He names three pairs of metahistorical anthropological conditions of historical expe-

rience beforeafter insideoutside abovebelow (Ibid p 331048678f) These anthropological con-

stants can be understood as parameters that structure experience and make reality tangible

And it is in virtue of this pre-structured reality that language has purchase on experiences

10486271048631983081 It would not be impossible to reconcile Frege with Koselleck however if one took Frege

to be talking about logical meta-concepts that govern normative thinking Koselleck is not

interested in understanding the logical structure of thinking but in the cultural and politi-

cal implementation of thinking and applying concepts

10486271048632983081 He does this when he writes about how the concept of a direction can logically evolve

from the concept of a line Frege The Foundations of Arithmetic sect 64ndash69

1048627983097983081 The most well known nominalist position in the 20th century was arguably held by

Goodman and Quine N Goodman and WVO Quine ʻSteps Toward a Constructive




Occamrsquos razor This lex parsimoniae-argument simply states that abstract

entities are to be shaved o1048678f if one can o1048678fer a more economical explanation

that make abstract entities obsolete If concrete entities can explain some-thing better than abstract entities then the postulated abstract entities are

super852070983148uous and should be discarded

While nominalism releases us from some of the metaphysical baggage of

platonism it has problems of its own If there are only particulars in the

world then how can one account for the capacity of humans to use sub-

suming categories such as numbers or properties To say that there are

only particulars is tantamount to claiming that nothing ever repeats itself

But on what basis are we able to classify something as being a member ofsomething else if repeatability is rejected To hold that there are not such

things as numbers or properties not even the representations of these bor-

ders on the absurd To cut the discussion short a nominalist would have to

concede that there are such things as numbers and properties but he could

think of them not as metaphysical abstract entities but rather as particu-

lars that classify other particulars This is precisely the position for which

Sellars will argue

I have summarized di1048678ferent positions that provide possible perspec-tives from which one can understand the nature of concepts and the rela-

tionship between words and concepts Despite the di1048678ferent respective

weaknesses of the platonist logical-positivist and nominalist positions I

have also highlighted the arguments that I believe Sellars integrates into

his own philosophical project to which we now turn

IV Wilfrid Sellars worked out his position on universals and abstract objects in

a series of four articles from 1958 to 196310486281048624 In the end he called himself a

Nominalismʼ The Journal of Symbolic Logic 12 (1947) pp 105ndash122 WVO Quine ʻOn

Universalsʼ The Journal of Symbolic Logic 12 (1947) pp 74ndash84

10486281048624983081 W Sellars ʻCounterfactuals Dispositions and the Causal Modalitiesʼ in H Feigl (ed)

Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science vol 2 (Minneapolis 1958) pp 225ndash308

W Sellars ʻGrammar and Existence A Preface to Ontologyʼ in W Sellars K Scharp and

R Brandom (eds) In the Space of Reasons Selected Essays of Wilfrid Sellars (Cambridge

Mass 2007) pp 126ndash162 W Sellars ʻNaming and Sayingʼ in In the Space of Reasons

pp 103ndash125 W Sellars ʻAbstract Entitiesʼ in In the Space of Reasons pp 163ndash205




nominalist but he also expressed the feeling that his nominalism entitled

him to certain freedoms that others nominalists usually do not have10486281048625 To

understand Sellarsrsquo nominalism I think it is helpful understand it as a dual-commitment

1 universals do not exist in any kind of way (ontologically logically lin-

guistically as sets etc)

2 there are metalinguistic ldquoonesrdquo that are not universals but that can clas-

sify ldquomanysrdquo

While the 983142983145rst commitment is more or less straightforwardly nominalistthe second commitment needs some illumination

In ldquoAbstract Entitiesrdquo (1963) Sellars makes the point that ldquonot all ones

over and against manys are universals (ie qualities relations sorts kinds

or classes) and consequently to conclude that the problem of lsquothe one and

the manyrsquo is in fact broader than the problem of universals (in a the speci-

983142983145ed sense)rdquo10486281048626 There are things Sellars is saying here that do classify other

things but understanding this relationship can be done without recourse

to universals The strategy he employs to hold on to both commitments isto understand these ldquoonesrdquo in functional terms

He uses a very Wittgensteinian example to argue on these grounds

ldquoConsider for example the various pieces of chess A familiar dialectic

unfolds Pawns for example are a concrete many Over and against this

many is the pawn as a onerdquo10486281048627 And later he adds

If [ ] we can understand the relation of the lion (one) to lions (many) with-

out construing the lion as a universal of which lions are instances and if the

looked-for singular term pertaining to pawns can be construed by analogy

with ldquothe lionrdquo ndash indeed as ldquothe pawnrdquo ndash then we would be in a position to

10486281048625983081 For good treatments of Sellarsrsquo nominalism see WA DeVries Wilfrid Sellars (Montreal

2005) pp 67ndash93 JR OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Naturalism with a Normative Turn vol 6 (Key

Contemporary Thinkers 6 Cambridge 2007) pp 48ndash77 MJ Loux Metaphysics (3rd edn

London 2006) 64ndash71 J Seibt Properties as Processes A Synoptic Study of Wilfrid Sellarsrsquo

Nominalism (Atascadero CA 1990)

10486281048626983081 Sellars ʻAbstract Entitiesʼ p 166

10486281048627983081 Ibid p 165




understand how the pawn could be a one as against a many without being a

universal of which pawns are instances10486281048628

Meaning is therefore not a relation between one universal and many par-

ticulars but rather meaning is ldquofunctional classi983142983145cationrdquo1048628983093 And so terms

derive their meaning from the role they play in a language or more speci983142983145-

cally from the inferences they can license in a conceptual framework For

Sellars ldquothe conceptual meaning of a descriptive term is constituted by

what can be inferred from it in accordance with the logical and extra-

logical [ie material] rules of inference of the language (conceptual frame)

to which it belongsrdquo10486281048630 To expound on this Sellars introduces a number ofconceptual tools

1 Distributive Singular Terms (DST) These ldquoonesrdquo he is concerned with

here are functional terms that name singular items He introduces the des-

ignation ldquodistributive singular termsrdquo (DST) for these ldquoonesrdquo He believes

that distributive singular terms are not additional vocabulary for talking

about the manys Rather he argues that in fact talk of ldquomanysrdquo is talk of

ldquoonesrdquo if one tries to construe logically what is actually being said DSTs are

expressions of the form ldquothe pawnrdquo or ldquothe staterdquo or in general ldquothe Krdquo where K is a common noun A DST is thus a conceptual tool to emphasize

that something nominalizes sortals and thereby can enable us to make

claims about various Ks not a single K but all of them distributively So

the word ldquostatesrdquo in the phrase ldquostates are peacefulrdquo is more perspicuously

in fact talk about ldquothe staterdquo when boiled down to what is being said con-

cretely Thus ldquoKs are peacefulrdquo is more perspicuously construed as ldquothe K

(and distributively the Ks) is peacefulrdquo And ldquoK-nessrdquo is better understood

as ldquothe Krdquo and distributively ldquothe Ksrdquo In this sense Sellars postulates that he

can unearth ldquoa sense in which ones are reducible tomanysrdquo10486281048631 This way of

10486281048628983081 Ibid p 167

1048628983093983081 ldquoTo say what an expression means is to classify it functionally by means of an illustrating

sortalrdquo W Sellars ʻConceptual Changeʼ in W Sellars (ed) Essays in Philosophy and its

History (Boston 1974) p 180) See also W Sellars ʻMeaning as Functional Classi983142983145cation

A Perspective on the Relation of Syntax to Semanticsʼ in In the Space of Reasons pp 81ndash100

10486281048630983081 W Sellars ʻIs There a Synthetic A Prioriʼ in W Sellars (ed) Science Perception and

Reality (Atascadero Calif 1991) p 317 See also W Sellars Inference and Meaningʼ in In the

Space of Reasons pp 3ndash27





talking about the ldquoonesrdquo is more concrete than other ways especially pla-

tonic ways of talking about ldquoonesrdquo10486281048632

2 Dot Quotes To form a clearer sense of DSTs he introduces a furtherconceptual tool dot quotes ldquoDot quotesrdquo Sellars writes ldquoare used to form

the common nouns which refer to the items which play the role played in

our language by the design illustrated between themrdquo1048628983097 So ldquothe state is

peacefulrdquo should be understood as ldquothe bullstatebull is peacefulrdquo and ldquostates are

peacefulrdquo as ldquobullstatebulls are peacefulrdquo with bullstatebull having a certain function

in a conceptual framework Dot quoted DSTs functionally classify expres-

sions that play a speci983142983145c role in a language Just like a chess piece that is

able to ldquomove any number of squares diagonally but may not leap overother piecesrdquo is called a ldquobishoprdquo a dot quoted DST that tells us that the ldquoKs

are F and Grdquo And Ks that can license the inference ldquoif K then Xrdquo can be

called called bullK bull

This means that dot quoted expressions are language independent or

more precisely dot quoted DSTs can be understood as metalinguistic func-

tional classi983142983145catory sortals And so triangularity-talk redness-talk state-

hood-talk is misleading because it is not explicitly metalinguistic in its

way of talking about thebull

triangularbull

bull

redbull

orbull

statebull

And the metalinguis-tic duty of these sortals is licensing good inferences This is the Fregean

insight of Sellarsrsquo philosophy that concepts have content in virtue of the

role they play in inferences In this sense Sellars is a Fregean and by exten-

sion I believe Koselleck should be one too

Although more could be said about Sellarsrsquo nominalism this must suf-

983142983145ce for our purposes Some have found Sellarsrsquo nominalism a misguided

e1048678fort that is basically a Rube Goldberg machine that does a lot of work but

ends up at a position in which platonists already 983142983145nd themselves9830931048624 Sometake DSTs to be nothing more than sly euphemisms for abstract entities

strikingly analogous to platonic univerals Others have been able to make

10486281048632983081 Sellars would nonetheless have to admit in saying nothing is abstract every item is

concrete but some things are more concrete than others

1048628983097983081 Ibid p 167 footnote 5

9830931048624983081 Sellars himself wrote ldquoI have often been asked what does one gain by abandoning such

standard Platonic entities as triangularity orthat 2+2=4 only to countenance such exotic

abstract entities as functions roles rules and pieces The answer is of course that the above

strategy abandons nothing but a picture Triangularity is not abandoned rather lsquotriangularityrsquo

is see for what it is a metalinguistic distributive singular termrdquo Sellars ʻConceptual Changeʼ

p 184 For criticism of Sellarsrsquo nominalism see for instance Loux Metaphysics p 70f




more of Sellarsrsquo nominalism9830931048625 The overarching idea that Sellars does cash

in I believe is that to say ldquotriangularity is a propertyrdquo is saying in the mate-

rial mode what is said more perspicuously in the formal mode which is forSellars the metalinguistic locution ldquobulltriangularbull is a distributive singular

termrdquo Sellarsrsquo nominalism thus naturalizes universals by understanding

them as metalinguistic classi983142983145catory expressions And this in turn allows

him to abandon unfortunate ontological commitments such that univer-

sals actually exist metaphysically

To come back to Koselleck I suggest that we should view Koselleckrsquos

basic concepts as dot quoted DSTs The basic concept ldquostaterdquo or ldquocrisisrdquo

should be understood I argue as the DSTbull

statebull

orbull

crisisbull

9830931048626 It is in thismode namely that we are entitled to the Koselleckian claim that the con-

cept bullstatebull ldquois connected to a word but is at the same time more than a

wordrdquo9830931048627 The bullstatebull is thus not a nonlinguistic universal but rather is a

metalinguistic singular term that will be connected to words in the practice

of licensing certain inferences But bullstatebull is not the word ldquostaterdquo It is a

metalinguistic sortal that plays a certain functional role in a certain con-

ceptual framework Here we 983142983145nd so I argue a more precise way of articu-

lating and construing the notion of a concept that remains blurred inKoselleckrsquos writings

Additionally when we identify concepts with dot quoted DSTs we can

articulate a robust understanding of conceptual change Concepts change

I argue when the conceptual framework changes in which a concept has a

9830931048625983081 Michael Loux believes that Sellars is ldquothe only nominalist who has actually gone to the

trouble of showing how the project [of nominalism] is to be carried out in detail and his

e1048678forts have resulted in one of the most impressive pieces of twentieth-century metaphysicsrdquo

(Ibid p 70) See also MJ Loux Substance and Attribute A Study in Ontology (Dordrecht

1978) pp 78ndash85

9830931048626983081 One could also write a conceptual history of a verb Nominalists are obviously not con-

cerned about verbs in the way they are about common nouns Concerning verbs one would

obviously not construe them as DSTs but there can be no objection to keeping to the

dot quote mechanism So writing the conceptual history of ldquokillingrdquo would be to write the

conceptual history of ldquokillingrdquo

9830931048627983081 Koselleck ʻeinleitungʼ p XXII see also Koselleck ʻBegri1048678fsgeschichte and Social Historyʼ

p 85




certain functional job Sellars himself o1048678fers an example of conceptual

change9830931048628 Suppose that

(1) at T1 physicists believe that ldquolengthrdquo is independent of ldquovelocityrdquo

(2) at T2 physicists believe that ldquolengthrdquo is a function of ldquovelocityrdquo

Now if we say that T1 is the 18th century and T2 is the 20th century then we

can say that the concept ldquolengthrdquo or more precisely bulllengthbull has not only

changed due to the belief that physicists have about the concept But rather

we can say that the concept bulllengthbull has changed because it ful983142983145lls a di1048678fer-

ent function in the conceptual framework of Newtonian physics comparedto Einsteinian physics bullLengthbull plays a di1048678ferent functional role and the

meaning of the concept licenses di1048678ferent inferences in the conceptual

framework of T1 compared to T2

V

Sellars holistic claim that one can have a concept ldquoonly by having a whole

battery of conceptsrdquo983093983093 and that conceptual change is part of a transforma-tion of a conceptual framework would remain a fragile philosophical posi-

tion were it not part of a larger project Sellarsrsquo nominalism and his

functionalist account of concepts form small pieces of a much larger philo-

sophical picture that Sellars worked out throughout his career I now turn

to sketching very brie852070983148y Sellarsrsquo larger philosophical work in order to show

the family resemblance it bears to Conceptual History

Sellarsrsquo life-long project was to attack the ldquomyth of the givenrdquo that is the

idea that humans have sensations that are simply given in perception andthen use language instrumentally to describe the sensations they have of

the world It might be helpful to illustrate where Sellars disagrees with

empiricism Take a child who is taught that when it sees an apple she is to

9830931048628983081 This example is taken from the ldquoWilfrid Sellars Notre Dame Lectures 1969ndash1986 (Boot-

leg Version)rdquo at Robert Brandomrsquos webpage at httpwwwpittedu~brandomphil-2245

downloadsSellarsTheNotreDameLecturesMarch1pdf These lectures can also be found

in manuscript form at httpdigitallibrarypitteducgi-binf983142983145ndaid983142983145ndaid-idxc=ascead

cc=asceadq1=sellarsrgn=mainview=textdidno=US-PPiU-asp199101

983093983093983081 W Sellars R Brandom and R Rorty Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (3rd edn

Cambridge 2000) p 44




utter ldquoapplerdquo After this learning process has continued for a while the child

develops the ability to utter ldquotreerdquo under the appropriate circumstances

Both Sellars and empiricists would agree so far that humans have sensa-tions and learn to describe the world with language But Sellars points out

that this story is by all means not complete In the story so far humans do

not di1048678fer from parrots or even dogs barking Learning the meaning of the

word ldquoapplerdquo is not completed when we utter the word in response to a

sense episode The idea that sensing a sense content ldquoapplerdquo entails the

non-inferential belief that there is an ldquoapplerdquo is what Sellars calls the ldquomyth

of the givenrdquo

What makes human communication categorically di1048678ferent from otheranimal communication is that humans not only describe the world they

know how to describe the world That is humans not only learn concepts to

describe objects but more importantly learn how to appropriately use con-

cepts to justify knowledge-claims ldquoIn characterizing an episode or a state

as that of knowingrdquo Sellars wrote ldquowe are not giving an empirical descrip-

tion of that episode or state we are placing it in the logical space of reasons

of justifying and being able to justify what one saysrdquo9830931048630

It is important to stress that Sellars is not an anti-foundationalist or post-structuralist agrave la Jacques Derrida or Michel Foucault9830931048631 The main reason is

that Sellars is committed to the Kantian claim that reason is governed by

normativity The ldquological space of reasonsrdquo is essentially a space structured

by norms ldquoTo be able to think is to be able to measure onersquos thoughts by

standards of correctness of relevance of evidencerdquo9830931048632 Thus we are subject

9830931048630983081 Ibid p 76

9830931048631983081 ldquoThere is clearly some point to the picture of human knowledge as resting on a level of

propositions ndash observation reports ndash which do not rest on other propositions in the same

way as other propositions rest on them On the other hand I do wish to insist that the meta-

phor of lsquofoundationrsquo is misleading in that it keeps us from seeing that if there is a logical

dimension in which other empirical propositions rest on observation reports there is

another logical dimension in which the latter rest on the former [ ] For empirical knowl-

edge like its sophisticated extension science is rational not because it has a foundation

but because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy though

not all at oncerdquo Ibid p 78f

9830931048632983081 W Sellars ʻPhilosophy and the Scienti983142983145c Image of Manʼ in In the Space of Reasons

p 374




to the ldquopeculiar force of the better reasonrdquo983093983097 because reasons are part of a

normative metalanguage that we rely on to make claims So like Koselleck

Sellars does not believe that the limits of onersquos language mark the limits ofonersquos world In saying that the empiricist and instrumentalist view of

language is radically mistaken and arguing that ldquothinking is essentially a

verbal activityrdquo10486301048624 he does not fall prey to the relativistic pitfalls of anti-

foundationalism or post-structuralism

Sellarsrsquo philosophy manages to climb out of the mind of isolated thinkers

and understand language as a social project Language for Sellars is ldquoessen-

tially an intersubjective achievementrdquo10486301048625 If speech is located in the norma-

tive space of reasons then we are always caught up in the social practice ofgiving and asking for reasons Sellars writes ldquoThe essentially social charac-

ter of conceptual thinking comes clearly to mind when we recognize that

there is no thinking apart from common standards of correctness and rel-

evance which relate what I do think to what anyone ought to think The

contrast between lsquoIrsquo and lsquoanyonersquo is essential to rational thoughtrdquo10486301048626

Sellarsrsquo linguistic community is interactive and one that carries the entire

weight of meaning without handing it over to any other metaphysical

bearer All matters of meaning and authority are in the end matters ofsocial practice not ontology Intersubjective interaction the game of giv-

ing and asking for reasons is a practice that stabilizes or destabilizes knowl-

edge But this linguistic community does not fall prey to unrestrained

relativism It would be impossible for Sellarsrsquo linguistic community unlike

Hobbesrsquo community to ever pretend to believe that three angles of a tri-

angle should be equal to two angles of a square even if this doctrine were

enforced by a tyrannical ruler10486301048627 This is not due to ontology but rather to

the normative space of reasons that governs social practice

983093983097983081 R Brandom Making it Explicit Reasoning Representing and Discursive Commitment

(Cambridge 1994) p 5

10486301048624983081 Sellars ʻConceptual Changeʼ p 177

10486301048625983081 Sellars lsquoEmpiricism and the Philosophy of Mindrsquo p 107

10486301048626983081 Sellars ʻPhilosophy and the Scienti983142983145c Image of Manʼ p 384

10486301048627983081 Thomas Hobbes seems to have believed that a very authoritative ruler could suppress

laws of geometry if it were important enough and served his interest ldquoFor I doubt not but if

it had been a thing contrary to any manrsquos right of dominion or to the interest of men that

have dominion that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two angles of a square

that doctrine should have been if not disputed yet by the burning of all books of geometry




Once we place Sellarsrsquo nominalism and functionalism into this wider

framework a well-rounded and coherent picture emerges Although obvi-

ously many aspects of Sellarsrsquo thought have been left out and many ques-tions could be posed I believe that Conceptual History can and should

adopt this framework in justifying and legitimizing its own enterprise

VI

Before I conclude let me brie852070983148y digress and reply to a possible objection

that involves the role of representations Frank Ankersmit has put much

e1048678fort into raising awareness of the precarious nature of representations for

historians10486301048628 Representations (which can be a text or a picture or a con-

cept) can be so tricky for historians and possibly for Conceptual History

because they have two dimensions on the one hand a representation can

be about something (a ldquopresentedrdquo as Ankersmit calls it1048630983093) that refers to an

object in the world that is beyond the representation itself (this can be

called extensional representation) On the other hand a representation can

also be about a presented that points to a state of a1048678fairs that is contained

within the representation itself (this can be called intensional representa-tion) By saying for instance that the ldquoking of France is baldrdquo10486301048630 as John

Searle points out in his book Intentionality we are not representing any-

thing extensionally because there is no king of France ndash at least not cur-

rently But this does not mean that the phrase ldquothe king of France is baldrdquo is

devoid of any meaningful content For a representation to be contentful

there does not necessarily need to be any reference to the world Under-

stood as not referring to any object in the world the representation ldquothe

king of France is baldrdquo makes perfect sense So we must note that there aretwo dimensions of representations one in which the representation refers

to something extensionally beyond itself and one in which a representa-

suppressed as far as he whom it concerned was ablerdquo (T Hobbes and EM Curley Levia-

than With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 (Indianapolis 1994) p 61)

10486301048628983081 An e1048678fort that can be dated back to the 1980s See eg F Ankersmit Narrative Logic

A Semantic Analysis of the Historianrsquos Language (Den Haag 1983) especially chapter 8

F Ankersmit ʻHistorical Representationʼ History and Theory 27 3 (1988) pp 205ndash228

1048630983093983081 F Ankersmit Meaning Truth and Reference in Historical Representation (Ithaca 2012)

p 72

10486301048630983081 JR Searle Intentionality An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge 1983) p 17




tion intensionally points to a state of a1048678fairs that might or might not exist in

the world

This two-dimensionality of representations can theoretically create anumber of pitfalls for historians Speci983142983145cally two dangers come to mind

First of all a historian might use a term that is important for organizing

his argument (much like Max Weberrsquos ldquoideal typerdquo) but that is completely

anachronistic This term does not represent any object in the historical

world in a strong sense but it can nonetheless be used to organize onersquos

argument perfectly well In this sense the historian is using the term

intensionally For instance when a contemporary historian uses the term

ldquoan intellectualrdquo for a person in the 15th century then he is not using thehistorically accurate term because the term and the entire concept of

ldquoan intellectualrdquo (ie a social agent in the public sphere) arises for the 983142983145rst

time only in the late 19th century in France (ldquoles intellectuelrdquo) Before the late

19th century the terms ldquothe intellectualrdquo ldquoles intellectuelrdquo not ldquoder Intellek-

tuellerrdquo did not exist So when the historian loses sight of the fact that some

of his terms might not represent a historical object extensionally but rather

a state of a1048678fairs intensionally then there is a danger that he could be delud-

ing himself into giving an empirically exact description of the pastThe second danger crops up when an historian approaches a text that

was written in the past ndash a ldquoprimary sourcerdquo By the same logic when the

historian reads this text he could be mislead in assuming that the text was

referring to some extensional object in the world while it was only repre-

senting a state of a1048678fairs that entailed no reference to any objects of the

world So the point is that the two dimensions of representations can cre-

ate dangers for historians

Now I want to point out that both Koselleck and Sellars would not wantto overstress these dangers because it is not possible for the gap between

both dimensions of representation (intensional and extensional) to be as

big as some skeptics or deconstructivists would like us to believe Although

the two-dimensionality of representation did not attract Koselleckrsquos atten-

tion I believe he was roughly aware of the problem whenever he would talk

about the ldquoverschiedene Seinsweisenrdquo10486301048631 of language and experience And

he would argue that extensional and intensional representations are not

10486301048631983081 R Koselleck ʻSprachwandel und Ereignisgeschichteʼ in R Koselleck (ed) Begri983142fsge-

schichten Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen Sprache (Frank-

furt aM 2010) p 32




that di1048678ferent once they become articulated in a language community and

partake in discursive interaction While language can be an intensional

representation of states of a1048678fairs without referring to anything extension-ally experience must be articulated linguistically in order for it to gain con-

tent and so also language will always refer to something external

(experiences) once it is used This is roughly what Koselleck means when

he writes ldquoFor Conceptual History language is on the one hand an indica-

tor of encountered lsquorealityrsquo and on the other hand a factor in the process of

983142983145nding realityrdquo10486301048632 Or also when he writes History ldquodoes not evolve without

speech but it is never identical with it it cannot be reduced to itrdquo1048630983097

Frank Ankersmit has made the point that every representation is a three-point operator ldquofrom a logical point of view representation is a three-place

and not a two-place operator a representation (1) de983142983145nes a represented (2)

in terms of which the world (3) is seenrdquo10486311048624 Koselleck would argue that (3)

the represented reality that concepts o1048678fer always has political ideological

and utopian implications that o1048678fers a layout of how the world should be

And precisely because every concept o1048678fers a ldquorepresented realityrdquo that

might be closer or further away from the ldquoexperienced realityrdquo it can be

contested and replaced by a concept that o1048678fers a di1048678ferent ldquorepresentedrealityrdquo So pragmatically the gap between extensional and intensional rep-

resentation will never be too large

Koselleck gives an example where one ldquorepresented realityrdquo o1048678fered by a

concept is contested and replaced by another ldquorepresented realityrdquo o1048678fered

by a di1048678ferent concept

In 1847 Marx und Engels were asked to write a ldquoCommunist Confession of

Faithrdquo for the Communist League The speci983142983145cally German and the theological

implications are unmistakable That is why Marx and Engels decided to radi-

cally rephrase the document Instead of writing a Confession of Faith for the

Communist League they wrote a Manifesto of the Communist Party This was



2010) p 99




p 72




a deliberate act of language politics which was innovative and e1048678fective in the

long run10486311048625

Neither the word ldquoGlaubensbekenntnisrdquo (confession of faith) nor ldquoMani-

festrdquo (manifesto) refer to any extensional object in the world in any narrow

sense of the term but the ldquorepresented realitiesrdquo that are o1048678fered by these

concepts are very di1048678ferent and have di1048678ferent political and ideological

implications And it is because concepts o1048678fer ldquorepresented realitiesrdquo that

are continually compared to onersquos own desired reality and onersquos experi-

enced reality that concepts develop a dynamic history

Koselleck would probably agree that there are two dimensions of repre-sentations that should be kept in mind but once a representationconcept

is pragmatically used in discursive debate the political and ideological

implications of the representation (whether the representation is com-

pletely intensional or extensional) will urge the participants to contest or

con983142983145rm the legitimacy of the concept And this means that the two dimen-

sions become more or less con852070983148ated in practical discourse It is only in an

abstract thought experiment that the dangers of the two-dimensionality

appear to be imminent for historiansKoselleck is very aware of the fact that most contemporary historians

use terms in their writings that do not refer to any objects of historical real-

ity The terms historians use are often anachronistic which of course does

not mean that they are worthless or meaningless it just means that the

terms organize the historical writings in their own way One of the main

motivations of Conceptual History however is the practice of avoiding

using contemporary terms for past realities and rather to trace the exact

terms and concepts that people used to describe their own (desired or

experienced) reality Koselleck wanted historians to be aware of the con-

cepts employed and be aware of the di1048678ferences in use between contempo-

rary concepts and past concepts



furt aM 2010) p 47




VII

I have argued that Conceptual History if understood in light of Sellarsrsquo phi-

losophy is a reliable and important tool to investigate history By tracing

basic concepts historians can discover shifts of conceptual awareness and

possibilities of articulation and by accumulating many conceptual histo-

ries historians can discover important social developments that remain

hidden if one only otherwise examines events and social movements

To summarize and conclude I have argued that we should view con-

cepts as metalinguistic distributive singular terms With this analytic tool

we can endorse Koselleckrsquos claim that a concept is connected to a word

but at the same time is ldquomore than a wordrdquo Secondly I have also argued

that the meaning of locutions does not arise by reference to experiences

objects or universal ideas Rather meaning is functional classi983142983145cation that

occurs in a conceptual framework and conceptual content arises in the

inferential use of metalinguistic sortals Thirdly conceptual change is the

result of a shift that occurs in the conceptual framework And so while a

word might remain the same it can happen that a concept metalinguisti-

cally adopts a new functional role Finally because Sellars argues that the

use of concepts always takes place in the ldquological space of reasonsrdquo which isa space structured by norms and is bound to the logical rules of normativ-

ity this philosophy of history does not fall prey to relativism or a relativistic

account of truth

The challenge I have taken up has been to defend Conceptual History

without resorting to relativistic accounts of truth Concepts cannot be

applied irrationally and no matter what kinds of concepts might arise in

the future it will not be possible to convincingly argue that for instance

three angles of a triangle should be equal to two angles of a square Becauseconcepts follow normative rules that are governed by social practice con-

ceptual change is possible Thus meaning and conceptual change are sub-

ject to history but because truth is held in check by the normative rules

that govern social practices we can reasonably reject relativistic accounts

of truth




not only articulated new ways of understanding historical developments

since the 18th century he also underpinned these with keen theoretical

acuity giving other historians methodological tools along the way WhileKoselleckrsquos studies include a wide range of topics his most lasting contri-

bution is arguably in what has come to be called Conceptual History

(Begri1048678fsgeschichte) which traces the semantic transformation of ldquobasic

conceptsrdquo (Grundbegri1048678fe) that have shaped the epistemological frame-

work of the modern period

While Conceptual History has securely established itself as a 983142983145eld of

study it has occasionally run into unresolved philosophical di1048678983142983145culties

Koselleckrsquos writings on ldquobasic conceptsrdquo have been very in852070983148uential but when it comes to o1048678fering a robust account of the philosophy of language

behind Conceptual History Koselleck is content to o1048678fer no more than sug-

gestive remarks Speci983142983145cally the de983142983145nition of a ldquobasic conceptrdquo and how

there can be such entities as ldquobasic conceptsrdquo that are subject to change

has remained neglected and problematic

There are a number of possible options to address the di1048678983142983145culty of con-

ceptual change and the relationship between words and concepts Some

are better than others but in general the problems I focus on here pose no vital threat to the overall project of Conceptual History This article then

will not argue that Conceptual History is in dire straits and in need of res-

cue That would be setting up a straw man Rather the goal of this paper is

to put the approach of Conceptual History on a surer philosophical footing

by turning to the writings of Wilfrid Sellars whose philosophy I argue

bears a ldquofamily resemblancerdquo to Koselleckrsquos writings My reading of Koselleck

does not claim to remain a faithful one in every aspect However I do claim

that if we want to think of Conceptual History seriously we must seek amore sound philosophical foundation than has been o1048678fered so far

In a word I suggest that Conceptual History should integrate functional-

ist and normative categories into its theory of concepts I argue that Sellarsrsquo

philosophy and speci983142983145cally his notion of the ldquogame of giving and asking for

reasonsrdquo sets up the grid on which Conceptual History can be plotted It

will therefore be the task of this paper to show how Conceptual History can

and should be at home with Sellarsian philosophy

I will 983142983145rst elucidate the project of Conceptual History as originally con-

983142983145gured by Koselleck (Part II) Then I turn to a more in-depth discussion of

the philosophical di1048678983142983145culties that arise within the horizon of this project












II



















2010) p 99


indicated



































1974) p XV

983093983081 Ibid p XV











desires1048631






























































































1048625983093983081 Ibid p 80

10486251048630983081 Ibid p 548
































10486251048632983081 Ibid p 14













terms of concepts












torical discipline

III














































pp 225ndash263


p 85


1964) pp 3ndash23


































p 104























































and adopted later










words1048627983093




10486271048628983081 Ibid sect3 p 103



pp 59f

























































Sellars will argue
















































10486281048627983081 Ibid p 165





























10486281048628983081 Ibid p 167





























triangularbull

bull

redbull

orbull

statebull












1048628983097983081 Ibid p 167 footnote 5




















statebull

orbull

crisisbull
















1978) pp 78ndash85







p 85















V






























of the givenrdquo













9830931048630983081 Ibid p 76











p 374













































VI


























p 72






the world































furt aM 2010) p 32
































2010) p 99




p 72





long run10486311048625




























furt aM 2010) p 47




VII




















account of truth









of truth












II



















2010) p 99


indicated



































1974) p XV

983093983081 Ibid p XV











desires1048631






























































































1048625983093983081 Ibid p 80

10486251048630983081 Ibid p 548
































10486251048632983081 Ibid p 14













terms of concepts












torical discipline

III














































pp 225ndash263


p 85


1964) pp 3ndash23


































p 104























































and adopted later










words1048627983093




10486271048628983081 Ibid sect3 p 103



pp 59f

























































Sellars will argue
















































10486281048627983081 Ibid p 165





























10486281048628983081 Ibid p 167





























triangularbull

bull

redbull

orbull

statebull












1048628983097983081 Ibid p 167 footnote 5




















statebull

orbull

crisisbull
















1978) pp 78ndash85







p 85















V






























of the givenrdquo













9830931048630983081 Ibid p 76











p 374













































VI


























p 72






the world































furt aM 2010) p 32
































2010) p 99




p 72





long run10486311048625




























furt aM 2010) p 47




VII




















account of truth









of truth



































1974) p XV

983093983081 Ibid p XV











desires1048631






























































































1048625983093983081 Ibid p 80

10486251048630983081 Ibid p 548
































10486251048632983081 Ibid p 14













terms of concepts












torical discipline

III














































pp 225ndash263


p 85


1964) pp 3ndash23


































p 104























































and adopted later










words1048627983093




10486271048628983081 Ibid sect3 p 103



pp 59f

























































Sellars will argue
















































10486281048627983081 Ibid p 165





























10486281048628983081 Ibid p 167





























triangularbull

bull

redbull

orbull

statebull












1048628983097983081 Ibid p 167 footnote 5




















statebull

orbull

crisisbull
















1978) pp 78ndash85







p 85















V






























of the givenrdquo













9830931048630983081 Ibid p 76











p 374













































VI


























p 72






the world































furt aM 2010) p 32
































2010) p 99




p 72





long run10486311048625




























furt aM 2010) p 47




VII




















account of truth









of truth











desires1048631






























































































1048625983093983081 Ibid p 80

10486251048630983081 Ibid p 548
































10486251048632983081 Ibid p 14













terms of concepts












torical discipline

III














































pp 225ndash263


p 85


1964) pp 3ndash23


































p 104























































and adopted later










words1048627983093




10486271048628983081 Ibid sect3 p 103



pp 59f

























































Sellars will argue
















































10486281048627983081 Ibid p 165





























10486281048628983081 Ibid p 167





























triangularbull

bull

redbull

orbull

statebull












1048628983097983081 Ibid p 167 footnote 5




















statebull

orbull

crisisbull
















1978) pp 78ndash85







p 85















V






























of the givenrdquo













9830931048630983081 Ibid p 76











p 374













































VI


























p 72






the world































furt aM 2010) p 32
































2010) p 99




p 72





long run10486311048625




























furt aM 2010) p 47




VII




















account of truth









of truth





































































1048625983093983081 Ibid p 80

10486251048630983081 Ibid p 548
































10486251048632983081 Ibid p 14













terms of concepts












torical discipline

III














































pp 225ndash263


p 85


1964) pp 3ndash23


































p 104























































and adopted later










words1048627983093




10486271048628983081 Ibid sect3 p 103



pp 59f

























































Sellars will argue
















































10486281048627983081 Ibid p 165





























10486281048628983081 Ibid p 167





























triangularbull

bull

redbull

orbull

statebull












1048628983097983081 Ibid p 167 footnote 5




















statebull

orbull

crisisbull
















1978) pp 78ndash85







p 85















V






























of the givenrdquo













9830931048630983081 Ibid p 76











p 374













































VI


























p 72






the world































furt aM 2010) p 32
































2010) p 99




p 72





long run10486311048625




























furt aM 2010) p 47




VII




















account of truth









of truth






























10486251048632983081 Ibid p 14













terms of concepts












torical discipline

III














































pp 225ndash263


p 85


1964) pp 3ndash23


































p 104























































and adopted later










words1048627983093




10486271048628983081 Ibid sect3 p 103



pp 59f

























































Sellars will argue
















































10486281048627983081 Ibid p 165





























10486281048628983081 Ibid p 167





























triangularbull

bull

redbull

orbull

statebull












1048628983097983081 Ibid p 167 footnote 5




















statebull

orbull

crisisbull
















1978) pp 78ndash85







p 85















V






























of the givenrdquo













9830931048630983081 Ibid p 76











p 374













































VI


























p 72






the world































furt aM 2010) p 32
































2010) p 99




p 72





long run10486311048625




























furt aM 2010) p 47




VII




















account of truth









of truth







terms of concepts












torical discipline

III














































pp 225ndash263


p 85


1964) pp 3ndash23


































p 104























































and adopted later










words1048627983093




10486271048628983081 Ibid sect3 p 103



pp 59f

























































Sellars will argue
















































10486281048627983081 Ibid p 165





























10486281048628983081 Ibid p 167





























triangularbull

bull

redbull

orbull

statebull












1048628983097983081 Ibid p 167 footnote 5




















statebull

orbull

crisisbull
















1978) pp 78ndash85







p 85















V






























of the givenrdquo













9830931048630983081 Ibid p 76











p 374













































VI


























p 72






the world































furt aM 2010) p 32
































2010) p 99




p 72





long run10486311048625




























furt aM 2010) p 47




VII




















account of truth









of truth


































pp 225ndash263


p 85


1964) pp 3ndash23


































p 104























































and adopted later










words1048627983093




10486271048628983081 Ibid sect3 p 103



pp 59f

























































Sellars will argue
















































10486281048627983081 Ibid p 165





























10486281048628983081 Ibid p 167





























triangularbull

bull

redbull

orbull

statebull












1048628983097983081 Ibid p 167 footnote 5




















statebull

orbull

crisisbull
















1978) pp 78ndash85







p 85















V






























of the givenrdquo













9830931048630983081 Ibid p 76











p 374













































VI


























p 72






the world































furt aM 2010) p 32
































2010) p 99




p 72





long run10486311048625




























furt aM 2010) p 47




VII




















account of truth









of truth


































p 104























































and adopted later










words1048627983093




10486271048628983081 Ibid sect3 p 103



pp 59f

























































Sellars will argue
















































10486281048627983081 Ibid p 165





























10486281048628983081 Ibid p 167





























triangularbull

bull

redbull

orbull

statebull












1048628983097983081 Ibid p 167 footnote 5




















statebull

orbull

crisisbull
















1978) pp 78ndash85







p 85















V






























of the givenrdquo













9830931048630983081 Ibid p 76











p 374













































VI


























p 72






the world































furt aM 2010) p 32
































2010) p 99




p 72





long run10486311048625




























furt aM 2010) p 47




VII




















account of truth









of truth





















































and adopted later










words1048627983093




10486271048628983081 Ibid sect3 p 103



pp 59f

























































Sellars will argue
















































10486281048627983081 Ibid p 165





























10486281048628983081 Ibid p 167





























triangularbull

bull

redbull

orbull

statebull












1048628983097983081 Ibid p 167 footnote 5




















statebull

orbull

crisisbull
















1978) pp 78ndash85







p 85















V






























of the givenrdquo













9830931048630983081 Ibid p 76











p 374













































VI


























p 72






the world































furt aM 2010) p 32
































2010) p 99




p 72





long run10486311048625




























furt aM 2010) p 47




VII




















account of truth









of truth

























































Sellars will argue
















































10486281048627983081 Ibid p 165





























10486281048628983081 Ibid p 167





























triangularbull

bull

redbull

orbull

statebull












1048628983097983081 Ibid p 167 footnote 5




















statebull

orbull

crisisbull
















1978) pp 78ndash85







p 85















V






























of the givenrdquo













9830931048630983081 Ibid p 76











p 374













































VI


























p 72






the world































furt aM 2010) p 32
































2010) p 99




p 72





long run10486311048625




























furt aM 2010) p 47




VII




















account of truth









of truth

































10486281048627983081 Ibid p 165





























10486281048628983081 Ibid p 167





























triangularbull

bull

redbull

orbull

statebull












1048628983097983081 Ibid p 167 footnote 5




















statebull

orbull

crisisbull
















1978) pp 78ndash85







p 85















V






























of the givenrdquo













9830931048630983081 Ibid p 76











p 374













































VI


























p 72






the world































furt aM 2010) p 32
































2010) p 99




p 72





long run10486311048625




























furt aM 2010) p 47




VII




















account of truth









of truth





























10486281048628983081 Ibid p 167





























triangularbull

bull

redbull

orbull

statebull












1048628983097983081 Ibid p 167 footnote 5




















statebull

orbull

crisisbull
















1978) pp 78ndash85







p 85















V






























of the givenrdquo













9830931048630983081 Ibid p 76











p 374













































VI


























p 72






the world































furt aM 2010) p 32
































2010) p 99




p 72





long run10486311048625




























furt aM 2010) p 47




VII




















account of truth









of truth





















triangularbull

bull

redbull

orbull

statebull












1048628983097983081 Ibid p 167 footnote 5




















statebull

orbull

crisisbull
















1978) pp 78ndash85







p 85















V






























of the givenrdquo













9830931048630983081 Ibid p 76











p 374













































VI


























p 72






the world































furt aM 2010) p 32
































2010) p 99




p 72





long run10486311048625




























furt aM 2010) p 47




VII




















account of truth









of truth














statebull

orbull

crisisbull
















1978) pp 78ndash85







p 85















V






























of the givenrdquo













9830931048630983081 Ibid p 76











p 374













































VI


























p 72






the world































furt aM 2010) p 32
































2010) p 99




p 72





long run10486311048625




























furt aM 2010) p 47




VII




















account of truth









of truth















V






























of the givenrdquo













9830931048630983081 Ibid p 76











p 374













































VI


























p 72






the world































furt aM 2010) p 32
































2010) p 99




p 72





long run10486311048625




























furt aM 2010) p 47




VII




















account of truth









of truth












of the givenrdquo













9830931048630983081 Ibid p 76











p 374













































VI


























p 72






the world































furt aM 2010) p 32
































2010) p 99




p 72





long run10486311048625




























furt aM 2010) p 47




VII




















account of truth









of truth













































VI


























p 72






the world































furt aM 2010) p 32
































2010) p 99




p 72





long run10486311048625




























furt aM 2010) p 47




VII




















account of truth









of truth





the world































furt aM 2010) p 32
































2010) p 99




p 72





long run10486311048625




























furt aM 2010) p 47




VII




















account of truth









of truth
































2010) p 99




p 72





long run10486311048625




























furt aM 2010) p 47




VII




















account of truth









of truth





long run10486311048625




























furt aM 2010) p 47




VII




















account of truth









of truth




VII




















account of truth









of truth

Concepts History and the Game of Giving

Documents

Transcript of Concepts History and the Game of Giving