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CONCEPT OF THE CULMINATION POINT

The concept of a culmination point is closely identified with Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), who was one of the first to identify and explain it in his seminal work On War. The critical importance of this concept has been shown repeatedly in military history. Many campaigns and wars ended unsuccessfully when the concept of the point of culmination was not properly applied or, even worse, was completely ignored. For example, strategic culmination eventually doomed Napoleon I’s invasion of Russia in 1812. The German general staff in the conduct of its campaign in the west in 1914 neglected Clausewitzian teaching on the culminating point and friction.1

There is probably no aspect of operational art as complex as the concept of culmination. Hence, the highest art of an operational commander is to timely anticipate or sense his own or the enemy’s arrival at the point of culmination and then take proper and effective actions to take advantage of the newly created situation and bring about a decision. Operational commanders and their staffs should evaluate all aspects of a situation in order to plan for and then anticipate the point of culmination in the execution of a campaign or major operation. The inherent uncertainty of war due to friction and “fog of war” further complicates this problem.2

Theoretical Foundations: General Carl von Clausewitz was the first military theoretician who explained in some detail the concept of culmination. He defined the culminating point (Kulminationspunkt) as “the point where the remaining strength is just enough to maintain a defense and wait for peace.” Clausewitz also implied that once the culminating point is passed, the chance of victory is foreclosed unless the enemy yields from fear without engaging in decisive combat. If the enemy were to choose to fight it out, he would prevail.3

The Austrian archduke Charles (1771–1847), a well-known military practitioner and thinker, discussed the concept of the culminating point in his Fundamentals of Strategy, written in 1823–1826. However, in contrast to Clausewitz, he explained that the main cause of the point of culmination is when one moves at too high a speed, which in turn leads to a reduction of one’s striking power due to fatigue and disorder. The only case in which the point of culmination does not cause harm is when the enemy’s striking power is even more reduced than one’s own. He used the example of Napoleon I in his invasion of Russia in 1812. Archduke Charles aptly observed that Napoleon I’s capture of Moscow did not represent a success. The speed of the operation in a country such as Russia, which offered limited means, weakened and broke down Napoleon I’s army. It also took away sorely needed time and the strength required for consolidating his base of operations and lines of operation.4

The U.S. theoretician Bernard Brodie wrote that unless an offensive results in the defender’s complete collapse, there will be a culminating point at which the attacker is about to lose effective superiority. He also observed that to push beyond this point without a good chance of an imminent favorable decision is dangerous.5

The Soviets apparently did not embrace the Clausewitzian concept of point of culmination in their theory of operational art. One of the early Soviet theoreticians, Nikolay N. Movchin (1896–1938), alluded to what he called “operational exhaustion” (Operativnoye izmoreniye), which had some similarity to the Clausewitzian culminating point concept. He wrote that even when an advance begins under the most favorable circumstances it cannot be sustained indefinitely because of the inevitable friction of war.6 Aleksandr’ A. Svechin took a more moderate approach in conducting operations than many of his Soviet counterparts by warning about the possibility of the offensive overreach. He made a conscious effort to find a formula for conducting operations that would impose some constraints on the more offensive-minded commanders whose enthusiasm for the uninterrupted offensive was pregnant with the very dangers Clausewitz had pointed out. Svechin stressed that the attacker’s decision to continue the offensive following the initial operation would place a growing strain on his communications and his ability to maintain his strength. The further the attacker moved into the enemy’s territory, the weaker he would become vis-à-vis the defender, who would be able to draw upon an undamaged resource base and shorter lines of supply to alter the correlation of forces in his favor. Svechin

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concluded that the responsibility of strategy is not to allow offensive operations to drag out to the last gasp and to halt the offensive in time.7

What is Point of Culmination?: In generic terms, a culmination can be understood as a point in terms of time and space reached by the attacker or the defender, after which his stated objectives cannot be accomplished and continued effort to reach them will significantly increase the chances of failure or even defeat. The concept of the culminating point is often misunderstood, and any defeat of friendly or enemy forces is attributed to overshooting a point of culmination. This is not necessarily the case, because in many instances the attacker has won a decisive victory, or the defender has decisively beaten the attacker, without approaching or arriving at their respective culminating points.

A culminating point should not be understood too literally; it is not a “point,” but rather an area of uncertainty or nonrecognition in terms of space and time (see Figure 11). The higher the level of war, the larger the area of uncertainty and the more difficult it is to anticipate or sense the culminating point’s arrival. One reason for this is the extreme complexity of the change in the balance of combat power. The mutual relationship of elements of combat power is highly dynamic and hard to quantify with any degree of certainty. This area is at the heart of what Clausewitz called the equilibrium of the combat power of both sides in a conflict.8 It is a point at which the attacker can still revert to defense to protect his gains and regenerate his combat power. When equilibrium exists, theoretically a determined and agile defender can take the advantage and go on the counterattack or counteroffensive.

A culminating point in combat is reached when the relative combat power shifts between two sides.9 It is the point beyond which the difference in relative combat power begins to decrease rapidly.10 Theory does not say that if a commander continues beyond the culminating point he will face a defeat. It only warns that the risks of setback and even defeat will be pretty high if he does so. In practice, a commander might well gamble and continue his attack beyond the point of culmination, after weighing all the pertinent elements in the situation, and be ultimately successful in accomplishing the assigned objective. Clearly, if a commander goes beyond the culminating point and suffers unacceptable losses and even defeat, then he has gambled too much.

FIGURE 11: THEORY OF CULMINATING POINT

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Characteristics: The concept of the culminating point is applicable to war in all physical mediums: on land, at sea, and in the air. Yet its full complexity can be demonstrated largely in land warfare. The concept of culmination applies to both the attacker and the defender. Clausewitz in On War focused predominantly on what he called the “culminating point of attack.” He insisted that the defense is intrinsically stronger than the offense, because it is easier to hold ground than to seize it. Therefore, it follows that defense is easier than attack, assuming both sides have equal means. The superiority of defense rests on the utilization of terrain; the possession of an organized theater of war; and often, but not always, the support of the population. Defense has a passive purpose—preservation; and attack has an active (or positive) one—conquest. Clausewitz believed that defense should be used only so long as weakness compels. It should be abandoned as soon as the defender is strong enough to pursue a positive object. He also observed that pure defense would be contrary to the very idea of war, because then only one side would be waging it. The principal advantage of defense over attack is that of waiting. The defender also enjoys all the benefits of any error or mistake the attacker makes. Yet the defender should not be passive; he should do everything possible to wear down the attacker by conducting counterattacks. Victory normally results from the superiority of one side—that is, from a greater aggregate of physical and psychological strength. As a war unfolds, armies are constantly faced with some factors that increase their strength and with others that reduce it. In general, every reduction in strength on one side can be considered an increase on the other.11

In terms of time, the culminating point is usually not the same for the attacker as for the defender. An attacker who can no longer continue with his attack or offensive is culminated, but the defender may not be. The opposite is also true. Because of the fog of war and friction, the arrival time of the culminating point is extremely difficult to determine precisely. It usually takes some time before one or both sides realize the shift in relative combat power and the approach of the point of culmination. Sometimes culmination is a matter of the commander’s judgment or imagination, in which case it may not actually be reached or exceeded.

A culminating point can shift over time through the attacker’s or the defender’s actions. To prevent the culminating point from arriving too early, the attacker should maintain higher combat power over the defender in both current and future combat actions. At the same time, friendly forces should be fully protected, while the enemy’s forces should be subjected to danger of defeat. In land warfare, this can be achieved through properly assigning forces to echelons to maintain operational momentum, and through adequate sustainment.12

Attacker’s Culmination: The attacker’s culmination is the point in time and space at which the attacker’s combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender (see Figure 12). The relative reduction of the attacker’s strength over time and space is the fundamental cause of his arrival at the point of culmination.13 Among other things, the attacker’s culmination could be reached because momentum is being lost or because of losses the defender has inflicted. However, that does not mean that the defender can take the advantage and go on the counteroffensive. Culmination occurs when and where the attacker must stop and defend his gains if he wishes to avoid losing them.

Clausewitz observed that the force of attack diminishes over time, while that of defense increases. The attacker must not only overcome the effects of friction but also move against an enemy who can use terrain and can strike when and where the attacking force has exposed itself. The attacker also must act with greater strength and urgency than the defender, who, as Clausewitz noted, gains relative strength with the passage of time. Therefore, the art of attack at all levels of war is to accomplish the assigned objective before reaching one’s own point of culmination.14 To be successful, the attacker should, at least initially, possess sufficient strength to impose his will on the defender. He needs to have superiority of available combat potential in a sector of main effort or point of main attack.

In land warfare, the strength of the attacker is progressively diminished as the attacker advances deeper into the enemy’s territory. His lines of supplies become progressively longer and more vulnerable to enemy counterattacks unless he assigns adequate forces to protect them. The attacker has to detach relatively large forces to protect these links with his base of operations. Other things being equal, the longer the distance from his base of operations, the longer the time the

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SPACE GAINEDCANNOT BE HELD

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attacker needs for bringing up supplies and reinforcements. Either additional forces or part of the existing forces must be assigned to protecting these lines of supplies. For example, Napoleon I in his invasion of Russia in 1812 had about 95,000 men after reaching Moscow, but he had to use an additional 118,000 troops to protect his rear and lines of supplies.15

On land, the attacker also needs to destroy or neutralize bypassed enemy forces and strong points. The attacker’s strength can be further reduced if his policies lead to an open mass uprising of the enemy’s population; this was clearly shown by Napoleon I’s experience in Spain in 1809–1814, and by the German difficulties in maintaining control of the rear in Poland, Soviet Russia, and the Balkans in World War II.

The defender’s ability to resist the attacker’s advance might actually increase if he avoids major combat and his rear area is relatively secure from enemy attack. For the attacker, any pause in fighting to regenerate his combat power might result in an advantage for the defender. Moreover, it might happen that the defender can regenerate his combat power faster than the attacker can.

If the attacker approaches the point of culmination before reaching his objective, the best he can do is to revert to defense before he suffers a major setback or is forced to retreat and surrender his gains. Otherwise, he may well overshoot his point of culmination by a large margin, which could lead to hasty retreat and even defeat. Clausewitz was certain that at the culminating point of attack, the initial superiority of an attack is expended and the ratio of strength between the two sides is steadily reduced, leaving the attacker with enough strength to conduct a successful defense.16

Political or diplomatic considerations sometimes compel a decision not to revert to defense after reaching or overshooting one’s own operational culmination. For example, Napoleon I in his ill-fated invasion of Russia in 1812 passed his culminating point of attack, not in the Battle of Borodino (7 September), but most likely at Smolensk (7 August), where he still had about 154,000 men and was strong enough to regroup and meet any Russian attack. However, Napoleon I perhaps believed that stopping the advance to Moscow would cause a weakening of French power and influence in Europe. Such a course of events was simply

FIGURE 12: ATTACKER’S POINT OF CULMINATION

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unacceptable to him. Ultimately, he overshot his culminating point by about 250 miles in terms of space and about 30 days in terms of time, without achieving a decisive victory and while suffering further losses in manpower and materiel.17 The Russians had probably also reached their point of culmination before the battle of Borodino. They were too weak to have taken advantage of Napoleon I’s predicament even if they had realized that he had passed his point of culmination. In the end, Napoleon I was defeated by a combination of severe weather, sickness among his troops, and constant Russian harassments during his long retreat from Moscow. By the end of November, after he finally reached the Berezina River, the once-mighty Grande Armée totaled only about 37,000 men.18

An example of the attacker overshooting his point of culmination and suffering a significant defeat at the hands of numerically inferior but much better led and trained forces is the Soviet failure in the major offensive in southern Russia in January–March 1943. After the end of the Battle of Stalingrad, a 200-mile gap opened in the German front lines as a result of the disintegration of Romanian, Italian, and Hungarian formations.19 The Soviets planned two major operations (GALLOP and STAR) aimed to reach the Sea of Azov, to start on 29 January and 2 February, respectively. For this double major operation, the Soviets committed four armies (6th Army, 1st Guards Army, 3rd Guards Army, and 5th Tank Army), plus Mobile Group Popov, totaling 42 rifle divisions and 100 brigades, to the southern front and southwestern front, deployed along the 155-mile-long front from south of Kharkov along the Dnieper River to south of Voroshilovgrad.20 The Soviets’ ultimate operational objective was probably to cut off and destroy two German army groups with about 75 divisions then deployed in southern Russia and the Caucasus.21 The southwestern front, led by General Nikolay F. Vatutin, was tasked to seize the Donbas area and drive the German forces across the Dnieper River by executing a gigantic single-sided envelopment maneuver. At that time the German forces in southern Russia were led by one of the ablest operational commanders on either side in World War II, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (1887–1973). They consisted of Army Group Don (after 14 February, Army Group South), composed of 22 divisions (including 7 panzer, 10 infantry, and 2 motorized infantry divisions) defending some 435 miles of front. Like their Soviet counterparts, the German forces had been engaged in heavy combat since November 1942. They were especially weak in armor, having not more than 20 to 40 panzers per division.22

The growing danger of losing an army group so soon after the destruction of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad finally convinced Hitler to approve Manstein’s plan for a counteroffensive on 6 February. Manstein’s idea for a counteroffensive was relatively simple in design but extremely difficult to execute. His plan was based on the premise that the Soviets would extend themselves to the point where he could unleash his decisive counterstroke. By trading space for time, he caused extensive delays in the execution of the Soviet plan. Manstein also traded space for force by shortening the front line from 250 miles to about 112 miles on the Mius River, to better defend his right flank. The 1st Panzer Army was directed to tie down the Soviet 1st Guards Army and then advance to the Kharkov-Sumy area. Army Detachment Hollidt (named after General Karl Hollidt), with three corps, had to defend against attacks by six Soviet armies on the Mius River. By ordering the 4th Panzer Army to make a “castling” (Rochade) movement on 8–9 February from Rostov-on-Don to the middle Don on his left flank, Manstein created a force to serve as an operational reserve where none had existed.23

On 17 February, in the course of their offensive, the Soviets advanced to a point only 37 miles from Manstein’s headquarters in Zaporozhye. Hitler was at that time at Manstein’s headquarters and was able to see for himself the seriousness of the situation facing Army Group South. Manstein pointed out to Hitler that the priority was not to recapture Kharkov but to stop the Soviet advance southward of that city. The German counteroffensive started on 19 February (some sources say 20 February); two days later, the right flank of the Soviet 6th Army was cut off, and the Soviet center began to crumble. By 23 February the Germans had cut off the escape route of the Soviet forces. Then they counterattacked and defeated the widely dispersed Soviet thrusts in detail. One day later, Vatutin issued an order to suspend all operations and revert to defense. However, the Soviet forces had already overshot their culminating point. The Soviet offensive ended after 21 days. The Soviets paid a heavy price in personnel and materiel.24 By 24

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March the Germans had recaptured Kharkov. The Germans had destroyed Mobile Group Popov. In addition, four armies of the Soviet southwestern front had suffered such losses that they were incapable of further combat.25 This significant operational success was accomplished by only 160,000 German troops and about 100 tanks.26 In the process, Manstein not only saved the German forces from being cut off in the Caucasus but also stabilized the entire southern part of the German front. The success of Manstein’s counteroffensive in southern Russia probably also saved the Germans from losing the war on the eastern front in 1943 or 1944.

Another example of the attacker overshooting his point of culmination was the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) in its invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in June 1950. In a swift advance across the border, the North Koreans seized the capital, Seoul, and pushed the UN forces to a narrow perimeter around the port of Pusan in the southeastern part of the country. The commander of the UN forces, U.S. general Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964), conceived a bold and risky plan to land about 70,000 UN troops at Inchon on 15 September 1950. General Walton H. Walker, commander of the U.S. Eighth Army within the perimeter, would make a holding attack, while the X Corps would make a turning movement. After seizing objectives in the Seoul area, the X Corps would deploy south and act as a blocking force, while the Eighth Army would break out from the Pusan perimeter. A prompt linkup with the X Corps along the Tajeon-Suwon axis was a prerequisite for cutting off a large force of North Koreans on the southern part of the peninsula. Walker planned that his attack would not begin until the day after the Inchon landing. U.S. intelligence estimated that the North Korean forces deployed around the perimeter totaled some 101,500 men. However, their real strength did not exceed 70,000 men, and their situation was in fact much worse than the numbers alone might indicate: By the first half of September, the North Koreans probably did not have more than 50 percent of their original equipment, and their morale was rather low. No more than 30 percent of the original troops of the divisions remained. Most of the recruits in the NKPA were forcibly drafted South Koreans who did not show a strong desire to fight. Food in the NKPA was scarce, and undernourishment was the most frequent cause of low morale.27 The total strength of the UN forces in the Pusan perimeter was about 159,000 men.28

The UN breakout from the Pusan perimeter started on 16 September, and the North Korean forces, their lines of supplies cut off and threatened from both south and north simultaneously, literally collapsed. By 26 September, Seoul was liberated and the UN forces took some 125,000 prisoners, together with most of the North Korean weapons and equipment. During their hasty retreat from the southern part of the Korean peninsula to the 38th Parallel, the NKPA probably lost more weapons and equipment than the ROK lost during its retreat from Seoul to the Pusan perimeter.29

Defender’s Culmination: In land warfare, a defender reaches culmination when he can no longer go on the counteroffensive or defend successfully (see Figure 13).30 However, if the defender’s objective is to go on the offensive, then the culminating point is where the defender should revert to a holding action and await reinforcements. If the defender’s objective is to retain terrain, the culminating point is where the defender must withdraw, delay, or retreat.31 The art of defense is to speed up the attacker to his point of culmination and then quickly shift to the offensive.32 In general, the attacker would suffer greater losses than the defender in taking on a prepared defense. As the attacker advances deeper into the enemy’s territory and moves away from his base of operations, his combat power is steadily reduced. Thus, the defender’s strength increases relative to the attacker’s.33 As long as the attacker’s strength is declining faster than the defender’s, it is to the defender’s advantage to wait. However, the point of culmination will necessarily be reached when the defender must decide to act, after the advantages of waiting have been completely exhausted.34 The defender’s best chances for a successful counterattack occur when the attacker has reached or exceeded his culminating point. For example, in southern Russia in February 1943, Manstein counterattacked when the Soviets approached the Dnieper River—that is, only after the Soviet forces had passed their point of culmination.35 In general, the transition from defense to attack is one of the most difficult tasks for any commander.

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The British offensive in North Africa in June 1941 (Operation BATTLEAXE) was aimed at destroying the Axis force near the Egyptian-Libyan border and seizing and securing the area of Bardia, Sollum, and Capuzzo, and then relieving Tobruk. However, the British suffered a setback as soon as the operation was under way: their frontal attack on the Halfaya position was repulsed by the Axis forces. The British armored forces seized Capuzzo but were stopped west of Sollum. On 17 June, the third day of the battle, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel counterattacked, and the British forces had to retreat with heavy losses—91 tanks, compared to Rommel’s 12. The British also lost their momentum after suffering high losses in their failed attack at Halfaya and Sollum. Hence, Rommel got the opportunity to regain the initiative and launch a counteroffensive.36 This operation is a good example of an unsuccessful offensive in which the attacker never reached a point of culmination. Rather, it was the defender who had to act and go on the counteroffensive.

To speed the attacker’s arrival at the culminating point, an agile and offensive-minded defender should always be on the tactical offensive, conducting counterattacks and raids. However, the defender must wait to revert to a counteroffensive or major counterattack until the attacker reaches and possibly overshoots his culminating point. Then the defender’s objective is no longer to attrite the attacker, but to seize and maintain the initiative and accomplish objectives beyond destroying the enemy or regaining the lost space.37

Levels of War and Culmination: A point of culmination exists for the attacker and the defender at each level of war: national strategic, theater-strategic, operational, and tactical. The higher the level of war, the more serious the consequences of overshooting the point of culmination. At the tactical level, the commander can relatively easily determine when the actual culminating point has been reached or passed. In contrast, a culminating point at the operational or strategic level is extremely difficult to anticipate or sense because so many factors affect its occurrence. To complicate the matter, the indicators of approaching operational and especially strategic culmination are long in coming and are difficult to discern, even for a very experienced operational commander.

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FIGURE 13: DEFENDER’S POINT OF CULMINATION

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Today, Clausewitz’s terms culminating point of attack and culminating point of victory are inadequate to address the concept at the tactical and operational levels of war. The term culminating point of attack pertained to what we understand today as the operational and tactical levels, while culminating point of victory dealt with a campaign or strategic level of war in Clausewitzian times. To make a better and more precise distinction among points of culmination at the three basic levels of war, it is important to use different terms. Therefore, the term culminating point of attack (or defense) will be used here when referring to the tactical level of war and culminating point of offensive (or defensive) for the operational level of war.38 For the national-strategic level of war, the Clausewitzian term culminating point of victory (or defeat) still seems to be the most appropriate (see Figure 14).

Tactical culmination occurs in the course of a major battle or engagement when one’s combat power is reduced if it is not regenerated in time. Then one’s force must either stop its actions or continue fighting and accept the risk of failure or even defeat. If a force can prevent or postpone the culmination but opts not to, then it contributes to its own culmination.39 A good example of tactical culmination is the Battle of Gettysburg, on 1–3 July 1863, one of the most decisive battles of the American Civil War (1861–1865). This battle was fought between the Confederate Army of 70,000, under General Robert E. Lee, and the Union Army of the Potomac of 80,000, led by General George Meade. The engagement on Little Round Top (a high hill at the southern end of the Union line), where Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain saw the culmination of his defense coming to its climax and decided to counterattack, saved the Union’s forces from imminent defeat.40 The Union suffered high losses—some 23,000 casualties—for the victory, while Confederate losses were 28,000.41

In October 1944, in the series of naval actions popularly known as the Battle for Leyte, the Japanese First Diversionary Attack Force under Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita probably reached its tactical culminating point during or in the aftermath of the Battle in the Sibuyan Sea on 24 October—not, as is commonly believed, during the Battle of Samar on the morning of 25 October.

WAR AS A WHOLE

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FIGURE 14: CULMINATING POINT AND THE LEVELS OF WAR

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Kurita made a fateful decision to turn north and away from his intended objective in the Leyte Gulf just when his forces were at the brink of victory over much weaker U.S. forces of escort carriers and their escorts. In retrospect, there were several reasons for Kurita’s decision. Perhaps the most important were the heavy losses inflicted by U.S. submarines off Palawan Passage, and the rather severe losses and damage inflicted on his force by U.S. carrier aircraft in the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea on the preceding day. Kurita’s sheer physical exhaustion and lack of persistence were most likely another factor in his decision, which ended any prospect of humiliating the U.S. Navy and thereby perhaps slowing down Allied operational tempo in the Pacific.

Tactical culmination may also occur as a result of either operational or strategic decisions, as the example of General George S. Patton Jr.’s Third Army operations in Lorraine in October 1944 illustrates. The Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, made a deliberate decision on 22 September to allocate most of the then-scarce logistical resources to General Bernard L. Montgomery’s 21st Army Group’s drive in the north. He specifically instructed General Omar N. Bradley, commander of the 12th Army Group (formerly First U.S. Army Group), that the Third Army and the newly created Ninth Army were to take “no more aggressive action than is permitted by the maintenance situation after the full requirements of the main effort had been met.” Patton, irritated by the orders to revert to the defensive, persuaded his immediate superior, Bradley, to let him continue local attacks to adjust his front line.42 He also continued his advance, with the ultimate result that some of his frontline units ran out of fuel.43

Operational culmination may be reached in the course of a major operation or campaign. A culmination in a major operation usually happens only once, while in a campaign several operational culminating points can occur, in sequence or almost simultaneously. An example of operational culmination occurred for the Japanese forces in Burma in the early spring of 1944. By the end of 1943 the Japanese counteroffensive in Burma reached its limit. However, the Japanese continued to threaten Imphal and Kohima. In Japanese hands, these two positions would serve as springboards for the final destruction of the British forces. General William Slim (1891–1970), commander of the 14th Army, concentrated four corps in the Imphal Plain and fought the decisive battle there on ground of his own choosing. His plan was based on the enemy offensive beginning in mid-March 1944; however, the British were surprised, because the Japanese attacked one week earlier. Nevertheless, Slim’s basic plan still worked. The Japanese attacked against the concentrated power of the 14th Army at Imphal and Kohima but failed to reach their objectives. Slim counterattacked in May and advanced to the Irrawaddy River before ordering an operational pause.44

In another example, the German Army Group Center overshot its point of culmination during the first phase of the German campaign against Soviet Russia. This army group, directed in early October 1941 to seize Moscow (Operation TAIFUN-TYPHOON), in retrospect clearly did not have sufficient combat strength to do so. The early onset of the muddy season in Russia turned the ground into a sea of mud, considerably slowing the movement of German mechanized forces.45 This enormously complicated German efforts to complete the operation quickly. To make the situation worse, the Germans’ greatest obstacles became not only the weather but also Russia’s poorly built and inadequate roads. General fatigue and weariness affected the entire German front.46 The combat effectiveness of the German infantry divisions dropped by 35 percent, and armored divisions by 40 to 50 percent; the panzer attrition rate varied from 65 to 75 percent. There was also a high percentage of officer losses in combat. The flow of German supplies was disrupted, and only the most urgently needed rations, ammunition, and gasoline could be moved forward—and then only with difficulty. There was practically no winter clothing, and equipment for army units would not become available before early January 1942.47 The Soviets sensed that the Germans had reached their point of culmination and prepared a counteroffensive.48 The German offensive on Moscow finally stopped on 4 December, after its momentum was lost. Hitler ordered a shift to defensive in his directive no. 39, issued on 8 December. Army Group Center had to defend a front line of 620 miles with 67 heavily attrited divisions and no reserves.49

The Soviet counteroffensive at Moscow probably reached its point of operational culmination in late January or early February 1942. The Soviets forced the Germans to retreat.

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However, after large territorial gains in the central part of the front, and after inflicting on the Germans approximately 376,000 battle casualties (increased to about 900,000 due to illnesses caused by severe weather), the Soviet offensive began to peter out at the end of January 1942 and came to a complete stop in early March. The extended and heavy fighting greatly reduced the Soviet troops’ ability to continue with their offensive. Also, the quality of the Soviet reserves steadily deteriorated after December 1941. The German Army Group Center’s retreat had ended. The German situation had in fact slightly improved, because Hitler ordered the army’s general staff to provide 500,000 replacements for the losses on the eastern front. In February 1942, Army Group Center received some 70,000 replacements (but was still short about 40,000 men).50 Nevertheless, the Germans suffered a significant setback and were forced to revert to the defensive, not only in front of Moscow but also along the entire front line, from Finland to the Crimea. The Soviets made deep penetrations of the German front in many places, but especially in front of Moscow.51 The German failure was primarily due to severe weather conditions, inadequate logistical preparations, and an inability to replace the ever-increasing losses in manpower and equipment.

For their part, the Soviets ultimately overreached themselves and suffered great losses in February and March 1942. Despite all the signs that their forces had reached the point of culmination, Stalin and the Soviet High Command (Stavka) made the bad decision to direct General Georgi K. Zhukov, commander of the western front, to resume the offensive on 16 February. Although some additional 60,000 troops and 200 tanks were assigned to the western front and some reinforcements were sent to the Kalinin front, the Soviet forces were insufficient to make much progress.52 Stalin and the Stavka overestimated the successes of their winter offensive and greatly underestimated the resilience and fighting qualities of the German soldiers. Stalin was primarily responsible for ordering numerous offensives in all parts of the fronts, which ultimately led to a dissipation of effort and large and unnecessary Soviet losses.53

Multiple Points of Culmination: In a land campaign, sometimes the attacker might reach several points of culmination in a quick sequence or even almost simultaneously. This usually happens if there is a severe disconnect between the operational objectives to be accomplished and the respective factors of space, time, and force. For example, the Germans reached several successive operational culminations in the series of major operations between March and July 1918. The peak of fighting was at the Second Battle of the Marne, 15–17 July, in which, after initial successes, the Germans failed to reach their stated objectives. Afterward, the first quartermaster-general, General Erich Ludendorff, admitted defeat and ordered a general withdrawal. In the five months of heavy fighting the Germans had incurred half a million casualties, but the Allied losses were larger. Yet the Allied forces were reinforced by fresh American troops, arriving at the rate of 300,000 men per month.54 The turning of the tide in the west came with the Allied Aisne-Marne offensive (18 July–5 August). Afterward, the Allies obtained the strategic initiative that eventually led to the armistice on 11 November and the German defeat.

The Germans overshot several operational culminating points during the first phase of their campaign in Soviet Russia, which started on 22 June 1941. They divided the entire theater of war into what amounted in today’s terms to three theaters of operations. By the end of October the German offensive in the central part of the front was losing its momentum. The Germans gained some ground in the fighting around Tula and in the direction of Kalinin, but their war of rapid movement had clearly ended at the gates of Moscow in early December 1941. In the northern theater of operations, the German Army Group North had progressed little after September 1941. Leningrad was not captured, and the planned linkup with the Finns did not materialize. In the southern part of the front, Army Group South had made large gains. By the first week of November, the Germans had already reached the Kursk-Stalino-Taganrog line. The Eleventh Army had crossed the Perekop Isthmus and advanced into the Crimea. However, despite these gains, the German forces were stretched to the limit. The Soviets offered a stubborn defense and began to prepare a counteroffensive. The German advance in the south came almost to a halt, partly because of the bad weather, but mainly from the troops’ sheer exhaustion. The German drive toward Rostov lost speed and strength. By 22 November, the Germans entered

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Rostov, only to be forced to retreat a few days later. At the same time, the Soviets opened an offensive from the northwest against the German forces in the Donets Basin. Within the next fortnight, the forward elements of Army Group South were in a general retreat toward the Stalino-Mariupol line. This was no local setback. The German offensive had reached its culminating point, not only in the south, but also on the entire eastern front.55

The strategic culmination point pertains to the theater-strategic and national or alliance/coalition levels of war. It occurs only once in the course of a war fought in a single or multiple theaters. The strategic culmination is a point in space and time at which the combination of military and nonmilitary sources of power is reduced to such an extent that the chances of winning a war are foreclosed and one must go on the defensive or risk ultimate defeat. In terms of sources of military power, arrival at a strategic point of culmination is caused, among other things, by a lack of sufficient strategic reserves in manpower and weapons/equipment, inadequate mobilization, and one’s inability to field adequately trained forces in the longer term.56

In referring to what is today commonly understood as strategic culmination, Clausewitz insisted that as the attacker’s strength is reduced, a moment comes when both forces are roughly in balance and “the remaining force is just enough to maintain a defense and wait for peace.” If the attacker proceeds beyond this moment, then the defender’s moral and physical strength becomes superior to the attacker’s. Clausewitz contended that there are times when the superiority of the attacker is not sufficient to defeat the opposing army. In such instances, the attacker conducts war to acquire certain advantages over the defender. These advantages may even be psychological. The key consideration in such wars is that the attacker does not have the strength to destroy the opposing army but could achieve and maintain the political advantage and equilibrium. This moment of equilibrium is called the culminating point of victory.57 If the attacker attempts to go beyond that point, it is not merely a useless effort that cannot add to success; it is a damaging one that will lead to a reaction, and experience shows that such reactions usually have a completely disproportionate effect.58 To expand the Clausewitzian concept further, the culmination point of defeat also exists for a nation, alliance, or coalition on the strategic defensive, dealing with military and nonmilitary resources available over long periods, as well as being closely linked to military strategy and national or alliance/coalition policy and strategy.59

Relationships: Culminating points affect each other, sometimes in the most profound way. A culmination at the lower level of war almost invariably affects culmination at the next higher level. Sometimes a culminating point at the tactical or operational level may have operational or even strategic implications or consequences. The First Battle of Ypres, 22–23 October 1914, is an example of a tactical culmination that had operational consequences. The German objective in this major operation later known as the “race to the sea” was to seize the port of Calais on the French coast. The German Fourth Army was pitted against the British Expeditionary Forces (BEF), the Belgian army, and the French Territorials. The Germans had substantial numerical superiority—426 battalions against 263 Allied battalions. They focused their efforts on seizing the bridges across the River Yser, thereby enabling their Fourth Army to secure Calais. However, the Germans failed in that effort. Afterward, the Germans and the Allies became involved in a two-month-long struggle for control of the area. The Allies made better use of terrain than the Germans did. By 11 November, the Allies finally wrested the initiative from the Germans. It was the stubborn resistance of the British and the timely arrival of French reinforcements that prevented the Germans from breaking the Allied lines and thereby stabilized the front.60

The failure of Hitler’s all-or-nothing counteroffensive in the Ardennes in December 1944 (Operation WACHT AM RHEIN) had far-reaching and adverse consequences at the strategic level for the Germans. The German operational objective in that operation was to recapture the port of Antwerp by splitting and then destroying Allied armies in the northern and southern sectors of the Ardennes. Specifically, the Germans planned to use their 6th SS Panzer Army and 5th Panzer Army, with 28 to 30 divisions (including 12 Panzer and Panzer Grenadier divisions) in a surprise advance toward the Meuse River, and then without delay continue their movement toward Antwerp. They hoped to split the First U.S. Army and the British 21st Army Group and destroy them in the Antwerp-Brussels area.61 Hitler’s aim was also to derail the timetable for the Allied

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thrust into Germany, to allow the bulk of the German forces in the west to move to the east against the advancing Soviet armies.

The German offensive started on 6 December and achieved some local tactical successes. However, the offensive soon began to lose momentum because of ammunition and fuel shortages. German losses steadily increased, and Hitler finally admitted on 8 January that the offensive had failed. In the process, the Germans lost 100,000 men, 800 tanks, and 1,000 aircraft that they could not replace. These losses opened the door for the final Allied push into Germany. Had Hitler listened to his field commanders, either before or during the Ardennes offensive, the Germans might have been able to stabilize the front in the west, thereby allowing a more effective defense against the great threat to the Reich in the east—the advancing Soviet armies.62

Another example of the attacker’s operational culmination that had strategic consequences was the failure of the North Korean offensive against South Korea in June–September 1950. The UN amphibious landing at Inchon on 15 September 1950 (Operation CHROMITE) was aimed to cut off the lines of supplies to the North Korean divisions besieging the UN forces in the Pusan perimeter. In landing some 70,000 troops far behind the North Korean frontline troops, General MacArthur set the stage for the rapid culmination of the North Korean forces by compelling them to fight UN forces on two fronts.63 This action allowed the UN forces to begin a counteroffensive across the 38th Parallel and eventually all the way to the Yalu River, along the border with mainland China.

Causes of Overshooting the Culminating Point: Arrival at the point of culmination can occur because of many diverse factors. At the tactical level, an attack or defense can be temporarily overextended by the commander’s and his forces’ sheer fatigue or exhaustion, or by depletion of supplies of all kinds—a problem that could be resolved by simply replacing the commander or entire units, sending reinforcements, or rushing in supplies.64

One of the common causes of culmination at the operational level is the pursuit of multiple objectives without properly harmonizing the factors of space, time, and force versus each objective. For example, Hitler’s decision on 23 July 1942 to pursue three operational objectives simultaneously and in three divergent directions in southern Russia—one along the eastern coast of the Black Sea, one toward the Caucasian oil fields, and the third toward Stalingrad—led to multiple culminating points. None of these thrusts was mutually supporting.65 This decision was one of the major causes of the German defeat at Stalingrad.66 Hitler specified that the primary tasks of Army Group A (Seventeenth Army and 1st Panzer Army) would be to encircle and destroy the Soviet forces in the area southwest of Rostov-on-Don, seize the entire eastern coast of the Black Sea, and take out the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. Simultaneously, considerable mechanized force would protect flanks eastward, capture the area around Groznyy, and, with part of the forces, block Ossetian and Georgian roads. Finally, Army Group A would sweep along the Caspian Sea shores and seize the area of Baku. Army Group B (Sixth Army and the weakened 4th Panzer Army) had the task of building up the defense on the Don River and thrusting toward Stalingrad to destroy the Soviet forces deployed there, seize the city itself and crossings on the rivers Don and Volga, and block the river traffic. Other fast German units would advance to Astrakhan to block the main waterway on the Volga River.67 The Germans concentrated the entire Army Group A at one point—Rostov—thereby missing the opportunity to encircle the still-remaining strong Soviet forces behind the Don River. In addition, poor terrain conditions, unfavorable weather, and shortages of fuel all worked against the Army Group A. By 1 August, the 4th Panzer Army, with two German and one Romanian corps, totaling eight divisions, was assigned to support the Sixth Army’s drive toward Stalingrad. The planned offensive toward Stalingrad would last a little more than three weeks. Army Group A was directed to concentrate its remaining motorized units under the 1st Panzer Army for a drive in the direction of Maikop.68 Hitler overestimated the results of the German summer offensive in southern Russia and, subsequently becoming preoccupied with seizing Caucasian oil fields, neglected the operational thrust toward Stalingrad.69

The expansion of the initially assigned operational objectives can also be a significant cause of offensive culmination. For example, Stalin and the Stavka made such a blunder in their planning for the new offensive following the Soviet victory at Stalingrad in January 1943. They apparently believed

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it would be possible to achieve a strategic victory and end the war in a single blow by executing a new offensive against the German forces deployed in southern Russia and the Caucasus. Hence, Stalin changed the objectives of the Soviet offensive from crossing over the Donets River to encircling the German forces at Rostov, then proceeding to Zhdanov, and ultimately to Zaporozhye.70

The physical characteristics of the terrain can considerably affect culmination. The defender can use terrain to attrite advancing enemy forces. One way the attacker can overcome the factor of terrain is to operate at a high tempo. For example, operating at a higher tempo might create other effects that degrade attacking forces. In the Soviet offensive in southern Russia in January–February 1943, numerous unfrozen rivers delayed the Soviets’ advance by canalizing their attacks. The mobile units lacked trucks and tanks to continue their advance. Intermittent thaws turned parts of the countryside into quagmires, bogging down all means of transport, which exacerbated the already-tenuous supply situation.71 The small villages in the area provided excellent defensive positions for the Germans.

The factor of distance poses a major challenge in both offense and defense. The width and depth of the theater or area in which combat takes place necessarily cause the dispersal of combat power, which is an especially great problem for the attacker. For example, in their massive offensive in southern Russia in January–February 1943, the Soviets pursued defeated German troops uninterruptedly along a 750-mile-long front that in the south attained a depth of 435 miles. The Soviet spearheads became thinner and thinner, and eventually their advance came to a halt. Overextension and weakening of the Soviet combat power was the main reason for the success of Manstein’s counteroffensive.72 Likewise, the British in their offensive in North Africa in November 1942 (Operation CRUSADER) suffered a steady weakening of their forces because of the increased distances from their base of operations.

Time is another major factor of culmination. Clausewitz observed that both sides need time, and the question is only which of the two is in a situation to derive special advantage from it.73 Failure to use available time is unforgiving; once lost, time can never be recovered.74 The defender seeks to delay the decision. He can use time to increase relative advantage. In contrast, the attacker must move to hasten the decision since the passage of time accrues to the benefit of the defender.75

Very often one of the major contributing factors for culmination is the great reduction of combat power through attrition. The combat power of the attacker usually decreases faster than that of the defender and can become equal to, or lower than, that of the defender. Decreases in combat power can be due to fatigue, disadvantageous position, difficult terrain, or heavy weather. For example, Stalin and the Stavka ordered a major offensive in the aftermath of the Battle of Stalingrad although the Soviet troops had been in almost continuous combat for nearly two and half months. The Soviet infantry and armored units were short of men and machines. The Soviet 6th Army had only 40 tanks, and Mobile Group Popov had 212. These two armies were expected to conduct the 185-mile-deep operation with uncertain supply lines. In addition, their supply bases were far in the rear, and there was a shortage of trucks and horses to transport necessary supplies over the bad roads.76

The arrival at, or overshooting of, the culminating point is also affected by one’s inability to concentrate his forces in the critical area to gain the advantage of surprise and psychological shock and momentum. Another factor is the inability to protect friendly forces. If one’s superior mass is dissipated prior to attaining the assigned objective, then one’s ability to go on the offensive is essentially foreclosed. It is not numerical superiority itself that is one of the main prerequisites for success, but rather the application of superior combat potential/power at the decisive place and time.77 For example, Hitler grossly violated the principle of mass and dissipated German power in ordering three almost simultaneous and divergent thrusts in southern Russia (as described above) in the summer of 1942. Likewise, Stalin dissipated Soviet strength by ordering a series of offensive thrusts along the entire front in the winter of 1941–1942. The Soviets again violated the principle of mass in their offensive in southern Russia in January–February 1943, by advancing over a broad front in multiple directions and trying to seize all their objectives almost simultaneously.

Sometimes the attacker mistakenly believes that his forces have reached or are about to overshoot a point of culmination and decides to stop his offensive. This happened in the German

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offensive in the west in August–September 1914. The German Army’s Supreme Command (OHL) ordered a general withdrawal after the Battle of the Marne (5–10 September) although German forces were not significantly attrited and logistical support was still adequate. The German offensive in the west had started on 3 August 1914; Belgium and northern France were overrun. Four French armies were forced to retreat, suffering some 800,000 casualties. However, the French struck back at the German flanks and temporarily halted the German advance on 27 August. The German First Army commander, General Alexander Kluck, shifted the direction of his advance to the southeast, passing east of Paris, not south as envisaged in the Schlieffen Plan. By 2 September Kluck’s forces had reached the rivers Marne and Oise. In the meantime, the German chief of the general staff, General Helmuth von Moltke, Jr., moved his headquarters to Luxembourg, some 170 miles away from the German First Army. Yet this did not improve greatly his ability to control the movements of subordinate army commanders. Also, there were no telephone communications to army commands, because the French and the Belgians had destroyed commercial lines. Telegrams often arrived at the German Army’s Supreme Command 24 hours late. In addition, some time was required for these telegrams to be decoded. Aerial delivery was confused and uncertain. Motorcycle and automobile service was slow and sometimes hazardous.78

During the most critical phase of the battle of the Marne, General Joseph Joffre (1852–1931), commanding the French armies, ordered his Sixth Army to complete its concentration in the Paris area while continuing general withdrawal elsewhere until the Fifth Army was safely out of danger of being enveloped by the advancing Germans. In contrast, Moltke, Jr., made a series of decisions between 30 August and 4 September that proved to be quite wrong. These errors were caused by not only his poor judgment but also his lack of knowledge of the extent and speed of advance of Kluck’s First Army and poor communications between the Army’s Supreme Command Headquarters and the armies in the field.79 As a result of miscommunication, Kluck, instead of halting his advance, continued southward across the Marne and thereby opened his right flank to French counterattack. The German Army’s Supreme Command was confused by poor intelligence received from other parts of the front. Moltke, Jr., received news that additional British troops had landed at Ostend on 30 August. The rumors—subsequently proved false—were that this force was a vanguard for 80,000 Russians.80

At the height of the Battle of the Marne on 8 September, Moltke, Jr., sent a general staff officer, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hentsch, to assess the situation at the subordinate army headquarters. Hentsch, who had only oral orders, approved the planned withdrawal of General Karl von Buelow’s Second Army that day, and Kluck’s army a day later. Contributing to this decision was the Belgian one-day sortie from Antwerp, which had all the incalculable psychological effect of bad news at a critical moment in the crisis.81 Moltke, Jr., realizing that the offensive had failed, ordered the general withdrawal of all German armies to new positions behind the Marne River.82 However, the Allied troops were too exhausted to pursue the retreating Germans. The Germans lost the Battle of the Marne mainly because of the ineptness of the chief of the general staff, poor intelligence and communications, and Joffre’s superior leadership.

The unfounded optimism and overconfidence of Stalin, Stavka, and the front commanders before and throughout most of the offensive in southern Russia in January–February 1943 were among the major reasons the Soviets overshot their operational culmination and suffered a significant operational setback. This optimism was based in part on the fall of Stalingrad and the destruction of the Italian 8th and Hungarian 2nd armies. The Soviets also misunderstood German intentions and underestimated their capabilities. A more serious error, perhaps, was that the Stavka overestimated the capabilities of the Soviet forces and was thus led to issue unrealistic directives. This resulted in heavy Soviet casualties. None of the Soviet high-ranking field commanders accurately assessed the operational situation; forces with barely enough combat power to defend were ordered to attack. Communications between higher headquarters and subordinate commanders were generally poor. Also, the operational objectives were changed without indicating where subordinates would accept risk.83

Lack of adequate logistical support is probably one of the most frequent causes of culmination. Poor organization of the forward movement of supplies and lack of transportation assets are only a few examples of such factors.84 Constant combat and overextension of lines of

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supplies, combined with lack of coordination and shortages of vital supplies such as fuel, water, and ammunition, considerably affect arrival at the point of culmination. For example, during the Allied offensive in November 1941 (Operation CRUSADER), Rommel experienced great logistical difficulties. About 10 percent of his fuel was expended to transport the other 90 percent. The fuel for his panzers was only one-third of the total requirements. Between 30 and 50 percent of all the fuel shipped to Libya was wasted between Tripoli and the front. Aviation fuel became so scarce that German aircraft were limited to one sortie per day. In addition, there were heavy losses of supplies across the Mediterranean and also on land. The supplies were carried on the truck columns only during the night hours.85 Only four hours after the start of the counteroffensive on 21 January 1942, the German 15th Panzer Division was out of fuel and incapable of pursuing British forces. This situation was compounded for the Germans by the British destruction of Allied fuel stores as they retreated under pressure from the Afrika Korps.86

The ever-expanding length of supply lines and corresponding sustainment difficulties were the principal reasons for Rommel’s failure to continue his offensive past El Alamein in 1942.87 Rommel’s drive into Egypt did not culminate at El Alamein in November but actually in late June, because of exhaustion after almost five weeks of continued combat that had begun at Gazala. By 3 July his forces were woefully short of personnel, especially infantry. The Afrika Korps’ lines of supplies were about 1,600 miles long, while the Allied lines of supplies from Egypt to the front line were only about 100 miles long.88 The distance between Alexandria and El Alamein is only about 60 miles. A single 1,200-mile-long road was available for moving the Axis forces’ supplies between Tripoli and the front line. The intermediate port of Benghazi, only 300 miles from the Egyptian border, was theoretically capable of handling 2,700 tons of supplies per day; however, constant harassment by the Royal Air Force (RAF) limited the supplies to no more than 700 to 800 tons per day.89 To compound the Axis difficulties, everything the Afrika Korps needed had to be transported from Italy across the central Mediterranean and then offloaded in a few inadequate Libyan ports. Afterward, all supplies had to be transported hundreds of miles across the desert in truck convoys, always in short supply.90 About one-third of the Afrika Korps’ supplies remained hundreds of miles to the rear, awaiting transportation to the front. Furthermore, too few tanks remained in the German panzer divisions.91

In their great, and ultimately unsuccessful, offensive in southern Russia in January–February 1943, the Soviets lost more tanks to mechanical breakdown than to enemy fire. The Stavka failed to take into account fatigue of troops. Resupply was delayed by bad roads, and stocks rapidly became depleted. The Soviet units were committed without fuel or ammunition, and local labor could not resupply the fast-moving mechanized forces. When Mobile Group Popov started its attack on 29 January, it was short of fuel and ammunition and its combat power was reduced by the need to leave forces behind to guard supply trains and lines of communications.92

Logistical difficulties were the principal reason the Allied armies paused in western France in late September and October 1944. The Allies had a great shortage of gasoline, ammunition, and transportation to support the operations of several armies along the entire front. Their hopes of mounting an advance on a broad front into the heart of Germany were dashed because their armies could not be sustained without first seizing the port of Antwerp.93 Patton’s Third Army’s rapid advance across France culminated mainly for lack of supplies. By 31 August the Third Army’s advance into northeastern France had stopped because of a lack of fuel for its tanks. The day before, the Third Army had received only 32,000 gallons of fuel instead of its normal requirements of 400,000 gallons, and no new fuel supplies were promised until 2 September. Two days later, after the Allied capture of Antwerp, the Third Army received an equal share of supplies with the First Army. Patton resumed his advance, but by then the Germans had considerably stiffened their resistance, and the Third Army was stopped on the Meuse River.94

In the war against Iraq in 2003 (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM) the U.S. 3rd ID and the 101st Airborne Division crossed the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border on 20 March and then advanced fast over the broad front toward Baghdad. On or about 24 March, they apparently arrived at the point of culmination after reaching a position about 50 to 60 miles from Baghdad. Almost at the same time, a severe three-day sandstorm delayed further advance.95 For the next 72 hours, the coalition forces stopped their advance to refuel, reequip, rest, and prepare for the next phase of

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the advance toward Baghdad. The primary reason for reaching or even overshooting culminating points was the logistical difficulties caused by a too-rapid advance and ever-extending lines of communications between logistical bases in Kuwait and the frontline units. These conditions, in turn, gave the Iraqi Fedayeen paramilitary forces an opportunity to harass coalition forces in the rear. The Iraqis, however, were unable to coordinate and mass their forces to attack weak points in the coalition lines.96 Undoubtedly, a more skillful enemy would have done more damage.97

In addition to logistics, the abilities of the opposing commanders and their forces often cause one’s force to reach the culminating point.98 The operational commanders might be overly optimistic or pessimistic in their assessment of the operational or strategic situation. Their perception of the enemy operational commander’s abilities or intentions might be off the mark by a wide margin. Or they might have unrealistic expectations of their subordinate commanders and the capabilities of friendly forces. Each of these and similar errors might be a significant factor in reaching or overshooting one’s own culminating point.

The attacker’s culmination can occur because the attacking forces move faster than their intelligence can support. A commander with barely adequate forces might then take unnecessary risks or suffer losses and endanger his success. The attacker and the defender can also reach their respective culminating points because of a lack of adequate intelligence support.99 For example, in the First Battle of El Alamein in July 1942, Rommel lost intelligence assets in combat, making it even more difficult for him to accurately evaluate the operational situation.100

Poor intelligence is often one of the major reasons for the attacker’s or the defender’s culmination: Sometimes the commander and his staff draw the wrong operational conclusions even though they are in possession of good intelligence, as Rommel’s experience in North Africa in January 1941 shows. Rommel’s decision to launch a counteroffensive was based on his intelligence officer’s false evaluation of the situation. The intelligence officer told Rommel that for at least the next two weeks the German forces would be much better supplied than the British forces facing them, and that now would be the best time to attack.101 Rommel also received radio intercept intelligence that the British were experiencing supply difficulties.102 For their part, the British had extremely bad intelligence on the German forces. Among other things, they believed Rommel’s divisions existed in name only; the Germans were disorganized, short of senior officers, short of materiel, and tired by continued pressure from the Allied forces. Information from German prisoners of war suggested that German morale was low and losses in recent fighting high. They also wrongly believed that there was dissatisfaction with Rommel’s leadership.103 The British CINC in the Middle East, general Earl Wavell, made the same mistake in April 1941 in concluding that Rommel would not be strong enough to launch an attack before May.104

Before and during the Soviet offensive in southern Russia in January–February 1943, the Stavka and Soviet front commanders completely misread German intentions and capabilities. The air of overconfidence affected the intelligence assessment of the Soviet field commanders.105 On 19 and 20 February, Soviet air reconnaissance observed large German panzer concentrations near Krasnograd, identified forward movement of German equipment from Dnepropetrovsk, and detected a regrouping of panzer forces from the east toward Krasnoarmeyskoye.106 However, the Soviets misconstrued these movements as being part of a general withdrawal of German forces from the Donets Basin. To subsequent Soviet dismay, these movements proved to be preparations for a German counteroffensive that would destroy Mobile Group Popov and a major part of the forces of the southwest front.107 In contrast, Manstein knew the conditions of the Soviet armies better than the Stavka did. He monitored the radio traffic of all key Soviet units because his signal corps had broken Soviet codes. Reportedly he was aware of everything his Soviet counterpart, Vatutin, was doing.108

The premature arrival at and overshooting of one’s own culminating point is rarely the result of a single factor, no matter how important or dominant that factor may be. Rather, a combination of factors usually causes culmination. For instance, in the Battle of Borodino on 7 September 1812, Napoleon I carried out a frontal attack and inflicted heavy losses on the Russians. Russian general Mikhail I. Kutuzov lost some 52,000 men and was pursued by some 28,000 greatly weakened French soldiers. A week later Napoleon I entered Moscow at the head of a 95,000-man army. However, he recognized the weakness of his position—he was about 560

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miles away from his main base on the Niemen River, and Kutuzov threatened the security of the single French line of supplies from Moscow to Kaluga. After signing a peace treaty with Turkey in late September, the Russians released additional forces against Napoleon I. General Pavel Chichagov, with 64,000 men in Volhynia, threatened the French from the south; and Schwarzenberg Corps (named after Count Karl Philipp Schwarzenberg), with 34,000 in the north, represented an additional threat to Napoleon I’s line of supplies. In addition, General Ludwig Wittgenstein, with 40,000 men, advanced to the Dvina River from the north. Napoleon I’s efforts to negotiate with the tsar were ultimately unsuccessful. A combination of lack of supplies, the Russian threat to his lines of supplies, and growing problems with morale and discipline of his troops led Napoleon I to order the retreat from Moscow on 19 October.109

The first of three great German offensives on the western front that started on 20 March 1918 reached its point of culmination through a combination of logistical difficulties, lack of mobility to consolidate gains on the ground, and timely countermeasures by the Allies at the most threatened parts of the front The German objective was to achieve penetration in three sequential operations (MICHEL-I/-II/-III) and reach the Le Fêre–Ham–Péronne line, to be expanded in the area of Arras a few days later by two successive operations (MARS and ERZENGEL). Despite some brilliant tactics, the German offensive was an operational failure.110 The Germans eventually gained a 40-mile salient and penetrated the Allied front at three places. However, their attempt to straighten out and shorten their front line failed, their drive petered out, and the offensive halted on 5 April.111 The Allies suffered about 240,000 casualties during the offensive. The German losses were similarly high. One reason for the German setback was the lack of adequate logistical support after the troops penetrated the Allied lines. The Germans were unable to provide the required level of ammunition, food, and other supplies to their advancing troops. They did not have fast-moving troops to exploit their tactical successes. Also, the establishment of the Allied unified command under General Ferdinand Foch (1851–1929) on 26 March allowed the Allies for the first time to have unity of command in the west. During the most critical phase of the German offensive, Foch was able to commit Allied reserves in a timely manner.112

Rommel’s counteroffensive in North Africa in November 1941 suffered because of a lack of replacements for both personnel and equipment, overextended supply lines, and continued weakening of his forces.113 Likewise, the British offensive in Libya in January 1942 reached its operational culmination due to extended supply lines, low morale among the troops, high attrition, and inadequate training.114 In 1942, prior to the First Battle of El Alamein, Rommel put himself in an impossible situation: either to stand still or to continue to advance. Rommel decided to continue pursuit and attack the British Eighth Army. He believed—wrongly, as it turned out—that the British were on the run and that hence they should not be given time to prepare their defenses. The ensuing battle, which started on 30 June–1 July, was a close call, but in the end Rommel failed to achieve a decision. By 4 July a combination of inadequate logistics, troop exhaustion, and stiffening Allied resistance forced Rommel to stop his advance and revert to defense. In retrospect, the first battle of El Alamein signaled that Rommel had overshot his operational culminating point.115

The Soviets overshot their point of culmination during their offensive in January–February 1943 in southern Russia because of a combination of logistical difficulties, continued use of attrited troops and materiel, lack of operational reserves, poor intelligence, and lack of realistic appreciation of their own capabilities. Stalin and the Stavka were too sure of success. A poorly prepared and broad linear offensive along a 750-mile front in southern Russia was planned. No operational reserves existed or were created to influence the course and the outcome of the operation. In fact, the Soviets were forced to pull divisions out of line, thus making new sectors vulnerable to German attack. The Soviet commanders also failed to amass whatever combat strength they had, thereby limiting their offensive potential. The commanders of the Soviet armies directed their depleted divisions to continue to fight ineffectively instead of regrouping the remaining tanks, artillery, and soldiers into fewer but stronger forces. Higher headquarters constantly pressured subordinates to maintain the momentum and accomplish assigned missions. They allowed units to be bogged down attempting tasks which they were no longer capable of carrying out. Several times Mobile Group Popov’s tanks had to rescue infantry, causing them to fall

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further behind in their schedule for accomplishing assigned missions. Mobile Group Popov also had to protect its flanks against counterattacking Germans, weakening its main effort even further. The Soviets also wrongly assumed that the Germans were retreating. Otherwise, they might have been able to recognize their forces’ arrival at the point of culmination.116

Methods: The main problem for the attacker is to delay the culmination as long as possible, while the defender must find ways to hasten the attacker’s culmination. Actions to postpone or prevent culmination move that point further away in time and space. Both sides in a conflict, then, should try to obtain their respective objectives before reaching their respective culminations.117

Some methods of overcoming a culminating point are similar, but their purpose and procedures differ greatly. Among other things, the attacker can delay the arrival or overshooting of his point of culmination by better force protection, which lowers the rate of attrition; by maintaining the initiative and high operational tempo; and by ensuring timely arrival of reinforcements or commitment of his reserves. He can also delay the arrival at the point of culmination by the proper sequencing of major operations or campaigns, sound planning of tactical and operational fires, and planning or execution of operational pauses. In addition, by applying the principles of unity of effort, simplicity, and security he can delay the approaching point of culmination. An offensive culmination can also be prevented or at least delayed by the proper synchronization of one’s logistics. In that way, the commander can control the tempo of actions by his forces. This is far more important at the operational level than at the tactical level because of the much larger factors of space, time, and forces and the correspondingly more dire consequences if logistical sustainment proves inadequate. Logistical support and sustainment should be adequate to allow the commander to achieve his operational or strategic objectives before the onset of culmination.118 A commander might intentionally decide to temporarily overextend his forces to reach a decision, but there is always a rather large risk in doing so. Therefore, a prudent operational commander should carefully weigh all factors to measure the importance of the success he might achieve against the possibility of failure.119

The defender’s task is to hasten the attacker’s arrival at his point of culmination before he can accomplish his stated objective. The defender’s actions should force the attacker to culminate early and then shift to counterattack or counteroffensive.120 The defender can considerably hasten the attacker’s arrival at a point of culmination by launching a series of combined ground and air attacks aimed at inflicting heavy losses on the attacking forces. He can derail the attacker’s timetable by offering unexpectedly strong resistance on some selected strong points, or he can try to cut off the attacker’s lines of supplies.

The most profitable methods are often strikes on selected road or railroad junctions, supply depots, or major bridges or causeways whose destruction or neutralization might cause a ripple effect through the entire logistical support and sustainment infrastructure. For example, in his highly successful counteroffensive in southern Russia in February–March 1943, Manstein hastened the Soviets’ arrival at their culminating point by using the Luftwaffe to destroy the Soviet supply depots and transportation network. During the counteroffensive, the German units also carried out a special operation to destroy supply lines within the battle area.121

Given the advantage of waiting, the defender may reduce the attacker’s strength faster than his own is worn down, while protecting his main source of power. Eventually, however, he will approach a defensive culminating point. By then he will no longer benefit from waiting, and his own losses will no longer yield an increase in relative advantage over the attacker. However, there is no guarantee that the defender will be successful in a counterattack unless he has a safe margin of relative combat power over the attacker. Therefore, the defender should, if possible, direct combat power not only against the enemy’s force but also against elements of his logistical supply and sustainment. The essence of General MacArthur’s plan to land some 150 miles behind the North Korean forces besieging the Pusan perimeter was to cut off their lines of supplies and bring the arrival of their operational culmination much faster than by simply attriting them over time. The U.S. X Corps not only cut off the enemy lines of supplies but also forced the North Koreans to face a threat from two directions. Synchronized with the X Corps’s landing, the Eighth Army launched an offensive to break out of the Pusan perimeter. The psychological effect

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of the Inchon landing caused the rapid disintegration of the North Korean Army, and by 26 September the lead divisions of the Eighth Army had linked up with the X Corps at Seoul.122

Another option is to trade space for time and thereby preserve one’s own combat power while lengthening the enemy’s lines of supply. As these lines become longer, they become more vulnerable to attack, forcing the enemy to assign more resources to defense and thereby weakening his ability to continue his advance. By inflicting attrition on the attacker’s combat force and interdicting his lines of supply, the defender can cause the attacker to arrive at or exceed his culminating point.123

One method of speeding the enemy’s arrival at his point of culmination is to attack selected modes of transport or force him to carry supplies and bring reinforcements by other, more cumbersome, time-consuming, or vulnerable modes of transport. For example, during the Soviet offensive in southern Russia in January–February 1943, the Germans focused their attacks on the Soviet railroad system, which forced the Soviets to use less adequate and more time-consuming motor vehicle and horse transport.124 The defender can also hasten the attacker’s arrival at the point of culmination by properly sequencing tactical actions or major operations.

Conclusion: The Clausewitzian concept of a culminating point remains relevant and viable today despite the passage of time. While the theoretical underpinnings of the concept remain essentially the same as Clausewitz postulated, its content has changed significantly. Since the early nineteenth century, the operational level of war and several sublevels of war have emerged. The factors affecting culmination today are also much more diverse and difficult to quantify than they were in the past, making the proper application of the concept more difficult. This is especially true in low-intensity conflict, where the linkage between strategic and tactical levels is much closer than in high-intensity conventional war. Also, the factors affecting culmination at the operational and strategic levels are predominantly unquantifiable in character. To successfully anticipate and plan for arrival at the culminating point, it is critical to fully comprehend the theory. Theory can show the way, but it cannot guarantee success. Historical examples can only illustrate certain aspects or problems with theory; it cannot show the path in the future. But it is difficult to see how the theory can be properly understood without those examples.

Application of the concept of culmination requires the highest degree of skill on the part of commanders and their staffs. This is even more critical at the operational and strategic levels of war, because the consequences of premature culmination or failure to take advantage of the enemy’s culmination are far more severe and more durable than at the tactical level. Factors affecting culmination should be fully understood. While many factors cause culmination, probably the four most important factors are pursuing simultaneously or nearly simultaneously the accomplishment of multiple operational or major tactical objectives, and inadequate logistics, intelligence, and force protection. Operational commanders and their principal staff officers should identify the various factors that cause one’s own and enemy forces to reach culmination and then plan action to prevent one’s own or speed up the enemy’s point of culmination. Among other things, these factors include logistical support and sustainment, protection of one’s lines of supply, weather and terrain, attrition, replacement of troops and equipment, and the relationships of the factors of time, space, and force. Operational planners should identify actions that will lead the opposing force to culminate prematurely. It should be emphasized that intangible elements of combat power—specifically, leadership, morale and discipline, doctrine, and training—are as critical to success as they were in the past. Therefore, while always paying close attention to tangible elements of combat power that affect or cause culmination, operational commanders should perhaps focus even more on those unquantifiable elements that significantly or even decisively affect culmination.