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Description of document: National Security Agency (NSA) document: A History of

U.S. Communications Security Post World-War II

released under Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR)

Released date: February 2011

Posted date: 07-November-2011

Source of document: National Security Agency

Declassification Services (DJ5)Suite 6884, Bldg. SAB2

9800 Savage Road

Ft. George G. Meade, MD, 20755-6884

Note: Although the titles are similar, this document should not be

confused with the David G. Boak Lectures available:

http://www.governmentattic.org/2docs/Hist_US_COMSEC_Boak_NSA_1973.pdf

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http://www.governmentattic.org/2docs/Hist_US_COMSEC_Boak_NSA_1973.pdfhttp://www.governmentattic.org/2docs/Hist_US_COMSEC_Boak_NSA_1973.pdf


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A HISTORY OF U.S . COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY,POST-WORLDWA:RU

SfER:E'f

corv11fff)

P.L. 8 6 ~ 3_... ..-'

peclassified and approved for release byNSA. NSC. OSD. the Joint Staff. DIA. the U.~ t a t e Department. the U,S. Army, the U.S.Navy, and the U.S. Air Force on 02-04-2011b_ursuantto E.O. 13526. MDR 59142


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, \ d m o w l < u l g e n w n l ~

The ;.;ourtr!s used in c o m p i l i n ~ this history arc many an d ,aricd. We a n ~ f!SJJeciallyundclitcd to l-lr. G f ~ l r g c II owe, r-.;sA II istoriun from 19 to 19 , f11r Ihe significant contrihuti(ms hehtts made to t.he l\gcncy's heritage in his lhe vdume draft of The. Narrative /lis ory ofAFSA VS:\

The portion of Ihe II istory covering most :1Hpccts of wirt!d rotor dcvclopnumt is hasf!O on ASuney ofWired /lotors w h i < ~ h was p r c i # ' ~ d hy a long time expert in that fiP-Id, :\tr. Ryun Page ::\.lr.Po1gc's survey is prcscntly being rcvicwt.>d and updul.cd, and will he published in due cour!-'c ns anacljuncllo this llistory ofCommuni

y" iTSEC/KY-8 , I'Y-28, and K Y :i8 syshmts. 'l'his historical study will also be publh:hed in due coursnas a further adjunct to this II is tory

.:\lany thanks go, also, to the numerous pa:;t and J>rc,;cnt employees of the S Organizalionfor their valuable ad\ice and assistance.

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l"orewordIn his trcati;.:e entitled "The First SIGI:\T Organization,"! :\Jr. Htli :.hlh,nrd. u ltrm

thl! Dirccl.orale or GCilq,:z dr .. rtbmlthc.> M!CIIt! inllrnry V ..\rlll. Scene II, whi


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IntroductionThe history of the i.nvention, development, and appl'ication of cryptographic devices,

machines, and associated apparatas and material is long and int-eFesting. Attempts to keep secure , o - y ~ n , : t - a f t o 1 ? the contents of the various communications passing between and among Civil and m i l i t a r y ~ -.hav.e gone through many vissicitudes over the yeaz:s, not always with a great deal of saccess. This is

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Eaciphering and deciphering were teQious, time consliming processes. The wired rotor, which becamepracticable for secure maclii:nes in the late '30s, was to revolutionize the encryption/decryptionprocesses ofthe era.

By early 1942 rotor machines were b@nnittg ta ease th e l ~ a d on manlial sy.stems and tolower the time between filing of a message and delivery to its inteaded recipient. At least this was

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commPrt"ittl (radio, television data), etc. 'l'hc volume of matfrial in the radio frcuucncy Sp


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Chapter3Part I. ' fhP R l e m c n t . ~ o(Commnnir:ation.o; Sec-urity

.\lost. members of the cryptologic c:ommunily have a fairly good knowledge of what thet.erm communications security means. But just in case there ar c some who do nul, communicutionssecurity IC


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Crypt11graphic S(>curily - This con;;ists of the prO\ision of cr_\ptog-raphic ::;ystcms whichinherently secure: provision of the m l < ~ s . regulations, and policies to govern t h f ~ i r u!ie: and t h < ~ uxcPhJsical.Secr.trity- 1'his amounts simply lo l.aking the necessary prcerhaps others such as size and weighl. I f thtl-.:../requirement could be met by cxist.ing crypl.osystcms, th e proper malf!tiuls would huve beenprovidld and the job was relathely simple. But if i t was a new requirement, a newly expressed needwhich had not ar-is(m before, a different procedure was called fi1r.

a. Requirements, Production, Control. First, a research project would be established.Engineers would devise an equipment which would mcell.he physical requir(lmtmts; crypl.ographicexports would "invent" a cryptographic component which would fit into the geographicallimitations impost.'

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cquipmnntl-1 \\'(!re t.hcn produced. Thus, in h.ce1)ing with the d1!finiiion of t : r y p w : - c < . ~ u r i t y through t h < ~ fln;t step. pro\ision of' an inh

Whih! th e production of basic equipment. wuH going ahead at ~ o n w commercial plant,1 \ F S / \ / ~ S i \ was manufacturing, in it s own l'acilitim;, the materials that had to he provided with thecquir>mrml. As wus generally th e case, most cryplosystcms consisted of a hash:, unvariable methodcJf opcrat ion, u:mally a m ~ 1 c h i n c and, in addition, ecrt.ain \'Uriablc t!lcments. It wus these lattervnriables whieh were produced by A F S A i ~ S A . t.:'suully they consisl.nd of cipher rotors, small wheelswith e l e c t r i c ~ circuits through them, which could be placed in a ciphm mar


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p w < ~ e d u n was put. into

Closely intcrwo,cn in this pattern of control was cryptosccurily's companion clement,physical security. Physical security of cryptomaterial breakdown into three main aspects -c ~ l a b l i s h m c n t . of safeguards govern i n ~ t.hc material itself i.e., how it should he prot


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what is rcull.' meant it< the e:owcution of steps df!:-;igncd t.o make interception as difficult as p o s s i h l l ~ . Included in t h c ~ s c prou.>eth;n measmc!; mn:

1) the! use ofspecialhcd radio equipment, i;pecial antennas, f n ~ q u c m c i e s , etc.2) p r o t c c l ( ~ d landlines:H r c f ~ i s t ration of and accounting for, docunwnts and e


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produced tht r < ~ c c i v


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C h u p t t ~ r IScr\'ice COMsgc E s l a h l i ~ h m c n t s C S. Army

Part IICOMSEC J9J5-l955

At the boginning ofWorld War ll ,thc Signal S ( ~ c u r i t y Agency's Code Compilation &!


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~ e c u d l y ! c i l u d i c ~ and monitming of traffic.During the war. technological adnm

Atlhc end of World Watll, Army communications sccul'ity was the sole J'f!HponsibiJit.y oft.hc Signal St!curity Agency. 'rhc heud of th e Signal Security Agency at that lime reporl

On 15 Snptmnhc9(U new organization, the t\rmy Security Agency (ASA) was

!Ibid.2Whcn wearing hi s other hat, i.e., C O ~ f l ~ ' l ' , the Chief, Signal Security Agency reported to

th e Assistant Chief of Staff, G2.squadrons: Radio lntclligoncc Platoons of Aviation SignalCompanies; and all other units and activities organized to perform communications intelligenceand communications security functions.

Althc time of this change in ~ t r u c l . u r c , C0:\11;\;T and CO).TSEC units and personnel ofASA wore allocated to major

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I r\GO : ~ 2 2 , (1/9/45), OBS B-:\1, dated 6 Scpt

As head of this new establishmcnl, the Chief, Army &lcurily Agency, was rcsponsibl(l forthe f(,llowing S f G I ~ T . and C(>.:\ISBC activities.

a. lntcrccplion, identification, and analysis of radio and wire traffic.b. Organization, employmont, nnd operation of C 0 : \ 1 l ~ T an d COMSEC establishments,

procl!dures, and cquipments within the Army, exclusive of message centers.c. H c s < ~ a r c h and development of uH items of equipment of partkular inwrcst to the Army

Security Agency.d. Determination of the military characteristics of and Uw rcquir'cmcnls for items of

equipment pQculiar to the Army Security Agency.c. Research, development, preparation, publication, revision, storage and dh;tribution of

ull cryptographic equipment an d matcrinl (including codes, ciphers , and S


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h. l>l'f!paration of field r:uJnU;lls an dtraining Iiteraturc.

i. Prnparation ofT/O's, :\lOS's, etc, required h ~ lh(! Army Sc until 1 January 1949,did no t have any single entity responsible for directing an d coordinating all phases ofcommunicatiom; security. 'rhe Dcparf.mcnl of th e Army undertook to provide these 5er\'iccs to th eArmy Air Forces in accordance with the terms of u 15 September 1945 letter signed by :\tGcnEdward Jo'. W i t s ~ l l . Acting Adjlllant General, L: .S. Army I Tht! first fotmal step in establishing the

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CSA F S m ~ u r i t . y Service was t


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a. Th!! operational command and dirr!ction of ~ r l l ('Ommunicatior:! int.ellig-Pncc an dC\lmmunicalion security units and personmll assif.{nt' will be used whore feasible.

g. 'J'hc llrCparation of operating and m a i n l c n u n c ( ~ instructions for cryptographicequipment and related systems developed und used cxclusi vcly by the Air I'orcc; collaboration inthe p r f ~ p a r a t i o n of operating and m a i n t e n a n c e ~ instructions for jointly dm:clopcd and uHcdcQptographic systnms and equipment. Security classification of the aforementioned equipment andrelated systems will be a responsibility of the Agency developing the equipment.

h. 'l'he cryptographic and transmission security of Air l'orcc communications .i. The establishment of r ~ ( J U i r c m e n l s for p ( ~ r s o n n e J fm the communication security

unif.s in accordance wilh c:,;tablished 1\ ir 1-'orcc policies.j. The organization and training of all units and provision for the specialized

lraini ng of al1 individuals engaged in Air [.'orce communication int.clligcncc nnd Hccurity acti\'ilies .k. 'l'he determination of doctrine and techniques and the preparation of training

literature an d field manual::;.

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I. 'l'hn prntlaration of T


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Army.?. l:ff()ctivc 15 F c ~ h n m r : 19-Hl. th e ;\ir Force a , ; ~ u n w d rc!-;pon;;;ihilitie;; f(n ttw followingfandions:

2 ,J AAFAR J. 11-5-1-, 3 t December 1948

2. Prcpan.JI.ion and puhliculion of operating and maintenance instructions forcryptographic equipment and systems developed by, and used exclusively by,lhc Air l'orcc.

3. Collaboration in the preparation and publication of operating an d maintl!nanceinstructions for cryptographic cquipm(ml and systems in which both !he Army and Air fo'orcc arcinvol\'ed in th e usc or development, thereof.

4. Determination of doctrines and techniques, and for the preparation of trainingliterature for Air Force C O ~ U N T an d CO:\ISJ:C operations, with th e cxccpl ion of individualspecialists training conduclf!d by the Army for the Air Forco.

5. Prcparation of Tables of Organization and gquipmcnt for CSAI


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b. cryptanalysisc. n!!'\carch and dc\'clopmcntd. development of common C0:\11 \ 'T and Cof USAI-' communictions, prf!paration and produdion of key lisL"l, and storage, distribution andaccounting of cryptographic systems and C(JUipmcnts, the Army continued to perform lhctm tasksuntil the Air 1-'orce was able lo assemble the facilitit!S and resources to assume them.

C. t;.S. ~ a v y U.S. Navy regulations in force throughout WWU directed that all codes an d cipht!rs an d

signal publications would he produced by the Chiefof Naval Opcrutions. 'l'o meet the rcquircmcnlRof these regulations, a communications security organi:t.ation was established under the Chif!f of: \aval Comnmnieations lo carry oullhe most imporlant.functions:

a. Roscarch was porformcd by the cryptographic research section (OP-2041.)). Thissection dctctmincd cryJ>lographie principles of t;.S .:'\aval cryptographic aids, and producedbreadboard models of new machine and devices resulting from its research.

b. Engineering developments were carried out by th e ~ a v a J Code and SignalI..nhoratory. This facility completed enginc01ing on equipment and designs, and o\nrhaulcd - and

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11l:-:c1 manufaclund in ils own shops- a tonsirl


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Chnf1lcr2/ntP.rservi('t' Coordirwtion

l'rtrt II

A P P H < M C I H ~ G A TH:\:-.:SITIO:'oir\L PEHIOD1\s the military snrviccs looked to the post war peaiod, certain c o n s i d ( ~ J a t i o n s indicated a

need for much closer collatoration and perhaps even for a complete merger - of the two existingC O ~ l l . : \ ' 1 ' Agencies, i.e., the ~ a v y Communictions Security Agency (CSA) and the Army SecurityAgency tASA). One overriding consideration was that continuity of C0:\11.:"'1' and C0:\1SECoperations would have to be prescr\"ed in order to maintain zoadiness for possible futurecmcagcncies. The organizations which would result from close collaboration or mcrgcr would bedirected in a manner which would prevent another Penrl llarhor, and would be lrnincd andequipped to S

One of the most difficult probl(!ms arising out of such a consolidation ,..,ould be that offusing th e essentially military organizal,ion of ~ a \ ' y ' s CSA with th e essentially civilianorganization of Army's ASA. A primary purpose of a consolidation would be to conserve and makemaximum usc of the l i m i t ! ~ number of personnel who were trained und oxpcrien(:cd in COMJX'I'm a t t E ~ r s . Thus it was most important that any new organization be established along lines thatwould not only assure retention of the personnel who were employed by CSA nnd /\SA, but. ulsowould attract n < ~ w personnel of the requisite caliber, both civilian an d military.

'l'o aid in ciTecl.ing such a merger, an unofficial working level group was rc,rmcd. 'l'hisresulted from an agreement reached in February 1944, between leaders of the Army and the Navy.I'rhc group was known as the Army-.Navy Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee( A ~ C I C C ) . '!'his commitlcc, along with other committees and groups, f o r m u l a t f ~ d and viC\\cdvarious studies and proposals which resulted eventually in the formation of the Armed ForcesSecurity Agency (:\FSAl.

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I S e e r ~ l A r r n y - ~ H \ ' ) ' A g r < ~ m n e n t lor the Exchnng

Deputy Chief, ~ l i l i t u r y Intelligence Scnicc, L'.S. Army, Colonel C. W. Clarke.CornmandingOflkcr. Signal Security 1\g(mcy, L.S.l\rmy, Colorwl W. P. C o r d t ~ r m a n

q;or it s lirsl. two meetings, 18 April and tO :\Jay 1944, it u ~ o k th e namt! Army-Xavy RadioIntelligence Coordinating Commith!e.

2Top Secret .:\linutcs of A ~ C I C C Mectingof8 !';on!mbcr 1944, pp 12-15. AG r c c ~ 3'I'opSccrct. ANCICC General Information- :\o. 1, 10 :';;ovember 194-l. AG Rec.Assistunt

IJirf!clorof:";;uval Communictions (0P-20G), U.S. ~ a v y , Capt.nin J. ~ - W e n g e r . Officer in Charge, Kava! Communications Annex, U.S. :'\avy, Captain P.R. Kinney.Assistant, Combat Intelligence, C0.:\11:'\Cll, C.S. :'l;a.vy, Cuplain W. R. Smedberg, III.

It s standing subcommittees consisted of members of the Army's 0-2 and Signal Security Agency(SSA); 'rhc Navy's Office of :\aval Jnt.clligcnce ( 0 ~ 1 ) ; an d OP-20G (including ~ E G I \ T ) . ~ o r m a l l y , c ~ t c h service supplied at least two members of a subcommil.tcc, with the S(mior oflicc of the hoststation for a given meeting acting as chairman. Th(! light original s u b c o m m i l b ~ c s were as follows:

Intercept and Direction-l'inding Cryptanalysisrraffic Analysis ResearchC0.:\111\'r Communications l'rcqucncy A localion Co,cragcColluterul Jnformution lnt.clligcnce and Security

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Each suhcommittN was cxpech!d lo meet. m h!asl. once a month, und to submit In A:'\CICCa monthly report conlai ning a n!cord of proceedings and a list of pol icy matl!Cled to establish its own procedure,;, to make and to implcmtnl. dtdsions on!:lpccific matters insofar us tht! individual mcmbcrs po!>scsscd authority to commit their rcsp

The st.atus of Ai\CICC did no t change unti li t was given a more official character afternearly a year of existence. An interser\"iCC agreement in the form ofa joint memorandum signed bylh(l Army Chief of Staff and th e Chiefor :\iaval Operations on 10 March 1945l!!stahlh;bcd ll U!!W higherle\'el board. d m ; i ~ t n a l c d as the Army-!'\avy Communication Intelligence Board ( A ~ C I B ) with l.hcfollowing membcrshir>:

Assistant ChiefofStafffor C o m b a t . l ~ t c l l i g c n c c , L' .S. FleetDircctoror:.;aval CommunicationsAssistant. ChiefofStaiT, G-2, Wa r Dcpart.mfmt General StaffCommanding Officer, Signal St'Curity Agency

l'ol" security reasons, it. \\as to remain outside th e framework of th e .Joint Chief of StafrsSecretariat, and to report directly to the two signatories, exercising its authority subject to t.hcirjoint approval. 1'hc functions assigned to the Board were to coordinate th e plans an d operations ofthe communication inlcllig,mce organizations of the Army and the !\avy; th e formulate .iointagreements as to pcrtincmt procedures: and to rcgol.iatc and


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or!.mnizationf:. 'l'hc ~ l a t u s nl' .-'\::\CICC waH fcll'maliud hy tlw Hllthority heslowc!d on the Board tot:st.ahlish a working cnmmiti(W and tH'inc:ipal pt for lhc amalgamation in l.hc A:'liCI!AD subcommittee of two separate unitspreviously known as subcommittees on cryptanalysis and on Ucscarch, an d for the change indesignation of another suhcommitt.et! from "frequency allocation coverage" to "lnt.crccptCoordination." 'l'hc . t \ ~ C I C C subcommittees ar c shown in the following reorganization t ~ h a r t . 2


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During tlw 19-l!'i-1949, the 1\rm(!d Fon: l < ~ d their coordinutcd effort in C 0 ~ 1 1 \"Tintlw area ol' C O ~ l S E C a!so, to t.he degree n r . c : c s ; . a r ~ f'or cfficifmt int.rn Hen-ke and combinedcommunications. A Joint Sccurit.y an d Cry1>tographi(: Panel of l.hc .Joint CommunicationsEtcctronks Committee attended to C O : \ f S I ~ : c nspccts within !.hat eonunittce's jurisdiction. oint.Army-Xavy Pllblications induded a scl'i(!S or communications, i n ~ t r u c l i o n s , and rules forrecognition and identification. Although they wen! mandatory only for joint communications, somewere also applied voluntarily lo intra-Servicn communicutionl', thus bi'Oadcning the an!a of uniformpractices. On e S < ~ r v i < : l ! , in contracting fur and pmcuring ma.ior itt!ms ()r inln.I-Scl'vicc crypt.ogruphiccquiJliU(ml for its own usc occasionally expanded a contract to take care of the needs of th e otherS

Besides rcsc,trch and dnvclopmcnt in cryptography, standard CO:\ISEC act.iviticl'lconsislt:d of thf! preparation of


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widng diagram!', an d operating i n : ; L r u c f i o n ~ lor ciphct machine::-, an d their d i ~ t d h u t i o n to user!i.T h e ~ : includc!d continuous rnonituring of :u:tual Hcrvkc! tr-aJ1'it- to dist:O\"(lr eompromisrls or\ \ ' P I . I k m l ~ s e s in a service's owr1 t:r-ypt.ographic !iystmns. Cryptogn1phk de\ icc:-; not only ha d to beprocured and distributed, bu t also had to be rcpain!d and maintained within a Scr\'icc's !-lCt:urcsystem.

l:ach !,H!rvic:c conducted C 0 . \ 1 S I ~ C activities In it s own way. .-'\SA had the simpleadministrative st.ructum hu t the ~ a \ y ' s older organization probably functioned as elTnctivr!ly. In19--t8 AS/\ had u Research an d Dcvt!lopmcml Division an d a Sncurily Division, branches uf whichaccomplished al l COl1St.;c activities except proc:urcmcnl. At that time the ; ' \ a v ~ s units under th eDeputy Chi


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division fthe :\1cthods an d Proteetivf' Branches.) In f.hl! : \ ~ 1 \ y one unit, thf! C o m m u n i c ~ a t ion SIied to thoso related to C O \ U ~ ' I ' . An .._____________ JfPolic.\o, forexample, was wholly within th e province of t:SCICC, but a l1anipulativc CommunicationDeception Polit:y could only be treated as a suhject for coordinat.ion with the ReparatcCommunication Security C nit, OP 20-K, also under thc !\avy's D i n ~ < : t o r of Communications.

Certain legislation respecting the security of CO!\ti :"T act.ivitics conf lhc fact that a foreign code orcipher had been "broken," act ions which act.ually did damage the l : nitcd Stales. Secret de\ ices forcryptanalysis or cryptography needed the protection not only of patents, but of silcncfcn:;c Worrresial) in t947 in supporting the security legislation before Congress. I

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Although in 1 9 . ~ 8 1 he C0:\11 agr.mcie::; ol' t h ( ~ Armed S c r v i c ( ~ S withstood, Ihmugh l:SCIB,an nt lt:mpl to ~ u h . i c d them to the Control of 1h( Dire

AI. the en d of hostilities, th e Armed Forces possessed l wo s u b ~ : ; t a n t i a l agencies forproducing communications intelligence ( C O : \ U ~ ' I ' ) and maintaining communications security(CO:\tSEC). 'rhe Army an d the 'Suvy had each formed organi:r.aLions of more than I 0,000 persons toaccomplish these purposes. Their r o ~ t c r s startd shrinking soon afh!r the German surrcndor, butwhen th e fighting in t h e ~ Pacific also ended about three months later, they were still large, goingconcerns. The inevitable p o ~ ; ; t - w a r rcadjustm(mls which the:. f a c < ~ d SC(mtcd liktdy to diminishgreatly their abiHiy to furnish communication inlolligcnce of tho quality und volume which mightyield substantial advantages in peacetime. I

While th e :Kavy's Communications Support /\ctiily and the Army Security Agency werede\'cloping the means of coordinated service effort in cryptanalysis, al the working le\el somemutual assistant in cryptanalytic n!:::carch was effected through an informal, intcrscrvicecommittee which originated in mid 1944. Known us the A r m y - ~ a v y Cryptanalytkal Research andDevelopment Committe


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also prepared and i s ~ n w d a glossary of crypt.ologic t l ~ r m s and other rnfcrcnco and training aids.He:>enrch and devf!lopm(mt in thn l iddof cryptography, howenr, r f ~ m a i n c d a matter or sepurat(!act ion in which cooperation was less official an d c o r n p l e ~ . e .

During th e final stage of t.hc negotiations whkh rcsultnd in the Joint Operating Plan ofApril 1946, the J\cting Chiof, ASA's Colonc I l11ycs, propoHd to have only inira-ser\'icc application. ASJ\ accepted this limitation. A firstmeeting on an informal basis occurred on 22 April 1946, an d by early July of that year unagreement establishing the Army-Navy CryJ>to-Equipmcnl Coordinating Committee, AI\CRI-:CC,had been drafted. :\tcmbers of th e committee an d it s subcommittees on ciphoncy an d cifitx, oncipher machines, and on procurement, were designated by t.hn Chief of val Communications on19 ,June 1946, and by the ChiefofASA ten days later.

A.NCRECC me l irregularly either fo r general exchanges or information or for th ediscussion of particular problems, or for a demonstration or cquipmcnts under development. Ithelped to formulate a single U.S. posilion on such CO:\ISI:C problems as the modificul.ion or th eCombined Cipher .Machine. ANCHECC remained on an informal, voluntary basis, partly lo a\oid amembership too numerous to permit uninhibited dcli\erations. J\s a purely advisory body, it

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nceomplislwd al l that could he u c h i m ~ d hy :-haring knowlcdgt> and .iudgcmfmls to ach:arH:rJ thr!inh!resls of oint t:omnmnicat ions.

On 5 Fcbruary 19l7, Admiral .\'imitz, then Chief of :'\avul Operations, p r o p o ~ r ~ d in amemorandum to Gcnrcal Eisenhower, Chief ol' Sluff, C.S. Army, thut. the existing informal jointcommillcc lo exchange Lcchnical information on Ihe TfJS!arch and development of cryplo-equiprmmtbn f o r m a l i 1 . ~ d through their joinl. approvaJ. l In his mcmomndum to Gtmcral E i s c ~ n h o \ \ c r entitled" l ~ s l u b l i s h m c n t of the Army :"iavy Crypl.o-Ettuipmcnl Coordinating Committee (A:\'CRECG);Admiral :"iimit:r. cited the filet that the A.XCilECC, a joint committee whosc! objective was th eattainment of closer coordination between the services in the field of crypt.o-equipmcnt,2 had been onlyinlirmallr established and he was now proposing to formalize th e committee as it was thenconstituted. Admiral Nimit?. observed thai., in his view, lhc committ.t'C had been functioning soc!Tcd.ivcly that il s continuuncf! on a formal basis should be assured.

In his response, Gfmnrnl Eisenhower staled that oven though the informal oxchange nftechnical information bctwt!en th e services had been of considerable mutual benefit, he believedthat it would serve no particular purpose to formalize the existing cummilb!O because of it s verylimited authority vis-a-vis coordination between the scnict!s. Rather he fell Utat the research anddevc opmcnt of crypto-equipmcnt should be under the cognizance of th e Hesea rch and DcvclopmfmlHoard of th e Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this way al l three services, Army, l'\avy, and the newlycstablishd 'C'SAP, would be participating in a common effort to insure a coordinat.!'d effort.

On 23 July 1948 th e ,\rmy proceeded on this tack and proposed that the research anddevelopment of crypto-equipment be placed under the cognizance of the Joint C h i < ~ f s of StufrsResearch an d Development Board.

Initially, th e Na\'y indicated that it did not concur, and proposed instead that the charterofthe Joint Security an d Cryptographic Panel of the Joint Communications Electronics Committee(JCgC)1 br broadened to include \ h t ~ mukin1t nf r(!COmmcndations regarding the research an d developmentofcrypto-cquipments. In the end though. the ~ a v y did agrc(;' to the Army proposal, following whichit w a ~ coordinated ith an d concurred in by th e CSAF.

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Coordi1ULtionAm9ngDefenseandNon-Defense AgenciesOn. 23 September 1944, the Joint Communications Eloardl re-pQrted to the Jomt Chiefs of

Staff on the findings of an ad hac committee which had investigated cryptograph.ic secl:lrityaetivities of several departments and ageacies of the gover:nment. The r ~ p o r . t recommended theestablishment within the Joi,at Chiefs of Staffof a permaaent cryptographic sec1;1nty board w-hich

' ' ~ " ' .o-" ~ " ' - ''wou'ld-liave c o g n i z a . n c e o v e r ~ t h e c r y p t o g r a p h k ' a c ' f i v i : t 1 ~ s of""an gb\letnmen t ~ . a ' g e . t t ' e i ~ s aD:d'departments.

On 20 June 1945 a provisional committee on the secur-ityof cemmunications wasestablished by the Joint: CommQajcatj.ons El&rd, for the purpose of stugyin,g the s ~ t l t i ~ of U.S'.intra- service and joint communications.2 ThiS committee c o l \ s i ~ e r : e d the following joint an& intra-serviceaspectsof heir problem:

a. Educationb. Terminology and nomenclat'l:lree. Physical securityd. Transmission securitye. Crypoographic pvoceduPesThese collective. activit ies regarding the t ~ ~ t m e n t of commlUlications security played a

role in the 3 July 1945 issuance of a confidential, tinregistered Presidential E x ~ c q t i v e Otderl whichestablished a Cryptographic Security BoaFd consisting of the Secretaries ef State,.War, and theNavy, and charged it with the functien of determining -and esta:bfishing e r - y p t o g r t ~ , p h i , c seuritystandaxds and ~ l i c i e s in Q r ~ r to achieve the maxim'll>m d e ~ f;)f ~ c u r i t y in all governmentalcommunications. The CcyptogPaphic Secq,rity Board was al:lthorized to establ ish a c l ' ) 1 l t o g r a p h ~ c Security Coordinating Committee and other committees as needed, and was. also autihorized toregulate communications security-activities ij:l al l parts of the government except the FederalBureauoflnvestigation, to which the terms ofthe Execl:ltive Order did not apply. Nodepartment oragency was obliged,_however, to release infotn:tationor yield cryptographic practices 'ff'ills:directore0ncluded that it. would be in the r - t a t i o ~ ' l interest to retain ~ ~ ~ lurisd iction over thern.2

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Secret A r m ~ :"luvy Agreement for the Ex

Communications rntcfligcncc Board- Establishment of; 'I'op Secret memo, ChiefofStuff, U.S. Army,CO:\fi;\Cfl, U.S. l;'lec!l and C!\0, for l>ir. of i'."avallnt.clligcncc, Dir of';\aval Communications, C ofSG-2, CG SSA, 10 March 1945, subj: Army-l"\u . y Communications Intelligence Board,1 - ~ s t a b l i s h m e n l of,


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Slancradi ;\'SA Library.

The Arm.v ~ a v y Cryptanul.vticul H!S(:an:h nnd U(.velopmenl Committee t A ~ C H L \ D I c o n s i s t t ~ d of Conunandm J . ~ . Wenger, Commander 11.'1'. Engstrom: an d ILW.C. ~ o r r i s for th e~ a v y : und Colonel II.G. l l a ~ ; e s , :\lajor Leo Rosen, an d Mr. William F. Friedman for the ,\rmy.

OP-20Y, Serial 03666P20 5 February 1947.According to th e pr-oposed terms of reference, f o r m a l i ; ~ . a t i o n oflhc Cummil.1.ee was intended

" ... lo c!xpcditc research, development., manufacture, an d procurement of crypto- equipment, and toobtain maximum benefit from common effort in this field ..and to facilihtl.c the exchange ofinformation bclwetm t.h(! two services ... " Because of the highly classified nature of th e act.ivit.icsfalling within the cogni:r.ancc of the commill


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CHAPTf:J{ :JPari/. Th.e r:/rment:; o{Commun.ifalions S ( < ~ u r i ( l "

:\-lost m


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Cryptuuraf1hk Sf't'Urity- This tum:ist.s 1) f the JH'O\"i!l'OI."i:-;ion of the rult!s, regulations. and policies to ~ o , e r n theit usc; an d Lhct ~ X t ! c u l i o n ofpropt!r uwasures lo insurc thdr correct usd for.

a. Requirement, Production, Control. l'irst, a research project would be established.J ~ n g i n c c r s would devise an equipment which would meet. the physical requirements; cryptographicexperts would "invent" a cryptographic component \\-'hich would fit into th e geographicallimitations impm.;c!d upon t,hcm, and one which would aff01d the necessary degree of cryJ>I.ographicsecurity, one which would resist cryptanalytic al.tock by other CO\HS'l' organizations. When thiswas complct.cd, the project would usually be t.urn(!d o\cr to an outside commercial developmentcompany. llcrc the line points were completed, development models made and tested, an d thespedfica lions an d designs for mass production established. Following this a production contract w ~ : t s let, the manufacturcr tooled up for the Job, an d thn first production models were pro...-ided. 'l'hcscW(!f'C then turned over to f.hc originators of the initial requirement, and they would conduct servicetests. 1\s a result of the tests, production modifications were made if necessary, and the

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cquipntNJl:-o \ \ ' C ! l ' ( ~ them prom

1'he bulk of the manufactu1c of this type of material was done by the cryptologic agency.with commercial assislanc(!. t'or example, blank rotor shells were produced outside, hut !.he wiringand all other security ftmtures that went into a completed rotor were inser ted at J \ I ' S ; \ / ~ S A .

The m!xt step in the birth of a new cipher system had really been going on all the Lime.Various ways of using the system had been under study and finally a procedure for its usc had beendecided upon, a procedure which would maintain the inherent security of the system and at thesame time be as simple an d easy on the operator as was possible. This procedure was then writtenup and printed as a document which went to each user of the system. A Iso published W

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proct!durc wa,.: pu t into ellcd. This con;;i,.;tfd of a mquirenumtthat any curity's companion clement,physical sccutit.y. PhyHical :rocurity of cryptomal.crial breaks down into three main aspects -establishment. ofsafeguurds go\'crning the material itself, i.e., how it should be protectt..'rhe transmission security ( T R A ~ S E C ) clement of communication security was and is ascritical to the !-lytem as was the cryptographic an d physical security aspcct.'=l. Transmission securityis best defined as the taking of al l measures necessary to protect communicati36 ~ i C R E T


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ll t} w use of speciali:wd radio !!tluipnwnl, spN:ial anhmnas, fraking, cipher systems up till then had b

The first new concept, no t new really but certainly in th e early-to-mid 1950s justh

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appropriate receiving point or next relay swlion. The gap lwhHwn r e t ~ t ! i v e r(!perf()rator andlclcly!>


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Ptirl/1

B. I.B. The augnwnlat ion and :\fanagtmumt of ~ a t i o n a l C0:\1SEC Hesourccs.

1. 'l 'hc Formation oflhc Armed Forces Securi ty Agency, AFSA.While llw CO:\JJ.l\:T agencies tried 0111. a Joint operating plan, com1>lntc unification of th e

ruttion's armed sen ces within a ~ i n g l t ! dcpartnwnt of defense was not achieved unlit the spring of1947.1

The ~ n t i o n a l Security Act of 19672 created a :'\ul.ional Security Organization of which them : ~ i o r clements were the National .Military l!stablishmcnl, the :\ational Security Council, and the:'\ational Security H c ~ o u r c e s Board. A civilian SUrtmenl, headed the :\ational ~ l i l i t a r y catablishmcnl.. 'l'hc .Joint Chinfs of Staff, four mcmht!r:;with a joint st.saff were named the principal military ad,isors to the PrcHident and Secretary ofDeffm!-i(!. ' l ' h n ~ df!partnwnt.s (Army, .:\'avy, and Air Force) hcad!d hy Secretaries without. cabinf!l.rank, were established.

The i\at.ional Security Council waa dcsigcd to pro\'idc t.hc President with a4vice on thebasis of which to integrate domm;Lic, foreign, and military policies. It brought into association forthe purpose the Prcsidmtt, the S

Directly under the "'aLionnl Security Council, with th e mission of coordnaling th eintelligence activities of the .Federal Go\e1nmcnt which wmc concerned with national scurily, wasa Central lnlclligcncc Agency, headed by a Director of Central Intelligence. 'l'his Aglmcy wasexpected to corrclal.c, C\'aluatc, and disseminate national sccurily intelligence, render intcllig


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lt.:i mission w u ~ tc) lHhisf! th e Pre:-;id

Responsibilities fhr communications St'Curity during the p t ~ r i o d proceeding the formationof AFSA were rclalt.>d to, but separate from, those for C 0 : \ 1 1 ~ ' 1 ' . By a confidential, u n r c g i s t c r < ~ d Executive Order dated 3 .July 1945,1 the President had cstablishnd a cryptographic Stocurity Boardc o n s i ~ l i n g of the Secretaries of Stale, War, and ~ U \ " ) ' , and had charged it with Hm function ofdch!rrnining an d t!stablishing cryptographic security standards and policies in order to achieve themaximum degree of security in all Oo\"crnmcntal communictions. 'l'hc cryptographic Security

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Board was pennitlcd to crcul.e u t:ryJtlographic Securily Comdinaling C o m m i l t ( ! ( ~ ~ m d oth(!rc o m m i t l ( ! < ~ . ;


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"at t.he Wm.;hinglon h ~ \ n l " rather Hum of p e r m i t t i n ~ duplkal.ion t.o

of communications intelligence, and if so, ,.,hat form should it. take?

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2. Should t h t ~ r e be juint m unified Cryplogrllphic S t ~ c u r i l . y Act ivii iPs of 1lw Army, :'\nvy.un d Ai r Fmt:t! and, if:>o, what f(,rm should thf!) talw'?These queries an d topics .wcre meant to he illustrative, not rc,;tricthc. The commil.lCf! wa suuthl)rizcd to take up any related problems. Jt was instructed to tak() into consideration th einl.crm:;ts of the other members of CSCJB, lh(l Depurtmcnt of State, and the Central Jnl(!lligcnceAgency, and to consult them, if appropriate, but it.s pro\'incc was only that portion t ~ f t h e Co transmission andphysical security.

'I'he first assembly of the Commilt.t!c was on 25 August l948, at the Pnntagon. At thisorganizal.ion session, the Committee cleeted Ucar Admiral I!arl K Stone as pcrmuncnl chainnan,an act. ion which caused the committee to be known thereafter as "the Stone Board." 'Phc committeeagreed that. each member might dcsignnt.e an allernnte, and also that. a Working Group should becreated to prepmc the studies on which the committee itself would subsequently deliberate. Th eworking Group consistt.-d of the following:Department (l{lhe t\ rm.v A l t c ~ r n a t e MemberColonel Harold G. llayes Lieutenant Colonel Paul 1':. NeffLieutenant Colonel A C.Peterson Lieutenant Colonel Carter I.. Clark

/)epartment of he NavyCapt.ain JS. Wenger Commander Bernard RoederCaptain J .S.llarpcr Caplain KS.I . Goodwin

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Colonel H. P. K l o < ~ k s l,ifmlen;wt Colond 11.11. T o w l t ~ r l.it!lll.Col. L.C. S h e ~ t z :\1ajor ,J. \ l o r r i ~ o n T h e Working Group then cst hy interpreting the Terms of Uefercncc from the Secretary of Defense. At il,; Lhir(l session,howCV(!r, i l had before it a prcliminury ,ersion of a study d to recommend t.o the .JointChicf.'i of Staff policies; operating plans, and doctrines for the production of CO\IIX'l' and th emaintenance (lfCOMSEC.

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20 :\lay 19-19.\.11:.\.HHM.\"I>l: .:\1 nm TilE .JOI.\"'1' Cl fiEFS OF STAFFSCB.JECT: Organi:wtion ufCryptologic Adhitins within t h ( ~ .\"atiunul .\.lilitary l:;;.tahlishmIRAFSA, would apply not only to C 0 . \ . 1 1 ~ ' 1 ' but. tomilitary C < n r S I ~ C also. He was expected normally to prepare, produce, store, account for, anddeliver cryplo-matcrial for distribution to lhc J\rmcd j'orccs. He was also to formulate poliCies andpublish instructions.

On 20 :\1ay J948, Sccrct.ary of DcJcnsc Louis Johnson sent u co\cring m < ~ m o r a n d u m l to theJoint Chiefs of Staff, with copi(!S to the Service $Ccrctarics, which contained a directive describingthe establishment of a unified crypt.ologic organization--the Annoo I'orccs Security Agency. rhisAgency was to conduct the communications intelligence and communicntions ~ : ~ c c u r i l y activitieswithin the ~ a t i o n a l Military J.::stablishment. Secretary Johnson expressed the desire that t.hccommon activities of Al'SA be carried ou t in not more than lw'l'he Directive also defined the responsibilities the .Joint Chiefs of Staff ,is-a-vis t.hc newAFSA.

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TJw mil'sitm of tht! Dircdf)r of .\FS:\. DilL\ FS/\, would 11pply no: only to C0.\11XT hut tornilitmy CO.\ISJ:C ul!'o. l i t! was d Huisun with other appropriate dcJ>arlmcnts and ugcncics for th e purpoHc ofcoordinating cryplologic equipment and procedures, and providing technical supervision of allmi iLary CO:\JSEC ac t h it it!s. :'ione of hi s C0:\1SI':C rcsponsibi I t ic!s cam(! within the jurisd iclion ofcscm.

For units oflhc Armed Forces, AFSA was to establi sh a mt!thod of providing special i t < ~ m s of crypf.-cquil>m


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Sinee Arlington Hall Station eould p m v i d ~ -120,000 S.

AI'CIAC acccpl.t.'CI the argument in favor of consolidating a t one station almost all of theC0:\11:\T opnrations and r-elated research and de\Cl()pmcnt, and, at the other site, almost allCOMSI:c operations with rclatt>d research and development.

Alctor assumed office on 15 .July 1949 and r-eceived a directive from t.hcJoint Chiefs ofStafron I September. On the same day, AFSAC obtained it s charter. 'l'hc nucleus ofplanners and organizers grew and, by a succession of steps taken or planned prepared for th eapproval of the JC S the outlines of the new Agency's composition, physical location, andheadquarters organization.! On I October 1949 DIRAFSJ\ officially assumed operational control.'l'wo striking features deserve emphasis: the Military Service>s were establishing an orgtfnizat ionthrough which thdr production o f C O l f l ~ ' l ' would be under unified control, and they were linkingthe cryptologic agencies of all three Services with reference not only to CO.Mil'\'r production but. toCOMsgc activities as well.R. Formation of the Office of Communications Security, AF'SA- 04.

While fundamental planning defined A l ~ S A ' s position in the J)cpurtmenl of Defense an dthe relationships to the Armed Services, simultaneous, detailed planning was determining AI'SA'sinternal structure. The first Director depended hemily upon the advice and assistance of keyindividuals who had been close lo the eryplologic activit ies oft.he Services during his tour as Chiefof Naval Communications. In matters of ()rgunilr.at.ion, distribution of functions, selection ofpersonnel for specific key positions, and the relations to be developed bet ween AFSA and the sen cecryptologic agencies, he relied in particular on Captain J . ~ . Wenger, CS!\, who had been his chiefsubordinate in CO.MI).IT matters for several years.

1 - ~ a c h Armed Service furnished one Deputy Director soon after Admiral Slone look office inJuly. Captain J.N. Wenger, USN; Colonel S.P. Collins, USA; and Colonel Roy II. Lynn, t:SAF,became the official Steering Group, and they scrved in l.hat capacity until AFSA's organization \\as

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lirmly e::;tablishf!d. Ench Deputy l)ircctur wa!i gh:fm particular f u n c l i n n ~ , with (H W of hi:; mainfunctions hcing that of liaison hetwt!cn :\FSt\ and his S

The puttcr-n of action intended to bring about A I:'SA's full functioning was sketched in th efin;t organizational memorandum, is...:;ucd on 22 .July 1949. There were to be suc

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c r y p t a n a l ~ ~ i : < and cntlual iHn: for Iraffk ann l y ~ i l ' and .,JCS 2010 assigned t.o .i\I"SA served specific rcsponsibilitiJS in th e C0:\1SEC field, such asformulation of policies, production of cryptographic material for tho S(!niccs, evaluation of cryptosecuri1.y violation::;, and technical supervision of Service communication security activities. Anamr.ndmcnt to .JCS 20102 assigned to f.hc r(!sidual Service cryplologic o r g a n i l ~ a t i o n s theresponsibi I ly for "sccuri ly mon t.oring ofintra-!:icrv icc circuits."

On 25 August 1949 t.hc Director, AFSA, !'!Ubmitted to AI


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wgr:t.hcr with necessary w c h n i < ~ a l i n : - ; t . r i H ~ t i o n s : C\'aluation of violutinn:-: of !-'neurity: dclerminin!{( ~ o m p r o m i s c s ; and formula! ing p o l i c i t ~ s fur d hy A FSA.

Arrangements with the Army wcm rnndc early in ScplcrnlH!t. The undcrHtanding reachedat this time was amended at another confcrcntc held on 14 October, and was then formalized in awritten documcntl dated 22 Ilcccmbcr t9.t9. According to this agreement, ASA was to continue tohe rm;ponsiblc for communication Sl!CUrity within the Army, through such task::; as issuance ofcrypto-matcrial to Army users, cryptographic maintcnanco and repair, enForcement of AFS/\'s

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~ t : C R E T

d i r f ' c : t . i H ~ s on s e c u r i l . ~ , etc. ,\FS:\ wu:; to he J'nspmJ:;ihlc ltH' p n ~ p a l ' i n g n y p w mattrial for , \nny usc:.d < ~ d a r i n g crypt.ographk c H m p a t l m i ~ < ~ s . c s t a h l i ~ h i n g n y p t o g r a p h i < ~ procedures, an d conductingeryptnn:llytic studils for s ( ~ c w i t . . v cvaluul ion. :So mcnt ion was made of the opcrution of s c c u r i t . ~ monitoring units.

A list of proposed appointm


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of'tlu:sc facilitic!' hu d progn?ssed l'uffidl?ttfly to r:ary. This fuelwa::; point


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t h 1 ~ offk


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of' tlw ,\FSA c ~ , : y p l . o g n t J ) h i c r c ~ s e 1 . m ~ h and dPnlopment program, including, in this (:onrwction.sonitn testing of new cryptocquipmcnt. T h r ~ Analysis and E\"aluution Division (AFSA- 411 dealtwith rna.inwnancc of cryptographic s


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T h f ~ following nflllrCf':::; c : o n c t ~ r n i n g unifit:utinn of the Anrwd Fon:f's are worth noting:Walter :\Iilli!>, ~ < L , The /t"orr(stal /Jiurin; Y. 1951 J, pp 59, and following: Elias lluwr, " ~ o t e s onthe Cnilications Contro\crsy" in Public: t\dminislralion lleuiews, VI, :'iu. 4 (Autumn, 1946), pp 297-314; 'fusk Force Report on Nati()nal Security Organization, prepared ftH" th e Commission onCkgani7.alion ( ) i th e gxeculive Branch of i.hc Government (a::; Appendix G), and !,a.ib.mittcd to Mr.Herbert lloo\cr by .Mr. F. Ebnrstadt, Chairman of th e Committee on :'\atiunal SecurityOrgunho:ation, J5 .:'\i o n ~ m l x - 1 1948 CWu,;hington, GPO, 1949).

Public Law 253, 80th Congmss.'I'hc Board consisted of rcJ>rcsentalivcs from th() Dcpnrtmcnts of State, Army, ~ a v y , an d

Air J'orce, and from the Ccntrallnteligcmcc Agency.:'\SCm ~ o . 9, Chapter .Prcsidtml Harry S. Truman's order of 3 .July 19,15, "Cryplographic Security \\'ilh Respect

to Ct!rtain Communications of the Government."Information dcri vc d from a

Study o{.Joi1d Orgfmizationfor the Security o{ll.S. Military Commt.tniations, prepared for t.hc "SI.oncBoard" and included within Part Horils report, and from Communications Di\'ision, C .S. vy, Top&cret Order No. 15-48, 8 St!ptcmber 1948.

llistoryofthc l."SAFSS, 1,1-9, Scl:ret. Annual Hcport., ASA Starr, FY-48, J, 5. ropSccrctMemos for th e Secretary of Defense from ~ l r . Roh


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Augul:'t HM8. S u b j f ~ c t : T(.rms of H.efenmcP. for the Committee on t h

:\lcmorar1dum for the .Joint C h i c ~ f s ofStalT. Suhjt!ct: Organization of CryptologilRAJ


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C o n l i d ( ~ n t ial ~ ~ ( ~ m n m n d u m lor OP 202 Staff and Officer in C h a r ~ c , CSA :w, fmm Captain.J. S. lloltwic:k, OP-202, Serial 027fi4P20, 30 Sepl.t:mher 19-19 (in ,'\FS!\ ()r-ganizatitm fuldcr file771). SetJ chart of organization of Communication Security Section ~ t h c r ( ! d(!signatcd OP0204).dated I -July 1949, ( m c l o ~ ; e d as 'l'ab lOa in Top Secret Folder :\o. 3, Organizations o f U.S. NavyCryptologic Activities us ofl July 1949, Encl. B, C ~ C St'rial 000192P20.

AFSA ()rdcr ~ o . 1-49, 1 Odoher 1949. (A I"SA Organization f o l d c ~ . ) Lt!UOr serial 001013P20, 1 :\ovmnbcr 1949, from Chief of Nand Communications (OP-

202), Caplajn J.S. lloltwkk Jt., to al l t.:.S. :\avy Communication Security Activities, Subject.:Armed Forces Security Agency; information concerning. (Al'SA Organization folder.)

Ibid.Ibid.Ibid.Supplementary Rranch O r d ~ ~ r ~ o . 2-49, 15 Occcmber 1949, Subject: Communicat-ions

Supplementary Activity, Washington: de-activation of. (AFSA Organization f ( ) l d ~ r . ) Letter !mrial 09, 21 Scptcmb(!r 1949, from DIRAFSA l.o Chi(!f of the Rurcau of Ships,

Subject: Assumption of Operational Control ofCryptologic Act.i vi ties. Rear Admiral Stone day file.BuShips serial I\o. 852-742lo DlRAr'SA, 21 Oct.ober 1949, Subject: C.S. :-.;a\al Code an d

Signed Laboratory, status of. ([n folder CSA and NCSI,, St. Paul. NSA AG file 771.) Confident ial.LcUnr serial No. 040, 9 Xovcmbcr 1949, from DIRAFSA to Chief of t.hc Bureau of Ships,

Subject.: U.S. Na\ al Code an d Signal Laboratory, Request for disestablishment of.BuSh ips lcUQr Code 740, C:'\Pl67) A4(743), I December 1949 to Assistant Scc1ctary of the

::"avy, Subject : r.S. K a ~ o a J Code and Signal Laboratory, Request for d i s ~ s t a h l i s h m c n t of, SEC::"AVletter serial No. 446P24, 6 Occembcr 1949.

BuShips letter serial ~ o . 852-939, 14 Dcccmb(!r 1949, to Commanding Officer, t;.S. !\avyCommunication Station, Subject: U.S. Naval Code and Signal Laboratory, l)isc!->tablishment of:

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BuShips h!Uer S 1 ~ r i a l ~ o . Rfi2-9

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OFFICE OF CO:I.I:\ft: rc .\TIO:'-i SECUUTY, ,\FS,\-0401 Chilf, Captain II. 0. Hansen. t;S\'0-t.A Assistant C h i ( ~ r . Li(:ulcnnnl Colon!! G. \i . Juhnson, CSA0-!1' Technical Director, Dr. A. Sinkov04'1'1 Assistant 'l'echnicall>irector, ltr . ll . L. Ch1rk41 Chief, Analysis and !!valuation Division, :\1r. frank ;\ustin42 Chief, Crypto engineering Division, .Mr. Kenneth ld.3. Insures provision of such technical supporL as is rt'Quin>d of AF'SA by the Armed

Forces an d aJ>propriatc go..-ernmcnt agencies in thci r conducL of C O l \ I S I ~ C aeli v itics.

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.J. E x e r d ~ c ~ ; operatiortal ctm11Hl o n ~ r such Service CO:\TSEC activit inl' us may he< t l l o < . ~ a t c d to tht! operational control of AFS,\.

5. Insures compliance wit.h applicable !:WCurity diredi\es, und cstablishc:; suehaddit ional ::mcurity s a f ~ g u a r d s , as may be nt,>ccs!"ary, within the Oflice of Communications &!curit.y.

6. Providcsl(!Chnical support t.o Combined and:\A'PO COi\1SI:C a c t i v i t i 1 ~ s as direct t,'


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cffect.iv(hnical liaison with t h f ~ S ~ r v i c ~ C S and J m ~ p a m s a l : O f l l J l r e h e n s i \ " ( ~ longrange program f'(Jr each C0:\1SI:C equipment from I. he time the rcquiremcnt for 11 c r ~ p t o ( . ! q u i p m c n t is firHt oxprm;scd unti I th(l (!((Uipmmtl is placed into usc. Pcrf


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7. Pr"l!parcs mohilizatinn plan for !he omcc of Communication S N ~ u r i l . y in conjunctionwith th

b. Acts to establish R&D p r ~ j e c t s in AFSA by initiating AI-'SA'f action. Posif.ionsproject in program. Prepares Af'Si\ projed sheet.

c. Prepares und maintains long-range time sch(!dulc co\ering development, l.est,and procurcrntml.

d. ~ l a i n t . a i n . s detailed liaison with the Oflicc of Rcscarch and Development, Office ofCommunication Security divisions, and Services.

c. Arranges for tests of cquipm(mt by Scr\'ices and for AFSA's part..icipution thcrin.f. Furnishes to Logistics Division specifications and drawings for t.hc procurement

o f C O : \ t S I ~ C equipment.g. Determines when u newly dovelopcd COMSEC equipment is ready for

Jlrocurcment.h. Maintains close coordination check with Office of Communication S

operatingdivisions on al l Office of Communication Security actl\ ilics related to new equipment.i. Prepares and maintains detailed time schedule for bringing al l clements of a m!w

C


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j. Eslablislws Offic:e of Communication Sceurity priMit.ics for H c ~ s c a n ~ h urufntvf!lopm(!nl projects Jor Cmnmunkatinn Security Enf.lo proper communication cquit>mcnt.

5. Determines by liuisor1 with Service Cryptologic Agtmdns th e lyjlC of technicalinformation required by lhmn for conduct of their rcsponl-;ibilitics.l'((ODl:

5. :\lonilors production activiLics through close and continuous contact with productionunits.

6. I ~ e c o m m c n d s arcus w h e r t ~ simplificut.ion studies would houseful and where changesshould be made in work m c a s u r < ~ m c n t schldulc.G f o : ~ a m A I . SYSTE!\tS P l . A : S ~ I ~ O SJ::C'l'IO!', t\Jo'S!\-4021::

I. ln coordination wiLh each Scr\'icc and Office of Communication Sl.>curiLy operatingdivisions, determines characteristics and organi?.ation (cryploncts, cryptochannels) ofcryplosystems which will be brought. inl.o usc by th e introduction of new crypto-cquipmcnl.Recommends programs for phased introduction of systems involving new crypt.o-cquipmcnts.

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2. For I!On machine crypto;;ysteml-l lind t a c t i < ~ t t l cryplomalt'rial involving e x t c n : ; h < ~ u ~ a g < ! and high volume production, investigates ~ r v k e need and, in conjunction with operatingdivisions, initiutm1 pluns relating to organization und sup}>ly of"th e material.

3. Performs spcciul planning l'(llal.ing to Combined t:S l:K and :-.IA'l'O communic;.ttionsc


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5. Consolidates pmiodie p m g r m ; . ~ r ~ p o r f s , mont.hly o p ( ~ r a t i u n n l ~ u m m n r i e s , (JWlrterlyund annual mporls, and presentation data li)r t h e ~ O f l k f ~ ofCommunicution S c c : u r i t ~ .

6. Hc\itws rcquisitions and i s s w ~ : . - : l i ~ pnparcd by operating dhh;ion:-; 1()1'


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1 - : s t a b l i ~ h c ! ! ' ! and promulgates Ihr. communication ~ > l ' c u r i l y d o d r i n c ~ )f the Arml)d Foret's:docs this through the operation of two b m n e h ( ~ : : ; . with fundions as fhllows:TH,\ "S:'.IIS.'ilOK SJ:n :IUTY l ! l t ! \ : . ; C ! I . , W ~ : ' \ - 4 1 1

1. Prepares policy, dochinc, techniques and instructional material applicuhlc l.o thet i l ~ l d s of transmission security, friendly traffic analysis and communications cover and deceptionwhich urc within 1\FSA d to insure uniform Service enforcement. of transmissionsecurity regulations.

' t Performs sct:urity monitoring of ointly utilized circuits; conducts analySf!S of trafficthus o b t a i n ~ d ; forwards rcsu Its of :tu


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CHYI'TOSI':n:HJTY BH\:\CJI. :\FS:\-4121. 1-tecomnumds new crypwsecurity and physic;JI sP.curity (of crypt .omaterial) p o l i d c ~ s .

and directs impkmentation in t h t ~ Scrvict!S off!s tahlished policies in these fields.2. Performs security und procedural evaluation of all existing and proposed

cryplosystcms and communications St.'Curily mechanism;; an d devices.3. Pmscrihcs cryplo-opcral.ing procechues, based on cr_vplanalytic sludi.cs, which will

provide the maximum cryplosccur ity compatihlC! with operational requirements.4. t:litablishcs proccdu1cs for th e tcpurting uf ,iulutiom; of cypt.ot;ecur-ily un d po:-;Hibl

7. On request from non-military ag


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to u.,;ing , . : m v i c e ~ an d upon re t ur n l.herefrom. Pre p a n ~ ~ 1ra ini ug lll


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F. 'l'ape-SE!('I.ion 1121G)1. ProdtU'!$ al l one tinm t a p , ~ s utilized by tim Scnicm;.2. Prodm:es ull :\1209 k e ~ s utilized hy the Scr\ict:s.

Following is a breakdown by & d i o n ~ ; of the functions of lhc _ 1 - : n g i m ~ e r i n g Dc\elopmtmtBranch.

A. Machine S(!Ct ion (422B)1. :\tanufuctures part!:i for various types of communication efor communications equipment })rodueed in the Cryplo-Enginccring Di\'ision.2. Prepares drawings for use as instruction manual illusl..rations an d diat.,rrams for

equipmcnts produced in AJ'SA or contracted for by AFSA. Detailed wiring diagrams or crypt.oe q u i p m ~ n t . s ar c also prepared.

3. Provides storage for an d is responsible for security of all drawings pr-oduced inthe Crypto-Enginccring I>i\'ision and those prepared for AI'SA by private contract.ors.

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4. Set.!' up and m a i n t a i n ~ standards l(n modern an d (!fficicnt drafl iug p r a c t i c e ~ for1\FSA and i:; n ~ ~ p o n s i b l f ! fnr disl'leminaling stwh information to printh! coni nut.ors fu r Iheirguidunhision and the Office dfCommunication &cmity in general.

C. :\lanufucturing Dcvelopmm1t.SE!ction (4221))1. Designs an d de\'(!lops breadboard product.ion models of new and modified

clussificd communication::; equipment. Pcdhnns all engineering und tl'ial tc:st " ~ o r k necessary toarrive at u practical working modeL

2. Designs, develops and builds special production an d lest devices fo r theEngineering Services Brunch, AFSA-421.

3. Conducts life cycle tests on new equipmcnts an d components and reeommendsdesign changes ha:>Hd on these tests.

4. Provides gcnerallt!chnicuJ ad de c an d cnginc(Jring scnicc for AFSA-04 and ck on cleclritools and equipment.4. Dcvi.scs special methods, procedures an d fixtures for inspection of unusually

in ricatc parts or parts an d assemblies held to very close tolcran(.'CS.

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5. gncJcavon; to kt"ep abrcasl. with Ihe l u l c ~ i t m e t h o d ~ in lhc fit:ld ofQualit,y Controland in t h(l USl' of special cqu ipmcnl.

(). Prcpar

Requirements Branch.A. :\laterial Procmcmcnl and Stores &!chon (423B)

I. l n i l i a h ~ s procurcmcnl. for al l it.ems for which thl Divh:ion is re:;ponsiblc.2. Cuordinate::; \o\ilh project < m g i n e c r ~ material requirements for special Juojccts

and prepares supply forecasts.3. :\"laintains comple te and current project control records of propcrt.y, equipment

spare parts and associated items.4. Prepares and distributes th e cryptographic parts


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I. Pt!rf{,rms a variety 'Jfclerieal duties.2. PrcpmlH and main Ia ins po:-:it ion con trnl cards of as:-:i gntod pnt'C.4. H e c c h ; c ~ s an d distributes al l incomingcorrespondence.5. Sct!i up and maintains curtcnl corrc;;pcmdcnl'c and personnel n!cords.6. Prepares and distributes al l official outgoing t:orrc:;pondcn

CHYPTO-AIDS 1 > 1 \ ' I S H ) ~ , At'SA-43

1. Supervises and directs the uclivities of th e various Branches within the Divisionwhi(:h arc responsible for the coordination of l " < ~ u c s t s for programming, preparation, repr72 SECRET


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4. l l t ~ C c ! i v c s , re,iew!:i, and p r m : e ~ : ; e ! ' reilation and SchedulingSection (-t32C)I. Initiates and schedules requests for production of cryplomatel'iaJ on a

supersossion basis.2. Coordinates the formal for a11 cryptographic documents and prepares l t ~ t t c r s of

promulgation concerning lhoir production, distribution und usc.

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a. Dm)IOJJS and produbranch.b. Offset Pres..c; Section (433C)

1. Reproduces by the offset method in quantity cryptographk an d cryptologicmaterial, forms, an d miscellaneous printed items.

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Letter Prm;s Section (43:31))1. T m n s l a h ~ s original dral\ of'

Supcniscs and dirr!cts the o p r ~ r a t i o n of t.hc various sections conccmcd with !.he storage,distribution and accounting of rcgistcr(.>d cryptographic materials.

Following is a breakdown by Sections of he functions of the l>istribution Branch.a. Routing and Uecords S ( ~ l . i o n (434B)

1. ).1aint.ains master ac


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Part II , A4Prior to the start of World War II, manual systems, which had carried t.hc main load of

communications sccul'ity, were gradually replaced by wired rotor machines. D u r i r ~ g the nextseveral years rotor machines became the standard ciph(!r devices for high lc\"d tn.1ffic. At lm1.:crechelons, for example, helow Army division level. manual syHI.cms continuml to housed, wilh the:\12091, a mechanical device, currying Uu.: bulk of cncrypttd c o m m u n i c u t i < > m ~ . As tape productionsbecame more efficient and more economical, one time l . a p ( ~ S came to he used more heavily, but il islikely thallhcy carrit>d no more t.han 10% of all encryption.

'l'hc securing of voice communictaions continued to pre!'umt major difficulties for thotechnicians of the day. lly the beginning of J9.-13, lhc SIGSAI.Y, a ponderous on-Jinc micecncrypl.ion system, had been installed al about u dozen ~ i t e s around l.hc world, includingWashington and London. It was used on a few occasions for talks between Rooscvcll and Churchill,but the system \.,orked pourly an d suffered from r>roblems such as low--grad

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significantly. Eledronic cryptography W1t!> d e \ " t ~ l u j J e d und employed to O\"t!r l.hesc! Hn!us first.. J'oroff-line purpu:-:e:-, th e S I G / \ B A t i ~ C : \ 1 1. and tJw modified vcr::;ion, 'I'SEC/K 1.-29. cuntimwd in usethrough th e 1950s2. The Comhinnd Cipher :\lnd1ine !CC:\IJ, was wwd hy t.hf' Lnited St.aws.England, and other allied nations. 1'hc l .S. s t o p p t ~ d usc of the C C ~ I in 1960, but it was continued inusc by !'/\TO until about 1966. 'rhe TSJ:C KL-7/47 hod ubout a 20-year life span, to the mid 1970s,for th e l .S. , und uhuut a 30-seur life span fori' \ NI'O.

:\lachines using wired roton; rtmained as thtl limndation of U.S. c r y p t o g n l p h ~ into th e1950s, an d r o t o r ~ > served to complcrmmt other technologies well into th e 1970s.HOTOH. ROTOK D E \ ' F . L O P ! \ I I ~ ~ r s

In the dt>cnde following World War II, the lnitcd Stales engaged in an cxt.en!'ivc programfor th e d c v e l o p m t ~ n t of rotors, principally for f!lcctro-mcchnnical cryplogntphic equipment.However, this dcvclopmcm progrum had hccn malflrially reduced by 1960. Although l h ( ~ rotor hadbc


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r e p n ~ s < ! t l l c d a major m i l m ; t o m ~ in the! hi!-'IOry of mad1ine nyptography. Available (l\idenee s m ~ m : : ; toi n d i t ~ a l ( ! that. thl! wired rotor \\as originally roneeivcd hy II.:\ K(1ch, n Buteh inventor, dwing thl!~ c a r s immcdiatC!ly pn!Cc

Another concurrent, and ugl\in pcd1aps indcpcnd(ml..; contribution to th e art was made by Sidney llolc, a farmer from Dc,onshire, I-:ngland, who

EO 1 . 4 . (c )developed and patented a cipher machine \\'hich utilized pneumatic rotms. P. L. 8 6-3 6'J'hc subsequent history of the development of electrical wired rotors in th e C.S. is one of

evalutionary progress through th e Stlc

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,.,>lnr h.td flu;;h ch.cttical contacts on each ol' its ! ; U r l ' a c c ~ an d it lit hctwcen fixed l - ' C p a r a l l ~ s \'l:hichI!OntaiNtd :-;pring loaded COOtadS. 1 ' h f ~ : i l ~ f.!OOI.UCI.S p r e ~ s < ' d against th e flush l'Orll.aring loaded contacts on t h ( ~ other face whi


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f l l : m m ~ fYPI: WIIU:I>l(OTOH m:V!:I.OI':>.H::-.TS BJ.n: HOTOitT h i ~ 2(;-point.rolol wa s th


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dt!cided to modify the Kl.-47 l.o at'cept the cxi1:


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m c ~ t h o d s used in the molding process, os well us the cnvironnwnlal ::ituations in which lh e(!quiprmmts were used.

Starting in 1946, four contracton; \ H ~ r ~ assigrwd to studing lkd Hot or d ( ! n ~ l o p m f m t a l problems. l ) ~ r i n g the following ten years more than a million and a quarter dollars wenl SJXml onrcslurch relating lo th e Red Rotor and its ~ u < : c c s s o r , thus Orangc Rotor. A thorough evaluation ofnearly 200 contact materials did not uncovm a b(!t.lcr mal


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c i n ~ u i t nnd wired rotors in the m a c h i n e ~ u;;ing lh


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mm of conductive plastic pnrts, and pvssihly a much smallf!r rotor ( ~ t m l d be uchin\'cd. 'l'his p r n j < ~ c l . designated CA LJ.IOPI:. wm; C\"entually d r o p p r ~ l .

Work on printed mto rs for use in the TSEC/K L 98 and the TSI;CIK J..:l contimwd. Thi:-:effort resulted in a rotor for usn in low echelon, low sp1..>ed, manual devices. 'l'hc use of this rotor inpower driven quipmcnt was twaluatcd through ils application in the 'I'SEC/K L-7 modificatit>nni med at achieving intcropcrabilil> with the TSEC/K 1.-17.

Termination of the studies on conductive plastics and printed rotors signHIIed the definitedc-cmphash; of rotors as a major cr) plographic tool of general applicabilil.y in commlmicution!>security equipment.

Itoto rHod/Orange Hotor

White Rolor

Printed RotorFlammable Plastic(for u plastic suitablefor rolor usc which wouldmake it possible toreadily destroy rotors inan cmCIgcncy byincendiary means)Pcnumatic Rotor(for KL-17)Hluc ltotorC/\I,LIOPE(developmentof aconductive plastic forrotor'S

Rotor Development, Post World War II: \ l a n u i a c t u r ~

Molded fnsuhtl.ion Co.; :\Iinncai>OlisHoneywell Rcgulat.or Co.; AmericanPhcnobic Corp.American Molded Products; Lundquistrool and :\1anfacluringCo.:\1elpar Inc; General Mills, Inc.f!ssclen Hcsardt f)i,ision ofU.S. 'l'cstingCorJ>.

Corning Glass Works: .\1yealex Corp.;Pure Carbon Co.:\'ational Scientific Labs; Sterling gng. C o ~ ,;'\.1arkil.c Co.

JHGii ,\:'\U ~ U : D t U \ 1 GHADKCIPIIER Mr'\CIU:\'F:S IN US!::

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Covered Fiscal Y um!1947 through 1956

1952-1953

1954 through 19571952-1953

1954-1957

1954-19561950-1957


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C o n n ~ r l c s :\t-134-A, shorllillc SIG\1 Y, and its .-ucccssor, Connrte r \1-13-1-C. short t.illt!SIGAB!\ n: .S. :'\av:. designation: Elf'Ctric: C'iph(!r \lmhiml, or CSP887l were th e maiu:-;tays of LS.cornmuni


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l : ' l . ' t ~ u r i t y to


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same line nf procf)dure us l hut f i 1 l l o w ( ~ d in th an dTYPEX.SECUUTY CWHOTOH !\1:\CIII:-.:I:S

Three factors formed a defense linE) agu inst exploitation of L' .S. rotor mach i f l ( ~ s : I1. 'l'he opponent had lo know predscly how t h ~ crn>Lographic machine proc

the Lime that a machine was put. into usc it was acceplEach rotor se t had a shorter life - one to thrc..>e years of actual use - and a narro\\'erdh;trihution than th e machine itself. 1.;\ery rotor se t and every rotor was prolcct(!d by strongphysical and personnel security measures. ye t when some event occurred which waR judged topermit successful rt!ading of t.raffic if rotors were known t.o the opponent, t.he action taken might bebased on the possibility that the rotors were known. Fo r example, ifa copy ofa key list was reportedmissing an d unaccounted for and th e corresponding rotor se t was a widely held one that had been inusc for one or two years, thn messages encrypted in that key list might he declared lo hecompromised. In that case al l holders were requested Lo review t.hc affccwd messages for any actionwhich might. case th e damage rrom compromisn. Similar ly, if a ctyptographic ..bust occur-red

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that would enahlf! r ~ a d i n g of m c s ~ n g ~ s by a tor

1'he key list was consider-ed the most critical of the three l i n l ~ S of defense. An.v suspicionsurrounding a copy of the key list, from it s inception t.o it:; destruction, was reason for prompt an dserious actions. With few exccplions, compromise of a key list was viewed as tant.amount. tocompromi:;e of al l traffic encrypted in that kt!y list. Hmwrvc keys were kept in position for promptsupcrccsaion. f.'or a majority ofsuch incidcnl.s Lh

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The SIOCC:\1 muchinc 'fhc SIGABA was a rather heavy ehercd or plain text depending on the operation being performed. 'l'hegummed tape was then posted onto a mcssnge form. This type of off line o p < ~ r a t . i o n had lwo majorwealmcssess: flrst, it was too slow; second, i t increased the possibility of operator errors. 'fhcsc offline cquipments required opera tor handJing ofbot.h plain text and cnciphcn!d text at each end of thecommunications circuit . In tht! first shlp the plain text was typed into the cryplo-cquipmcnl, whichproduced an endphcred tmct on gummed tape. The enciphered text. was posted onto a message l(,rmand then transmitted as a separate and additional operation -(lither the operator of the crypf.o...equipment or the transmitting operator could, and did, make errors. At the receive end, th eoperator received the enciphered message which, in a next step operation, had t.o be decipher1!d bythe crypto-equipmenl. 'fhis of(-linc operation was too cumbersome for increasingly modernizedcommunications, and had the added serious disadvnntagc of increasing the number of' operatorerrms because oft.hc additional handling step involved.

Around about the mid 1950s, it hecumc accepted f a < ~ t lhat growing requirements for rapidsecure communications could only be mel with on-line systems. These systems provided for

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simulhmcous cnciphcrment and tran!'misment. which has boonused e x l c n s i v ~ l y . [ t was built during the vacuum tubsto-lransistors transitional period. Dimagnetic c


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hoards and packages which could rapidly he rcplac(.d lo r e ~ t o r c ~ an c


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number ofshurl tit.lcs, induding Corl\'crtc:r :\1-13-tC: CSP 8881889: CSP 2900: ASA.\1-1; und thoH'uhovn. i.(!.; SIGABA, l:l(lctric Cipher :\Jachim, CC.\1. BC.\1, unci BACCI! L:S.

'J'hc CC:\1 was designed curly in World War II to encrypt allied communications. 'l"hcBritish CC:\1 oiT-line mainstay was a machine d(!signalcd 'l'ypc X ('I'Yf_,EX l, a live ml.or machine!with mechanical activation of rotor stepping. A CC:\1 maze \\as dc$igncd for a baskc!l imposre made from new parts.

t::xtcnsivtl cryptanalysis on the syslem from 1943 onward coupld to periodic revis ions in the procedural processesof encryption.J

//!The CCl1 wus withdrawn from usc starting about 1955. Replacement was made o ~ ! ' a

continuing basis us sufficient quantities oflhe next generation of ciphtlr machines carne along./'l'hcnew machines, designutcd 1'Sgc KI.-7/KL-47, to replace the CC:\t in 1'0 in late 1958. EO 1 .4 . ( c )P.L. 86-36TSJ::C KI,.-7/Kl..-t?

Ry th e end of World War ll ,lhe Army Security A g e n < ~ y had readied requirements {or thedevdopmcnl of a new, portable, oiT-Hne, rotor machine. Early requirements for such an f!quipm


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Whil p l i < : ~ l . i o n s . This was defined as field :\rmy c q u i v n l E ~ n l . andhdow, and o p 1 ~ r a t i o n a l procedures t ~ a l l e d f(.u- clear lexl n u ~ s s a g c indit:ators and fixed :;el of' six rotors.The other lc"cl of usage was termed ADO:'\IS. 'rhc AUO:'\JS system provided lh r cnciphccdmessage indicators and a box ofLen rotors, from which t h 1 ~ :;ix needed While ASA was developing th e KL-7, the :'\avy C 0 ~ 1 S E C organizat-ion under the dr.signdireccifically th e shipboardenvironment, AFSA continued dr.\clopment of the Army originated machine, with emphasis onproviding an equipment that would be suitablt! to field environments. Keying mal.(!rials for t.heNuvys Kir-47 wctc as prescrib(!d for the Army's Kl,-7, as were c n c i p h m i n g i d c c i p h f ~ r i n g proccdurf!S.KW-9/t\FSA:I.I-9

This on-line system was developed in para11el with the off-lind clear tc"l message indicators, and another method of usc (!IUS) cmploydencrypted message indicators.

'l'hc KW-9 was used only sparingly, for less than ten years. It was Sl.>curc enough, but ithad maintenance pr-oblmns which significantly affected it s reliability.C O ! \ t B I X f ~ D C I P l l E R l t . t \ C ! l i i ~ E I C C \ 1 1

The Combined Cipher lJachinc (CCll), introducd in 1944, was designed spcdfically to filJth e ncd ror a common cryptographic system for usc between the U.S. Army/Na'-'"Y and the Britishmilitary. For hlh security and operational reasons, iL was necessary to have it high grade

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dphr!r sy:-;l.(!nl h.v whieh a hugc vulumc t>l't.nJilic < ~ o u l d b ' ~ handlf!d hut \\hich would not (!ndmtg(.r mc o m p r l l m i ~ e Convcrlnr ~ 1 - 1 : 1 4 - C , SIGABA. It wus nut p o s ~ i h l e lu permit. ttw Brit ish for

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comnnitmec than it could provido. Th e machine W t ~ s r w \ c ~ r put into pruduction and tho pmjt!Cl wm;(!VInluu1ly uhaondorwd.IW\1 I B a c k w n r < h ; C ( ' ~ f l

The B C ~ t . a modification of the Comhincd Cipher Machine, was dcsign!d by CuptainLawrence 1-,. StaO


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The Sl!GBR.AT w.as ba.j.'lt from SIGABAs tG fill this p ~ : , t r p a s e , but there was considerl;l!ble controversyover whether or not it was sw:ticieFitly !)ect:


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Hnfi!T"I'!nrn Ctyptunalysi::, Cipher Dca\'our, Louis Krugh. PI>. 6.

Arlcch Ilow;(!, Dcdhum,:\tuss. 12850Get info onSurmmuy attachedThe! Colmar incident occurred during World Wa r II whmt a l'rcnch farmor fi'Om Colmar,

l'rancc, sloltl a military \'Chicle with an operational SIGABA on board. The fitrmcr dumped th eSIGABA an d it s a c c o m p a n ~ i n g rotor s c ~ t s into a nearby rivm. As a n!sult of this action, SIGABAI'Otors in usc an d p r o ~ r a m r n e d for usc in thn l ~ u r o p < : a n Theatre wuro declared

Comsec Post Ww2

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Transcript of Comsec Post Ww2