Compstat challenges and opportunities

Compstat andOrganizational Change

in the LowellPolice Department

Challenges and Opportunities

1201 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036-2636

(202) 833-1460

Fax: (202) 659-9149

E-mail: [email protected]

www.policefoundation.org

i

WASHINGTON, DC

Compstat andOrganizational Change

in the LowellPolice Department

Challenges and Opportunities

James J. WillisStephen D. Mastrofski

David WeisburdRosann Greenspan

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The Police Foundation is a private, independent, nonprofit organization dedicated to supportinginnovation and improvement in policing. Established in 1970, the foundation has conducted seminalresearch in police behavior, policy, and procedure, and works to transfer to local agencies the bestinformation about practices for dealing effectively with a range of important police operational andadministrative concerns. Motivating all of the foundation’s efforts is the goal of efficient, humanepolicing that operates within the framework of democratic principles and the highest ideals of thenation. The Police Foundation’s research findings are published as an information service.

This project was supported by Grant Number 98-IJ-CX-007 by the National Institute of Justice, Officeof Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view or opinions contained in this docu-ment are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of theU.S. Department of Justice or the Police Foundation.

Additional reports are forthcoming from the larger project, Compstat and Organizational Change,from which this report on the Lowell, Massachusetts, Police Department’s implementation ofCompstat is derived. A Police Foundation Report, The Growth of Compstat in American Policing, willdescribe the national survey that assessed the number of American police agencies using Compstatand measured the degree to which the elements of Compstat were part of their routine and structure.A third report will describe intensive examinations of Compstat’s implementation in three policedepartments–Newark, New Jersey, Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Lowell, Massachusetts.

©2003 by the Police Foundation. All rights, including translation into other languages, reservedunder the Universal Copyright Convention, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary andArtistic Works and the International and Pan American Copyright Conventions. Permission to quotereadily granted.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

CompStat and organizational change in the Lowell Police Department :challenges and opportunities / James J. Willis ... [et al.].

p. cm.ISBN 1-884614-19-1 (alk. paper)

1. Lowell (Mass). Police Dept. 2. Police administration—Massachusetts—Lowell.3. Police administration—Data processing. 4. Law enforcement—Data processing.5. Crime analysis—Data processing. I. Willis, James J.

HV8148.L85C66 2004363.2'0285--dc22

2004001900

ISBN 1-884614-19-1

1201 Connecticut Avenue, NWWashington, DC 20036-2636(202) 833-1460 • Fax: (202) 659-9149Email: [email protected]

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Table of Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1Background on Lowell and its police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

II. Overview of Compstat at Lowell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

III. Origins and Development of Compstat at Lowell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5The influence of the NYPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5The role of the superintendent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5Government support—City Hall and the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services . . .6Early Compstats—fuzzy memories and change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

IV. Research Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

V. Analysis of Lowell’s Experience with Compstat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9Mission Clarification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9Internal Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13Geographic Organization of Operational Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

Organizational structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19Decision making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19Coordination issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22Geographic versus temporal organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

Organizational Flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24Manpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26City politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27Rivalry between sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

Data-Driven Problem Identification and Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30A history of Compstat—overcoming technical and learning obstacles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31What kinds of data are used? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33Visibility of crimes at Compstat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33How are the data collected, processed, and analyzed? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34How are the data used? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35Quality of the data—timeliness and accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38The Crime Analysis Unit (CAU)—autonomy, time constraints, and frustrations . . . . . . .39

Innovative Problem-Solving Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41Problem solving and brainstorming during Compstat meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42Follow-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43Traditional police responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44Traditional and innovative police responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45Innovative police responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46

External Information Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48

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VI. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51Mission Clarification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52Internal Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53Geographic Organization of Operational Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54Organizational Flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55Data-Driven Problem Identification and Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55Innovative Problem-Solving Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56External Information Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57

VII. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58

Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61Appendix I: Lowell Police Department Organizational Chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63Appendix II: Map of the City of Lowell and City Neighborhoods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67Appendix III: Patrol Officer Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71Appendix IV: Sample Compstat Prep Sheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87

Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .89

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Foreword

The birth of Compstat dates back to 1994, whenformer NYPD police commissioner William Brat-ton asked a team of officers to create a simple data-base with information about the major crimes thatcities must report to the FBI. A significant changein police practice ensued when the simple data-base became an elaborate program where policeentered crime reports into a computer system thatsorted them by type. With the continuing evolu-tion of the program, officers began scrutinizingthe statistics it generated to create maps and chartsshowing notable changes and emerging problemspots. Meanwhile, department heads convenedregular meetings to discuss crime trends, to ques-tion district commanders on their responses tocrime, and to work out future strategies.

The systematic use of hard data and height-ened accountability to reduce crime has been her-alded as a seminal innovation in police manage-ment. Compstat’s many advocates claim that it hasspurred the development of innovative, local,crime-fighting strategies and improved publicsafety. These perceived successes have caused anexuberant Compstat movement to rapidly sweepthe nation. A Police Foundation survey found thata third of the country’s 515 largest police depart-ments had implemented a Compstat-like programby 2000 (Weisburd et al. 2001).

The aura that surrounds Compstat in polic-ing circles stems from the marvels that it report-edly worked in New York, where crime plummetedin the 1990s. Faith in the program is not univer-sal, however, and a number of detractors havearisen to contest the Compstat dogma. They haveargued that crime dropped in New York as a re-sult of factors such as demographic shifts, the endof the crack epidemic, and a strong economy. Theyhave pointed to other U.S. cities that saw crimesimilarly decline in the 1990s though they lackedthe benefit of Compstat. They have also challengedCompstat by questioning the ability of police workto significantly affect crime trends that reflect fac-tors beyond the control of the police. Brattonlaunched Compstat in the conviction that policecan manage for better outcomes, but skeptics havecontended that police reforms, including Comp-stat, make little dent on the economic trends andsocial pathologies that spawn crime.

This report provides another challenge toCompstat’s proponents by showing the programto be a tool whose potential is unfulfilled. Accord-ing to Bratton, Compstat meetings created a senseof immediate accountability that galvanized NewYork’s local commands, fostered innovative prob-lem solving, and guided the department in ration-ally allocating resources to precincts that mostneeded them. Implementation of the program inthe much smaller Lowell Police Department re-veals, however, that a gap divides the theory andpractice of Compstat.

Lowell, Massachusetts, like New York City,stoked Compstat’s reputation for working miraclesin crime-ridden streets. Lowell’s crime rate beganto decline in 1994 and continued to drop after thedepartment implemented Compstat. Like NewYork, Lowell conducts biweekly Compstat meet-ings where the department’s leaders question sec-tor commanders on problems and crime spikes.While many cities that use Compstat only callmeetings when a particular sector needs attention,Lowell holds regular meetings where command-ers present statistics on their sectors and face anunnerving grilling if crime has increased.

The theory of Compstat notwithstanding,Lowell’s program was subject to internal conflictsthat made it deviate from New York’s prototype.Scarce resources and a veiled sense of competi-tion made commanders reluctant to share re-sources with sectors that were hardest hit by crime.Lack of training in data analysis and general ex-clusion of rank-and-file officers from the Compstatprocess bred indifference toward the programamong many department members. Conservativeattitudes toward crime fighting led to continuedreliance on traditional police responses rather thanthe innovative, problem-solving strategies that arecentral to the Compstat process. The absence ofsystematic follow-up at Lowell’s Compstat meet-ings often caused the department to plot strategyon the basis of officers’ impressions of what hadpreviously worked, not on the basis of the data.Moreover, the hefty burden of accountability car-ried by sector commanders may have made themreluctant to try new approaches to problems,though Bratton had seen accountability as a cata-lyst that would energize police to attack crime.The prospect of being publicly criticized by thesuperintendent may have made more impact on

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Acknowledgments

We are deeply indebted to Superintendent EdwardF. Davis III for granting us access to his police de-partment and for his unconditional backing of thisproject. We would also like to thank Deputy Super-intendent Kenneth Lavallee for all his assistanceduring our time at Lowell, especially when it cameto administering the officer survey. A note of ap-preciation also goes to Deputy SuperintendentDennis Cormier and Captain William Taylor fortheir support. We would also like to acknowledgeJill Casey, Stephanie Hunter, and Suzannah Hackerfor all their administrative help. In addition, wewould like to thank Officer Mark Trudel for hisencouragement. Thanks also to Sergeant DavidAbbott for explaining the intricacies of the detail.

This case study would have been impossiblewithout the unfailing support of the sector cap-tains, Captain Arthur Ryan Jr., Captain SusanSiopes, and Captain Robert DeMoura. Their can-did and intelligent remarks contributed mightilyto the overall quality of this project. Moreover,their thoughtful observations provided invaluableinsights into the complexities, rewards, and chal-lenges of modern police work.

We would like to thank Carol Fitzgerald andBrenda Bond for their immeasurable help in ex-plaining how Compstat works in the Lowell Po-lice Department. We very much appreciated theirtime and effort in answering our queries and pro-viding us with relevant documents. Thanks alsoto the rest of the Crime Analysis Unit: Officer TomLombard, Dawn Reeby, Derek Desrochers, andRobin Smith. Their comments and patience con-tributed significantly to our understanding of theoverall Compstat process.

We would especially like to thank the dozensof precinct personnel who we interviewed andobserved in meetings, as well as those patrolofficers who completed our survey.

We would also like to thank Ann MarieMcNally, a former research associate at the PoliceFoundation, for her help with the data entryprocess.

Finally, we wish to express thanks to Dr. LisaYarkony, Police Foundation research associate andeditor of this report, and to Police FoundationCommunications Director, Mary Malina, manag-ing editor, who oversaw its production.

some sector commanders than Compstat’s ven-turesome ideal of crime fighting.

This report suggests that we should temperour enthusiasm for Compstat, but it also acknowl-edges the valuable impact that the program hasmade on the Lowell Police Department. The de-partment’s decision makers have become morefamiliar with the use of data and better informedabout what is taking place in their areas. Sectorcaptains feel more accountable for identifying andaddressing crime problems, and there has beensome successful use of innovative, crime-fightingstrategies. At the same time, the endurance of tra-ditional practices and structures appears to haveinhibited Compstat’s potential for innovation.Additional training is necessary if police are to putmore faith in Compstat’s data-driven approachthan in time-honored responses to crime, andother members of the department must shouldersome of the burden of accountability that weighsso heavily on sector commanders. The most ad-vanced technology is pointless unless the policethemselves understand its value and have thetraining to use it. By exploring both Lowell’s fail-ures and successes in carrying out Bratton’s vision,this report reveals the fallible, human dimensionof the Compstat process.

Hubert WilliamsPresident

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Compstat and Organizational Change in the Lowell Police Department

I. Introduction

What the late Jack Maple, formerly deputy policecommissioner of the New York Police Department,pithily called “putting cops on dots” has rapidlybecome a fixture in many large police departmentsacross the country. Between 1994, when the NYPDfirst implemented Compstat,1 and 2001, when wecompleted our national survey, a third of depart-ments with one hundred or more sworn officershad implemented a Compstat-like program and26 percent were planning to do so.2 Widely vauntedand even referred to as an “emerging paradigm”in law enforcement, Compstat is an informationand management tool that maps crime statisticsand holds command staff more accountable forthe level of crime in their beats (Walsh 2001, 347).Its sweeping popularity among police and policymakers has been fueled by a flurry of nationalpublicity that attributes the recent plummet inNew York’s crime rate to Compstat’s innovativeuse of geographic information systems technol-ogy and cutting-edge management principles.

Much of the literature on Compstat consistsof brief studies that rely heavily on anecdotal evi-dence or concentrate on the nation’s largest andmost exceptional police department, the NYPD.3

To date, there has been little systematic analysisof the elements of Compstat and their implemen-tation in smaller departments. This report, whichis an in-depth evaluation of how Compstat worksin a much smaller agency, the Lowell Police De-partment (LPD), is part of a project funded by theNational Institute of Justice and conducted by thePolice Foundation. In an earlier component of theproject, “Compstat and Organizational Change:

A National Assessment,” we identified seven coreelements of Compstat: (1) mission clarification;(2) internal accountability; (3) geographic orga-nization of operational command; (4) organiza-tional flexibility; (5) data-driven identification ofproblems and assessment of the department’s prob-lem-solving efforts; (6) innovative problem-solv-ing tactics; and (7) external information exchange(Weisburd et al. 2001). Using these elements as ageneral framework, we analyzed how Compstatis being implemented across the country. Theproject’s initial stage consisted of a national sur-vey that assessed the number of local police de-partments that were using Compstat and measuredthe degree to which these Compstat elements werepart of a department’s structure and routine. Thesecond stage involved sixteen short site visits toidentify emerging patterns and differences amongCompstat programs across police agencies. Finally,we selected three police departments, Newark,New Jersey; Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Lowell,Massachusetts, as sites suitable for lengthier andmore intensive research and sent a researcher toeach department for a period ranging from two toeight months. He or she was responsible for gath-ering detailed information that explained howCompstat worked at all levels of the police orga-nization.

There are three primary reasons for selectingthe Lowell Police Department as a case study: (1)Its high score on our national survey indicatedthat it had fully implemented Compstat; (2) It hadreceived considerable publicity as an innovativedepartment under Davis’ leadership;4 and (3) Itwas relatively small compared to most other de-partments that had received publicity for their

1. There is some disagreement about what the acronym “Compstat” actually means. Former NYPD police commissioner William Brattonsuggests that it stands for “computer-statistics meetings” (Bratton 1998, 233), but Silverman attributes its name to “compare Stats,” a computerfilename (Silverman 1999, 98). Some commentators have collapsed these interpretations and argue that Compstat refers to “computer comparisonstatistics” (U.S. National Agricultural Library 1998, http://www.nalusda.gov/pavnet/iag/cecompst.htm).

2. Forty-two percent had not implemented a Compstat-like program. For the first detailed analysis on the extent of Compstat’s implementationby police departments across the country, see Compstat and Organizational Change: Findings from a National Survey, Weisburd et al., PoliceFoundation (2001).

3. James L. Heskett, “NYPD New,” Harvard Business School Report no. N9–396–29 (April 1996); Eli Silverman, NYPD Battles Crime, NortheasternUniversity Press (1999); Phyllis McDonald, Sheldon Greenberg, and William J. Bratton, Managing Police Operations: Implementing the NYPDCrime Control Model Using COMPSTAT, Wadsworth Publishing Co. (2001); Vincent E. Henry, The COMPSTAT Paradigm: Management Accountabilityin Policing, Business, and the Public Sector, foreword by William J. Bratton, LooseLeaf Law Publications (2002).

4. In May 2002, Superintendent Davis was awarded one of only two Leadership Awards by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) for hisrole “in bringing major changes in the department that greatly benefited the city.” In this context, Compstat was recognized as “an innovativecrime-tracking program” (Skruck, 2002).


2

Compstat efforts, notably, New York City, Balti-more, New Orleans, Newark, and Philadelphia.The last reason was the most compelling becausean examination of Lowell had potential to pro-vide insights into the special challenges and op-portunities that arise when small departments tryto institute a program of organizational changethat originated in much larger agencies. On theone hand, smaller departments typically havefewer resources to mobilize for new tasks, pro-grams, and structures. On the other hand, theymay find it easier to overcome some of the inter-nal resistance that is so endemic to large policeorganizations (Mastrofski, Ritti, and Hoffmaster1987). What could Lowell’s experience withCompstat teach us and other researchers?

This report serves three purposes: (1) to pro-vide a detailed description of Lowell’s Compstatprogram that should interest police chiefs andother police personnel who are curious aboutCompstat; (2) to explain the benefits and chal-lenges of implementing the various key elementsof Compstat; and (3) to use our knowledge ofLowell to provide some insights into Compstat’sfuture in law enforcement.

Compstat’s primary goal is to make police or-ganizations more rational and responsive to man-agement’s direction. The seven elements of Comp-stat had been discussed in the organizationaldevelopment literature and used by numerouspolice departments for many years before theNYPD launched its Compstat program. TheNYPD’s contribution was to assemble these ele-ments into a coherent package (Weisburd et al.2001). According to Compstat’s principal propo-nents, Compstat’s various elements interweave toform a program with its own logical integrity andto make Compstat work like a well-oiled machine.Indeed, Compstat as a crime-fighting tool is intu-itively appealing, with its use of sophisticated tech-nology for the timely identification of crime prob-lems and practice of holding middle managersaccountable for reducing them (Bratton 1998,233–39; Maple 1999, 31–33; Kelling and Sousa2001, 2–3; Silverman 1999, 97–124). Our exami-nation of Lowell’s Compstat, however, challengedthe program’s accepted image as a smoothly func-tioning machine by revealing numerous paradoxesand incompatibilities among its various elements.

Background on Lowelland its police

The City of Lowell, Massachusetts, is located thirtymiles northwest of Boston on the banks of theMerrimack and Concord Rivers. Formerly a pow-erful center for U.S. textile production, Lowellbegan to decline during the Great Depression. Thecity’s long slump came to a halt, however, whenthe late Senator Paul Tsongas spearheaded thelaunch of the Lowell Plan in the early eighties.The plan provides for a partnership between pub-lic and private sectors to encourage and guidebusiness development in the city. Its ultimate goalsare to strike a balance between manufacturing andknowledge-based industries and to create an at-tractive downtown that encourages use of publicspaces for civic, cultural, and recreational activi-ties (Bluestone and Stevenson 2000, 54–56, 72).

According to the 2000 census, Lowell had105,167 residents within its fourteen square miles.The city is divided into several neighborhoods andis moderately diverse: 62.5 percent white, 16.5percent Asian, 14.0 percent Latino, 3.5 percentblack, 0.2 percent American Indian and AlaskanNative, and 3.3 percent other race or two or moreraces (U.S. Census Bureau 2002). Income levelsfor 2000 are currently unavailable, but in 1990Lowell’s median family income was $29,351, with18 percent of families living below the poverty line.The Lowell Plan envisions a thriving and livablecity for the twenty-first century, and an importantelement of this vision is a strong emphasis on con-trolling crime and disorder. Since Edward F. DavisIII became superintendent in 1995, Lowell hasincreased the number of patrol officers from 159to 210, a 32 percent increase, and implemented anationally recognized community-policing pro-gram. As part of a joint city government and com-

Compstat’s primary goal is to

make police organizations more

rational and responsive to

management’s direction.

3


munity initiative, the department has establishedseven precinct stations and formed fourteen neigh-borhood groups that meet regularly with policeofficers to identify their most pressing concernsand offer suggestions for their resolution. A com-bination of efforts by city government, commu-nity members, and local police led Lowell to winthe prestigious “1999 All-America City Award”from the National Civic League in recognition of“exemplary community problem solving.”

There were 260 sworn officers and approxi-mately eighty civilians in the Lowell Police De-partment when we visited in 2000.5 In terms of itsorganization, the department consisted of an In-vestigative and Prevention Bureau, an OperationsBureau, and an Administrative Division (see Ap-pendix I). The bureaus were each headed by adeputy superintendent, and the AdministrativeDivision was supervised directly by the superin-tendent. The city’s neighborhoods were dividedinto three sectors determined by both census blockpopulation and the presence of physical bound-aries, such as rivers and roads: North (Pawtucket-ville, Centralville, and Belvidere), East (Back Cen-tral, Downtown, and South Lowell), and West(The Highlands and The Acre) (see Appendix II).These sectors or “service divisions” were underthe command of a sector captain and containedwithin the Operations Bureau, along with theTraffic Division, Headquarters Division, and Com-munity Response Division. The Merrimack andConcord Rivers provided clear, natural bound-aries, with a major road further subdividing theEast and West Sectors. The different sectors cov-ered approximately the same area, but their dif-ferent demographic groups and socioeconomicstructures presented each sector captain with aunique set of problems. A department report,based on the 1990 census, indicated that the NorthSector was the most populous with a populationof 40,635, followed closely by the West with apopulation of 40,442, and finally the East with apopulation of 22,617. In general, the North Sec-tor had the highest median family income of about$35,000, compared to the West, where half of

Lowell’s poor now reside, and the East, which cov-ered Lowell’s downtown and contained a large eld-erly population. All of Lowell’s patrol officers wereassigned to a sector, aside from the handful thatcovered various housing developments through-out the city and were assigned to specialty posi-tions. As of August 2000, there were approxi-mately the same number of patrol officers in eachsection, with forty-eight assigned to the North,fifty-one to the East, and fifty-two to the West.

In addition to the Operations Bureau, the de-partment was divided between an Investigative andPrevention Bureau, also headed by a deputy, andan Administrative Division that answered directlyto Davis. The Crime Prevention Division, EvidenceResponse Division, Special Investigation Section,Criminal Investigation Section, and Legal Divisionfell under the command of the deputy in chargeof the Investigative and Prevention Bureau. Finally,the Administrative Division consisted of the Ac-creditation Section, Budget and Finance Section,Communications Section, Detail Section, Informa-tion Technology Section, Intelligence Crime Analy-sis Section, Professional Standards Section, Train-ing Section, and Employees Assistance Section.

II. Overview of Compstatat Lowell

This section provides an overview of how Comp-stat has operated in recent years. It introduces itsmajor features and provides a reference point fromwhich to assess how much Compstat has evolvedsince its inception. An in-depth discussion of themajor features of Lowell’s Compstat program willappear in subsequent sections.

Superintendent Davis first implemented theexisting format for a Compstat presentation onFebruary 22, 2001. It calls for one of the threesector captains to be present at each biweeklyCompstat meeting and for data to be presentedfor all sectors over a six-week period. Meetingstake place on alternate Thursdays, when approxi-mately twenty to thirty members of the depart-

5. In addition to the superintendent and the 210 line officers, there were two deputy superintendents, eight captains, thirteen lieutenants, andtwenty-six sergeants.


4

ment’s top brass, plus a handful of invited guests,sergeants, and patrol officers, file into a large roomat Lowell’s Cross Point Training Facility. Davis sitsat one end of several tables that form an orderlyrectangle and is flanked on either side by mem-bers of his command staff. He or one his deputies,in his absence, begins the meeting at 9 a.m. withsome introductory comments. Then the lights dimto focus attention on the lone figure of the sectorcaptain who stands in the front of the room. Mem-bers of the Crime Analysis Unit (CAU) use laptopcomputers to project crime data and maps onto anearby screen, and over the course of the next two-and-a-half hours the sector captain, who is en-tirely responsible for the policing of his or her areaof the city, reports on the sector’s crime incidents,trends, and tactical responses. The sector captainalso faces questions, suggestions, and commentsfrom audience members. Typical remarks mightinclude: “What are you doing about motor vehiclebreaks on East Street? They seem to be up fromthe last Compstat period;” “I have always felt thattraffic stops are useful for identifying potentialsuspects;” “Has anyone got any suggestions abouthow we should deal with this latest outbreak ofgraffiti in the downtown area?”

The multiple goals of this Compstat meetinginclude eliciting collective input on crime patternsand problem-solving strategies; encouraging in-formation sharing on crime locations, victims, andsuspects; and facilitating the deployment of de-partment resources. In addition, the forum acts asa mechanism for holding the sector captain ac-countable for crime in his or her beat. Even thoughconversation is shared around the room, the pri-mary focus of audience members remains on thesector captain. Any failure to provide a satisfac-tory response to the various inquiries may lead toa rebuke from Davis.

The Compstat presentation at Lowell is theend product of a lengthy process that begins whenan individual patrol officer files an incident re-port. Once this report is scanned into the depart-ment’s mainframe, the members of the CAU areresponsible for inputting relevant crime data intoa database and using these data to aggregate, ana-lyze, and map crime incidents. Prior to 1996, whenCompstat came to Lowell, crime analysis barelyexisted, since Lowell’s administration, like that of

many agencies across the country, merely con-ducted an annual review of local Part I crime ratescollected in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports(UCR). The purpose of this brief examination wasto provide the department with a general indica-tion of its overall success in controlling crimeduring the previous year. In contrast to this rela-tively narrow focus, Lowell’s Compstat programplays a continuous and critical role in the depart-ment-wide process of identifying specific crimesas soon as they emerge, driving decision making,and facilitating problem-solving strategies.

Lowell’s CAU now inputs data on a daily basisfor a wide variety of crimes ranging from aggra-vated assaults to traffic accidents. Some of thesedata are made available via the mainframe to alldepartment personnel, as well as through roll-callannouncements and a daily newsletter. The CAUalso uses these data to prepare maps, spreadsheets,and descriptive statistics, which are given to sec-tor captains on the Monday before the Compstatmeeting. The presenting captain is then respon-sible for examining the detailed analysis for his orher sector—a process that may take a period ofseveral hours over the next few days—in order toprepare fully for Thursday’s meeting. In additionto preparing for Compstat, Lowell’s sector captainsand their executive officers are responsible foraccessing and reviewing all daily police reportsfrom their sectors and for responding to crimeproblems.

Before Compstat, the use of timely crime datafor the implementation of crime-reduction strate-gies had no place in the organization and opera-tion of the LPD. The following section will exam-ine the factors that led to the formation of Lowell’sprogram. It will also show that departments canimplement and adopt Compstat with a modestoutlay of resources and can readily adapt it to workwithin their existing organizational structures.Hence, Compstat is not a program that is prohibi-tively expensive for small departments, nor doesit require a great deal of organizational change.Indeed, Compstat’s low cost and flexibility con-tributed to its rapid development within Lowell’srelatively small police department.

5


III. Origins and Development ofCompstat at Lowell

Our examination of the implementation and de-velopment of Lowell’s Compstat program revealsseveral key points that are worth highlighting: (1)Lowell’s program drew heavily on the NYPD ex-perience; (2) Nearly all of the impetus for itsimplementation came from Davis; (3) The super-intendent’s innovative reforms received strongpolitical support from city hall, while externalgovernment grants enabled the initial formationand rapid growth of the CAU; and (4) The Comp-stat format has changed significantly in the fewyears since its inception.

The influence of the NYPD

Davis and his command staff tailored Compstatto suit their own department’s priorities but alsoborrowed heavily from the NYPD’s program. Somebackground on the NYPD experience, therefore,will help frame our understanding of Lowell’s ef-forts. When William Bratton became commis-sioner of the NYPD, he sought to transform a slug-gish, bureaucratic organization with demoralizedpersonnel into an outfit that responded keenly andeffectively to crime problems. He did so by adopt-ing management principles advanced by organi-zational development experts, such as using datato make informed decisions, giving priority tooperational rather than administrative concerns,and holding key personnel accountable. Commis-sioner Bratton, as a result, managed to “turnaround” the NYPD and reduce crime throughoutthe city (Bratton 1998).

The NYPD’s Compstat is a “strategic controlsystem” that identifies and disseminates informa-tion on crime problems and tracks efforts to ad-dress them by implementing four basic principles:(1) accurate and timely intelligence about crimemade available to all levels in the organization;(2) the selection of the most effective tactics forspecific problems; (3) rapid deployment of peopleand resources to implement those tactics; and (4)“relentless” follow-up and assessment to learnwhat happened and make subsequent tactical ad-justments as necessary (Bratton 1998, 224). These

principles are most evident at the department’sregular, twice-weekly meetings where precinctcommanders tell top brass about ongoing crimeproblems and their efforts to address them. In itsuse of these basic principles, Compstat representsa transformation in police operations and man-agement, as well as in attitudes toward the capac-ity of law enforcement to influence crime rates(McDonald et al. 2001).

According to our national survey, the NYPD’sexperience has had a powerful impact on depart-ments across the country, since about 70 percentof police departments with Compstat programsreported attending a Compstat session in NewYork City (Weisburd et al. 2001). The NYPD alsoinfluenced Lowell’s implementation of Compstatas a result of a casual conversation that took placebetween Davis and Bratton at a promotion cer-emony in New York during 1996. Bratton, as Davisrecalled, described Compstat as a useful way ofbringing “a private sector mentality to the publicsector,” and this remark made him eager to tryout the program. Davis, as one officer remarked,“came back from one of his visits with Brattonand said, ‘Let’s have a Compstat here.’” Shortlythereafter, he followed Bratton’s basic model, or“took stuff from their [New York’s] game planbook,” as another officer put it, and broughtCompstat to Lowell.

The role of the superintendent

Davis’ brief encounter with Bratton in 1996 con-vinced him to implement Compstat, but he hasremarked that two other factors contributed to itsdevelopment. Around the same time, he readJames Heskett’s case study of the NYPD (1996) asa participant in the Senior Executives in State andLocal Government Seminar at Harvard’s KennedySchool of Government. Davis explained that thisinformative article gave him some ideas forLowell’s Compstat program by emphasizing therelationship between crime strategies and crimestatistics, as well as the value of breaking cities downinto sectors. He also recalled how a meeting withFrank Hartmann at Harvard’s Senior ManagementInstitute for Police underscored the value of data fordriving the decision-making process, a perspectivethat mirrored his own organizational philosophy.


6

Convinced that Compstat would be a usefuladdition to the department, Davis ran the idea byhis civilian staff and commanding officers duringone of the department’s annual strategic planningretreats in late 1996. The retreat’s purpose was tocontinue exploring the possibility of decentraliz-ing the department geographically as part of amajor transformation toward community polic-ing. The initial impetus for this move to commu-nity policing had emerged from a 1994 strategicplanning session. The department was still imple-menting the strategic plan in 1996 when Davissuggested that they implement Compstat.

Proponents of community policing argue thatpolice reform requires geographic decentralizationand devolution of decision making down the chainof command (Eck and Maguire 2000, 218). Inkeeping with this school of thought, these factors,rather than the implementation of Compstat,drove Davis’ decision to reorganize the departmentunder the twenty-four-hour supervision of thesector captain (Thacher 1998, 36). The creationof this sector structure was certainly consistentwith Compstat’s requirements, but the departmentwent much further. Stating that one of the basictenets of community policing was “one officer, oneneighborhood,” Davis explained that assigningofficers to specific sectors encouraged them to getto know the residents on their beats and to be re-sponsive to community problems. He highlightedthe importance of line officer decision making bycommenting that he wanted his patrol officers torecognize their responsibility for “their beat” andby quoting former LAPD chief Edward M. Davis,who talked about the significance of “territorialimperative.” Ironically enough, as we shall see,community policing and Compstat operate atcross-purposes in relation to the decentralizationof command. Community policing delegates deci-sion-making authority as far down the chain ofcommand as possible, while Compstat concen-trates decision-making power among middle man-agers and holds them directly accountable to thetop brass. Since district commanders are prima-rily responsible for identifying and solving prob-lems, the capacity of the rank and file to exercisediscretion is necessarily constrained.

Davis may have been the catalyst for decen-tralizing the organization geographically, but he

attributed the ultimate decision to a strategic plan-ning process involving all his command staff. Healso noted that there was generally a lot of diffi-culty getting officers to think geographically, de-spite command’s support for the change. Officershad mixed responses to the change, according tothe recollection of one Lowell lieutenant:

You know, you got a variety of responses at alllevels. Some were kind of interested. A lot wereon the fence. And there were a few adamantlyopposed to any kind of change whatsoever,who feel it’s just constitutionally wrong tochange (quoted in Thacher 1998, 35).

Ultimately, the department moved toward asystem that established three sector captains, or“sector bosses” in department vernacular, each re-sponsible for a separate area of the city. In con-trast to the decision to decentralize, no respon-dents, including Davis, remembered any resistancewithin the department to the decision to imple-ment Compstat. It seems likely that officers re-garded the implementation of Compstat as a rela-tively minor event when compared to the large-scale, structural transformation implied in themove to community policing. Since managementis structured geographically under both Compstatand community policing, Lowell’s Compstat pro-gram was easily adapted to the department’s pre-existing community-policing model. None ofthose interviewed suggested that Compstat wasrevolutionary, and our overall impression was thatmost remembered it as somewhat of a novelty.

Government support—City Halland the Office of CommunityOriented Policing Services

In NYPD Battles Crime, Eli Silverman (1999, 181)argues that a major factor in Compstat’s successin New York was the strong “external backing” itreceived from Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. Similarly,Davis was appointed superintendent with thestaunch support of City Manager Richard Johnson,the head and arguably most powerful member ofcity hall. In contrast to New York, this politicalbacking was based upon Davis’ ardent commit-ment to community policing. Davis’ appointmentin 1994 corresponded with federal passage of the

7


Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act.The act provided for over $8 billion over a six-year period to deploy 100,000 additional com-munity-policing officers and also created the COPSOffice to oversee the process and administer ex-tensive funding for nationwide implementation ofcommunity-policing programs (U.S. Departmentof Justice 1994). Davis was able to use the newresources earmarked for community policing toimplement Compstat. The years 1994 and 1995,therefore, represented a “unique” opportunity forhim, as he recalled, since he had both the power-ful support of city government and the suddenavailability of considerable federal and state funds.In addition, Davis and the department were gain-ing popularity with local residents who werethrilled when the city established its first com-munity-policing precinct in Centralville, a toughneighborhood in the North sector.

Davis reminisced fondly about this uniquepolitical environment. He remembered watchingSenator John Kerry at 3 a.m. on C-SPAN talkingabout the funds available through the 1994 crimebill, and he commented that any motion dealingwith crime that came before the city councilaround this time would pass by a wide margin ofeither seven to two or eight to one in the depart-ment’s favor. As a further illustration of this po-litical support, he noted that the department’sbudget had doubled in the five years between 1996and 2000 from $10 million to $20 million. Thissupport transferred into the “considerable leeway”that the city granted Davis in the hiring process.

The COPS Office contributed significantly tothe emergence and development of Compstat inthe Lowell Police Department. To get Compstatoff the ground, Davis reassigned an input clerk,who was already working in Records, and a patrolofficer familiar with databases to form a new CrimeAnalysis Unit. The creation of the first civiliancrime analyst position was supported through aCOPS MORE grant (Thacher 1998, 51).6 UsingComputer-Aided-Dispatch (CAD) data, thefledgling CAU prepared and disseminated simplecrime sheets that helped identify crime trends and

patterns in the city by listing the location, address,and time of calls to the police.

Since its first appointments in 1996, the CAUhas grown to five full-time members, three ofwhom have master’s degrees in criminal justice,and several student interns from local universi-ties. Further financial support for full-time posi-tions and for computer hardware and softwarecame from additional local, state, and federalgrants that were made available for communitypolicing and problem-solving policing (Thacher1998, 51). Clear indications that Compstat doesnot require significant new resources are evidentin Davis’ decision to implement Compstat bymobilizing the department’s existing personneland his use of available community-policing grantsto expand the CAU rapidly. Davis noted, “The costis mainly people” and estimated that it took only$100,000 to hire four additional employees for thefirst year of the program (Anderson 2001, 5).Compstat’s relatively low cost and adaptability arelikely to contribute to its speedy adoption bysmaller police departments across the nation, asour survey indicated. At the time of our survey, in1999, only 11 percent of departments with be-tween fifty and ninety-nine sworn officers hadimplemented Compstat. The popularity of theprogram can be seen, however, by the fact that 30percent were planning to adopt it (Weisburd et al.2001).

Early Compstats—fuzzy memoriesand change

Memories fade with time, and after the passage ofseveral years, it is hardly surprising that individualaccounts of the first Compstat sessions at Lowelldiffer. Many people gave conflicting statements onwhether Compstat was actually implementedsometime in 1996 or early in 1997 and how thefirst meetings were managed. Several of those in-terviewed remembered the early Compstats asbeing confrontational “pressure cookers” whereDavis played the role of a “hard man” and putcommand staff “on the spot” by peppering them

6. COPS MORE (Making Officer Redeployment Effective) grants were to help increase the amount of time officers could spend on communitypolicing by covering up to 75 percent of the total cost of technology, equipment, or civilian salaries for one year.


8

with questions about crime rates in their sectors.One lieutenant recalled that what made Compstatparticularly tough was “people did not knowwhere they were going with it.”

Officers who attended the first Compstats alsogave varying accounts on the primary focus of themeetings. Davis commented that initial Compstatscentered on “crime issues,” but other attendeesremembered spending a significant amount of timedealing with administrative concerns. One officercommented that Compstat meetings often in-cluded discussions on the utility of decentraliz-ing the entire department, including the Crimi-nal Investigation Section. Another recalled that theearly Compstats were “very administrative andlargely concerned questions about the work de-tail and problems with manpower, while crimeonly occupied about 20 percent of the ‘talk time.’”

These accounts clearly indicate that Lowell’sCompstat program, which required little changeto the existing organizational structure, hasevolved considerably since its inception. When wefirst arrived in October 2000, several captains andmembers of the administrative staff had been dis-cussing the possibility of changing a Compstatformat that had not been altered for two years. Atthe time, the three sector captains all presentedcrime data on a biweekly basis. Unfortunately, bythe time the third presenter walked to the podium,two to three hours had passed and members ofthe audience were weary, having difficulty con-centrating, and less capable of providing usefulfeedback on crime problems (the NYPD had ex-perienced a similar scheduling problem). On Feb-ruary 12, 2001, Davis met with several of his com-mand staff and senior members of the CAU todiscuss some changes. He was concerned, as hetold them, that the sector captain who presentedlast received short shrift and that the two-weekreporting period might be too short for identify-

ing meaningful crime changes because the “qual-ity of analysis was lacking.” Ten days later thedepartment implemented Lowell’s existing Comp-stat with only one sector captain present at eachmeeting.

IV. Research Methods

Between October 2000 and June 2001, we ob-served eight biweekly Compstat meetings andseven weekly operations meetings in Lowell. Wealso conducted thirty-one formal interviews withcity and police department personnel including:the mayor, city manager, superintendent, middlemanagers or sector captains, civilian staff, captains,lieutenants, detectives, first-line supervisors orsergeants, and patrol officers. We tried to gain thetrust of department members by guaranteeinginterviewees anonymity, whenever possible, andby ensuring confidentiality through our uncondi-tional refusal to act as a conduit for informationwithin the department. Despite some initial sus-picion, most of those interviewed felt comfortableenough to engage in lengthy and candid discus-sions about Compstat. On average the interviewslasted one-and-a-half to two hours, with manyrunning over the allotted time.

We conducted six post-Compstat debriefings,each lasting about fifteen to twenty minutes, inorder to help us identify the main crime problemsin each sector and track responses to these prob-lems over time. We debriefed Davis or the deputysuperintendent who ran Thursday’s biweeklyCompstat meeting immediately after the meetingand usually talked to the presenting sector cap-tains on the following Monday or Tuesday. Wedistributed surveys to 124 patrol officers in whichwe asked them to describe their involvement inCompstat and their views of the program; and wecollected ninety-seven completed surveys, yield-ing a response rate of 78 percent (See AppendixIII). We also collected documents that could fur-ther our understanding of Compstat, including allthe Compstat maps, spreadsheets, and crimeanalyses that were provided to sector captains;internal department memos; research grants; ar-ticles on Lowell; community handouts; and copiesof the department’s newsletter, the Daily Bulletin.

. . . Lowell’s Compstat program, which

required little change to the existing

organizational structure, has evolved

considerably since its inception.

9


We promised respondents that we would doour best to conceal their identities. It was obviouslyimpossible to guard against the identification of thesuperintendent of police, city manager and mayor,as we made clear. It was also challenging in sucha small police organization to protect the confi-dentiality of those who occupied the few special-ized and mid/upper-level management positions,especially the sector captains. We consequentlydecided to omit identifying characteristics, suchas a respondent’s ethnicity or number of years inthe department, in our initial draft of this report.We also made a concerted effort in our final revi-sion to identify and amend any text that couldpossibly breach a respondent’s confidentiality.

V. Analysis of Lowell’sExperience with Compstat

Using the seven key components we identified asCompstat’s general framework, we comparedLowell’s Compstat program with data from ournational survey to help assess how typical Lowell’sprogram was of programs in other departments.We also used our qualitative data to assess thedosage or amount of each element within the de-partment to determine the extent to which eachof Compstat’s key components had been institu-tionalized throughout the organization. We tried,finally, to elucidate some of the problems associ-ated with Compstat by examining the challengesthe department faced. This gave us some insightsinto Compstat’s ability to operate as a coherent pro-gram and a clearer sense of its long-term prospects.

Mission Clarification

The first element of Compstat is mission clarifica-tion. Compstat assumes that police agencies musthave a clearly defined organizational mission inorder to function effectively. When Bratton assumedcommand of the NYPD, one of top management’sfirst tasks was to clarify a mission statement thatembodied the organization’s fundamental reasonfor existing. In order to convey a clear sense ofthe department’s commitment, top managementreasoned that the mission statement should in-

clude specific terms, such as reducing crime by10 percent in a year, for which the organizationand its leaders could be held accountable (Bratton1998, 252). The establishment of a mission state-ment, therefore, helps police agencies to functionmore effectively by encouraging leaders and lineofficers to commit to a clearly defined goal, likecrime reduction, that is highly valued by thedepartment’s leadership. Despite these seeminglyobvious benefits, our analysis of Lowell’s Compstatprogram suggests that mission statements mightresonate differently with the public than they dowith those inside the department. Furthermore,mission statements might present a set of chal-lenges to police agencies with potentially negativeoutcomes. A mission statement that is inappro-priate, for instance, or exceeds the organization’scapacities might contribute to organizational dys-function and ultimately undermine the policechief’s credibility if the agency fails to meet itsstated goal.

Our general survey showed that 92 percent oflarge departments that had reported implement-ing a Compstat program had also reported thatthey “set specific objectives in terms that couldbe precisely measured.” In other words, a generalstatement that clarified a department’s overall mis-sion was closely associated with implementing aCompstat program, and Lowell, in this sense, wastypical of other Compstat departments. The over-all mission that it clearly promulgated in much ofits literature and on its new Web site was: “To workwith the community to reduce crime, the fear ofcrime, and improve the quality of life in the Cityof Lowell.”

Compstat demands that departments establisha clear and specific organizational mission ratherthan a general commitment to a broad set of ob-jectives. When our national survey asked, “In thelast twelve months has your agency publicly an-nounced a goal of reducing crime or some otherproblem by a specific number?,” only 49 percentof departments responded in the affirmative, andalmost a third of these departments reported fo-cusing on “many different goals” (Weisburd et al.2001). Since Lowell had announced a clearer andmore specific goal—that of making Lowell thesafest city of its size in the United States—it wasatypical of other Compstat departments.


10

When Davis was first appointed superinten-dent, he occasionally met with the late SenatorPaul Tsongas, a resident of Lowell, who initiallysuggested that, “they come up with a vision forthe city.” He did not recall having a particularlylengthy discussion with Tsongas on this topic butnoted that these meetings enabled them to createthe goal of making Lowell “the safest city of itssize in the United States.” According to Davis,Tsongas believed it was important for them to ar-ticulate a goal that would be clear to everyone andhelp Lowell with its steep crime rate. Around 1995to 1996, Davis told us earnestly, “Lowell was get-ting beaten down,” and coming up with the goalwas about “more than just trying to make peoplesafer . . . the city’s future was hanging in the bal-ance . . . [and] the goal gave people in the citysome hope.” Not only were city residents in crisisin the early 1990s, so was the Lowell Police De-partment. Public confidence in the department haddeteriorated to the point that “the association ofdowntown businesses voted to hire private secu-rity to patrol Lowell’s rapidly deteriorating com-mercial district” (Thacher 1998, 9).

Given that the mission statement’s intentionwas to rally public support for a department thatseemed incapable of stemming crime in a danger-ous city, it is not surprising that Davis and Tsongas’proclamation was unburdened with technical de-tails and emboldened with powerful symbolism.Similar to the NYPD, crime reduction lay at theheart of Davis’ mission for the department—a goalthat he associated closely with Compstat. An im-portant point to note: Davis stated that Compstatallowed one to examine data before making anydecisions. “If you approach problems any otherway,” he commented, “you are allowing the ‘causedu jour’ to set your priorities when you should bedealing with the crime rate” (emphasis added).However, in contrast to the NYPD, the resolutionto make Lowell “the safest city of its size in theUnited States” did not contain potentially confus-ing percentage reductions. Furthermore, it ap-pealed directly to residents by creating an attrac-tive vision of Lowell as a pleasant or desirable placeto live (again). One respondent stated that themission statement was a “big deal” and remem-bered that it was popular in the newspaper andamong community members. More importantly,

he believed that the “articulation” of this goal gavemomentum to the Davis’ overall plan to changethe department. He told us, “The safest city phrasewas what brought it all together.”

Lowell’s mission statement differed from thatof the NYPD by not committing the departmentto reduce crime by a specific percentage. It alsodiverged from the NYPD by primarily targetingcity residents. Commissioner Bratton used thedepartment’s mission statement to motivate po-lice personnel and hold them accountable, whilethis appeared to be a less important considerationin Lowell. Davis was more concerned with themission statement’s appeal to external constitu-ents than to department members, as another re-spondent recalled: “It was really used for the ben-efit of those outside of the department . . . it wasnever used within the department . . . it was notlike the department rallied around it . . . the state-ment is not part of the guys’ [line officers] daily . . .you know . . . what they talk about.”

Since Lowell’s broad mission statement wasdesigned to appeal primarily to city residents, itsimplementation did not resonate quite so stronglywithin the police department. In contrast to acrime-reduction goal defined by a modest percent-age over a finite period (a year, for example), theadoption of such an ambitious and enduring goalas becoming “the safest city of its size in the UnitedStates,” may have further mitigated its impactwithin the police organization—it was just tooambitious for police officers to incorporate withintheir daily operations. One officer characterizedthe statement as more of a slogan than a missionbecause it was “not realistic,” and he embellishedhis claim by comparing it to the New EnglandPatriot’s recent win in the 2002 Super Bowl: “Justlike the Patriots winning the Super Bowl, sure,they might have won . . . but now we expect themto do it again . . . it is not a practical statement.”In using this analogy, he was drawing attention tothe unrealistic expectations conjured up by the“safest city” analogy and the fact that “crime can-not continue to drop forever.” The ambitious na-ture of the mission statement helped explain whythe few times he heard reference to it within thedepartment was when an officer at a crime scenejoked: “Uh-huh . . . another murder in the safestcity in America.”

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Some department personnel might then haveregarded the mission statement as unrealistic, al-though our observations and survey data sug-gested that patrol officers did recognize and ac-cept the relationship between Compstat and thedepartment’s approach to fighting crime. Even ifmost doubted the practicality of the department’s“safest city” mission, they endorsed the focus ofthe effort. One patrol officer described Compstat’sexplicit focus on the identification of crime pat-terns by saying, “It enables the department to givea focused effort on policing as opposed to hap-hazardly driving around in circles . . . it allows thedepartment to focus on a specific area.” Resultsfrom our patrol officer survey further supportedthis observation that the rank and file clearly as-

cially in comparison to more ambiguous strate-gies or programs that appear to challenge the ca-nonical crime-fighting role of the police. Commu-nity policing, for example, has been the focus of aprodigious amount of scholarship over the lasttwenty years, but its goal and key elements arestill subject to much debate among police practi-tioners and academics. What police department,however, would not want to adopt a programwhose clear purpose is to reduce crime throughthe implementation of a well-defined set of tech-nologies and procedures? The appeal of Compstat’scrime-fighting goal to the police increases the like-lihood that it will endure.

There is an implicit and important consider-ation contained within the preceding commentsabout Compstat’s objective. What measures orbenchmarks will the department use to evaluateits progress toward a specific goal? This becamean issue every October or November, when theFBI published its annual Uniform Crime Reports,and Lowell’s crime analysts examined the sixty-two U.S. cities with populations between 95,000and 100,000. Lowell’s analysts listed these citiesalphabetically and used them to create a table,which they sent to Davis but not to the rest of thedepartment. Since the rankings were not dissemi-nated more widely, and we did not observe anyspecific reference to the “safest city” goal duringour stay, it appeared that the table served prima-rily to give Davis an annual impression of howLowell was doing in relation to other cities of itssize. In short, the “safest city” goal remained animplicit rather than a highly visible element ofdaily operations. This does not mean that the goalwas merely symbolic, particularly since Davis de-scribed worrying about the extent to which thedepartment was meeting its goal at every biweeklyCompstat meeting. It may suggest, however, thatthe six-year-old “safest city” imagery had becomeso commonplace as to no longer provoke muchinterest within the department.

Underlying the simplicity of the Compstatmission is a more complex set of challenges: Whathappens to Compstat when a police departmentfails to meet the crime-reduction goal of its mis-sion? Will failure to meet the goal lead to cyni-cism both within and outside the department? Willthe end result be the termination of Compstat, as

What police department . . . would not

want to adopt a program whose clear

purpose is to reduce crime through the

implementation of a well-defined set of

technologies and procedures?

sociated the goal of crime reduction with Comp-stat. Approximately 92 percent of those surveyedresponded that “reducing violent crime in the city”and “improving the quality of life in the city” werevery or somewhat important to the department’sCompstat strategy. The power of Compstat’s im-age as a crime-fighting tool is further reinforcedwhen we consider that: (1) Davis did not devise amission statement that explicitly defined Comp-stat’s goal but incorporated it within the depart-ment’s goal of making Lowell the safest city of itssize in the nation; and (2) The implementation ofCompstat was not accompanied by any depart-ment-wide training. Despite the absence of thesemeans of fostering a shared understanding ofCompstat’s purpose, there was still a general con-sensus that Compstat was a means of refocusingthe department’s energy on reducing crime.

It seems likely that officers had a broad un-derstanding that the fundamental objective ofCompstat was to control crime. The simplicity andlong tradition of this goal in police departmentshelps to explain the program’s popularity, espe-


12

city residents and police officers question the valueof the entire program?

Tsongas and Davis were aware of the dangerof establishing a mission statement that set anunattainable benchmark for success. Davis com-mented that in coming up with a vision for thedepartment, he remembered thinking that the “saf-est city” statement was “kind of reaching.” Henoted that even though he recognized that the“safest city” goal was ambitious, he felt it was tan-gible. They both believed, he said, “Lowell was aplace that they could get their hands around . . .that there was real potential for serious gains.” Thedepartment has indeed had considerable successin achieving its goal, notwithstanding the risksinvolved in setting such an ambitious benchmarkfor success. For cities with populations between90,000 and 110,000, Lowell ranked the forty-fifthsafest in 1993 and jumped to the fifteenth safestin 1997. This drop in crime is among the reasonswhy many police administrators and scholars con-tinue to pay close attention to the department’sachievements (Lehrer 2001).

Davis, who was reluctant to attribute the de-cline in crime to Compstat alone, cited three ad-ditional causes: an improving economy, an increasein the length of jail sentences, and the efforts ofthe police. Public opinion, however, focused onthe impact of Compstat, as shown in a newspaperheadline from October 1999 which reported that“Crime in Lowell Continues to Plummet” and at-tributed “much of the success in combating crime”to “targeted policing through the Compstat pro-gram” (Iven 1999). This success, notwithstand-ing, there is reason to be cautious about Compstat’sability to reduce crime. Silverman, like Kelling andSousa, has argued that the NYPD’s success in re-ducing crime was a direct result of its Compstatprogram (Silverman 1999, 125–177; Kelling andSousa 2001, 2), but many criminologists remainunconvinced. Crime, they argue, is too complex aphenomenon to be mitigated by any single ap-proach (Bouza 1997; Eck and Maguire 2000;Harcourt 2002). In Lowell’s case, the implemen-tation of Compstat roughly corresponded with the

hiring of fifty-one new police officers, and it isthis increase that might have contributed to theoverall reduction in crime. Furthermore, Lowell’srecent crime increase appears to lend credence toa more cautious standpoint in attributing crimereductions to the police in general or, more spe-cifically, to Compstat. In Lowell, index crimes for2001 increased 12.7 percent over 2000 (4,507 in-dex crimes compared to 3,999). As a result of itsincreasing crime rate, Lowell fell to the twenty-eighth safest city of its size in 2000.7 After a pe-riod of rapid decline, this reversal has been metwith some disquiet. In 2000, the local newspaperreported, “If the past year is any indication, Supt.Ed Davis and the Lowell Police Department willhave their work cut out for them in the next 12months” (Lowell Sun 2000).

Whatever the causes for mounting crime rates,some evidence suggests that Davis was feelingapprehensive as the local press reported on theslight upturn in crime. In a November 2000 inter-view he expressed concern that crime was risingfor the first time in six years, and by December2000 we overheard a comment that Davis was nowpaying for previous statements he had made inwhich he claimed credit for Lowell’s decliningcrime rate. One respondent noted that the firstresponse to any news of an increasing crime ratewas “damage control,” and he expressed disap-pointment that the department was not lookingat the 10 percent increase more critically and ask-ing questions such as, “What’s different from lastyear; what’s happening nationally?” Two recentarticles in the local paper also suggested that criti-cism of Davis was becoming more acute. One re-marked that Davis’ reluctance to attend city coun-cil meetings appeared to reflect a lack of focus onpublic safety issues (Scott 2002), while the otherexpressed disappointment with the upward crimetrend given the department’s $20 million budget(Lowell Sun Online, April 4, 2002).

These comments illustrate the conflicting pres-sures that Compstat imposes on police chiefs andtheir departments. Compstat requires chiefs toformulate highly visible, public mission statements

7. According to the 2000 Uniform Crime Reports, Lowell experienced 3,803 Part I crimes per 100,000 people. In comparison, the crime rate forSimi Valley, CA, America’s safest city with a population between 90,000 and 110,000, was 1,441 per 100,000 people (US Department of Justice2001).

13


that set tangible organizational goals for reducingcrime, as well as hold them and their departmentsaccountable for meeting these standards. Increasedexpectations for lower crime rates, therefore, putpolice chiefs under considerable pressure to claimsome responsibility and generate positive press forany successes. Absent convincing evidence thatpolice departments possess the capacity to reducecrime and that managers have the will and skill tomobilize that capacity, setting a specific crime-re-duction goal is like a batter of untested capabili-ties pointing to center field each time he comes tobat. This works only if he delivers a home runmore often than not.

Mission statements can do more than createunrealistic expectations; they can also be dysfunc-tional in other ways. An increasing crime rate islikely to foster a great deal of public scrutiny andconcern over a department’s failure to fulfill itsgoals. The pressure that this places on a chief andhis organization may provoke a knee-jerk reac-tion from the police (“damage control”) ratherthan a more thorough investigation of the crimeincrease. A chief will probably respond to this pres-sure by exhorting his officers to work harder. This,in turn, might alienate managers and rank-and-file officers who feel the chief is blaming them forcrime problems that stem from factors beyondtheir control, such as poverty, drugs, and unem-ployment.

Typical of such officers was one respondentwho specifically noted the impact of broader struc-tural factors to support his earlier comments thatthe department’s mission was not attainable in apractical sense: “There are cities of the same size,say in California, where people have much higherincomes,” and it is consequently easier to controlcrime. The department’s failure to achieve its goal,as we have seen, threatened to breed this type ofcynicism among civilians and department mem-bers who accused Davis, as the easiest target, ofdisingenuously claiming responsibility for previ-ous successes. In short, depending on the depart-ment’s capacity to meet its objectives, missionstatements might motivate the organization tosucceed or exacerbate its continuing failure tomeet those same objectives.

These observations suggest an obvious meansof reducing the dissonance caused by a depart-

ment’s failure to live up to its goal—modify themission statement. Davis suggested that this wascurrently happening at Lowell. He acknowledgedthat the department had recently experienced“some drawbacks with the crime rate,” and con-tinued to say, “Some people have come in andgiven a qualifier” to amend the mission statement.He noted that it was important to take into ac-count Lowell’s socioeconomic and demographiccharacteristics in comparison to other cities, andhe added that they were now referring to Lowellas the “safest city of its size and type in the UnitedStates” (emphasis added). Of course, the depart-ment could decide to drop, rather than merelyrefine, its vision entirely, but this seemed veryunlikely at Lowell. Davis said firmly that Lowell’s“safest city” statement was still “vitally importanttoday.”

Internal Accountability

For a department’s mission statement to be effec-tive, workers need to be held responsible for meet-ing the goals that the department espouses.Compstat does this by holding operational com-manders accountable for knowing their command,being well acquainted with its problems, and mea-surably reducing them—or at least demonstrat-ing a diligent effort to learn from the experience.Compstat, in short, makes someone responsible fortackling and reducing crime and imposes adversecareer consequences, such as removal from com-mand, on those who fail to comply. In conductingour fieldwork, we discovered that accountabilitywas experienced most intensely by district com-manders and far less so by those further down thechain of command. In addition, our research re-vealed the paradox that holding officers to a veryhigh standard of accountability inhibited two otherCompstat components: Compstat’s ability to fa-cilitate innovative problem solving through brain-storming and its capacity to reallocate resourcesto crime problems that most needed them, a com-ponent we address more fully under the section“Organizational Flexibility.” Finally, we discoveredthat there are two challenges to the potency ofaccountability’s ultimate threat to replace districtcommanders for poor performance: (1) There mayonly be a small pool of suitable replacements who


14

are willing or able to do the job of district com-mander (this is particularly the case in smallerdepartments); and (2) Union and civil service re-quirements make it exceedingly difficult to removeofficers for poor performance.

Responses to our national survey and inten-sive site interviews suggested that departmentsthat have implemented a Compstat-like programconsider internal accountability to be a very im-portant feature of Compstat. Almost seven in tenof these departments told us that a district com-mander would be “somewhat” or “very likely” tobe replaced if he or she did not “know about thecrime patterns” in his or her district. Almost eightin ten of these departments told us, in turn, that acommander of a specialized unit would be “some-what” or “very likely” to be replaced if he or sheregularly failed to fulfill requests for cooperationfrom district commanders. A much smaller pro-portion of these departments reported that a dis-trict commander would be replaced simply if crimecontinued to rise in a district. Few departmentstake this extreme position because Compstat gen-erally requires commanders to be familiar withproblems and develop solutions to them but doesnot hold them too accountable for achieving out-comes that may be unresponsive to well-plannedpolice interventions (Weisburd et al. 2001).

Internal accountability was an integral part ofLowell’s Compstat program, as it was in manyother Compstat programs examined in our na-tional survey. In fact, Davis explicitly recognizedthe importance of this feature when he definedCompstat as a means “to manage the police de-partment in a timely manner with an eye towardaccountability.” He was not alone in acknowledg-ing the value of this element, as the comments ofother department members reveal. When askedwhat was particularly useful about Compstat, one

sector captain responded that it prevented “slack-ing off.” Another sector captain noted that Comp-stat was a way of “keeping them honest” since“having things up there on a map can show youhow bad things are, and you cannot say, ‘Ooh, Imissed those reports; I did not see them.’”

These sector captains clearly recognized andaccepted that Compstat held them accountable forall that occurred in their respective beats. Theircomments also brought out the central role thatCompstat meetings played in fostering account-ability by allowing Davis to visibly assert his lead-ership. Since all the command staff attended thebiweekly meetings, Compstat provided Davis withan ideal opportunity to display his authority andhold his sector captains publicly responsible.Compstat may provide a suitable venue, but ourresearch suggests that the accountability mecha-nism also relies upon the leadership style of theindividual who runs Compstat.

Davis’ leadership style, as observed at Lowell’sCompstat meetings, was to constantly ask ques-tions and make suggestions. Davis remarked thathe was seeking to foster “data-driven decisionmaking in a learning organization” by interrogat-ing his command staff about their responses tovarious crime problems and encouraging othersto promulgate helpful solutions. In an interviewwith David Thacher (1998, 37), a researcher whovisited Lowell in 1997 as part of a national COPSevaluation, Davis explained, “You have to be 90percent a teacher when you have this job and that’swhat I do.” He hopes that by asking people, “Whatthey’re working on and how they’ve come to thisconclusion . . . in front of people . . . eventuallythey’ll get the idea of it—that it’s their responsi-bility.”

In addition to promoting an information anddata-driven environment, a chief can use Compstatas an arena to reward or punish his command staffin order to convey his expectations about accept-able performance. Holding command staff ac-countable for crime in their beats was a contro-versial element of the NYPD Compstat program.There is a well-known story in police circles thatduring one Compstat meeting Jack Maple repeat-edly flashed up a slide of Pinocchio while a mem-ber of the command staff struggled to explaincrime in his precinct (Maple later apologized). In

Internal accountability was an

integral part of Lowell’s . . .

program, as it was in many other

Compstat programs examined in

our national survey.

15


contrast, Davis recognized that commanding of-ficers might be apprehensive or fearful about be-ing held accountable. Referring to this infamous“beating-up” scenario in New York, he argued thatit was “counterproductive” to humiliate individu-als during Compstat and adopted a more human-istic approach: “Police officers are competitive bynature and all you really need to do is give themthe facts and ask them a question. They will gofrom there.” Just asking them a question in frontof their peers, Davis opined, would make sectorcaptains feel accountable. That said, there havebeen occasions when Davis has been so displeasedby the lack of initiative of his command staff inresponse to his queries that he has taken a harderline and “balled them out.”

Compstat’s potential for confrontation ac-counts for why there is some concern that it canresult in command staff members being repri-manded. Outside of the usual command staff par-ticipants and audience, Compstat has a more pro-nounced reputation for being brutal. Despiteproviding a forum for making “people do the jobthey do,” many are clearly discouraged by the con-frontational atmosphere that can characterizeCompstat meetings. One officer described Comp-stat as a forum where officers had their “ballsripped off” and surmised that this only served tomake individuals “reluctant to speak up . . . reluc-tant to do their job.”

Compstat’s reputation as a pressure-cookerenvironment that holds sector captains account-able was widespread at Lowell. Even patrol offic-ers, who rarely attended Compstat, recognized thisfeature. Based on the survey we distributed at rollcall, 61 percent of officers reported that holdingsector captains accountable for crimes in theirbeats was “very important” (26 percent) or “some-what important” (35 percent). Only 34 percentreported that holding sector captains accountablefor crime in their beats was “not at all important.”Five percent responded that they “don’t know” tothe question. In contrast, a slightly smaller pro-portion of officers, 56 percent, responded that,“Holding officers accountable for crimes in theirbeats” was “very important” (18 percent) or“somewhat important” (38 percent). The fact thata greater proportion of patrol officers believed thatCompstat was “very important” for holding sec-

tor captains, in particular, accountable suggeststhat there is some general recognition that ac-countability is experienced most acutely bymiddle-level managers.

The conventional notion that grilling precinctcommanders on crime-reduction efforts “rein-forces the patrol officer’s desire to combat crime”seems to overstate the case in Lowell (Silverman1999, 194–5). Our research suggested a greaterlikelihood that the sense of accountability becamediluted as one moved down the command struc-ture. As one patrol officer put it when asked aboutCompstat, “If you don’t go, you don’t know.”Nearly the entire command staff attended Comp-stat, but only two or three patrol officers werepresent at any given Compstat meeting. Theymight answer a question or two, and they mightparticipate in a brief presentation, but they gener-ally played a peripheral role, leading one high-ranking officer to remark, “Patrol officers can hidein the meeting and get away without saying any-thing.”

Just because patrol officers were not regularattendees at Compstat did not mean that they didnot learn about or experience accountability; itsuggested, however, that they experienced it lessintensely. Several comments made to us suggestedthat when someone was chastised in Compstat,news of their plight spread quickly throughout thedepartment. The roll-call survey results, however,indicated that what happened in Compstat wasmore likely to be communicated informally thanthrough a systematic process. Stories, anecdotes,and jokes expressing sympathy for, or humorabout, an individual who was unfortunate enoughto be chastened by Davis seemed to feed Comp-stat’s powerful reputation for holding officers ac-countable. However, the absence of a formalmechanism for transmitting this message fre-quently and directly to patrol officers could miti-gate its impact on those at the bottom of the po-lice hierarchy. When asked, “How often does yoursupervisor discuss what has happened at Compstatmeetings?,” 61 percent of the patrol officers wesurveyed responded “never” (43 percent) or “everyfew months” (18 percent).

Since accountability relies heavily upon a pub-lic setting with high-ranking officials in atten-dance, it follows that accountability is experienced


16

less acutely outside of this forum. In brief, a sec-tor captain who has been rebuked in Compstatfor an inadequate strategy may return to his sec-tor and admonish his line officers, but the forceof the message is considerably weakened for threereasons: (1) Compstat ultimately holds middlemanagers, not line officers, accountable; (2) Themessage does not come from the highest rankingofficial in the police department, and (3) It, there-fore, does not result in public censure on the samescale.

Lowell’s Compstat is an independent program,but its impact on accountability relies heavily uponthe individual personality and leadership style ofthe superintendent, as shown by differences in thetenor and operation of Compstat meetings. WhenDavis was present, he tended to dominate Comp-stat meetings. In his absence, Compstat meetingswere more subdued. This difference in tonestemmed from a number of complex social dy-namics, as Davis pointed out. He was aware thatCompstat meetings ran differently in his absenceand proposed the general nature of police depart-ments as “paramilitary organizations” as a partialexplanation for the difference. He observed thatthese kinds of organizations, with their presumedemphasis on the command structure, didn’t en-courage “free-thinkers,” but he was optimistic thata “system” like Compstat could encourage indi-viduals to think differently. Davis’ comments re-veal that even though the individual responsiblefor running Compstat influences how accountabil-ity is experienced within the department, the or-ganization is simultaneously constrained by largerstructural limitations. These present significantchallenges to Compstat’s purported goals to en-courage information sharing and hold officers ac-countable for crime in their beats.

The department’s organizational hierarchy,embodied in the rank structure, hampers the freeexchange of crime-related information and prob-lem-solving strategies at Compstat. Personal his-tories between officers intertwine with rank toform a complex set of social norms and relation-ships. Mutual exchange is clearly restricted by theexpectation that, on account of their social posi-tion, higher-ranking officers are primarily respon-sible for communicating crime information dur-ing Compstat. In addition, department norms

regarding camaraderie and respect curtail the free-dom to share ideas by prohibiting officers fromsharing potentially useful information that otherscould interpret as criticism.

This type of information might appear benignto outside observers who are unfamiliar with thedepartment’s “back-stage” environment, but insid-ers know the least vague suggestion that a supe-rior is uninformed, misinformed, or incompetentcarries significant risk. The adamant refusal of onelieutenant to “embarrass captains in Compstat”reflects a feature of paramilitary organizationsembodied in the popular police maxim, “shit rollsdownhill.” Since information sharing at Compstatmay put a member of the command staff at fault,an officer may take the safest course of action andchoose not to participate in the meeting at all. Hemight also take the path of low risk by makingonly short and simple comments reiterating whathas already been said. Of course, he could alsodramatically increase the likelihood of negativerepercussions by directly criticizing a superior,even though we never witnessed this behaviorduring our research at Lowell.

Davis openly acknowledged that displays ofdeference limited the value of information ex-change by remarking that it was “extremely dif-ficult” to facilitate questions at Compstat. He notedthat an officer who is questioned by a peer or sub-ordinate during Compstat might later confront theinquisitor and complain, “You really screwed mein there.” To avoid this scenario, some membersof the command staff made a practice of givingadvance warning to colleagues whom they in-tended to call on at Compstat. One officer men-tioned that he preferred to discuss Compstat-related matters in private with Davis, rather thanbring them up at meetings; and Davis similarlyappeared to choose discrete rather than visiblesettings when directing his most vociferous criti-cism at command staff. Members of the CAU alsoshared this tendency to bring discretion to theCompstat accountability process and describeddoing their best to inform sector captains of anychanges in the Compstat format because Compstatwas about “providing information, not catchingpeople out.”

We have already seen how Compstat’s stresson accountability conflicts with its emphasis on

17


brainstorming, limiting effective collaborationbetween department members. The size of theorganization and its administrative rules and regu-lations, both factors independent of Compstat,limit, in turn, the level of accountability to whicha chief can formally hold his sector captains. Thesefactors also determine whether Compstat can liveup to its claim for predictably improving perform-ance by helping departments achieve greater ac-countability than they have in the past. Salientissues in this regard include how much a chiefcan punish those who fail to meet the goals of theorganization, whether he can remove them fromtheir position, and how much reward he can offerthem.

Our research in the relatively small departmentof Lowell suggests that incentives are usually lim-ited to public acknowledgement of good or badperformance. This can be attributed to two orga-nizational features that exist independently fromCompstat and are generalizable to other policedepartments: the size of the agency and the rulesand regulations that govern its administration. Insmall departments, the chief’s power is limited bythe small pool of qualified candidates for the po-sition of district commander, lowering the risk ofan individual being fired for marginal perform-ance. There are, furthermore, usually few positionsabove the rank of district commander, as was thecase in Lowell, thus undercutting the incentive ofpromotion. Finally, the strict regulations that gov-ern personnel decisions in police departmentsconstrain a chief’s ability to take action, though,in Lowell, Davis indicated that he would transfera sector captain who was not performing up toCompstat’s standards to another position in thedepartment.

Commissioner Bratton was able to replacemore than half of all the NYPD’s middle-levelmanagers during the first year of Compstat. Therewas some turnover of older officers when Davistook over, but it appeared that this was attribut-able to the department’s commitment to commu-nity policing rather than a direct result of its imple-mentation of Compstat. An officer recalled thatthe incentive program to buy out officers was a“sign of the times,” since the department was“old.” No one remembered Davis removing anyof the original sector bosses from their positions,

but Davis indicated that he would move a sectorcaptain who was not doing his or her job atCompstat to another position. This is not to sug-gest that there was no turnover of sector captains.Respondents recalled that some individuals wereuncomfortable with the Compstat process (thepublic speaking and the intense scrutiny) andasked to be reassigned. However, responding to arequest for reassignment obviously differs fromremoving sector captains for failing to fulfill theobligations of their position. Not only was Davis’capacity to remove a sector captain limited by thesmall pool of qualified candidates, the magnitudeof the responsibility commensurate with the po-sition, not to mention the administrative burdens,also made it unlikely that all those who qualifiedwould choose to serve as one of the three sectorcaptains at Lowell. One interviewee pointed out

Our research in . . . Lowell suggests

that incentives are usually limited

to public acknowledgement of good

or bad performance.

that given the significant responsibilities of theposition “maybe four out of eight captains [total]are willing to do this job.” Finally, some respon-dents mentioned forcefully that the superinten-dent could not just remove sector captains withimpunity. They noted that his authority in mak-ing personnel decisions, similar to chiefs acrossthe country, was limited by civil service and unionregulations: “A chief cannot hire, fire, or promotepeople at will” (Walker 1999, 368). Additionally,the provisions regarding discipline, such as nu-merous avenues for appeal, make it extremely dif-ficult for chiefs to dismiss bad officers, or even todiscipline officers for poor performance (Mas-trofski 2002, 158).

The sense of accountability varied through-out the Lowell Police Department. Sector captains,who clearly recognized their responsibility fortheir beats, apparently felt more accountable thanother members of the department. The failure ofmany department members to pose probing ques-


18

tions at Compstat meetings in Davis’ absence alsosuggested the sense of accountability was less per-vasive in Lowell than it was in Compstat sites likeNew Orleans whose department held district-levelCompstat meetings to foster accountabilitythrough the ranks (Gurwitt 1998).

Davis plays an integral role as facilitator ofquestions and judge of sector captains’ account-ability, and his centrality raises concerns regard-ing Compstat’s potential longevity in the LowellPolice Department. It remains unclear whetherCompstat is institutionalized at Lowell andwhether the department would be committed tocontinuing Compstat if Davis moved on. One re-spondent addressed this concern directly by sug-gesting that Compstat relied so heavily upon Davis’distinct leadership style that it would disappear ifhe left. Compstat also inspired some ambivalenceamong patrol officers, whose sentiments wereequally divided along response categories, accord-ing to our survey.

Considerable ambivalence also exists amongtop brass, middle management, and patrol officersabout the use of Compstat as a forum for holdingofficers accountable for crime. There is some evi-dence, however, that Compstat can be a powerfulmeans for achieving this goal at Lowell. Sectorcaptains understood that being interrogated infront of one’s peers is a guaranteed method forensuring some level of accountability. Sector cap-tains expected Davis to ask numerous probingquestions about crime and openly acknowledgedtheir responsibility to come to Compstat fully pre-pared with an array of questions. This sense ofaccountability did not filter down to the rank andfile with the same potency, but patrol officers un-derstood that their sector captains carried asignificant burden of responsibility. One lieuten-ant felt that Compstat held everybody account-able since no officer was anxious for commandstaff to see a “crime spike” on his route or for fel-low officers to leave a Compstat meeting and passaround the news that “So and so got his ass handedto him.” Humiliating as this is, hearing indirectlyabout someone else’s misfortune is a less effectivemethod of holding officers accountable than ex-posing them to the possibility of public censureon the same scale as their sector captains atCompstat.

Geographic Organization ofOperational Command

Compstat holds police managers to a high level ofaccountability, but it does not do so without pro-viding these commanders with the authority tocarry out the Compstat mission. Mid-level man-agers are empowered in this model through theconcept of geographic organization of operationalcommand. Operational command is focused onthe policing of specific territories, so primary de-cision-making responsibility is delegated to com-manders with territorial responsibility (e.g., pre-cincts). That is, the organization gives a higherpriority to commanders who specialize in terri-tory rather than function. Functionally special-ized units—such as patrol, detectives, school re-source officers, and traffic—are placed under thecommand of the precinct commander, or arrange-ments are made to facilitate their responsivenessto the commander’s needs.

In this section, we describe how operationalcommand was organized in the LPD, and we as-sess how much authority sector captains had overdepartment sections and units that had tradition-ally operated independently of them. Furthermore,we highlight some of the specific challenges facedby a department that was only partially decentral-ized, with some detectives assigned to the sectorsand others to a central division, and that was struc-tured both geographically and temporally, withindividual sector captains working eight-hourshifts and bearing responsibility for their specificterritory over a twenty-four-hour period.

Results from our national survey suggestedstrong support for Compstat’s emphasis on geo-graphic organization of command. When we askedwhether departments authorized middle manag-ers to select problem-solving strategies for low-level problems, 90 percent of Compstat-like de-partments claimed to have given such authorityto district commanders, line supervisors, or spe-cialized unit commanders. This response clearlydemonstrated that empowering middle managerswith decision-making autonomy is an importantfeature of Compstat departments (Weisburd et al.2001).

Since Davis assumed control of the LowellPolice Department, decision making has become

19


more decentralized, a change that we can quan-tify by considering which levels in the organiza-tion bear geographical responsibility for spacessuch as beats, sectors, or cities. Before the adventof community policing and Compstat, the depart-ment was organized temporally. A captain oper-ated as a shift or watch commander and was re-sponsible for supervising officers on a single shiftfor the entire city; once the shift was over, his orher responsibilities ceased. Under the old system,therefore, the lowest-ranking officer with twenty-four-hour responsibility for a geographic locationheld the command-level position of deputy chiefin charge of operations. Compstat, however, wasgrafted onto the department’s community-polic-ing model and accordingly devolved this powerdown one level by giving sector captains twenty-four-hour responsibility for their sectors. So, forthe 60 percent of officers assigned to the sectors,geographic organization of operational commandhad shifted from the very top of the organization(unitary command) down one level to the threesector captains, effectively cutting the scope ofoperational command to one third the previousscope (if measured by number of sworn officers).

Organizational structure

In some respects the Lowell Police Departmentunder Compstat remained quite traditional. Thephysical structure of the LPD continued to be cen-tralized with department headquarters dominat-ing operations. While some of its precinct substa-tions were equipped with computer terminals(connected to the department’s mainframe) andcould function as command bases, others werelittle more than storefront operations that wereclosed at night. Detectives could not use the pre-cincts to conduct investigations because they didnot have interview rooms. The fact that all policeofficers, no matter what their sector assignment,

attended roll calls at department headquartersunder the supervision of a single sergeant or lieu-tenant indicated that on one level the LPD re-mained fairly centralized.

Decision making

Despite this traditional structure, decision makingat Lowell is now significantly more participatorythan it ever was under the traditional policingmodel that preceded the widespread introductionof community policing in the 1980s. Police ex-ecutives in Lowell, as elsewhere, were responsiblefor making decisions on department policy andprocedure without much input from middle man-agers. This began to change, however, when theLPD adopted community policing and moved to-ward decentralization in 1996. Since then thedepartment’s command staff of lieutenant throughdeputy superintendent, as well as civilians, haveplayed a more integral role in the decision-makingprocess through informal private conversations,weekly Operations Staff meetings, and annual stra-tegic planning meetings, which also involve sepa-rate conferences for patrol officers and adminis-trative personnel. Prior to this development,meetings between middle managers and the su-perintendent were infrequent, formal, and pro-foundly hierarchical in character (Thacher 1998,17).

The decision-making autonomy of Lowell’ssector captains in managing their own beats hasincreased significantly under Compstat. Accord-ing to the department’s organizational chart, sec-tor captains reported to the deputy superinten-dent of operations, but they really reported directlyto the superintendent, leading one former sectorcaptain to state that he felt very much “like thecaptain of his own ship.” Another former sectorcaptain, now in charge of a large enterprise, ex-pressed a similar sentiment by commenting thatDavis allowed him to run his project how hewanted. Davis, who preferred his sector captainsto rely upon their own judgment when makingdecisions about their sectors, echoed these state-ments. For example, he explained that he did notinterfere when sector captains decided to allocatepersonnel equally within their individual sectors.Were he to make an executive decision in this in-

In some respects the

Lowell Police Department

under Compstat remained

quite traditional.


20

stance, he continued, it would appear to sectorcaptains as an edict and foster resentment withinthe department.

Despite the increased autonomy of sector cap-tains, some evidence suggests that the authorityto make decisions without supervisory approvaldoes not extend further down the organization.In contrast to the autonomy of sector captains,one of Davis’ responses to a sergeant’s questionduring a Compstat meeting suggested that linesupervisors feel far less certain about their capac-ity to make decisions without consulting a supe-rior. When a sector sergeant mentioned to Davisthat he should probably discuss his decision toreassign back-up cars with his immediate super-visor (a lieutenant), Davis used this as an oppor-tunity to reinforce the message that sergeantsgenerally had a great deal of decision-making au-tonomy within the department. Davis explained,“Some people might not be happy with sergeantstaking initiative, and there could be some uniongrumbles,” but he was willing to deal with thisand was disappointed that sergeants did not real-ize “they could move people around” within theirsectors. He reiterated this point at another Comp-stat meeting by stating that the official detail wasonly a guide, and that sergeants had the authorityto put men “where they were needed.” Althoughhe noted that sergeants should still consult withtheir sector captains, he was trying to encouragehis street supervisors to recognize that they shouldexercise more initiative.

Davis has decentralized decision making downto sector captains, but in contrast to Lowell somepolice departments have made more vigorous at-tempts to take geographic organization all the waydown to line officers (Parks et al. 1998). In SaintPetersburg, Florida, for example, the police de-partment assigned a small team of about five pa-trol officers to one of the city’s forty-eight beatsfor their shifts. In addition, each beat was assigneda community-policing officer who could work anytime during the day as long as he worked fortyhours per week. Freed from calls for service, hewas primarily responsible for working on devel-oping problem-solving strategies for the beat and

coordinating these plans with other beat officers.Finally, a single sergeant, who had twenty-four-hour responsibility for the team, was authorizedto work any shift he chose so that he had the flex-ibility to meet with all the members of his team.The system in Saint Petersburg became unwieldyand collapsed after only three years, but it stillserves as an example of how the level of decen-tralized decision making can vary dramaticallybetween police agencies. At Lowell, sector cap-tains definitely felt that they had the authority tomake decisions without getting approval fromabove, but this level of clarity did not exist at lowerlevels in the organization.

Despite the extensive autonomy enjoyed bysector captains, the exact nature of this autonomyunder Compstat is more complex than it might atfirst appear. Our national survey revealed that 90percent of departments with Compstat-like pro-grams gave district commanders, line supervisors,or specialized unit commanders the authority toselect problem-solving strategies for low-levelproblems, but this percentage dropped to 70 per-cent when it came to authorizing middle manag-ers to choose how to deal with higher visibilityproblems (Weisburd et al. 2001). These resultssuggested that middle managers under Compstatdid possess a significant amount of decision-mak-ing autonomy, but Davis and his deputies mightcurtail their independence at times. When we ex-amined the extent to which departments are will-ing to give middle managers greater responsibil-ity for determining beat boundaries or staffinglevels we found even less support for the conceptof geographic organization of command. Only fourin ten departments that claimed to have imple-mented a Compstat-like model gave district com-manders, line supervisors, or specialized unitcommanders the authority to determine beatboundaries. Even fewer, only 18 percent, gavethese commanders the authority to determine rou-tine staffing levels (Weisburd et al. 2001).

In Lowell, the sector captains were largely re-sponsible for redrawing their beat boundariesduring the department’s bid process.8 During ourresearch period, the sector captains used their

8. As part of their union contract, every eighteen months, patrol officers were allowed to request reassignment to any beat in the city; prioritywas then given to those officers with the greatest seniority, or most years on the force.

21


extensive familiarity with their sectors in redraw-ing cruiser and walking routes. This recon-figuration involved the deputy superintendent ofoperations and the sector captains, with Davisrarely interfering with his sector captains’ deci-sions. This did not mean that he was unwilling tooverrule any decision that he felt was inappropri-ate. Under pressure from both the community andthe city to increase the total number of walkingroutes, Davis overturned a sector captain’s deci-sion to cut one of his officer’s walking time in half(to four hours). Davis’ commitment to commu-nity policing and the problem of scarce resourcesin the face of an increasing demand for beat officerscontributed to the complexity of this issue, andgood arguments were presented on both sides.

This scenario illustrated that sector captainsmight have significant autonomy, but they alwaysoperated within certain limits defined by Davis.One observer summed up Davis’ style as, “You cando anything you want, as long as I agree with you.”Decisions over routine staffing levels also revealedthe persistence of the traditional hierarchical com-mand structure. A sector captain who requiredadditional personnel was supposed to approachDavis or his deputies and they would accommo-date him/her if possible.

In sum, the decentralization of decision mak-ing to mid-level managers in Lowell is complex.First, Compstat appeared to have consolidateddecision-making power by creating the job of sec-tor captains, putting more of the department’spersonnel under their command, and using thatjob as the focal point for twenty-four-hour respon-sibility. Previously, the organization’s decisionmaking was done at levels both above and belowthat rank (by the command staff at headquartersand by shift commanders). Second, sector captainspossessed a great deal of autonomy. Davis encour-aged them to solve problems in their sectors, todecide how to assign sector personnel, and to co-operate with one another. This suggested that de-cision making was considerably more decentral-ized at Lowell than at more traditional policeagencies. However, this did not mean that sectorcaptains possessed unrestricted authority. Our ob-servations suggested that Davis liked to be keptinformed of his sector captains’ decisions, requiredthat they provide supportable reasons for their

actions, and was not averse to exerting his author-ity over them. On many matters, Davis invited theparticipation of sector captains in identifying prob-lems and driving solutions. They engaged him onthese matters, and he had the final say. This pro-cess is more accurately characterized as participa-tory management than as a pure delegation ofDavis’ authority to the sector commanders. In con-trast to mid-level managers, our observations sug-gest, although we cannot state this definitively, thatstreet supervisors seemed to feel that their deci-sion-making autonomy was narrowly confined.

In addition to giving district commanders theauthority to make decisions that once belongedto top management, Compstat also requires thatfunctional differentiation, a conventional featureof police organizations, be replaced with “geo-graphically based management” (Silverman 1999,149), in which largely autonomous specializedunits that focus on specific crimes or vices areplaced under the direct command of district com-manders or made responsive to their needs. Whilethe accounts of respondents at Lowell suggestedthat specialized units would try to accommodatea sector captain’s request for assistance, it was clearthat the supervision of these units had not beentransferred to sector captains because of Compstat.Before and after Compstat, captains remained re-sponsible primarily for patrol officers, and the re-assignment of detectives from headquarters to thesectors was part of the department’s community-policing program rather than its Compstat initia-tive. Compstat, in fact, did not lead Lowell to pro-vide sector captains with additional specialists.Lowell differed, in this respect, from the NYPD,which used Compstat to reconstitute some pre-cincts so that “all detectives, drug investigators,and housing police who had previously reportedto their separate borough and headquarters supe-riors” came under the direct control of the dis-trict commander (Silverman 1999, 149). At Lowell,on the other hand, the detectives responsible fordrug and serious crimes did not come under thedirect command of the sector captains followingthe implementation of Compstat, and the LowellHousing Authority continued operating as a sepa-rate precinct.

Besides significantly increasing the input ofsector captains in decision making and slightly


22

modifying the department’s division of labor, thegeographic organization of operational commandunder Compstat contributed to a number of orga-nizational challenges faced by the department.These included the difficulty of coordinating tasksbetween central and sector detectives, harmoniz-ing duties across sectors and shifts, and dealingwith the disproportionate burden of responsibil-ity that falls on sector captains in an organizationthat is structured both geographically and tem-porally.

Coordination issues

Lowell differed considerably from more traditionalpolice departments in the decentralization of itsCriminal Investigation Section. The process be-gan in 1998, when the section was split into ahandful of detectives, who were assigned to eachsector, and a number of central detectives, whoretained responsibility for the most serious crimes,such as homicides and armed robberies. The taskof coordinating investigations between sector andcentral detectives that began at this time was on-going at Lowell, according to our observations.The officer in charge of the section made a pointof using sector detectives on homicide divisionsin order to provide them with much needed ex-perience. He also acknowledged the authority ofa sector captain over his or her own detectivesand did not interfere in a sector investigation un-less the sector captain requested assistance. Hetook this hands-off attitude toward sector captainsbecause he believed his role was “to be aware ofwhat is going on” and to offer assistance when hesaw “problems develop.” This approach was evi-dently productive according to a number of at-tendees at Operations Staff meetings who re-marked that sector detectives were much moreseasoned than they were two years ago and nolonger had to rely upon the central detectives fordirection. The officer in charge of the CriminalInvestigation Section made a point of using sec-tor detectives on homicide investigations. This wasa way of providing them with much needed expe-rience. Since the sector captain supervised his orher own detectives, the officer in charge of thesection would not interfere in a sector investiga-tion unless the sector captain requested assistance.

In relation to the sector captains, he defined hisrole as offering assistance and seeing “problemsdevelop . . . to be aware of what is going on.”

The continuous flow of information amongsector captains, their detectives, and the CriminalInvestigation Section was the primary means ofcoordinating investigations within the department,a loosely defined coordination structure that hasboth benefits and drawbacks. Its most importantadvantages are to facilitate the flow of informa-tion and potentially enhance productivity by re-ducing red tape and turf battles. In other words, itcan help mitigate bureaucratic dysfunction,though it does have the drawback of dependingheavily upon individuals taking the initiative forcontacting and coordinating with each other.

Under these circumstances, there is obviouslysome potential for organizational dissonance.Some members of Lowell’s command staff wereindeed concerned that coordination between sec-tors was not clearly defined and might breed con-fusion over the responsibilities of individual sec-tor captains, particularly in the event of an ongoingmulti-agency investigation. One sector captain, forexample, asked other members of the commandstaff to define his responsibilities in a homicideinvestigation, given that homicide investigationsin Massachusetts are the primary responsibility ofthe local district attorney and state police whocoordinate their activities with local detectives.Officers responded thoughtfully by proposing thathis responsibilities were to ensure a controlledresponse, such as “canvassing the neighborhood,”or to “provide support by securing the crime sceneand offering assistance.” Davis also responded bycommenting that the sector captain was doingexactly what was expected by empowering thecommunity through crime prevention strategies.

The outcome of the investigation in questionwas a success, but this scenario illustrates howthe lack of a clear process fostered a need for clari-fication and assurance. Speaking more generally,one high-ranking official suggested, “The depart-ment needs to put a plan together as to what su-pervisors should do.” The absence of clear opera-tional guidelines makes it more likely that theautonomous actions of lower-level managers maycircumvent the chain of command and create dis-cord at higher levels of the organization.

23


Communication breakdowns are inevitable inany organization, and it is unclear to what extentstricter rules and procedures would improve co-ordination. There was still some ambivalence inthe department over whether the Criminal Inves-tigation Section should be entirely decentralizedand whether the current hybrid system was work-ing effectively or, as one officer jeered, “It is work-ing in spite of itself.” Still, it is much easier for usto point to cases where coordination broke downthan where it succeeded, since failures are mucheasier to detect.

Geographic versus temporal organization

Conflict between the department’s geographicaland temporal organization was the factor that mostcomplicated coordination among departmentmembers. Sector captains were directly account-able for whatever happened in their sectors over atwenty-four-hour period, even though they wereonly on duty for eight hours during the day shift.When the sector captains were off duty, the earlyor late night shift commander or lieutenant wasresponsible for carrying out each sector captain’sorders while simultaneously supervising all threesectors. This obviously raised difficult organiza-tional issues, such as the need for effective com-munication between the sector captains and shiftcommanders and the problem of clearly establish-ing command responsibilities when the sectorcaptain was off duty.

Once a problem strategy was recommendedat Compstat, it was the sector captain’s responsi-bility to inform the shift commander (most oftenthrough a phone call or e-mail) about any tasksthat needed to be implemented and supervised onthe early and late night shifts. The sector captainwas also responsible for informing his or her lieu-tenant and sergeants of his actions so that the de-cision was conveyed down the organizational hi-erarchy. It was up to the shift commander to ensurethat these instructions were followed, but it ulti-mately fell to the sector captain to “complete theloop” by making sure that the decision was actu-ally implemented at the street level. Technically asector captain had twenty-four-hour responsibil-ity for everything that happened on his or her sec-tor, but members of the command staff recognized

that it was difficult, and somewhat unfair, to holdsomeone continuously accountable while off duty.

The issue of coordination between shifts wasa topic of much discussion at Lowell and came upoften at Operations Staff meetings. One observersuggested that the issue was confusing enough thatsome officers, in particular the department’s ser-geants, might not actually know who their directsupervisor was. “If they [the sergeants] are con-fused,” he commented, “what do you think thepatrol officers think?” He also described thedepartment’s hierarchy metaphorically, in termsof parents, or sector captains, and baby-sitters, orshift commanders, who are responsible for enforc-ing the parents’ rules. This description might havebeen a slight exaggeration, but it suggested theexistence of a feeling among some officers thatthey had two bosses, a sector captain and a shiftcommander. One sector captain disagreed, stat-ing that his personnel clearly knew that he wastheir boss. After all, as he said, “I approve theirvacation time, their schedule, and their time off.”He did, however, acknowledge that a sector cap-tain’s relationship with a shift commander wascomplicated because the shift commander wasworking “in a sense” for the sector captains butsimultaneously exercised a great deal of decision-making autonomy.

The core of the coordination problem takesus back to the challenges associated with account-ability. It is the sector captains who are entirelyresponsible for crime in the city and must answerto the superintendent during Compstat. This es-sentially moves a major burden for managing thepolice organization onto the shoulders of onlythree people. The shift commanders, by contrast,“get a break” by being divorced from the wholeCompstat process and “have little on their plates,”when compared to sector captains, as one respon-dent said. In a thoughtful paper entitled “An Or-

It is the sector captains who are

entirely responsible for crime in the

city and must answer to the

superintendent during Compstat.


24

ganizational Plan for Patrol Operations,” one sec-tor captain argued that the current system let ev-eryone “else off the hook” and placed a dispro-portionate workload on the sector captains. Insupport of this perspective, another respondentnoted that some shift commanders did not worryabout conveying command decisions to the lowerranks because “the heat falls on the sector com-manders.” The sector captains did have some com-mand support, since each sector was assigned alieutenant who served as executive officer. Theprimary responsibility of the executive officer,however, was to convey the sector captain’s or-ders down the chain of command rather than actas a key decision maker.

There are potential dangers that sector cap-tains, who bear significant responsibilities, mayburn out or become frustrated. The potential forburnout is high since sector captains carry a heavyadministrative burden, including weekly Opera-tions Staff meetings with Davis, regular depart-ment meetings, weekly meetings with communitygroups, and the preparation of information forCompstat meetings. In addition to all this, theyhave significant command responsibilities, includ-ing managing and staffing large events, such asLowell’s Winter Fest, and dealing with personnelissues, such as abuse of sick leave by officers. Infulfilling these responsibilities, sector captains hadto satisfy Davis that they were handling his pri-orities; they had to coordinate with each other;and they had to exercise initiative in identifyingand solving important problems. They also hadto ensure that their subordinates fed useful infor-mation up the chain of command, carried out di-rectives that came down the chain of command,and exercised the kind of problem-solving initia-tive that Davis hoped to foster in his department.As a result of these myriad responsibilities, sectorcaptains spent so much time going to meetingsthat there was hardly any time for them to imple-ment anything or to sit at their desks and talk totheir staff, as one respondent observed. A sectorcaptain described this difficult situation simplyand poignantly by stating that, “Time is precious.”

To sum up, the geographic operation of com-mand at Lowell under the Compstat model didprovide middle managers with considerable au-thority. To a large extent, just three individuals

were primarily responsible for controlling crimein the city. To support them in this endeavor theypossessed significant decision-making autonomythat was only, for all intents and purposes, directlycurtailed by the superintendent. In comparison,Compstat had not resulted in a significant changeto the overall structure of the department. Spe-cialist units were, in theory, made available to sec-tor captains, but they did not fall under their di-rect supervision. Sector captains continued onlyto be responsible for patrol officers. Decentraliz-ing decision making clearly encouraged middlemanagers to take initiative and responsibility forpolicing specific territories, but it also createdsome difficult problems. An organization that ismanaged both geographically and temporally willhave to establish clear and effective communica-tion channels that bridge sectors and specializedunits and also extend across shifts and sectors.This helps ensure cooperation between top andmiddle-level managers and helps minimize break-downs in coordination and in the chain of com-mand. There is also a danger that a few middlemanagers are burdened with too much responsi-bility in comparison to their peers and subordi-nates. Based on the impressions of our informants,Compstat may encourage many to slide, whileincreasing the likelihood that sector commandersmay burn out or become frustrated with their con-siderable commitments and the high level of ac-countability to which they are held. However,without any specific examples of burnout withinthe department, these findings remain speculative.

Organizational Flexibility

Having the authority to respond to problems is anecessary but insufficient condition for middlemanagers to implement their decisions effectively.They must also have adequate resources. Compstatpromises to respond rapidly and effectively toproblems as they emerge, but it also requires flex-ibility in an organization’s use of resources sinceproblems often arise in patterns that are difficultto predict. Unfortunately, police organizations areordinarily designed in ways that restrict their ca-pacity for flexibility. First, they are highly bureau-cratic and operate according to detailed rules andregulations that are often imposed or embraced

25


by police administrators themselves. This makesthem much more successful at performing rou-tine tasks in response to highly predictable workdemands than at developing the capacity for cop-ing with unexpected problems. Second, adminis-trators’ ability to make their organizations flex-ible is constrained by other organizational forces,mainly those concerned with employees’ rightsand management’s duty to negotiate changes inworkplace routines. For example, the inflexibleregulations that labor union contracts impose tendto discourage middle managers from changingwork shifts and job assignments (Mastrofski2002). Third, the department is subject to pres-sures from a host of interest groups, includingpoliticians, business, the press, and neighborhoodassociations, that want to determine how andwhere officers spend their time. Sometimes thesegroups reinforce what management believes to bethe department’s priorities, but they often con-strain what it may do to cope with unexpectedproblems and work demands.

One of the ways that police organizations tra-ditionally coped with unpredictable fluctuationsin work demand was to overstaff their patrol unitsrelative to the demand they expected on a givenwork shift (Reiss 1992). That is, they built in slacktime, during which officers engaged in preventivepatrol, but their principal function was to be avail-able for work that might arise, especially thatwhich might require an emergency response. Po-lice departments have tried to build in enoughslack to deal with significant, and unexpected,catastrophes since the 1960s, when former Chi-cago police chief and policing theorist O.W. Wil-son advocated the systematic incorporation of thisflexible capacity into the calculation of staffingneeds (Wilson and McLaren 1972).

For many years this approach was widely prac-ticed by police departments and accepted by thosewho approved their budgets, but the ethos of moreefficient, results-oriented policing has changed allthat. Community policing, problem-oriented po-licing, and Compstat all call for officers to engagein directed activities focused on preventing andsolving problems, spending time with the com-munity, and engaging in crime-reduction activi-ties—all of which diminish the slack time avail-able through “preventive patrol.”

In this even more constrained environment,how can police departments become more flex-ible? They can attempt to negotiate with collec-tive bargaining units for greater flexibility in mak-ing job and shift assignments. They can budgetfor overtime, which allows managers to workaround the constraints of set work shifts. Theycan create special units that are not bound to workin a particular geographic area or work shift, serv-ing as “taxi squads” that are portable in when andwhere they work. They can also require or rewardcooperation and teamwork within and across or-ganizational units. Ultimately, the flexibility of thepolice organization is displayed when managersare able and willing to alter the allocation struc-tures and routines in response to non-routine workdemands.

In our national survey, we measured organi-zational flexibility by the department’s responseto two questions: (1) To what extent had the de-partment reallocated resources such as reassign-ment and overtime to the primary crime or disor-der problem of the last twelve months; and (2) Towhat extent did middle managers have generalauthority to approve requests for flexible hoursor to mobilize SWAT units to specific operations?Although these two items reflected the depart-ment’s commitment to geographic organization ofcommand, they also focused directly on whetherthere was flexibility in the allocation of depart-mental resources. Departments in the nationalsurvey that claimed to have implemented a Comp-stat-like program did appear to have a great dealof organizational flexibility. Eighty-four percent ofthese departments had reassigned patrol officersto new units, areas, or work shifts to address theirprimary crime or disorder problem of the past year,and 80 percent of them had responded by usingovertime to provide additional personnel (Weis-burd et al. 2001).

What did Lowell do to develop flexibility?Officers were sometimes reassigned to other units,geographic areas, or work shifts, but by far themost common practice of reallocating resourcesoutside of normal patterns was to do so on an adhoc, informal basis that actually minimized dis-ruptions to department routine. The most likelyoccurrence was for sector captains to direct a po-lice officer or detective away from some of their


26

more routine activities during their shift and askthem to pay particular attention to a specific prob-lem area. In response to the ongoing problem ofmotor vehicle crimes in one sector of the city, Davisrequested that a central detective be assigned towork more closely with the CAU. In addition, ifnecessary, the department would pay officers over-time as part of a crime-reduction strategy. For ex-ample, in response to the brutal mugging of awoman in the highly visible downtown area, Davisauthorized overtime funds for additional patrolover a two-week period.

A clear example of the reassignment of a spe-cialist to a crime problem was the decision madeat an Operations Staff Meeting to temporarilymove an assistant crime analyst from the CAU tothe criminal division. In order to provide centraldetectives with greater access to gang information,the crime analyst was relocated and assigned spe-cific gang-related cases. In relation to this move,

signed some specialists (some of the detectives),a measure that increased within-sector flexibilityin responding to problems, but in general the de-partment did not rely on “taxi squads” to enhanceflexibility. The department’s top leadership spokeof a desire for greater teamwork but had to con-tend with a number of disincentives and limita-tions on the organization’s capacity to reward it.Thus, while the LPD did undertake to increaseflexibility in resource allocations, it was signifi-cantly limited in its capacity to do so and ham-pered by traditional internal and external chal-lenges that included lack of manpower, citypolitics, and rivalries within the organization. Thefollowing sections discuss these in greater detail.

Manpower

The paradox of resource flexibility is that the fewerresources the organization has to devote to flex-ible assignments, the more it needs that flexibil-ity. Despite the considerable increase in the num-ber of sworn personnel since Davis took over,several respondents still felt that there was a realneed for more patrol officers in the police depart-ment: “More troops on the street,” as one sectorcaptain explained. This sentiment appeared to bewidely shared, especially among the sector cap-tains, and was particularly strong in the West sec-tor where a disproportionate amount of gang andmotor vehicle crime was concentrated. Silvermanwrites, “To its credit, Compstat is not tolerantwhen precinct commanders automatically respond‘we need more people’ to questions about below-par crime fighting” (Silverman 1999, 203). Thatsaid, several members of the LPD did seem to feelthat such a response was justified when discuss-ing how to tackle crime increases. One sergeantbelieved that the department could use more pa-trol officers. He questioned the logic of keepingpatrol officers in administrative or specialty posi-tions, such as computing or training, when theycould be used more effectively on the street. An-other line supervisor believed that his officers feltthat they were understaffed but added, “The ad-ministration doesn’t want to hear this.”

Given his budget constraints, Davis must re-spond to these general criticisms by exhorting hisofficers to work with what they have. At one

the crime analyst stated that there was a need forsomeone in the detective division to “go over pat-terns” in regard to specific crimes. According tothe national survey, almost three quarters of de-partments responded that they allowed districtcommanders, line supervisors, or specialized unitcommanders to decide on flexible hour requests,and 65 percent allowed them to mobilize SWATunits. In line with this trend, Lowell’s sector cap-tains were responsible for making these kinds ofdecisions with little or no review by superior of-ficers.

Other methods to increase flexibility were lesscommon. We did not observe the department seek-ing concessions from labor. It did use overtime,but the funds available were not always sufficientto meet the demands, at least in the view of somebelow top management. Sector captains were as-

The paradox of resource flexibility

is that the fewer resources the

organization has to devote to

flexible assignments, the more it

needs that flexibility.

27


Compstat meeting, Davis expressed concern overa recent increase in motor vehicle crime in onearea of the city, inspiring a sergeant to state thatdue to injuries, “We don’t have a full contingent,”and “this really hurt us.” Davis pointedly remindedthe sergeant, “There is a propensity to want morepeople, but there are one hundred more cops outthere than five years ago.” He continued by tell-ing his audience that one way he was trying toincrease the number of officers available was toput a system in place that closely monitored of-ficer injuries and sick days. It was his hope thatthis would increase available personnel by decreas-ing the number of inexcusable absences. Davis andhis deputies also tried to increase the number ofpatrol officers by asking those in specialist posi-tions to consider moving to patrol during thedepartment’s bid process. Davis, however, was notkeen on “pulling” specialists from their key posi-tions because he felt, according to one respondent,that they fulfilled a necessary purpose where theywere.

Compstat may not be particularly sympatheticto claims for more officers on the street, but byconstantly bringing attention to crime problemsand the need for rapid and effective solutions, italso brings a sharper focus to the old bugbear ofthe police organization—the lack of manpower.Since middle managers are held most accountablefor crime problems in their sectors, they are themain proponents of an increase in personnel asone of the most effective strategies for reducingcrime.

City politics

The department’s budget must obviously be ap-proved by the city council, which is unlikely tofund significant increases in police personnel dur-ing times of fiscal constraint. This reality of citypolitics has affected Davis who began his tenurein office with “carte blanche” to run things as hewished, according to one officer. Five years later,however, municipal funds were more limited, lead-ing city hall to propose that the police departmenthad enough resources to effectively maintain or-der, control crime, and provide services to Lowell.

City politics can also reduce the department’sorganizational flexibility by influencing officer

deployment, as it did in early 2001 after a citycouncilor expressed concern about a spate of drug-related crimes in one area of the city. Contendingthat police should be more visible in the neigh-borhood, he told Davis and other city councilorsthat he wanted to see “more cops walking.” Davisresponded with some reservations, through he isa staunch advocate of community policing andfoot patrol. Placing a higher priority on walkingroutes, he said, would reduce the number of avail-able cruisers and provide some areas of the citywith less patrol. The only way to avoid this prob-lem, he continued, would be for the departmentto hire more officers or increase overtime. Sincethe city council was unable or unwilling to sup-port either of these measures, the department’sonly alternative was to come up with a plan for“Advanced Community Policing” that assignedpatrol officers to all the city’s neighborhoods be-fore filling cruiser route assignments.

In prioritizing the deployment of patrol offic-ers, the police department was influenced by thepolitically powerful editor of the local newspaper,local business owners, and the Lowell HousingAuthority, as well as city councilors. They too werekeenly in favor of the department maintaining ahigh level of police visibility in the downtown areawhere their businesses were located. Davis re-sponded to this political pressure by requiring hissector captains to maintain foot patrols in thedowntown area on the day and early night shifts.These patrols were in addition to six officers anda lieutenant who were assigned to the LowellHousing Authority precinct, according to an agree-ment between Davis and the city. In taking theseactions, Davis emphasized that he was ultimatelyresponsible for his department and would not doanything that that he considered “inappropriate,”no matter who was putting pressure on him. Heultimately decided to assign additional patrols tothe downtown area and housing precinct becausehe was just as committed to community policingas those outside the department.

This prioritization of patrol in certain areasplaced considerable restrictions on the ability ofsector captains to allocate resources and select tac-tics. On one occasion, a sector captain had muchdifficulty arranging for the regular deployment ofa decoy car to catch perpetrators of motor vehicle


28

crimes because of a lack of manpower. A respon-dent commented that using a decoy car “ was nota practical application of manpower.” Even thoughCompstat encourages the flexible deployment ofresources, the department’s organizational capac-ity is limited by city politics.

This daily reality became apparent during areassignment meeting, when a sector captain notedthat the department “was trying to do with doingwithout” and suggested that it use Compstat morescientifically to allocate manpower to high-crimeareas. Another sector captain responded by point-ing out that “there are politics” which make itimpossible to base manpower entirely on Comp-stat. Given the limited supply of officers and over-time pay, the goal of maintaining a highly visiblepolice presence competes with that of flexiblydeploying officers to problem areas. Sector cap-tains and those they command are consequentlyunder frequent pressure to find alternative waysof controlling crime that do not increase the ex-isting strain on manpower. One sergeant, whoseterritory covered the downtown area, noted, forexample, how difficult it was at times for him tofill his route. Just that weekend, he complained,he had been unable to fill his cruisers because fourofficers had called in sick and he had to keep “twowalkers” in areas designated as high priority byDavis and the city.

Rivalry between sectors

One way of improving deployment flexibilitywould be to increase the organization’s ability tomove officers from one sector to another on a tem-porary basis. Such flexibility requires that sectorcommanders have a strong sense of shared respon-sibility for the overall good of the organizationand city, but an ethos like this clashes directly withanother Compstat principle—accountability. Wenoted earlier that one of the paradoxes of account-ability was that it limited Compstat’s ability to fa-cilitate innovative problem solving through brain-storming. Accountability similarly conflicted withorganizational flexibility. How does one balancethe need of sector commanders to simultaneouslydemonstrate that they are effectively addressingcrime in their assigned areas and promoting organ-izational flexibility by readily “donating” their

resources to another sector for assistance? In otherwords, is it more important to demonstrate per-formance in your own sector or to help out yourneighbor?

Clearly, this is an issue for top management toresolve, which it can do in two ways. One is forthe chief to get involved on a continuing and adhoc basis, refereeing requests for additional re-sources between sector commanders. Of course,doing this undercuts the integrity of the principleof delegating operational control to sector com-manders. How can a general run his army whenthe commander in chief may at any time take asignificant portion of his troops from him to helpout another general? The other alternative is forthe chief to create one or more special units thatare not assigned to a specific sector, but that heuses to fulfill special requests from sector com-manders, like a “special forces” unit in the mili-tary. This provides for greater stability among sec-tor units, but in most departments the creation ofsuch a unit would require reductions in the allo-cation of resources to sector commands, therebyreducing the organization’s commitment to geo-graphic organization of command. Davis occasion-ally opted for the first strategy and not at all forthe second, but, for the most part, resource allo-cation between sectors remained stable, suggest-ing that organizational flexibility was a constantchallenge.

In this sort of environment, flexibility dependsa great deal on informal cooperation between sec-tors, which depends, in turn, on the nature andextent of rivalries among sectors. There is an ap-parent contradiction in Silverman’s praise for theNYPD’s use of Compstat to compare statisticsamong precincts, such as coming up with top tenlists for those with the most arrests or the greatestdrop in crime. Silverman argues that “rankingsspurred analysis of precinct activities, crimetrends, and results, and drove commanders toperform better” (Silverman 1999, 101), but thiscompetition also had potential to hinder collabo-ration. In Lowell, the department did not encour-age competition directly, but Compstat did helpfoster rivalries since it compared crime statisticsacross sectors.

Our observations suggested that competitionbetween the sector captains over crime numbers

29


was relatively subdued. Most often they expressedsolidarity and sympathy when a crime spike oc-curred in one of their sectors. A sensitivity to com-petition was not, however, entirely absent. On oneoccasion a respondent said that he was slightlyuncomfortable that detective follow-ups and ar-rests had been displayed at a Compstat meeting—this was not the norm. The respondent felt thatthis might reflect negatively, and unjustly, on thehard work that was being carried out in those sec-tors that were understaffed—in this case, due toinjuries.

Most supervisors did not react like this respon-dent, though many line officers did have an acuteperception of Compstat as a tool for fostering com-petition and a “big contest between captains tohave impressive stats,” as one patrol officerphrased it. Responses toour line-officer surveylent some support to thisdescription since 75 per-cent of those surveyed“agreed” or “stronglyagreed” that Compstathad made supervisorsplace too much empha-sis on statistics. Sixty-fivepercent, moreover, “dis-agreed” or “strongly dis-agreed” with the statement, “Compstat has in-creased teamwork between my unit and specialistunits in the department.” This latter response,though it did not specifically address teamworkamong sectors, did suggest that Compstat was notparticularly successful at fostering the sharing ofresources within the organization.

One of the areas where this competition mani-fested itself most clearly was in regard to man-power. Since sector commanders were held ac-countable for their own individual sectors, theyfocused primarily on what happened in their par-ticular area of the city. Several current or formersector captains commented that they paid someattention to what was going on elsewhere, but thereality was that during Compstat they were onlyasked questions on their own sector. In addition,sector captains exercised ownership over theirsectors and were proud to take individual respon-sibility for any problems that occurred on their

turf. Any measure, therefore, that threatened toreduce their ability to reduce crime in their ownsector would encounter resistance. One sectorcaptain commented that if he was “down a ser-geant” on one of his shifts, he could ask a ser-geant from another sector “to keep an eye onthings.” He recognized, however, that, “It wouldbe an exceptional sergeant who would be willingto take on the added responsibility of stuff goingon outside of his/her sector.”

Officers further down the ranks were alsoaware that Compstat did not encourage sectors toshare manpower. One officer described this reluc-tance to share “route men” between sectors as “aturf thing” and explained that sector captains“don’t go into each others’ turf” because “they wanttheir own officers to ride around in their own sec-

tor.” A sergeant painteda similar scenario in re-sponse to a questionabout the problem ofunderstaffing and thelikelihood of borrowingofficers from another sec-tor to deal with a press-ing crime problem. “Itcould happen,” he con-jectured, “but everyonein their own sector has

their own problems they are dealing with.” Hewent on to note that it had been much easier toget the people you needed when the departmentwas centralized than it was under the existing sec-tor system because sector captains think of thesectors “as their own little kingdoms and don’twant to let people go.” On one occasion, for ex-ample, detectives carrying a heavy workload re-ceived overtime pay when several injuries left thedepartment understaffed. The department did notdecide to provide additional detectives from othersectors, however, suggesting that it is easier toprovide overtime than to shift resources acrosssectors.

There appeared to be greater organizationalflexibility in the LPD than in more traditionalpolice organizations because Davis encouragedteamwork and pared down bureaucracy. This flex-ibility was significantly limited, nonetheless, byboth internal and external forces including: the

. . . many line officers . . . have

an acute perception of

Compstat as a tool for

fostering competition and a

“big contest between captains

to have impressive stats” . . .


30

lack of available manpower, city politics, intra-organizational rivalries, and the demands on anorganization that was trying to pursue a numberof conflicting objectives simultaneously. On theone hand, the organization was trying to be fair toits employees, by giving them stable shift assign-ments for example. On the other hand, it wantedto have enough flexibility in shift assignments tosuccessfully address unforeseen community needsas they arose. It wanted to be fair to its citizensand provide them with equal protection againstcrime, but it also wanted to be responsive to po-litically powerful individuals and groups who wantmore resources for their priorities, regardless ofhow it affects safety throughout the community.Contemporary police organizations are not at lib-erty to pursue a single objective for any length oftime, so they resolve the conflicting demands onthem by making compromises that will not pro-voke a crisis or inspire negative publicity.

In Lowell, many respondents seemed to feelthat “manpower” was an “issue,” despite thesignificant increase in patrol officers over the pastsix years. Unlike some of the other Compstat de-partments we visited, organizational flexibility wasnot clearly facilitated within the structure of theLPD. For example, there were no “taxi squads”—officers that are part of a sector’s operational forcethat do not have a specific geographic assignmentbut are available to a sector captain to use wherehe or she pleases. (One sector captain’s commentthat the amount of collaboration between sectordetectives was due to “personalities” nicely en-capsulates the ad hoc quality of organizationalflexibility in the LPD.) Even though a sector cap-tain would never interfere in the management ofanother sector—“Everyone needs to take care oftheir own house”—there was some cooperationacross sectors. One sector captain acknowledgedresources were tight, but this did not dissuadedetectives from different sectors from collaborat-ing with one another. However, he observed thathe only had a few detectives and would make itclear to any of them who wanted to help workanother sector’s case that their primary responsi-bility was to their own sector’s cases. This focuson intra-sector responsibilities rather than inter-sector collaborations is also evident during Op-erations Staff meetings. When Davis offers encour-

agement or praise to his sector captains it tendsto be for the achievements of individual sectorsrather than for teamwork that occurred acrosssectors.

In sum, the department’s limited resourceswere frequently requested by, and provided to,sector captains for use within their own sectorsand were only rarely shared among sectors for theoverall good of the department. For instance, theincreasing number of motor vehicle crimes in theWest sector led the department to assign two cen-tral detectives to help solve the problem, but itdid not result in a request for, or assignment of,additional personnel from the two other sectors.The absence of inter-sector cooperation that thisinstance indicates arose from several factors. Thefirst was that budgetary constraints did not leavesectors with resources to share. The second wasCompstat’s apparent failure to systematize team-work as part of accountability by making sectorcaptains only accountable for their individualturfs. Last is the irony that Compstat’s emphasison organizational flexibility conflicts with the de-velopment of geographic organization of opera-tional command. When a department strives toincrease geographic organization of command bygiving more resources to sector captains, it auto-matically increases the capacity of each sector cap-tain to operate within his or her sector. At the sametime, however, the department also decreases itscapacity to shift resources between sectors, a pro-cess that is easier when more personnel are movedfrom sector commands to special units that canbe allocated from one sector to another as needed.

Data-Driven ProblemIdentification and Assessment

Compstat relies heavily on crime statistics to re-structure information for managerial decisionmaking by shifting the focus from highly selec-tive anecdotes of individual cases to the largerpatterns and trends that might exist. The result,as our national survey suggests, is for Compstatdepartments to have the capacity to manage andanalyze data in more sophisticated ways. Over 90percent of these departments claimed that theyconducted “crime trend identification and analy-sis,” and nearly as many claimed that they used

31


“database or statistical analysis software for crimeanalysis” (Weisburd et al. 2001). Lowell was typi-cal of these departments in having a Compstat pro-gram designed to provide information that wouldhelp managers decide on their priorities in handlingcrime or safety issues. As one Lowell officer putit, “Information is always the name of the game.”

Lowell designed its Compstat around account-ability mechanisms so that systematically collectedand analyzed data pulled from officer reportswould guide decision making. The doubling insize of the department’s CAU and the rapidchanges in the way crime data was collected andanalyzed attest to the importance of crime datafor instructing decision making. There were, how-ever, a number of challenges to data collection inLowell. We hope to serve two purposes by brieflyexamining how Lowell attempted to overcomethese challenges and routinely gather, analyze, anduse crime data to understand and tackle problems.The first is to show police organizations how onedepartment overcame serious, technical obstacles.The second is to provide a clearer understandingof the sophisticated, “data-driven” processes thatfuel Compstat.

Our discussion also highlights a specific di-lemma associated with using data to act strategi-cally: What data should be selected for Compstatand what should be overlooked? In Lowell, whenmembers of the department became aware thattheir high-priority problems were being droppedfrom Compstat, they exerted pressure by bendingDavis’ ear. Alternatively, they raised concerns dur-ing Compstat or made suggestions to the CAU toinclude or exclude a particular crime category.There was no forum for any kind of systematicdiscussion on what to include in Compstat, andboth these ad hoc approaches contributed toCompstat’s constant state of flux.

Finally, in addition to some of the technicalobstacles Lowell faced in implementing its Comp-stat program and the decisions surrounding whatdata to include, we discuss some other challengesassociated with gathering, analyzing, and present-ing data. These include: (1) the burden put ondistrict commanders to learn crime analysis; (2)the problem of encouraging detectives and mem-bers of the rank and file to participate in a pro-gram that is heavily oriented toward command

staff; (3) the importance of ensuring timely andaccurate data; and (4) the heavy workload carriedby civilian crime analysts in a small department.

A history of Compstat—overcomingtechnical and learning obstacles

It is impossible to understand how Compstat op-erated at Lowell without considering how the de-partment constructed its crime database and pro-duced crime statistics. At the time of our visit, theability of the department to gather and processcrime data was seriously hampered by the absenceof a Records Management System (RMS), or elec-tronic filing system, that would have allowed theCAU to download crime information directly froma central database rather than enter it manuallyfrom individual police incident and arrest reports.The department contracted Lucent Technologiesto remove the old Larimore RMS and install a newone by December 1999, but a host of technicaland financial difficulties prevented Lucent fromdoing more than shutting down the old systemand installing a Computer-Aided-Dispatch Systemor CAD. Members of the department were frus-trated by Lucent’s failure to completely honor itscontract, but they managed to implement a seriesof stopgap solutions that allowed Compstat tooperate.

The fact that any crime data could be system-atically gathered and analyzed in a timely fashionwas testimony to the innovative thinking and un-common work ethic of members of the CAU. FromCompstat’s inception until the summer of 1998, aclerk in Records was responsible for photocopy-ing every page of every individual police report, aprocess that could take up to eight hours for re-ports filed over the weekend, according to theofficer in charge of the CAU. Copies of these re-ports were distributed to the three sectors, as wellas the detectives, juvenile section, and CAU. Atthis time, the principal crime analyst inputtedcrime data from the Larimore RMS into MS Exceland used this to run Compstat. The crime ana-lysts also exported CAD call data from the Lari-more system, “eyeballed” the resulting printoutto identify locations that appeared to generate ahigh volume of calls, and distributed hard copiesof this data to the sector captains and shift com-


32

manders who attended Compstat meetings. With-out any kind of mapping software, however, crimeanalysts had to rely on their own experience andobservations for identifying hot spots. One crimeanalyst conjectured that “We probably missed alot,” though he thought that most of the CAD calldata concerned simple quality-of-life problems,such as complaints about barking dogs. In Janu-ary 1998, Davis recommended that the departmentbegin using crime mapping, according to onecrime analyst, and rely on officer reports ratherthan CAD call data, which tended to mislead thedepartment by failing to tell the specific time orlocation of an incident. The members of the CAUresponded to Davis’ recommendations by input-ting information from officer incident and arrestreports into MS Excel and then importing thesedata into MapInfo in order to generate maps. CAUmembers also had to learn to use MapInfo on theirown since they were unfamiliar with mappingsoftware.

Another innovation took place around sum-mer 1998 when Records began using PaperPortto scan police officer reports into the department’sserver. PaperPort expedited the CAU’s access topolice reports, which had previously dependedupon the speed with which the Records clerkscould input data into the old RMS and providethe CAU with copies of officer reports. NowRecords clerks could generally scan all officer re-ports from the previous day onto the department’sserver by 10 a.m. the following morning. The CAUcould then print them off, read them, and use theinformation on crime they contained to supple-ment data that input clerks had entered into theLarimore RMS. This process provided timely in-formation to Compstat participants, who had for-merly used data that was often more than twoweeks old.

Real administrative and technical problems inrunning Compstat began to materialize with theshutting down of the Larimore RMS at the end of1999, leaving the LPD without any kind of cen-tralized database. In January 2000, the officer incharge of the CAU and members of Lowell’s Man-agement Information Systems Division tried toovercome this problem by setting up a temporaryMS Excel database as an indexing system on thedepartment’s server. The input clerks in the

Records Division could use this to enter data frompolice officer reports. From January to March2000, the CAU extracted the data it needed to runCompstat from this MS Excel database and con-tinued to supplement it with information fromofficer reports on PaperPort. Compstat, however,depends upon up-to-date information, and the twoinput clerks—out of the four clerks in Records—were generally one-and-a-half to two months be-hind schedule with their data entry. The cause ofthis delay was that they were still entering oldpolice reports into the temporary database for gen-eral departmental access. In order to run Comp-stat, the CAU needed to find out how far Recordshad proceeded with its data entry, locate the re-ports that had not been entered, and then enterdata from these reports into its own CAU data-base. In addition to this cumbersome process andthe tardiness of the data, the MS Excel data werenot in a Compstat-friendly format. One of thedepartment’s crime analysts explained that therewere no standardized codes for crimes. For ex-ample, simple assault might be entered as “s.a.”or “simp. ass.,” and street addresses were fre-quently misspelled.

The tensions that these problems created be-tween Records and the CAU came to a flashpointin March 2000, when a sector captain complainedthat the CAU was mapping data incorrectly. Mem-bers of the CAU thought they were being blamedunfairly for inputting errors, while those inRecords felt they were being penalized for the limi-tations of their database. The officer in charge ofthe CAU and members of the Management Infor-mation Systems Division responded to the incipi-ent crisis by replacing the temporary MS Exceldatabase with an MS Access database that providedusers with drop-down menus containing standard-ized data fields. This helped eliminate inputtingerrors but was only intended as a short-term so-lution until Lucent installed the new RMS.

MS Access provided a more user-friendly data-base, but the CAU still depended upon Recordsfor inputting crime data. By September 19, 2000,the CAU decided that the whole process of coor-dinating data entry with Records was too difficult,particularly because the clerks in Records wereentering only “the bare bones” of police reports,and the CAU demanded more detailed informa-

33


tion for Compstat. Since then, the CAU alone hasbeen responsible for inputting all the crime datathat Compstat draws from police reports into itsown MS Excel database.

What kinds of data are used?

At the time of our site visit, Lowell police officersgenerated approximately sixty incident and arrestreports on any given day, and the department drewheavily on these reports for its crime data.9 Theprocess of data collection and analysis began whenan officer filled out an incident or arrest report atthe end of his or her shift. The officer then gavethe report to the sergeant or commanding officerresponsible for approving it before it was scannedonto the department’s server and made accessibleto all personnel. A subsequent stage of the pro-cess took place every weekday morning whenmembers of the CAU accessed the PaperPort data-base on the department’s server and printed offthe previous day’s reports for eight categories, in-cluding traffic accidents and crimes dealing withassaults, burglaries, drug activity, breaking andentering motor vehicles, motor vehicle damage,motor vehicle theft, and other crimes. Informa-tion from these reports would then be presentedat Compstat meetings.

Compstat at Lowell was in a constant state offlux as feedback from participants in the programgenerated future change. This was shown by thechoice of crimes depicted during Compstat meet-ings. When Compstat first started, Davis, alongwith members of his command staff, selected thosecrimes they felt deserved the greatest focus. Partof this selection process involved dispatching acommunity liaison into Lowell’s neighborhoodsto identify their concerns. Over time, sector bosseswould visit the CAU and make requests that mightresult in changes. In addition, members of theCAU would review each Compstat and any com-

ments that arose during the meetings, where Davisoften made suggestions. They would then use thisinformation to make additional changes and im-provements, such as choosing to display motorvehicle crimes at Compstat, on account of theirprevalence.

Visibility of crimes at Compstat

Since 1998, the crimes selected for Compstat havegenerally remained the same. The disappearanceand reappearance of domestic incidents—assaults,disputes, arrests, and violations of restraining or-ders—demonstrates the dynamism of the Comp-stat process, however, and shows that the highvisibility of “Compstat crimes,” as distinct fromthe low visibility of non-Compstat crimes, caninfluence how the department perceives and ad-dresses crime. Domestic assaults were mappedseparately at Lowell’s Compstat until January 1999when people began to recognize that domesticviolence incidents did not lend themselves to aresolvable situation or “strategic technical re-sponse.”10 Although they were a priority withinthe department, the nature and prevalence of thistype of crime made it difficult to identify patterns.Officers were bothered by seeing so many “dots”on display month after month and found thedepartment’s way of mapping domestic violenceto be “a bit overwhelming and not instructive.”The department responded by grouping domesticassaults into the general category of “assaults,”which only distinguished simple from aggravatedassaults. By January 2001, Davis publicly ex-pressed concern about the change in Compstat’smapping procedures, a sentiment that several com-mand staff members had also voiced over the pastfew months. The opening of Lowell’s new Domes-tic Violence Center reinforced this concern a fewmonths later, and the department reintroduced themapping of domestics at Compstat meetings.

9. The CAU did use CAD call data for Compstat, though this was mainly for reporting drug activity and to a far lesser extent than police/incident reports. In addition to its limited utility, the CAD system was a “locked” or self-contained system at Lowell. If crime analysts wanted touse CAD call data, they would have to print it out and then manually type it into MS Excel, putting additional time constraints on a system thatwas already seriously hampered by the absence of an RMS. The disadvantage of not using CAD call data, one captain pointed out, was that oneaddress could be responsible for twenty-five calls a month, but it would not register at Compstat.

10. In contrast, the Compstat process is well suited to identifying and solving traffic problems. Between 1997 and 2000, the American AutomobileAssociation (AAA) gave Lowell several awards acknowledging the department’s considerable success in reducing traffic accidents and problems.


34

Crimes displayed at Compstat maintained highvisibility among the command staff, ensuring thatthey were subject to both ample attention and fre-quent discussion. Some sector captains may havecontinued to focus on domestic violence incidentsfollowing their removal from Compstat but foundit difficult to give them the same level of scrutiny.This is because the department may ignore crimesthat are absent from Compstat. After all, Compstatresembles police radar, and “If something is noton the radar, it is invisible,” as one officer put it.It was therefore unlikely that the departmentwould hold a sector captain to the same level ofaccountability for a crime that was not on theCompstat screen. A general rule of thumb as statedby one respondent was, “If something is not shownat Compstat, no one cares about it . . . it meansthat you are not paying attention to it . . . you arenot accountable for it.” It may be an overstate-ment to argue that non-Compstat crimes are “in-visible” to the department, since those that arereported are usually documented and often receivesome police response. However, these observationsdo raise an important issue: constantly holdingdistrict commanders accountable for the samecrimes at Compstat may lead to potentially usefulcrime-related information being overlooked.

The decision to include a particular crime inCompstat reflected the pressures exerted by com-mand staff members through conversations witheach other, Davis, or the CAU, and, at times,through discussions that arose during Compstat.For the most part, therefore, individual initiativerather than a systematic decision-making processdetermined the types of crime data that were ulti-mately displayed at Compstat. Indeed, some non-crime-related issues that Compstat excluded couldstill be very important to the department, accord-ing to one captain, because Compstat directed dis-cussion to specific crimes rather than quality-of-life issues in Lowell’s neighborhoods.

How are the data collected,processed, and analyzed?

The absence of an RMS created problems, includ-ing the lengthy three to four hours per day that ittook the CAU to input data from officer reportsinto its MS Excel database for the eight Compstat

categories. The types of data that the CAUpunched in for each crime included the field re-port number, the date, day of the week, platoon,and sector, as well as specific information that mayor may not have appeared on a map. CAU mem-bers generally shared data inputting, though themost senior crime analyst took personal respon-sibility for any errors by saying that any mistakeswere “on her.” Besides potential errors, the lackof an RMS made it difficult for the CAU to com-pare current Compstats with those conducted be-fore September 19, 2000, when the unit estab-lished its own database. This difficulty was onlyunderlined by requests for longer-term compari-sons from department members who did not seemaware of this restriction. In addition, the CAU’scapacity for data analysis was seriously curtailedbecause half a day was spent on data entry. Theo-retically, it would have been possible for Lowell’scrime analysts to make comparisons of crime overperiods longer than twelve months, but this wouldhave been incredibly time consuming, requiringanalysts to print hard copies of reports compiledbefore September 19, 2000 and to input the nec-essary data. Given that they were entering dataevery day in order to remain current, this was atall order indeed. The CAU, however, was able tomake shorter-term comparisons, such as compar-ing consecutive Compstat periods.

During this same period, the CAU made thefollowing preparations for Compstat meetings. Onthe Monday or Tuesday before Thursday’s meet-ing, the CAU provided each sector captain withcopies of all the police reports for the previoustwo weeks. It also used MS Excel to manufacturespreadsheets that organized individual crimes bycity sector and gave details, such as the suspectsinvolved in an assault and battery case and thecase’s disposition, as well as recording variables,such as day, time, and total number of crimes. Bylate Tuesday night or early Wednesday morning,it gave sector captains copies of their sector crimeslocated on Compstat maps and MS Excel sum-mary sheets that reported aggregates, includingdetails on the number of assaults and the platoonor shift where they occurred (see Appendix IV).

This procedure remained in effect until 2001,when the department instituted a number ofchanges. As of February 2001, when each sector

35


captain began presenting every six, rather thanevery two weeks, the CAU began giving sectorcaptains copies of their sector’s reports and theadditional spreadsheets a week ahead of time, sincethere were now six rather than two weeks of re-ports to review. As of September 2001, the CAUhas been using SPSS, which is a more powerfulstatistical package than MS Excel. It has alsoemployed MapInfo, rather than PowerPoint, toproject slides at Compstat meetings becauseMapInfo, unlike PowerPoint, allows presenters tozoom in on specific geographical areas. The LowellPolice Department generates all the data displayedat Compstat, but it encourages other agencies toshare information. The department, for example,collaborated with Lowell’s chief probation officer,who exchanged information with an assistantcrime analyst during daily phone calls and regu-larly attended Compstat meetings where he par-ticipated in the department’s discussion of crimedata.

How are the data used?

Sector captains _______________________Everyone in the department had access to officerreports on PaperPort, and each day the sector cap-tains and their executive officers printed off theprevious day’s sector reports. Some sector captainsread all the reports to familiarize themselves withthe crimes in their sector, while others relied moreheavily upon their executive officers for this pur-pose. The executive officer read all the reports and,in consultation with the sector captains, assigneddetective follow-ups. The executive officer wasalso primarily responsible for notifying his ser-geants of these joint decisions. The sergeants thenrelayed priorities to patrol officers. The sector cap-tain also found out what was going on in the sec-tor by communicating directly with line officers.The week before Compstat, the presenting sectorcaptain would examine all of the sectors’ policereports in order to reacquaint himself/herself withwhat had been happening in the sector. The sec-tor captain might also skim reports from othersectors but paid far more attention to the crimereports from his or her own sector. The primarypurpose of examining the reports, maps, and sum-mary data was to identify crime patterns.

Maps and patterns _____________________The originators of New York’s Compstat programwere very aware of the importance of crime map-ping. Jack Maple observed, “It’s easy to lose sightof the power of mapping. Maps are superior tonumbers or narratives as a means of communi-cating to individuals at every level of an organiza-tion the immediate challenges in front of them.Maps tell a story in a way numbers and narrativessimply can’t” (Maple 2000, 105). The visual pre-sentation of crime maps was a central componentof Lowell’s Compstat meetings. Crime maps weredisplayed for the presenting sector and for theentire city. This ensured that the department didnot focus solely on one sector’s crime figures—the sector that was being presented—since any ofthe sector captains could be asked to account forcrime in their beats.

Sector captains did not receive maps daily, onlyduring the week before Compstat. They usedthem, in combination with other available crimeinformation, to identify crime patterns and prepthemselves on incidents that were unfamiliar.Throughout the preparation process, they collabo-rated closely with their executive officers and com-municated with the officers under their commandto gather relevant information. Sometimes theyalso called or e-mailed the CAU in order to clarifyany questions they had about data for their sec-tors. All sector captains noted that preparing forCompstat was time consuming, usually takingseveral hours over a period of two days. Particu-larly daunting were the maps. Since they displayedcrime incidents over the long period of six weeks,one sector captain was inspired to playfully com-ment, “Oh crap! I did not think that there are asmany of these [crime incidents],” when he recol-lected his feelings upon receiving them.

Sector captains and their executive officerswere primarily responsible for identifying patterns

All sector captains noted that

preparing for Compstat was time

consuming, usually taking several

hours over a period of two days.


36

and figuring out what was driving them. This wasbecause Lowell, unlike a larger department suchas the Richmond Police Department, did not haveenough resources to provide sector commanderswith their own civilian crime analysts. Districtcommanders in smaller departments may have todevelop crime analysis skills on their own, a chal-lenge faced by Lowell’s sector captains, none ofwhom had received any specific training on Comp-stat. It was clear from our discussions with themthat some were more comfortable with this rolethan others, even though none of them directlyaddressed the challenges of becoming a crime ana-lyst. From time to time, sector captains did con-tact the CAU at headquarters, but this tended tobe for additional information or clarification on aparticular report rather than an in-depth discus-sion of crime patterns. This may have been be-cause members of the CAU were so busy that sec-tor captains did not want to bother them withadditional requests or because sector captains wereso busy that they did not have time to consult withthe CAU. It also may have been because sectorcaptains felt they were better equipped to identifypatterns, since they were able to combine Comp-stat data with their detailed street knowledge. Al-ternatively, it may even have been because sectorcaptains felt no need for assistance since crimeanalysis consisted of identifying clusters on mapsrather than engaging in sophisticated statisticalanalysis.

The importance of discovering patterns wasmost apparent during Compstat meetings, wheresector captains felt compelled to acknowledgeeven the absence of a pattern during their presen-tations.11 The failure to make an explicit statement,such as “there are no patterns here,” could leadanother audience member to identify spuriousrelationships between incident clusters. When thisoccurred, sector captains might respond that acluster of dots on a map did not necessarily meanthat a pattern existed because the dots might in-dicate a set of incidents that occurred at differenttimes and on different days. This tended to makemeetings drag on because sector captains, who didnot have crime patterns to discuss, tended to fill

the “dead air” with details of specific incidents.Though some presenters related incidents thatwere serious, unusual, or entertaining, others usedthe occasion to engage in tedious monologues,leading Davis to interrupt and ask them to moveon.

The Daily Bulletin _____________________Since March 2001, the CAU has tried to makeCompstat more inclusive by putting together sum-mary handouts for distribution to all attendees atCompstat meetings. Those who did not attendlearned about some of the main issues raised atThursday’s Compstat from the Daily Bulletin, thedepartment’s quotidian publication. At the time,the Daily Bulletin was a two-page summary ofcrime-related material that was e-mailed to allmembers of the department and distributed inhard copy at roll call. The importance of the DailyBulletin should not be underestimated. The officerin charge of the CAU praised it as “the most vitalinformation tool that we have in the department,”an opinion supported by a patrol officer who de-scribed it as a “very useful . . . little newspaperkind of thing.” According to a crime analyst, theCAU took most of the material that appeared inthe Daily Bulletin from police reports and regu-larly included announcements made at roll call.Occasionally, the CAU added a synopsis of a crimepattern or issued an officer safety warning, andFriday’s edition often included a short summaryof one or two crime incidents from each sectorthat had merited attention at the previous day’sCompstat meeting. Patrol officers never made sug-gestions for the bulletin, the crime analyst noted,although command staff and detectives occasion-ally requested that the CAU include certain infor-mation.

Line officers __________________________The dissemination of information through theDaily Bulletin raises questions about the availabil-ity of crime data and Compstat to line officers.Granted, Davis demanded that a couple of offic-ers from the presenting sector attend Compstat,but members of the department’s command and

11. Sector captains understand the word “pattern” to mean an underlying factor that explains or ties together the occurrence of a number ofcrime events.

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administrative staff dominated the meetings. Pa-trol officers and detectives played only a marginalrole in both Compstat meetings and the overallCompstat process, and line officers, as a group,received no training in Compstat. When we dis-tributed surveys at roll call, feedback from patrolofficers suggested that they were, in fact, surprisedto be asked their opinions on Compstat. They didnot feel that their limited attendance at, and par-ticipation in, Compstat qualified them to answerany questions concerning its implementation andimpact on the department. Compstat belonged tothe “brass,” not to them. Fifty-six percent of pa-trol officers had not attended a Compstat meet-ing, and of the 41 percent who had attended,approximately half responded that they had “ob-served meeting only,” rather than participating oranswering questions. Before March 2001, whenthe CAU began formatting Compstat data in SPSSand MapInfo, all personnel could easily access theinformation collected for, and presented at, Comp-stat by using a series of folders and drop-downmenus on the department’s server. Several respon-dents suggested, however, that line officers veryrarely accessed Compstat in this way due to a rangeof factors that included lack of knowledge thatCompstat could be accessed via a computer ter-minal, lack of interest, inadequate computer skills,and the inability of computer terminals in thedepartment’s cruisers to access crime data on thedepartment’s server. Compstat data on the depart-ment’s server became even less accessible after theswitch to SPSS and MapInfo because most of thedepartment’s computer terminals did not containeither of these programs. As a result, even officerswho wished to access Compstat information afterMarch 2001 were unable to do so.

The majority of officers learn about Compstatand crime-related issues through information pro-vided at roll call and in the Daily Bulletin. Theycan also access crime maps by “asking someone.”Rank-and-file officers learn what happened atCompstat meetings from their fellow officers andsupervisors, though the latter source tends to befairly haphazard. Forty percent reported that theirsupervisors discussed what happened at Compstateither “every week” or “about once a month,”while almost the same proportion reported thattheir supervisors “never” discussed what happened

at Compstat. Comments from other respondentssuggested that information is usually exchangedwhen line officers have informal conversationswith captains, lieutenants, or sergeants. Follow-ing the chain of command, the sector captain orlieutenant may inform a sergeant to tell his or herpatrol officers to “keep an eye on” a problem or“increase visibility” in a problem area identifiedby Compstat.

Members of the command staff and CAU wereconcerned that information generated at Compstatwas not reaching the rank and file. One captainstated, “Quite honestly, I am not sure all the stuffat Compstat filters down to them.” To help rem-edy this situation, the CAU placed a large pinmap—measuring about six feet by four inches—that marks crimes for a given Compstat period inthe roll call room. This has been in place sinceFebruary 2001, and the hope is “it will bringpolicy-level decisions down to the patrol officerlevel.” Still it would appear to have limited utility.Before roll call, a handful of officers wandered overto the map and examined it for a couple of min-utes, but, for the most part, it was ignored. Thisdid not necessarily mean that officers were unfa-miliar with the major crime problems in their sec-tor, only that they were not involved in the Comp-stat process of collecting, analyzing, and discussingcrime data. Our visits to other Compstat depart-ments suggested that they have made more of aneffort to engage detectives and lower-ranking per-sonnel at the sector level in Compstat. In NewOrleans, for example, the department held sec-tor-level Compstats the day before the precinctcommander had to appear at the departmentCompstat. These could last as long as two-and-a-half hours and involved detectives, patrol super-visors, and some patrol officers.

Special presentations ___________________At the request of Davis or a sector captain, theCAU may assemble a short presentation forCompstat or for organizations outside the depart-ment, such as the city council. The CAU, for ex-ample, gave two ten-to-twenty minute presenta-tions on motor vehicle crime in the city duringour research in Lowell. These presentations, whichoften took up to eight hours of preparation, gen-erated more interest when Davis was present.


38

Detectives ___________________________Apart from the officers in charge of the CriminalInvestigation Section and the Special InvestigationSection, only one or two other central or sectordetectives were present at any given Compstat, alow rate of attendance that disappointed one re-spondent. Fortunately, the officers in charge of thecentral detectives could tell them what happenedat Compstat. In addition, the Daily Bulletin pro-vided detectives with yet another means of gain-ing information about Compstat.

The CAU did receive requests from detectives,but they were infrequent and generally originatedfrom concern over a specific “hot” issue, such as aseries of robberies, motor vehicle crimes, or tag-ging incidents in a high-profile downtown area.The requests generally required the crime analyststo collect all the reports on a specific crime andidentify characteristics, such as day of week andlocation, which they had in common. On one oc-casion, for example, a detective asked an assistantcrime analyst to access his gang database in orderto help identify suspects involved in a rash ofgraffiti incidents. These types of requests, as onemember of the CAU related, were “retrieval re-quests,” in which detectives asked, “can you getme all the reports on . . .,” as opposed to calls forin-depth analyses of crime incidents. They re-quired the CAU to simply collect the informationand then present a short summary report to thedetectives.

Quality of the data—timeliness and accuracy

Effective decision making under Compstat de-mands data that are timely and accurate. Policereports are generally available the next day onPaperPort, and updated crime statistics and mapsfor Compstat are available from the CAU everytwo weeks. Before the implementation of Comp-stat, Davis related, they only looked at the Uni-form Crime Reports, which provided statistics thatcould be as much as a year old. “I believe in theutility of timely data,” he added, “so Compstatseems like a smart approach.”

The accuracy of the Compstat data was pri-marily affected by officer reporting errors and in-putting errors by the CAU, compounded by theabsence of a formal procedure for checking the

accuracy of data entry and mapping by the CAU.Moreover, sector maps sometimes varied slightlyin the way they displayed addresses or dates, per-haps because different crime analysts prepareddata for different sectors. The variations were mi-nor and seldom perceptible to Compstat partici-pants. The officer in charge of the CAU worried,however, that the lack of standardization acrossmaps could do harm by undermining the cred-ibility of all the data. On occasion, an incidentmight be mapped incorrectly, but this was rare andusually caught prior to the Compstat meeting

Two major factors that contributed to the ac-curacy of data were that the most senior crimeanalyst felt personally responsible for inputtingerrors and that close collaboration among mem-bers of the CAU encouraged the discovery of dataerrors. These safeguards notwithstanding, theLowell Police Department did not systematicallyverify its data by drawing a sample of records anddouble-checking them to see what percentage wereentered incorrectly. Since information drives de-cision making in Compstat departments, unreli-able data can be a major concern. For example,the accuracy of data on the frequency of juvenilecrime in Lowell inspired heated debate at a com-mand staff meeting between Davis and his cap-tains after a lengthy report by the department’sjuvenile crime analyst showed that very few crimesagainst persons occurred in the local high school.Some captains proposed the analyst’s figures re-flected attempts by school officials to bolster theschool’s safety record by underreporting crimes,and they worried about making policy decisionson the basis of inaccurate information. Davis, onthe other hand, was clearly apprehensive that com-ments like these from his command staff wouldundermine the department’s general commitmentto using data to drive policy. Such an approach,he feared, might lead officers to reject valid infor-mation that could help them tackle crime.

It is crucial for officers to record informationcorrectly because almost all the information gen-erated at Compstat comes from their reports. AtLowell, the shift supervisor was responsible forensuring that officers wrote accurate reports, un-like New York where precinct commanders an-swered for any errors. Davis frequently urged com-manding officers at Compstat meetings to make

39


sure that officers’ reports were accurate and suffi-ciently detailed. Despite his efforts, one respon-dent still felt that officers’ reports had not im-proved very much over the last three years. Henoted that he had never heard of a report beingsent back for revision to either a shift commanderor a patrol supervisor because it was so poor. Headded, “Somewhere the message is not gettingdown [to the rank and file] crystal clear.” Thoughthere were some problems with officers’ reports,one of the crime analysts estimated that only asmall fraction of about 2 percent were illegible orincomplete enough to be considered terrible. Oc-casionally the CAU would put up a caption on aCompstat slide that reminded the audience aboutthe problem of substandard officer reports, forexample “only 9 of the [stolen motor vehicle re-ports] listed damages” (italics in the original). Interms of the bigger picture, a respondent notedthat poor reporting hindered attempts to identifycrime patterns. For example, an incident couldbe gang related, but this was left unrecorded. Byrelating this to the lack of direct communicationbetween the CAU and patrol officers, the respon-dent was drawing attention to how much less lineofficers participated in Compstat than sector cap-tains did.

In sum, CAU members had to depend upontheir experience and familiarity with the data, theircollaboration with one another, and their interac-tions with supervisors and managers in order toensure reliability. In the absence of an RMS, CAUmembers had to input a great deal of data and hadno time to systematically check for the kinds oferrors associated with manually entering data ortransferring data from one format to another. TheCAU also joined Davis in expressing concernabout the quality of officer reports. As far as wecould tell, Davis conveyed this priority to sectorcaptains and shift commanders by urging them toexhort their patrol officers to focus more intentlyon writing accurate reports.

Rather than being careless, patrol officers maysimply not have known how important it was towrite complete reports, a problem exacerbated bythe department’s ostensible failure to give patrolofficers enough positive reinforcement for accu-rate reporting. Patrol officers did express consid-erable ambivalence about the amount of praisethey received for writing accurate reports, whenresponding to a question in our survey that askedthem to rank ten activities for which they mightreceive praise from their superiors. Responses tothe question were divided between 54 percent ofofficers who ranked writing accurate reports oneto five and 46 percent who ranked it from six toten, with one being the activity that would receivethe least praise from superiors and ten the most.12

These closely divided responses showed clearlythat the importance of accurate report writing, asindicated by perceptions of praise from superiors,seemed unclear to patrol officers. It seems likelythat the lack of contact between the CAU and lineofficers also hindered the impact of this message.It might facilitate accurate reporting if CAU mem-bers were able to express their needs directly toline officers and explain to them that high qualityreports are indispensable to the Compstat process.Officers need to understand that all decisions thatemerge from Compstat rely on the quality of in-formation they provide to the CAU. If the data areunreliable, decision making will be misguided.

The Crime Analysis Unit (CAU)—autonomy,time constraints, and frustrations

The CAU’s authority to prepare for Compstat andrun meetings with a high degree of autonomymirrors the standard division in police depart-ments between civilians who provide technicalsupport and sworn personnel who focus on fieldoperations (Crank 1989). Sometimes the crimeanalysts received requests from the brass, but theywere left alone for the most part. Formal meet-

12. If we sort the activities according to the percentage of officers who ranked them one through three in terms of how much praise they mightreceive we get the following ranking: (1) recovering a weapon (62 percent); (2) making a large drug bust (53 percent); (3) reducing overallcrime in their beat (43 percent); (4) writing accurate reports (33 percent); (5) identifying a crime pattern (32 percent); (6) working withcommunity members to solve local crime or disorder problems (26 percent); (7) assisting crime victims in obtaining services and cooperatingin prosecutions (22 percent); (8) rapid response to 911 calls (21 percent); (9) making misdemeanor arrests upon sight of persons known to thepolice (17 percent); providing legitimate activities for potential offenders (13 percent).


40

ings between the CAU and the department’s com-mand staff were also very rare, occurring only oncein the eight months we spent at Lowell. Somemembers of the department were disappointed bythis lack of executive oversight in a process socentral to the organization’s operation and felt thatcommand should invest more interest and energyin constantly evaluating and improving Compstat.This hands-off attitude also troubled the CAUwhen command asked it to run an analysis on aparticular problem, such as motor vehicle crimesin city garages, but failed to explain the reasonsfor its request or provide any substantive feedbackon the CAU’s subsequent report.

In addition to operating with little guidancefrom management, the CAU was under consider-able time constraints. Preparing data for Compstatwas labor intensive and placed a heavy burden ona couple of crime analysts and the unit’s full-timeinterns. Assisting detectives, preparing specialpresentations, and producing the Daily Bulletinadded to the CAU’s duties. In addition, some mem-bers of the CAU were responsible for time con-suming and onerous tasks that were unrelated toCompstat. One crime analyst, for example, hadto take a week out of every month to count policereports by hand for the Uniform Crime Reports.Another analyst had a monthly commitment totracking and recording information on recentlyreleased inmates as part of a national Prison Re-entry Initiative program.

Besides this heavy workload, members of theCAU also had to contend with other disadvan-tages. CAU members were unable to fully utilizetheir research and technical skills in the absenceof an RMS and were frustrated at having to spendmany tedious hours in cramped quarters simplyinputting rather than analyzing data. They alsohad to perform menial tasks, such as locating miss-ing reports or retrieving reports from Records, atthe request of officers who were unfamiliar withthe integral role of crime analysts in the Compstatprocess. Additionally, crime analysts were fundedby soft money from federal or state grants so theyearned a relatively low wage, did not have com-prehensive health benefits, had little job security,and generally lacked employment privileges, suchas regular pay raises, that were enjoyed by mem-bers of the police union. One respondent outside

of the CAU acknowledged that members of theCAU were “undervalued and underpaid,” whileanother recommended that they and other civil-ian staff be integrated more fully into the depart-ment by becoming “a part of police business” and“a formal part of the organization.”

Given the importance of data-driven policingin Compstat, it may seem strange that crime ana-lysts were so undervalued in the Lowell PoliceDepartment. This might have been because Comp-stat was a relatively new program that operatedon a shoestring budget from soft money grants.One of the indicators of Compstat’s long-termimportance in Lowell is, in fact, what happens tocrime analysts’ positions and the resolution of is-sues surrounding the soft money that funds them.Davis and members of his administrative staff ex-pressed concern about the sustainability of theCAU, given that none of its members beside theofficer in charge are on the payroll. Davis com-mented that the department was experiencing abit of a “backlash” to the generous funding it hadreceived in the previous five years. He also feltthat it was clearly necessary to make Compstat apermanent part of the budget, even though heknew there was an “issue surrounding the inter-nal capacity of Compstat.”

William Walsh has recently argued that smalldepartments may be unable to implement Comp-stat as a result of the costs of purchasing appro-priate software and more sophisticated computertechnology for collecting and analyzing accurateand timely data. (Walsh 2001, 357). This may betrue in some cases, but the implementation ofCompstat at Lowell demonstrates how even asmall department with limited funds can use ex-isting resources in personnel and software to get aCompstat-like program off the ground. A depart-ment can also be inventive and include modestrequests for Compstat funds while applying for

Given the importance of data-

driven policing in Compstat, it

may seem strange that crime

analysts were so undervalued in

the Lowell Police Department.

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external grants earmarked for more popular pro-grams, as Lowell did when requesting funds forcommunity policing. The department can then usethese funds to develop Compstat by hiring trainedcrime analysts, installing powerful computer serv-ers and terminals, and purchasing sophisticatedmapping software.

Despite Lowell’s considerable success in imple-menting Compstat, obstacles remain. The contin-ued gathering, processing, and analysis of data,that provides the foundation for the Compstatprocess, presents additional challenges, especiallyto small police departments that are under-resourced. Compstat requires district command-ers to become skilled data analysts, but the com-plexity of advanced statistics makes it unlikely thatthey can achieve this without additional training.Our observations at Lowell, as well as the otherdepartments we visited, suggested that crimeanalysis there focuses on descriptive statistics—such as percentages, frequencies, and means—notthe kind of rigorous, analytic, and “evidence-based” research ideal advocated by LawrenceSherman (1998). Without the resources to assigncivilian crime analysts to individual precincts orsectors, it is unlikely that crime analysis withinsmaller police departments will become more so-phisticated.

It is more likely that CAUs in smaller depart-ments will be overwhelmed with commitmentsand feel underappreciated, given their significantworkloads and lack of stable funding. The unavail-ability of adequate resources might also increasethe likelihood that the reliability of the data willbe compromised. We found similar problems tothese in one form or another in several of our six-teen short site visits. Without more time or man-power, it is difficult for CAUs to conduct system-atic checks for reporting and inputting errors. Theperipheral role played by line officers in theCompstat process may further undermine the in-tegrity of the data. Since rank- and-file officers areunaware of the importance of carefully written andunbiased police reports, they may contribute tothe inaccuracy of the data—though we did notobserve an instance at Lowell where anyone was

embarrassed by a significant data error. Finally, inspite of general recognition that crime analystsplay an invaluable role in data-driven policing,smaller organizations might be unable to securethe permanent and adequate funding necessaryto attract and keep highly skilled civilian crimeanalysts. For all these reasons, it seems impera-tive that police departments should at least holdperiodic meetings with members of the CAU andrepresentatives from all police ranks to systemati-cally monitor and evaluate the entire Compstatprocess for weaknesses in order to make improve-ments.

Innovative Problem-Solving Tactics

Police have long collected data and compiled sta-tistics, but they rarely used these data to makeimportant decisions about how to solve problems(Mastrofski and Wadman 1991). Despite its cen-tral purpose of reducing crime, Compstat’s rela-tionship to innovative problem-solving tactics isprobably the least developed element in the exist-ing Compstat literature. Middle managers are ex-pected to select responses to crime problems thatoffer the best prospects of success, not becausethey are “what we have always done,” but becausea careful consideration of a number of alternativesshowed them the most likely to be effective. In-novation and experimentation are encouraged: useof “best knowledge” about practices is expected.In this context, police are expected to look be-yond their own experiences by drawing uponknowledge gained in other departments and in-novations in theory and research about crime con-trol and prevention. Silverman argues, “This in-novative process [Compstat] radiates throughoutthe NYPD as the energizer of strikingly creativedecision making at headquarters and in the field”(Silverman 1999, 123–4).13

In the national survey, this did not seem to bethe case very often in Compstat programs acrossthe country. When departments were asked howthey decided upon a problem-solving strategy toaddress “the one crime/disorder problem that usedmore of the department’s efforts than any other

13. Although in New York, units were also pushed to implement the same strategies that had guaranteed success in the past (Silverman 1999,113).


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problem in the last twelve months,” they weremost likely to tell us that they relied on the depart-ment’s previous success with an approach. Sixty-seven percent of departments stated that this was“very important” followed by 39 percent whostated, “research evidence suggested that this wasthe best approach” (Weisburd et al. 2001). In otherwords, departments with Compstat still tended torely on their own experience with traditional lawenforcement approaches, such as saturating anarea with police and making arrests.

In many respects, Lowell mirrored this na-tional trend. Compstat facilitated the gatheringand effective dissemination of information to amuch greater extent than it contributed to theimplementation of innovative problem-solvingtactics, such as mobilizing other public/privateagencies. On one occasion, a member of the com-mand staff recommended the innovative strat-egy—in comparison to merely increasing patrol—of contacting insurance companies and askingthem to notify owners of high-risk vehicles fortheft. During Compstat, he suggested that someof the insurance companies might have been will-ing to provide anti-theft devices, such as “the club”to their customers. Unfortunately, the idea fo-mented little discussion and never came to frui-tion. We noted earlier that one of the significantchallenges to brainstorming, an important elementof the innovative problem-solving process, isCompstat’s heavy emphasis on holding districtcommanders accountable for identifying and re-sponding to problems quickly. This pressure hin-ders careful sifting of crime patterns, deliberationabout them, and judicious review and discussionof the benefits and drawbacks of various ap-proaches—the very kind of analysis that Compstatclaims to encourage. A sector captain’s failure tohave a problem-solving strategy already in placeby the time of the Compstat meeting is an addi-tional limitation to the innovative problem-solv-ing process. The absence of a strategy can be seenas a sign of incompetence, and questions and state-ments made in Compstat can be perceived as at-tempts to undermine a sector captain’s authority.

These stumbling blocks did not prevent Davisand his sector captains from encouraging prob-lem solving, and there were some instances inwhich Lowell police implemented innovative re-

sponses. The department tended, however, to re-sort to traditional law enforcement strategies.Thus, the problem solving stimulated by Lowell’sCompstat generally replicated the classic streetcop’s ethos that it is more important to act deci-sively—even with an incorrect diagnosis and hast-ily considered solution—than it is to ponder theevidence and carefully weigh options before takingaction.

Problem solving and brainstormingduring Compstat meetings

Attendees at Compstat felt that there was a greatdeal of “reporting and brainstorming,” as one sec-tor captain put it. Our observations suggested,however, that this was an overstatement. The pre-sentation of crime data from each sector did fa-cilitate some sharing of information, and a littleprompting from Davis encouraged participants tooffer some insights on how sector captains mighttackle important problems. In other words, audi-ence members did exchange factual knowledgeand provide suggestions drawn from personal ex-periences, but they were far less likely to engagein in-depth discussion of the advantages and dis-advantages of a broad range of problem-solvingalternatives.

The pressure that internal accountabilityplaced upon sector captains limited the utility ofthe suggestions made at Compstat. In response tothis pressure, sector captains felt compelled tohave a crime strategy already in place before Comp-stat meetings. In addition, the onus on individualsector captains to come up with quick and effec-tive solutions to crime problems—solutions thatwere likely to involve the sector captain investingprecious resources in their successful implemen-tation—increased the likelihood that potentiallyhelpful criticism made during Compstat would beregarded as threatening or unhelpful. This likeli-hood increased when the source was perceived asbeing ill informed or inexperienced. At this pointthe sector captain had already invested his or herreputation, as well as the sector’s resources in thechosen solution. The Compstat meeting mighthave revealed a problem-solving approach notpreviously considered in the sector, but at thispoint the sector and its commander had already

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invested in the chosen solution. Radical changeswould be unnecessary, since the strategy had al-ready solved the crime problem, or unwelcome,given the investment of resources and reputation.

Sector captains at Lowell informed us that theycould start to identify patterns and problems wellin advance, since they were familiar with dailyofficer reports. Their knowledge of the geographyof their sectors also enabled them to map crimesin their heads while they were occurring, infor-mation that they supplemented through discus-sions with their staff and drives around their in-dividual sectors. Given the importance thatup-to-date crime maps play in Compstat, it seemedcurious that sector captains felt no need for dailyor weekly maps in order to identify crime prob-lems in their beats. An explanation for this dis-crepancy may lie in one sector captain’s approvalof the department’s decision to have each sectorpresent every six weeks, rather than every two,and to come to each meeting with more data. Ifcrime patterns become more detectable overlonger periods of time, as this sector captain be-lieved, daily maps would probably not be veryhelpful in identifying long-term patterns.

The ability of sector captains to discern pat-terns without access to daily maps and have acrime strategy in place before Compstat wouldseem to undermine the value of maps as a crime-fighting tool. A cynical interpretation of thisdevelopment would be that the maps were prima-rily for show or entertainment, but a more bal-anced assessment would be that the maps con-tributed usefully in a number of ways. Theyencouraged and reminded sector captains to thinkgeographically and “see” patterns. They informeddepartment members who were less familiar witha sector’s geography about its crime topography;and their display at Compstat identified patternsthat sector captains may have missed before meet-ings. In short, our observations at Lowell suggestthat Compstat maps may be helpful but not indis-pensable to the problem-solving process—afinding that challenges the highly touted utilityof crime mapping claimed by Compstat advocates.

The Compstat format raised other problem-atic issues. Since sector captains were held ac-countable for having effective crime control strat-egies already in place, they regarded some

comments or suggestions from audience membersat Compstat as a challenge to their authority andexpertise, superfluous, ill informed, or merely asan attempt to try and impress Davis. Audiencequestions very noticeably interrupted the rhythmof Compstat presentations whose familiar routineseemed almost scripted at times. One respondentobserved that if Compstat was really intended tosolve problems then “it would not be in its presentform.” Eliciting problem-solving responses fromadministrators or civilians, who lacked experiencein the complexities of police work, was unhelp-ful, since their comments were sometimes per-ceived as “slings and arrows” designed to exposethe sector captain to criticism. One respondentremarked trenchantly that Compstat, despite allthe hype, still promoted a traditional “reactive”response to crime. He supported his statement bynoting, “People have never comprehended tech-nology to be proactive.” Since the informationdisplayed at Compstat was as much as six weeksold, Compstat participants were clearly reactingto incidents rather than implementing preventivemeasures. He asked, “Why are we still seeing somany dots?” meeting after meeting if Compstatwas so effective.

Follow-up

According to Silverman one of the key features ofCompstat is the “particular emphasis on follow-up and constant monitoring” (Silverman 1999,193). This is essential for ensuring that tacticalresponses are being implemented and desired re-sults are actually being achieved (Walsh 2001,355). At Lowell, an administrator took notes dur-ing Compstat, but these were cursory—maybe aline or two on each Compstat slide—and were forDavis’ personal use rather than for command staffreview. Immediately following Compstat, therewas no meeting to discuss “reinforcement and fol-low-up.” One respondent expressed disappoint-ment that there was not a more effective “feed-back” loop in the Compstat program. He notedthat when a problem came up at one meeting, therewas no guarantee that it would be addressed at asubsequent meeting. He commented that prob-lems were “lost” because of this. His suggestionwas to encourage an “intensive and formal exami-


44

nation of the data.” An important crime problemcould be addressed six months after its identifica-tion. If the problem had not abated, according tocrime analysis, the comparison could be used tohold the sector captain accountable: “You have hadsix months to work on this problem, why is thereno change?” Another regular Compstat attendeenoted that the hot topic at one Compstat was usu-ally forgotten two weeks later. Pointing vigorouslyto a handout showing a 132.14 percent increasein motor vehicle breaking and enterings for thelast Compstat period, he asked rhetorically whyit had not been addressed at the following Comp-stat: “Where did it go?” He added cynically: “Canyou tell me that anything is honestly getting donebecause of Compstat?” Our observations sup-ported the assertion—one made by other respon-dents—that there was a discontinuous relation-ship between Compstat meetings. Invariably, littlereference was made to discussions that took placeat a prior Compstat, as if each meeting was her-metically sealed in time and space.

Follow-up at Lowell may not be “relentless,”but sector captains must provide some kind ofanswer to Davis’ inquiries at Compstat—for ex-ample, “We have increased patrol in that area.”We observed that Compstat was similar to a gun-fight in the Old West. What appeared to matter atCompstat was that sector commanders were“quick-to-the-draw” and able to return fire with asuitable response. The speed and decisiveness ofthe response was more important than a clear di-agnosis of why a particular course of action waschosen and why it was considered the most effec-tive approach. One respondent used another anal-ogy to illustrate that it was more important to ap-pear knowledgeable about a problem than todemonstrate the development of strategies to ame-liorate it. He said that presenting at Compstat wassimilar “to dealing with a term paper: You do it,turn it in, and then get ready for the next one.”Another respondent compared it to taking a test:“Compstat is in some ways like being a student.As a student you study just so that you can pass atest; just like with Compstat you just prepare inorder to pass it.” These analogies point to a coupleof interesting implications: (1) They draw atten-tion to a pass/fail standard where turning some-thing in—or, in relation to Compstat, being well

enough prepared to have something intelligent toreport—is enough to succeed. In contrast, gettinga good grade for “doing well” would imply a dif-ferent measure of success—one that ranked per-formances according to much more selectivecriteria, in this case, the careful selection andevaluation of an effective problem-solving strat-egy; and (2) They suggest that Compstat is farremoved from the “real” world of police work. Bybeing a student taking a test or turning in a paper,they seem to imply a disjuncture between whatgoes on in Compstat, or the classroom, and whatis happening out there on the streets.

An unfortunate side effect of this lack of fol-low-up is that innovative ideas can go unrewarded,since there is no collective memory or positivereinforcement encouraging their implementation.The vulnerability of new ideas becomes clearerby returning to the insurance example cited ear-lier. At one Compstat, as we have seen, partici-pants bounced numerous ideas around the tableconcerning how to reduce the problem of stolenmotor vehicles in the city, including encouraginginsurance companies to contact owners of certainhigh-risk vehicles. Since there was no concertedfollow-up, this potentially effective approach wassoon forgotten. Fortunately, Davis and other de-partment members recognized the problem, whichincreased the likelihood it would be remedied. Ingeneral, however, as Davis admitted, “We do a lotof analysis here, but we don’t track a lot of plansfor a response.”

Traditional police responses

Most of the problem-solving approaches identi-fied at Compstat relied on traditional police strat-egies that had been used before—in particular,asking patrol officers to identify suspects and“keep an eye on things,” area saturation, steppingup traffic enforcement, “knock-and-talks,” and

Follow-up at Lowell may not be

“relentless,” but sector captains must

provide some kind of answer to

Davis’ inquiries at Compstat . . .

45


increasing arrests. For example, in response to twounrelated incidents—an increase in prostitutionin a particular location and the constant use of aspecific pay phone by suspected drug dealers—the sector captain put “extra cruisers” in the area.When one Compstat showed that the street-sidewindows of several parked cars had been smashed,Davis asked his deputy: “What kinds of thingshave we done in the past?” The deputy suggestedthat they clamp down on motor vehicle violations:“You know, chief, sometimes you just get lucky.You catch a kid and they just talk. We need to getpeople in to talk to them.”

Traditional and innovative police responses

When a relatively minor problem, such as that ofthe smashed side windows, appeared isolated, ran-dom and offered few leads—“We don’t know the‘who, what, when, and how?’” of the crime—thedepartment was more likely to turn to traditionalresponses. When the problem was more seriousand intractable, there was greater likelihood thatthe sector captains would employ a mix of tradi-tional and more innovative police responses. Thereare probably a couple of reasons for this: (1) Sec-tor captains have limited resources of time, money,and manpower, and they prefer to allocate themto more serious problems; and (2) Sector captainsare under more pressure to solve serious thanminor problems in their sector. Consequently, itis likely that they will try a broader array of strat-egies to demonstrate to Davis that they really aredoing something and to increase the likelihoodthat a combination of these strategies, as opposedto a single approach, will succeed in mitigatingthe crime problem. We might also surmise that acombination of traditional and innovative strate-gies reduced the overall risk of censure to the sec-tor captain. Should a sector captain implement anexperimental and creative problem-solving ap-proach in lieu of a more traditional response, thefailure of the more innovative strategy may openhim to possible ridicule and reprimand. Put sim-ply, the implementation of a traditional responseposes the lowest risk of opprobrium to districtcommanders in departments that do not particu-larly encourage or reward innovation. Of course,just because an approach is innovative does not

mean that it will be more effective than a tradi-tional law enforcement response. Nevertheless, itdoes appear that Compstat’s claim to encourageresponses that rely upon cutting-edge research andexperimentation could easily be a serious over-statement.

During our research at Lowell, the departmentcontinued its attempts to reduce the long-termproblem of motor vehicle crime—theft, damage,and breaking and enterings. This was a citywideconcern, but it was a major problem in the Westsector. The high visibility of these types of crimesin the department and city put pressure on sectorcaptains to remain “on top of the problem.” Overthe eight-month period we visited Lowell, the sec-tor captain from the hardest hit sector respondedby blanketing particularly vulnerable neighbor-hoods with crimeprevention information, pre-senting this information at weekly communitymeetings, identifying targeted motor vehicles andpublicizing this information in the local newspa-pers and on local radio stations, increasing motorvehicle enforcement and patrol, and making morearrests. He also took less traditional approaches,such as requesting the CAU to run an analysis ofmotor vehicle crime for Compstat, soliciting aproblem-oriented-policing approach from one ofhis sergeants, using the assistant crime analyst’sgang database, contacting twenty other police de-partments about suitable responses—Davis sug-gested that he contact Newark—and using thisinformation to deploy a decoy car.

In most cases, the sector captain had overallresponsibility for coming up with problem-solv-ing tactics and implementing a crime-reductionstrategy in the sector. While assuming the lead inthe decision-making process, the sector captainmay have taken suggestions from Davis and otherparticipants at Compstat and may have also elic-ited advice and feedback from lieutenants and ser-geants; it was less likely that he would approachline officers for suggestions. In other words, theremay have been some “bubble-up” from the lowerranks, but ideas tended to originate from the topand trickle down the chain of command.

Since Compstat rewards “something beingdone”—otherwise, as one sector captain put it inreference to the persistent motor vehicle problem,“You might get your head broken”—problem-


46

solving efforts tended to center on the implemen-tation of a series of alternative approaches ratherthan the meticulously researched, carefully coor-dinated, in-depth problem-solving response ad-vocated by Herman Goldstein (1990). If approachA did not work at first, the sector boss might tryA again, move on to approach B, or try a combi-nation of A and B, and so on. In all fairness, it isimportant to acknowledge that motor vehiclecrime is a difficult problem to resolve. A sectorcaptain explained that motor vehicle crimes werevery often scattered throughout the city ratherthan concentrated in specific areas or hot spots,took place at different times, were perpetrated bymany different types of suspects, and were com-mitted for a variety of reasons, including vandal-ism, gang-related retaliation or initiation, drug-related thefts, joyriding, selling the parts to chopshops, and defrauding insurance companies. Therewas no magic bullet to the problem, Davis sur-mised. Another respondent wondered how usefulGoldstein’s approach was for solving these typesof crime. Given the many victims, perpetrators,and locations, it seemed unlikely that there wasone underlying cause for the problem. In decid-ing upon a suitable response, a sector captain mustalso balance how much attention can be focusedon these crimes in comparison to other sectorconcerns. Putting out a decoy car might look goodon paper, but “in terms of resources—time, money,manpower,” as a respondent observed—“it was nota good method . . . it pulled cops away from otherthings, and it was not cost effective.”

Despite these attempts to reduce motor vehiclecrime, some still felt that more needed to be done:“We need to put more emphasis on this.” In Janu-ary 2001, one respondent suggested that it mightbe time for the department to “look at this differ-ently” and perhaps put together a coordinated re-sponse between sectors and outside agencies, in-cluding other police departments. Another felt thatthere was a pressing need for a task force, and hesuggested collaborating with the state police andinsurance companies. At the beginning of 2002,the department eventually formed an auto thefttask force with the city’s fire department inspec-tors and city inspectional services. The task forcefocused on closing down auto shops operatingwithout a license.

Innovative police responses

Many incidents that are identified at Compstat aretemporary crime blips that will disappear by thetime the next Compstat period rolls around. Forinstance, following a period of heavy Januarysnowfalls, several motor vehicles had their tiresslashed on one of Lowell’s streets during a singlenight. Compstat encourages a focus on patternsover time and the identification of underlyingcauses, but this does not mean that there are any.In this case, the crime series only occurred onceand may have been motivated by frustration overthe lack of available parking, which was alreadyat a premium in the congested area and exacer-bated by snow clearance. Once crime analysis didnot reveal any patterns, a routine response wasappropriate—take a report and assign follow-ups.

There are some incidents, in contrast, that areclearly related, and their resolution may demandsignificant time, resources, and creative efforts.Such was the case when the department dealt witha dilapidated boarding house whose residents en-gaged in a great deal of criminal activity. The sec-tor captain’s response was at once one of the mostinnovative and effective problem-solving strate-gies we witnessed at Lowell, an illustration of howthe department can use city agencies to tackle dif-ficult crime problems and a demonstration of howproblem-solving strategies can “bubble up” fromline officers. This was not a commonplace occur-rence, but it cautions us not to overgeneralizeabout a department’s limited capacity to imple-ment innovative strategies and use the decision-making abilities of its rank and file.

When we arrived at Lowell, the departmentwas having serious and persistent problems withthe residents of an old, derelict rooming house,known as the Surf Building, in downtown Lowell.Located near several bars and occupied by va-grants, criminals, and down-and-outers, the SurfBuilding was recognized by the police as a “stag-ing area” for crime. The department respondedalmost every day to numerous incidents involv-ing alcohol abuse, drug activity, vandalism, andserious crimes involving robberies and stabbings.These problems continued unabated despite in-creased police activity and enforcement and ulti-mately inspired the sector captain, who inherited

47


them upon assuming command, to make the SurfBuilding his sector’s major concern. To address theproblem he implemented some traditional strate-gies and also pursued two innovative problem-solving approaches to great effect. The first wasfor patrol officers to conduct bed checks after 10p.m. and to arrest all those who were not legalresidents of the building. The second was for thedepartment to encourage city administrators tosecure a court order requiring the recalcitrant land-lord to close down the building. These police ac-tivities, as the sector captain noted, required ac-tive involvement from both administration andpatrol and represented a clear example of a coor-dinated response to a difficult problem.

Sector sergeants and patrol officers contrib-uted to the department’s response by coming upwith the idea of asking officers who walked theSurf beat to conduct bed checks. Thrilled by thisdisplay of initiative, the sector captain proposedthat the police use this method to take names,conduct arrests, and generally make it clear thatthey would no longer tolerate crime and disorderin this area. In addition, the information gatheredby officers promised to help to identify suspects,provide evidence for the wide variety of criminalincidents associated with the Surf Building, andfacilitate the city’s efforts to resolve the problemsassociated with this location.

One obstacle to this goal was that Lowell resi-dents generally recognized the Surf as a historicbuilding, so city officials worried that closing itand displacing its residents would be legally diffi-cult and politically unpopular. This official reluc-tance notwithstanding, the sector used crime data,with the aid of the CAU, to demonstrate that theSurf Building had accounted for some three hun-

dred calls to the department between January andNovember 2000. The department then illustratedthe magnitude of the problem by presenting thisdata at a city council meeting. Its efforts to thusend the city’s legal foot-dragging succeeded inDecember 2000, when the city evicted and relo-cated the Surf’s residents and finally shut downthe building.

The Surf example shows how innovative prob-lem-solving strategies that come from both upperand lower levels of police organizations can worktogether to solve intractable, long-term crimeproblems. Compstat also played a role in this pro-cess by enabling the department to identify recur-ring incidents and maintain its focus on a specificproblem area. The department then used the datato convince external parties, including the mu-nicipal government, local newspaper, and city resi-dents, that only prompt and vigorous action wouldprovide an effective and lasting solution

Since the appearance of Goldstein’s (1990)seminal work on problem-oriented policing, in-novative problem-solving responses have beenclosely associated, at times uncritically, with pro-gressive or “cutting-edge” police departments.Compstat claims to encourage innovative prob-lem solving, but crimes that police regard as par-ticularly prevalent, random, difficult to prosecute,and obviously symptomatic of much larger struc-tural problems—poverty, unemployment, drugaddiction, and disenfranchised youth—may beless likely to be the focus of a Compstat-related,problem-oriented-policing strategy. Certainly thelikelihood of a successful outcome to these typesof crime is limited. There may be some patternsto domestic violence and motor vehicle crimes,but their complex and persistent nature generallyinteracts with other important considerations,such as limited police resources and a need to fo-cus on more serious crimes, to mitigate the likeli-hood that they will be the focus of a particularlyinnovative crime-control strategy. Interestingly, thesector captain who helped close the Surf Buildingbelieved that having a physical location on whichto focus significantly enhanced her problem-solv-ing success. She contrasted this to the “multi-di-mensional location” of motor vehicle crimes, aswell as the multiple reasons for why youths werevandalizing, breaking into, and stealing automo-

. . . crimes that police regard as

particularly prevalent, random, difficult

to prosecute, and obviously

symptomatic of much larger structural

problems . . . may be less likely to be

the focus of a Compstat-related,

problem-oriented-policing strategy.


48

biles. These factors made finding approaches thatwould dramatically reduce motor vehicle crimessignificantly more elusive (Sherman and Weisburd1995; Weisburd and Braga 2003).

In sum, based on our findings at Lowell, theclaim that Compstat fosters problem-solving in-novation and experimentation, based upon brain-storming in Compstat meetings, collaborationsbetween departments, and a close examination ofresearch evidence, is a serious overstatement.Compstat’s data orientation did seem to affect whatproblems were identified and, thus, when andwhere responses would be mobilized, but it hadgenerally done little to stimulate analysis of howto actually respond on the basis of the data. Thisis not entirely surprising, inasmuch as the sort ofsophisticated data analysis that might go beyondtargeting problems and hot spots was not yet partof the department’s routine. Unable to break downgeneral crime patterns, such as those involvingmotor vehicles, into the multiple patterns thatcontributed to them, department personnel were“flying blind” as to how to innovate effectively.That they did find ways to innovate on some seri-ous problems must be duly acknowledged. Inno-vation in the police response was not absent fromthe Compstat process in Lowell, but it was hardlythe hallmark that Maple said was an essentialelement.

External Information Exchange

A final element in the Compstat process is exter-nal information exchange, which is composed oftwo critical components. Compstat provides apolice department with: (1) the means of com-municating information to the public, other mu-nicipal actors and organizations, the press, andpeers about what the department is doing and howwell it is accomplishing its mission; and (2) a po-tential mechanism for outside constituents to pro-vide departments with input in the form of evalu-ations and expressions of needs and priorities fromthe community and even to create consequencesfor performance. In New York Bratton, gave the“elite” community—the press, researchers, localgovernment officials, and visitors from other po-lice department—greater access to the depart-ment’s inner sanctum in order to encourage fa-

vorable stories and “to help push the police forceinto an aggressive law enforcement mind-set”(Silverman 1999, 91). The department did notfocus on disseminating Compstat maps and crimedata more generally to facilitate input on crimeissues and its performance, but Compstat couldprovide the police with the opportunity to garnerfeedback from a mass audience.

In communicating information about thedepartment’s mission, Compstat can be used tocreate knowledge about what the department isdoing and accomplishing and to acquire informa-tion from others. Members of the organized com-munity play an important role in this process. Byinviting members of the press, representatives fromother municipal organizations—including publicworks, inspectional services, and probation—localdignitaries, and visitors from other police depart-ments, a police agency can use Compstat to se-cure community support and enhance its legiti-macy. With its sophisticated maps, officers in fullregalia, and tension-filled atmosphere, Compstatis impressive theater. Consequently, it is a power-ful means of helping the organization earn creditfor its accomplishments and enhancing its pro-fessional reputation among peer agencies andother police leaders. In addition to public recog-nition, Compstat meetings allow municipal actorsto share useful information and offer their services.These collaborations might help district com-manders implement more effective crime strate-gies and enable the department to attain its goals

At Lowell, members of the press, commandstaff from neighboring police departments, localdignitaries, such as a visitor from Boston’s Attor-ney General’s office, and academics from nearbyuniversities all attended Compstat at some timeduring our research. These visitors often appeareddazzled by the show, and Compstat made a simi-lar impact on the local press. When it was firstimplemented, it received significant and positivepublicity in The Lowell Sun, but interest seemedto have waned by the time we arrived at Lowell.Even though reporters continued to be grantedfree access to Compstat meetings—although theywere not allowed to release crime details—theyattended far less frequently than other visitors. Anarchival search of The Lowell Sun only revealedone reference to “Compstat” in the past year—

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subsumed within an article on Davis’ recent lead-ership award from the Police Executive ResearchForum (PERF).

The chief probation officer of Lowell’s districtcourt was the only representative of a municipalorganization who attended Compstat regularly. Heoften participated in discussions with the sectorcaptains, providing information on the names andaddresses of suspects, and he was especiallyknowledgeable about the city’s gangs—their mem-bers and turfs. We did not observe officials fromother local municipal organizations attendingCompstat on a regular basis, but this did not sug-gest that they were absent from the Compstat pro-cess. Sector captains communicated frequentlywith city agencies in order to help them imple-ment their crime strategies. For example, in anattempt to reduce thefts from automobiles in thecity’s parking garages, a sector captain was in con-stant contact with Lowell’s parking authority.Through phone calls and memos, the sector cap-tain urged officials in city hall to post signs en-couraging citizens to remove valuables from theirparked cars.

Although the department did not actively dis-courage community members from attendingCompstat, we did not observe any of them at themeetings. That information was shared primarilyat the macro-level with local officials and the pressis consistent with our more general observationthat Compstat functions as a top-down approachto policing. Much of the information sharing andbrainstorming occurs among the high-rankingmembers of the department and some of the “in-siders” who attend Compstat. In addition, thesemeetings help publicize the department’s effortsto reduce crime. Certain visitors are afforded privi-leged access because they can help generate posi-tive attention for the department’s accomplish-ments and offer information that may contributedirectly to the department’s success in meeting itsgoals. In comparison, ordinary citizens and mem-bers of the rank and file do not generally attendor participate in the Compstat process. In this re-spect Compstat differs from community policing,where departments are encouraged to elicit inputfrom community members at a grass-roots levelrather than just contact city leaders and munici-pal organizations.

But Compstat certainly could operate as amechanism for acquiring input from ordinary citi-zens on crime problems and making the depart-ment accountable for its performance—the sec-ond principal component of external informationexchange. Perhaps Compstat does not resonate aspowerfully with local citizens as community po-licing because the responsibilities of district com-manders and the utility of computer maps do nothave the same allure as the promise of extra officerswalking their beats. When Davis mused that hewas unsure whether Compstat had “won the pub-lic relations battle like community policing” andadded, “It is just management people that lookwith interest on Compstat,” he might have beenacknowledging these particular characteristics.Nevertheless, a department could use Compstatto disseminate crime data and information on itsefforts to reduce crime through media outlets, suchas the press and department Web site, and throughexisting community policing programs, such asneighborhood meetings. Thus, Compstat has thepotential to encourage a mass audience to play amore integral role in policing. Davis was keen onthe using the local newspaper and the departmentWeb site to disseminate Compstat information, buthe was constrained by outside forces. The localpaper’s editor was worried about portraying thecity in a negative light, Davis told us, and the citycouncil was unable to provide the department withadditional funds to improve its information tech-nology.

Despite these constraints, our observations atLowell suggested that the department had movedCompstat in this direction. The department pro-vided timely crime data to the local newspaper,mentioned Compstat on its Web site, http://www.lowellpolice.com/index.htm, and discussedCompstat maps at community meetings. Never-theless, its use as a mechanism for eliciting com-munity input was infrequent and extremely lim-ited, and Compstat hardly functioned at all topromote external accountability. We should notethat time constraints restricted our ability to ex-plore this element of Compstat as fully as wewould have liked. We only attended one formalmeeting between a sector captain and a localneighborhood group, and we did not have theopportunity to interview local residents. As a re-


50

sult, our analysis of this component of externalinformation exchange draws more on our generalimpressions and on comments made during in-terviews than on systematic observation of theinteractions between police and community.

One way that Compstat can be used to fostercommunity feedback is if its products—maps andstatistical analysis—are made available to the lo-cal media. At Lowell the department did usemonthly crime statistics in its statements to thepress. For example, one newspaper story identi-fied how an increase in motor vehicle crimes inone area of the city was contributing to the city’sannual crime increase. This Compstat-generatedinformation was in the form of percentages anddid not contain any maps, crime analysis, or ref-erence to Compstat. Ourobservations and a briefreview of The Lowell Sunfrom 2002 gave us theimpression that the LPDused Compstat data tohelp explain annual ormonthly crime increasesor decreases but did notprovide the press withthe sophisticated and up-to-date crime statisticsand maps that were produced regularly by theCAU. This was a small change from the conven-tion of releasing statistics from the Uniform CrimeReports once or twice a year; a more significantchange might have involved reporting crime pat-terns or providing an assessment of problem-solving strategies to the local newspaper. Thus,Compstat seemed to serve more as a means forthe department to establish legitimacy by show-ing that it was knowledgeable and responsive tocrime trends than as an important accountabilityfunction through the press.

Many police departments have constructed, orare in the process of building, their own Web sites.Currently these are used to give some generalbackground on a department, including its keypersonnel, community programs, organizationalstructure, and mission statement. Some of theseWeb sites, like that of Newark, New Jersey, arealso used to disseminate crime statistics that serveto illustrate how well the agency is doing in ac-

complishing its goal of crime reduction. It is pos-sible to envision Compstat as a more comprehen-sive mechanism for encouraging communitymembers to provide the department with helpfulinformation. Should departments post Compstatmaps on their sites, residents could learn the typesand general locations of crime in their neighbor-hoods and could offer specific insights into pos-sible causes and solutions. Even though the LPDdid post descriptive information on each of thecity’s sectors, it did not make any Compstat-generated data available.

Sometimes Compstat maps and crime statis-tics were made more visible at regular monthlymeetings between sector captains and local neigh-borhood groups. Since there were four or five

neighborhood groups foreach sector, on average asector captain would at-tend a community meet-ing every week, thoughsometimes another of-ficer would appear on thesector captain’s behalf. Atthese meetings, sectorcaptains were respon-sible for soliciting crime-related information, ad-

dressing community concerns, and suggestingcrime-prevention techniques. In order to help ac-complish these goals, a sector captain might men-tion Compstat and provide a few Compstat maps.Several respondents observed that the frequencywith which Compstat-generated maps were useddepended on the style of the individual sector cap-tain, but the maps were present at the neighbor-hood group meeting we attended. Our observa-tions suggested that these products mainly servedto reassure residents that local crime problemswere being quickly identified and tackled, and,on a much more modest level, to get some feed-back from the community.

At the one community meeting we attended,the sector captain provided a one-page crime mapdepicting burglaries, motor vehicle breaking andenterings, traffic accidents, and stolen cars over atwo-week period. The rest of the handout con-tained contact information and crime-preventiontips, such as “How to keep you and your property

It is possible to envision

Compstat as a more

comprehensive mechanism

for encouraging community

members to provide the

department with

helpful information.

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safe.” The sector captain stated that he selectedthe crimes because, “From my experience, theseseem to be what people care about.” In addition,he noted that any information from communitymembers on these crimes would really help thepolice. Finally, the sector captain explained thatthe Compstat map “not only gives a geographicalillustration of neighborhood crimes to my com-munity members, but it also provides me with aspecific focus” and ensured that the communitymeeting “did not wander all over the place.” Themaps could also be used to show residents thatthe department was successfully tackling quality-of-life and crime problems. A precipitous decreasein traffic accidents provided the sector captain withthe opportunity to convince his audience ofCompstat’s utility and a notable department suc-cess: Later in the meeting he revisited this themeof closely monitoring crime problems by tellinghis audience that the police “visit everything [notjust the crimes depicted on these maps] daily.”He also introduced another key Compstat elementwhen he stated, “We are truly held accountablefor what is going on.”

In raising the issue of accountability, the sec-tor captain was clearly referring to the pressurethat Compstat places on middle managers to re-duce crime. But Compstat may also serve as amechanism for holding an entire department ac-countable for meeting its goals. For example, in-formation on a department’s problem-solving strat-egies could be disseminated to the public to enablecommunity members to assess the department’sefforts to reduce crime. During our time at Lowellwe did not observe Compstat operating in this way,but this is not surprising. Such a finding wouldbe consistent with research that suggests that evenwith the advent of community policing and itspromise of closer police-community partnerships,police departments remain reluctant to cede anyof their decision-making autonomy to communitymembers (Lyons 1999).

In sum, Compstat’s symbolic capacity, or “dra-maturgy,” to impress audiences about departments’efforts to reduce crime and its focus on the utilityof information exchange with other municipalofficials help explain why members of the elitecommunity were granted much greater access toLowell’s Compstat program than local residents

(Manning 2001). Other external constituents,however, were not entirely removed from Comp-stat. The community meeting we attended dem-onstrated that it could be used as a tool to en-courage community members to support theirlocal police department. Giving community mem-bers less restricted access—no matter how small—to “internal” information and police crime con-trol strategies than under more traditional policingmodels may help increase local residents’ overallinvestment in the success of the department’s ef-forts to reduce crime.

VI. Discussion

Results from our national survey suggested thatCompstat was a policing phenomenon sweepingacross the nation. We have argued elsewhere thatthis is probably due to the publicity it received asa creation of the NYPD which is the nation’s mostvisible police department, the fact that some de-partments had already implemented Compstatelements before the term Compstat was coined,and Compstat’s easy adaptability to the traditionalhierarchical organization of U.S. police depart-ments (Weisburd et al. 2003). However, the popu-larity and praise afforded Compstat by many po-lice practitioners and scholars is fueled moreheavily by rhetoric and anecdotes than a body ofsystematic research. Rather than focus on theNYPD, we decided to contribute to a more com-prehensive understanding of Compstat by exam-ining how it was implemented and operated in apolice agency of much smaller size and differentorganization. What insights could Lowell teachus about Compstat?

We focus our main findings around three ba-sic questions: (1) What was the dosage or amountof each Compstat element within the depart-ment—very high, high, moderate or low?; (2)What were the opportunities and challenges as-sociated with each element?; and (3) How welldid each element integrate with the others to forma coherent program? Our responses to these ques-tions suggest that each core element can be quicklyadopted by police agencies, even smaller ones withmore limited resources, and can have some posi-tive effects on how they operate. However, the


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dosage level of those specific elements that de-mand significant change to a department’s dailywork and management is likely to be lower thanthose that reinforce traditional structures and ac-tivities. Thus our qualitative research supports thefinding from our national survey that Compstat iseasily adapted to the traditional police organiza-tion but does not move the entire organization ina new direction. Resistance to change in policeorganizations is well documented (Guyot 1979;Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy 1990), but ourfindings suggest that Compstat contains some hid-den dilemmas and paradoxes that further limit itsability to work effectively as a fully functioning,crime-fighting program. The most important ofthese in Lowell is the premium that Compstatplaces on making district commanders responsiblefor having an immediate strategic response tocrime in their specific beats. We argue that thepowerful effects of internal accountability com-promise the integrity of other elements of the pro-gram: They undermine the innovative problem-solving process, and they discourage the flexiblereallocation of resources to crime problems acrosssectors.

Mission Clarification

In contrast to the confusion surrounding the spe-cific goals of community policing (Bayley 1988),Compstat’s objective is elegantly simple: to fightcrime. Compstat revitalizes the attitude that thepolice are primarily crime fighters, one that hasfallen into disfavor over the last thirty years amongprogressive reformers who underscore the impor-tance of community problem solving (Goldstein1979; Wilson and Kelling 1982). More ambi-tiously, Compstat’s proponents argue that the po-lice actually have the capacity to influence crimerates (McDonald 1998; Bratton 1998; Kelling andSousa 2001). The articulation of a clear missionstatement centered on results, not effort, is de-signed to make a major contribution to the thrustof this message.

When Bratton became commissioner of theNYPD, he rejected the “kinder-gentler” commu-nity-policing style of his predecessor, Lee Brown,in favor of a stance that was tough on crime. Hispromise to reduce crime by 10 percent in the first

year encapsulated this approach in a bold missionstatement that left little uncertainty about his vi-sion inside and outside of the department. Awareof the department’s focus on formal bureaucracy,one that had exacerbated divisions between man-agement and the rank and file, Bratton’s rallyingcry was positively received within the NYPD. Uponhis arrival, patrol officers had ranked fightingcrime a lowly seventh on a list of activities thatthey believed the department wanted to see fromthem. They afforded administrative and manage-ment concerns the highest priority; writing sum-monses and holding down overtime ranked firstand second respectively (Heskett 1996). By ap-pealing to the self-image of the police as crimefighters, Bratton reconnected line officers with theorganization’s primary purpose. In addition, hemade its symbolism more authentic and endur-ing by repeatedly rewarding officers who came upwith effective crime-reduction strategies. He alsopackaged his mission for consumption outside thedepartment through frequent and highly visiblepress releases and news conferences. Realizing thatthe public was disenchanted with departmentscandals and rising crime rates, Bratton’s promiseof a more aggressive approach toward corruptionand public safety appealed directly to city residents(Heskett 1996, 5–7; Silverman 1999, 88–91). Inessence, the power of Bratton’s mission as a beliefsystem rested upon it being “concise, value-laden,and inspirational” (Simons 1995, 82).

Davis, like Bratton, provided a bold and vis-ible mission statement with crime reduction as itssine qua non. The mission to make Lowell “thesafest city of its size in the United States” appealedto city residents and has been widely accepted inthe department. In our survey, nine out of ten ofthe rank and file recognized that reducing violentcrime and improving the quality of life in cityneighborhoods were “very” or “somewhat impor-tant” to the department’s Compstat strategy. Sincethe value of fighting crime was widely shared, weassess the overall dosage of this core element as“high.” We also note that the Compstat missiondoes not need to be antithetical to communitypolicing. Bratton may have dramatically shiftedthe NYPD’s focus away from community policing,but Superintendent Davis continued to balance hisdepartment’s crime-fighting efforts with a focus

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on working with citizens, city agencies, and com-munity groups to identify and solve problems.

In contrast to Bratton, Davis established abenchmark for success that might have been over-ambitious, as he himself recognized. The superla-tive “safest” leaves no room for failure, and thegoal implies a continued ability to meet the sameexceptional standard for success—it is not enoughto become the safest city, the city has to stay inpole position. Ironically, the same audacity thathelped motivate residents and mobilize police of-ficers also fomented criticism when crime, after along decline, began to rise. Mission statementspresent chiefs with a dilemma: How do they rec-oncile the benefits of a bold objective with the lackof confidence and public disapproval that mightaccompany an organization’s failure to attain itsgoal? As leaders of their organization, chiefs areparticularly vulnerable to criticism from externalconstituents and their own officers. Despite theserisks, Compstat requires that chiefs raise expecta-tions of performance both inside and outside ofthe department. Perhaps that leaves three imper-fect “solutions:” (1) Only propose a bold crime-reduction goal in cities where the existing crimeproblem is so bad that department efforts are likelyto meet with a high level of success; (2) Whensuccess is less likely, sacrifice the motivationalvalue of the mission for a more modest crime-re-duction goal; or (3) Leave the organization afteran initial success before crime rates have thechance to rise again. Given the pressure on chiefsto succeed, it is not surprising that John Diaz, anassistant police chief in Seattle stated that, “Thepolitics of being a police chief have become soinsane no one wants the job” (Bratton 2001).

Internal Accountability

In Lowell, many regarded internal accountability,or making a specific individual responsible for

tackling and reducing crime, as Compstat’s prin-cipal element. This component did have somepositive effects: The top echelon and district com-manders certainly seemed more aware of theircrime environment than they were before. Thiswas a major change from earlier operations, andsector bosses were motivated to do somethingabout crime problems that arose—getting on topof problems—much more than before.

Lowell’s Compstat meetings put sector cap-tains under considerable pressure, as widely rec-ognized by the rank and file. Even though lineofficers did not feel this pressure directly, whattranspired at Compstat took on mythic propor-tions among the lower ranks. This suggested thatinternal accountability was a very important com-ponent of daily operations, and we assessed thedosage of this Compstat element as “very high.”

Compstat appears to be a mechanism thatmakes district commanders highly responsive tothe chief, but it does not provide a similar struc-ture to facilitate the responsiveness of patrol of-ficers to district commanders. This depends onthe will and skill of the individual district com-mander. This finding differs from Kelling andSousa’s assertion that accountability, “Drive[s] thedevelopment of crime reduction tactics at the pre-cinct level” (Kelling and Sousa 2001, 11). To over-come the challenge of disproportionately burden-ing district commanders with reducing crime,holding smaller meetings at the precinct level, andhaving sector captains, lieutenants, line super-visors, and patrol officers attend them, could helpspread the sense of accountability among allofficers.

In fact, we discovered that the onus of account-ability placed upon sector commanders might ac-tually sabotage Compstat’s capacity to reducecrime. Paradoxically, two other Compstat ele-ments—the practice of innovative problem solv-ing and the organization’s capacity to allocate re-sources to the most pressing problems—wereundermined by the burden of accountabilityplaced on district commanders. Compstat is in-tended to facilitate the creation of an information-seeking, data-driven, collegial, and reflexive en-vironment that thrives on the willingness of itsmembers to think creatively, to share information,to be critical of themselves and others, and to act

Lowell’s Compstat meetings put

sector captains under

considerable pressure, as widely

recognized by the rank and file.


54

on this criticism in a positive way. In many re-spects, this represents the ideal of how profession-als, such as academics, engineers, and scientists,are supposed to operate within their different in-stitutional environments. Atypical problems arepresumably best resolved in a less hierarchicalenvironment, or at least one that is buffered fromthe very sort of rapid-response-time accountabil-ity that Compstat inspired in Lowell (see Mas-trofski and Ritti 2000 for an overview of the lit-erature). Davis tried to foster brainstorming andbelieved that a system like Compstat could en-courage individuals to think differently. Ironically,it is the operation of this system within a para-military, hierarchical organization—one that so-cializes officers to support one another and deferto rank—that hinders innovative thinking andcollaborative learning. Given the high standard ofaccountability to which sector captains were held,many members of the command staff were reluc-tant to share their insights at Compstat out of con-cern that these might appear as criticisms of thesector captains. Lower-ranking officers were es-pecially reticent to make suggestions. Since thereis an unwillingness to appear disputatious, par-ticipants at Compstat express broad and support-ive opinions rather than engage in incisive andcritical debate.

Furthermore, since Compstat put pressure onLowell’s district commanders to have a crime strat-egy in place before the biweekly meetings, the util-ity of discussing alternative crime strategies wasseriously curtailed. The pressure of Lowell’s systemof internal accountability hindered innovativeapproaches to crime by demanding so-much-so-quickly in a work culture that avoided contradict-ing those who felt this accountability most in-tensely. It did not, as Kelling and Sousa claim,“constantly challenge precinct commanders todevelop new responses to crime problems” (2001,12).

A final paradox associated with the premiumCompstat places on accountability is that it re-duces organizational flexibility by fostering com-petition rather than collaboration across geo-graphical sectors or precincts. When resources arescarce, which is especially likely to be the case insmaller departments or departments that are nowunder pressure to stretch their limited resources

to cover anti-terrorist activities, sector personnelmay be reluctant to share resources with one an-other. In spite of its claim to encourage the shift-ing of resources to the most pressing problems,Compstat’s emphasis on holding middle manag-ers accountable for lowering crime statistics intheir precincts hinders a more collective approachto crime.

Geographic Organization ofOperational Command

Operational command at Lowell had been low-ered one level to the sector captains who weregiven twenty-four-hour responsibility for theirspecific beats—a change from the period prior toCompstat’s implementation. Sector captains werenow empowered to make a wide range of admin-istrative, managerial, and tactical decisions thatincluded approving vacation time, solving person-nel problems, and deploying officers to problemareas. In addition, sector captains were grantedbroad access to other departmental resources, suchas specialized units, in their problem-solvingefforts.

Despite this devolution of decision-makingauthority to the sector level, Compstat continuedto reinforce the ideal of top-down control. Davisencouraged his sector captains to take initiative,but he also exercised his decision-making author-ity directly over them. In approving a request forovertime or abrogating a beat change, Davis dem-onstrated that he was willing to intervene whenhe disagreed with a sector captain’s decisions.Furthermore, a high level of centralized commandand control penetrated down the organizationalhierarchy. Significant decision-making autonomymay have been granted to each sector, but it didnot exist at the precinct level. In addition, spe-cialist units were not placed directly under a sec-tor captain’s control, suggesting that many enforce-ment and deployment decisions continued to befunctionally, not geographically, based. We esti-mated the dosage of this element as “moderate.”

In sum, our findings suggest that operationalcommand under Compstat may subvert one of thecentral tenets of community policing—decentral-ized decision making. By reinforcing the formalhierarchy of rank and giving sector commanders

55


most of the decision-making power to identify andsolve problems, Compstat works against the no-tion of many community-policing advocates thatline officers must be granted greater decision-making autonomy. Absent an attempt to devolvethis authority to the street level, Compstat con-tributes to the existing divisions between manag-ers and line officers for which professional bureau-cratic models of policing have been highlycriticized (Kelling and Moore 1988).

Organizational Flexibility

Regularity is a necessary and desirable character-istic of the police organization, and it is achievedthrough permanent structures and routines. Manyof the features of the traditional bureaucratic po-lice organization, such as rules and regulationsgoverning officer behavior or the hierarchy ofrank, deliberately restrict flexibility in favor of pre-dictability and order. Compstat, however, demandsthat police organizations develop flexibility to dealwith emerging or unforeseeable problems. AtLowell, the top leadership did encourage team-work and coordination, but the strategic realloca-tion of resources operated on an ad hoc basis. Pa-trol officers were commonly asked to pay attentionto a particular area during their shift. Less fre-quently, a specialist was temporarily assigned to acrime problem. It was even less common for a sec-tor captain to request additional funds, such asovertime, and the department did not rely upontaxi squads to enhance its flexibility. Davis told usthat sector captains would willingly share theirpatrol officers if a crime occurred that warrantedadditional resources, but we never witnessed theredeployment of officers across sectors; and sec-tor captains reported that it rarely occurred. Werated the treatment level of this element as “low.”

Why did the department continue to relyheavily on routines in response to crime problems?The LPD did attempt to increase its flexibility, butit was hampered by traditional internal and exter-nal challenges that are very difficult for an orga-nization to overcome. Budget constraints pre-vented the hiring of additional officers, and thenumber of specialist assignments restricted howmany officers were available for routine patrol. Inaddition, the department was under pressure from

city politicians and business owners to deploy of-ficers to certain areas of the city at specific times.The reallocation of officers was also hindered byDavis’ obligation to support the Lowell HousingAuthority. It would be extremely difficult for anydepartment to control these pressures from out-side forces.

In addition to traditional internal and exter-nal constraints, Compstat itself limited organiza-tional flexibility in one of the paradoxes we previ-ously noted. By acting to ensure the responsivenessof each individual sector captain to the superin-tendent, internal accountability helped foster com-petition between the sectors and discouraged col-laborations. As a system, Compstat explicitlyrewards district commanders for handling theirown beat problems effectively, but it does not con-tain a similar mechanism for rewarding the moreefficient sharing of resources—even if this couldcontribute to an overall reduction in crime. A chal-lenge to a police department implementing Comp-stat will be how to balance the requirement ofholding district commanders accountable forspecific territories against a capacity to shift re-sources across precincts—away from where theyare needed to where they are needed most. With-out a structure that specifically recognizes andrewards the willingness of district commandersto share valuable resources and collaborate withother precincts, it is unlikely that a small policedepartment can maximize its organizationalflexibility.

Data-Driven ProblemIdentification and Assessment

At Lowell, the department expended a great dealof effort to overcome several obstacles to the col-lection and processing of timely data. Its successis testimony to how Compstat can be implementeddespite significant technical problems. Our re-search also suggests that small departments canstart Compstat inexpensively by relying upon ex-isting computer equipment and hiring civiliananalysts. Whereas crime data was formerly usedhalfheartedly once a year or so, it has now be-come an integral part of the day-to-day dialoguebetween Davis and his middle managers, especiallysector bosses. Compstat data now establish the


56

structure and information used within the agencyfor identifying problems, establishing priorities,and deciding where and when to mobilize re-sponses. As one Lowell officer stated bluntly,“Concern over information is different from tenyears ago when police officers did not give ‘twocraps’ about the UCR.”

Despite this increased use of data to informdecision making, middle managers were not givenany special training to help develop their dataanalysis skills. Identification of the location ofcrime problems had become significantly morerapid, but data were not analyzed to figure outexactly how to mobilize in order to decide exactlywhat to do. Sector captains were comfortable iden-tifying patterns using descriptive statistics, but forthe most part this only occurred during the twoor three days before Compstat. Instead, they re-lied upon serially reviewing reports, without rely-ing upon statistics or maps, and then formingimpressions. Furthermore, the very little time thatthe CAU had to analyze data and check it for ac-curacy, and the modest level of appreciation amongsupervisors and the rank and file for the useful-ness of data analysis, suggested that this elementwas underdeveloped in the LPD. Consequently,we assessed the dosage of this element as “mod-erate.”

It is highly unlikely that sophisticated dataanalysis will play a fundamental role in shapingthe adoption of specific crime strategies through-out police departments without additional train-ing. Higher levels of data analysis require the kindof skills and knowledge that cannot be merelypicked up while working on-the-job. For example,a familiarity with tabulating bivariate relation-ships—such as tabulating the frequency of drug

crimes with homicides in a sector to see if an in-crease in homicides is likely drug related—wouldbe a more powerful method for detecting plau-sible patterns than just relying upon maps. Re-sources permitting, departments could furtherenhance the use of data to identify and assess prob-lems by providing middle-level managers withtheir own civilian crime analyst. Given the nu-merous command and administrative responsibili-ties of district commanders under Compstat, it isunlikely that they would have the time to con-duct an in-depth data analysis of crime in theirbeats without this additional source of support.Finally, increased training could raise the level ofappreciation for conducting, interpreting, andapplying a more research-oriented paradigmamong all of a department’s supervisors and lineofficers. At the very least, it would help teach therank and file the importance of writing accurateand complete reports.

Innovative Problem-Solving Tactics

Supporters of Compstat claim that it encouragesinnovation and experimentation. Police are en-couraged and expected to look beyond their ownexperiences by consulting with other departmentsand examining theories and research on crimeprevention. Our research suggests that, on occa-sion, Compstat has encouraged innovation, espe-cially with more serious problems, and that thismight occur, albeit on an ad hoc basis, at the sec-tor level. On the whole, however, it has made onlymodest inroads into previous practice, so we esti-mated the dosage of this element as “low.”

The department’s continued reliance on tradi-tional police responses can be attributed to twoother reasons: (1) Based upon their experiencepolice officers believe these tactics work; and (2)These practices may be the only realistic optiongiven the limited resources available from the city.We heard many comments asserting the problem-solving effectiveness of increasing traffic enforce-ment and saturating areas with patrol. In regardto the use of a decoy car, some officers mentionedthat the significant commitment of resources thatthis strategy required did not necessarily implysuccess. The time it took to organize the stake-

It is highly unlikely that

sophisticated data analysis will

play a fundamental role in

shaping the adoption of specific

crime strategies throughout

police departments without

additional training.

57


out, the extra personnel assigned to the case, andthe additional disbursement of overtime still couldnot replace the dose of luck needed to get thethieves to “hit” the decoy car. In all likelihood, achief would be pleased that his district command-ers only resorted to more creative and resource-rich strategies when absolutely necessary. In ad-dition, the department’s reliance upon traditionalstrategies could be explained by the paradox thatwe mentioned earlier. In Lowell, Compstat’s in-tensive emphasis on internal accountability de-mands that district commanders rush to do some-thing quickly about crime problems: Middlemanagers are now as concerned about responsetime as patrol officers once were. Compstat hasjust moved reactive policing to another level. Amore innovative police response would requirethat district commanders have sufficient time tofoster, develop, and test long-term preventiveplans. Compstat has made this process moredifficult.

Finally, the absence of any kind of systematicfollow-up at Lowell’s Compstat meetings hinderedinnovation. Since the department did not have theability to evaluate whether different crime strate-gies were actually achieving their intended result,it tended to resort to officers’ impressions of whatappeared to have worked in the past. The imple-mentation of a rigorous follow-up system to over-come this challenge, however, might present anadditional set of challenges to a police organiza-tion. The careful assessment of the effectivenessof crime strategies would hold district command-ers to an even higher standard of accountabilitythan already exists. Not only would they be ac-countable for responding quickly to crime prob-lems, their responses would be scrutinized forpossible weaknesses. The challenge, therefore, ishow to create a follow-up mechanism that facili-tates the selection of the crime strategy that holdsthe best prospect for success but does not operateto penalize individuals for their creative failures.This is a tall order, given Compstat’s emphasis onsingling out district commanders and holdingthem directly accountable for the department’smission of crime reduction. Long-term successprobably requires innovation, and we learn morefrom our failures than our successes. Compstat

may be putting our future police leaders in a con-ceptual box of their own devising.

External Information Exchange

The final element of Compstat is external infor-mation exchange. Given the time constraints, ourfindings on this element are more tentative thanthose on the other six elements, which were sup-ported by more intensive participant-observationresearch. Nevertheless, our research can providesome insights into how external information ex-change operated at Lowell.

Compstat can be used to generate externalsupport for a police department among peer agen-cies and community stakeholders, and it can alsobe used as a mechanism for providing externalconstituents with information about a depart-ment’s goals and its progress toward achievingthem. The interest with which the crime mapswere received at the meeting we attended sug-gested that Compstat did have a positive effect oncommunity members. In addition, our researchsuggests that Compstat facilitated the availabilityof timely crime data to the press. Even though thelocal newspaper did not print Compstat maps,department press releases sometimes usedmonthly data to provide statements on specificcrime problems and police responses to them. Ourimpression is that this represents a change fromprevious police practice, when the data availablethrough the annual release of the UCRs was lessdetailed and less timely.

Despite these modest changes, external infor-mation exchange appeared to be an underdevel-oped element at Lowell: Compstat was not a well-publicized and well-understood police programoutside of the department, and we assayed its dos-age as “low.” Certainly it enjoyed far less publicattention than Lowell’s community-policing pro-gram, and we are confident that those outside ofthe department could provide a far more compre-hensive description of community policing thanCompstat. In addition, Compstat was not used asa tool for providing external constituents withdetailed knowledge about the department’sprogress toward meeting its goals. Organizationsare obviously cautious about exposing their per-


58

formance to public scrutiny, and the provision ofdetailed crime statistics and problem-solving ef-forts for external consumption could expose thepolice to the unwelcome pressure of increasedcriticism.

In the absence of strong, external pressure, itis likely that police organizations will be reluc-tant to give external constituents greater access totheir decision-making process and measures oftheir performance. Doing so would expose a de-partment to a higher level of accountability and amore critical assessment of its efforts to reducecrime. It is much easier for a police agency to con-vey a favorable public impression of itself if it cancontrol what types of information are made pub-licly available. Nevertheless, just as internalaccountability is used to motivate district com-manders within the police department, “publicinformation” about a department’s crime-fightingefforts might “create the strongest pressure for im-provement” (Sherman 1998, 10).

VII.Conclusions

When Mayor Giuliani gave his farewell address,he devoted a significant portion of his speech toNew York City’s success in reducing crime duringhis two terms in office. In the midst of the speech,he described Compstat as one of the “pillars” ofthe NYPD’s policing model, and elsewhere hepraised Compstat as “a rational, reasonable, sen-sible, strategic response to crime.” His commentsare not an aberration. Even though research onCompstat is still in its infancy, Compstat is theobject of almost unconditional admiration frompoliticians, practitioners, and scholars who laudits capacity to operate as a sophisticated, effec-tive, and coherent crime program. However, ourintensive site research at the Lowell Police Depart-ment, a department that is nationally recognizedfor its adoption of some of the latest innovationsin police management techniques and strategiesfor the delivery of police services, suggests thatthis fanfare is premature. Our study calls for a moretextured assessment.

At the time of our observations, Compstat hadbeen operating in one form or another in Lowellfor nearly five years. We were unable to observe

Lowell before Compstat was implemented, butbased on accounts from our informants, it is clearthat the implementation of Compstat has resultedin some impressive changes in organization prac-tice. Over only a brief period, crime analysis hascome to play an integral role in police operations.This would have been impossible without thedepartment’s tremendous efforts to overcome anumber of technical data-entry and processingchallenges. Decision makers are now more famil-iar with the use of data and better informed aboutwhat is going on in their areas. In addition, sectorcaptains feel much more accountable for identi-fying and responding to crime problems. Finally,members of the department have a much stron-ger sense of the mission that their leader wantsthem to pursue. Although we determined that thedosage of several elements’ implementation waslow or moderate, all appeared to represent a sig-nificant change from past practice. Since policeorganizations are notoriously resistant to innova-tion and any substantial changes usually requiremany years to take effect, the achievements of theLowell Police Department are especially note-worthy.

But the actual operation of Compstat in Lowellhas produced a pattern of practices that does notreadily fit with the idealized characterizations thathave trumpeted its implementation in other ven-ues. The unevenness of the implementation hasplaced greatest stress on elements that are mostconsistent with goals that have long been em-braced by top police managers in the United States:fighting crime and getting subordinates to carryout their leader’s priorities. Those elements thatrepresent the greatest departure from past man-agement ideals—organizational flexibility, data-driven decision making, and innovative problemsolving—remain the least developed. Some of thisunderdevelopment is attributable to the paradoxi-cal conflicts between Compstat’s elements that wehave highlighted. By opting to stress internal ac-countability, Lowell imposed costs on the otherthree. Such conflicts can be managed, of course,but that requires compromises that must be ad-justed frequently, depending upon the presentingproblem. And a dynamic program of compromiserequires either: (1) continuing hands-on involve-ment by top management, or (2) middle manag-

59


ers who, with a good sense of the department’smission, develop a shared set of “rules” about howto reach compromises that promote the desiredoutcomes. In either case, a more balanced inte-gration of Compstat’s varied elements cannot beleft to a static set of management practices thatputs the Compstat process on “autopilot.”

The underdevelopment of certain Compstatelements may also be attributed to a second cause.Lowell seems to present a classic case of creatinga program for which department personnel re-ceived relatively little preparation. The prior ca-reer experiences of the sector captains did notprepare them well for developing organizational

flexibility, data-driven decision making, and in-novative problem solving. They received virtuallyno formal training in these areas before implemen-tation, so they had to adapt and learn on the fly.We should expect, then, that these three elementsshould prove most problematic for the depart-ment. If Compstat endures in Lowell, we mightwell expect these elements to be strengthened.Over time the captains should increase their skillsand inclinations to engage in these activities, andthose who follow them may rise to those posi-tions precisely because they have already achievedmastery of such things as crime analysis and prob-lem solving.

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Appendices

Appendix I Lowell Police Department Organizational Chart

Appendix II Map of the City of Lowell and City Neighborhoods

Appendix III Patrol Officer Survey

Appendix IV Sample Compstat Prep Sheet

63


Appendix I

Lowell Police Department Organizational Chart

65


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67


Appendix II

Map of the City of Lowell and City Neighborhoods

69


71


Appendix III

Patrol Officer Survey

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Patrol Officer Survey

The survey was distributed to patrol officers who attended roll call on the late night, day,and early night shifts (Platoons 1, 2, and 3 respectively). The officer in charge of the detailprovided us with the department’s monthly work schedule. Patrol officers were assigned toone of three groups (Group 2, 4, or 6) and worked four days on and two days off. On anygiven day, one group was off-duty. Surveys were distributed on two separate days to reachofficers from all three groups across all three shifts.

The on-site researcher distributing the survey told officers that the study was beingconducted by the Police Foundation to learn how Compstat worked at Lowell. He notedthat input from patrol officers on police programs and procedures was not always solicited,but that the Police Foundation valued any feedback that they were willing to provide sothat we might gather their insights into the Compstat process. Officers were advised thatthe survey was voluntary and responses would be anonymous, that the researchers wouldnot attempt to identify individual respondents, and that completed surveys would bemaintained in a secure space at the Police Foundation, accessible only to members of theresearch team.

In Lowell there were 145 patrol officers. Based on our examination of the detail, weestimated that approximately twenty officers were absent from roll call on any given day.This left us with an approximate sample size of 124 officers from which we received 97completed surveys, a 78 percent response rate.


74

Officer Survey Survey #L__ __ __ __ __

The Police Foundation is conducting a study of Compstat. This research project is funded by theDepartment of Justice. As part of the study, we are conducting a survey of officers in your department.The survey is completely anonymous and you will not be identified in any report. The surveys will bekept under lock and key at the Police Foundation. The survey will take about 10 minutes to complete.We greatly appreciate your participation. Please answer as many questions as you can. You may refuseto any question or stop at any time. Again, thank you for your participation.

1. Please indicate whether each of the following is very important, somewhat important, or not at allimportant to the Compstat strategy in the Lowell Police Department.

Very Somewhat Not at all Don’tImportant Important Important Know

a. Reduce complaints against officers 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

b. Reduce violent crime in Lowell 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

c. Improve the quality of life in Lowell 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

d. Arrest people committing misdemeanoroffenses 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

e. Hold sector captains accountable forcrimes in their sector 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

f. Provide timely and accurate crime data 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

g. Respond quickly to calls for service 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

h. Identify crime patterns and chooseappropriate tactics 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

i. Respond quickly to emerging crimeproblems 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

j. Hold officers accountable for crimesin their beats 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

k. Follow up to assess whether solutionswere successful 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

l. Make officers and equipment available todifferent sectors as needed 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

m. Encourage officers to take responsibilityfor their beat 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

n. Resolve disputes among different segmentsof the community 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

o. Create and maintain open lines ofcommunication with the community 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

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2. In the last five years, has your department’s effectiveness in accomplishing each of the followingincreased, decreased, or stayed the same?

StayedAbout the Don’t

Increased Same Decreased Know

a. Reduce complaints against officers 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

b. Reduce violent crime in Lowell 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

c. Improve the quality of life in Lowell 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

d. Arrest people committing misdemeanoroffenses 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

e. Hold sector captains accountable forcrimes in their sector 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

f. Provide timely and accurate crime data 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

g. Respond quickly to calls for service 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

h. Identify crime patterns and chooseappropriate tactics 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

i. Respond quickly to emerging crimeproblems 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

j. Hold officers accountable for crimesin their beats 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

k. Follow up to assess whether solutionswere successful 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

l. Make officers and equipment available todifferent sectors as needed 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

m. Encourage officers to take responsibilityfor their beat 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

n. Resolve disputes among different segmentsof the community 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑

o. Create and maintain open lines ofcommunication with the community 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 8 ❑


76

3. Listed below are 10 activities for which you might receive praise from your superiors. Pleasereview all of these activities and then rank them from 1 to 10 in terms of how much praise youmight receive. Write a 1 by the activity which would bring you the most praise, a 2 by the activitywhich would bring the second most praise, and so on.

Rank

a. Identifying a developing crime pattern

b. Rapid response to 911 calls

c. Assisting crime victims in obtaining services and cooperating in prosecutions

d. On-sight misdemeanor arrests of persons known to the police

e. Working with community members to solve local crime or disorder problems

f. Recovering a weapon

g. Writing accurate crime reports

h. Working to provide legitimate activities for potential offenders

I. Making a large drug bust

j. Overall reduction of crime in your beat

4. Have you attended a Compstat meeting? Please check one.

1 ❑ Yes 2 ❑ No [SKIP TO Q6]

5. If “Yes,” please indicate what you did at the meeting. Please check all that apply.

1 ❑ Observed meeting only—did not participate2 ❑ Assisted someone else make a presentation but did not speak3 ❑ Answered questions4 ❑ Offered an opinion or information5 ❑ Made a short presentation (less than 2 minutes)6 ❑ Made a long presentation (2 or more minutes)

6. How often does your supervisor discuss what has happened at the Compstat meetings?Please check one.

1 ❑ Every week2 ❑ About once a month3 ❑ Every few months4 ❑ Never

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7. To the best of your knowledge, how much has Compstat changed your job responsibilities? By jobresponsibilities, we mean what you are expected to do on a daily basis. Please check one.

1 ❑ A great deal2 ❑ Somewhat3 ❑ A little bit4 ❑ Not at all [SKIP TO Q9]8 ❑ Don(t know [SKIP TO Q9]

8. Please describe any changes.

9. Please indicate your view of each of the following statements by marking the appropriate box.

Strongly Strongly NoAgree Agree Disagree Disagree Opinion

a. Compstat has made supervisorsplace too much emphasis on 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 4 ❑ 5 ❑statistics

b. Compstat has made it possible forofficers to get credit for doing 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 4 ❑ 5 ❑quality work

c. Compstat has kept supervisorsfrom spending enough time 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 4 ❑ 5 ❑on the street

d. Compstat had made me more awareof what goes on in other parts of the 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 4 ❑ 5 ❑department

e. Compstat has increased teamworkbetween my unit and specialist 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 4 ❑ 5 ❑units in the department

f. Compstat will be an importantfeature of the department’s 1 ❑ 2 ❑ 3 ❑ 4 ❑ 5 ❑organization in 5 years

10. Overall, how would you rate the impact of Compstat on the department’s performance in servingthe public? Please check one.

1 ❑ Highly beneficial2 ❑ Beneficial3 ❑ No effect4 ❑ Detrimental5 ❑ Highly detrimental8 ❑ Don’t know


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11. Please briefly describe your view.

12. Overall, how would you rate the impact of Compstat on the department as a good place to workas a police officer? Please check one.

1 ❑ Highly beneficial2 ❑ Beneficial3 ❑ No effect4 ❑ Detrimental5 ❑ Highly detrimental8 ❑ Don’t know

13. Please briefly describe your view.

14. How many years have you worked for the Lowell Police Department in a sworn position?

1 ❑ Fewer than 3 years2 ❑ 3–5 years3 ❑ 6–10 years4 ❑ 11–20 years5 ❑ More than 20 years

15. What is your current rank?

1 ❑ Police officer2 ❑ Rank higher than police officer

16. What hours do you work? from _____:_____ am/pm to _____:_____ am/pm

17. How old are you?

1 ❑ Under 21 5 ❑ 40–492 ❑ 21–25 6 ❑ 50–593 ❑ 26–29 7 ❑ 60+4 ❑ 30–39

18. What is your highest level of formal education? Please check one.

1 ❑ Some High School 5 ❑ Some Graduate School / Law School2 ❑ High School Graduate or GED 6 ❑ Masters Degree / JD or LLB3 ❑ Some College / AA Degree 7 ❑ PhD4 ❑ Bachelors Degree

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19. Are you male or female?

1 ❑ Male2 ❑ Female

20. What is your racial group? Please check one.

1 ❑ White2 ❑ African American3 ❑ American Indian or Alaska Native4 ❑ Asian American or Pacific Islander5 ❑ Other

21. Are you Hispanic or Non-Hispanic?

1 ❑ Hispanic2 ❑ Non-Hispanic

Thank you for completing the survey!

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Appendix IV

Sample Compstat Prep Sheet

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COMPSTAT PREP SHEETS January 11, 2001

ASSAULTS

NORTH EAST WEST CITYWIDE

Total # 6 14 10 30

Arrests 0 8 3 11

Aggrav/Simple Agg-3 Agg-8 Agg-5 Agg-16Simp-3 Simp-6 Simp-5 Simp-14

Day of Week Sat-4 Sun-7 Sun-4 Sun-11

Time/Platoon P1=3 (1-3) P1=6 P1=3 P1=12P2=1 P2=4 P2=2 P2=7P3=2 P3=4 (10-12) P3=5 P3=11

Liquor Related 1- Honkey Tonk 5- Brewery 2-C’est La Vie 8Shamrock Worthen House Party

Gang Related No No 1 1

Weapons Used

Non-Lowell Victims= Victims= Victims= Victims=Residents Suspects= Suspects= Suspects= Suspects=

Suspects

Additional Info


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BURGLARY


Total # 7 3 9 19

Comm/Dwell Comm-2 Dwell-3 Dwell-9 Comm-2Dwell-5 Dwell-17

Day of Week Sat-4 Sat-5

Time/Platoon P1=2 P1= P1=2 P1=4P2=1 P2=1 P2=2 P2=4P3=2 P3=1 P3=3 P3=6

Method of Entry Forced Open Forced Open Forced Open Forced Open

Property

Suspects

Additional Info 2 Arrests 1 Arrest 3 Arrests

DRUG ACTIVITY


Total # 4 4 2 10

Arrests 3 2 2 7

SIS Involved 1 1 2

Neighborhood Centra-2 S.Lowell-2 Acre-2Belv-2 Down-2

Day of Week Sat-3 Sat-4

Time/Platoon P1= P1= P1= P1=P2= P2= P2= P2=P3= P3= P3= P3=

Drug Type Cocaine Cocaine, Heroin Cocaine, HeroinMarijuana,

Heroin

Confiscated 1 Bag 25 MG Pills 1 Needle 1 Bag Cocaine2 Needles 39 Batman Bags 9 Bags 48 Bags Heroin

3 Needles25 MG Pills

Suspects

Additional Info

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MV B&E


Total # 7 11 12 30

Day of Week Wed-3 Mon-4 Mon-5Fri-5

Time/Platoon P1=2 P1=4 (9-11)P1=5 P1=11P2=1 P2=2 P2=1 P2=4P3=1 P3=3 P3=4 P3=8

Neighborhood Belv-4 Down-7 High-10 High-10Centra-2

MV Make Honda-3 Honda-3 Honda-7

Point of Entry Window-3 Window-7 Window-5 Window-15

Property Taken CD Stereo-2 Stereo-3 Stereo-7

Suspects

Additional Info

MV DAMAGE


Total # 23 11 8 42

Day of Week Sun-8 Mon-3 Sun-10Fri-7

Time/Platoon P1=4 P1=2 P1=3 P1=9P2=3 P2=2 P2= P2=5P3=9 P3=1 P3=4 P3=14

Neighborhood Centra-10 Bck Cent-3 High-5 Centra-10Belv-6

MV Make Dodge-2 Acura-3 Honda-5Toyota-2 Dodge-5

Toyota-5

Damage Smshd Wind-9 Smshd Wind-5 Smshd-Wind-3 Smshd Wind-17Slshd Tire-7

Suspects

Additional Info


86

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Authors

James J. Willis is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Massachusetts-Boston. Hisresearch focuses on the impact of reforms and technological innovations on police organization andpractice. His other research area is punishment and penal history.

Stephen D. Mastrofski is Professor of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University andDirector of the Administration of Justice Program and the Center for Justice Leadership andManagement. His research focuses on police and police organizations.

David Weisburd is Professor of Criminology at the Hebrew University Law School in Jerusalem, andProfessor of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Maryland, College Park. He is alsoa Senior Fellow at the Police Foundation and Chair of its Research Advisory Committee.

Rosann Greenspan is Associate Director, Center for the Study of Law and Society at the University ofCalifornia at Berkeley and Lecturer in Residence, Boalt Hall School of Law. She was research directorat the Police Foundation from 1997–2000.

Compstat challenges and opportunities

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