Component 2.2 Water Safety Plan Warsaw, March 2009 Oliver Schmoll, Ingrid Chorus Federal Environment...

Component 2.2Water Safety Plan

Warsaw, March 2009

Oliver Schmoll, Ingrid Chorus

Federal Environment AgencyBad Elster and Berlin, Germany

Water Safety Plan (WSP)

Twinning Programme component 2.2

Warsaw, March 2009


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Framework for Safe Drinking-water

Health-based targets(Regulatory body)

Independent surveillance(Surveillance agency or third party)

Water Safety Plan(Water supplier)


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Rationality for WSP

Limitations of end-product testing:• Limited early warning capability of microbial testing

• Water volumes tested are rarely statistically representative

• Limited capability to detect short term fluctuations of water quality

Quality management procedures focusing on keeping processes under control have advantages:• Emphasis on prevention

• Focus on process control

• Designed to reduce, eliminate and prevent contamination


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WSP in simple

Continuous cycle

What are the hazards in my supply system?

How do I fix the hazards?

How do I know that the hazards are fixed?


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Prepare WSP

Describe water supply system

Control hazards

Implement and manage control measures

Define monitoring of control measures

System assessmentIdentify hazards

Determine existing control measures

Prioritize risks

Identify additional or improved control measures

Prepare management procedures

Verify and audit WSP

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WaterSafetyPlan


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Step 1


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Management commitment

Clear signal from senior management is imperative for successful WSP development:• To secure manpower and financial resources

• To obtain support for changes in working practices

• To get commitment from all management levels

• To increase acceptance of operational staff

Management needs to actively promote water safety as a goal of the water supplier


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The WSP team

Interdisciplinary team with collective responsibility for planning, development and implementation of the WSP

Qualifications of team members:• Engineers (operations, maintenance, design)

• Water quality control staff (microbiologists and chemists)

• Technical staff involved in day to day operations

• Health scientists

Team leader for pushing and steering the project


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WSP teamExternal support

WSP is feasible without heavy external input

Water supplier should take the lead in WSP development and implementation:• Relocation of responsibility to consultants is not intended

• External specialised competence can be sought, if necessary


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Step 2


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Document and describe the system

Comprehensive description of the water supply chain from catchment to consumer:• Describe all processes which may influence water quality

• Compile information concerning individual supply steps:

Source water and catchment, treatment processes applied, storage within the distribution system, distribution system

• Define areas of primary responsibility

• Identify areas beyond the suppliers responsibility

• Summarise regulatory requirements


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Document and describe the system

Construct conceptual flow diagram to improve understanding and system overview

WSP team must validate completeness and accuracy of flow diagram “out of the office”


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Layout planExampleCommunity

Layout plan1:10,000


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Hydraulic scheme Example


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Catchment mapExample

Description ofhazards

Hazard


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Step 3


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System assessment

Identify hazards


Prioritize risks



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What is a hazard?

“Hazard“:• Any biological, chemical, physical or radiological agent that has

the potential to cause harm to public health

• Hazards may be present or may originate throughout the water supply chain from catchment to consumer

Pathogens:• Bacteria, viruses and protozoa from human or animal faeces

Chemicals:• From geological formations (e.g. fluoride, arsenic)

• From man-made activities (e.g. nitrate, pesticides)

• From distribution system materials (e.g. lead, copper)


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What is a hazardous event?“Hazardous event”:• An event that introduces hazards to, or fails to remove them

from, the water supply

Examples for hazardous events:• Heavy rainfalls which cause runoff of pathogens into water

• Disturbance or breakdown of a treatment step

• Burst of a transmission pipeline

Example for hazardous condition:• Prolonged use of mineral fertilizers in agriculture which is

not adapted to the hydrogeological environment

• Poorly protected well-head


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Biological hazardsPathogens: bacteria, viruses and protozoa• Main source: Human or animal faeces

Non-pathogenic organisms:• Relevant to acceptability of drinking-water as the consumer may reject

water and use potential unsafe sources

Toxic cyanobacteria

Chemical hazardsAny agent with negative impact on water quality:• From geological formations (e.g. fluoride, arsenic)

• From human activities (e.g. nitrate, pesticides)

• From treatment (e.g. flocculants, disinfection by-products, impurities in treatment chemicals)

• From distribution system materials (e.g. lead, copper)


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Hazard identification

For each step of the flow diagram:• Systematically identify hazards and corresponding events

• “What could go wrong and where?”

Understand the relationship between the source of a hazard, its pathway thru the environment and its occurrence in water

System tailored assessment


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Hazard identificationStarting points

Hazard analysis should be based on existing experience and knowledge from within the supply:• Be pragmatic!

• Interview of staff in on-site operations

• Systematically analyze previous incidents or failures

• Supported by sanitary inspections


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Generic checklistsCatchment

Rapid variations in raw water quality

Sewage and septic system discharges

Land use (e.g. animal husbandry, agriculture, forestry, industrial area or discharge, waste disposal, mining)

Chemical use in catchment areas

Major spills (both accidental and deliberate)

Human access (e.g. recreational activity)

Wildlife and livestock


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Generic checklists Offtake and Distribution system

Inadequate wellhead structure / condition

Unsuitable well or intake location

Low internal pipe pressure or “pressure waves” leading to ingress/infiltration of contaminated material

Backflows drawing in contaminated water

Pipe bursts leading to the ingress during repair, replacement or installation of mains

Open/insecure water storage reservoirs/aqueducts resulting in faecal contamination


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System assessment

Identify hazards


Prioritize risks



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Control measures are “barriers to contamination”

Control measures may include:• Preventing contaminants (hazards) gaining access to water

• Removing hazards from the water

• Inactivating pathogens in the water

• Maintaining the quality of the water during distribution by choosing adequate materials for piping and maintaining pressure


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Determine existing control measuresDescription /1

Control measures are “barriers to contamination”

Control measures are activities and processes applied to• Prevent hazard occurrence

• Directly improve / maintain drinking-water quality

• Collectively ensure that water consistently meets health-based targets

• collectively form the “multiple-barrier principle”


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Determine existing control measures Description /2

Control measures may include:• Preventing contaminants (hazards) gaining access to water

• Removing hazards from the water

• Inactivating pathogens in the water

• Maintaining the quality of the water during distribution

Various natures of control measures:• Catchment: wide range of planning activities to protect raw

water quality (preventative nature)

• Treatment, storage and distribution: focus on design, construction, operation and maintenance (technical nature)


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Determine existing control measures – examples:

Supply step Catchment area Catchment area

Hazard Nitrate Pathogens

Hazardous event Regular over-fertilisation in vulnerable groundwater catchment and nitrate accumulation in source water

Run-off of manure into creek as a result of heavy rainfall and short-circuit with aquifer

Control measures Training programme for farmers on fertilising regimes adapted to the hydrogeological environment (periodical)

Extension of storage volumes for manure (once)

Incentives for intercropping (continuously)

Blending of different source waters for achieving water quality target (continuously; over limited period of time)

Training programme for farmers on manure use patterns that prevent source water pollution by pathogens (periodical)

Purchase of vulnerable land (once)

Extension of storage volumes for manure (once)

UV-disinfection (continuously)

Distribution system

E. coli

Contamination due to construction or maintenance works

Work is performed by certified company in accordance with specified good practices (continuously over construction period)

Flushing and disinfection of constructed/maintained network sections employing good practices (once)

Testing and commissioning of network section (once)


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System assessment

Identify hazards


Prioritize risks



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Risk prioritizationWhy?

Decide whether any event present a significant risk

Identify hazards or events that need most urgent action

Methods available:• Simple team decision

• Quantitative or semi-quantitative approach


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Risk prioritizationSimple team decision

Informed team judgment to rule events in or out• Assess all events identified at each step in the process

• Determine whether they are under control

• Document whether those events need urgent attention

Significant Clearly a priority The risk should be considered further by the team to define whether additional control measures are required and whether a particular process step should be elevated to a key control point in the system.

Uncertain Unsure if event is or is not a significant risk

The risk may require further studies to understand if the event really is a significant risk or not.

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Insignificant Clearly not a priority Note that the risk will be described and documented as part of a transparent and diligent process and will be revisited in future years as part of the WSP rolling review


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Risk prioritizationExample: output


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Risk prioritizationSemi-quantitative risk matrixes

Risk is calculated by multiplying ‘Likelihood’ by ‘Severity’

Likelihood or frequency:• How often or likely will a hazardous event occur?

Severity or consequence: • What will be the consequences for public health or the

consumer acceptance?


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Risk prioritizationExample from Jordan

I (1) II (2) III (3)

A (3) M (3) H (6) H (9)

B (2) L (2) M (4) H (6)

C (1) L (1) L (2) M (3)

SEVERITY / CONSEQUENCESL

IKE

LY

HO

OD

RISK MATRIX

For translation into Polish only – please delete ths box afterwards: L=low;

M=medium;

H= high


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SEVERITY CATEGORIES:I No impactII Impact on aesthetic quality (i.e. consumer acceptance)

OR quantityIII Regulatory impact

OR impact on consumer health

LIKELYHOOD CATEGORIES:A Daily to weeklyB Monthly to quarterly (seasonally)C Yearly or above

RISK CATEGORIES:H High Urgent management attention needed

(= immidiate action)M Moderate Management attention neededL Low Routine procedures

Risk prioritizationExample from Jordan

I (1) II (2) III (3)

A (3) M (3) H (6) H (9)

B (2) L (2) M (4) H (6)

C (1) L (1) L (2) M (3)

SEVERITY / CONSEQUENCES

LIK

EL

YH

OO

D

RISK MATRIX


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Risk prioritization Example: output


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Risk prioritizationSemi-quantitative risk matrices

Each identified hazardous event will receive a value

Events can be compared and be classified (prioritized)

Basis for a relative assessment of single risks within one supply utility


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Risk prioritizationDirect your thinking before start

Be specific about what the risk is in terms of:• Risk of a specific event

• Leading to a specific hazard

• Reaching a specific and problematic concentration

• At a specific point in time and space


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Risk prioritizationResults

Which hazards (and hazardous events) are covered by sufficient control measures?

Which control measures are most important?

Which hazards require further measures to control the hazard adequately?

Is there insufficient knowledge about hazards and/or control measures (knowledge and research demands)?


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System assessment

Identify hazards


Prioritize risks



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Additional/improved control measures

Significant risks identified require further investigation:• Additional control measures need to be identified

• Existing measures may need to be modified or improved

• Interim solutions may be necessary


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Action plan


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Step 4


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Control hazards




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Implement control measures Combination of control measures

Type and number of control measures will vary for each system

For each hazardous event identified as a significant risk, efficient control measures need to be implemented

Each control measure needs to be described in a sufficiently precise and comprehensible manner

Standard operating procedures support the effective realization of individual measures


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Determine existing control measures Example of an instruction

Maintenance instruction Nr. 5-2

Critical point Backwatering of the Wildenstein creek

Maintenance area

(What is to be judged and maintained?)

Backwater prevention valve of Wildenstein creek

Time

(When and how often?)

a) monthly

b) after each heavy rain event

Working instruction

(What to do?)

1. Judgment

2. Maintenance

1. Judgment

ι Is valve free of bulky material and sediments?

ι Is the valve damaged?

ι Does the valve function accurately?

2. Maintenance

ι Clean backwater prevention valve

ι Grease valve and open/close it two times

Confirmation of performed work

(Who did it and when?)


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Control hazards




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Establish operational monitoring

Operational monitoring assesses the performance of control measures at appropriate time intervals

Monitoring Plan:• What will be monitored?

• How it will be monitored?

• Where it will be monitored?

• When it will be monitored?

• Who will do the monitoring?


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Monitoring intervals need to be defined individually for each control measure

Intervals may vary widely, e.g.:• On-line control of residual chlorine

• Quarterly inspection of the integrity of the plinth surrounding a well


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Simple and measurable tests:• Turbidity, pH, chlorine residual, conductivity,

precipitation events etc.

Observable features:• Integrity of technical infrastructure

(e.g. wellhead, fences, distribution, storage)

Definition of operational limits:• Upper or lower limits or tolerance ranges

• Monitoring results that exceed limits trigger corrective action(s)


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Define corrective actions

Planned and routine response to be taken when the results of operational monitoring at a control point indicate a loss of control during standard operation

Corrective actions should be specific and pre-determined to enable their rapid enaction

Most corrective actions are capable of being handled by• Automated systems

• Trained system operators


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Establish operational monitoringSimple monitoring procedure

Control point instruction Nr. 7-1

Critical point Turbidity

Location

(Where to measure/to control?)

Inlet tube

Time

(How often and when?)

Continuously

Measurement category

(What is to be measured or controlled?)

Siegrist turbidity measurement equipment (Photometer CT 65 B22-F3)

Documentation

(How to document/archive?)

Documentation on-site with multi channel writer. Longtime archiving by foreman

Given value and tolerance range < 0.24 FTU

Corrective actions

(How to alarm and what has to be done?)

Exceeding of critical limit: Automatic rejection of spring water

Phone alarm of well’s foreman

Responsibilities

ι For corrective actions

ι For inspection of measurement equipment

Wells foreman

Measurement equipment supplier, yearly


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Step 5


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Improvement and upgrade plan

If significant risks are identified: • Improvement and upgrade plan

• Define “owners” to take responsibility

• Define target implementation dates

Incremental improvement is pivotal• Short-, medium- or long-term programs

• Reflecting priorities

• Reflecting resources available


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Improvement and upgrade planIssues

Capital investments

Capacity building

Enhanced managerial and operational procedures

Research and development

Developing incident protocols

Communication and reporting


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Step 6


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Management procedures /1

Accessible management procedures:• For actions in normal operation of the system

(Standard Operating Procedures = SOPs)

• For corrective actions and incident conditions

Written by experienced staff:• Interview staff and ensure their activities are captured

Updated as necessary:• Implementation of the improvement/upgrade plan

• Reviews of incidents, emergencies and near misses


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Management procedures /2

Accountabilities and contact details for key personnel

Clear description of the actions required in the event of a deviation

Location and identify of the SOPs and required equipment

Location of backup equipment

Relevant logistical and technical information


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Step 7


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Verification and auditing

Step provides sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the supply system is working effectively and will meet the health-based targets, i.e. that the WSP is adequately set up and implemented

Verification of water quality:• “Does the water produced meet the quality objectives?“

Auditing of operational activities:• ”Is the WSP being implemented in practice as it was

designed to be?”


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Step 8


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Periodic review /1

Review process is essential in the overall implementation

Regular review assesses that the WSP is still valid• Analysis of the data collected as part of the monitoring

process

• Learning from experiences and new procedures

Provides the basis from which future assessments can be made


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Periodic review /2

When is it time for review ?• At regular intervals, taking into account the results of WSP

implementation

• Immediately after an emergency/incident/near miss

• Immediately if there is a significant change of circumstances

Review may result in reassessment of risk

Review may alter improvement/upgrade plan

Any change as a result of a review should be documented !


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Step 9


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DocumentationWhat should be considered?

Description and assessment of the drinking-water system

Upgrade programs

Description of control measures, the plan for operational monitoring and verification plan

Water safety management procedures for routine operation

Incidents and emergency response plans

Description of supporting programs, including training programs, communication protocols


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Keep in mind /1

Maintain basic simplicity and straightforwardness of the WSP strategy !

WSP is a systematic, ongoing and dynamic process:• A WSP is never completed

• A WSP is not just another operating procedure

• It is not about writing a “plan” in its own right

• A WSP process may result in a document which you may wish to label “Our WSP”

• A WSP should not end up as bureaucracy and paperwork!


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Keep in mind /2

There is no one single right way to develop your WSP

It is important that the WSP team has adequate experience and expertise

A WSP cannot be done solely as a desk study

Overcome complacency: nothing should be taken for granted

Don’t start from the scratch:

It is important to get started!


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New Zealand

Why to prepare PHRMP: public health responsibility

Explanation of coverage in plain words:• What could happen to cause the water quality

to deteriorate and become unsafe to drink?• Which of these factors need urgent attention?• How do you know when the water quality is

deteriorating to a point where action is needed?• How do you respond if action is needed?• How do you stop this happening in the future?

How to prepare a PHRMP: simple 3 step process

What to do with the plan: guide day-to-day actionsand long-term planning


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New Zealand: Small but beautiful

www.moh.govt.nz/water


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New Zealand: Training tools


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New Zealand: Training DVDs


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New Zealand: “Pathogens Anonymous”


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Bangladesh: Generic WSP

Vast number of rural water supplies in country with limited resources

Nature of hazards and hazardous events sufficiently similar to allow technology generic WSP

Developed in a participatory fashion based on local expert opinion

Workshops with key sector professionals


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Bangladesh: Generic WSP

www.buet.ac.bd/itn/


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Switzerland

Simple guidance

Made to assist in complying with regulations

9 Steps:• Clear instructions • Pro-forma based• Case examples


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Switzerland

Component 2.2 Water Safety Plan Warsaw, March 2009 Oliver Schmoll, Ingrid Chorus Federal Environment...

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