Complex Transformation - Creating the National Security ... · Meet the Integrated Weapons Activity...

Complex TransformationComplex TransformationCreating the National Security

Enterprise

INMM SW Chapter Annual Technical Meeting

May 15, 2008Taos, New Mexico

Jack JekowskiInnovative Technology Partnerships, LLC

Innovative Technology Partnerships, LLC

TM

http://www.itpnm.com

The Proposed Restructuring of the Nation’s Nuclear Weapons Complex…past, present and future?

Updated for NA-YGN SandiaSeptember 24, 2008

2


TM

When Last We Met…Complex 2030• NNSA had developed the concept of

“Complex 2030”, in response to the recommendations of the SEAB Task Force (October 2005):– Implement RRW– Office of Transformation– Some consolidation of SNM– Aggressive dismantlement schedule

• Planning Scenarios• Detailed Implementation Plans

http://www.seab.energy.gov/publications/NWCITFRept-7-11-05.pdfhttp://efcog.org/docs/council_meeting/06%20Meeting/Presentations/David%20Overskei.pdf

“In summation, the Task Force found the Complex neither robust, nor agile, nor responsive, with little

evidence of a master plan.”

“The Secretary should assemble a team of outside experts to assist with this review.Prior reviews have largely been conducted by insiders from the weapons complex, who produce predictable but not very credible recommendations that the Department should preserve the status quo and maintain all existing facilities and capabilities.”

The Road to Complex 2030The Road to Complex 2030A look back, one year later, on the

proposed restructuring of the Nation’s Nuclear Weapons Complex

INMM SW Chapter Annual Technical MeetingMay 17, 2007

Taos, New Mexico

Jack JekowskiInnovative Technology Partnerships, LLC


TM

http://www.itpnm.com

• Immediate design of Reliable Replacement Warhead• Establish a Consolidated Nuclear Production Center

(CNPC)• Consolidate all Category I/II at the CNPC• Aggressive dismantlement as a part of deterrence• Establish the Office of Transformation

Language in House Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, 2005, page 111

3


TM

NNSA’s Response: Complex 2030*

* Excerpted from “NA-10 All Hands Briefing” by Tom D’Agostino, May 10, 2006

4


TM

The Road to Complex 2030

J. JekowskiInnovative Technology Partnerships, [email protected]


TM

GOAL SUB-GOAL ACTION CHAMPION OWNER

1.1.1.1 Achieve the First Production Unit date in FY2006 and sustain specified production rates for the B61 ALT 357 in FY2007. Goodrum Driscoll

1.1.1.2 Achieve the First Production Unit date in FY2007 and sustain specified production rates for the W76-1 LEP in FY2008. Goodrum Rose

1.1.1.3 Deliver planned quantities of limited-life components and products to DoD per defined schedule. Goodrum Gazda

1.1.2.1

Implement Dismantlement plan briefed to Congress. (a.) Complete W56 dismantlements in FY06. (b.) Accelerate the dismantlement of retired weapons with ~49% increase from FY2006 to FY2007. (c.) Accelerate dismantlement completion from 2034 to 2023 of legacy weapons currently planned for retirement.

Goodrum Baca

1.1.2.2Continue using lean, six sigma tools on all current assembly and disassembly and surveillance operations in 2007 with the goal of 50% reduction in span time.

Goodrum Cochran

1.1.2.5 Develop plan to work off the surveillance backlog, except W84 and W88, by the end of FY2007 consistent with an enhanced evaluation strategy.

Goodrum Baca

1.1.2.6 Improve the Pantex Plant operations by implementing a Pantex Throughput Improvement Plan in 2006. Goodrum Goodrum

1.1.2.7 Meet the Integrated Weapons Activity Plan deliverables for the B83 in FY2007. Goodrum Driscoll

1.1.2.8 Meet the Integrated Weapons Activity Plan deliverables for the W88 (cell) in FY2007. Goodrum Rose

1.2.1.1 Complete an RRW-based stockpile plan by the end of 2007. Schoenbauer Gazda

1.2.1.2Deliver the first production unit of an RRW in 2012 and achieve sustained specified production rates to establish confidence in the transformation process .

Crandall/ Goodrum Hooper

1.2.2.1

In 2007, develop a business case for an optimal future design/deployment cycle that balances responsiveness objectives, weapon life-cycle costs, and training of new personnel using a model future system.

Allen Cox

1.2.2.2 Update and revamp critical skills program to prepare for future needs in 2007. Tavares Berger

1.2.3.2In 2007, develop a JTA plan that eliminates SNM use in current or replacement JTAs and minimizes future needs of SNM in JTAs for new systems.

Goodrum Sweeney

1.2.3.3

Develop common joint test assembly architectures, modular instrumentation packages, and other initiatives to drive down costs per JTA plan, achieving a QER for the micro-modular instrumentation technology at the end of FY2009.

Goodrum Cochran

1.2.3.4

Deploy integrated complex wide information system for effective management of stockpile evaluation data and performance analysis to include margins, trends, and uncertainties with SNL implementation in 2007 followed by complex wide integration.

Crandall/ Goodrum Krumpe

1.2.3.5 Embed State of Health and evaluation information capability for future systems starting in 2009.

Crandall/ Goodrum

Greenaugh

1.2.3.6 In 2006, develop a surveillance transformation plan for improving stockpile evaluation and cost effectiveness for 2007 and beyond.

Goodrum Cochran

2.1.1.1Define all reasonable alternatives to modernize and consolidate the complex for National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) evaluations in 2006

Allen Wyka

2.1.1.2 Issue a Notice of Intent to perform a Complex 2030 Programmatic EIS on future complex alternatives in 2006.

Allen Wyka

2.1.1.3 Initiate and complete independent business case assessments to support decisions by 2008. Allen Wyka

2.1.1.4 Complete NEPA process Record of Decision by end of 2008. Allen Wyka

2.1.2.1Develop and implement a plan in 2007 that defines goals and processes used to maximize external supplier use for all non-nuclear components and subsystems.

Goodrum Gentile

2.1.2.2

Approve a plan in 2007 that will reduce square footage of non-nuclear production, currently done at KCP, to approximately one third of the current size through outsourcing and a new facility by 2012 using modern manufacturing and construction concepts.

Goodrum Ascanio

2.1.2.3Establish design rules and goals to outsource RRW components and sub-systems production to commercial suppliers and qualify initial supplier in 2008.

Goodrum Hooper

2.1.2.4 Occupy new non-nuclear production facility by 2012. Goodrum Ascanio

2.1.3.1 Complete a Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF) in 2009. Goodrum Underwood

2.1.3.2 Complete Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) Preliminary Design and revise and validate cost estimates by 2009. Goodrum Rhoads

2.1.3.3

By 2016 and with the completion of HEUMF and UPF, all Cat I/II HEU operations at Y-12 will be consolidated into a smaller footprint leading up to a 90% reduction in the Y-12 PIDAS as compared with today’s security perimeter reducing security costs significantly.

Goodrum Rhoads

2.1.3.4By 2007, complete further analysis to assess whether an upgraded or/and consolidated non-enriched uranium facility to support near- and long-term CSA manufacturing requirements is needed at Y-12.

Goodrum Rhoads

2.1.4.1Before 2014, CMRR becomes operational providing production support and storage capacity for production rates from PF-4 enabling closure of CMR, and removal of Cat I/II plutonium operations from LLNL.

Goodrum Rhoads

2.1.4.2 By 2014, Pu R&D will be consolidated to PF-4/CMRR to support LLNL and LANL R&D requirements by removing non-DP missions from PF-4. Goodrum Rhoads

2.1.4.3 After 2022, conduct R&D activities on the LANL site at the Cat III/IV SNM level or less.

Goodrum/ Crandall Edgeworth

2.1.4.4 Generate a CMRR business case in 2006. Allen Rhoads2.1.5.1 Select site for the consolidated plutonium center in 2008. D'Agostino Wyka

2.1.5.2 Achieve CD-2 and complete design for the consolidated plutonium center by 2012. Crandall Edgeworth

2.1.5.3 Achieve CD-3 and begin construction of the consolidated plutonium center by 2014. Crandall Edgeworth

2.1.5.4 Achieve CD-4 and start operations at the consolidated plutonium center by 2020. Crandall Edgeworth

2.1.5.5 Operate the consolidated plutonium center by 2022. Crandall Edgeworth

2.2.1.1Upgrade LANL plutonium facilities at Technical Area 55 to support an interim production rate of 30 to 50 RRW war reserve pits per year net to the stockpile by the end of 2012.

Crandall Edgeworth

2.2.1.2 Deliver a certified war reserve W88 pit in FY2007. Crandall Edgeworth

2.2.1.3 Achieve a 10 W88 pits per year production capacity at LANL in FY2007, ramp up to 30-50 pits per year in 2012. Crandall Edgeworth

2.2.2.0 Evaluate NTS Device Assembly Facility as backup for weapon assembly and disassembly operations.

2.2.2.1 Complete study to determine availability and timing of Device Assembly Facility (DAF) at the Nevada Test Site for backup in 2006. Goodrum Higgins

2.2.3.1 Operate a new Tritium target-tube loading capability at SNL/NM in 2006.Goodrum/ Lewis Claycomb

2.2.3.2 Maintain TPBAR production and extract tritium from rods irradiated in a commercial nuclear reactor in FY2007.

Goodrum/ Lewis

Founds

2.2.3.3 Prepare a tritium R&D facility consolidation plan in 2007. Crandall Higgins

2.2.3.4 Establish GTS loading capability and capacity for Acorn reservoirs via modification of two existing reservoir-loading lines at SRS (FY07-08).

Goodrum/ Lewis Claycomb

2.2.4.1 Incorporate Complex 2030 initiatives into Secure Transportation operating plan and budget in 2006. Tucker Conner

2.2.4.2

Participate in the selection, design acceptance, certification, and deployment of versatile transportation packages that optimize material capacity and cargo pallet systems (based on commercial aircraft loading technologies) that produce efficiencies by optimizing trailer capacity and load times while meeting rigid cargo restraint and safety requirements in 2007.

Tucker Conner

2.3.1.1In 2006, integrate NNSAs requirements with the Nuclear Materials Disposition and Consolidation Coordination Committee (NMDCCC) to minimize the number of long-term Cat I/II SNM sites and facilities.

Allen Dunsworth

2.3.1.2 Eliminate need for CAT I/II SNM security at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) by the end of 2008. Crandall Davis

2.3.1.3 Identify an alternative to neutron exposure test capabilities by the end of 2011. Crandall Greenaugh

2.3.1.4 Develop a plan in 2007 for transition of LLNL programmatic work involving CAT I/II SNM to LANL and NTS. Crandall Edgeworth

2.3.1.5 Develop a plan in 2007 for removal of CAT I/II SNM from LLNL. Crandall Dunsworth

2.3.1.6 Start moving material from LLNL in 2008, or earlier. Crandall Thompson

2.3.1.7 De-inventory CAT I/II SNM from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) by the end of 2014. Crandall Thompson

2.3.1.8 Reduce nuclear facility space at Los Alamos National Laboratory from 1.3 million square feet (gross) in 2005 to 0.7 million square feet in 2015.

Ascanio Rhoads

2.3.1.9 By 2022, cease operation of facilities containing CAT I/II quantities of SNM by LANL. Crandall/ Allen Thompson

2.3.1.10Establish nuclear criticality experimental capability at the Nevada Test Site Device Assembly Facility (DAF) by the end of calendar year 2009 to maintain capability to perform experiments with nuclear materials.

Crandall Bishop

2.3.2.1 Approve a disposition plan for Site 300 at LLNL in 2007. Crandall Thompson

2.3.2.2In 2007, create a plan to transition hydrodynamic testing to NTS as Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Testing (DARHT) facility reaches end of life in the 2020's.

Crandall Deeney

2.3.3.0 Consolidate environmental testing facilities.

2.3.3.1 Determine what capabilities are required and develop a plan by 2007 for consolidating environmental testing facilities by 2009. Crandall Higgins

2.3.4.1In 2007, locate the consolidated IHE & HE production facility at a site compatible with weapon assembly/ disassembly operations and provide for sufficient safety/security buffer areas.

Goodrum/ Crandall Higgins

2.3.4.2 Outsource synthesis and formulation of insensitive high explosive (IHE) and high explosive (HE) materials by 2007. Goodrum Higgins

2.3.5.0 Consolidate HE R&D and laboratory-scale HE testing without the presence of CAT I/II quantities of SNM.

2.3.5.1 Prepare IHE/HE R&D facility consolidation plan in 2007. Crandall Higgins

2.3.6.0 Reduce weapons program computing footprint to two sites, with capability maintained at a single site at any one time.

2.3.6.1 Execute ASC implementation plan by 2010. D'Agostino Kusnezov

2.3.7.1

Define contract performance measures, facility program advisory committees, and other processes in 2007 to assure major science assets (e.g., LANSCE, OMEGA, Z, DARHT, U1A, Jasper, and ultimately NIF) are operated as effective, shared, national user facilities starting in FY2008.

Keane Hauer

2.3.7.2

By the end of 2007, the DP HED community will develop a coordinated national plan to meet national HED needs for facility usage, experimental platforms at relevant regimes, calibrated diagnostics, and target research and development and production. The strategy will define HED data needs through 2015 and will incorporate ignition weapons physics experiments.

Keane Hauer

2.3.7.3

By the end of 2008, incorporate specific user facility performance objectives, measures, and targets into the contracts for each institution, and implement the process for evaluating performance against these objectives.

Keane Samuelson

2.3.8.1 Complete study to determine flight test alternatives and work with DoD to determine impacts and effect transition in 2006.

Crandall/ Goodrum Lopez

2.3.8.2Consider alternatives including ceasing NNSA operations at Tonopah Test Range by the end of 2009 through use of alternative, non-NNSA or NNSA operated ranges.

Goodrum/ Crandall Lopez

2.3.9.0 Eliminate duplicative facilities 2.3.9.1In 2007, implement plan to consolidate missions and capabilities (within and between sites) using Baseline Capabilities review to reduce lifecycle costs, square footage of the complex, and indirect costs.

Goodrum/ Crandall Higgins

2.3.10.0 Disposition excess facilities 2.3.10.1 Prepare a plan to manage D&D activities and costs during and after consolidation in 2008. NA-17 Rhoads

3.1.1.1 Continuously improve the Corporate Performance Evaluation Process (CPEP).

Tavares Mistretta

3.1.1.2In 2006, evaluate the Federal oversight model in the Sandia and Los Alamos contracts for possible revision to reinforce the GOCO model of reliance on the M&O’s management system.

Tavares Bell

3.1.2.1

Develop a methodology and a process facilitating risk-informed decision making, conduct a risk informed evaluation of existing rules and regulations that govern security at NNSA aimed at ensuring a balancing of costs, benefits, and risks, and deploy uniform safety and security risk-management standards across the complex.

Goodrum Leifheit

3.1.2.2Subject rules, regulations, and major recommendations to risk-informed decision making and authorization basis that balances costs, benefits and risks across the spectrum of mission, safety, and security needs in 2006.

Goodrum Goodrum

3.1.2.3 Establish a Safety Authorization Basis Academy to facilitate uniformity across the weapons complex in 2007. Goodrum Goodrum

3.1.2.4Devise and conduct a trial of a new model for dealing with the recommendations of the Office of Safety and Security Performance Assurance in 2007.

Goodrum Goodrum

3.1.2.5

Submit all DNFSB recommendations, letters, or suggestions and changes to Department of Energy (DOE)/NNSA Orders to appropriate line organization review prior to decisions on implementation in order to support risk-informed decision making in 2007.

D'Agostino/ Goodrum Goodrum

3.1.2.6Employ graded approaches to security risk management and rethink DBT paradigm to lower the cost of secure transportation and site physical security while maintaining protection at required high levels in 2007.

D'Agostino Leifheit

3.1.2.7

Each site conduct an internal review of (a) burdensome internal requirements that have been put in place simply as a hedge against problems with Federal oversight and (b) proposed reduction in current burdensome Federal requirements in 2006.

Goodrum Goodrum

3.1.2.8 Evaluate the Tri-Lab Security Initiative for technology and system solutions in 2008. Goodrum Leifheit

3.2.1.1 Establish a common information standard that facilitates communications by 2008.

Willbanks/ Tavares

Uecke

3.2.1.2Requirements Modernization and Integration (RMI) Project team is to establish implementation plan for business practice revamping and uniformity in 2007.

Abbott Schwartz

3.2.2.1Establish a Supply Chain Management Center in 2007 to achieve the most cost effective procurement of products and services across the nuclear weapons enterprise.

Allen Bell

3.2.2.2

In 2007, Develop a process that reduces the amount of ineffective time for employees and supplier companies while awaiting security clearances and Foreign Ownership Control and Influence (FOCI) determinations to an average of 90 days or less.

Allen TBD

3.2.3.1

The NA-10 Program Management Manual (PMM) directs DP to (by mid-FY2008) implement a uniform program/project management system [including these five tools: 1) common planning documentation definitions, 2) standardized WBS and WBS dictionaries, 3) milestone schedules, 4) integrated master schedules across the NWC for a single weapon, systems and subsystems, 4) critical paths, and 5) scope and schedule change control that meets defined NNSA standards. These standardized tools and definitions will allow NNSA at the federal and contractor levels to enable site-to site, program-to program, and year-to-year comparisons to be made starting in early 2008.

Tavares Higgins

3.2.3.2 Develop Data Warehouse for NWC costs and inventory data in 2008. Tavares Higgins

3.2.3.3 Train and certify appropriate managers in the Program Management system in 2007. Tavares Higgins

3.2.3.4Install complex-wide systems to provide high quality planning data (scope/schedule/cost/cost estimating) and integrate resource constraints and change control in 2007.

Tavares Higgins

3.2.4.1 Drive uniformity in the management of the RTBF program by reducing Federal management to one program office in 2006. NA-17 Ascanio

3.2.4.2 Create and annually revalidate a comprehensive, uniform listing of mission critical facilities starting in 2007.

NA-17 Ascanio

3.2.4.3Implement an RTBF Program Plan that includes a detailed WBS structure and definitions to achieve uniform implementation across the NWC in 2007.

NA-17 Ascanio

3.2.4.4 Communicate lessons learned and recommend business practice to enhance uniformity across the complex in 2007.

Ascanio Thompson

3.3.1.1 Communicate the transformation plan to all levels of the nuclear weapons complex and key stakeholders in 2006. D'Agostino Stoner

3.3.1.2 Establish and implement transformation objectives in personnel performance appraisal plans in 2006. D'Agostino Schoenbauer

3.3.1.3 Implement a federal organizational structure to achieve better integration between NA-10, NA-50, NA-70, and site offices in 2006. Schoenbauer Tavares

3.3.1.4Direct nuclear weapons complex contractors to institute a personnel and square footage reductions consistent with a smaller more efficient complex and develop target objectives in 2006.

D'Agostino Tavares

3.3.2.1 Establish Office of Transformation as direct-report to Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs in 2006.

Brooks D'Agostino

3.3.2.2 Update and maintain nuclear weapons complex enterprise models in 2007.

Allen Cox

3.3.2.3 Submit Transformation Plan for the Nuclear Weapons Complex to Congress (HASC) by February 1, 2007. Allen Cox

3.3.2.4 Establish complex-wide metrics for responsiveness and cost-effectiveness in 2006. Allen Monroe

3.3.2.5 In 2007, develop a cashflow strategy to increase and manage cashflow for transformation. Allen Cox

3.3.3.1 Select the Systems Integrator from existing M&O contractors in 2006. D'Agostino Schoenbauer

3.3.3.2 In 2006, create a charter and an implementation plan for the Systems Integrator.

Schoenbauer Henson

4.1.1.1Establish and implement a cost effective science and technology roadmap by the end of 2007 defining the capabilities required to sustain the transformed stockpile.

Crandall/ Keane Kusnezov

4.1.1.2 Develop a plan in 2007 to apply technology selection, maturation, and insertion including elimination of expired R&D activities. Crandall/ Keane Kusnezov

4.2.1.0 Partner with the Office of Science and other leading national R&D sponsors regarding the national laboratory complex.

4.2.1.1

Define options and recommend path forward by the end of 2007 on developing jointly funded, integrated programs within NNSA and the DOE Office of Science that provide leading edge science and engineering capabilities needed for national security and broader scientific, technological, and economic competitiveness.

Crandall/ Keane Deeney

4.2.2.1 In 2007, identify key areas where WFOs would provide mission benefit to Defense Programs. Crandall/ Allen Soudah

4.2.2.2In 2008, develop business practices guidelines for WFOs cost recovery while facilitating long-term support for the S&T base and physical infrastructure.

Crandall/ Allen Soudah

2.3.4.0 Outsource synthesis and formulation of high explosive (HE) materials as practical, outsource or consolidate large-scale HE production pressing, and consolidate HE machining to Pantex.

2.1.2.0 Establish a process for non-nuclear components and sub-systems to reduce production cycle times and occupy a new, smaller non-nuclear production facility that minimizes footprint and optimizes flexibility to produce items that cannot be out-sourced, e.g. component final assembly and use control components.

2.3.1.0 Reduce the number of sites with Category (CAT) I/II special nuclear materials (SNM) and consolidate SNM to as few locations within a given site.

2.3.7.0 Operate major science facilities (LANSCE, Omega, Z, and the National Ignition Facility) as national, shared user facilities.

2.1.5.0 Plan, construct, and startup a consolidated plutonium center for long-term R&D, surveillance, and manufacturing operations with a baseline capacity of 125 units per year net to the stockpile.

1.1.0.0 Ensure vitality of legacy weapon systems while they remain in the stockpile

1.1.1.0 Use a comprehensive strategy of maintenance, surveillance, and refurbishment to meet commitments to the DoD.

1.1.2.0 Improve Weapon Assembly/ Disassembly/ Surveillance/ Dismantlement Throughput

1.2.2.0 Implement a continuous design/deployment cycle that exercises design and production capabilities and enables responsiveness of the nuclear weapons complex.

1.2.1.0 Establish an RRW-based stockpile plan with a majority of intercontinental ballistic missile, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, bombs, and cruise missiles transitioned to RRW-types by 2030.

2.0.0.0 Transform to a modernized, cost-effective nuclear weapons complex:

2.2.4.0 Upgrade a secure transportation asset to support DOE requirements.

2.3.2.0 Transition hydrodynamic capabilities to NTS.

2.2.1.0 Utilize TA-55 PF-4 as interim pit production facility

2.2.3.0 Maintain right-sized tritium operations for production, extraction, and loading within the complex and through contracts.

2.1.0.0 Replace infrastructure as necessary to ensure required future capabilities

2.1.1.0 Conduct NEPA process for Complex 2030 decisions.

4.2.0.0 Establish synergies with other agencies to complement the S&T base 4.2.2.0 Define a plan that recognizes

that Work for Others (WFO) plays an essential role in maintaining capabilities required for the NNSA mission.

4.1.1.0 Establish and implement a science and technology strategy.

3.3.0.0 Ensure strong federal leadership

3.3.1.0 Ensure strong, consistent NNSA Leadership to meet nuclear weapons responsibilities and balance competing priorities across missions, risks, and program elements.

3.3.3.0 Implement the concept of systems engineering and integration contractor (SEIC) support for Federal decision-making (such as being used for managing life-extension programs) to other parts of the weapons program.

4.0.0.0 Drive the science and technology base essential for long-term national security:

3.3.2.0 Establish an Office of Transformation

4.1.0.0 Establish appropriately-sized science & technology base for nuclear weapons activities.

3.0.0.0 Create a fully integrated and interdependent nuclear weapons complex:

3.2.0.0 Implement improved business practices

3.2.1.0 Implement uniform technical and administrative business practices across the complex, utilizing industrial standards to the greatest extent possible.

3.2.3.0 Implement uniform program/project management practices and project management certification for all weapon activities across the complex.

3.2.4.0 Manage Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) uniformly across the complex.

3.1.0.0 Create an integrated, interdependent system or laboratories, plants & test sites that shares resources, applies common approaches, and efficiently meets complex-wide objectives.

3.1.1.0 Utilize contracts and incentives to promote an integrated, interdependent system of laboratories, plants, and test sites.

3.1.2.0 Implement an approach and culture that manages risk rather than seeks to eliminate it.

Transformation Action List (TSIP Attachment 1) Januaru 5, 2007

3.2.2.0 Improve acquisition practices.

1.2.0.0 Define and implement an RRW strategy to enable transformation of the stockpile and infrastructure

2.3.8.0 Consolidate flight test operations.

1.0.0.0 In partnership with the Department of Defense, transform the nuclear stockpile through development of reliable replacement warheads, refurbishment of limited numbers of legacy designs, and accelerated dismantlement of the Cold-War stockpile:

2.2.0.0 Upgrade and leverage existing infrastructure where cost effective

2.3.0.0 Consolidate and eliminate duplicative infrastructure

2.1.3.0 Plan, construct, and modernize uranium facilities at Y-12 to reduce security costs, provide an efficient means to consolidate existing uranium materials contained in legacy weapons, dismantle legacy canned subassemblies (CSAs), conduct high-enriched uranium research, and provide a long term capacity for new CSA production.

2.1.4.0 Complete and operate Chemistry and Metallurgy Research – Replacement (CMRR) at Los Alamos.

NWCITF Future Path Business Case Options

September 15, 2005

The Complex Today

Y-12 National Security Complex

“From a management perspective, the Task Force determined that there is not a unified interdependent nuclear enterprise Vision or set of mission priorities. Instead the following was found:• DoD does not provide unified and integrated weapon requirements• DoD does not appear to trust DOE’s ability to respond

with predictability• Complex rules and regulations focus on process rather

than mission safety• No cost/benefit, or risk analysis• Design labs are too independent – they compete and

create redundant programs and facilities

Continuum of business case options – very sensitive to these assumptions:• Number and extent of LEP Programs• Efficiencies of operation at the CNPC• Reductions in the cost of Security

~ 2035End of current

Stockpile’s Pit Life

$155B (through 2030) withnew Complex/Stockpile

$175B (through 2030)with continuing issues

$170B (through 2030) with no options

“Revolutionary Complex

Transformation”

“Complex Transformation

in Place”

High Risk

Low Risk

Very High Risk (not valid)

+ $10B thru 2015+ $10B thru 2015

“Baseline”Status Quo

• RRW• CNPC• Consolidate SNM• Dismantlement• Office of Transformation

• Reduce effort at design Labs• Close all redundant facilities• Reduce one or more LEP

Delay start of CNPC

Curtail or eliminate LEP

CNPC assumes new role – close facilities

Credit for reduction in Security

Outsource non-nuclear components

Reprogram FIRP

Large RIF at Weapon Labs

“ In summary, the Task Force found a Complex neither robust, nor agile, nor responsive, with little evidence of a master plan”

(A Graphical Interpretation by J. Jekowski)

“…A vision for the agile and responsive nuclear weapons Complex of the future…is embodied by the…proposed Consolidated Nuclear Production Center (CNPC).”

“The Complex of 2030 should be an integrated, interdependent enterprise”

“ The Cold War stockpile and the Complex have served the country well, but neither embodies the characteristics that are important to serve the nation in the future.”

http://www.seab.energy.gov/publications/NWCITFRept-7-11-05.pdf


TM

Key transformational efforts will include:• Reliable Replacement Warhead• Dismantling of retired warheads• Consolidating special nuclear materials• Establishing a consolidated plutonium center• Implementing more efficient and uniform

business practices throughout the complex

Increased confidence in warhead designs and demonstration of a responsive infrastructure will enable a reduction in total stockpile size

WARHEADS

Today 2012-20302012

LegacyWeapons

Augmentation Reserves

RefurbishedLegacy Designs

Legacy

Capability to Augment

Future

RRW, Adapted, New

LegacyWeapons

Baseline Stockpile


Refurbished

RRWCapability to Augment

WARHEADS

Today 2012-20302012

LegacyWeapons



Legacy


Future

RRW, Adapted, New

LegacyWeapons

Baseline Stockpile


Refurbished


WARHEADS

Today 2012-20302012

LegacyWeapons



Legacy


Future

RRW, Adapted, New

LegacyWeapons

Baseline Stockpile


Refurbished


2001 2012 2012-2030 Future

TodayToday Future

Stockpile BasedTo

Enterprise Based Deterrent

Joint NNSA/DoD Responsive Infrastructure Objectives

A responsive infrastructure possesses the capabilities to:1. Identify, understand, and fix stockpile problems in time to assure

continued confidence in the reliability and safety of the stockpile;2. Dismantle warheads on a timescale consistent with policy requirements;3. Ensure warheads are available to augment the operationally deployed

force on a timescale that supports DoD’s requirements;4. Design, develop, certify, and complete first production unit (FPU) of

refurbished or replacement warheads with a frequency that both sustains the stockpile and exercises the supporting infrastructure and critical skills;

5. Improve the capability to design, develop, certify, and complete production of new or adapted warheads in the event of new military requirements;

6. Produce required quantities of warheads in time to meet militaryrequirements;

7. Demonstrate nuclear competencies that assure allies, dissuade adversaries, and ensure against technological surprise;

8. Sustain readiness to conduct underground nuclear tests; and

9. Ensure an economically sustainable nuclear weapons enterprise.

Four over-arching, long-term strategies:1. In partnership with the DoD, transform the nuclear stockpile

through the development of RRWs, refurbishment of limitednumbers of legacy designs, and accelerated dismantlement ofthe Cold War stockpile;

2. Transform to a modernized, cost-effective nuclear weaponscomplex;

3. Create a fully integrated and interdependent nuclear weaponscomplex; and,

4. Drive the science and technology base essential for long-termnational security

Ten Goals to implement over-arching strategies:1.1 Ensure vitality of legacy weapon systems while they remain

in the stockpile. 1.2 Define and implement an RRW strategy to enable

transformation of the stockpile and infrastructure.

2.1 Replace infrastructure as necessary to ensure required futurecapabilities.

2.2 Upgrade and leverage existing infrastructure where costeffective.

2.3 Consolidate and eliminate duplicative infrastructure.

3.1 Create an integrated, interdependent system of laboratories,plants, and test sites that shares resources, applies commonapproaches, and efficiently meets complex-wide objectives.

3.2 Implement improved business practices. 3.3 Ensure strong federal leadership.

4.1 Establish an appropriately-sized science & technology basefor nuclear weapons activities.

4.2 Establish synergies with other agencies to complement theS&T base.

1.2.3.1

Action

Sub-Goal

Goal

Strategy

Meeting the goal of a“Responsive Nuclear

Weapons Infrastructure”

Transformation Action List

See details in previous presentation to INMM at: http://www.itpnm.com/whats-new-archives/whatsnew-archive-popup-sept-26-2007.htm

5


TM

The Historical Driver: The New Triad

“The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR),[1] completed in December 2001, concluded that the 21st century presents a national security environment in which threats may evolve more quickly, be more variable in nature, and be less predictable than in the past. It also recognized that the roles of United States (US) nuclear forces and the infrastructure to support those forces must evolve to meet the requirements of the new threat environment. The NPR calls for a transition from a threat-based nuclear deterrent with large numbers of deployed and reserve weapons to a deterrent based on capabilities with a smaller number of stockpiled nuclear weapons and greater reliance on the capability and responsiveness of US infrastructure to respond to threats. A new triad (Figure 1-1) was defined to illustrate how offensive capabilities, defenses, and a responsive infrastructure must be balanced to fulfill future security strategy requirements.”

[1] Nuclear Posture Review, Report to the Congress in Response to Sections 1041 (as amended) and 1042 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, PL 106-398, December 2001.

“Defending our nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government.”

NNSA Transformation Strategy Implementation Plan

NNSA Strategic Plan, November 2004, page 7

6


TM

Strategic Linkages to National Policy

QDR Four priority areas:• Defeating terrorist networks• Defending the homeland in

depth• Shaping the choices of

countries at strategic crossroads• Preventing hostile states and

non-state actors from acquiringor using WMD

As the diagram shows, the Department is shifting its portfolio of capabilities to address irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges

while sustaining capabilities to address traditional challenges

Conflicts in which enemy combatants are not regular

military forces of nation-states – terrorism,

insurgency or guerrilla warfare – to break our will through protracted warfare

Terrorism employing Weapons of Mass

Destruction

Traditional role for military Threats to the U.S.

ability to maintain qualitative edge and to

project power

“We live in a time of unconventional challenges and strategic uncertainty”

“The major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different requirements. All of them must be transformed.”

NPR New Triad

• Assure• Dissuade• Deter• Defeat

“The Nuclear Posture Review shifts planning for America's strategic forces from the threat-based approach of the Cold War to a capabilities-based approach. “

“Defending our nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government.”

ICBMs

Bombers SLBMsCommand & Control,

Intelligence & Planning

Non-Nuclear & Nuclear Strike Capabilities

Responsive InfrastructureDefenses

NWCITF Future Path Business Case Options

September 15, 2005

The Complex Today

Y-12 National Security Complex

“From a management perspective, the Task Force determined that there is not a unified interdependent nuclear enterprise Vision or set of mission priorities. Instead the following was found:• DoD does not provide unified and integrated weapon requirements• DoD does not appear to trust DOE’s ability to respond

with predictability• Complex rules and regulations focus on process rather

than mission safety• No cost/benefit, or risk analysis• Design labs are too independent – they compete and

create redundant programs and facilities

Continuum of business case options – very sensitive to these assumptions:• Number and extent of LEP Programs• Efficiencies of operation at the CNPC• Reductions in the cost of Security

~ 2035End of current

Stockpile’s Pit Life

$155B (through 2030) withnew Complex/Stockpile

$175B (through 2030)with continuing issues

$170B (through 2030) with no options

“Revolutionary Complex

Transformation”

“Complex Transformation

in Place”

High Risk

Low Risk

Very High Risk (not valid)

+ $10B thru 2015+ $10B thru 2015

“Baseline”Status Quo

• RRW• CNPC• Consolidate SNM• Dismantlement• Office of Transformation

• Reduce effort at design Labs• Close all redundant facilities• Reduce one or more LEP

Delay start of CNPC

Curtail or eliminate LEP

CNPC assumes new role – close facilities

Credit for reduction in Security

Outsource non-nuclear components

Reprogram FIRP

Large RIF at Weapon Labs

“ In summary, the Task Force found a Complex neither robust, nor agile, nor responsive, with little evidence of a master plan”

(A Graphical Interpretation by J. Jekowski)

“…A vision for the agile and responsive nuclear weapons Complex of the future…is embodied by the…proposed Consolidated Nuclear Production Center (CNPC).”

“The Complex of 2030 should be an integrated, interdependent enterprise”

“ The Cold War stockpile and the Complex have served the country well, but neither embodies the characteristics that are important to serve the nation in the future.”

http://www.seab.energy.gov/publications/NWCITFRept-7-11-05.pdf


TM

8


TM

AAAS Report Highlights*• A very complex report – April 2007

– “The independent designs for RRW could lead to a final design that is certifiable without a nuclear test”

– “The full engagement of the DoD is necessary to set the conditions under which an RRW can be introduced into the arsenal”

– “RRW and Complex 2030 will have a number of international impacts”

– “There are no Presidential or Cabinet-level statements…that argue the case for the RRW”

– “Only Presidential leadership can create the bipartisan program necessary to transform the nuclear weapons complex on a path that may take well over two decades.”

*See http://cstsp.aaas.org/content.html?contentid=899

9


TM

Events Since Last May• Joint statement on Nuclear

Policy by DOE, DoS and DoD• Continuing decline in support for

RRW and Complex 2030• S.1914 Nuclear Policy and

Posture Review Act• Elimination of funding for RRW• NNSA Request for Information• Draft Complex Transformation

SPEIS release and public hearings

• “Toward a Nuclear-Free World” Wall St. Journal Editorial

• CRS Report “Nuclear Weapons in U.S. National Security Policy: Past, Present and Prospects” RL34226 January 28, 2008

• Congressional Strategic Posture Commission

10


TM

Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy• Policy Statement by Secretaries of Energy, Defense and

State (July 2007)– “The extension of a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent has been

critical to allied security and removed the need for many key allies to develop their own nuclear forces.

– “It is the policy of this Administration to achieve an effectivestrategic deterrent at the lowest level of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security and our commitments and obligations to allies.”

– “The ‘new triad’…reduces U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons while mitigating the risks associated with drawing down U.S. nuclear forces.”

– “We are at a critical juncture that requires the U.S. to invest now in the capabilities needed to maintain a credible deterrent at the lowest level of nuclear weapons.”

– “The skills and technologies needed to refurbish and maintain these older weapons designs are increasingly difficult to sustain or acquire.”

– “Delays on RRW also raise the prospect of having to return to underground nuclear testing to certify existing weapons.”

– Detailed report to follow http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/factsheets/2007/NA-07-FS-04.pdf

Events Since Last May

11


TM

The Future of Nuclear Weapons?Rice Declines to Sign U.S. Nuclear Strategy Paper

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has not signed a U.S. nuclear deterrence policy paper expected to be approved by the defense and energy secretaries (Paul Kane/Getty Images).

By Elaine M. Grossman Global Security Newswire

Issue for Tuesday, August 5, 2008 http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2008_8_5.html

WASHINGTON — U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has declined to formally endorse an interagency “white paper” on nuclear deterrence strategy, Global Security Newswire has learned (see GSN, July 25, 2007).

Rice Declines to Sign U.S. Nuclear Strategy Paper

http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2008_9_12.html

Military’s RRW Alternative Is Warhead Life Extension

By Elaine M. Grossman Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON. Convinced the time has come for an alternative to building a controversial new nuclear warhead, a key U.S. military command is laying the groundwork for Plan B: Dramatically extending the existing stockpile’s service life, Global Security Newswire has learned (see GSN, Aug. 5).

The U.S. Strategic Command, led by Gen. Kevin Chilton, hopes to expand programs to extend the lifetime of U.S. nuclear weapons

12


TM

Nuclear Policy and Posture Review Act

• S.1914– Requires President to conduct a nuclear policy and

Posture review• Submit report on Nuclear Policy Review by September 1,

2009– Coordinated by National Security Advisor with Secretaries of

State, Energy, and Defense; Directors of National Intelligence, Office of Management and Budget, and Office of Science and Technology Policy

• Submit report on Nuclear Posture Review by March 1, 2010– Conducted by Secretary of Defense in collaboration with the

Secretaries of Energy and State, the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Security Advisor

– No funds may be appropriated for RRW for FY08, FY09, or FY10 until reports have been submitted to Congress


13


TM

Nuclear Policy and Posture Review Scope

• Nuclear Policy Review– Address role and value of nuclear weapons– Set short and long term objectives– Recommendations for strengthening NPT– Examine nonproliferation and arms control objectives

– particularly w/r to Article VI of the NPT– Examine START and Moscow Treaties and

recommend successor treaty with verification provisions

– Provide guidance for follow on Posture Review

S.1914Events Since Last May

14


TM

Nuclear Policy and Posture Review Scope

• Nuclear Posture Review– The role of nuclear forces including extent to which

conventional forces can assume roles previously assumed

– Requirements and objectives to maintain a safe, reliable and credible nuclear deterrence posture

– Targeting strategy– Levels and composition of delivery systems– Examine nuclear complex including any plans to

consolidate, modernize or modify– Active and inactive stockpile and plans for replacing

or modifying warheads– Posture options examined and reasons for selection

S.1914Events Since Last May

15


TM

Contract Strategy for Weapons Complex• Request for Information – released September 10, 2007*

– Solicit input from the public• “We are open to consideration of a facilities-based approach (perhaps

combining two or more sites under a single contract) and/or a function-based approach (providing to some or all locations such capabilities as purchasing, financial management, information technology services and management, etc.).”

* http://www.doeal.gov/MOContracts/Default.aspx


16


TM

Contract Strategy for Weapons Complex• Request for Information*

– More uniform program execution with improved integration of resources and priorities;

– Increased standardization of technical processes and application of best practices to improve processes and capabilities;

– Improved inter-site coordination, cooperation, information sharing and technical integration;

– Improved workforce planning, maintenance of critical skills, and human capital management;

– Reduced cost and improved performance through streamlining of the organization with reduction of management layers, elimination of unnecessary redundancies, outsourcing appropriate activities, and integration and leveraging of technical and business expertise at multiple sites;

– Increased contractor authority and accountability in accomplishing the NNSA mission; and

– Sustained competition.



17


TM

RFI II: Contract Strategy for Weapons Complex

• Second Request for Information, January 23, 2008*– Employed recommendations from first round to focus

additional questions on contracting strategies – followed with one-on-one meetings in March.

– First RFI – over 20 interested parties, with over 35 different ideas

– Some options presented:• Consolidate Pantex Plan and Y-12• Consolidate Kansas City Plant (KCP) and Sandia National

Labs (SNL)• Transfer tritium operations from Savannah River Site (SRS)

to Pantex Plant and Y-12 Plant• Transfer tritium operations from SRS and production at LANL

to Pantex Plant and Y-12 Plant• Transfer tritium operations from SRS to KCP and SNL• Transfer production and vendor quals from Sandia to KCP• Obtain nuclear services from NRC licensed contractors• Use commercial sources for non-nuclear products and

services– Comments sought on function based contracting and

incentive provisions



18


TM

Draft Supplemental PEIS

• Structured process to seek public input*

* Public comment period closed April 30, 2008. http://www.complextransformationspeis.com/


19


TM

Draft Supplemental PEIS• Several programmatic alternatives were examined:


http://www.complextransformationspeis.com/

20


TM

Draft Supplemental PEIS• Several project-specific alternatives were examined:



21


TM

Draft Supplemental PEIS

• Consolidating to Interdependent Centers:



22


TM

Draft Supplemental PEIS• Preferred Alternatives:



23


TM

Toward a Nuclear Free World• Op-Ed in Wall St. Journal –

January 15, 2008– Authored by George Schultz,

William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn

– Followed Op-Ed in January 2007 entitled “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons” that was supported by a subsequent Op-Ed from Mikhail Gorbachev entitled “The Nuclear Threat”

– Discusses the “nuclear tipping point”

– Makes several recommendations toward a nuclear-weapons free world

http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB120036422673589947.html


24


TM

CRS Report on Nuclear Weapons Policy

• Updated January 2008• Many CRS reports help to shape

Congressional Committee agendas

• Examines the history of the nation’s nuclear posture and the concept of deterrence –specifically the concept of “tailored deterrence” which the current Administration pursues based on the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review

http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB120036422673589947.html

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34226.pdf


25


TM

U.S. Strategic Posture Commission• Established by House Armed Services (H.R. 1585, Sec. 1062)

– Will submit a report by December 1, 2008 that includes a detailed review of nuclear weapons policy and strategy and an examination of non-nuclear alternatives to nuclear weapons


26


TM

Strategic Posture Commission MembersEvents Since Last May

27


TM

D’Agostino on Complex Transformation• Four pillars*:

– Transform the nuclear stockpile through the Stockpile Stewardship program in partnership with the Department of Defense

– Transform to a modernized, cost-effective national security enterprise to support needed capabilities in our infrastructure.

– Create an integrated, interdependent enterprise that employs best business practices to maximize efficiency and minimize costs.

– Advance the science and technology base that is the cornerstone of our nuclear deterrence and remains essential for long-term national security.

Complex Transformation & Strategic Weapons in the 21st Centuryhttp://www.lanl.gov/conferences/sw/papers08.shtmlhttp://www.lanl.gov/conferences/sw/docs/dagostino-SW21-FINAL-31Jan08.pdf

*Note: these are very similar to the four overarching strategies for Complex 2030

28


TM

DOE/NNSA on The Future Vision

• Congressional Testimony by Lab Directors and “Media Roundtable” in June, 2008– Reaffirms Work

for Others (WFO) mission for Labs and NTS

29


TM

D’Agostino on The Future Vision• “To respond to the evolving 21st century global security

threats, NNSA will bring our science, technology and engineering enterprise to bear on solving large, urgent national security challenges.” – Supporting war fighter needs in Iraq with IED modeling and

analysis; – Assisting in the safe recovery and securing of a potential

radiological device or a lost or stolen U.S. nuclear weapon; – Helping identify, among other things, the source of a nuclear

device, its effects, and the persons or groups responsible usingtechnical nuclear forensics;

– Developing and deploying integrated systems for countering aerosolized bioterrorist releases and bio-decontamination technologies; and

– Developing and deploying portal detector technology to prevent smuggling of illicit nuclear materials.

30


TM

Paul Robinson on the Future of the Complex*• “Establish at a national level the purpose and

sizing of the US arsenal of nuclear weapons-appropriate to the threats we and our allies most likely face going forward

• Reorganize the management structure of the complex to have a nuclear weapons enterprise that is coherently managed and budgeted for

• The fact has been well established that the Federal government is incapable of “managing the advancement of science”

*Response to questions of House Arms Services Committee, Summer, 2008

“My deeply held conviction is that the GOCO model has deteriorated so far, that it must now either be eliminated or drastically rejuvenated (with a new

agency and a “clean sheet of paper”)”

31


TM

Paul Robinson on the Future of the Complex*

*Response to questions of House Arms Services Committee, Summer, 2008

“Personally, and after many years of believing that it was important to keep the nuclear weapons design, development,

and production separate from the Defense Department, I have now reached the point that I believe it is worth

considering removing the weapons responsibilities from DOE and placing it as a new agency within the DoD. The presence of a uniformed military could provide a continuity that has been lacking as different administrations came and went. The nation’s nuclear deterrent has only suffered from

these short-term upheavals in what must be a long-term commitment.”

32


TM

Defense Science Board Highlights• Three Key Issues

– Need for a national consensus on the nature and the need for and role of nuclear weapons

– The Nuclear Weapons Complex and the approach to sustaining a reliable, safe, secure and credible set of nuclear weapons

– The organization and management of the NWC enterprise – DOE and DoD

• Recommendations suggested for:– Assessing progress in developing integrated

strike capabilities in the New Triad– The structure, organization and management of

the Nuclear Weapons Enterprise– Sustaining the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

33


TM

Defense Science Board Highlights• Proposed “government corporate”

structure– Create National Nuclear Weapons Agency

with administrator reporting to President– Board of Directors including Secretaries of

Defense, Energy Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence

– Core will be three national nuclear weapons labs and weapons production complex

34


TM

What Lies Ahead: Complex Transformation• Development of national consensus on stockpile

– Follow on to Joint Statement with white paper: “National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century”

– Congressional action• Strategic Posture Commission – report December 1, 2008• Nuclear Posture Act – reports September 1, 2009 and March 1, 2010

• Review of comments on Draft SPEIS• Review of comments on Solicitation of Industry input -

RFI• Development of integrated, National Security Enterprise

concept

http://nnsa.energy.gov/defense_programs/complex_transformation.htmhttp://www.complextransformationspeis.com/

35


TM

What’s Wrong With This Picture?

• The U.S. is re-examining its nuclear weapons Policy and Posture– Funding for RRW and other elements of the

transformed Complex has not been forthcoming– Congressional actions usurping leadership role of

NNSA and Laboratories– Critical technical resources are retiring while the

“pipeline” is not being filled due to budget and policy decisions

• All of the other Nuclear Weapons States are enhancing their stockpiles and delivery systems

• Proliferation of nuclear weapons technology continues in several countries

• Over 40 developing countries from the Persian Gulf to Latin America have announced intentions to pursue nuclear power options to satisfy energy demand

36


TM

The Dominoes Continue to Fall• Revitalization of NWS stockpiles• Nationalistic moves in Russia• Iran, DPRK, GCC, Syria, Egypt,

others move toward nuclear options

37


TM

U.K.

• $1.75B upgrade to AWE

• Development of High Surety Warhead – U.K. version of RRW

• $30B - $40B upgrade to Trident fleet proposed

http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/AC00DD79-76D6-4FE3-91A1-6A56B03C092F/0/DefenceWhitePaper2006_Cm6994.pdf

38


TM

France• $10B M51 upgraded MIRV’d Ballistic

missile development• New warheads – TNO and TNA – will

replace older TN75’s and TN81’s – to be designed using Megajoule Laser

• $1.5B Megajoule Laser for simulation tests

• Advanced ASMP-A cruise missile entering service this year

• New Triomphant-Class Submarine – Le Terrible – is under construction to enter service in 2010 with M51s

39


TM

Russia• Claims of new systems to be

deployed in next few years• Strategic bomber flights

restarted• Oil rejuvenates economy• Invasion of Georgia• Threats against Poland

40


TM

China• Growing evidence of nuclear

submarine fleet• Increased defense spending• Ballistic anti-aircraft carrier

missile technology

China has secretly built a major underground nuclear submarine base that could threaten Asian countries and

challenge American power in the region, it can be disclosed.

41


TM

Uncertainties Posed Last Year• Waning Congressional and public support for Nuclear

Stockpile– Can Administration, DoD and DOE/NNSA articulate a convincing

national policy for nuclear weapons in the post 9/11 environment?• Budget deficits and the Long War on Terrorism

– RRW and transformation will take additional funding or require potentially detrimental modification to current LEP and other programs

• Continuing security and management problems at DOE/NNSA and the Laboratories

• Next generation of weapons designers, researchers• The asymmetric global terrorism threat• The rise of China as a peer superpower• Energy crisis

– Global expansion of nuclear power and related technology– Global Warming

42


TM

New Uncertainties to Ponder• Global non-proliferation efforts• Iran, DPRK nuclear weapons status• Expansion of nuclear technology in Third

World• Stability of Pakistani Government• Israeli-Palestinian issues• Loss of Domenici and New Mexico

Congressional Delegation seniority• Presidential/Congressional election• Iraq War/Financial Crisis• Viability of Complex Transformation

concept• DOE/NNSA contracting concepts –

results from RFI

43


TM

What is the Future Path?A proposed scenario construct:

The Global Nuclear PostureD

OE

/NN

SA

Fu

ture

• NNWA formed• New national security missions• Revitalization of funding• Direct “WFO” link to DoD• NPR consensus

• NNSA and DOE remain intact• Status quo for LEPs and Complex• NPR stays ambiguous

• DPRK tests again• Iran tests• NWS test new designs• Arab states move toward nuclear

• NPT Regime is strengthened• Iran nuke program shut down• DPRK abandons Nuke program• U.N role grows – source material• CTBT enters into force

Path of Least Resistance• Reduced global threat causes delay in RRW. Supplemental PEIS continues, but with nosignificant transformation projects as nationaldialogue continues on future Nuclear Posture.

NWCITF• Reduction of global threat and consolidationinto DoD creates broad support (no baggage)and environment for construction ofconsolidated nuclear facility at NTS leadingto a new streamlined, modern stockpile

National Security Enterprise• Global proliferation and otherdistractions in Congress provide impetusfor RRW and transformation efforts toproceed in the new Administration

Damn the Torpedoes, Full Speed Ahead•

• Global discontinuity drives significant ramp upin RRW, transformation of complex, and returnto testing. NNWA is implemented to supporta new 21st Century nuclear arms race and NationalLaboratories are infused with new war-related funding.

Can the Laboratories and NNSA develop robust strategies to prepare for these

future worlds?

Can the Laboratories and NNSA develop robust strategies to prepare for these

future worlds?

The Transformation of the U.S. The Transformation of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons ComplexNuclear Weapons Complex

Past, Present and…

Future?

These are historic times…we need to use all of our collective knowledge,

wisdom, and imagination, to ensure that there is no question mark at the

end of the road…our national security hangs in the balance

44


TM

For electronic copies of this presentation email Jack Jekowski: [email protected] or visit ITP’s website (http://www.itpnm.com) and click under “What’s New”. Previous presentations on this subject, including the 2006 and 2007 INMM presentations can be found at: http://www.itpnm.com/whats-new-archives/whatsnew-archive-popup-sept-26-2007.htm

Complex Transformation - Creating the National Security ... · Meet the Integrated Weapons Activity...

Documents

Transcript of Complex Transformation - Creating the National Security ... · Meet the Integrated Weapons Activity...