Complaint to AG

P.O. Box 87491 Houston 77287 August 15, 2008

Office of the Attorney General Attn: Criminal Investigation Division PO Box 12548 Austin, TX 78711-2548 Cert. Mail # 7008 1140 0000 5315 3352, R.R.R.

Dear Sir or Madam

This is a complaint against and request for investigation of the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney and the Galveston County Sheriff.

The cause of this complaint is the refusal of the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney’s office to adhere to the procedures of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure for filing criminal complaints resulting my being subjected to the criminal actions of various individuals and entities using perjury, fabrication of evidence, tampering with governmental records, and criminal conspiracy to achieve their ends. This irregular procedure seems to be the usual practice of the office. Documents are included that identify this practice and that indicate that this practice is unwritten and not kept as any record of the office. Complaint against the Sheriff is due to that office’s concealment of video evidence showing one of the district attorney’s staff committing an overt criminal act.

Facts stated herein are proved by the affidavit of Danny Royce Murphy. See Exhibit A.

I was involved in a lawsuit and became aware that various documents being used in court against me were the product of perjury, fabrication, and tampering with governmental records. This case was in regard to a foreclosure action, the right to foreclose being based on the foreclosing party being the holder of the note secured by the property. During the course of the case, documents were discovered and a deposition obtained showing that the note had been sold long before the foreclosure action took place. The foreclosing party was not the holder of the note as was claimed in affidavits and other documents. I believe that I sufficiently brought this to the attention of the court, but no relief was granted.

Eventually, I prepared a number, 58, of formal criminal complaints describing the criminal acts and identifying the locations in the court records that documented these acts. These records are in the pleading and evidence files held by the District Clerk of Galveston County for cause number 02CV0624, Danny Royce Murphy v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et. al. The primary basis for these complaints, other than those against officials, was that Countrywide and it agents had used perjury, fabrication, and tampering with governmental records to make its case in court. These complaints were sworn before a notary public, and I mailed these complaints in September of 2006 to the members of the grand jury sitting in Galveston County in care of the Criminal District Attorney. See Exhibit B. All indications now are that the District Attorney’s

office failed to file these complaints with a magistrate and have them brought before the grand jury.

Nearly a year after this set of complaints was receive by the District Attorney’s office, I prepared set of additional complaints. These complaints were delivered into the hands of Assistant District Attorney Angela Taylor at the District Attorney’s office. She proceeded to explain that the district attorney’s office does not accept complaints directly from the public, and she referred me to the Galveston Police Department. I replied that she could call the police, and they would be glad to investigate for her. I turned to leave. She followed and continued to insist that I take back the complaints. I told her that the documents had been delivered to government and were then governmental records that I could not have. I proceeded on, and when I opened the door to go into the hall, she tossed the complaints through the doorway and onto the hall floor. She then retreated through a door into the secure areas of the District Attorney’s offices.

My actions in the matter of these complaints were guided by provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Penal Code. Article 20.09 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for any credible person informing a grand jury of crimes liable to indictment. Articles 2.04 and 2.05 impose a duty upon the attorneys to take complaints brought to them, and to file those complaints with a magistrate or, for misdemeanors, to prepare an information and file it with the proper court. No provision has been made for complaints to be refused until an investigation is done. The meaning for governmental record intended here is that given by Penal Code Section 31.07(2)(A).

The refusal of the District Attorney’s office to accept complaints is irregular procedure. That this is the usual practice in the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney Office is shown in my included affidavit and paragraph 5 of the affidavit of attorney Steven A. Leyh. See Exhibit C. That this practice is unwritten and not kept as a record in the office is indicated by the response to a Public Information Act request. See Exhibit D. The statements and actions of Ms. Taylor are consistent with this irregular practice.

This practice appears to be designed to have complainants remove their complaints from the District Attorney’s office so that there are no records left with that office to show that it failed to perform a duty. This practice also provides a subtle means for the machinery of government to be used as a political tool to support privilege over law.

After Ms. Taylor left, I gathered up the complaints and took them home with me where I proceeded to prepare complaints against Ms. Taylor for tampering with a governmental record, official oppression, and criminal conspiracy. I took these complaints and filed them with the Galveston Police Department.

I talked by telephone several times with the police investigator who was assigned. Early on he indicated that he was waiting for a call from the District Attorney. I asked if he could give an estimation of how long this process might take. He replied that he expected it to be “A while. A long while.” Policy and procedure of the Galveston Police Department includes consulting with the District Attorney’s office about proceeding in an investigation. See Exhibit E. Records obtained from the police department indicate that a Special Prosecutor was assigned to this case. This Special Prosecutor never interviewed me. Upon advise from this Special Prosecutor, the

police closed the investigation. The police did not produce any records showing what is the regular office of this prosecutor or anything in writing from this prosecutor. See Exhibit F. Documents obtained from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals and the Texas Bar Association indicate that this special prosecutor is a former associate of the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney’s Office and has been in private practice since at least 2003. See Exhibit G

The Galveston County Criminal Justice Center, which houses the offices of the District Attorney, is a relatively new building with surveillance cameras throughout. The surveillance equipment is operated by personnel of the Galveston County Sheriff. I made several attempts to use the Public Information Act to obtain copies of video recordings that would show the acts of Ms. Taylor. The totality of responses from the Sheriff indicate that there are personnel who operate the video equipment, that the sheriff’s office does not have or maintain the requested recordings, it has no records of any agency or contractor that maintains the recordings, and it has no forms or procedures for obtaining copies of recordings. See Exhibit H. These responses are incredulous and appear to be, at best, violations of policy enacted by the Legislature as stated at Section 552.001, Government Code.

Eventually, I realized that the only evidence I had that the first set of complaints was received by the District Attorney’s office was the return receipt for certified mail, and that is no proof of the contents. I then prepared a new set of complaints and had them sworn and notarized. I enlisted the aid of two people to examine the complaints and then deliver them to the offices of the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney. These two people made affidavits to prove this. See Exhibit I. Copies of complaints identified in those affidavits are included herein. See Exhibit J. A response from the District Attorney’s office to an information request shows that these complaints have not been filed with a magistrate of the county. See Exhibit K.

The District Attorney’s failure to follow procedures as prescribed by Texas law resulted in the perpetrators being allowed to use the force and color of authority of the Galveston County Sheriff’s Office to unlawfully deprive me of property.

Because of the facts stated herein and supported by included affidavits and other documents, I allege that:

1. the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney’s Office has intentionally failed to perform duties imposed upon it by Texas law,

2. the failure of the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney’s Office to perform these duties is the result of a private unwritten but openly acknowledged policy of refusing to take criminal complaints from the public, which conflicts with the requirements of Articles 2.04 and 2.05 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

3. this policy of the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney’s Office has promoted the concealment of criminal allegations from the magistrates and grand juries of Galveston County,

Exhibit A Affidavit of Danny Royce Murphy.

Exhibit A

STATE OF TEXAS COUNTY OF HARRIS

§ §

Affidavit of Danny Royce Murphy

Before me, the undersigned notary, on this day, personally appeared Danny Royce

Murphy, a person whose identity is known to me. After I administered an oath to him, upon his oath, he said:

“My name is Danny Royce Murphy. I am capable of making this affidavit. The facts

stated in this affidavit are within my personal knowledge and are true and correct.

I was the plaintiff in the case, Danny Royce Murphy v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et. al., cause number 02CV0624 filed with the 405th District Court in May of 2002. This suit was filed to challenge the right of Countrywide to foreclose on my home.

During the suit, attorney for Countrywide brought an affidavit to court with a copy of the original note attached attesting to the note and stating that Countrywide was the owner and holder of the note. A copy of this affidavit and the note can be found in the files for this case as an attachment to Defendant’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment, file stamped 03 JAN 30.

During discovery I was provided copy of the note showing that it had been endorsed by an officer of Countrywide, and I obtained a copy of a letter showing that the note and letter had been sent to another entity within days of the date of making the note. In the deposition Denise Elvir, branch manager for Branch 151 of Countrywide, it is stated that the note and other documents are packaged together and sent to the bank, not Countrywide’s bank, which then wires money to Countrywide. Copy of the endorsed note, the letter, and the deposition are in the evidence file for this case.

On the basis of this information, I prepared numerous criminal complaints and mailed them by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the members of the grand jury in care of the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney. The mailing label named each individual grand juror and alternate. Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the return mail receipt.

This case went on appeal and upon return a writ of possession was issued. I filed for a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction on the basis, in part, of the fraudulent documents and criminal acts used in this case. The response, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., Defendants Response to Plaintiff’s Application for Stay of Execution and Defendant’s Motion to Dissole Temporary Restraining Order, filed on or about July 27, 2007, included an affidavit by attorney Steven A. Leyh. Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of that affidavit.

On August 31, 2007 I delivered a set of 9 new complaints into the hands of Assistant District Attorney Angela Taylor at the offices of the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney. She began to explain how the District Attorney’s office does not accept complaints and that the complaints need to go to the police or some other law enforcement agency for

investigation before they are taken up by the District Attorney’s office. I told Ms. Taylor that she could have the police investigate, and I began to leave. She tried to make me take the complaints back. I told her that the documents had been delivered to government and that they were then governmental records that I could not have. Ms. Taylor followed me to the door while insisting that I take the complaints back. When I opened the door, she tossed the complaints through the doorway and onto the floor of the hallway outside. Ms. Taylor then made herself unavailable by retreating back into the restricted area of the District Attorney’s office from which she had come.

I picked up the complaints and took them back home with me where I began preparing complaints against Ms. Taylor. I took all of the complaints to the Galveston Police Department. An officer met with me and took my statement and the complaints. He indicated that an investigator would be assigned the next day and that he would probably give me a phone call around noon the next day.

The next day I found a phone message from Sergeant John Owens informing me that he had been assigned to the case with my complaints, and he asked me to give him a call. I spoke with Sergeant Owens on September 7th. I asked if there was anything that I could do to help. He said that he had put a call into the District Attorney’s office about this case, and he was waiting for a call back. A later telephone message indicated that the investigation had been terminated.

Police reports concerning this case were acquired at a later time and indicate that a Special Prosecutor was assigned to this case. This prosecutor never contacted me. Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of a Public Information Act request dated July 15, 2008 made to the Galveston Police Department and the response that included the police reports of this case.

The police reports indicated the name of the Special Prosecutor to be Richard Branson. A search of the State Bar’s website found a Richard Branson with the same telephone number as one of those listed in the police reports. A general search on the name Richard Branson turned up a document on the website for the Fourteenth Court of Appeals indicating Richard H. Branson as having been counsel for the State in appeals of criminal cases from courts in Galveston County. Exhibit G consists of true and correct copies of these documents.

I attempted to obtain surveillance video recordings that would show Assistant District Attorney Angela Taylor throwing the complaints out the door of the district attorney’s office through the use of Public Information Act requests to the Galveston Sheriff’s Office. Exhibit H consists of true and correct copies of opinion OR2007-15325 from the Attorney General related to one of these requests and of a request dated April 25, 2008 and one dated July 10, 2008 along with relevant portions of the responses.

I then prepared a new set of complaints and had them sworn and notarized. I enlisted the aid of John Ramey and Mary Haley to examine the complaints and then deliver them to the offices of the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney. Exhibit I consists of true and correct copies of their affidavits.

Exhibit B Certified mail receipt showing delivery accepted at the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney’s office.

Exhibit B

Exhibit C Affidavit of attorney Steven A. Leyh, paragraph 5 of which is relevant to this complaint.

Exhibit C

Exhibit D Public Information Act request and response on behalf of the District Attorney’s office showing that that office has no records of a policy for receiving and processing criminal complaints. This is indicated in the last paragraph of a letter from the Galveston County Legal Department. Remainder of the response has been omitted as irrelevant to this complaint.

Exhibit D

Exhibit E Response from the Galveston Police Department to a Public Information Act request concerning its policies and procedures for taking complaints, investigating complaints, filing complaints, and preservation of records.

The response indicates that the police department does involve the District Attorney’s office in its investigations through number 10 under “Follow Up Investigation” under “Major Case Investigation”, next to last page of response, denoted by “*” toward right margin.

Exhibit E

Danny

*

Exhibit F Response from the Galveston Police Department to a Public Information Act request concerning complaints that it received against Angela Taylor. Involvement of a special prosecutor is indicated in the last two pages of this response.

Note that the Galveston Police Department has been requested to correct its records for this case that show a complaint of counterfeiting rather than criminal conspiracy.

Exhibit F

Exhibit G Information about the individual named as the Special Prosecutor in the police report of Exhibit F.

Information from the State Bar website............................................................................... Tab G-1

Information obtained from the State Bar of Texas website for Richard Hugh Branson showing a private practice with a telephone number matching that given by the Special Prosecutor to the police investigator and showing that the statutory profile was last certified on 08/07/2003.

Information from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals website................................................ Tab G-2

Information indicating that in 1999 Richard H. Branson acted as appellate counsel for the State in three criminal appeals taken from courts in Galveston County. Relevant entries designated by “*” toward right margin.

Exhibit G

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Richard Hugh Branson

Bar Card Number*: 02899200

Work Address PO Box 1534 League City, TX, 77574-1534

Work Phone Number (281) 316-2233

Primary Practice Location

LEAGUE CITY , Texas

Current Member Status

Eligible To Practice In Texas

License Information

State Bar Card Number*: 02899200Texas Licensed*: 06/01/1982

Practice Information

Firm: No information reported by attorneyFirm Size: SoloOccupation: Private Law PracticePrimary Practice Areas:

No information reported by attorney

Services Provided:No information reported by attorney

Assistance available in languages:No information reported by attorney

Courts of Admittance:Federal Courts of Admittance:No Federal Courts reported by attorneyOther Courts of Admittance:No information reported by attorneyOther States Where authorized to practice:Tennessee

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Education and Certification History

Law Schools:Law School Graduation Date Degree Earned

University Of Tennessee06/1975 Doctor of

Jurisprudence/Juris Doctor (J.D.)

Texas Board of Legal Specialization Certifications:No profile data on file for Texas Board of Legal Specialization Certification

Public Disciplinary History

Public Disciplinary History - Texas*:

*NOTE: Only Texas disciplinary sanctions within the past 10 years are displayed. For sanction information beyond 10 years, please contact the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel at (877)953-5535.

Public Disciplinary History - Other:No information reported by attorney

Statutory Profile Last Certified On: 08/07/2003

For information about a specific disciplinary sanction listed above, please call (877)953-5535.

The Texas Attorney Profile provides basic information about Attorneys licensed to practice in Texas. Attorney profile information isprovided as a public service by the State Bar of Texas as outlined in Section 81.115 of the Texas Government Code. The informationcontained herein is provided "as is" with no warranty of any kind, express or implied. Neither the State Bar of Texas, nor its Board ofDirectors, nor any employee thereof may be held responsible for the accuracy of the data. Much of the information has been provided bythe attorney and is required to be reviewed and updated by the attorney annually. The information noted with an asterisk (*) is provided bythe State Bar of Texas. Texas grievance/disciplinary information will not appear on the profile until a final determination is reached.Access to this site is authorized for public use only. Any unauthorized use of this system is subject to both civil and criminal penalties.This does not constitute a certified lawyer referral service.

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weekly http://www.14thcoa.courts.state.tx.us/Case/Opinions/102899/index.htm

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Opinions

The Court's opinions may be viewed, saved, or printed in Adobe Acrobat Reader® which is available free of charge at www.adobe.com

Click here to return to this week's opinions.

Opinions delivered on October 28, 1999:Civil

Published:14-97-00596-CV In Re: Estate of Garland Fredderick Wells, Deceased, Sametrius Wells, Individually and as Next

Friend of Denzel Wells, A Minor Child, and as Administratrix of the Estate of Garland FredderickWells v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.REVERSED AND REMANDEDOpinion by: Hon. Paul C. MurphyTrial court: Harris County Probate Court No. 2 (Hon. Mike Wood)For appellant: Thomas K. BrownFor appellee: Robert M. Schick and Demetrios Anaipakos

14-97-00820-CV W. M. Riddick

v. Quail Harbor Condominium Association, Inc.AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PARTOpinion by: Hon. D. Camille Hutson-Dunn (sitting by assignment)Trial court: 125th District Court (Hon. Don Wittig)For appellant: William S. Chesney, IIIFor appellee: Teri A. Walter and Craig Von Sternberg

14-97-01206-CV In the Matter of Jon Grafton Hawk, Sr., Deceased

AFFIRMEDOpinion by: Hon. Kem Thompson FrostTrial court: Brazoria County Court at Law No. 1 (Hon. Jerri Lee Mills)For appellant: Timothy A. Hootman and John E. RussoFor appellee: Jim Wiginton

14-98-00293-CV Glenda Davis Andress, et al.

v. MacGregor Medical Association, P.A., et al.AFFIRMEDOpinion by: Hon. J. Harvey HudsonTrial court: 190th District Court (Hon. John Devine)For appellant: Scott Rothenberg


2 of 9 8/6/2008 9:09 AM

For appellee: H. Kent Twining, John B. Wallace, and Linda J. Cole

14-98-00464-CV Roy Stallman, et al.

v. Katherine T. NewmanREVERSED AND RENDEREDOpinion by: Hon. J. Harvey HudsonTrial court: 2nd and 25th District Courts (Hon. Gus J. Strauss)For appellant: Randy M. ClappFor appellee: Sidney Levine

Unpublished: (Opinions not designated for publication have no precedential value and must not be cited as authority. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.7)

14-94-00368-CV Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation v. David M. McClung and Evelyn M. McClungDISMISSED (Per curiam)Trial court: 80th District Court (Hon. Scott Link)For appellant: John R. Hawkins, Mark A. Perry, Kevin F. Risley, and N. Terry Adams, Jr.For appellee: Steve Kherkher, Richard N. Countiss, and John E. Williams, Jr.

14-95-00606-CV Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation

v. Jim T. Cortinas, et ux.DISMISSED (Per curiam)Trial court: 151st District Court (Hon. Carolyn Garcia)For appellant: Kevin F. Risley, N. Terry Adams, Jr., and Roger E. PodestaFor appellee: Denman Heard and Richard N. Countiss

14-98-00113-CV Norma L. Kiefer, Robert Kiefer, and Mills, Shirley, Eckel & Bassett, L.L.P.

v. Continental Airlines, Inc.AFFIRMEDOpinion by: Hon. Joe L. Draughn (sitting by assignment)Trial court: 129th District Court (Hon. Patrick Mizel)For appellant: George W. Vie, IIIFor appellee: Winstol D. Carter, Jr., Richard B. Stilwell, and Reagan M. Brown

14-98-00148-CV Ronald Gene Nachtman

v. Myriam CareyAFFIRMEDOpinion by: Hon. J. Harvey HudsonTrial court: 309th District Court (Hon. Mary Ann Hicks)For appellant: Pros seFor appellee: Charles J. Michael

14-98-00322-CV Regina Hardy Smith

v. Chowdary Yalamanchili, et al.REVERSED AND REMANDED


3 of 9 8/6/2008 9:09 AM

Opinion by: Hon. Richard H. EdelmanTrial court: Harris County Civil Court at Law No. 3 (Hon. Lynn Bradshaw-Hull)For appellant: Marshall B. BrownFor appellee: Terry Lea Elizondo, Jay D. Hirsch, Tina Snelling, and Fred L. Shuchart

14-98-00429-CV Vicente R. Velasquez

v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage CorporationAFFIRMEDOpinion by: Hon. Richard H. EdelmanTrial court: 295th District Court (Hon. Tracy Christopher)For appellant: George M. BishopFor appellee: Steven A Leyh

14-98-00847-CV City of Houston

v. Joe AldacoVACATED AND DISMISSEDOpinion by: Hon. J. Harvey HudsonTrial court: 190th District Court (Hon. John P. Devine)For appellant: Rose Garcia MoriartyFor appellee: Richard H. Cobb

14-98-01163-CV Donald Eubanks

v. Hal McCabe, Independent Executor of the Estate of Ethel McCabe Trevitt, DeceasedDISMISSED (Per curiam)Trial court: Galveston Probate and County Court (Hon. Jerome Jones)For appellant: J. Michael FiegleinFor appellee: Grand Gealy and George W. Vie, III

14-98-01413-CV A.V.W., Inc.

v. C.E.K. de Centroamerica, S.A.AFFIRMEDOpinion by: Hon. Richard H. EdelmanTrial court: 269th District Court (Hon. John T. Wooldridge)For appellant: Russell J. RamseyFor appellee: Kenneth T. Fibich, Beverly Bell Godbey, and Stacy R. Obenhaus

14-99-00557-CV Ann Elizabeth Webb and Paul LeRoy Crist

v. HCM Claim Management Corporation and The Hertz CorporationDISMISSED (Per curiam)Trial court: Harris County Civil Court at Law No. 3 (Hon. Lynn Bradshaw-Hull)For appellant: Ann Elizabeth WebbFor appellee: Wesson H. Tribble and Mark A. Sanders

14-99-00694-CV Joan K. Galway

v. Ogilvie Products, Inc.


4 of 9 8/6/2008 9:09 AM

DISMISSED (Per curiam)Trial court: 281st District Court (Hon. Jane Bland)For appellant: Alden D. HolfordFor appellee: Carolyn Stamper Schultz

14-99-01092-CV Angela Ratisseau

v. Steven RatisseauDISMISSED (Per curiam)Trial court: 257th District Court (Hon. Linda Motheral)For appellant: Felicia Harris KyleFor appellee: Mary Louise Callier

14-99-01107-CV Magdalena Adamski Sullins

v. Fred SullinsDISMISSED (Per curiam)Trial court: 257th District CourtFor appellant: Pro seFor appellee: Chad Blasingame

Criminal

Published:

No published opinions were issued this week.

Unpublished: (Opinions not designated for publication have no precedential value and must not be cited as authority. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.7)

14-96-01470-CR Carlos Johan Mejia v. The State of TexasAFFIRMED (Per curiam)Trial court: 180th District Court (Hon. D. M. Stricklin)For appellant: Stephen MorrisFor appellee: Kimberly Aperauch Stelter

14-97-00515-CR Stephen Mark Triplett

v. The State of TexasAFFIRMEDOpinion by: Hon. Norman Lee (sitting by assignment)Trial court: 262nd District Court (Hon. Doug Shaver)For appellant: Belinda Johnson ChagnardFor appellee: Kelly Ann Smith

14-97-00658-CR John Albert Cook


5 of 9 8/6/2008 9:09 AM

v. The State of TexasAFFIRMED (Per curiam)Trial court: Fort Bend County Court at Law No. 2 (Hon. Walter S. McMeans)For appellant: Johnell WilliamsFor appellee: John F. Healey, Jr.

14-97-00857-CR Marlous Barnard Ferguson

v. The State of TexasAFFIRMEDOpinion by: Hon. Norman Lee (sitting by assignment)Trial court: 337th District Court (Hon. A. D. Azios)For appellant: Jay T. KarahanFor appellee: Carmen Castillo Mitchell

14-97-00887-CR Henry Dee Gilmore, III

v. The State of TexasAFFIRMEDMajority Opinion by: Hon. Richard H. EdelmanConcurring Opinion by: Don WittigTrial court: 122nd District Court (Hon. Henry G. Dalehite)For appellant: Linda J. NickelsonFor appellee: B. Warren Goodson, Jr. and Richard H. Branson

14-97-01062-CR Garrick Deon Beck

v. The State of TexasAFFIRMEDOpinion by: Hon. Joe L. Draughn (sitting by assignment)Trial court: 337th District Court (Hon. Jim Barr)For appellant: Mark A. GoldbergFor appellee: Kelly Ann Smith

14-97-01200-CR Willie James Johnson

v. The State of TexasAFFIRMEDOpinion by: Hon. Don WittigTrial court: 56th District Court (Hon. Norma Venso)For appellant: Robert A. MonksFor appellee: Richard H. Branson

14-97-01223-CR Mike Rivera Hernandez

v. The State of TexasAFFIRMEDOpinion by: Hon. Ross A. Sears (sitting by assignment)Trial court: 272nd District Court (Hon. John Delaney)For appellant: Bruno A. ShimekFor appellee: James W. Locke

Ray

*

Ray

*


6 of 9 8/6/2008 9:09 AM

14-97-01250-CR Aracelia Zamora

v. The State of TexasDISMISSED (Per curiam)Trial court: 208th District Court (Hon. Denise Collins)For appellant: Gary M. PollandFor appellee: Eric Kugler

14-97-01283-CR 14-97-01284-CR

Terry Bradley Dickson v. The State of TexasAFFIRMEDOpinion by: Hon. J. Harvey HudsonTrial court: Harris County Criminal Court at Law No. 4 (Hon. James Anderson)For appellant: Richard Haynes and Donald W. Rogers, Jr.For appellee: Alan Curry

14-97-01295-CR Sergio Escobar

v. The State of TexasAFFIRMEDOpinion by: Hon. Ross A. Sears (sitting by assignment)Trial court: 268th District Court (Hon. J. Bradley Smith)For appellant: J. Sidney CrowleyFor appellee: John Harrity, III

14-97-01369-CR Clayton John Guillory

v. The State of TexasAFFIRMEDOpinion by: Hon. D. Camille Hutson-Dunn (sitting by assignment)Trial court: 262nd District Court (Hon. Doug Shaver)For appellant: Jake PerretFor appellee: Dan McCrory

14-98-00060-CR Demetrio Lopez

v. The State of TexasAFFIRMEDOpinion by: Hon. Richard H. EdelmanTrial court: 208th District Court (Hon. Lee Duggan, Jr.)For appellant: Mary E. ConnFor appellee: Dan McCrory

14-98-00064-CR 14-98-00065-CR

Anthony Shiner v. The State of TexasAFFIRMED AS REFORMEDOpinion by: Hon. J. Harvey HudsonTrial court: 351st District Court (Hon. Mark Ellis)For appellant: Leora Teicher KahnFor appellee: Carmen Castillo Mitchell


7 of 9 8/6/2008 9:09 AM

14-98-00069-CR Michael Glenn Erskine

v. The State of TexasAFFIRMEDOpinion by: Hon. Don WittigTrial court: 212th District Court (Hon. H. G. Dalehite)For appellant: Terri Tipton HolderFor appellee: B. Warren Goodson, Jr. and Richard H. Branson

14-98-00737-CR Curtis Sheard

v. The State of TexasAFFIRMED (Per curiam)Trial court: 337th District Court (Hon. J. Hughes)For appellant: Pro seFor appellee: Calvin A. Hartmann

14-98-00895-CR 14-98-00896-CR

Edward George Lewis v. The State of TexasAFFIRMED (Per curiam)Trial court: 339th District Court (Hon. A. D. Azios)For appellant: Pro seFor appellee: Calvin A. Hartmann

14-99-00192-CR Juan Calvillo Barron

v. The State of TexasDISMISSED (Per curiam)Trial court: 240th District Court (Hon. Thomas R. Culver, III)For appellant: Gordon M. WhiteFor appellee: John Harrity, III

14-99-00353-CR Robert Clayton Swanson

v. The State of TexasAFFIRMED (Per curiam)Trial court: 337th District Court (Hon. Jon Hughes)For appellant: William W. BurgeFor appellee: Alan Curry

14-99-00586-CR 14-99-00587-CR

Karim Abdul Aziz v. The State of TexasAFFIRMED (Per curiam)Trial court: 177th District Court (Hon. Curt Steib and Hon. Carol Davies)For appellant: Murphy S. KlasingFor appellee: Calvin A. Hartmann

Ray

*


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14-99-00808-CR Richard Wright Jr. v. The State of TexasAFFIRMED (Per curiam)Trial court: 268th District Court (Hon. J. Bradley Smith)For appellant: Logene L. FosterFor appellee: Shelly Dawn Strimple


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Exhibit H Public Information Act requests aimed at obtaining copy of the surveillance video recording showing Assistant District Attorney Angela Taylor removing records from the District Attorney’s office.

Attorney General Open Records Opinion OR2007-15325.................................................. Tab H-1

Paragraph 2 shows that Sheriff’s office has represented to Attorney General that it does not maintain the surveillance videos itself.

Response on behalf of Sheriff for PIA request dated April 25, 2008 .................................. Tab H-2

Letter indicates that the Sheriff’s office has no records of any contractors or agencies that maintain surveillance video recordings of areas of the Galveston County Courthouse and that it has no forms or procedures for obtaining copies of surveillance video recordings made by its personnel. Portions of the response not relevant to this complaint are omitted.

Response on behalf of Sheriff for PIA request dated July 10, 2008.................................... Tab H-3

Letter indicates that the Sheriff’s office has no surveillance video recordings of areas of the County Galveston County Criminal Justice Center and that it has no records of any contractors or agencies that maintain surveillance video recordings of areas of the County Galveston County Criminal Justice Center.

Exhibit H

Exhibit I Affidavits showing that sixty-nine (69) criminal complaints were delivered to the Galveston County District Attorney’s office.

Affidavit of John Martin Ramey............................................................................................Tab I-1

Affidavit of Mary Haley ........................................................................................................Tab I-2

Note that subsequent to these affidavits being made, for technical reasons, complaints against George C. Hanks, Jr., Evelyn Keyes, Wayne J. Mallia, and Tim Taft were withdrawn.

Exhibit I

Exhibit J Copies of criminal complaints delivered to the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney and identified in the affidavits of Exhibit I, excepting complaints that have been withdrawn. These are only single complaints against various offenders arranged alphabetically, but each complaint describes all offenses that were being charged against that particular offender.

BARRETT, BURKE, WILSON, CASTLE, DAFFIN, & FRAPPIER, LLP........................ Tab J-1

Griffin Burke......................................................................................................................... Tab J-2

Frank T. Carmona ................................................................................................................. Tab J-3

COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC............................................................................. Tab J-4

Samuel Daffin, II .................................................................................................................. Tab J-5

Diane DeLoney ..................................................................................................................... Tab J-6

LEYH & PAINE LLP........................................................................................................... Tab J-7

Steven Leyh .......................................................................................................................... Tab J-8

Sylvia Loredo........................................................................................................................ Tab J-9

Angela Taylor ..................................................................................................................... Tab J-10

Exhibit J

BARRETT BURKE WILSON CASTLE DAFFIN & FRAPPIER, L.L.P.

(Charge 1 of 8) –– Misapplication of Fiduciary Property p. 1 of 8

IN THE NAME AND BY AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF TEXAS:

I, Danny Royce Murphy, being duly sworn, do state upon my oath that I have

personal knowledge and good reason to believe and do believe based upon the

following information, most of which is evident in records held by the District

Clerk of Galveston County in the file for cause number 02CV0624, Danny Royce

Murphy v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et. al.: In order to stop a planned non-judicial foreclosure action against my home by Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., I brought suit against Countrywide and the substitute trustee for the foreclosure action, Samuel Daffin, II, in the 405th District Court of Galveston County in May of 2002. Wayne J. Mallia was the regularly sitting judge in the 405th District Court.

Mr. Daffin was part of the law firm BARRETT BURKE WILSON CASTLE DAFFIN & FRAPPIER, L.L.P., which was attorney for COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC. for the foreclosure action that Countrywide was taking against my property. Documents filed into the court case indicate that Mr. Daffin was acting as agent for the law firm in the foreclosure action.

While this suit was ongoing, Samuel Daffin, II, conducted a supposed foreclosure sale of the property in the lobby of the Galveston County Courthouse on October 1, 2002. He signed a Substitute Trustee’s Deed and had it notarized on October 1, 2002 in Harris County, Texas. Mr. Daffin caused the Substitute Trustee’s Deed to be filed and recorded into the Official Public Records of Real Property of Galveston County on October 7, 2002. A copy of this Substitute Trustee’s Deed was attached to and used as evidence for Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to Possession, and this motion was filed with the District Clerk of Galveston County, file stamp 04 JAN –8.

This substitute trustee’s deed indicated that the property had been sold on October 1, 2002 to Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation for an amount of $60,300.00, that the Grantors were Danny R. Murphy and Sandra G. Cruz, and that the Current Beneficiary was Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. The body of the substitute trustee’s deed indicated that the Beneficiary had declared that Grantor defaulted performing the obligations of the Deed of Trust, that all duties and obligations of the Beneficiary were lawfully performed, and that the Substitute Trustee acted under the authority conferred by the Current Beneficiary and the Deed of Trust.

Mr. Daffin knew that material facts stated in the Substitute Trustee’s Deed were false. The primary material fact falsely stated was that the Current Beneficiary was Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., and second that the Substitute Trustee acted under



the authority conferred by the Current Beneficiary and the Deed of Trust.

During the discovery process of the lawsuit, I was provided copies of documents that showed that, years prior to the foreclosure sale, Countrywide had given up ownership and possession of the note upon which it supposedly based its right to foreclose to recover amounts still owed to it. Mr. Daffin’s attorneys, LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P., provided me with a copy of the note displaying an endorsement signed by an officer of Countrywide and a letter dated 12/18/97 stating that the Note was enclosed with the letter and that the original note had been “endorsed in blank”. This letter was addressed to First Chicago National Processing Corporation in Pasadena, California. In endorsing the note and delivering possession of it to another, Countrywide gave up all rights it had in the note and deed of trust.

Mr. Daffin was an attorney and, as such, is presumed to have been knowledgeable in the law, and he regularly acted in the capacity of a substitute trustee in foreclosure actions. Since Countrywide had given up the note years prior to Mr. Daffin conducting the foreclosure sale and making the Substitute Trustee’s Deed, Mr. Daffin could not possibly have found documentation sufficient to support his statement that Countrywide was the Current Beneficiary or that he had conducted the foreclosure sale “by authority conferred by the Current Beneficiary and by the Deed of Trust.”

Mr. Daffin had a fiduciary responsibility as a trustee to insure that the property entrusted to him was dealt with in the manner prescribed by the Deed of Trust. The acts of Mr. Daffin were done in a manner contrary to the agreed Deed of Trust, and he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly misapplied the property that he held as a fiduciary in a manner that involved substantial risk of loss to the owner of the property, in violation of Texas Penal Code §32.45:

§32.45 Misapplication of Fiduciary Property or Property of Financial Institution

(a) For purposes of this section:

(1) "Fiduciary" includes:

(A) trustee, guardian, administrator, executor, conservator, and receiver;

. . .

(2) "Misapply" means deal with property contrary to:

(A) an agreement under which the fiduciary holds the property; or

(B) a law prescribing the custody or disposition of the property.

(b) A person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly misapplies property he holds as a fiduciary or property of a financial institution in a manner that involves substantial risk of loss to the owner of the property or to a person for whose benefit the property is held.



(c) An offense under this section is:

(1) Class C misdemeanor if the value of the property misapplied is less than $20;

. . .

(5) felony of the third degree if the value of the property misapplied is $20,000 or more but less than $100,000;

. . .

Mr. Daffin was a defendant in the lawsuit and knew that the lawsuit was an official proceeding in progress, and he made the Substitute Trustee’s Deed with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the lawsuit in violation of Texas Penal Code §37.09:

§37.09 Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence

(a) A person commits an offense if, knowing that an investigation or official proceeding is pending or in progress, he:

(1) alters, destroys, or conceals any record, document, or thing with intent to impair its verity, legibility, or availability as evidence in the investigation or official proceeding; or

(2) makes, presents, or uses any record, document, or thing with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the investigation or official proceeding.

(b) This section shall not apply if the record, document, or thing concealed is privileged or is the work product of the parties to the investigation or official proceeding.

(c) An offense under Subsection (a) or Subsection (d)(1) is a felony of the third degree. An offense under Subsection (d)(2) is a Class A misdemeanor.

(d) …[Not applicable to this complaint]

Mr. Daffin made the Substitute Trustee’s Deed, with knowledge of its falsity, and caused it to be filed and recorded into the governmental records held by the County Clerk of Galveston County in violation of Section 37.10 Texas Penal Code:

§37.10. Tampering With Governmental Record.



(a) A person commits an offense if he:

(1) knowingly makes a false entry in, or false alteration of, a governmental record;

(2) makes, presents, or uses any record, document, or thing with knowledge of its falsity and with intent that it be taken as a genuine governmental record;

(3) intentionally destroys, conceals, removes, or otherwise impairs the verity, legibility, or availability of a governmental record;

(4) possesses, sells, or offers to sell a governmental record or a blank governmental record form with intent that it be used unlawfully;

(5) makes, presents, or uses a governmental record with knowledge of its falsity;

…

Mr. Daffin carried out his acts of misapplication of fiduciary property, fabrication of evidence, and tampering with governmental records in agreement with and with aid of others in violation of Texas Penal Code §15.02:

§15.02. Criminal Conspiracy.

(a) A person commits criminal conspiracy if, with intent that a felony be committed:

(1) he agrees with one or more persons that they or one or more of them engage in conduct that would constitute the offense; and

(2) he or one or more of them performs an overt act in pursuance of the agreement.

(b) An agreement constituting a conspiracy may be inferred from acts of the parties

. . .

Mr. Daffin’s choice to join with others in the furtherance of the conspiracy makes him culpable for his own acts and those of his co-conspirators,

§7.01 Texas Penal Code, Parties to offenses:



(a) A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both.

(b) Each party to an offense may be charged with commission of the offense.

(c) All traditional distinctions between accomplices and principals are abolished by this section, and each party to an offense maybe charged and convicted without alleging that he acted as a principal or accomplice.

§7.02 Texas Penal Code, Criminal responsibility for conduct of another:

(a) A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if:

(1) having a legal duty to prevent commission of the offense and action with intent to promote or assist its commission, he fails to make a reasonable effort to prevent commission of the offense.

(2) If, in the attempt to carry a conspiracy to commit one felony, another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, though having no intent to commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy.

Also employed by the law firm and acting as an agent for the law firm during the course of foreclosure action was Sylvia Loredo, whose unlawful acts are described hereinafter.

While the lawsuit was ongoing and in connection with a foreclosure sale of the property, Sylvia Loredo signed an Affidavit of Mortgagee and had it notarized on October 1, 2002 in Dallas County, Texas. Ms. Loredo caused the Affidavit of Mortgagee to be filed and recorded into the Official Public Records of Real Property of Galveston County on October 7, 2002. A copy of this Affidavit of Mortgagee was attached to and used as evidence for Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to Possession, and this motion was filed with the District Clerk of Galveston County, file stamp 04 JAN –8.

This Affidavit of Mortgagee indicated that Ms. Loredo was an employee of BARRETT BURKE WILSON CASTLE DAFFIN & FRAPPIER, L.L.P., attorney for COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., that the affidavit was made with respect to the foreclosure of that certain Deed of Trust dated December 16, 1997, recorded CLERK’S FILE NO. 9748599, Real Property Records, GALVESTON County, TEXAS … to secure payment of a Note to COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., that COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC. was the holder of the debt or agent for the holder of the indebtedness secured by the Deed of Trust, and



“At the instructions and on behalf of the holder of the debt or its agent” certain acts were performed as required by law.

Ms. Loredo knew that she did not know certain material facts stated in the affidavit were true. The primary material fact falsely stated and without any reservation or qualification was that Countrywide was the holder of the debt or agent for the holder of the indebtedness secured by the Deed of Trust.

During the discovery process of the lawsuit, I was provided copies of documents that showed that, years prior to the foreclosure sale, Countrywide had given up ownership and possession of the note upon which it supposedly based its right to foreclose to recover amounts still owed to it. At the offices of LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P., I was provided with a copy of the note displaying an endorsement signed by an officer of Countrywide and a letter dated 12/18/97 stating that the Note was enclosed with the letter and that the original note had been “endorsed in blank”. This letter was addressed to First Chicago National Processing Corporation in Pasadena, California. A copy of the endorsed note and letter are attached to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, file stamped 02 NOV 19. In endorsing the note and delivering possession of it to another, Countrywide gave up all rights it had in the note and deed of trust.

During the course of the Lawsuit, Countrywide never provided any documentation or even an assertion to show that it was acting as an agent for any other entity.

Ms. Loredo could not possibly have received any documentation sufficient to show the truthfulness of statements that she made in the Affidavit of Mortgagee.

False statements of material facts knowingly made by Ms. Loredo in the Affidavit of Mortgagee were made in connection with the official proceeding of the foreclosure sale and constitute a violation of Section 37.03 Texas Penal Code:

§37.02 Perjury (a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to deceive and with knowledge

of the statement's meaning:

(1) he makes a false statement under oath or swears to the truth of a false statement previously made and the statement is required or authorized by law to be made under oath; or

(2) he makes a false unsworn declaration under Chapter 132, Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

(b) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

§37.03 Aggravated Perjury

(a) A person commits an offense if he commits perjury as defined in Section 37.02, and the false statement:



(1) is made during or in connection with an official proceeding; and

(2) is material.

(b) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree.

Ms. Loredo stated in the affidavit that the affidavit was being made with respect to the foreclosure that was taking place, showing that she knew that an official proceeding was pending or taking place. She made the Affidavit of Mortgagee with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the foreclosure process in violation of Section 37.09 Texas Penal Code, Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence, text included above.

Ms. Loredo made the Affidavit of Mortgagee, with knowledge of its falsity, and caused it to be filed and recorded into the governmental records held by the County Clerk of Galveston County in violation of Section 37.10 Texas Penal Code, Tampering With Governmental Record, text included above.

Ms. Loredo carried out her acts of aggravated purjury, fabrication of evidence, and tampering with governmental records in agreement with and with aid of others in violation of Section 15.02 Texas Penal Code, Criminal Conspiracy, text included above.

Documents filed into court indicate that BARRETT BURKE WILSON CASTLE DAFFIN & FRAPPIER, L.L.P. was the attorney for Countrywide in the foreclosure action. BARRETT BURKE WILSON CASTLE DAFFIN & FRAPPIER, L.L.P. is an association for the purposes of the Texas Penal Code,

§1.07 Definitions

(a) In this code:

…

(6) "Association" means a government or governmental subdivision or agency, trust, partnership, or two or more persons having a joint or common economic interest.

…

The acts of Mr. Daffin and Ms. Loredo were in the capacity of agent for the association,

§7.21 Definitions

In this subchapter:

Griffin Pivateau Burke (Charge 1 of 3) –– Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence p. 1 of 4






Murphy v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et. al.: In order to stop a planned non-judicial foreclosure action against my home by Countyrwide Home Loans, Inc., I brought suit against Countrywide and the substitute trustee for the foreclosure action, Samuel Daffin, II, in the 405th District Court of Galveston County in May of 2002. Wayne J. Mallia was the regularly sitting judge in the 405th District Court.

A hearing was set in the 405th District Court to be heard on March 20, 2003 on Defendant’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment, file stamped 03 JAN 30, which was prepared by Defendants’ attorney’s law firm, LAYH & PAYNE, L.L.P., and personally signed by attorney Griffin Pivateau Burke, Texas Bar No. 16055950. Attached to this motion was an affidavit by Diane DeLoney, in which she states that she was the “custodian of Countrywide’s records” and in which she states, without reservation or qualification, on the second page of the affidavit that “Countrywide is the Owner and Holder of the Note and Deed of Trust.”

More than two months prior to Defendant’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment being filed with the court, I filed with the court and provided a copy to Mr. Burke of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, file stamped 02 NOV 19. Attached to this petition was a copy of the Note referred to in the DeLoney affidavit displaying an endorsement signed by an officer of Countrywide and a letter dated 12/18/97 stating that the Note was enclosed with the letter and that the original note had been “endorsed in blank”. This letter was addressed to First Chicago National Processing Corporation in Pasadena, California. In endorsing the note and delivering possession of it to another entity, Countrywide gave up all rights it had in the note and deed of trust. The endorsed note and letter show that material statements made in the DeLoney affidavit were false. The copy of the note attached to the DeLoney affidavit does not show this endorsement, but the copy attached to petition filed on November 19, 2002 does.

Further I obtained copies of the endorsed note and this letter from the law firm of LAYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. I was personally handed the file containing these documents by Mr. Burke at the offices of LAYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. These documents were being provided to me as part of the discovery process of the


lawsuit.

Mr. Burke was provided actual knowledge of the falsity of the DeLoney affidavit. Copies of the endorsed note and the letter were readily available to him in files kept at the offices of LAYH & PAYNE, L.L.P.; he was provided another copy of the endorsed note and letter as attachments to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition; discrepancies with the copy of the note previously provided to the court by Mr. Burke were pointed out in paragraph 8 of this petition; and the significance of the endorsed note and letter were pointed out in paragraph 27 of this petition. In spite of this, Mr. Burke still brought the DeLoney affidavit to court again to use as evidence in asserting claims in the lawsuit.

Mr. Burke knew that the lawsuit was an official proceeding in progress, and he presented the DeLoney affidavit with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the lawsuit in violation of Texas Penal Code §37.09:








Having knowledge that his client lacked the original note, Mr. Burke knew that his client did not have a valid claim to collect on the note and foreclose on the security named in the deed of trust. Mr. Burke still filed a claim into court against the property and me knowing that the claim of his client was baseless, frivolous, and without authority and that he was therefore acting without authority when he filed Defendant’s First Amended Original Counterclaim, file stamped 02 DEC –9, in violation of Texas Penal Code §38.12:

§38.12 Barratry and Solicitation of Professional Employment


(a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to obtain an economic benefit the person:

(1) knowingly institutes a suit or claim that the person has not been authorized to pursue;

. . .

(f) An offense under Subsection (a) or (b) is a felony of the third degree.

… [Remainder of §38.12 not relevant to this complaint]

Mr. Burke carried out his acts of fabrication of evidence and barratry in agreement with and with aid of others in violation of Texas Penal Code §15.02:






Mr. Burke’s choice to join with others in the furtherance of the conspiracy makes him culpable for his own acts and those of his co-conspirators,





Frank T. Carmona (Charge 1 of 2) – Tampering With Governmental Record p. 1 of 3


I, Danny Royce Murphy, being duly sworn, do state upon my oath that I have personal

knowledge and good reason to believe and do believe based upon the following

information, most of which is evident in records held by the District Clerk of Galveston

County in the file for cause number 02CV0624, Danny Royce Murphy v. Countrywide

Home Loans, Inc., et. al.: I had filed suit in the 405th District Court to stop a non-judicial foreclosure action by Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. that was being taken against my home.

A hearing was set in the 405th District Court to be heard on March 20, 2003 on Defendant’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment. On March 20, 2003 Frank T. Carmona sat on the hearing as the Judge Presiding by assignment from Olen Underwood, Presiding Judge, Second Administrative Judicial Region. On that date Carmona signed a “Final Summary Judgment” granting the motion and effectively dismissing my lawsuit. This signed judgment was entered into the court records.

Subsequently, I requested the office of the Secretary of State of the State of Texas to provide me with a copy of the Statement of Officer and Oath of Office for Frank T. Carmona as any type of judge of the 405th District Court. In response, I obtained a letter under seal indicating that a diligent search of the records of that office had failed to find a Statement of Officer or an Oath of Office for Frank T. Carmona as Judge of the 405th Judicial District. Copy of this letter may be found in the court files as Exhibit 2 attached to Plaintiff’s Motion to Set Aside the Summary Judgment of March 20, 2003, file stamped 04 JAN 23.

Defendants placed into the court record what appears to be every Statement of Officer and Oath of Office subscribed by Frank T. Carmona and filed into the records of the Secretary of State as attachments to their Defendants’ Response to Motion for New Trial, file stamped 03 MAY 23. These records show that Carmona properly filed Statements of Officer and Oaths of Office for two terms as the regular district judge of the 122nd Judicial District. These records also show a Statement of Elected/Appointed Officer for Carmona for a position of Visiting Senior District Judge filed in the Office of the Secretary of State on JAN 6 2003, but there is no Oath of Office that covers his tenure with the 405th District Court.

Carmona served two terms as a district court judge and is presumed to be knowledgeable in the law. That Carmona properly subscribed to and filed the necessary Statements of Officer and Oaths of Office to assume the office of District Judge demonstrates that he was familiar with the documentation and procedures necessary to assume the office of judge.

Texas courts have long held that without taking the constitutionally required oath of office, a person can not become a judge, and he is without authority to act. This requirement was more recently upheld by the Texas Court of Appeals in the case of Prieto Bail Bonds v. State, 978 S.W.2d 574, (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

While appearing as a judge but knowing that he was acting without the authority of a judge,

Frank T. Carmona (Charge 1 of 2) – Tampering With Governmental Record p. 2 of 3

Carmona signed the “Final Summary Judgment” with an indication that he was the Judge Presiding giving the appearance of a valid governmental record and had the same entered into the court record, in violation of Section 37.10 Texas Penal Code:

Sec. 37.10. Tampering With Governmental Record. (a) A person commits an offense if he:

(1) knowingly makes a false entry in, or false alteration of, a governmental record; (2) makes, presents, or uses any record, document, or thing with knowledge of its

falsity and with intent that it be taken as a genuine governmental record; (3) intentionally destroys, conceals, removes, or otherwise impairs the verity,

legibility, or availability of a governmental record; … (5) makes, presents, or uses a governmental record with knowledge of its falsity; …

Carmona’s actions show intent that the judgment that he signed be regarded as a valid judgment with the effect of dismissing my suit against the defendants and denying me the protection of the court against an unlawful dispossession of my home and impeding my right to access the court. Such actions constitute the offense of Official Oppression in violation of Texas Penal Code Section 39.03,

39.03 Official Oppression:

(a) A public servant acting under color of his office or employment commits an offense if he: (1) intentionally subjects another to mistreatment or to arrest, detention, search,

seizure, dispossession, assessment, or lien that he knows is unlawful; (2) Intentionally denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of any

right, privilege, power, or immunity, knowing his conduct is unlawful; or (3) Intentionally subjects another to sexual harassment

(b) For purposes of this section, a public servants acts under color of his office or employment if he acts or purports to act in an official capacity or takes advantage of such actual or purported capacity.

(c) (defines “sexual harassment”) (d) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

I charge that heretofore, and before the making and filing of this complaint, on or about the

20th day of March 2003 and within the boundaries of Galveston County, Texas,

COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC

(Charge 1 of 19) –– Securing Execution of Document by Deception p. 1 of 14






Murphy v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et. al.: In 1997 I applied for a loan with Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. to buy my home. A note, deed of trust and other papers were signed at the closing on December 16, 1997. The first monthly payment was scheduled for February of 1998. I made the first payment, and I continued to be billed for and make monthly payments for several years.

Some time during the year 2000, I began to learn of certain practices of banks and other commercial lenders that indicate that there are significant aspects of the loan agreement and transaction that is not revealed to borrowers.

I paid a monthly payment to Countrywide in December of 2001, and in January of 2002, I began to make inquiries to Countrywide concerning the loan that I had been paying and the location of the note. Informative answers were not forthcoming, so I ceased making further payments until I had located the note and verified that Countrywide was the holder of the note and the proper party to be paid.

I continued to make requests to Countrywide, and it continued to provide uninformative and evasive answers. Countrywide began to send me notices in preparation for foreclosure proceedings. Eventually a foreclosure sale was set for the first Tuesday of June of 2002.

To stop the foreclosure sale, I brought suit in the 405th District Court of Galveston County against Countrywide and Samuel Daffin, II, the substitute trustee for the foreclosure action. During the course of the lawsuit, I obtained a copy of the note and a letter that showed that Countrywide had signed away its rights in the note and given possession and ownership of the note to another entity two days after the note was signed.

In the early stages of the lawsuit, attorney for Countrywide brought in an affidavit from the Keeper of Records for Countrywide to show that Countrywide was the owner of the note. This affidavit had a copy of the note attached to it, and the affidavit identified the copy as a true and correct copy of the note.

During the discovery process of the lawsuit, attorney for Countrywide provided me with copies of documents that I had requested from Countrywide. Among those



was a copy of the note displaying an endorsement signed by an officer of Countrywide and a letter dated 12/18/97 stating that the Note was enclosed with the letter and that the original note had been “endorsed in blank”. This letter was addressed to First Chicago National Processing Corporation in Pasadena, California. In endorsing the note and delivering possession of it to another, Countrywide gave up all rights it had in the note and deed of trust.

Copy of the note originally brought to court by Countrywide may be found as an attachment to Defendant’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment, file stamped 03 JAN 30. A copy of the endorsed note and letter may be found as attachments to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, file stamped 02 NOV 19.

Countrywide’s own records showed that it had given up ownership and possession of the note two days after the note was made. Countrywide still sent bills to me through the United States Postal Service for payments on this note every month. Countrywide did not let me know that it had disposed of the note and no longer had possession, ownership or interest in the note. Sending bills to me was a misrepresentation of a debt owed to it. Because of this deception, I paid the monthly billing 47 times by execution of a check, money order, authorization for credit card payment, or by some other means of payment for total payment of more than $30,000 and less than $40,000. I would not have made these payments except for this deception. Countrywide’s actions in this matter constituted a criminal episode in violation of Texas Penal Code §32.46:

§32.46 Securing Execution of Document by Deception

(a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to defraud or harm any person, he, by

deception:

(1) causes another to sign or execute any document affecting property or service

or the pecuniary interest of any person; or

…

(b) An offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a:

…

(5) felony of the third degree if the value of the property, service, or pecuniary

interest is $20,000 or more but less than $100,000;

During the course of the lawsuit various individuals and law firms took actions on behalf of Countrywide. These actions indicate that these individuals and law firms had duties of such a level of responsibility that these individuals and law firms were high managerial agents of Countrywide,

§7.21 Definitions



In this subchapter:

(1) "Agent" means a director, officer, employee, or other person authorized to act in behalf of a corporation or association.

(2) "High managerial agent" means:

(A) a partner in a partnership;

(B) an officer of a corporation or association;

(C) an agent of a corporation or association who has duties of such responsibility that his conduct reasonably may be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation or association.

Countrywide is responsible for the offenses committed by it agents on its behalf,

§7.22 Criminal Responsibility of Corporation or Association

(a) If conduct constituting an offense is performed by an agent acting in behalf of a corporation or association and within the scope of his office or employment, the corporation or association is criminally responsible for an offense defined:

(1) in this code where corporations and associations are made subject thereto;

. . .

The following concerns the acts of the individuals Diane DeLoney, Griffin Pivateau Burke, Steven A. Leyh, Samuel Daffin, II, Sylvia Loredo, and the law firms LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. and BARRETT BURKE WILSON CASTLE DAFFIN & FRAPPIER, L.L.P. in the capacity of agents for Countrywide.

________________________________________________

A hearing was set in the 405th District Court to be heard on March 20, 2003 on Defendant’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment, file stamped 03 JAN 30. Attached to this motion was an affidavit by Diane DeLoney, in which she states that she was the “custodian of Countrywide’s records” and in which she states, without reservation or qualification, on the second page of the affidavit that “Countrywide is the Owner and Holder of the Note and Deed of Trust.” She states that true and correct copies of the note and deed of trust are attached to the affidavit. The first paragraph of the affidavit indicates that DeLoney knew that the affidavit was going to be used with a motion for summary judgment for the defendants. The affidavit indicates that it was signed on August 29, 2002 and made in Collin County, Texas.

As part of the discovery process of the lawsuit, I was given access to a file of documents supplied by defendant Countrywide and being held by defendants’



attorneys at the offices of LAYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. From that file, I obtained a copy of the Note referred to in the DeLoney affidavit displaying an endorsement signed by an officer of Countrywide and a letter dated 12/18/97 stating that the Note was enclosed with the letter and that the original note had been “endorsed in blank”. This letter was addressed to First Chicago National Processing Corporation in Pasadena, California.

The copy of the Note attached to the DeLoney affidavit and identified by her as being a true and correct copy did not display this endorsement. In endorsing the note and delivering possession of it to another entity, Countrywide gave up all rights it had in the note and deed of trust; it ceased being “the Owner and Holder of the Note and Deed of Trust.” The copy of the endorsed note and letter show that material statements made in the DeLoney affidavit were false.

Statements made by DeLoney in the affidavit constitute a violation of Texas Penal Code §37.03:









(2) is material.


Ms. DeLoney knew, as indicated in her affidavit, that an official proceeding was in progress, and she made the affidavit with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the lawsuit in violation of Texas Penal Code §37.09:


(a) A person commits an offense if, knowing that an investigation or official



proceeding is pending or in progress, he:






Ms. DeLoney committed her acts of perjury and fabrication of evidence in agreement with others in violation of Texas Penal Code §15.02:






Ms. DeLoney’s choice to join with others in the furtherance of the conspiracy makes her culpable for her own acts and those of her co-conspirators,










(2) If, in the attempt to carry a conspiracy to commit one felony, another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, thought having no intent to commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy.

____________________________________________

Court documents indicate that defendants hired the law firm LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. as attorneys for defendants for this lawsuit. Individual attorneys from this law firm who signed documents filed into court and who appeared in court for the defendants were Griffin Pivateau Burke, Texas Bar No. 16055950, and Steven A. Leyh, Texas Bar No. 12318300.

A hearing was set in the 405th District Court to be heard on March 20, 2003 on Defendant’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment, file stamped 03 JAN 30, which was prepared by Defendants’ attorney’s law firm, LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P., and personally signed by attorney Griffin Pivateau Burke. Attached to this motion was an affidavit by Diane DeLoney, in which she states that she was the “custodian of Countrywide’s records” and in which she states, without reservation or qualification, on the second page of the affidavit that “Countrywide is the Owner and Holder of the Note and Deed of Trust.”

More than two months prior to Defendant’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment being filed with the court, I filed with the court and provided a copy to Mr. Burke of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, file stamped 02 NOV 19. Attached to this petition was a copy of the Note referred to in the DeLoney affidavit displaying an endorsement signed by an officer of Countrywide and a letter dated 12/18/97 stating that the Note was enclosed with the letter and that the original note had been “endorsed in blank”. This letter was addressed to First Chicago National Processing Corporation in Pasadena, California. In endorsing the note and delivering possession of it to another entity, Countrywide gave up all rights it had in the note and deed of trust. The endorsed note and letter show that material statements made in the DeLoney affidavit were false. The copy of the note attached to the DeLoney affidavit does not show this endorsement, but the copy attached to petition filed on November 19, 2002 does.

Further I obtained copies of the endorsed note and this letter from the law firm of



LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. I was personally handed the file containing these documents by Mr. Burke at the offices of LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. These documents were being provided to me as part of the discovery process of the lawsuit.

Mr. Burke was provided actual knowledge of the falsity of the DeLoney affidavit. Copies of the endorsed note and the letter were readily available to him in files kept at the offices of LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P.; he was provided another copy of the endorsed note and letter as attachments to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition; discrepancies with the copy of the note previously provided to the court by Mr. Burke were pointed out in paragraph 8 of this petition; and the significance of the endorsed note and letter were pointed out in paragraph 27 of this petition. In spite of this, Mr. Burke still brought the DeLoney affidavit to court again to use as evidence in asserting claims in the lawsuit.

Mr. Burke knew that the lawsuit was an official proceeding in progress, and he presented the DeLoney affidavit with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the lawsuit in violation of Texas Penal Code §37.09, described previously in this complaint as Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence.

Having knowledge that his client lacked the original note, Mr. Burke knew that his client did not have a valid claim to collect on the note and foreclose on the security named in the deed of trust. Mr. Burke still filed a claim into court against the property and me knowing that the claim of his client was baseless, frivolous, and without authority and that he was therefore acting without authority when he filed Defendant’s First Amended Original Counterclaim, file stamped 02 DEC –9, in violation of Texas Penal Code §38.12:




. . .



Mr. Burke carried out his acts of fabrication of evidence and barratry in agreement with and with aid of others in violation of Texas Penal Code §15.02, described previously in this complaint as Criminal Conspiracy.



Steven A. Leyh signed Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to Possession, and this motion was filed with the District Clerk of Galveston County, file stamp 04 JAN –8. Attached to this motion and referred to as summary judgment evidence on page 3 of the motion was a copy of a Substitute Trustee’s Deed.

This substitute trustee’s deed indicated that the property had been sold on October 1, 2002 to Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, that the Grantors were Danny R. Murphy and Sandra G. Cruz, and that the Current Beneficiary was Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. The body of the substitute trustee’s deed indicated that the Beneficiary had declared that Grantor defaulted performing the obligations of the Deed of Trust, that all duties and obligations of the Beneficiary were lawfully performed, and that the Substitute Trustee acted under the authority conferred by the Current Beneficiary and the Deed of Trust.

Also attached to Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to Possession was an Affidavit of Mortgagee. This affidavit stated that Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. was “the holder of the debt or agent for the holder of the indebtedness secured by the Deed of Trust”. This affidavit also stated that “at the instructions and on behalf of the holder of the debt or its agent” certain necessary actions had been taken.

Mr. Leyh knew that material facts stated in the Substitute Trustee’s Deed and the Affidavit of Mortgagee were false. The material facts falsely stated in these documents were that the Current Beneficiary was Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. and that Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. was “the holder of the debt or agent for the holder of the indebtedness secured by the Deed of Trust”.

Documents made available to Mr. Leyh and filed into court more than a year prior to his filing of Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to Possession provided him the knowledge that Countrywide had endorsed the note and transferred possession of it to another, and, thereby, it gave up all rights that it had in the note and the deed of trust.

More than year prior to Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to Possession being filed with the court, I filed with the court and provided a copy to another attorney in Mr. Leyh’s law firm of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, file stamped 02 NOV 19. Attached to this petition was a copy of the Note displaying an endorsement signed by an officer of Countrywide and a letter dated 12/18/97 stating that the Note was enclosed with the letter and that the original note had been “endorsed in blank”. This letter was addressed to First Chicago National Processing Corporation in Pasadena, California. In endorsing the note and delivering possession of it to another, Countrywide gave up all rights it had in the note and deed of trust. Copies of the Note previously submitted to court by Countrywide did not display this endorsement.

Additionally, I provided a copy of the endorsed note and the letter to Mr. Leyh as attachments to my Plaintiff’s Answer to Defendant’s Amended Motion for



Summary Judgment as to Possession, file stamped 04 JAN 23. Also, Mr. Leyh was present when a copy of the endorsed note and the letter was entered into evidence in open court on or about December 22, 2003. The issue of Countrywide’s lack of ownership of the note upon which it was taking action to collect was brought up to Mr. Leyh several times during the year 2003.

I obtained copies of the endorsed note and this letter from the law firm of LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. I was handed the file containing these documents at the offices of LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. These documents were being provided to me as part of the discovery process of the lawsuit.

Mr. Leyh was provided actual knowledge of the falsity of the Substitute Trustee’s Deed and the Affidavit of Mortgagee. Copies of the endorsed note and the letter were readily available to him in files kept at the offices of LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P.; he had available to him another copy of the endorsed note and letter as attachments to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition; discrepancies with the copy of the note previously provided to the court by Mr. Leyh’s law firm were pointed out in paragraph 8 of this petition; and the significance of the endorsed note and letter were pointed out in paragraph 27 of this petition. In spite of this, Mr. Leyh still brought the Substitute Trustee’s Deed and the Affidavit of Mortgagee to court to use as evidence in asserting claims in the lawsuit.

Mr. Leyh knew that the lawsuit was an official proceeding in progress, and he presented the Substitute Trustee’s Deed and the Affidavit of Mortgagee with knowledge of the falsity each and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the lawsuit in violation of Texas Penal Code §37.09, described previously in this complaint as Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence.

Mr. Leyh presented the Substitute Trustee’s Deed and the Affidavit of Mortgagee to court, with knowledge of the falsity each, as certified copies of governmental records held by the County Clerk of Galveston County in violation of Section 37.10 Texas Penal Code:

§37.10. Tampering With Governmental Record. (a) A person commits an offense if he:








… Having knowledge that his client lacked the original note, Mr. Leyh knew that his client did not have a valid claim to collect on the note and foreclose on the security named in the deed of trust. Mr. Leyh still filed a claim into court against the property and me knowing that the claim of his client was baseless, frivolous, and without authority and that he was therefore acting without authority when he filed Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to Possession in violation of Texas Penal Code §38.12, described previously in this complaint as Barratry.

Mr. Leyh carried out his acts of fabrication of evidence, tampering with governmental records, and barratry in agreement with and with aid of others in violation of Texas Penal Code §15.02, described previously in this complaint as Criminal Conspiracy.

____________________________________________

Mr. Daffin was part of the law firm BARRETT BURKE WILSON CASTLE DAFFIN & FRAPPIER, L.L.P., which was attorney for COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC. for the foreclosure action that Countrywide was taking against my property. Documents filed into the court case indicate that Mr. Daffin was acting as agent for the law firm in the foreclosure action.

Samuel Daffin, II, conducted a foreclosure sale of the property in the lobby of the Galveston County Courthouse on October 1, 2002. He signed a Substitute Trustee’s Deed and had it notarized on October 1, 2002 in Harris County, Texas. Mr. Daffin caused the Substitute Trustee’s Deed to be filed and recorded into the Official Public Records of Real Property of Galveston County on October 7, 2002. A copy of this Substitute Trustee’s Deed was attached to and used as evidence for Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to Possession, and this motion was filed with the District Clerk of Galveston County, file stamp 04 JAN –8.


Mr. Daffin knew that material facts stated in the Substitute Trustee’s Deed were



false. The primary material fact falsely stated was that the Current Beneficiary was Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., and second that the Substitute Trustee acted under the authority conferred by the Current Beneficiary and the Deed of Trust.

During the discovery process of the lawsuit, I was provided copies of documents that showed that, years prior to the foreclosure sale, Countrywide had given up ownership and possession of the note upon which it supposedly based its right to foreclose to recover amounts still owed to it. Mr. Daffin’s attorneys, LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P., provided me with a copy of the note displaying an endorsement signed by an officer of Countrywide and a letter dated 12/18/97 stating that the Note was enclosed with the letter and that the original note had been “endorsed in blank”. This letter was addressed to First Chicago National Processing Corporation in Pasadena, California. A copy of this endorsed note and letter can be found as attachments to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition. In endorsing the note and delivering possession of it to another, Countrywide gave up all rights it had in the note and deed of trust.







. . .








(1) Class C misdemeanor if the value of the property misapplied is less than $20;

. . .


. . .

Mr. Daffin was a defendant in the lawsuit and knew that the lawsuit was an official proceeding in progress, and he made the Substitute Trustee’s Deed with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the lawsuit in violation of Texas Penal Code §37.09, described previously in this complaint as Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence.

Mr. Daffin made the Substitute Trustee’s Deed, with knowledge of its falsity, and caused it to be filed and recorded into the governmental records held by the County Clerk of Galveston County in violation of Section 37.10 Texas Penal Code, described previously in this complaint as Tampering With Governmental Record.

Mr. Daffin carried out his acts of misapplication of fiduciary property, fabrication of evidence, and tampering with governmental records in agreement with and with aid of others in violation of Texas Penal Code §15.02, described previously in this complaint as Criminal Conspiracy.

Also employed by the law firm of the law firm BARRETT BURKE WILSON CASTLE DAFFIN & FRAPPIER, L.L.P., and acting as an agent for the law firm during the course of foreclosure action was Sylvia Loredo.

While the lawsuit was ongoing and in connection with a foreclosure sale of the property, Sylvia Loredo signed an Affidavit of Mortgagee and had it notarized on October 1, 2002 in Dallas County, Texas. Ms. Loredo caused the Affidavit of Mortgagee to be filed and recorded into the Official Public Records of Real Property of Galveston County on October 7, 2002. A copy of this Affidavit of Mortgagee was attached to and used as evidence for Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to Possession, and this motion was filed with the District Clerk of Galveston County, file stamp 04 JAN –8.



This Affidavit of Mortgagee indicated that Ms. Loredo was an employee of BARRETT BURKE WILSON CASTLE DAFFIN & FRAPPIER, L.L.P., attorney for COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., that the affidavit was made with respect to the foreclosure of that certain Deed of Trust dated December 16, 1997, recorded CLERK’S FILE NO. 9748599, Real Property Records, GALVESTON County, TEXAS … to secure payment of a Note to COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., that COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC. was the holder of the debt or agent for the holder of the indebtedness secured by the Deed of Trust, and “At the instructions and on behalf of the holder of the debt or its agent” certain acts were performed as required by law.


During the discovery process of the lawsuit, I was provided copies of documents that showed that, years prior to the foreclosure sale, Countrywide had given up ownership and possession of the note upon which it supposedly based its right to foreclose to recover amounts still owed to it. At the offices of LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P., I was provided with a copy of the note displaying an endorsement signed by an officer of Countrywide and a letter dated 12/18/97 stating that the Note was enclosed with the letter and that the original note had been “endorsed in blank”. This letter was addressed to First Chicago National Processing Corporation in Pasadena, California. A copy of the endorsed note and letter are attached to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, file stamped 02 NOV 19. In endorsing the note and delivering possession of it to another, Countrywide gave up all rights it had in the note and deed of trust.



False statements of material facts knowingly made by Ms. Loredo in the Affidavit of Mortgagee were made in connection with the official proceeding of the foreclosure sale and constitute a violation of Section 37.03 Texas Penal Code, previously described in this complaint as Aggravated Perjury.

Ms. Loredo stated in the affidavit that the affidavit was being made with respect to the foreclosure that was taking place, showing that she knew that an official proceeding was pending or taking place. She made the Affidavit of Mortgagee with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the foreclosure process in violation of Section 37.09 Texas Penal Code, previously described in this complaint as Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence.

Ms. Loredo made the Affidavit of Mortgagee, with knowledge of its falsity, and

Samuel Daffin, II (Charge 1 of 4) –– Misapplication of Fiduciary Property p. 1 of 5







While this suit was ongoing, Samuel Daffin, II, conducted a supposed foreclosure sale of the property in the lobby of the Galveston County Courthouse on October 1, 2002. He signed a Substitute Trustee’s Deed and had it notarized on October 1, 2002 in Harris County, Texas. Mr. Daffin caused the Substitute Trustee’s Deed to be filed and recorded into the Official Public Records of Real Property of Galveston County on October 7, 2002. A copy of this Substitute Trustee’s Deed was attached to and used as evidence for Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to Possession, and this motion was filed with the District Clerk of Galveston County, file stamp 04 JAN –8.


Mr. Daffin knew that material facts stated in the Substitute Trustee’s Deed were false. The primary material fact falsely stated was that the Current Beneficiary was Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., and second that the Substitute Trustee acted under the authority conferred by the Current Beneficiary and the Deed of Trust.

During the discovery process of the lawsuit, I was provided copies of documents that showed that, years prior to the foreclosure sale, Countrywide had given up ownership and possession of the note upon which it supposedly based its right to foreclose to recover amounts still owed to it. Mr. Daffin’s attorneys, LEYH &


PAYNE, L.L.P., provided me with a copy of the note displaying an endorsement signed by an officer of Countrywide and a letter dated 12/18/97 stating that the Note was enclosed with the letter and that the original note had been “endorsed in blank”. This letter was addressed to First Chicago National Processing Corporation in Pasadena, California. A copy of this endorsed note and letter can be found as attachments to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, file stamped 02 NOV 19. In endorsing the note and delivering possession of it to another, Countrywide gave up all rights it had in the note and deed of trust.







. . .






(1) Class C misdemeanor if the value of the property misapplied is less than


$20;

. . .


. . .

Mr. Daffin was the substitute trustee for the foreclosure action that was taking place. He made the Substitute Trustee’s Deed with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the trustee’s sale in violation of Texas Penal Code §37.09. Additionally, Mr. Daffin was a defendant in the lawsuit and knew that the lawsuit was an official proceeding in progress, and he made the Substitute Trustee’s Deed with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the lawsuit in violation of Texas Penal Code §37.09:








Mr. Daffin made the Substitute Trustee’s Deed, with knowledge of its falsity, and caused it to be filed and recorded into the governmental records held by the County Clerk of Galveston County in violation of Section 37.10 Texas Penal Code:



(a) A person commits an offense if he:






…

Mr. Daffin carried out his acts of misapplication of fiduciary property, fabrication of evidence, and tampering with governmental records in agreement with and with aid of others in violation of Texas Penal Code §15.02:






. . .

Mr. Daffin’s choice to join with others in the furtherance of the conspiracy makes him culpable for his own acts and those of his co-conspirators,


(a) A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is

Diane Deloney (Charge 1 of 3) –– Aggravated Perjury p. 1 of 4







A hearing was set in the 405th District Court to be heard on March 20, 2003 on Defendant’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment, file stamped 03 JAN 30. Attached to this motion was an affidavit by Diane DeLoney, in which she states that she was the “custodian of Countrywide’s records” and in which she states, without reservation or qualification, on the second page of the affidavit that “Countrywide is the Owner and Holder of the Note and Deed of Trust.” She states that true and correct copies of the note and deed of trust are attached to the affidavit. The first paragraph of the affidavit indicates that DeLoney knew that the affidavit was going to be used with a motion for summary judgment for the defendants. The affidavit indicates that it was signed on August 29, 2002 and made in Collin County, Texas.

As part of the discovery process of the lawsuit, I was given access to a file of documents supplied by defendant Countrywide and being held by defendants’ attorneys at the offices of LAYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. From that file, I obtained a copy of the Note referred to in the DeLoney affidavit displaying an endorsement signed by an officer of Countrywide and a letter dated 12/18/97 stating that the Note was enclosed with the letter and that the original note had been “endorsed in blank”. This letter was addressed to First Chicago National Processing Corporation in Pasadena, California. A copy of this endorsed note and letter can be found as attachments to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, file stamped 02 NOV 19. In endorsing the note and delivering possession of it to another, Countrywide gave up all rights it had in the note and deed of trust.

The copy of the Note attached to the DeLoney affidavit and identified by her as being a true and correct copy did not display this endorsement. In endorsing the note and delivering possession of it to another entity, Countrywide gave up all rights it had in the note and deed of trust; it ceased being “the Owner and Holder of the


Note and Deed of Trust.” The copy of the endorsed note and letter show that material statements made in the DeLoney affidavit were false.

Statements made by DeLoney in the affidavit constitute a violation of Texas Penal Code §37.03:









(2) is material.


Ms. DeLoney knew, as indicated in her affidavit, that an official proceeding was in progress, and she made the affidavit with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the lawsuit in violation of Texas Penal Code §37.09:




(2) makes, presents, or uses any record, document, or thing with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the


investigation or official proceeding.




Ms. DeLoney committed her acts of perjury and fabrication of evidence in agreement with others in violation of Texas Penal Code §15.02:






Ms. DeLoney’s choice to join with others in the furtherance of the conspiracy makes her culpable for her own acts and those of her co-conspirators,






(a) A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the

LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. (Charge 1 of 7) ––Fabricating Physical Evidence #1 p. 1 of 8







Court documents indicate that defendants hired the law firm LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. as attorneys for defendants for this lawsuit. Individual attorneys from this law firm who signed documents filed into court and who appeared in court for the defendants were Griffin Pivateau Burke, Texas Bar No. 16055950, and Steven A. Leyh, Texas Bar No. 12318300.

A hearing was set in the 405th District Court to be heard on March 20, 2003 on Defendant’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment, file stamped 03 JAN 30, which was prepared by Defendants’ attorney’s law firm, LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P., and personally signed by attorney Griffin Pivateau Burke. Attached to this motion was an affidavit by Diane DeLoney, in which she states that she was the “custodian of Countrywide’s records” and in which she states, without reservation or qualification, on the second page of the affidavit that “Countrywide is the Owner and Holder of the Note and Deed of Trust.”

More than two months prior to Defendant’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment being filed with the court, I filed with the court and provided a copy to Mr. Burke of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, file stamped 02 NOV 19. Attached to this petition was a copy of the Note referred to in the DeLoney affidavit displaying an endorsement signed by an officer of Countrywide and a letter dated 12/18/97 stating that the Note was enclosed with the letter and that the original note had been “endorsed in blank”. This letter was addressed to First Chicago National Processing Corporation in Pasadena, California. In endorsing the note and delivering possession of it to another entity, Countrywide gave up all rights it had in the note and deed of trust. The endorsed note and letter show that material statements made in the DeLoney affidavit were false. The copy of the note attached to the DeLoney affidavit does not show this endorsement, but the copy attached to


petition filed on November 19, 2002 does.

Further I obtained copies of the endorsed note and this letter from the law firm of LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. I was personally handed the file containing these documents by Mr. Burke at the offices of LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. These documents were being provided to me as part of the discovery process of the lawsuit.

Mr. Burke was provided actual knowledge of the falsity of the DeLoney affidavit. Copies of the endorsed note and the letter were readily available to him in files kept at the offices of LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P.; he was provided another copy of the endorsed note and letter as attachments to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition; discrepancies with the copy of the note previously provided to the court by Mr. Burke were pointed out in paragraph 8 of this petition; and the significance of the endorsed note and letter were pointed out in paragraph 27 of this petition. In spite of this, Mr. Burke still brought the DeLoney affidavit to court again to use as evidence in asserting claims in the lawsuit.

Mr. Burke knew that the lawsuit was an official proceeding in progress, and he presented the DeLoney affidavit with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the lawsuit in violation of Texas Penal Code §37.09:








Having knowledge that his client lacked the original note, Mr. Burke knew that his client did not have a valid claim to collect on the note and foreclose on the security named in the deed of trust. Mr. Burke still filed a claim into court against the


property and me knowing that the claim of his client was baseless, frivolous, and without authority and that he was therefore acting without authority when he filed Defendant’s First Amended Original Counterclaim, file stamped 02 DEC –9, in violation of Texas Penal Code §38.12:




. . .



Mr. Burke carried out his acts of fabrication of evidence and barratry in agreement with and with aid of others in violation of Texas Penal Code §15.02:






Mr. Burke’s choice to join with others in the furtherance of the conspiracy makes him culpable for his own acts and those of his co-conspirators,


(a) A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is


criminally responsible, or by both.






(2) If, in the attempt to carry a conspiracy to commit one felony, another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, thought having no intent to commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy.

Steven A. Leyh signed Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to Possession, and this motion was filed with the District Clerk of Galveston County, file stamp 04 JAN –8. Attached to this motion and referred to as summary judgment evidence on page 3 of the motion was a copy of a Substitute Trustee’s Deed.




Mr. Leyh knew that material facts stated in the Substitute Trustee’s Deed and the Affidavit of Mortgagee were false. The material facts falsely stated in these documents were that the Current Beneficiary was Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. and that Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. was “the holder of the debt or agent for the holder of the indebtedness secured by the Deed of Trust”.

Documents made available to Mr. Leyh and filed into court more than a year prior to his filing of Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to Possession provided him the knowledge that Countrywide had endorsed the note and transferred possession of it to another, and, thereby, it gave up all rights that it had in the note and the deed of trust.

More than year prior to Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to Possession being filed with the court, I filed with the court and provided a copy to another attorney in Mr. Leyh’s law firm of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, file stamped 02 NOV 19. Attached to this petition was a copy of the Note displaying an endorsement signed by an officer of Countrywide and a letter dated 12/18/97 stating that the Note was enclosed with the letter and that the original note had been “endorsed in blank”. This letter was addressed to First Chicago National Processing Corporation in Pasadena, California. In endorsing the note and delivering possession of it to another, Countrywide gave up all rights it had in the note and deed of trust. Copies of the Note previously submitted to court by Countrywide did not display this endorsement.

Additionally, I provided a copy of the endorsed note and the letter to Mr. Leyh as attachments to my Plaintiff’s Answer to Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to Possession, file stamped 04 JAN 23. Also, Mr. Leyh was present when a copy of the endorsed note and the letter was entered into evidence in open court on or about December 22, 2003. The issue of Countrywide’s lack of ownership of the note upon which it was taking action to collect was brought up to Mr. Leyh several times during the year 2003.

I obtained copies of the endorsed note and this letter from the law firm of LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. I was handed the file containing these documents at the offices of LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. These documents were being provided to me as part of the discovery process of the lawsuit.

Mr. Leyh was provided actual knowledge of the falsity of the Substitute Trustee’s Deed and the Affidavit of Mortgagee. Copies of the endorsed note and the letter were readily available to him in files kept at the offices of LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P.; he had available to him another copy of the endorsed note and letter as attachments to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition; discrepancies with the copy of the note previously provided to the court by Mr. Leyh’s law firm were pointed out in paragraph 8 of this petition; and the significance of the endorsed note and letter were pointed out in paragraph 27 of this petition. In spite of this, Mr. Leyh still brought the Substitute Trustee’s Deed and the Affidavit of Mortgagee to court to use as evidence in asserting claims in the lawsuit.


Mr. Leyh knew that the lawsuit was an official proceeding in progress, and he presented the Substitute Trustee’s Deed and the Affidavit of Mortgagee with knowledge of the falsity each and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the lawsuit in violation of Texas Penal Code §37.09, which makes tampering with or fabricating physical evidence an offense.








…

Having knowledge that his client lacked the original note, Mr. Leyh knew that his client did not have a valid claim to collect on the note and foreclose on the security named in the deed of trust. Mr. Leyh still filed a claim into court against the property and me knowing that the claim of his client was baseless, frivolous, and without authority and that he was therefore acting without authority when he filed Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to Possession in violation of Texas Penal Code §38.12, which makes Barratry an offense.

Mr. Leyh carried out his acts of fabrication of evidence, tampering with


governmental records, and barratry in agreement with and with aid of others in violation of Texas Penal Code §15.02, which makes Criminal Conspiracy an offense.

Court documents indicate that Griffin Pivateau Burke and Steven A. Leyh were acting in behalf of LEYH & PAYNE, L. L. P. LEYH & PAYNE, L. L. P. is an association for the purposes of the Texas Penal Code,

§1.07 Definitions

(a) In this code:

…

(6) "Association" means a government or governmental subdivision or agency, trust, partnership, or two or more persons having a joint or common economic interest.

…

The acts of Griffin Pivateau Burke and Steven A. Leyh were in the capacity of an agent for the association,

§7.21 Definitions

In this subchapter:

(1) "Agent" means a director, officer, employee, or other person authorized to act in behalf of a corporation or association.

. . .

As agents for the association, the association is criminally responsible for the offenses committed by Griffin Pivateau Burke and Steven A. Leyh,

§7.22 Criminal Responsibility of Corporation or Association

(a) If conduct constituting an offense is performed by an agent acting in behalf of a corporation or association and within the scope of his office or employment, the corporation or association is criminally responsible for an offense defined:

(1) in this code where corporations and associations are made subject

thereto;

. . .

Steven A. Leyh (Charge 1 of 4) –– Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence p. 1 of 6







Steven A. Leyh, Texas Bar No. 12318300, of LAYH & PAYNE, L.L.P., attorneys for defendants, signed Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to Possession, and this motion was filed with the District Clerk of Galveston County, file stamp 04 JAN –8. Attached to this motion and referred to as summary judgment evidence on page 3 of the motion was a copy of a Substitute Trustee’s Deed.



Mr. Leyh knew that material facts stated in the Substitute Trustee’s Deed and the Affidavit of Mortgagee were false. The material facts falsely stated in these documents were that the Current Beneficiary was Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. and that Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. was “the holder of the debt or agent for


the holder of the indebtedness secured by the Deed of Trust”.

Documents made available to Mr. Leyh and filed into court more than a year prior to his filing of Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to Possession provided him the knowledge that Countrywide had endorsed the note and transferred possession of it to another, and, thereby, it gave up all rights that it had in the note and the deed of trust. I filed with the court and provided a copy to another attorney in Mr. Leyh’s law firm of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, file stamped 02 NOV 19. Attached to this petition was a copy of the Note displaying an endorsement signed by an officer of Countrywide and a letter dated 12/18/97 stating that the Note was enclosed with the letter and that the original note had been “endorsed in blank”. This letter was addressed to First Chicago National Processing Corporation in Pasadena, California. In endorsing the note and delivering possession of it to another, Countrywide gave up all rights it had in the note and deed of trust. Copies of the Note previously submitted to court by Countrywide did not display this endorsement.

Additionally, I provided a copy of the endorsed note and the letter to Mr. Leyh as attachments to my Plaintiff’s Answer to Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to Possession, file stamped 04 JAN 23. Also, Mr. Leyh was present when a copy of the endorsed note and the letter was entered into evidence in open court on or about December 22, 2003. The issue of Countrywide’s lack of ownership of the note upon which it was taking action to collect was brought up to Mr. Leyh several times during the year 2003.

I obtained copies of the endorsed note and this letter from the law firm of LAYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. I was handed the file containing these documents at the offices of LAYH & PAYNE, L.L.P. These documents were provided to me as part of the discovery process of the lawsuit.

Mr. Leyh was provided actual knowledge of the falsity of the Substitute Trustee’s Deed and the Affidavit of Mortgagee. Copies of the endorsed note and the letter were readily available to him in files kept at the offices of LAYH & PAYNE, L.L.P.; he had available to him another copy of the endorsed note and letter as attachments to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition; discrepancies with the copy of the note previously provided to the court by Mr. Leyh’s law firm were pointed out in paragraph 8 of this petition; and the significance of the endorsed note and letter were pointed out in paragraph 27 of this petition. In spite of this, Mr. Leyh still brought the Substitute Trustee’s Deed and the Affidavit of Mortgagee to court to use as evidence in asserting claims in the lawsuit.

Mr. Leyh knew that the lawsuit was an official proceeding in progress, and he presented the Substitute Trustee’s Deed and the Affidavit of Mortgagee with knowledge of the falsity each and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the lawsuit in violation of Texas Penal Code §37.09:



…

Having knowledge that his client lacked the original note, Mr. Leyh knew that his client did not have a valid claim to collect on the note and foreclose on the security named in the deed of trust. Mr. Leyh still filed a claim into court against the property and me knowing that the claim of his client was baseless, frivolous, and without authority and that he was therefore acting without authority when he filed Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to Possession in violation of Texas Penal Code §38.12:




. . .



Mr. Leyh carried out his acts of fabrication of evidence, tampering with governmental records, and barratry in agreement with and with aid of others in violation of Texas Penal Code §15.02:







Mr. Leyh’s choice to join with others in the furtherance of the conspiracy makes him culpable for his own acts and those of his co-conspirators,








(2) If, in the attempt to carry a conspiracy to commit one felony, another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, though having no intent to commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy.

I charge that heretofore, and before the making and filing of this complaint, on or

about January 8, 2004 and within the boundaries of Galveston County, Texas,

Steven A. Leyh did then and there unlawfully and willfully violate Section 37.09

Texas Penal Code, against the peace and dignity of the State.

Sylvia Loredo (Charge 1 of 4) –– Aggravated Perjury p. 1 of 5







While this suit was ongoing and in connection with a foreclosure sale of the property, Sylvia Loredo signed an Affidavit of Mortgagee and had it notarized on October 1, 2002 in Dallas County, Texas. Ms. Loredo caused the Affidavit of Mortgagee to be filed and recorded into the Official Public Records of Real Property of Galveston County on October 7, 2002. A copy of this Affidavit of Mortgagee was attached to and used as evidence for Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to Possession, and this motion was filed with the District Clerk of Galveston County, file stamp 04 JAN –8.

This Affidavit of Mortgagee indicated that Ms. Loredo was an employee of BARRETT BURKE WILSON CASTLE DAFFIN & FRAPPIER, L.L.P., attorney for COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., that the affidavit was made with respect to the foreclosure of that certain Deed of Trust dated December 16, 1997, recorded CLERK’S FILE NO. 9748599, Real Property Records, GALVESTON County, TEXAS … to secure payment of a Note to COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., that COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC. was the holder of the debt or agent for the holder of the indebtedness secured by the Deed of Trust, and “At the instructions and on behalf of the holder of the debt or its agent” certain acts were performed as required by law.


During the discovery process of the lawsuit, I was provided copies of documents that showed that, years prior to the foreclosure sale, Countrywide had given up ownership and possession of the note upon which it supposedly based its right to


foreclose to recover amounts still owed to it. At the offices of LEYH & PAYNE, L.L.P., I was provided with a copy of the note displaying an endorsement signed by an officer of Countrywide and a letter dated 12/18/97 stating that the Note was enclosed with the letter and that the original note had been “endorsed in blank”. This letter was addressed to First Chicago National Processing Corporation in Pasadena, California. A copy of the endorsed note and letter are attached to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, file stamped 02 NOV 19. In endorsing the note and delivering possession of it to another, Countrywide gave up all rights it had in the note and deed of trust.



False statements of material facts knowingly made by Ms. Loredo in the Affidavit of Mortgagee were made in connection with the official proceeding of the foreclosure sale and constitute a violation of Section 37.03 Texas Penal Code:









(2) is material.


Ms. Loredo stated in the affidavit that the affidavit was being made with respect to the foreclosure that was taking place, showing that she knew that an official


proceeding was pending or taking place. She made the Affidavit of Mortgagee with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the foreclosure process in violation of Section 37.09 Texas Penal Code:








Ms. Loredo made the Affidavit of Mortgagee, with knowledge of its falsity, and caused it to be filed and recorded into the governmental records held by the County Clerk of Galveston County in violation of Section 37.10 Texas Penal Code:





(4) possesses, sells, or offers to sell a governmental record or a blank


governmental record form with intent that it be used unlawfully;


…

Ms. Loredo carried out her acts of aggravated purjury, fabrication of evidence, and tampering with governmental records in agreement with and with aid of others in violation of Section 15.02 Texas Penal Code:






. . .

Ms. Loredo’s choice to join with others in the furtherance of the conspiracy makes her culpable for her own acts and those of her co-conspirators,







Angela Taylor (Charge 1 of 3) – Tampering With Governmental Record p. 1 of 5




following information: On August 31, 2007, I went the Galveston County Courthouse to deliver a set of criminal complaints to a magistrate. I went to the 10th District Court with Judge David E. Garner.

When I arrived at around 9:40 am, there were various criminal hearings taking place. I waited until those cases were finished. One of the court personnel, who I believe is the court reporter, came and asked my name and if I had a case in the court. I explained that I had some brief business needing the attention of the court. She relayed my information to the judge.

The judge came down from his bench and called me forward. I crossed the bar and met with him. He inquired about why I was there. I explained that I was a witness to crimes and that I was bringing criminal complaints to him as a magistrate. He began to give various reasons why he couldn’t take the complaint and offered to escort me to the District Attorney’s office to submit them. I agreed.

We went to the District Attorney’s office and after making our presence known one of the attorneys came out to meet us. Judge Garner explained the situation to her. I handed my folder of complaints to her, and Judge Garner left. I asked if she had a card. She said that she did not have a card with her. I asked her name again, and she replied Angela Taylor. I wrote her name down.

She began to explain how the District Attorney’s office does not accept complaints and that the complaints need to go to the police or some other law enforcement agency for investigation before they are taken up by the District Attorney’s office. However, I knew that such a policy is not consistent with the duties imposed on attorneys for the state by Articles 2.04 and 2.05 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure:

Art.2.04. [28] [34] [35] Shall draw complaints Upon complaint being made before a district or county attorney that an offense has been committed in his district or county, he shall reduce the complaint to writing and cause the same to be signed and sworn to by the complainant, and it shall be duly attested by said attorney. Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722. Art.2.05. [29] [35] [36] When complaint is made


If the offense be a misdemeanor, the attorney shall forthwith prepare an information based upon such complaint and file the same in the court having jurisdiction; provided, that in counties having no county attorney, misdemeanor cases may be tried upon complaint alone, without an information, provided, however, in counties having one or more criminal district courts an information must be filed in each misdemeanor case. If the offense be a felony, he shall forthwith file the complaint with a magistrate of the county. Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722.

I told Ms. Taylor that she could have the police investigate, and I began to leave. She tried to make me take the folder back. I told her that the documents had been delivered to government and that they were then governmental records that I could not have. Governmental record is defined in the Texas Penal Code at §37.01 (2):

(2) "Governmental record" means: (A) anything belonging to, received by, or kept by government

for information, including a court record; …

Ms. Taylor followed me to the door while insisting that I take the complaints back. When I opened the door, she tossed the folder with the criminal complaints through the doorway and onto the floor of the hallway outside. Ms. Taylor then made herself unavailable by retreating back into the restricted area of the District Attorney’s office from which she had come.

I picked up the folder and complaints and took them back home with me where I began preparing complaints against Ms. Taylor. I decided to take Ms. Taylor’s advice, and on September 4, 2007 I took all of the complaints to the Galveston Police Department. An officer met with me and took my statement and the complaints. He indicated that an investigator would be assigned the next day and that he would probably give me a phone call around noon the next day.

The next day I found a phone message from Sergeant John Owens informing me that he had been assigned to the case with my complaints, and he asked me to give him a call. I spoke with Sergeant Owens on September 7th. I asked if there was anything that I could do to help. He said that he had put a call into the DA’s office about this case, and he was waiting for a call back. I asked if he had any kind of estimate of how long things might take. He said a while, a long while.

This short conversation demonstrates the problem of district attorneys not strictly adhering to the duty imposed by Article 2.05 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The police investigation of these cases is paused for a phone call from the district attorney’s office, which may never come in this case. This policy of not accepting criminal complaints from the public in the district attorney’s office goes against the duties imposed by laws passed by the Texas Legislature, and it makes the district attorney’s office more susceptible to political pressure and other undue influence to use its “discretion” in proceeding with the prosecution of certain cases. The police


get blamed for not investigating while the police are waiting for the go ahead from the district attorney’s office. The Legislature’s enactment of Articles 2.04 and 2.05 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shows that no such discretion has been provided to Texas prosecutors.

The situation is created where there are no records in the district attorney’s office to indicate that that office failed to perform any duty. Generally, someone at the district attorney’s office convinces a complaining witness to take his or her records and statements some place else. In this particular case, though, I refused to do so, and Ms. Taylor took the only course of action that she could conceive at the moment to enforce the policy of the district attorney’s office and remove those records from the office.

Ms. Taylor’s position as an experienced Assistant Criminal District Attorney in the Felony Division of the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney’s office shows that she is thoroughly knowledgeable of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Penal Code. That she took such action with formal written sworn and notarized criminal complaints that she had just received shows that she violated Section 37.10 of the Texas Penal Code:


(a) A person commits an offense if he: …

(3) intentionally destroys, conceals, removes, or otherwise impairs the verity,

legibility, or availability of a governmental record; …

I had previously mailed sworn criminal complaints to the members of a grand jury in Galveston County in care of the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney in September of 2006. The certified mail receipt was returned to me showing that the package of complaints was received at the district attorney’s office. In July of 2007 I obtained a copy of an affidavit made by attorney Steven A. Leyh in which he indicated that the Section Chief of the Grand Jury was unaware of those criminal complaints. This indicated to me that someone in the Criminal District Attorney’s office was interfering with those criminal complaints being delivered to the grand jury; the probable purpose being to protect various public officials, attorneys and others accused in those complaints. Ms. Taylor’s actions showed that she had joined in this criminal conspiracy to conceal certain criminal complaints from the grand jury in violation of Texas Penal Code Sec. 15.02:


(a) A person commits criminal conspiracy if, with intent that a felony be


committed:




…

Ms. Taylor’s choice to join with others in the furtherance of the conspiracy makes her culpable for her own acts and those of her co-conspirators,

§7.01 Parties to Offenses (a) A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is

committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both.


(c) All traditional distinctions between accomplices and principals are

abolished by this section, and each party to an offense may be charged and convicted without alleging that he acted as a principal or accomplice.

§7.02 Criminal Responsibility for Conduct of Another


(1) acting with the kind of culpability required for the offense, he

causes or aids an innocent or nonresponsible person to engage in conduct prohibited by the definition of the offense;

(2) acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the

offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense; or

(3) having a legal duty to prevent commission of the offense and

acting with intent to promote or assist its commission, he fails to make a reasonable effort to prevent commission of the offense.

(b) If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony,

another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, though

Exhibit K Response made on behalf of the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney to a Public Information Request, which shows that the criminal complaints identified in Exhibit I have not been filed with a magistrate of the county.

Exhibit K

Complaint to AG

Documents

Transcript of Complaint to AG